SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126170. August 27, 1998.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMMA MAQUILAN, accused-
appellant.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J p:
Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing in violation of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in a
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte
(Branch 11) on October 14, 1994. The 59 sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes and
the matchbox of marijuana seeds seized from her were ordered destroyed.
Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal as a result of which the records of the case
(Criminal Case No. S-2191) were forwarded to this Court. However, before the Court
could act on the appeal and require her to file an appellant's brief, accused-appellant
moved to withdraw her appeal. In a handwritten letter, dated March 14, 1997, prepared
for her by another person, accused-appellant stated that she was going to file a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to seek her release from confinement for the
sake of her children who needed a mother's support and guidance. ("Sumulat po ako para
po ipaalam na nais ko nang iurong ang aking apila dahilan po sa nais kong mag-file ng
Habeas Corpus. May mga anak po akong lumalaki at kailangan ang pagsubaybay ng
isang ina.") 1
In its resolution, dated July 9, 1997, the Court required the Solicitor General to comment,
even as it required accused-appellant's counsel, Atty. Teresita S. de Guzman, of the
Public Attorney's Office (PAO), to confer with her and to determine whether in filing the
motion accused-appellant acted of her own free will.
In his comment, dated September 22, 1997, the Solicitor General stated he had no
objection to the motion. Per certification of Cecilia B. Veneracion, Clerk I and
Documents Incharge of the Bureau of Corrections, the Solicitor- General believed that
accused-appellant fully understood the nature and purpose of her motion. He cited the
statement in People v. Mendoza, 2 that "withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the
appellee's brief is allowed and granted."
On the other hand, in a manifestation, dated September 3, 1997, Atty. de Guzman
informed the Court that accused-appellant had been released from prison on July 25,
1997 by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court of ` City (Branch 71) issued in a
habeas corpus case. Counsel therefore asked to be excused from making a report on the
voluntariness of the motion to withdraw appeal. In another manifestation, dated
November 10, 1997, Atty. de Guzman stated that she had no participation in the filing of
the habeas corpus case.
In view of this information, the Court required the Solicitor General to comment, but the
latter reiterated his position that he had no objection to the withdrawal of the appeal and
expressed the view that "appellant filed the proper remedy of a petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. Said remedy appears to be duly supported by evidence
presented in the hearing of said petition and by jurisprudence."
In its resolution of June 15, 1998, the Court required Judge Celso D. Laviña of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court for granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
and for ordering the release of accused-appellant from confinement, considering that the
appeal in this case was still pending. In compliance, Judge Laviña submitted the
following explanation, dated July 22, 1998:
1. On February 26, 1997, a verified and certified Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus was filed by Atty. Editha C Pio, PA III, Public Attorney's Office,
Department of Justice, as counsel for petitioner Emma Maquilan versus Rachel D Ruelo,
respondent, in Sp Proc NO 10725, which was raffled to Branch 71, on February 27, 1997,
a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex A.
2. On March 10, 1997, an Order was issued setting the case for hearing on March
18, 1997 and the Writ directing respondent Ruelo, as Superintendent IV of the
Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, to produce the petitioner-inmate
Maquilan and to make a return of the writ, copies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes B and C.
3. On March 18, 1997, respondent Ruelo through Concesa V. Mendoza,
Superintendent I, filed a Comments, Exhibit C, stating "(T)that she interposes no
objection to the Petition and reliefs prayed for as she is entitled to the same pursuant to
the rulings in the cases or jurisprudence mentioned in the Petition", a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex D.
4. Per Orders of April 8, 1997, April 21, 1997, May 26, 1997, June 9, 1997 and June
30, 1997, as Annexes "E" to "E-4", respectively, the case was reset for hearing and heard
with Minutes of sessions held on April 8, 1997, April 21, 1997, May 26, 1997, Notice
dated May 27, 1997, Minutes on June 9, 1997, Subpoena dated June 10, 1997, Minutes
on June 30, 1997, Subpoena dated June 30, 1997, Minutes on July 7, 1997 and
Certification dated December 15, 1995 as Annexes "F" to "F-8", respectively.
5. On July 7, 1997, an Order was issued granting the petition for habeas corpus and
ordering the immediate release of petitioner unless "there is other lawful cause for her
further detention", as Annex "G"
In People v. De Lara (236 SCRA 291, 299), it was held that "(I)f the marijuana involved
is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal. If the
marijuana involved is from 250 to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor
and if the weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional." In People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555), R A. No. 6425, as
amended, was further amended by R A No 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993
(On page 569). And, it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the
beneficent provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective
effect to crimes punished by special laws" like R A No 6425, as amended by R A No.
7659 (On page 570).
Petitioner Maquilan in Sp. Proc. No. 10725 and accused-appellant herein, stated that she
was convicted in Crim. Case No. S- 2191 for selling "fifty five (55) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes rolled in RP paper and one (1) match box of marijuana seeds" in violation of
Republic Act No. 6425 (Sec 4) (pp 1-2, Petition as Annex "A").
Prosecution's witness, in Crim. Case No. S-2191, RTC Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
Branch 11, Chief Inspector Godofredo Dalida testified that his group took "from inside
the cabinet" of Maquilan 50 or 51 sticks of marijuana cigarettes rolled in RP paper plus
the 4 sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes handed by Maquilan to asset/poseur-buyer
Diogracias Ramirez. In his Decision dated October 17, 1994, the Honorable Presiding
Judge ordered 59 sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes and one (1) matchbox of
marijuana seeds destroyed. He sentenced Maquilan "to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua" (Decision as Annex A of Petition).
Petitioner Maquilan states that "she has actually served 4 years, 10 months and 13 days of
good conduct time allowance as of 06 January 1997" (Par. 7, Petition as Annex "A"). In a
Certification dated January 6, 1997 (Exhibits B and Annex C of Petition) signed by Asst.
Documents Incharge Edna T. Miranda and Superintendent IV Rachel D Ruelo,
Correctional Institution for Women, it stated that Maquilan "was credited in the service
of her sentence with 1 year, 6 months and 15 days . . and has actually served 4 years, 10
months and 13 days "
Acting Chief Idabel Bernabe-Pagulayan of Forensic Chemistry Division, NBI, Manila,
testified on Exhibit "D", as Annex "G" which was the Certification dated December 15,
1995 to the effect that the average weight of one stick of marijuana cigarette was 0.3300
to 0.5000 gram in Metro Manila and nearby provinces.
Since there were 59 sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes ordered destroyed at 0.5000
gram per stick, the result would be 29.5 grams plus one (1) match box of marijuana seeds
which would total to not more than but less than 250 grams or for 55 sticks of handrolled
marijuana cigarettes at 0.5000 gram per stick would be 27.5 grams plus one (1) match
box of marijuana seeds The total would be not more than 250 grams.
Under SIMON, the penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional or 6 months and
1 day to 6 years to be taken from the medium period (On page 573, 574, thereof) or two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Based upon the evidence on hand and solely guided by the averments in the verified
Petition as Annex "A" hereof, the Certification, Exhibit "D" as Annex "G' by respondent
Ruelo, Exhibit "B'' as Annex "C" of Petition, the Comment by respondent Ruelo, Exhibit
''C" as Annex "D" hereof, interposing no objection to the petition, the testimony of
Acting Chief Forensic Chemist Pagulayan on . the quantity or weight of the marijuana
and the existing jurisprudence on the matter, an Order dated July 7, 1997, as Annex "H''
was issued granting the petition for habeas corpus and ordering the immediate release of
petitioner from detention as petitioner Maquilan had already served 4 years, 10 months
and 13 days as of January 6, 1997 "unless there is other lawful cause for further
detention."
Petitioner Maquilan therefore "is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty
introduced by the new law" and her ''continued detention in the (Correctional Institution
for Women) is a violation of (her) basic human rights and that, therefore, (she) should be
released from prison without further delay" (Ordonez v. Vinarao, 239 SCRA 114, 115).
It appears that in her petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, accused-
appellant falsely stated that she was in custody "by reason of a final decision issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte (Branch 11)." 3 No
mention was made by her of her appeal pending in this Court. On the other hand; the
respondent in the habeas corpus case, Rachel D. Ruelo, Superintendent IV of the
Correctional Institute for Women, filed a comment interposing no objection to the
petition. 4
The release of accused-appellant constitutes unlawful interference with the proceedings
of this Court and is only somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City appears to have been misled by accused-appellant as to the status of the
decision in Criminal Case No. S-2191. The trial court's order granting release on habeas
corpus, based as it is on the erroneous assumption that the decision in the criminal case
had become final, is void. The trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the order in
question.
This case is analogous to People v. Bacang. 5 There accused-appellants moved for the
withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of their motion, they
applied for and were granted pardon by the President and released from confinement.
Quoting People v. Salle, Jr., 6 this Court ruled:
We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19,
Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or
conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the
trial court. Any application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the
process toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.
Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require
proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has
withdrawn his appeal Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial
court or the appellate court, as the case may be The acceptance of the pardon shall not
operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by
virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal
shall render those responsible therefor administratively liable Accordingly, those in
custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the
accused from confinement. 7
Accordingly, the Court in that case denied the accused-appellants' motion to withdraw
their appeal and ordered their rearrest. Those responsible for their release were cited for
contempt.
What was said in Bacang applies mutalis mutandis to this case. The use of the high
prerogative writ as a post-conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment by virtue of
which accused is detained for the service of his sentence. As a matter of fact, however,
that is not the case here as accused-appellant's appeal is still pending.
WHEREFORE, the motion to withdraw appeal is DENIED and the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to effect the rearrest within sixty (60) days from notice of
accused-appellant Emma Maquilan, utilizing for this purpose the assistance of the
Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation, and her
reconfinement thereafter at the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila and forthwith to submit a report to the Court. Further action on the appeal is held
in abeyance pending the rearrest of accused-appellant Emma Maquilan.
Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan, Atty. Editha C. Pio of the Public Attorney's Office,
and Rachel D. Ruelo, Superintendent IV of the Correctional Institute for Women are
hereby REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice why they should
not be held in contempt for misrepresenting to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(Branch 71) the status of Criminal Case No. S-2191.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
Regalado, J ., On official leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 27.
2. 93 Phil. 581 (1953),
3. Id., p. 84 (Emphasis supplied)
4. Id., pp. 104-105.
5. 260 SCRA 44 (1996)
6. 250 SCRA 581, 592 (1996).
7. Supra note 5, pp. 47-48.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-23516. June 25, 1980.]
CANDIDO SAN LUIS, JESUS BENJIL, CARMELITA BENJIL, ROMEO SAN LUIS,
JOSELITO SAN LUIS, ENCARNACION SAN LUIS and PURISIMA SAN LUIS,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. TOMASA SAN LUIS NEGRETE, assisted by her husband,
RAMON NEGRETE, ROSARIO SAN LUIS, and her husband, IRENEO SUSON,
defendants-appellees.
DECISION
FERNANDEZ, J p:
This is a direct appeal to this Court from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Basilan City in Civil Case No. 315 entitled "Candido San Luis, et al. versus Tomasa San
Luis Negrete, et al." the dispositive part of which reads:
"In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered denying the action for
rescission of the deed of absolute sale, Exhibit 'F-1'. The defendants Rosario San Luis
Suson and Ireneo Suson, are, however, ordered to pay to the heirs of Felipe San Luis the
sum of P750.00, with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing of the complaint,
until the same shall have been paid, with costs against them. The defendants Tomasa San
Luis Negrete and Ramon Negrete are hereby absolved from the complaint. Their
counterclaim is, however, dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 31st day of March, 1964, at Isabela, Basilan City.
GERONIMO R. MARAVE Judge" 1
On November 22, 1961, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Basilan City, docketed as Civil Case No. 315, seeking the annulment of a deed of sale
executed by Felipe San Luis and some of his children in favor of Tomasa San Luis
Negrete and Rosario San Luis Suson, both daughters of said Felipe San Luis, on the
ground that the sale was simulated and was not supported by valid consideration and to
set aside the order issued in Land Registration Case No. N-5 directing the Register of
Deeds of Basilan City to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 and to issue a new
title to Tomasa San Luis Negrete and Rosario San Luis Suson embracing the land
covered by plan Psu-145621. 2
In her answer filed on September 22, 1962, the defendant Tomasa San Luis Negrete
averred as special and affirmative defenses that Felipe San Luis sold the parcel of land
containing 510 square meters covered by Plan Psu-145621 and by Original Certificate of
Title No, 0-7 of the Registry of Deeds of Basilan City on May 9, 1956 to Tomasa San
Luis, married to Ramon Negrete and Rosario San Luis, married to Ireneo Suson; that the
Court of First Instance of Basilan City, by virtue of a motion dated July 6, 1960 filed by
defendant Tomasa San Luis Negrete, issued an order dated July 15, 1960 ordering and
authorizing the Register of Deeds of Basilan City to register the deed of sale dated May
9, 1956 and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 and to issue a new title to
Tomasa San Luis Negrete and Rosario San Luis Suson over the said parcel of land; that
the order of the trial court dated July 15, 1960 and the order dated July 29, 1960 are valid
and within its jurisdiction; and that in the document of sale of May 9, 1956, the plaintiff,
Candido San Luis, appears as one of the instrumental witnesses. 3
The trial court summarized the evidence of the parties as follows:
"Plaintiffs' evidence shows that spouses Felipe San Luis and Encarnacion Rodriguez had
nine children already mentioned above. On August 8, 1955, plaintiff Candido San Luis as
attorney of his father, Felipe San Luis, filed an application for registration of title of the
land in question in the name of Felipe. Paragraph 1 of the application states that Felipe
San Luis was the owner in fee simple of the land applied for. On May 9, 1956, during the
pendency of said application for registration, Felipe San Luis and his children Ramon,
Pilar, Amado and Antonio, all surnamed San Luis, executed a deed of absolute sale
conveying the land to Rosario San Luis Suson and Tomasa San Luis Negrete (Exhibit F-
1'). In the meantime, on March 15, 1958, the Court issued a decree confirming the title of
Felipe over the land and ordering the registration thereof. So, on August 6, 1958, the
Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 in the name of Felipe San
Luis. On January 8, 1960, Felipe San Luis died. On July 6, 1960, Tomasa and Rosario
filed a motion praying this Court to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 by virtue
of the said deed of absolute sale of May 9, 1956, and to issue a new one in their names.
On July 15, 1960, this Court ordered Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 cancelled and
the issuance of a new one in the name of Tomasa San Luis Negrete and Rosario San Luis
Suson. On July 18 and 22, 1960, Atty. Candido San Luis filed motions for
reconsideration of the order of this Court of July 15, 1960. On July 29, 1960, the Court
denied the motion for reconsideration. On July 30, 1960, Atty. San Luis filed a petition
for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying to declare the orders of this Court of
July 15 and 29, null and void. On September 30, 1961, the Court of Appeals denied the
writ of Certiorari and dismissed the petition on the ground that there were no questions of
fact to be passed upon but merely questions of law which were not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. This dismissal was, however, without prejudice to the filing of the proper
action in Court. To supplement the above evidence, Atty. Candido San Luis took the
witness stand and testified that on May 9, 1956, his father Felipe San Luis, sold the land
in question to the defendants for P3,000.00. He was a witness to the transaction but did
not draft the document himself. One time his father complained to him that he was not
paid the consideration of the sale by the vendees. His brothers and sisters were, however,
duly paid for their corresponding shares. He did not sell his share nor receive payment
therefore. The vendees never took possession of the land for his father had always been in
possession thereof and collected rentals from lessees.
Rosario San Luis Suson, testifying for the plaintiffs' corroborated the testimony of Atty.
San Luis. In addition, she testified that in the year 1956, she and Tomasa approached
their brother, Atty. Candido San Luis, to prepare the deed of sale to be signed by their
father, but Atty. San Luis advised them to ask their father's decision before preparing the
deed of sale. Their father, however, decided to execute the deed of sale and the document
was accordingly prepared. She and Tomasa, however, never paid the consideration of the
sale to their father, for Tomasa kept on postponing the payment.
Rosario further testified that it was her father who paid the taxes on the land and collected
the rentals from lessees. After her father's death, she continued collecting the rentals on
the land.
On the other hand, Tomasa San Luis Negrete testified that on May 9, 1956, she and
Rosario San Luis Suson purchased the land in question from their father. The deed of
sale, Exhibit F-1', was prepared by her brother, Atty. Candido San Luis himself who told
her to bring it to Atty. Segundo Martinez for ratification as soon as the parties and
witnesses had signed it. Their father told them to divide the P1,500.00 among their
brothers and sisters and the rest to be paid to him (father). So, she and Rosario paid
P1,500.00 to their father, while her brothers and sisters were paid P166.00 each, except
Atty. Candido San Luis who waived receiving his share alleging that it was too small an
amount and that he has more than enough for himself. This sale was subject to the
condition that their father would continue collecting the rentals on the land during his
lifetime. Tomasa paid taxes on the land as evidenced by Exhibits 4' to 9'. During his
lifetime, her father used to live with her and she knows he had no debt. As a matter of
fact, he had a bank deposit as the amount received by him from her was deposited in the
bank. After the fire of 1962, she constructed a house on the land valued at P8,000.00. Her
sister Rosario testified in this case in favor of the plaintiffs because Atty. Candido San
Luis promised to give her his share in the event the plaintiffs win in this case. Her sister
Rosario is now occupying one-half of the land in question.
Ramon San Luis corroborated the testimony of Tomasa. In addition, he testified that
when he signed the document, Exhibit 'F-1', he understood that he sold his share thereof
and received P200.00 consideration for the same. All his brothers and sisters were also
paid their shares. On one occasion when he visited his father in Isabela, he (father)
informed him that Tomasa had already paid her part in the consideration of the sale. His
father did not have any account with anyone when he died. As a matter of fact, he had
deposit in the bank.
Although the land Registration Court decreed Felipe San Luis as the sole owner in fee
simple of the land, he considered his nine children as his co-owners thereof. This is so
expressly stated in the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit F-1'. He divided the proceeds of the
sale by giving one-half thereof to his children and retained the other half for himself. His
children were actually paid the purchase price for their respective shares, except Atty.
Candido San Luis.
The plaintiffs in this case are Atty. Candido San Luis and the nine children of deceased
Remedios San Luis and Jose San Luis who did not sign the document of sale, Exhibit 'F-
1'. The other heirs of Felipe San Luis who signed Exhibit 'F-1' did not join the plaintiffs
in this action for rescission." 4
The trial court rendered judgment "denying, the action for rescission of the deed of
absolute sale, Exhibit 'F-1'" because:
"The first question to be determined is whether the plaintiffs did not sell their shares of
the land to the defendants.
"When the deed of absolute sale was executed on May 9, 1956, Remedios San Luis and
Jose San Luis were already dead and their respective children were still minors. While
said children of Jose and Remedios did not sign the deed of absolute sale, their respective
surviving parents signed receipts Exhibits '2' and '3'. An examination of these receipts
shows that the surviving parents did not only give their consent to the sale but actually
sold the shares of their children by receiving the amount of P166.00 equivalent to the
share of one child of Felipe San Luis from Tomasa and Rosario. One of those receipts
was witnessed by Atty. San Luis. Article 320 of the New Civil Code, in force at the time
of the sale, provides that the father, or in his absence, the mother is the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the
property is worth more than P2,000.00, the approval of the Court is necessary for a
contract entered into by said parents in behalf of the minor, since the parent shall be
considered the guardian of the child's property (Padilla, Comments on the Civil Code,
Vol. 2, pages 542-543, 1951 Ed.) In other words, if the property is not more than
P2,000.00, the approval of the Court is not necessary for the efficacy of such a contract.
The value of the share of the children of Jose as well as that of Remedios is P166.00 only.
The surviving parents therefore, of the children of Jose and Remedios may sell the
property without the necessity of the previous approval of the Court and this sale may
only be rescinded if the heirs suffered lession by at least one-fourth of what they ought to
receive.
With respect to the contention that Atty. San Luis did not sell his share to Tomasa and
Rosario, it should be stated that he signed the deed of sale as an instrumental witness. He
is the only attorney in the family. He knows that the other heirs were all paid their shares.
He did not demand for the payment of his share. Under the circumstances, the Court will
have to give credence to the testimony that Atty. San Luis gave his consent to the sale
and that he waived receiving his share in favor of his sisters, Tomasa and Rosario. He is
much better off in comparison with his sisters.
It follows from the foregoing that Atty. San Luis and the minor children of Jose and
Remedios had legally conveyed their respective shares to Tomasa and Rosario." 5
The trial court sustained the order of the registration court cancelling Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-7 in the name of Felipe San Luis and directing the issuance of a new one in
the names of Tomasa San Luis Negrete and Rosario San Luis Suson for the following
reason:
"The second question to be determined is whether or not the failure of Tomasa and
Rosario to file their claim over the land during land registration proceedings bars them
from claiming the land in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case Moldero vs.
Yandoc, G.R. No. L-14321, Oct. 20, 1961, to the effect that under the torrens system,
claims and liens of whatever character existing against the land prior to the issuance of
the certificate are cut off by such certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so
issued binds the whole world. This case of Moldero vs. Yandoc is not, however, in point,
because in this case, the action was instituted against a third person, an innocent
purchaser, and the plaintiff did not have any cause of action in so far as the latter if
concerned. In the case at bar, no innocent third person or purchaser had acquired the
property. The decree is a mere confirmation and registration of the ownership of the land.
Since the ownership thereof had already been sold by the lawful owners to Tomasa and
Rosario, the sale may be enforced against the vendors.
Article 1159 of the New Civil Code provides that obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith. Article 1167 of the same Code provides that if a person obliged to do something
fails to do so, the same shall be executed at his cost.
'As deeply embodied at the very foundation of all the provisions of the Code touching the
nature and effect of all contractual obligations is the maxim that the will of the
contracting parties is the law of their contract - a maxim which amplified in the
elementary propositions that contracts are perfected by mere consent', that the contracting
parties may make any agreement and establish any clauses and conditions which they
may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy; that the validity or compliance of contracts cannot be left to the
will of one of the contracting parties'; and that contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for validity are
present'
'It is elemental that the law requires parties to do what they have agreed to do. If a party
charges himself with an obligation possible to be performed, he must abide by it unless
performance is rendered impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party.'
(Francisco, Annotated Civil Code, Vol. IV, pages 21-22).
Public policy demands that a person should not be allowed to use a torrens title to enrich
himself at the expense of another." 6
The plaintiffs-appellants assigned the following errors:
"I
Holding that the registration of the property in favor of Felipe San Luis, ceases to be a
conjugal property, hence he only allowed his children to participate in the proceeds of the
Sale:
(a) Denying the share of Candido San Luis;
(b) Denying the rights of the minor children;
II
In holding that the receipts signed by the surviving parents of the minors are sufficient
transfer of participation of ownership in real property;
III
In not holding that the registration of property in favor of Felipe San Luis on March 15,
1958, almost two years after the alleged Deed of Sale of May 9, 1956, binds the land and
quiets title thereto;
IV
In failing to hold that there was no consummated contract of Sale on the ground of lack
of consideration and no actual delivery and possession by the vendees;
V
For holding that this action for the dissolution of contract of Sale based on lack of
consideration has prescribed in four years." 7
The facts, as stated in the brief of the plaintiffs-appellants, are:
"A parcel of land containing Five Hundred and Ten (510) square meters, more or less,
situated at the commercial section of Isabela, Basilan City, acquired and owned by the
spouses Felipe San Luis and Encarnacion Rodriguez during their matrimonial regime
under possessory information title and described in Psu 145621. That on August 8, 1955,
long after the death of his wife, Felipe San Luis filed an application for the registration of
the title over the land in question. However, the surviving spouse, Felipe San Luis, during
the pendency of his application for the registration of the conjugal property herein
mentioned together with some of his children, namely, Antonio, Pilar, Ramon and
Amado, all surnamed San Luis, executed a deed of Absolute Sale on May 9, 1956,
conveying said property to Rosario San Luis-Suson and Tomasa San Luis-Negrete. (Exh.
F-1'). Candido San Luis and the minor children of his other younger sister and brother
Remedios San Luis-Benjil and Jose San Luis, all deceased and all are children of Felipe
San Luis and Encarnacion Rodriguez did not execute any deed of Sale. The minor
children are the other plaintiffs herein, namely, Jesus and Carmelita, surnamed Benjil and
Romeo, Joselito, Encarnacion and Purisima, all surnamed San Luis.
In the meantime, on March 15, 1958, the Land Registration Court issued a decree
confirming the title of Felipe San Luis over the land and ordering the registration thereof.
Wherefore, the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 in the name
of Felipe San Luis on August 6, 1958. Two years and three months after the alleged deed
of sale. (Records do not show that there was any motion presented to preserve the rights
of the vendees during the registration proceedings)
During all these years and until his death on January 3, 1960, Felipe San Luis was in full
exercise of his ownership and possession of his property, collecting all the rentals of
houses constructed therein in the amount of One Hundred to One Hundred Twenty Pesos
monthly and in the payment of land taxes. No delivery of possession or any color of
ownership was ever transferred to the alleged vendees, Tomasa Negrete and Rosario
Suson.
After the death of Felipe San Luis, specifically on July 6, 1960, exactly two years and
three (3) months and twenty one (21 days after the issuance of the decree in favor of the
former, Tomasa Negrete without the knowledge and consent of Rosario Suson filed a
motion before the lower Court to cancel the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-7 and to
issue a new one in their names, pursuant to the alleged Deed of Sale of May 9, 1960.
Subsequently, the lower Court on July 15, 1960 ordered the cancellation of the Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-7 and the issuance of a new one in the names of Tomasa San
Luis-Negrete and Rosario San Luis-Suson.
That when Candido San Luis, one of the heirs got wind of the irregular and anomalous
order of the Court, he immediately on July 18 and 22, 1960, filed motions for
reconsideration of this Order. The Court, however, on July 29, 1960, denied the motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, he instituted a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals, Manila, which should however be in the Supreme Court of the Philippines. The
petition was denied without prejudice to its filing in the proper Court on the ground that
the determination of whether or not the Court below abused its discretion in issuing the
order complained of, is a question of law that is not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.'
Hence this action." 8
The appellees made the following counter statement of facts:
"The relation of facts in the brief for the Appellants is substantially correct. The Spouses
Felipe San Luis and Encarnacion Rodriguez had nine children, namely (1) Antonio, (2)
Candido, (3) Pilar, (4) Ramon, (5) Remedios, (deceased) survived by her children, Jesus
Benjil and Carmelita Benjil, (6) Jose (deceased survived by her children, Romeo,
Joselito, Encarnacion and Purisima, (7) Tomasa, (8) Rosario, and (9) Amado, all
surnamed San Luis.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 2368. December 14, 1905.]
CIRILO ESTRELLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BONIFACIO ZAMORA AND JOSE
ZAMORA, defendants-appellees.
Claro Reyes, for appellant.
Pablo Borbon, for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. NEW TRIAL; DISCRETION OF THE COURT; EXCEPTION. — The
overruling or granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence is deemed, under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an act of
discretion on the part of the judge, and shall not be a ground of exception reviewable by
the Supreme Court.
DECISION
MAPA, J p:
This is an action with respect to the title and possession of a building lot. The trial court
found that the following facts had been established: (1) That the lot in question had at one
time belonged to the plaintiff, who inherited it from his father; (2) that on May 14, 1884,
the plaintiff sold the lot to Carlos Zamora for the sum of 660 pesos of which 200 pesos
were paid at the time of the sale, and the balance at a subsequent date; and (3) that the
purchaser, Carlos Zamora, was in possession of the lot until the time of his death in 1889,
when his children, defendants herein, succeeded him, they having since been in
possession.
Upon these facts the court below found that the defendant were the lawful owners of the
land, decided the case in their favor, with costs to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff contends in his brief that the findings of the court are not supported by the
evidence introduced at the trial. He, however, admits that there was a contract for the sale
of the land for the sum of 660 pesos, and that the purchaser, Carlos Zamora, paid him 200
pesos at the time of the sale on account of the purchase price, but he alleges that there is
nothing to show that Zamora ever paid him the balance of 460 pesos. This is not True.
The defendant Bonifacio Zamora testified in regard to two different payments of 100
pesos and 258 pesos, respectively, which according to the defendants, were made to the
plaintiff by his father, Carlos Zamora, on account of the purchase price of land. The first
amount was delivered to one Anselmo Ventura by order of the plaintiff, and the second
payment was made to the plaintiff himself in jewels. These jewels were delivered to the
plaintiff for sale on commission, with the condition that he was to return those which he
could not dispose of, and apply the proceeds of those he did sell to the payment of the
purchase price of the land. Zamora's testimony in this respect was uncontradicted. He
further stated that the plaintiff did not return any of the jewels delivered to him.
There were introduced evidence to prove the delivery of the two sums mentioned, the
receipt signed by Anselmo Ventura, and two telegrams from the plaintiff ordering that
100 pesos be delivered to Ventura, also a list signed by the plaintiff containing the pieces
of jewelry received by him from Carlos Zamora, the purchaser of the land. These
documents were admitted in evidence by the court below, but neither of them appears in
the bill of exceptions. It was the duty of the plaintiff as appellant to bring to this court the
documents mentioned for consideration in connection with the facts found in the decision
of the trial court. Having failed to do so, he must suffer the consequences thereof. In the
absence of these documents we must consider their contents to have been as stated by the
defendant in his testimony, and sustain the conclusions drawn therefrom by the trial
court.
Aside from the evidence referred to, we have the testimony of Bonifacio Zamora to the
effect that his father paid to the plaintiff the entire 660 pesos within the time stipulated in
the contract. His testimony, uncontradicted by the plaintiff, shows that in addition to the
200 pesos paid at the time of the sale, the 100 pesos paid to Anselmo Ventura, and the
258 pesos received by the plaintiff himself in jewels, the balance still due from the 660
pesos, the purchase price of the land, was also paid to him by the purchaser.
The appellant also assigns as error the admission in evidence by the court below of the
list of jewels referred to. He claims that the jewels were received from Tiburcia Reyes,
and that it was not shown that any privity existed between her and the defendants in this
case, and that the evidence was therefore immaterial, and improperly admitted by the
court. As already indicated the list does not form a part of the bill of exceptions. We can
not, therefore, make any finding as to its contents. It appears from the testimony of the
defendant Bonifacio Zamora that the jewels belonged to his father, and that the latter
agreed with the plaintiff that the proceeds of the sale of the jewels should be applied to
the payment of the purchase price of the land. This sufficiently shows the pertinency of
the evidence, even assuming that the list was made in favor of Tiburcia Reyes, who was,
after all, the mother of the defendants, as stated by them in their brief. The court below
therefore did not err in admitting the list in evidence.
The plaintiff moved for a new trial in the court below on the ground of material and
newly discovered evidence. The court overruled his motion, and he now assigns this as
error.
The plaintiff's petition for a new trial was accompanied by the affidavit of Prudencio de
Jesus, wherein the latter states "that while examining the trunk of Cirilo Estrella brought
to me for cleaning, I found therein a paper signed by Carlos Zamora, which is important
document in the case now pending between them." The affidavit says nothing more. It
will be noticed that this affidavit contains merely the opinion of the witness that the
document found by him was an important one in the present case. It was not the witness,
but the court, who was called upon to determine this question. Considering the form of
the affidavit, it seems to us that it was impossible for the judge to know whether the
document referred to had any importance in the case, there being nothing in the affidavit
upon which he could have based his opinion. The judge therefore properly overruled the
plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
The overruling or granting of a motion for a new trial on the ground of material and
newly discovered evidence is an act of discretion on the part of the judge. as such it can
not be a ground of exception under section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
judge's action is not reviewable by this court.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs of this instance against the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith, and let the case be remanded to the Court of First Instance for proper action. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 2 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

G.R. No. 2108 December 19, 1905

JUANA PIMENTEL vs. ENGRACIO PALANCA
005 Phil 436
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 2108. December 19, 1905.]
JUANA PIMENTEL, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ENGRACIO PALANCA, as administrator
of the estate of Margarita Jose, deceased, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher, for appellant.
M. Caringal and R. del Rosario, for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; WILLS; ADMINISTRATOR; ACTION TO
DETERMINE HEIRS. — When a will has been proved, an administrator appointed, and
the estate is in process of settlement in the Court of First Instance in a special proceeding,
as provided in Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no final decree has been
entered therein, no ordinary action between the parties can be maintained for the purpose
of determining who are the heirs of the deceased.
2. ID.; ID.; ACTION TO SET ASIDE. — No ordinary action can be maintained to
set aside the probate of a will or the appointment of an administrator. The remedy is by
appeal in the proceeding in which the orders were made.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF PROVISIONS. — The probate of a will does not
determine the validity of any disposition of property made therein.
DECISION
WILLARD, J p:
Margarita Jose, a native and citizen of the Philippine Islands, died in the city of Amoy,
China, on the 4th of February, 1902. Her last will was duly proved and allowed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on the 15th day of April, 1902, and on the same day
Engracio Palanca was duly appointed administrator of the state of the deceased. He
entered upon the discharge of his duties as such administrator, and is still engaged
therein. As far as appears from the bill of exceptions the state still remains unsettled, and
no final decree has ever been entered therein.
By her said will Margarita Jose left all her property, amounting to over 50,000 pesos, to
her two children, Vicente Barreto, alias Tan-Teng, and Benito Carlos, alias Doon. On the
8th day of July, 1902, Juana Pimentel and the mother of said Margarita Jose, commenced
this, an ordinary action, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that the two
children of Margarita Jose were illegitimate, and that she was the heir at law and entitled
to the whole state. The prayer of the original complaint was that the plaintiff be declared
the lawful heir and entitled to all the property of her daughter, Margarita Jose.
The defendant named in this original complaint was the "Estate of Dona Margarita Jose."
The summons in the action was served upon the administrator, Engracio Palanca. He
appeared and demurred, on the ground, among others, that there was a defect of parties,
and that the two sons should have been made defendants. This demurrer was overruled.
He took an exception to the overruling of the demurrer, and answered, denying generally
the facts stated in the complaint. A trial was had in the Court of First Instance, and
judgment was entered in favor of the defendant on the 28th of July, 1903, the court
holding that Vicente Barreto was the legitimate son of Margarita Jose. Plaintiff made a
motion for a new Trial, which was granted on the 15th day of September, 1903. On the
22d day of January, 1904, the plaintiff presented an amended complaint, naming as
defendants Engracio Palanca, as administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, and Benito
Carlos and Vicente Barreto. The prayer of that complaint is as follows:
"Por todo lo expuesto la demandante pide al Juzgado:
"(a) Que la legalizacion de dicho testamento sea revocada y anulada;
"(b) Que la institucion de los demandados Vicente Barreto alias Tan-Teng y Benito
Carlos alias Doon como herederos en dicho testamento sea declaranda nula por razon de
la pretericion de un heredero forzoso.
"(c) Que la demandante sea declarada heredera de tres cuartas partes de los bienes de
los cuales era duena la citada Margarita Jose al tiempo de su fallecimiento.
"(d) Que el nombramiento de administrador conferido por virtud del auto del Juzgado
a favor del demandado Engracio Palanca sea anulado;
"(e) Que el demandando Engracio Palanca como tal administrator sea requerido a
rendir cuentas de su administracion y a depositar an el Juzgado todo el dinero que tenga
en su poder perteneciente a los herederos de la citada difunta;
"(f) Que el Juzgado conceda a la demandante cualquier otro remedio adecuado y
equitativo."
The defendants all answered the amended complaint. A trial was had in the court below,
and on the 7th of April, 1904, judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. The court
held that Vicente Barreto was the legitimate son of Margarita Jose; that Benito Carlos
was an illegitimate son, and that Margarita Jose had a right to bequeath her property to
these sons to the exclusive of the plaintiff. He held also that the plaintiff, not having
appealed from the probate of the will, could not maintain this action.
We think that judgment should be entered for the defendants, but not upon the ground
stated in the decision of the court below.
The will od Margarita Jose was made and she died after the present Code of Civil
Procedure went into effect in these Islands. Her will was duly proved and allowed under
the provisions of that Code. An administrator was duly appointed and he is now engaged
in settling the affairs of the estate. The important question in this case is, Can an ordinary
action at law be maintained under these circumstances by a person claiming to be an heir
of the deceased against other persons, also claiming to be such heirs, for the purpose of
having their rights in the estate determined? We think that such an action is inconsistent
with the provisions of the new code, and that it can not be maintained. Section 600 of the
present Code of Civil Procedure provides that the will of an inhabitant of the Philippine
Islands shall be proved and his estate settled in the Court of First Instance in which he
resided at the time of his death. By section 641 when a will is proved it is obligatory upon
the court to appoint an executor or administrator. By virtue of other provisions of the
code this executor or administrator has, under the direction of the court, the full
administration and control of the deceased's property, real and personal, until a final
decree is made in accordance with section 753. During the period of administration the
heirs, devisees, and legatees have no right to interfere with the administrator of executor
in the discharge of his duties. They have no right, without his consent, to the possession
of any part of the estate, real or personal. The theory of the present system is that the
property is all in the hands of the court, and must stay there until the affairs of the
deceased are adjusted and liquidated, and then the net balance is turned over to the
persons by law entitled to it. For the purpose of such administration and distribution there
is only one proceeding in the Court of First Instance. That proceeding is not an action at
law, but falls under Part II of the Code of Civil Procedure, and is a special proceeding.
After the estate is fully settled, and all the debts and expenses of administration are paid,
the law contemplates that there shall be a hearing or trial in this proceeding in the Court
of First Instance for the purpose of determining who the parties are that are entitled to the
estate in the hands of the executor or administrator for distribution, and after such hearing
or trial it is made the duty of the court to enter a decree of final judgment, in which
decree, according to section 753, the court "shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, and in its order the court shall name the persons and
proportions or parts to which each is entitled." (See also sec. 782 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.) By section 704 it is expressly provided that no action shall be maintained by
an heir or devisee against an executory or administrator for the recovery of the possession
or ownership of lands until there is a decree of the court assigning such lands to such heir
or devisee, or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the
Court of First Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in
that court, or in any other court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor
or against the executor or against other persons claiming to be heirs, for the purpose of
having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate determined. The very purpose of the trial or
hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until
they are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such
as the present one can be maintained.
An examination of the prayer of the amended complaint above quoted will show that to
grant it would be to prevent the settlement of the estate of a deceased person in one
proceeding in the Court of First Instance. It would require, in the first place, the
revocation of the judgment probating the will. This relief can not be obtained in an
ordinary action. The plaintiff not having appealed from the order admitting the will to
probate, as she had a right to do, that order is final and conclusive. It does not, however,
as the court below held, determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to any part of the
estate. The effect of such a decree was stated in the case of Castañeda vs. Alemany 1 (2
Off. Gaz., 366). The statements there made need not be repeated here. The plaintiff in her
amended complaint asks also that the appointment of Engracio Palanca be annulled. This
relief can not be granted in an ordinary action. The plaintiff had a right to appeal from the
order of the court appointing the administrator in this case, and not having exercised that
right such order is final and conclusive against her. The plaintiff also asks that the
administrator be required to render an account to her of his administration, and deposit in
court the money which he has in his possession. To grant this relief in an ordinary action
between parties would be to take away from the court having in charge the settlement of
the estate the express powers conferred upon it by law. To grant that part of the prayer of
the amended complaint which asks that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to three
fourths of the property of the estate, would be to take away from the court administering
the estate the power expressly given to it by section 753 to determine that question in the
proceeding relating to the estate.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and after the expiration of twenty days
judgment should be entered in accordance herewith and the case remanded to the court
below, with instructions to dismiss the same, with costs, but without prejudice to the right
of the plaintiff to present her claims in the special proceeding relating to the
administration of the estate, when the final decree is made therein under section 753. No
costs will be allowed in this court. So ordered.
Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARELLANO, C.J. and MAPA, J., concurring:
In view of sections 753 and 782, we agree with the preceding opinion on the ground
therein set forth: "While the estate is being settled in the Court of First Instance in a
special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other
court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons
claiming to be the heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiff in the estate
determined." The purpose of this concurring opinion is to reserve the question as to any
other action in connection with the settlement of such estates not instituted during the
period of administration but independently and which may related to rights to any part
thereof, especially the action for distribution which differs from the action of partition.
Footnotes
1. 3 Phil. Rep., 426.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 8385. March 24, 1914.]
LUCIO ALGARRA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. SIXTO SANDEJAS, defendant-appellee.
Soutworth, Hargis& Springer for appellant.
Rohde & Wright for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; NEGLIGENT ACT OR OMISSION; EXTENT OF LIABILITY. —
Under both the Spanish Civil Code and American law of damages, actual damages for a
negligent act or omission are confined to those which "were foreseen or might have been
foreseen," or those which were "the natural and probable consequences" or "the direct
and immediate consequences" of the act or omission.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. — In this jurisdiction the author of a negligent act or omission which
cause damage to another is obliged to repair the damage done. This is practically
equivalent to compensatory or actual damages as those terms are used in American law.

3. ID.; ELEMENTS. — Pain and suffering, whether physical or mental, are not
elements of actual or compensatory damages in this jurisdiction. Aside from this
exception, the measure of damages in this country and in the United States is arrived at
by the same evidence.
4. ID.; LOSS OF PROFITS. — Loss of profits of an established business which was
yielding fairly steady returns at the time of its interruption by defendant's wrongful act is
not so speculative or contingent that a court of justice may refuse to allow the plaintiff
any damages at all. When the evidence shows the previous average income of the
plaintiff's business and the reduced receipts therefrom during or immediately after the
interruption, there can be no doubt that a loss of profits has resulted. The fact that such a
loss cannot be determined with exactitude is no reason for refusing to allow them at all.
In such a case damages should be allowed for the diminuation in profits from the time of
the interruption until the business has resumed its normal proportions, based upon the
time it has taken or will take the owner to rebuild it by the exercise of proper diligence.
5. ID.; FACTS OF THIS CASE. — Plaintiff received personal injuries as a result of
defendant's negligent act and was incapacitated for labor for two months. Plaintiff was a
commission agent, had about twenty regular customers, who purchased his wares in small
quantities, necessitating regular and frequent deliveries. Being unable to attend to their
wants during the two months he was incapacitated, his regular customers turned their
trade to other competing agents. On recovering, he had lost all but four regular
customers, whose purchases netted him about seven pesos per month. It took him four
years to build up his patronage to its proportions at the time of the accident. At that time
this trade netted him about fifty pesos per month. Upon these facts he should be allowed
fifty pesos per month for the actual time he was incapacitated, his medical expenses, and
for diminution in profits of his business for one year, during which he should be able to
rebuild his business to its former proportions.
DECISION
TRENT, J p:
This is a civil action for personal injuries received from a collision with the defendant's
automobile due to the negligence of the defendant, who was driving the car. The
negligence of the defendant is not questioned and this case involves only the amount of
damages which should be allowed.
As a result of the injuries received, plaintiff was obliged to spend ten days in the hospital,
during the first four or five of which he could not leave his bed. After being discharged
from the hospital, he received medical attention from a private practitioner for several
days. The latter testified that after the last treatment the plaintiff described himself as
being well. On the trial the plaintiff testified that he had done no work since the accident,
which occurred on July 9, 1912, and that he was not yet entirely recovered. Plaintiff
testified that his earning capacity was P50 per month. It is not clear at what time plaintiff
became entirely well again, but as the doctor to whom he described himself as being well
stated that this was about the last of July, and the trial took place September 19, two
months' pay would seem sufficient for the actual time lost from his work. Plaintiff further
testified that he paid the doctor P8 and expended P2 for medicines. This expense,
amounting in all to P110, should also be allowed.
Plaintiff sold the products of a distillery on a 10 per cent commission and made an
average of P50 per month. He had about twenty regular customers who, it seems,
purchased in small quantities, necessitating regular and frequent deliveries. Since the
accident his wife had done something in a small way to keep up this business by the total
orders taken by her would not net them over P15. He lost all his regular customers but
four, other agents filling their orders since his accident. It took him about four years to
build up the business he had at the time of the accident, and he could not say how long it
would take him to get back the business he had lost.
Under this state of facts, the lower court, while recognizing the justness of the claim,
refused to allow him anything for injury to his business due to his enforced absence
therefrom, on the ground that the doctrine of Marcelo vs. Velasco (11 Phil. Rep., 277) is
opposed to such allowance. The trial court's opinion appears to be based upon the
following quotation from Viada (vol. 1, p. 539), quoted in that decision: ". . . with regard
to the offense of lesiones, for example, the civil liability is almost always limited to
indemnity for damage to the party aggrieved for the time during which he was
incapacitated for work; . . ."
This statement, however, derives its force, not from any provision of the law applicable
to lesiones, but is a mere deduction from the operation of the law upon the cases arising
under it. That the interpretation placed upon this statement of Viada by the lower court is
either not correct, or that it does not apply to actions for personal injuries under article
1902 of the Civil Code, is apparent from the decisions of the supreme court of Spain of
January 8, 1906, January 15, 1902, and October 19, 1909, to which a more extended
reference will be made further on in this opinion. There is nothing said in the decision in
question prohibiting the allowance of compensatory damages, nor does there seem to be
anything contained therein opposed to the allowance of such damages occurring
subsequent to the institution of the action. In fact, it appears from the following quotation
that the court would have been disposed to consider favorably the plaintiff's claim for
injury to her business had the evidence presented it.
"No evidence was then offered by the plaintiff to show that this slight lameness in any
way interfered with the conduct of her business or that she could make any less amount
therein than she could make if she did not suffer from this defect. The court, therefore,
did not err in allowing her no further damages on this account, because there was no
evidence that she had suffered any."
The alleged damages which the court refused to entertain in that case and under the
discussion of which appears the above quotation from Viada, were for pain and suffering
the plaintiff may have experienced. The court said: "For the profits which the plaintiff
failed to obtain, spoken of in the latter part of this article, the plaintiff was allowed to
recover, and the question is, whether the value of the loss which she suffered can be
extended to pain which she experienced by reason of the accident."
Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon article 1902 of the Civil
Code, which reads as follows: "A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done."
Of this article, the supreme court of Spain, in its decision of February 7, 1900, in
considering the indemnity imposed by it, said: "It is undisputed that said reparation, to be
efficacious and substantial, must rationally include the generic idea of complete
indemnity, such as is defined and explained in article 1106 of the said (Civil) Code."
Articles 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code read as follows:
"1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only the amount of the loss which
may have been suffered, but also that of the profit which the creditor may have failed to
realize, reserving the provisions contained in the following articles.
"1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in good faith is liable, are those
foreseen or which may have been foreseen, at the time of constituting the obligation, and
which may be a necessary consequence of its nonfulfillment.
"In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all those which clearly may originate from
the nonfulfillment of the obligation."
Fraud is not an element of the present case, and we are not therefore concerned with it.
The liability of the present defendant includes only those damages which were "foreseen
or may have been foreseen" at the time of the accident, and which are the necessary and
immediate consequences of his fault. In discussing the question of damages under the
civil law, Gutierrez (vol. 4, pp. 64, 65) says:
"In the impossibility of laying down a surer rule, the Code understands known damages
to be those which in the prudent discernment of the judge merit such a qualification,
although their consequences may not be direct, immediate, inevitable.
"If it is a question of losses occasioned through other causes, except fraud, and the
contracting parties have not covenanted any indemnity for the case of nonfulfillment,
then the reparation of the losses or damages shall only comprise those that are the
necessary and immediate consequence of that fault. This rule may not be very clear, but
is the only one possible in a matter more of the domain of prudence than of law."
In its decision of April 18, 1901, the supreme court of Spain said: "Neither were the
errors incurred that are mentioned in the third assignment, since the indemnity for
damages is understood to apply to those caused the complainant directly, and not to those
which, indirectly and through more or less logical deductions, may affect the interests of
the Ayuntamiento de Viana, as occurs in the present case where the increase of wealth
concerns not only the Ayuntamiento but also the province and the state, yet, not on this
account does any action lie in their behalf as derived from the contracts with Urioste."
This doctrine is also affirmed in the more recent decision of March 18, 1909, in the
following words: "For the calculation of the damages claimed, it is necessary, pursuant to
the provisions of article 924 of the Law of Civil Procedure to give due regard to the
nature of the obligation that was unfulfilled and to the reasonable consequences of its
nonfulfillment, because the conviction sought can be imposed only when there exists a
natural and true relation between such nonfulfillment and the damages, whatever reason
there may be to demand them on another account."
In the case of Garcia Gamo vs. Compañia Madrileña de Alumbrado, etc. (101 Jurisp.,
662), it appeared that an employee of the defendant company whose duty it was to clean
and light the street lamps left a stepladder leaning against a tree which stood in a public
promenade. The seven-year old son of the plaintiff climbed the tree by means of the
ladder, and while endeavoring to cut some branches fell to the ground, sustaining severe
injuries which eventually caused his death. The plaintiff lost in the lower courts and on
appeal to the supreme court the decision of those lower courts was affirmed with the
following statement:
"That in this sense — aside from the fitness of the judgment appealed from, inasmuch as
the acquittal of the defendant party resolves all the issues argued at the trial, if no
counterclaim was made — the assignments of error in the appeal cannot be sustained,
because, while the act of placing the stepladder against the tree in the manner and for the
purposes aforestated, was not permissible it was regularly allowed by the local
authorities, and that fact did not precisely determine the injury, which was due first to the
abandonment of the child by his parents and secondly to his own imprudence, according
to the findings of the trial court, not legally objected to in the appeal; so it is beyond
peradventure that the circumstances necessary for imposing the obligations arising from
guilt or negligence do not concur in the present case."
The court here simply held that the injury to the child could not be considered as the
probable consequence of an injury which could have been foreseen from the act of the
company's employee in leaving the ladder leaning against the tree.
In De Alba vs. Sociedad Anonima de Tranvias (102 Jurisp., 928), a passenger was
standing on the platform of a street car while it was in motion when, or rounding a curve,
the plaintiff fell off and under the car, thereby sustaining severe injuries which took
several months to heal. He was not allowed to recover in the lower courts and on appeal
the supreme court sustained the inferior tribunals saying:
"Whereas, considering the circumstances of the accident that happened to D. Antonio
Morales de Alba, such as they were held by the trial court to have been proved, the
evidence does not disclose that any liability whatever in the said accident, for acts or
omissions, may be charged against the employees of the street car, as being guilty
through fault or negligence, since it was shown that the car was not traveling at any
unusual speed nor was this increased on rounding the curve, but that the accident was
solely due to the fact that the car in turning made a movement which caused the plaintiff
to lose his balance; and whereas no act whatever has been proved of any violation of the
regulations, nor can it be required of street-car employees, who have to attend to their
respective duties, that they should foresee and be on the alert to notify the possibility of
danger when not greater than that which is more or less inherent to this mode or travel;
therefore the appeal can not be upheld, and with all the more reason since the passenger
who takes the risk of travelling on the platform, especially when there is an unoccupied
seat in the car, should be on his guard against a contingency so natural as that of losing
his balance to a greater or less extent when the car rounds a curve."
In Crespo vs. Garcia (112 Jurisp., 796), the plaintiff, a servant woman, 72 years old, was
injured in the performance of her duties by the sudden and unexpected failure of the
upper floor of a house in which she was working. The owner and the architect of the
building were made defendants and after due trial it was held that no responsibility
attached to them for the failure of the floor, consequently the plaintiff was not allowed to
recover. On her appeal to the supreme court that tribunal said:
"Whereas the trial court held, in view of all the evidence adduced, including the expert
and other testimony, that the act which occasioned the injury suffered by Doña Maria
Alonso Crespo, was accidental, without fault of anybody, and consequently fortuitous,
and that, in so considering it to absolve the defendants, he did not incur the second error
assigned on the appeal, because, without overlooking the import and legal value of the
affidavit adduced at the trial, he held that the defendants in their conduct were not liable
for any omission that might constitute such fault or negligence as would oblige them to
indemnify the plaintiff; and to support the error assigned no legal provision whatever was
cited such as would require a different finding, nor was any other authentic document
produced than the aforesaid affidavit which contained an account of the ocular inspection
and the expert's report, which, as well as the testimony of the witnesses, the trial court
was able to pass upon in accordance with its exclusive power — all points of proof which
do not reveal any mistake on the part of the judge, whose opinion the appellant would
substitute with his own by a different interpretation."
These authorities are sufficient to show that liability for acts ex delicto under the Civil
Code is precisely that embraced within the "proximate cause" of the Anglo-Saxon law of
torts.
"The general rule, as frequently stated, is that in order that an act or omission may be the
proximate cause of an injury, the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of
the act or omission and such as might have been foreseen by an ordinarily responsible
and prudent man, in the light of the attendant circumstances, as likely to result therefrom .
..
"According to the later authorities foreseeableness, as an element of proximate cause,
does not depend upon whether an ordinarily reasonable and prudent man would or ought
in advance to have anticipated the result which happened, but whether, if such result and
the chain of events connecting it with the act complained of had occurred to his mind, the
same would have seemed natural and probable and according to the ordinary course of
nature. Thus, as said in one case, 'A person guilty of negligence, or an unlawful act,
should be held responsible for all the consequences which a prudent and experienced
man, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact existed, would at the time
of the negligent or unlawful act have thought reasonable to follow, if they had occurred to
his mind.' (Wabash R. etc. Co. vs. Coker, 81 Ill. App. 660, 664; Cooley on Torts, sec.
15.)"
"The view which I shall endeavor to justify is that, for the purpose of civil liability, those
consequences, and those only, are deemed 'immediate,' 'proximate,' or, to anticipate a
little, 'natural and probable,' which a person of average competence and knowledge, being
in the like case with the person whose conduct is complained of, and having the like
opportunities of observation, might be expected to foresee as likely to follow upon such
conduct. This is only where the particular consequence is not known to have been
intended or foreseen by the actor. If proof of that be forthcoming, whether the
consequence was 'immediate' or not does not matter. That which a man actually foresees
is to him, at all events, natural and probable." (Webb's Pollock on Torts, p. 31.)
There is another line of definitions which have for their basis "the natural and probable
consequences" or "the direct and immediate consequences" of the defendant's act. (Joyce
on Damages, sec. 82.)
It will be observed that the supreme court of Spain, in the above decisions, has rather
inclined to this line of definitions of what results a defendant is liable for as a
consequence of his wrongful acts, while the Civil Code uses the phraseology, "those
foreseen or which may have been foreseen." From either viewpoint the method of
arriving at the liability of the wrongdoer under the Civil Code and under the Anglo-Saxon
law is the same. Such was the holding of this court in Taylor vs. M. E. R. & L. Co. (16
Phil. Rep., 8, 15):
"We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally
accepted doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under
consideration, in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent
evidence:
"(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
"(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
"(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damages.
"These propositions are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real
difficulty arising in the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in
the case under consideration."
Parenthetically it may be said that we are not now dealing with the doctrine of
comparative (contributory) negligence which was established by Rakes vs. A. G. & P.
Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359), and Eades vs. A. G. & P. Co. (19 Phil. Rep., 561.)
The rules for the measure of damages, once that liability is determined, are, however,
somewhat different. The Civil Code requires that the defendant repair the damage caused
by his fault or negligence. No distinction is made therein between damage caused
maliciously and intentionally and damages caused through mere negligence in so far as
the civil liability of the wrongdoer is concerned. Nor is the defendant required to do more
than repair the damage done, or, in other words, to put the plaintiff in the same position,
so far as pecuniary compensation can do so, that he would have been in had the damage
not been inflicted. In this respect there is a notable difference between the two systems.
Under the Anglo-Saxon law, when malicious or willful intention to cause the damage is
an element of the defendant's act, it is quite generally regarded as an aggravating
circumstance for which the plaintiff is entitled to more than mere compensation for the
injury inflicted. These are called exemplary or punitive damages, and no provision is
made for them in article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Again, it is quite common under the English system to award what is called nominal
damages where there is only a technical violation of the plaintiff's rights resulting in no
substantial injury to him. This branch of damages is also unknown under the Civil Code.
If no damages have actually occurred there can be none to repair and the doctrine of
nominal damages is not applicable. Thus it has been often held by the supreme court of
Spain that a mere noncompliance with the obligations of a contract is not sufficient to
sustain a judgment for damages. It must be shown that damages actually existed.
(Decision of February 10, 1904.) Again, in its decision of January 9, 1897, that high
tribunal said that as a logical consequence of the requirements of articles 1101, 1718, and
1902 that he who causes damages must repair them, their existence must be proved.
In at least one case decided by this court we held in effect that nominal damages could
not be allowed. (Mercado vs. Abangan, 10 Phil. Rep., 676.)
"The purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is to repair the wrong that has been
done, to compensate for the injury inflicted, and not to impose a penalty. Actual damages
are not dependent on nor graded by the intent with which the wrongful act is done."
(Field vs. Munster, 11 Tex. Civ. Appl., 341, 32 S. W., 417.) "The words 'actual damages'
shall be construed to include all damages that the plaintiff may show he has suffered in
respect to his property, business, trade, profession, or occupation, and no other damages
whatever." (Gen. Stat. Minn., 1894, sec. 5418.) "Actual damages are compensatory only."
(Lord, Owen & Co. vs. Wood, 120 Iowa, 303, 94 N. W., 842.) " 'Compensatory damages'
as indicated by the word employed to characterize them, simply make good or replace the
loss caused by the wrong. They proceed from a sense of natural justice, and are designed
to repair that of which one has been deprived by the wrong of another." (Reid vs.
Terwilliger, 116 N. Y., 530; 22 N. E., 1091.) "'Compensatory damages' are such as are
awarded to compensate the injured party for injury caused by the wrong, and must be
only such as make just and fair compensation, and are due when the wrong is established,
whether it was committed maliciously--that is, with evil intention — or not." (Wimer vs.
Allbaugh, 78 Iowa, 79; 42 N. W., 587; 16 Am. St. Rep., 422.)
Finally, this court has itself held that actual damages are the extent of the recovery
allowed to the plaintiff. In Marker vs. Garcia (5 Phil. Rep., 557), which was an action for
damages for breach of contract, this court said: "Except in those cases where the law
authorizes the imposition of punitive or exemplary damages, the party claiming damages
must establish by competent evidence the amount of such damages, and courts can not
give judgment for a greater amount than those actually proven."
We are of the opinion that the requirements of article 1902, that the defendant repair the
damage done can only mean what is set forth in the above definitions. Anything short of
that would not repair the damages and anything beyond that would be excessive. Actual
compensatory damages are those allowed for tortious wrongs under the Civil Code;
nothing more, nothing less.
According to the text of article 1106 of the Civil Code which, according to the decision
of February 7, 1900 (referred to above), is the generic conception of what article 1902
embraces, actual damages include not only loss already suffered, but loss of profits which
may not have been realized. The allowance of loss of prospective profits could hardly be
more explicitly provided for. But it may not be amiss to refer to the decisions of the
supreme court of Spain for its interpretation of this article. The decision are numerous
upon this point. The decision of February 12, 1896, as epitomized by Sanchez Roman
(vol. 1, p. 281), interprets article 1106 as follows:
"Pursuant to articles 1106 and 1107 of the same Code, which govern in general the matter
of indemnity due for the nonfulfillment of obligations, the indemnity comprises, not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the prospective profit that was not realized,
and the obligation of the debtor in good faith is limited to such losses and damages as
were foreseen or might have been foreseen at the time the obligation was incurred and
which are a necessary consequence of his failure of fulfillment. Losses and damages
under such limitations and frustrated profits must, therefore, be proved directly by means
of the evidence the law authorizes."
The decision of January 8, 1906 (published in 14 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 516) had to do
with the following case: The plaintiff, a painter by occupation, was engaged to paint the
poles from which were suspended the trolley wires of a traction company. While at work
on February 8, 1901, the electric current was negligently turned on by the company,
whereby plaintiff received a severe shock, causing him to fall to the ground. Plaintiff
sustained severe injuries which took several months to heal and his right arm was
permanently disabled by the accident. The age of the plaintiff is not stated. His daily
wage was four pesetas. He was awarded 25,000 pesetas by the trial court and this
judgment was affirmed on appeal to the supreme court. This was equivalent to
approximately twenty year's salary.
In its decision of January 15, 1902 (published in 10 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 260), the
supreme court had the following case under consideration: Plaintiff's son was a travelling
salesman 48 years of age, who received an annual salary of 2,500 pesetas and expenses.
While travelling on defendant's train an accident occurred which caused his death. The
accident was held to be due to the failure of the defendant company to keep its track and
roadbed in good repair. Plaintiff was allowed 35,000 pesetas for the death of her son.
This would be equivalent to about fourteen years' salary.
In the case dated October 19, 1909 (published in 116 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 120),
plaintiff was suing for the death of his son caused from injuries inflicted by the
defendant's bull while plaintiff and his son were travelling along a public road. The age
of the son is not given. Plaintiff was awarded 3,000 pesetas damages.
In each of the above-mentioned cases the supreme court refused to pass on the amount of
damages which had been awarded. It appears to be the unvarying rule of the supreme
court of Spain to accept the amount of damages awarded by trial courts, its only inquiry
being as to whether damages have actually occurred as the result of the defendant's fault
or negligence. (Decision of July 5, 1909.) The reason why the supreme court of Spain
refuses to consider the amount of damages awarded is to be found in the great importance
attached by it to the provisions of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, articles 659 and 1692,
No. 7. In its auto of March 16, 1900 (punished in 8 Jurisp. del Codigo Civil, 503), the
following comment is made on these articles:
"As this supreme court has repeatedly held, the weight given by the trial judge to the
testimony, with good discernment or otherwise, can not be a matter for reversal, not even
with the support of No. 7 of article 1692 of the Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil, as it is
exclusively submitted to him, pursuant to the provisions of article 659 of the said law and
article 1248 of the Code."
The practice of this court, under our Code of Civil Procedure, does not permit of our
going to such lengths in sustaining the findings of fact in trial courts. We have repeatedly
held that due weight will be given in this court to the findings of fact by trial courts by
reason of their opportunities to see and hear the witnesses testify, note their demeanor
and bearing upon the stand, etc., but when the decision of the trial court, after permitting
due allowance for its superior advantages in weighing the evidence of the case, appears to
us to be against the fair preponderance of that evidence, it is our duty to reverse or set
aside the findings of fact made by the trial court and render such judgment as the facts of
the same seem to us to warrant. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 496.) We need go to no other
branch of law than that of damages to support this statement. In the following cases the
damages awarded by the lower court were reduced after a consideration of the evidence:
Sparrevohn vs. Fisher (2 Phil. Rep., 676); Campbell & Go-Tauco vs. Behn, Meyer & Co.
(3 Phil. Rep., 590); Causin vs. Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155); Marker vs. Garcia (5 Phil.
Rep., 557); Uy Piaoco vs. Osmeña (9 Phil. Rep., 299); Macleod vs. Phil. Pub. Co. (12
Phil. Rep., 427); Orense vs. Jaucian (18 Phil. Rep., 553). In Rodriguez vs. Findlay & Co.
(14 Phil. Rep., 294); and Cordoba y Conde vs. Castle Bros. (18 Phil. Rep., 317), the
damages awarded by the lower court were increased on appeal after a consideration of the
evidence. In Brodek vs. Larson (8 Phil. Rep., 425), it was held that the damages awarded
by the lower court were based on too uncertain evidence, and the case was remanded for
a new trial as to the amount of damages sustained. Also in Saldivar vs. Municipality of
Talisay (18 Phil. Rep., 362), where the lower court exonerated the defendant from
liability, this court, after a consideration of the evidence, held that the defendant was
liable and remanded the case for the purpose of a new trial in order to ascertain the
amount of damages sustained.
In this respect the law of damages under article 1902, as laid down by the decisions of the
supreme court of Spain, has been indirectly modified by the present Code of Civil
Procedure so that the finding of the lower court as to the amount of damages is not
conclusive on appeal.
Actual damages, under the American system, include pecuniary recompense for pain and
suffering, injured feelings, and the like. Article 1902, as interpreted by this court in
Meralco vs. Velasco (11 Phil. Rep., 287), does not extend to such incidents. Aside from
this exception, actual damages, in this jurisdiction, in the sense that they mean just
compensation for the loss suffered, are practically synonymous with actual damages
under the American system.
This court has already gone some distance in incorporating into our jurisprudence those
principles of the American law of actual damages which are of a general and abstract
nature. In Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors vs. Compañia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the
American principle of admiralty law that the liability of the ship for a tow is not so great
as that for her cargo was applied in determining the responsibility of a ship, under the
Code of Commerce, for her tow. In Rodriguez vs. Findlay & Co. (14 Phil. Rep., 294),
which was an action for breach of contract of warranty, the following principle,
supported entirely by American authority, was used in computing the amount of damages
due the plaintiff:
"The damages recoverable of a manufacturer or dealer for the breach of warranty of
machinery, which he contracts to furnish, or place in operation for a known purpose are
not confined to the difference in value of the machinery as warranted and as it proves to
be, but includes such consequential damages as are the direct, immediate, and probable
result of the breach."
In Aldaz vs. Gay (7 Phil. Rep., 268), it was held that the earnings or possible earnings of
a workman wrongfully discharged should be considered in mitigation of his damages for
the breach of contract by his employer, with the remark that nothing had been brought to
out attention to the contrary under Spanish jurisprudence.
In Fernandez vs. M. E. R. & L. Cl. (14 Phil. Rep., 274), a release or compromise for
personal injury sustained by negligence attributed to the defendant company was held a
bar to an action for the recovery of further damages, on the strength of American
precedents.
In Taylor vs. M. E. R. & L. Co., supra, in the course of an extended reference to
American case law, the doctrine of the so-called "Turntable" and "Torpedo" cases was
adopted by this court as a factor in determining the question of liability for damages in
such cases as the one the court then had under consideration.
In Martinez vs. Van Buskirk (18 Phil. Rep., 79), this court, after remarking that the rules
under the Spanish law by which the fact of negligence is determined are, generally
speaking, the same as they are in Anglo-Saxon countries, approved the following well-
known rule of the Anglo-Saxon law of negligence, relying exclusively upon American
authorities: ". . . acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious
and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have
ripened into a custom, cannot be held to be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the
circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his team while
assisting in unloading his wagon."
This court does not, as a rule, content itself in the determination of cases brought before
it, with a mere reference to or quotation of the articles of the codes or laws applicable to
the questions involved, for the reason that it is committed to the practice of citing
precedents for its rulings wherever practicable. (See Ocampo vs. Cabangis, 15 Phil. Rep.,
626.) No better example of the necessity of amplifying this treatment of a subject given in
the code is afforded than article 1902 of the Civil Code. That article requires that the
defendant repair the damage done. There is, however, a world of difficulty in carrying out
the legislative will in this particular. The measure of damages is an ultimate fact, to be
determined from the evidence submitted to the court. The question is sometimes a nice
one to determine, whether the offered evidence is such as ought to be considered by the
court in fixing the quantum of damages; and while the complexity of human affairs is
such that two cases are seldom exactly alike, a thorough discussion of each case may
permit of their more or less definite classification, and develop leading principles which
will be of great assistance to a court in determining the question, not only of damages, but
of the prior one of negligence. We are of the opinion that as the Code is so indefinite
(even though from necessity) on the subject of damages arising from fault or negligence,
the bench and bar should have access to and avail themselves of those great, underlying
principles which have been gradually and conservatively developed and thoroughly tested
in Anglo-Saxon courts. A careful and intelligent application of these principles should
have a tendency to prevent mistakes in the rulings of the court on the evidence offered,
and should assist in determining damages, generally, with some degree of uniformity.
The law of damages has not, for some reason, proved as favorite a theme with the civil-
law writers as with those of the common-law school. The decisions of the supreme court
of Spain, though numerous on damages arising from contractual obligations, are
exceedingly few upon damages for personal injuries arising ex delicto. The reasons for
this are not important to the present discussion. It is sufficient to say that the law of
damages has not received the elaborate treatment that it has at the hands of the Anglo-
Saxon jurists. If we in this jurisdiction desire to base our conclusions in damage cases
upon controlling principles, we may develop those principles and incorporate them into
our jurisprudence by that difficult and tedious process which constitutes the centuries-old
history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence; or we may avail ourselves of these principles in
their present state of development without further effort than it costs to refer to the works
and writings of many eminent text-writers and jurists. We shall not attempt to say that all
these principles will be applicable in this jurisdiction. It must be constantly borne in mind
that the law of damages in this jurisdiction was conceived in the womb of the civil law
and under an entirely different form of government. These influences have had their
effect upon the customs and institutions of the country. Nor are the industrial and social
conditions the same. An act which might constitute negligence or damage there might not
constitute negligence or damage here, and vice versa. As stated in Story on Bailments,
section 12, "It will thence follow that, in different times and in different countries, the
standard (of diligence) is necessary variable with respect to the facts, although it may be
uniform with respect to the principle. So that it may happen that the same acts which in
one country or in one age may be deemed negligent acts, may at another time or in
another country be justly deemed an exercise of ordinary diligence."
The abstract rules for determining negligence and the measure of damages are, however,
rules of natural justice rather than man-made law, and are applicable under any
enlightened system of jurisprudence. There is all the more reason for our adopting the
abstract principles of the Anglo-Saxon law of damages, when we consider that there are
at least two important laws on our statute books of American origin, in the application of
which we must necessarily be guided by American authorities: they are the Libel Law
(which, by the way, allows damages for injured feelings and reputation, as well as
punitive damages, in a proper case), and the Employer's Liability Act.
The case at bar involves actual incapacity of the plaintiff for two months, and loss of the
greater portion of his business. As to the damages resulting from the actual incapacity of
the plaintiff to attend to his business there is no question. They are, of course, to be
allowed on the basis of his earning capacity, which in this case, is P50 per month. The
difficult question in the present case is to determine the damage which has resulted to his
business through his enforced absence. In Sanz vs. Lavin Bros. (6 Phil. Rep., 299), this
court, citing numerous decisions of the supreme court of Spain, held that evidence of
damages "must rest upon satisfactory proof of the existence in reality of the damages
alleged to have been suffered." But, while certainty is an essential element of an award of
damages, it need not be a mathematical certainty. That this is true is adduced not only
from the personal injury cases from the supreme court of Spain which we have discussed
above, but by many cases decided by this court, reference to which has already been
made. As stated in Joyce on Damages, section 75, "But to deny the injured party the right
to recover any actual damages in cases of torts because they are of such a nature as
cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties to profit by and speculate
upon their own wrongs; such is not the law."
As to the elements to be considered in estimating the damage done to plaintiff's business
by reason of his accident, this same author, citing numerous authorities, has the following
to say: "It is proper to consider the business the plaintiff is engaged in, the nature and
extent of such business, the importance of his personal oversight and superintendence in
conducting it, and the consequent loss arising from his inability to prosecute it."
The business of the present plaintiff required his immediate supervision. All the profits
derived therefrom were wholly due to his own exertions. Nor are his damages confined to
the actual time during which he was physically incapacitated for work, as is the case of a
person working for a stipulated daily or monthly or yearly salary. As to persons whose
labor is thus compensated and who completely recover from their injuries, the rule may
be said to be that their damages are confined to the duration of their enforced absence
from their occupation. But the present plaintiff could not resume his work at the same
profit he was making when the accident occurred. He had built up an established business
which included some twenty regular customers. These customers represented to him a
regular income. In addition to this he made sales to other people who were not so regular
in their purchases. But he could figure on making at least some sales each month to
others besides his regular customers. Taken as a whole his average monthly income from
his business was about P50. As a result of the accident, he lost all but four of his regular
customers and his receipts dwindled down to practically nothing. Other agents had
invaded his territory, and upon becoming physically able to attend to his business, he
found that it would be necessary to start with practically no regular trade, and either win
back his old customers from his competitors or else secure others. During this process of
reestablishing his patronage his income would necessarily be less than he was making at
the time of the accident and would continue to be so for some time. Of course, if it could
be mathematically determined how much less he will earn during this rebuilding process
than he would have earned if the accident had not occurred, that would be the amount he
would be entitled to in this action. But manifestly this ideal compensation cannot be
ascertained. The question therefore resolves itself into whether this damage to his
business can be so nearly ascertained as to justify a court in awarding any amount
whatever.
When it is shown that a plaintiff's business is a going concern with a fairly steady average
profit on the investment, it may be assumed that had the interruption to the business
through defendant's wrongful act not occurred, it would have continued producing this
average income "so long as is usual with things of that nature." When in addition to the
previous average income of the business it is further shown what the reduced receipts of
the business are immediately after the cause of the interruption has been removed, there
can be no manner of doubt that a loss of profits has resulted from the wrongful act of the
defendant. In the present case, we not only have the value of plaintiff's business to him
just after the accident. At the trial, he testified that his wife had earned about fifteen pesos
during the two months that he was disabled. That this almost total destruction of his
business was directly chargeable to defendant's wrongful act, there can be no manner of
doubt; and the mere fact that the loss can not be ascertained with absolute accuracy, is no
reason for denying plaintiff's claim altogether. As stated in one case, it would be a
reproach to the law if he could not recover damages at all. (Baldwin vs. Marqueze, 91
Ga., 404.)
"Profits are not excluded from recovery because they are profits; but when excluded, it is
on the ground that there are no criteria by which to estimate the amount with the certainty
on which the adjudications of courts, and the findings of juries should be based."
(Brigham vs. Carlisle (Ala.), 56 Am. Rep., 28, as quoted in Wilson vs. Wernwag, 217
Pa., 82.)
The leading English case on the subject is Phillips vs. London & Southwestern Ry. Co. (5
Q. B. D., 78; 41 L. T., 121; 8 Eng. Raul. Cases, 447). The plaintiff was a physician with a
very lucrative practice. In one case he had received a fee of 5,000 guineas; but it appeared
that his average income was between 6,000 and 7,000 pounds sterling per year. The
report does not state definitely how serious plaintiff's injuries were, but apparently he was
permanently disabled. The following instruction to the jury was approved, and we think
should be set out in this opinion as applicable to the present case:
"You cannot put the plaintiff back again into his original position, but you must bring
your reasonable common sense to bear, and you must always recollect that this is the only
occasion on which compensation can be given. Dr. Phillips can never sue again for it.
You have, therefore, now to give him compensation, once for all. He has done no wrong;
he has suffered a wrong at the hands of the defendants, and you must take care to give
him full, fair compensation for that which he has suffered."
The jury's award was seven thousand pounds. Upon a new trial, on the ground of the
insufficiency of the damages awarded, plaintiff received 16,000 pounds. On the second
appeal, Bramwell, L. J., put the case of a laborer earning 25 shillings a week, who, on
account of injury, was totally incapacitated for work for twenty-six weeks, and then for
ten weeks could not earn more than ten shillings a week, and was not likely to get into
full work for another twenty weeks. The proper measure of damages would be in that
case 25 shillings a week for twenty-six weeks, plus 15 shillings a week for the ten and
twenty weeks, and damages for bodily suffering and medical expenses. Damages for
bodily suffering, of course, are not, for reasons stated above, applicable to this
jurisdiction; otherwise, we believe this example to be the ideal compensation for loss of
profits which courts should strive to reach, in cases like the present.
In Joslin vs. Grand Rapids Ice & Coal Co. (53 Mich., 322), the court said: "The plaintiff,
in making proof of his damages, offered testimony to the effect that he was an attorney at
law of ability and in good standing, and the extent and value of his practice, and that, in
substance, the injury had rendered him incapable of pursuing his profession. This was
objected to as irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent. We think this was competent. It
was within the declaration that this standing in his profession was such as to command
respect, and was proper to be shown, and his ability to earn, and the extent of his practice,
were a portion of the loss he had sustained by the injury complained of. There was no
error in permitting this proof, and we further think it was competent, upon the question of
damages under the evidence in this case, for the plaintiff to show, by Judge Hoyt, as was
done, that an interruption in his legal business and practice for eight months was a
damage to him. It seems to have been a part of the legitimate consequences of the
plaintiff's injury."
In Luck vs. City of Ripon (52 Wis., 196), plaintiff was allowed to prove that she was a
midwife and show the extent of her earnings prior to the accident in order to establish the
damage done to her business.
The pioneer case of Goebel vs. Hough (26 Minn., 252) contains perhaps one of the
clearest statements of the rule and is generally considered as one of the leading case on
this subject. In that case the court said:
"When a regular and established business, the value of which may be ascertained, has
been wrongfully interrupted, the true general rule for compensating the party injured is to
ascertain how much less valuable the business was by reason of the interruption, and
allow that as damages. This gives him only what the wrongful act deprived him of. The
value of such a business depends mainly on the ordinary profits derived from it. Such
value cannot be ascertained without showing what the usual profits are; nor are the
ordinary profits incident to such a business contingent or speculative, the sense that
excludes profits from consideration as an element of damages. What they would have
been, in the ordinary course of the business, for a period during which it was interrupted,
may be shown with reasonable certainty. What effect extraordinary circumstances would
have had upon the business might be contingent and conjectural, and any profits
anticipated from such causes would be obnoxious to the objection that they are merely
speculative; but a history of the business, for a reasonable time prior to a period of
interruption, would enable the jury to determine how much would be done under ordinary
circumstances, and in the usual course, during the given period; and the usual rate of
profit being shown, of course the aggregate becomes only a matter of calculation."
In the very recent case of Wellington vs. Spencer (Okla., 132 S. W., 675), plaintiff had
rented a building from the defendant and used it as a hotel. Defendant sued out a
wrongful writ of attachment upon the equipment of the plaintiff, which caused him to
abandon his hotel business. After remarking that the earlier cases held that no recovery
could be had for prospective profits, but that the later authorities have held that such
damages may be allowed when the amount is capable of proof, the court had the
following to say:
"Where the plaintiff has just made his arrangements to begin business, and he is
prevented from beginning either by tort or a breach of contract, or where the injury is to a
particular subject matter, profits of which are uncertain, evidence as to expected profits
must be excluded from the jury because of the uncertainty. There is as much reason to
believe that there will be no profits as to believe that there will be profits, but no such
argument can be made against proving a usual profit of an established business. In this
case the plaintiff, according to his testimony, had an established business, and was
earning a profit in the business, and had been doing that for a sufficient length of time
that evidence as to prospective profits was not entirely speculative. Men who have been
engaged in business calculate with a reasonable certainty the income from their business,
make their plans to live accordingly, and the value of such business is not such a matter
of speculation as to exclude evidence from the jury."
A good example of a business not established for which loss of profits will not be
allowed may be found in States vs. Durkin (65 Kan., 101). Plaintiff's formed a
partnership. and entered the plumbing business in the city of Topeka in April. In July of
the same year, they brought an action against a plumbers' association on the ground that
the latter had formed an unlawful combination in restraint of trade and prevented them
from securing supplies for their business within a reasonable time. The court said:

"In the present case the plaintiffs had only in business a short time — not so long that it
can be said the they had an established business. They had contracted three jobs of
plumbing, had finished two, and lost money on both; not, however, because of any
misconduct or wrongful acts on the part of the defendants or either of them. They carried
no stock in trade, and their manner of doing business was to secure a contract and then
purchase the material necessary for its completion. It is not shown that they had any
means or capital invested in the business other than their tools. Neither of them had prior
thereto managed or carried on a similar business. Nor was it shown that they were
capable of so managing this business as to make it earn a profit. There was little of that
class of business being done at that time, and little, if any, profit derived therefrom. The
plaintiffs' business lacked duration, permanency, and recognition. It was an adventure, as
distinguished from an established business. Its profits were speculative and remote,
existing only in anticipation. the law, with all its vigor and energy in its effort to right
wrongs award damages for injuries sustained, may not enter into the domain of
speculation or conjecture. In view of the character and condition of the plaintiffs'
business, the jury had no sufficient evidence from which to ascertain profits."
Other cases which hold that the profits of an established business may be considered in
calculating the measure of damages for an interruption of it are: Wilkinson vs. Dunbar
(149 N. C., 20); Kinney vs. Crocker (18 Wis., 80); Sachra vs. Manilla (120 Ia., 562);
Kramer vs. City of Los Angeles (147 Cal., 668); Mugge vs. Erkman (161 Ill. App., 180);
Fredonia Gas Co. vs. Bailey (77 Kan., 296); Morrow vs. Mo. Pac. R. Co. (140 Mo. App.,
200); City of Indianapolis vs. Gaston (58 Ind., 224); National Fibre Board vs. Auburn
Electric Light Co. (95 Me., 318); Sutherland on Damages, sec. 70.
We have now outlined the principles which should govern the measure of damages in this
case. We are of the opinion that the lower court had before it sufficient evidence of the
damage to plaintiff's business in the way of prospective loss of profits to justify it in
calculating his damages as to this item. That evidence has been properly elevated to this
court for review. Under section 496 of the code of Civil Procedure, we are authorized to
enter final judgment or direct a new trial, as may best subserve the ends of justice. We are
of the opinion that the evidence presented as to the damage done to plaintiff's business is
credible and that it is sufficient and clear enough upon which to base a judgment for
damages. Plaintiff having had four years' experience in selling goods on commission, it
must be presumed that he will be able to rebuild his business to its former proportions; so
that at some time in the future his commissions will equal those he was receiving when
the accident occurred. Aided by his experience, he should be able to rebuild this business
to its former proportions in much less time than it took to establish it as it stood just prior
to the accident. One year should be sufficient time in which to do this. The profits which
plaintiff will receive from the business in the course of its reconstruction will gradually
increase. The injury to plaintiff's business begins where these profits leave off, and, as a
corollary, there is where defendant's liability begins. Upon this basis, we fix the damages
to plaintiff's business at P250.
The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following
damages: ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his
enforced absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done
to his business in the way of the loss of profits, or a total of three hundreds and sixty
pesos. No costs will be allowed in this instance.
Arellano, C. J., and Araullo, J., concur.
Carson, J., concurs in the result.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130352. November 3, 1998.]
ROGELIA P. DIAZ-DUARTE, petitioner, vs. SPS. BEN AND ETHYL ONG, AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding Lot 1208 to respondent
spouses Ben and Ethyl Ong. 1
The facts are as succinctly summarized by the trial court, viz:
"Macario Diaz married Encarnacion Reyes sometime in 1895. Out of this union, Trinidad
Diaz was born in 1896. Sometime in 1903, Encarnacion Reyes died. In 1905, Macario
Diaz married Cristina Pedrosa. Out of this union, . . ., Rogelia-Diaz Duarte was born in
1910.
"Trinidad Diaz, . . ., married Filomeno Arteche. This marriage was blessed by nine
children, including Encarnacion Arteche and all the other plaintiffs in the case in the trial
court. Trinidad Arteche died on March 21, 1977. cdll
"On October 28, 1932, in Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Cad. Record No. 1040, Judge
Luciano Ortiz adjudicated Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre, located in Marasbaras,
Tacloban City, containing 26,738 square meters to 'Macario Diaz married to Cristina
Pedrosa, of Tacloban, Province of Leyte, Philippines'. The decision having become final,
Decree No. 639202 was issued by the General Land Registration Office on August 18,
1937, and Original Certificate of Title No. 19486 was issued.
"On April 30, 1941, Macario Diaz died and on October 2, 1962, his second wife Cristina
died. On June 6, 1979, Rogelia Diaz-Duarte issued an Affidavit of Adjudication and Sale
of Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre in favor of Wilfredo M. Corregidor for P20,000.00
before Notary Public Atty. Antonio F. Mendiola of Tacloban City who entered the same
as Doc. No. 445, Page 40, Book 29, Series of 1979. By virtue of this sale, OCT No.
19486 of Macario Diaz was cancelled and in its place TCT No. T-17501 was issued by
the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City in favor of Wilfredo Corregidor on June 25, 1979.
prcd
"On October 12, 1979, Wilfredo Corregidor sold back Lots 1208, 3332, and 3364 of the
Tacloban Cadastre to Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte for P33,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of
repurchase executed by him on said date before Notary Public Atty. Victor C. Veloso of
Tacloban City who entered the same as Doc. No. 5, Page 2, Book I, Series of 1979.
"On October 17, 1979, Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte executed an adverse claim to Lot 1208
covered by TCT No. T-17501 of Wilfredo Corregidor on the basis of the deed of sale
executed by Wilfredo to her on October 12, 1979.
"On April 10, 1980, 30 days having elapsed, the affidavit of adverse claim of Diaz-
Duarte was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, albeit erroneously,
pursuant to Sec. 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree of the Philippines.
"On February 28, 1981, notwithstanding the resale of the property made by him in favor
of Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-Duarte in 1979, Wilfredo Corregidor sold again Lot 1208 to Ben S.
Ong and his wife Ethyl Ong for P35,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale executed by
him on said date before a Notary Public who entered the same as Doc. No. 380, Page 79,
Book I, series of 1981.
"On July 21, 1981, Ben S. Ong mortgaged Lot 1208 and some other properties to the
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P450,000.00.
"On February 17, 1983, Encarnacion A. Arteche and the other children and heirs of the
deceased Trinidad Diaz-Arteche, filed a civil case for recovery of Lot 1208 of the
Tacloban Cadastre against herein petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte, Wilfredo Corregidor
and his wife, Ben S. Ong and his wife, and the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
and Pablo G. Amascual Jr., the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City." 2
On October 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region decided the civil case
for the recovery of Lot 1208 in favor of Encarnacion Arteche, et. al., to wit: 3
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: LLphil
"1. Declaring the affidavit of Adjudication and Sale of Lot 1208 of the Tacloban
Cadastre executed by Rogelia Diaz-Duarte on June 6, 1979 as null and void being a false
document it having been established to the satisfaction of the court that Mrs. Rogelia-
Diaz Duarte is not the sole heir of Macario Diaz, original owner of Lot 1208;
"2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-17501 of Wilfredo Corregidor and Roseanna F. Corregidor of Lot 1208 of the
Tacloban Cadastre and all certificates of title emanating therefrom including TCT No.
20338 of Ben S. Ong and Ethyl Ong;
"3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Tacloban to cancel TCT No. 20338 of Ben S.
Ong and his wife Ethyl Y. Ong to Lot 1208 of the Tacloban Cadastre and issue in lieu
thereof a new transfer certificate of title to the following person: Mrs. Rogelia Diaz-
Duarte, of legal age, widow and residing in Tacloban city, three-fourth or 20,052 square
meters; and to the Heirs of Trinidad Diaz Arteche, represented by Mrs. Encarnacion A.
Benedicto of Tacloban City, Philippines, one-fourth or 6,684 square meters, subject to the
mortgage lien of the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation.
"4. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED."
The defendants appealed but only the appeal of spouses Ben and Ethyl Ong was
considered by the Court of Appeals as Wilfredo Corregidor, Rizal Banking Corporation
and Pablo Amascual failed to file their respective briefs. 4 In their appeal, appellant-
spouses raised the following errors, to wit:
I
"The trial court erred in admitting as evidence and giving it any probative value the parol
testimony of the defendant Rogelia Diaz-Duarte as to the affidavit of adjudication with
deed of absolute sale of the land in question executed by Rogelia Diaz Duarte in favor of
Wilfredo Corregidor on June 6, 1979."
II
"The trial court erred in not finding or declaring that the affidavit of adjudication with
deed of absolute sale of the land in question executed by Rogelia Diaz Duarte in favor of
Wilfredo Corregidor was valid and legal.
III
"The trial court erred in not finding or declaring the deed of repurchase of the land in
question executed by Wilfredo Corregidor in favor of Rogelia Diaz-Duarte on October
17, 1979 was absolutely simulated or fictitious.
IV
"The trial court erred in not declaring or finding that the deed of sale of the land in
question executed by Wilfredo Corregidor in favor of the spouses Ben S. Ong and Ethyl
Y. Ong on February 28, 1981 as valid and legal.
V
"The trial court erred in not declaring or finding that Rogelia Diaz-Duarte was the sole
heir of Macario Diaz with respect to the property in question.
VI
"The trial court erred in ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No T-
20338 of Ben S. Ong and Ethyl Y. Ong of the land in question and the issuance of new
transfer certificates of title to Rogelia Diaz-Duarte and to the heirs of Trinidad Diaz
Arteche for the three fourth (3/4) and one fourth (1/4) portions of the land in litigation,
respectively in their names by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City."
The appellate court sustained the fourth and sixth assigned errors of the appellant-
spouses. It awarded Lot 1208 to appellant-spouses Ben and Ethyl Ong after a finding that
they were buyers in good faith and for value.
Hence, this petition where Rogelia Diaz-Duarte contends:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SPOUSES ONG WERE INNOCENT
PURCHASERS FOR VALUE AND IN GOOD FAITH. cda
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
SPOUSES ONG WERE BUYERS IN BAD FAITH.
III
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE WRONGFUL
AND ILLEGAL CANCELLATION OF PETITIONER'S ADVERSE CLAIM.
IV
THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER HAS
LOST HER RIGHTS OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
The core issue is who between petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte and respondent spouses
Ong, has a better right over Lot 1208. Petitioner claims ownership over Lot 1208 on the
basis of the deed of repurchase between her and Wilfredo Corregidor. When the latter
refused to surrender TCT No. T-17501 to her, she caused to be annotated thereon a notice
of adverse claim. On the other hand, respondent spouses aver that they own Lot 1208,
having bought the same from Corregidor without knowledge of its encumbrance. They
contend that petitioner's notice or adverse claim in Corregidor's title, was already
cancelled when they bought the property. Petitioner disputes the legality of said
cancellation. She maintains that the Registrar of Deeds should not have automatically
cancelled the notice of adverse claim simply because the 30-day period has lapsed. LLpr
We find for petitioner.
The good faith of appellant-spouses rests heavily on whether the notice on adverse claim
on Lot 1208 was validly cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds. The issue is no longer of
first impression. In the 1996 case of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals 5 , we explained that a
notice of adverse claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided
by Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. Section 70 provides:
"Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered owner,
arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing, setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the
number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed.
"The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall
be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim
shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse
of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified
petition therefor by the party in interest. Provided, however that after cancellation, no
second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same
claimant."
We explained in Sajonas that for as long as there is yet no petition for its cancellation, the
notice of adverse claim remains subsisting: Thus:
"At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the effectivity of the
adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and should not be treated
separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence following, which reads:
'After the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse claim may be cancelled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest.'
"If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso facto lose force and effect
after the lapse of thirty days, then it would not have been necessary to include the
foregoing caveat to clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of time, the law would
not have required the party in interest to do a useless act." 6
In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The
hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the
adverse claim. 7 Petitioner was unlawfully denied this opportunity when the Registrar of
Deeds automatically cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the cancellation of
her adverse claim is ineffective.
But this is not all. Appellant spouses alleged good faith is negated by the evidence on
record. At the trial court, respondent spouses declared that they retained Atty. Rufino
Reyes to assist them in buying Lot 1208. According to Atty. Reyes, his clients asked him
to verify the status of the land from the Register of Deeds. However, he failed to do so.
Had he done so, he would have discovered the adverse claim of the petitioner over the
lot. He would have also known that the adverse claim was cancelled by the Registrar on
his own and not because any petition was made by any party-in-interest. 8 Respondent
spouses are bound by the negligence of their lawyer.
Time and again, we have reiterated that a purchaser in good faith and for value is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the
property. 9 The adverse claim of petitioner Rogelia Diaz-Duarte was annotated in
Corregidor's title as early as October 17, 1979. It was existing when Corregidor sold the
property to respondents Ong on February 28, 1981. Hence, respondent spouses cannot be
considered innocent purchasers for value and in good faith. Their claim over Lot 1208
must yield to the lien in favor of petitioner. 10 cdtai
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 09598,
is REVERSED and the decision of the trial court is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
LLpr
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. C.A. G.R. CV No. 09598.
2. Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 2-5; Rollo, pp. 41-44.
3. Civil Case No. 6545 entitled "Encarnacion A. Benedicto, et al. v. Rogelia Diaz-
Duarte, et al".
4. Court of Appeals Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 41.
5. 258 SCRA 79 (1996).
6. Supra note 5.
7. Id. See also Gonzales v. Bersamin, 254 SCRA 652 (1996).
8. TSN, June 8, 1984, pp. 3-8.
9. Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 275 (1996)
10. Yu v. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 509 (1995).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164740. July 31, 2006.]
SPOUSES EDUARDO AND ELSA VERSOLA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, SHERIFF REYNALDO B. MADOLARIA, JUDGE LYDIA QUERUBIN
LAYOSA, BOTH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 217, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY AND DR. VICTORIA T.
ONG OH, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses
Eduardo and Elsa Versola, seeks to nullify and set aside the 28 April 2004 Decision 1 and
28 July 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79300, which
affirmed the Orders dated 6 January 2003 and 14 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Civil Case No. Q-93-16003. TAESDH
This case has its genesis from a loan transaction entered into by private respondent Dr.
Victoria T. Ong Oh and a certain Dolores Ledesma, wherein the former granted a
P1,000,000.00 loan to the latter. As a security for said loan, Ledesma issued to private
respondent a check for the same amount dated 10 February 1993 and promised to execute
a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot located at Tandang Sora, Quezon
City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-51142. The execution of the
deed of real estate mortgage did not materialize, but Ledesma delivered the owner's
duplicate copy of the TCT No. RT-51142 to private respondent.
Thereafter, Ledesma sold the said house and lot to petitioners for P2,500,000.00.
Petitioners paid Ledesma P1,000,000.00 as downpayment, with the remaining balance of
P1,500,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments of P75,000.00 2 starting 15 March
1993. Even before the monthly installments became due, Ledesma already asked
petitioners to pay the remaining balance of P1,500,000.00. Petitioners, however, were
only able to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to Ledesma. To raise the full amount that
Ledesma demanded, petitioners applied for a loan with Asiatrust Bank, Inc. (Asiatrust) in
the amount of P2,000,000.00. In the course of the application for said loan, petitioners,
private respondent, and Ledesma convened with Asiatrust to arrive at a scheme to settle
the obligation of Ledesma to private respondent and the obligation of petitioners to
Ledesma. After the meeting, the following agreement 3 was arrived at: (1) private
respondent would grant Ledesma an additional loan of P450,000.00, making the latter's
loan from the former amount to P1,450,000.00 (the amount of P1,450,000.00 would then
be credited to petitioners as full settlement of the purchase price of the property); (2)
Ledesma would execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership over her house and lot,
covered by TCT No. RT-51142, to petitioners; (3) private respondent would then deliver
the duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-51142 to Asiatrust; (4) once petitioners had secured a
title to the said house and lot in their names, they would execute a real estate mortgage
over it in favor of Asiatrust to secure their loan of P2,000,000.00; and (5) Asiatrust would
then grant a loan of P2,000,000.00 to petitioners with a written guarantee that the
P1,500,000.00 would be given directly by Asiatrust to private respondent after the
mortgage lien of Asiatrust would have been annotated on the title of the said property.
SDEHCc
In keeping with the foregoing agreement, private respondent granted Ledesma an
additional loan of P450,000.00. Ledesma, in turn, executed a Deed of Sale transferring
the title of the subject property to petitioners. Private respondent then delivered the title
of the said property to Asiatrust. The Deed of Sale was registered and TCT No. RT-
51142 in the name of Ledesma was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 83104, was issued
in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, Asiatrust approved the loan application of
petitioners, after which the latter issued a check in the amount of P1,500,000.00 to private
respondent. However, when Asiatrust tried to register the Real Estate Mortgage covering
the subject property executed in its favor by petitioners, it discovered a notice of levy on
execution was annotated on the title in connection with Ledesma's obligation to a certain
Miladay's Jewels, Inc., in the amount of P214,284.00. Because of this annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate Mortgage and refused to release
the P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners. When private respondent presented Ledesma's
check for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was already
closed. Subsequently, when private respondent presented for payment the check issued
by petitioners, the said check was likewise dishonored because there was a stop payment
order. With the dishonor of the checks and with Asiatrust's refusal to release the
P2,000,000.00 loan of petitioners, private respondent came away empty-handed as she
did not receive payment for the P1,500,000.00 loan she granted to Ledesma that was
assumed by petitioners. As a result, private respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money against Ledesma, petitioners, and Asiatrust before the RTC, Branch 217, Quezon
City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-93-16003.
After trial, the RTC, in a Decision dated 31 May 1996, rendered a verdict in favor of
private respondent and against petitioners, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
Dr. Victoria Ong Oh and against defendant-spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola. The
appellants Versolas are hereby ordered to pay to Dr. Victoria Ong Oh the following:
a) the sum of one million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) plus legal
interest to be computed from the time of judicial demand;
b) one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages and fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; and,
c) attorney's fees of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00). 4
Undaunted, petitioners appealed the trial court's Decision to the Court of Appeals, with
the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 54399.
In a Decision dated 30 August 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment affirming
the Decision of the trial court, but modifying the award of moral, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees by deleting the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED in this wise: the Court
orders appellants spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola to pay appellee Victoria T. Ong Oh
One Million Five Hundred Thousand (P1,500,000.00) Pesos with legal interest from
March 24, 1993. 5
No appeal having been filed, the foregoing Decision attained finality. ETIHCa
On 3 April 2000, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court, the
latter granted the same in an Order dated 14 April 2000. On 23 June 2000, the property
covered by TCT No. 83104, in the names of petitioners, was levied upon. The sheriff set
the sale of the property at public auction on 19 September 2000. Petitioners were served a
copy of the notice of the sale. On 18 September 2000, petitioners filed with the sheriff an
"Objection/Exception to the Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola's
Family Home Pending Court Order or Clearance." Despite petitioners' objections,
however, the property was still sold at public auction on 19 September 2000 and was
awarded to private respondent at the bid price of P2,835,000.00.
For failure of petitioners to redeem the property during the redemption period, a Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of private respondent on 19 March 2002.
On 5 August 2002, private respondent filed with the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for
Issuance of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa
Versola. Petitioners opposed the said motion on the following grounds: (1) the property
sold at the public auction is the family home of petitioners which is exempt from
execution pursuant to Article 155 of the Family Code; (2) no application was made by
private respondent for the determination of the value of their family home to be subjected
to execution, as required under Article 160 of the Family Code; and (3) there were
serious defects in the conduct of the execution sale.
In an Order dated 6 January 2003, the trial court debunked petitioners' arguments, and
granted private respondent's Ex-parte Motion and confirmed the Sheriff's Final Deed of
Sale.
In an Order dated 14 July 2003, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioners.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 79300, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
Judge in confirming the judicial sale of their family home.
In a Decision dated 28 April 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition for lack of
merit. A Motion for Reconsideration thereof was filed, but was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 28 July 2004. EHIcaT
Hence, the instant Petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
A. WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE ON (sic) THE PROVISIONS OF THE
FAMILY CODE SPECIFICALLY ARTICLES 152 TO 160 IN RELATION TO THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE III SECTION 1 OF THE CONSTITUTION, IS
MANDATORY; and
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROVISION UNDER ARTICLE 160 REQUIRING
AN APPLICATION TO THE COURT FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE AUCTION
SALE OF A FAMILY HOME IS MANDATORY AND A CONDITION SINE QUA
NON THAT MUST BE COMPLIED WITH PRIOR TO THE AUCTION SALE. 6
Petitioners aver that prior to the auction sale of their family home, they registered their
opposition and objection to the same by filing with the trial court an "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Auction Sale on the Property of Defendants under TCT No. 83104 located at
Sunville Subdivision, Quezon City," dated 12 September 2000 which was admittedly
treated by the court as a "mere scrap of paper and is deemed not filed." They also claim
that a day before the scheduled auction sale, they filed with the sheriff of the trial court an
"Objection/Exception to the Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola's
Family Home Pending Court Order or Clearance" which the latter disregarded.
Petitioners maintain that said objection to the sale was based on the fact that there was no
order or clearance from the trial court for the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale, in
clear violation of Article 160 of the Family Code, which requires an application by the
creditor and a determination of the actual value of the family home by the court ordering
the sale of property under execution.
It was likewise contended by petitioners that there were serious defects in the conduct of
the execution sale, namely, the sheriff based the execution on the dispositive portion of
the Decision of the RTC and not the modified Decision of the Court of Appeals, and that
there were no documents proving the amount of execution sale and the determination of
the proceeds.
On the other hand, the trial court found that the allegations of serious defects in the
sheriff's conduct of the execution sale are unfounded. According to the trial court,
although the sheriff inadvertently quoted the decision of the trial court in the "Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale" dated 19 March 2002, the "Statement of Accounts" submitted by
private respondent, as well as the computation of the sheriff showed that the auction sale
was based on the decision of the Court of Appeals. The bid price amounted to
P2,835,000.00, P1,500,000.00 thereof representing the principal amount owed by
petitioners to private respondent while the remaining P1,335,000.00 represented the legal
interest of 12% counted from 24 March 1993 up to 24 August 2000.
As to the allegation that the sheriff failed to act on petitioners' Objection/Exception to
Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola's Family Home, the trial court
ratiocinated that such inaction of the sheriff was justified since petitioners never filed any
motion before the said court to hold in abeyance the impending auction sale.
Accordingly, it held that it was correct for the sheriff to proceed with the auction sale as
there will be no order forthcoming to suspend the sale absent any motion from
petitioners.
Finally, the trial court criticized petitioner's claim that the subject property was their
family home. The court opined that the claim was never substantiated by petitioners aside
from the fact that they asserted this defense only after two years since the auction sale has
transpired. It added that if not for the private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance
of Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola filed
on 5 August 2002, petitioners would not have raised the issue of family home before the
said court. aHESCT
The issue in the main is whether or not petitioners timely raised and proved that their
property is exempt from execution.
Article 153 of the Family Code provides:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as
the family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence; there is no need to constitute the same
judicially or extrajudicially. 7
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must
be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at
public auction. 8 It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges
that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved
to the Sheriff. 9 Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exception.
10
In the case under consideration, petitioners allegedly filed with the trial court an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Auction Sale on the Property of Defendants under TCT No. 83104
located at Sunville Subdivision, Quezon City" which was dated 12 September 2000. The
said motion was filed before 19 September 2000, the scheduled date for the sale of the
subject property at public auction. The records of the case, however, do not disclose that
petitioners in the said motion set up and proved that the property to be sold was their
family home. In any event, said motion was treated by the trial court as a mere scrap of
paper presumably on the ground that such motion did not contain a notice of hearing. 11
As we have repeatedly held, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere
scrap of paper, it presents no question which merits the attention of the court. 12 Being a
mere scrap of paper, the trial court had no alternative but to disregard it. 13 Such being
the case, it was as if no opposition to the auction sale was filed.
On the day immediately prior to the scheduled sale of the subject property, petitioners
filed with the sheriff an Objection/Exception to Sheriff's Sale of Defendant Sps. Eduardo
and Elsa Versola's Family Home. Petitioners simply alleged there that the property
subject of the intended auction sale was their family home. Instead of substantiating their
claim, petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff had prior knowledge that the said
property was constituted by them as their family home. Lamentably, in the said objection,
petitioners did not set forth therein any evidence to substantiate their claim that the
property to be sold at the execution sale was indeed exempt for having been constituted
as a family home. The objection read:
"Evidently, a court determination of the value of the family home is indispensable for the
same to be subjected to execution sale, and more importantly, the judgment creditor has
to apply for a court order direction (sic) auction sale of said judicial home.
Your good office, thru you, has PRIOR knowledge of the fact that the real property
subject of the intended auction sale is the family home being occupied by the Defendants
Spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola.
Allow us to enter our objection/exception to the auction sale which is without the benefit
of a court order. We accordingly ask that the sale be suspended/held in abeyance pending
the court order directing the sale of the family home." 14 (Underscoring supplied.)
CIAcSa
It was only after almost two years from the time of the execution sale and after the
"Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale" was issued did petitioners rigorously claim in their
Opposition to private respondent's Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Confirmation of
Judicial Sale of Real Property of Sps. Eduardo and Elsa Versola that the property in
question is exempt from execution. Even then, there was no showing that petitioners
adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a family home.
In the case of Honrado v. Court of Appeals, 15 the family home of the petitioner therein
was levied upon to answer for his judgment debt, and the sale of the said property was
set. Petitioner was served with a copy of the notice of sale which he opposed. Petitioner,
however, allowed the sale at the public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a
certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent therein. The
petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the court until after
almost one year from the date of the auction sale when he filed his motion to declare the
property exempt from execution. But even in the said motion, petitioner did not present
evidence that the property was a family home. Finding that petitioner's claim of
exemption was not substantiated and was filed belatedly, the Court therein ruled:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the
party from later claiming the exemption . . . . 16 (Emphasis supplied.)
In view of the facts obtaining in this case, and taking into consideration the applicable
jurisprudence on the matter, the Court finds that petitioners' assertion for exemption is a
mere afterthought, a sheer artifice to deprive private respondent of the fruits of the verdict
of her case. aCcADT
As the Court aptly inculcated:
Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption, does not mean a time
after the expiration of the one-year period provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise
it would render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very purpose of
execution — to put an end to litigation. We said before, and We repeat it now, that
litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning
party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. . . . . 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79300, for lack of merit, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mariano C.
Del Castillo and Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring; rollo, pp. 22-29.
2. Records, p. 51.
3. Id. at 109-110.
4. Rollo, p. 67.
5. Id. at 70.
6. Rollo, p. 130.
7. Manacop v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 735, 741 (1997).
8. Honrado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166333, 25 November 2005, 476 SCRA,
280, 288.
 9. Id. at 290.
10. Id.
11. The records of the case appear silent as to the reason why the "Urgent Motion to
Suspend Auction Sale on the Property of Defendants under TCT No. 83104" was treated
as a mere scrap of paper.
12. Formaran III v. Trabajo-Daray, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1885, 17 November 2004, 442
SCRA 423, 435.
13. Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 60222, 22 April 1992, 208
SCRA 199, 205.
14. Rollo, p. 132.
15. Supra note 8.
16. Id. at 290.
17. Id. at 291.

Copyright 2006 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170829. November 20, 2006.]
PERLA G. PATRICIO, petitioner, vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 2005 1 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for
being contrary to law and evidence. CDESIA
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford
corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering
an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less. 2
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially
settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was
cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private
respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private
respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002, 3 the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the
following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino
G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction
wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject
property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. 4
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court
on August 11, 2003, 5 hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the
same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October
19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held
that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as
there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the
court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the
minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and
Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. 6
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING ITS
EARLIER DECISION OF OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER 2002 GRANTING THE
PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
aScIAC
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN
APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY
CODE ON FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION TO
ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON CO-OWNERSHIP. 7
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-
owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor
beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent. He argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private respondent insists that
even after the expiration of ten years from the date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987,
i.e., even after July 1997, the subject property continues to be considered as the family
home considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a
beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property remained as a family home
of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was
the 10th year from the date of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers
Marcelino Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the time of
the death of their father, 8 hence there is no more minor beneficiary to speak of. DEcTIS
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished
memories that last during one's lifetime. 9 It is the dwelling house where husband and
wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is
situated. 10 It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head
of a family. 11 The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law. 12
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner
thereof or by "any of its beneficiaries" must be actual. That which is "actual" is
something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to
something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be
by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
"beneficiaries" enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-
laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law
definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by
the Code. 13
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the
head of the family for legal support. ADHcTE
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be
among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a
period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot
partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall
apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs to persons who
constituted the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of
one or both spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the
family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family
home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property
as family home, the property will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more beneficiary left at the time of
death, we believe the family home will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more
reason for its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the family home,
it will continue for ten years, unless at the expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor
beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of
age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs who
are beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not partitioning the property after
the period provided by this article? We believe that although the heirs will continue in
ownership by not partitioning the property, it will cease to be a family home. 14
(Emphasis supplied) cACTaI
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its continued existence is
dependent upon whether there is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as
there is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses are already dead,
the family home will continue to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it
will subsist until 10 years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same
except when there are compelling reasons which will justify the partition. This rule
applies regardless of whoever owns the property or who constituted the family home. 15
(Emphasis supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there
are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10
years, unless at the expiration of 10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case
the family home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule, the family home
may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the
unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented
to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a
minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until that
minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard
and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would
now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must concur before a
minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in
Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the family. CIcTAE
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor
son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and
wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family
home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also
the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home
to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also
known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V.
Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death
of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand
support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting
him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's
parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the
grandparents. ASTIED
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother,
but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant
of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as
beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite
of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is
dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate
and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law,
comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. 16 Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on
family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot
be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution;
(6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount. 17
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from
their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of
supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art.
199. 18 We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the
relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first
upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved
to the next nearer relatives and so on. EHTIDA
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither
is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to
voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner
filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family
home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in
1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as oftentimes it results in
inequitable situations such as in the instant case. Co-owners should be afforded every
available opportunity to divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from
arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos, 19 no co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a co-
ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on the common property at any time.
An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property. 20
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the court a quo should have ordered
a partition by commissioners pursuant to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not
more than three competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to
each party in interest such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct.
aScITE
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion thereof,
cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the court may
order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the
other parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable, unless
one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold instead of being so assigned, in
which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale,
and the commissioners shall sell the same accordingly. 21
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance with the rule
embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil Code. 22 Under the law of intestate succession, if the
widow and legitimate children survive, the widow has the same share as that of each of
the children. However, since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by
the decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the other half to be
given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her conjugal share of the property), the
widow will have the same share as each of her two surviving children. Hence, the
respective shares of the subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1)
Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3) Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals, 23 we held that an action for partition is at once
an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. If the court after trial should find the
existence of co-ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the partition
of the properties in the same action. 24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is
directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual physical
partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements that lie therein, in the
following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G.
Dario III, 1/6. The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent
and disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the
property and the proper share appertaining to each heir, including the improvements, in
accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. When it is made to the commissioners
that the real estate, or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the
interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one of the parties willing
to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property
be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the
commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall sell the
same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the
just share of each heir. No pronouncement as to costs. SDHETI
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp 38-49. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred
in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. de los Santos and Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
2. Id. at 59.
3. Id. at 77-80. Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.
4. Id. at 80.
5. Id. at 88. Penned by Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr. as Pairing Judge.
6. Id. at 44-49.
7. Id. at 21.
8. Id. at 26.
9. A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. I (1990 ed.), p. 508, citing Code Commission of 1947, pp. 18-19, 20.
10. FAMILY CODE, Art. 152.
11. Id.
12. Id., Art. 153.
13. Manacop v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 735, 744 (1997).
14. Supra note 9 at 515-516.
15. E. Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated (1999 ed.), p. 291.
16. FAMILY CODE, Art. 194.
17. Supra note 9 at 575.
18. Supra note 15 at 401. Art. 199 provides that "[w]henever two or more persons are
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order
herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The
ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) The brothers and sisters."
19. 396 Phil. 928 (2000).
20. Id. at 948.
21. RULES OF COURT, Rule 69, Sec. 5.
22. Art. 996 states that "[i]f the widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of
each of the children."
23. 436 Phil. 233 (2002).
24. Id. at 240-241.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120107. January 20, 1998.]
DANILO P. AGUAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Hon. BENJAMIN T.
VIANZON Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, Spouses
BUENAVENTURA GREGORIO and CONSTANCIA GREGORIO, Spouses
ANTONIO GABAYA and ILUMINADA GABAYA, BALANGA RURAL BANK,
INC., Spouses RUFINO REYES and ELSIE RODILL and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF BATAAN, respondents.
DECISION
MELO, J p:
The petition at bar assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. SP NO.
33283, for being violative of petitioner's right to due process of law in that said court
dismissed his petition for review by resorting to facts not alleged in the petition and
worse, for being contrary to those hypothetically admitted by private respondents.
LLphil
The present controversy arose from the complaint filed by petitioner Danilo P. Aguas
before the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan)
for injunction, annulment of title, and/or conveyance of property, with damages and with
prayer for preliminary injunction and restraining order, which was therein docketed as
Civil Case No. 6215. Impleaded as defendants were herein private respondents, the
spouses Buenaventura and Constancia Gregorio, and the numerous co-owners of the
subject parcel of land, namely, the spouses Eduardo and Elenita Anacleto, Violeta, Vic,
Lila, Alejandro, Felicitas, Rolando, Daniel, and Efren, all surnamed Anacleto, and the
spouses Antonio and Iluminada Gabaya. Likewise included as defendants were the
Balanga Rural Bank, Inc., the spouses Rufino J. Reyes and Elsie Rodill, Jose P. Gapas in
his capacity as Revenue District Officer No. 17 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and
the Register of Deeds of Bataan.
In that complaint, the following relevant allegations (which we paraphrase) were made:
Petitioner is the lessee, since 1957, of one of the stalls of a building owned by the
Gregorio spouses and their co-owners located at J.P. Rizal Street, Balanga, Bataan. The
rented stall houses Dan's Studio, a photo developing center owned by petitioner. On June
25, 1993, petitioner received from private respondent Constancia Gregorio, acting as
attorney-in-fact for her other co-owners, a letter informing him that the lot and the
building are for sale for P7 million, and that he is being given the preferential right to
purchase the property within one month from receipt of the letter, or until July 25, 1993
(pp. 57-53, Rollo).
Before said date, petitioner went to see the Gregorio spouses with an offer of P5 million.
The latter told petitioner that they will be going to the USA to discuss the final price with
the other co-owners, although they themselves are willing to settle for P6.5 million.
Petitioner was thus told to wait for their final decision. On August 19, 1993, petitioner,
upon learning that the Gregorio spouses had arrived from the USA, went to them and
made another offer of P5.5 million. Petitioner was told that the other co-owners would be
in town on the 24th, and so petitioner should just wait and return on said date to know the
final price of the property (pp. 58-59, Ibid.).
The following day, however, petitioner learned from private respondent Felicitas
Anacleto that the spouses Antonio and Iluminada Gabaya had paid the Gregorio spouses
P1 million as earnest money for the purchase of said lot and building. Petitioner and his
mother thus went to see Iluminada Gabaya, who in turn showed mother and son an
agreement dated June 29, 1993, a mere four days after petitioner received the letter giving
him preference in the purchase of the property, stating that the Gregorio spouses had
agreed to sell the property for P5 million to the Gabaya spouses, with P1 million as
earnest money. The agreement, however, did not state how the balance of P4 million was
to be paid (pp. 59-60, Ibid.).
On September 28, 1993, petitioner received a letter from the Balanga Rural Bank
informing him that the bank had purchased the property from the Gabaya spouses and
will start the construction of a new building on said lot on January 1994. Hence,
petitioner was asked to vacate the premises by December 31, 1993. Petitioner, upon
learning of these transactions went to the Bataan District Revenue Office of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and to the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Bataan to inquire about
said transactions. His informal and formal requests were granted only after several
repeated attempts to get a copy of the pertinent documents. From these, he found that the
consideration in the two transactions were similarly P800,000.00. As a result of the
foregoing, TCT No. T-48239 in the name of private respondents Anacletos was canceled
in lieu of TCT No. T-158979 in the name of the Gabaya spouses, which later was also
canceled and new ones issued, TCT No. T-159406 and 159407, to private respondent
Reyes (pp. 62-65, Ibid.).
Petitioner further alleged that there was a conspiracy among the co-owners, as evidenced
by the fictitious deeds of sale and as further reflected by the gross undervaluation of the
lot, to deprive him of his right to buy the property. The Revenue District Officer and the
Registrar of Deeds were named defendants for processing the fictitious and unauthorized
documents which facilitated the transactions over the scandalously undervalued
properties (pp. 66-67, Ibid.).
Petitioner, therefore, prayed for the conveyance of the property; to him, and/or for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages. He also prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining his eviction from the premises, the
construction of the planned building and the encumbrance, alienation, or disposition of
the subject property (pp. 68-74, Ibid.).
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order but held back regarding the
preliminary injunction. On January 4, 1994, petitioner's motion to effect extrajudicial
service on the non-resident defendants was granted. However, it appears that no such
service has been effected. On January 6, 1994, petitioner filed an ex-parte motion to
declare all duly summoned but non-answering defendants in default, as only the Revenue
District Officer filed an answer. However, that same day, the Bank, the Reyes spouses,
and the Gabaya spouses filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that,
hypothetically admitting petitioner's material allegations, it states no cause of action. The
motion was set to be heard on January 21, 1994 (pp. 19-21, Ibid.).
On January 10, 1994, upon information that Presiding Judge Benjamin Vianzon is an
acquaintance of the Bank's president and the Registrar of Deeds, petitioner filed a motion
to inhibit the trial court judge. However, an order dated January 7, 1994 was forthwith
released, denying petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, of
which he later sought reconsideration. On January 17, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for
the early resolution of the motion to inhibit as it was prejudicial to all other matters
before the court. On January 21, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the complaint for
ejectment filed by the Bank with the Municipal Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan. On
January 25, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the motion to dismiss filed by the
Gregorio spouses, stating that petitioner's complaint states no cause of action and that his
claim is unenforceable for being violative of the statute of frauds. On January 25, 1994,
petitioner's motion for inhibition was denied for lack of merit (pp. 22-25, Ibid.).
Worried about such developments, particularly the ominous resolution of the motion to
dismiss despite protestations regarding the judge's impartiality, and mindful that he has
yet to file a motion for reconsideration of the orders denying preliminary injunction and
inhibition, petitioner nonetheless filed before respondent Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging that the trial court judge's actuations
constitute grave abuse of discretion (p. 26, Ibid.).
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the petition, delved extensively on the issue of
petitioner's right to enforce what he believes to be his preferential right to buy the subject
property. It ruled that the June 25, 1993 letter created no binding agreement because of
the absence of any consideration separate and distinct from the price of the property,
contrary to what is required by Article 1479 of the Civil Code , which states:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from
the price.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals continued, as admitted by petitioner, there was no
absolute acceptance of the offer because he made a counter offer of P5 million, and
eventually P5.5 million. Thus, there was no meeting of the minds in the first place.
Hence, having no right to the subject property, petitioner cannot speak of private
respondents having committed fraud and abuse of confidence, trust and right. The Court
of Appeals, therefore, denied petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, along with his prayer that the non-answering defendants be declared in
default. Regarding respondent judge's inhibition, the same was pronounced moot and
academic in view of respondent judge's order inhibiting himself from the case (pp. 234-
238, Ibid.).
His motion for reconsideration having been thereafter denied, petitioner is now before us
seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision for being violative of his right to due
process of law and for not being in accord with applicable law and jurisprudence. It is
petitioner's stand that it was error for the appellate court to rule on the issue of whether or
not he had a cause of action against respondent co-owners of the subject property.
Precisely, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action, wherein they hypothetically admitted the material allegations of
the complaint, which said facts are now controlling in the case at bar. Resorting to facts
beyond those which have been admitted, without the benefit of a trial on the merits,
constitutes denial of due process of law (pp. 42-45, Ibid.).
Also, petitioner contends that his prayer for the trial judge's inhibition was not rendered
moot and academic because respondent Court of Appeals was referring to an entirely
different case (Civil Case No. 6140) when it said that respondent judge had already
inhibited himself. He then reiterates the ground for the judge's inhibition (p. 36, Ibid.).
Cdpr
Lastly, petitioner observes, respondent Court of Appeals was silent regarding respondent
judge's failure to declare in default, upon proper motion, those who failed to file their
answer (p. 50, Ibid.).
After the petition was given due course, petitioner received an order issued by respondent
judge setting Civil Case No. 6215 for hearing on July 4, 1997. Petitioner immediately
filed a motion before us seeking a stop to the proceedings. This was granted by the Court
in a resolution dated July 2, 1997 restraining respondent judge from proceeding with the
heaving as scheduled (pp. 220-228, Ibid.)
It should be obvious that the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed
before respondent appellate court was premature, insofar as it relates to the motion to
dismiss which has yet to be resolved. There was no order denying or granting the motion.
Thus, there was really nothing to review insofar as the presence or absence of petitioner's
cause of action is concerned. Petitioner's apprehension that it will be granted does not
alone make it ripe for review by the Court of Appeals. There was no justiciable issue yet.
Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the complaint, from the facts
alleged by petitioner and hypothetically admitted by private respondents, does not state a
cause of action.
The only order that was issued and thus reviewable was the order issued by respondent
Judge Vianzon denying petitioner's motion for inhibition. The Court of Appeals, quoting
an order issued by Judge Vianzon dated November 19, 1993, held that petitioner's motion
to inhibit the judge had been rendered moot and academic in view of the said order
granting the motion and ordering that the case be raffled to another sala. Petitioner, in his
motion for reconsideration, called respondent appellate court's attention to the fact that
the order referred to another case (Civil Case No. 6140) and not to the case in dispute
(Civil Case No. (6215). Even so, petitioner was ignored, and that is error.
The quoted order is dated November 19, 1993. The complaint is dated December 6, 1993.
The motion for inhibition itself was dated January 6, 1994. It is clear, therefore, that the
Court of Appeals had overlooked this matter.
That settled, the only remaining issue to be resolved is whether respondent judge should
continue presiding over the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6215. Without necessarily
lending full merit to petitioner's allegations, in order to expedite matters, it is best that
Civil Case No. 6215 be tried by another judge. Petitioner, in his motion, alleged that
respondent judge is acquainted with or a friend of the Register of Deeds of Balanga,
Bataan, one of the private respondents, and certain officers of respondent Balanga Rural
Bank. Also, petitioner feels that the denial of his application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, despite the absence of any opposition thereto, and the finding that he is not
entitled to any relief prayed for in his complaint, is indicative of bias. In the order
denying his inhibition, respondent judge admitted being acquainted with the Register of
Deeds, who incidentally is merely a nominal party, because they have been officials of
Bataan, in different capacities, for 15 years, and to inhibit himself on such ground alone
would leave him perhaps with no cases at all to try, knowing practically all elective and
appointive officials of Bataan, not to mention his townmates who also have pending cases
before him. In his memorandum, petitioner further alleges that respondent judge also
conducts private business with the Register of Deeds in connection with the titling of real
estate. Lastly, petitioner is of the opinion that respondent judge's order setting the case for
hearing, despite his petition having been given due course, shows respondent judge's
partiality (pp. 148-149, 232-237, Ibid.)
If only to forestall any more unwarranted delays in the resolution of this case, Judge
Vianzon's inhibition is called for. Aside from being in fact impartial, dispassionate,
objective, and unbiased, a judge also ought to appear to be so, not only to litigants but to
the public as well. Impropriety, including the appearance of it, should it all times be
avoided.
The judge's decision to continue hearing a case, in which he is not legally prohibited from
trying notwithstanding the challenge to his objectivity, may not constitute reversible
error, except where the case has generated strained personal relationship, animosity and
hostility between a party or his counsel and the judge that the former has lost confidence
in the judge's impartiality or the latter is unable to display the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. cdphil
(Agpalo, Ruben E. Legal Ethics, 4th ed. 1989, p. 459 citing Villapando v. Quitain, 75
SCRA 24 and Tuazon v. Cruz, 66 SCRA 235).
Furthermore, while we agree with respondent judge that mere acquaintance with a
nominal party such as the Register of Deeds is innocuous and should not automatically
warrant inhibition, it is quite a different matter when, as petitioner has alleged, he has
private dealings, with supposedly economic benefits, with a party to a case pending
before him. To facilitate the administration of justice, especially so in this case, which in
four years has yet to reach the pre-trial stage, the Court orders that upon being remanded,
Civil Case No. 6215 should be reraffled and heard by another judge.
Regarding the issue of the failure to declare in default of the non-answering defendants,
that matter should be resolved, and with dispatch, in the proceedings hereby ordered in
the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby reversed and set
aside, and a new one is entered making permanent this Court's order of July 2, 1997
restraining Judge Benjamin Vianzon from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 6215.
Civil Case No. 6215 is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including the
holding of another raffle.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Romero, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE;
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES
OF PERSONALITY DISORDER. — In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN
PERFORMANCE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE
AT BAR. — On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that
the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr.
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not
psychological incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36. — The following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the
bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such
illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage (6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8) The
trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
PADILLA, J., Separate Statement:
CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY; EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE
CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST TAKE PAINS IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU
AND APPELLATE COURT MUST AVOID SUBSTITUTING ITS JUDGMENT FOR
THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. — I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr.
Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or
not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting
its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; OPPOSING
AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — The majority opinion, overturning that of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner
Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the
marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the alleged personality
traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as
a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF
MENTAL ILLNESS. — I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of
mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of
insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage
annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
VITUG, J., Concurring Opinion:
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE;
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; OTHER GROUNDS SHOULD BE READ
ALONG WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS IMPORT. — In determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be
taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify
a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances
are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36
of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as
so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. — In fine, the term psychological incapacity," to be a
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to
pass the following tests; viz: First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental not
physical, in nature; Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not
mere refusal, to understand assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and Fourth, the mental
disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had
interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court
of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision
in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce
procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds
the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25,
1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto
the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which
declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void
ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April
14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility"
as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends
on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved
of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family;
that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila
and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus
shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who
thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest
to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to
be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining
her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of
her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household
and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife."
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her
friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a
social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General
Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to
"E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's
decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous
and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the
trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their
opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil
Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to
liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights . . .." It
concluded that:
"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad
range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or
she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as
well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of
marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough
reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and conclusions thus made."
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is
not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C.
Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not
get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison
showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
"COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that
it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for
each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions."
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial
impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part and of being
"conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation
is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. lexlib
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and
applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend
Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a
member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank
these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for
the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically
invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting
and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the
petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and
Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because
of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field
of the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia
Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained,
and I still maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an
in-depth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge
must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as
possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing
and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter
"is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
(not physical) illness.
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it
were due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant
defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the
Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee
was to exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus
strictly on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of
marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential
marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that
it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent
and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and
there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage." 1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity
is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental
impotence," Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term "is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is
why it is considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C.
Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not
with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase
"and is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to
the question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it
would be more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the
psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by
Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy
was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or
annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage,
the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive
mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of
Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is
now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization." liblex
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of
marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes
an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical
Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved.
Hence, a properly performed and consummated marriage between two living Roman
Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full
tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon
Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church
but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the
Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for
declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not
provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly
from a combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be 'capable
according to law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at
least not ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the
force and fear category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order
for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related
grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence
means that the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or
she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving
sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment.
The Rota had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid
consent at the time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed
such problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals
began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested themselves
shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
"Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both
before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of
lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to
the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the
Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of
marriage could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a
necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent." 2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity,
"not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a
spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of
marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each
other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality community of the whole of life;
i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing
the development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give
themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love;
and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church
decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the
ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the other
spouse. 3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature
marital relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even
with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to
his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2)
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or
she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any
of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment
at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating
on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup
of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into." 4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well as in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home
from the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more than five years is not proof
of her psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity. 5 Therefore, Art. 36 is
inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court upheld
both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten
(10) months' sleeping with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but
he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to
prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic
marital obligation described as "to procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage," the wife
brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1) on psychological
incapacity, concluded:
"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is
considered a sign of psychological incapacity."
We declared:
"This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital
obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court."
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either
or both spouses.
VITUG, J ., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his
ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family
Code of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor
exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
"Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:
"(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law " 1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law —
"Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those) —
"1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
"2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
"3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment. 2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of
a Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be
taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38
and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or
Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify
a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances
are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 3 viz:
"(T)he use of the phrase psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances . . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on
marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the
judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.'
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a
party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to
Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity." 4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz.:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume and discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as
not a few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others
would also put it, to be an alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the
language of the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might
have indeed turned out for the better; if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to
doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid
down in terse language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
"Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State."
Section 12, Article II:
"Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . ."
Section 1, Article XV:
"Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
(The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for
the specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication,
a different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause
more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional
mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful,
not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
2. Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and chairman; JJ.,
Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3. Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.
4. Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.
5. The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the RTC
Decision as follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible,
dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These characteristics of
respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that the former failed to be gainfully
employed after he was relieved from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family.
Also when they were separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-
mother and son except during the first few months of separation when respondent
regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to
four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and
support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers. A
year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house and lot at
BF Homes, Parañaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred there only for the
petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually renting the house with
the respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from this,
respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at present, respondent is
living with his mistress and their child, which fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent
turned sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During their college days,
when they were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be conservative,
homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would make an ideal wife
and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent because of his
thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided to break their
relationship because of some differences in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later,
while they were working in Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair.
They became very close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent.
Believing that they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they
decided to settle down and get married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner and
respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties
cropped-up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner
and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in their
frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and help of their
parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties could not come to
terms.
 It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalties (sic). Neither of them can accept
and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead, blame each other
for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In fine, respondent cannot
be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because
both parties cannot relate to each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite
in marriage.
5a. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1, Family
Code). The unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing,
and lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully
understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently) united
in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the parties, among
others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding,
acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them
to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife
will most likely lead to the break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in
this case." (Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
6. 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7. Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First
Edition, 1988.
8. TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9. The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the
marriage tribunals of each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside from heading the
Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees
of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-
General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines — PCP II — held from January
20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a
constitutional convention in the Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a
Council member, had the privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful
discernments.
10. Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister of
Justice, author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
11. "Article XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the state.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
 (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the
state may also do so through just programs of social security.
12. "Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code."
13. Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14. This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other hand,
the text used in Santos vs. CA reads:
"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage."
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's
Memorandum is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both
versions are differently-worded English translations.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
1. Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil Code
Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
2. Zwack, Joseph P., Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
3. The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of
America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
4. Zwack, ibid., p. 47
5. G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6. G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
VITUG, J., concurring:
1. Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, in
Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
2. In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3. Supra.
4. At pages 34-35.

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 2 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.

G.R. No. 114144 February 13, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. FLORENTINO ABAD
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.]
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many
a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the
gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following
pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the
guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. CTEaDc
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals
had reversed the judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the
marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null
and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent
church wedding 5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on
6 December 1990. 6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly
died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993, 7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared
null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code
alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their
marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present. 8
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed
that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and
instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only
confessed the truth about the boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other
sources after their marriage. 11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and
kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred. 12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when she was neither. 13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold
Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed
her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented
an invitation to that effect 14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of
Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place. 15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as
the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million. 16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the
letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized
that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he
discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip
to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She
spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on
false pretexts. 20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his
officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual
behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated,
based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective,
shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondent's
persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined
the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They further
asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an
affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. 23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations
by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She
presented her version, thus: ASHaDT
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of
losing her husband. 25
(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from David's act of touching her back and ogling her from head to
foot. 26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the
advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told
petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with
the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that
a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8
December 1979. 28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a
resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she
merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband's whereabouts. 30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00. 31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their
marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and
unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient
for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. 32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to
refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series
of tests conducted by his assistant, 33 together with the screening procedures and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him
to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism,
psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to
the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by
Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's
psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which
was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that
respondent's propensity to lying about almost anything-her occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among others-had been duly established. According to
the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and
personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her
psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. cDCaTH
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of
lack of due discretion on the part of the parties. 37 During the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with
modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead
that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota
of the Vatican. 39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals.
Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent
may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals 40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to
this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence
accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner. 41 It is a settled principle of
civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the
Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent. 43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative
facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by
petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the
Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals 44 (also known as the Molina case
45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in
the case at bar. 46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to
squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi
Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, 48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse
was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy
afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is
concerned. 49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of
guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of
nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did
not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for
its allowance. HSEcTC
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization." 50 The concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although
mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are
not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as void, 52 in the same class as marriages
with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party's mental
capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage
where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an
"annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the
Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil
Code as a voidable marriage. 56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying
spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio. 57 Similarly,
among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is
one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like
insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a
contract. 59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices
Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and
conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but
was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect
the consent to the marriage." 61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the
Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply
would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil
Code . . . [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only." 62 At
the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity
to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of
consent to the marriage." 63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further
affirmed in the Molina 66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief
Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity]
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto." 67 Jurisprudence since
then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as
to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume." 68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from
the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the
same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family
Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by
avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for
"the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive
effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag: 71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court. 72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended
by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and
experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the
Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997.
Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts
in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the
Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-
case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed
the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. CSTHca
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of
the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological
incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had
bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from
canon law, 73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It
would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. 75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole
source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have
been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent
judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial
decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently,
this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited
Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to
marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to
put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This
has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial
denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to
protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage,
not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances
warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional
considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of
this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting
marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the
nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-
equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further
the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage. SECHIA
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial
disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied
Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general
rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of
the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"'
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." HEcTAI
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our
civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void. 77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a
certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This
requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. 79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In
any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the
records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court,
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the
refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be
considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her
character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and
generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological
incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold
Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims
pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner. 80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private
parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the
parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly
explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent,
from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies,
fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation,
income, educational attainment, and family background, among others. 81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or
clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two
(2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the
department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals, 82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say
that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a
couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One
of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think,
based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. . . .
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack
of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers
human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between
individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And
therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this
relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be
based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in
constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of the marriage?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner's
officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the
behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript
of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means
that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a
woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We
all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is
carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact
that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes
that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and
we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically
incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage? IDcTEA
A- Yes, Ma'am. 83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological
incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded
that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to
fabricate about herself." 84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case
record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the
supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine
respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos 85 that personal examination
of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. 86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's
witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on
their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert
witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its
finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been
shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies
about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her
income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.
She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to
give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly
lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity. 87
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at
the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made
up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept
petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when
the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her
disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible
that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated
petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as
borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a
failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the
truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate
proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to
them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform the essential
obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,
including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well
to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best
to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital
obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her
willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity
to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what
the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and
Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous
article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between
misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3)
and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the
spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate
pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact
that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court
apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it
anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its
attention. 88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. DTISaH
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the
invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion 89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the
"lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent. 90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed
by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, 91 and the Roman Rota of the
Vatican. 92 In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a
restrictive clause 93 was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from
contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered
ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part
Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a
perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal
Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance
and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based
on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common
and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse
personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and
implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of
her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted
with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on
account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the
Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the
Petitioner. 94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial
court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church
rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a
similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the
trial court instead appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court
affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have
diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of
facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this
Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition was
incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect. 95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned
to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior
remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's
condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave,
and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's
expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they
remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this
point.
The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered
its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was
promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.
DTAIaH
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its
discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee, 96 then the
opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal
definition of psychological incapacity. 98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion
expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the
view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." 100 However, in formulating the
doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity. 101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out
with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity
was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the
psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent
promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of incurability.
Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca, 102 the Court countered an argument that Molina
and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or
construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the
statute in enacted. 103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the
expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable
simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the
appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without
deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or
Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective
petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis
of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial
court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36
relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in
this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would
have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was
tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are
sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has
been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact
that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral
requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so
incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital
bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her
psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent
challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondent's avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these
cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is
more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under
Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. TAcSCH
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices
Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo; See rollo, pp. 67-84.
2. Rollo, p. 86.
3. Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina
Guevara-Salonga.
4. Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila.
5. Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
6. Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7. Records, pp. 1-5.
8. Id. at 1-2.
9. Id. at 2-3. See also rollo, pp. 69, 91.
10. Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11. Supra note 8.
12. Rollo, pp. 69, 92.
13. Id. at 70, 92.
14. Id. at 95.
15. Supra note 13.
16. Id. at 70, 92.
17. TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.
18. Id. at 12-13. See also records, p. 91.
19. Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
20. Id.; records, p. 3.
21. Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
22. Id. at 71-72, 92-93.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 93.
25. Id. at 74, 94.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 73, 93.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 74, 94.
31. Id. at 73, 94.
32. Id. at 77-78.
33. Miss Francianina Sanches.
34. Rollo, p. 94.
35. Id. at 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.
36. Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37. Id. at 97-98.
38. Id. at pp. 99-100.
39. Id. at 101-103.
40. 335 Phil. 664 (1997).
41. Rollo, p. 95.
42. Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995),
citing Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43. Rollo, p. 82.
44. Supra note 40.
45. The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
46. Rollo, p. 78.
47. There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court
order declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are Sy v.
Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However, in Sy, the Court
found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage license at the time
the marriage was solemnized, and thus declined to pass upon the question of
psychological incapacity. In Buenaventura, since the parties chose not to challenge the
trial court's conclusion of psychological incapacity and instead raised questions on the
award of damages and support, the Court did not review the finding of psychological
incapacity.
48. 334 Phil. 294 (1997).
49. It does not escape this Court's attention that many lower courts do grant petitions
for declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are not elevated for
review to the Supreme Court.
50. See Family Code, Art. 36.
51. Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. FISHER. SEE F.C. FISHER,
THE CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN WITH PHILIPPINE NOTES AND REFERENCES 45
(Fifth Ed., 1947). The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: "No
pueden contraer matrimonio: . . . (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su
razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio."
52. See Spanish Civil Code. (1889) Art. 101.
53. Act No. 2710 (1917).
54. See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c)
55. See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
56. Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband or wife. See Civil Code, Art. 85 (3).
57. See Civil Code, Art. 80.
58. Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See note
56.
59. See Civil Code, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A. SEMPIO
DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 37 (1988). A
contrary view though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a member of the
Family Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.
61. I A. TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES: COMMENTARIES
AND JURISPRUDENCE 274-275 (1990 ed.).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 274.
64. Supra note 60.
65. Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage." Id.
66. Supra note 40.
67. Id. at 677.
68. Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
69. It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected by
the Family Code Commission, stated that among those void ab initio marriages are those
"contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient
use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." See Santos v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30.
70. Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108;
citing A. SEMPIO-DIY, supra note 60, at 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 60, at 36; Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 677.
71. G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
72. Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997),
Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
73. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.
74. See SEMPIO-DIY, supra note 60, at 36.
75. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 678.
76. Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the
psychological incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the fact that
he did not engage in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10) month marital
cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was decided shortly before the
Molina case.
77. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 676-680.
78. Id. at 680.
79. See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441
SCRA 422, 435.
80. Rollo, p. 82.
81. Records, pp. 2-3.
82. University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr.
Abcede likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association. TSN,
February 23, 1994, p. 6.
83. TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
84. TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
85. 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
86. Id. at 850.
87. Rollo, pp. 95-96.
88. As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner
with the canonical declarations attached as annexes.
89. Id. at 97-98.
90. The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of
invalidity on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. On appeal,
however, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified the judgment by holding
that lack of due discretion applied to respondent but there was no sufficient evidence to
prove lack of due discretion on the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
91. Rollo, pp. 99-100.
92. Id. at 101-103.
93. "A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect
that the respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express consent of
this Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as
well as for the protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
94. Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.
95. Rollo, p. 82.
96. Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30-36.
97. Id. at 37-39.
98. Id. at 39-40.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Id. at 39.
101. "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that
the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not
been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's
"Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage,
like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established,
every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so
that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-
considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Santos v. Court of Appeals,
id. at 39-41.
102. G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103. Id. at 593.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine
qua non for such declaration. DcAEIS
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties
is hereby declared valid." 2
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent
Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is
dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to
Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In
the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner
subject to the visitation rights of respondent". HEcTAI
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office,
Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action
consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September
6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of
Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L.
Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in
Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born
(Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later
on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the
Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's
Auxiliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both
of them sought a discharge from the military service. SaCIDT
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo
Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development
Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as
the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her.
He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also
inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way
he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately. ISHCcT
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chicken.
While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning
before going to Malacañang. When she was discharged from the military service, she
concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness
Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a
bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their
house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she
lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her
mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children
left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G,
Records, 153). AEDHST
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at
the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he
got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with
a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and
his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, . . . 3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set
forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by
evidence and explained in the decision. SDIaCT
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad
Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the
parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of
the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her . . . unable
to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not
psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged
in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show
that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental
— not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable." 4
Hence, this Petition. 5
Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following
issues: cSCTEH
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself
to psychological evaluation .
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue:
Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests. aHSCcE
In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9
were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of
the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected'
by the state.
xxx xxx xxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists. DTIaCS
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095." 10 DSAacC
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in
Santos v. Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition.
For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
Main Issue:
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present
case — including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister
and the social worker — was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even
left the family home. HIAEcT
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. aTcIEH
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not
faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner
to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines in outlined in
Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that
portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
psychological incapacity. No costs. EHTIDA
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A.
Martin Jr. (Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
2. CA Decision, pp.12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
3. CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33.
4. CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, 36-37.
5. This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon
receipt by this Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio
V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been
filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
6. Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
7. Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
8. 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
9. "Article 36. — A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article
shall prescribe in ten years after its celebration."
10. Supra, pp. 209-213.
11. 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
12 "Article 55. — A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
 (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in
such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more
than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage,
whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner;
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause
for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature
or by adoption."

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 2 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47101. Abril 25, 1941.]
GODOFREDO BUCCAT, demandante y apelante, contra LUIDA MANGONON DE
BUCCAT, demandada y apelada.
D. Feliciano Leviste, D. Tomas P. Pañganiban y Doña Sotera N. Megia en representacion
del apelante.
Doña Luida Mangonon de Buccat en su propia representacion.
SYLLABUS
1. MATRIMONIO; VALIDEZ. — El matrimonio es una institucion sacratisima: es
el cimiento en que descansa la sociedad. Para anularlo, son menester pruebas claras y
fehacientes. En este asunto no existen tales pruebas.
DECISION
HORRILLENO, M. p:
Este asunto se ha elevado a esta Superioridad por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Baguio, ya que solo suscita una cuestion puramente de derecho.
El 20 de marzo de 1939 el demandante inicio la presente causa, en la que no comparecio
la demandada, no obstante haber sido debidamente emplazada. Por lo que, permitido el
demandante a presentar sus pruebas, el Juzgado inferior fallo el asunto a favor de la
demandada. De ahi esta apelacion.
El demandante pide la anulacion de su matrimonio habido con la demandada Luida
Mangonon de Buccat el 26 de noviembre de 1938, en la Ciudad de Baguio, fundandose
en que, al consentir en dicho matrimonio, lo hizo porque la demandada le habia
asegurado que ella era virgen.
De la decision del Juzgado inferior se desprenden los siguientes hechos:
El demandante conocio a la demandada el mes de marzo de 1938. Despues de varias
entravistas, ambos quedaron comprometidos el 19 de septiembre del mosmo año. El 26
de noviembre de igual año, el demandante contrajo matrimonio con la demandada en la
catedral catolica de la Ciudad de Baguio. Despues de convivir maritalmente por espacio
de ochenta y nueve dias, la demandada dio a luz un niño de nueve dias, la demandada dio
a luz un niño de nueve meses, el 23 de febrero de 1939. De resultas de este
acontecimiento, el demandante abandono a la demandada y no volvio a hacer vida marital
con ella.
No vemos razon alguna para revocar la sentencia apelada. En efecto, es inverosimil la
alegacion del demandante y apelante que el ni siquiera habia sospechado el estado
gravido de la demandada, estando esta, como queda probado, en condicion preñada muy
avanzada. Por lo que no ha lugar a estimar el fraude de que habla el apelante. Lo alegado
por este en el sentido de que no es raro hallar a personas de abdomen desarollado, nos
parece pueril para merecer nuestra consideracion, tanto maa cuanto que el demandante
era estudiante de primer año de derecho.
El matrimonio es una institucion sacratisima: es el cimiento en que descansa la sociedad.
Para anularlo, son menester pruebas claras y fehacientes. En este asunto no existen tales
pruebas.
Hallando la sentencia apelada ajustada a derecho, debe ser confirmada, como por la
presente las confirmamos, en todas sus partes, con las costas al apelante. Asi se ordena.
Avanceña, Pres. Imperial, Diaz, y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.
[G.R. No. L-19382. August 31, 1965.]
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELOIDA FARRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA
FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO
FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar A. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmeña and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. SUCCESSION; INTESTACY; COLLATERAL RELATIVES EXCLUDED BY
NEPHEWS AND NIECES. — A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab
intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.
2. ID.; ID.; WHEN COLLATERALS ENTITLED TO SUCCESSION. — The
absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. (Art. 1009 Civil
Code.)
3. ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP OF COLLATERAL RELATIVES TO
THE DECEASED. — An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the
decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives
belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then
descending to the heir (Civil Code Art. 966).
4. ID.; ID.; WHEN NEPHEWS AND NIECES INHERIT BY RIGHT OF
REPRESENTATION. — Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris,
Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as
well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said
resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown.
More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive,
she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and
distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse,
but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an
aunt, and half- sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,
Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the
children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris, who pre-deceased her
(the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate heirs and seek
to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending
parties to said Melodia Ferraris:

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit: an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be
excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent,
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephew succeed by right of representation, while petitioner- appellant is three
degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded by
brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with
article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of
the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right or
representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their
own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased, she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds
of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and
then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e.,
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Article 975:
"ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or
aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
"ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half."
"ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be, brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares."
"ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who
are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall
inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes."
"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate."
"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among by reason of
relationship by the whole blood."
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R. A. 386). Thus, Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
"ART. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of
the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a
final decree of divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."
"ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of
deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of the whole blood."
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of
the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present
Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is
true as to "other collaterals", since preference among them is according to their proximity
to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place."
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of
equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009
(Vol. II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote),
Tolentino expressly states:
"Other Collaterals.— The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we
can safely say, there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under
the law, therefore, persons beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives,
for successional purposes.
"Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship." (Italics supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No
costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 2 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4912. March 25, 1909.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMILIA GUY-SAYCO, defendant-
appellant.
C. Ledesma, for appellant.
Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ACTS PLEA OF SELF-
DEFENSE. — In the decision of a criminal cause, it is improper to hold that there was
unlawful aggression, and thus allow the allegation of exemption from responsibility on
the ground of self-defense when there has been nothing more than a threatening or
intimidating attitude which, under no consideration, is sufficient to justify the
commission of a criminal act punishable per se, inasmuch as it has always been held by
the courts that it is necessary that there be an attack, a material aggression, or an act
positively showing the wrongful intent of the aggressor, in order to warrant such defense.
2. ID.; JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD ALSO FIX CIVIL
LIABILITY. — In deciding a cause, the civil responsibility incurred by the accused,
consequent upon his criminal liability, must be declared, because every person criminally
responsible for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable, and the courts are obliged to
fix the amount of indemnity for damages in the terms prescribed for the reparation of
damage caused by the crime. (Arts. 17, 121, and 122, Penal Code.)
DECISION
TORRES, J p:
Long before the commission of the crime herein prosecuted, Gelasio Galupitan, the
husband of the accused, entered into unlawful relations with the deceased Lorenza
Estrada; all were residents of the town of Santa Cruz, the capital of the Province of La
Laguna.
The accused, Emilia Guy-Sayco, duly became aware of this relation. As her husband had
stayed away from home for more than two weeks, remaining in the barrio of Dujat,
distant about two and one-half hours’ walk from the said town under the pretext that he
was engaged in field work, on the 20th of March, 1907, at about 2 p.m., she decided to go
to said barrio and join him. To this end she hired a carromata, and after getting some
clothes and other things necessary for herself and husband, started out with her infant
child and a servant girl; but before reaching the barrio and the camarin where her
husband ought to be, night came on, and at about 7 o’clock she alighted and dismissed
the vehicle after paying the driver. They had yet to travel some distance, and for fear of
being attacked she disguised herself, using her husband’s clothes and a hat given to her
by her companion, and dressed in this manner they continued on their way. On seeing
her husband’s horse tied in front of a house she suspected that he was inside; thereupon
she went to the steps leading to the house, which was a low one, and then saw her
husband sitting down with his back toward the steps. She immediately entered the house
and encountered her husband, the deceased, and the owners of the house taking supper
together. Overcome and blinded by jealousy she rushed at Lorenza Estrada, attacked her
with a penknife that she carried, and inflicted five wounds upon her in consequence of
which Lorenza fell to the ground covered with blood and died a few moments afterwards.
The accused left the house immediately after the aggression, and went to that of Modesto
Ramos where she changed her clothes.
From an examination of the body made on the following day by Dr. Gertrudo Reyes, it
appeared that five wounds had been inflicted by a cutting and pointed weapon, one of
which was on the left side of the breast and penetrated the left ventricle of the heart; this
wound was of necessity mortal, the others being more or less serious.
A complaint was thereupon filed by the provincial fiscal on May 31, 1907, and the
corresponding proceedings were instituted. The court below entered judgment on June
29 1908 sentencing the accused, Emilia Guy-Sayco, to the penalty of twelve years and
one day of reclusion temporal, to suffer the accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. From said judgment she has
appealed.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in this case, constitute the crime of
homicide defined and punished by article 404 of the Penal Code, for the reason that in
the violent death of Lorenza Estrada, occasioned by the infliction of several wounds, one
of which was mortal, none of the circumstances were present that qualify the crime of
assassination and call for a heavier penalty as imposed by the previous article 403 of the
code.
The reality and certitude of the crime at bar can not be denied. It has been proven by the
testimony of several witnesses, to wit, Roberto Villaran, Susana de Mesa, the owners of
the house, and Maria Ramos, all of whom witnessed the aggression; they saw the
decreased die as the result of five wounds inflicted upon her, one of which was, of
necessity mortal; it was also proven by the testimony of the surgeon who examined the
body, which was seen by the said witnesses and by others who went to the place of the
occurrence.
The accused pleaded not guilty, and in exculpation she alleged that, when Lorenza
Estrada saw her and heard her remonstrate with her husband, she being then upstairs,
Lorenza at once asked what had brought her there and manifested her intention to attack
her with a knife that she carried in her hand, whereupon the accused caught the deceased
by the right hand, in which she held the weapon, and immediately grappled with her, and
in the struggle that ensued she managed to get hold of a penknife that she saw on the
floor close by; she could not say whether she struck the deceased with it as she could not
account for what followed.
From this allegation of the accused, her counsel, with a view to asking that she be
absolved, claims that in wounding the deceased she acted in proper self-defense.
It has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that as soon as the accused entered the
house where she found her husband, without saying a word, she attacked the deceased
with a penknife and inflicted wounds that caused the immediate death of the latter. Such
an allegation can not therefore be admitted, been though corroborated by the husband and
the servant of the accused, inasmuch as the testimony of the latter is entirely contradicted
and destroyed by the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, who were present at
the aggression, and who deny that the servant was present; it is not true that a penknife
was found on the floor of the house; its is probable that the instrument with which the
crime was committed was carried by the accused when she went to said house; and even
though it were true that when the accused, Emilia, made her appearance, the deceased
Lorenza arose with a knife in her hand and in a threatening manner asked the accused
what had brought her there, such attitude, under the provisions of article 8, No. 4 of the
Penal Code, does not constitute that unlawful aggression, which, among others, is the
first indispensable requisite upon which exemption by reason of self-defense may be
sustained.
In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary
that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of
the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been make; a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se,
and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-
defense. It has always been so recognized in the decisions of the courts, in accordance
with the provisions of the Penal Code.
In the commission of the crime the presence of mitigating circumstance No. 7 of article 9
of the code should be considered, without any aggravating circumstance to neutralize its
effects, for the reason that it has been proven that the accused, at the time when the crime
was committed, acted upon the impulse of passion and under great jealous excitement at
the sight of her husband taking supper in the company of his mistress, after he had been
absent from the conjugal dwelling for several days.
As to the penalty of indemnity contained in the judgment appealed from and impugned
by the defense, article 17 of the code reads: “Every person criminally liable for a crime or
misdemeanor is also civilly liable,” and according to the established rule of the courts, in
order that an accused person may be declared to have incurred civil liability, it is
sufficient that said liability shall proceed from, or be the consequence of the criminal
liability, and in addition thereto, article 122 of said code provides that the courts shall
regulate the amount of indemnity for damages under said civil liability, upon the same
terms as prescribed for the reparation of damage in article 121 of the code, and a finding
on the matter should be contained in the judgment.
For the reasons above set forth it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should
be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it in all its parts with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
WILLARD, J., dissenting:
I think that the aggravating circumstance of disguise should be applied, and I do not agree
with that part of the decision which treats of the matter of aggression ilegitima.

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 2 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153206. October 23, 2006.]
ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner, vs. LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal
separation filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution 2 of the CA dated April
26, 2002 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. DCScaT
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were
married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children:
Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority. 3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par.
(1) of the Family Code 4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch
41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct. 5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout
invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her,
pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could
reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children
or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their
bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the
children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she
protested with William's decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod,
William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she
asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and
William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on
the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a
gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister's house in
Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house
in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent's doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for
treatment of her injuries. 6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting
language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits
that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills
condominium and only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. In
the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the
house. 7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto,
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for
which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be
embodied in a supplemental decision. ISTCHE
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found that:
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels
and misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with
his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely
duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their
children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and
intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process,
insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured
the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when
she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage
could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an
atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very
well stated in plaintiff's memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for her to throw away
this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated
from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
endurance. 9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision
dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward
and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code,
i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were
adequately proven. 10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and
credible. Dr. Elinzano's testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several
injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained
redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a
blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The
presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her
sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence
presented and does not deviate from the doctor's main testimony — that [Lucita] suffered
physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping
of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the main
thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that
[William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she
had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at
her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang
ina mo," tanga," and "you don't know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in
their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995
incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness
to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived
with them. She observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and
becomes very violent." She cited several instances which proved that William Ong
indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx xxx xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon
[Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These
incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general
denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial,
weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion. CTHaSD
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and
her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its
entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive
conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly
abusive conduct. . . . 11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26,
2002. 12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE
SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND
OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER THE
SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S FAMILY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN
DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE
CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER. 13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest
control and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these
properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and
Dagupan, were acquired during the marriage through his (William's) sole efforts; the only
parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are Lucita's parents and siblings
while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and
child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese
community; substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked which warrant an
exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed
on appeal; the findings of the trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical
violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what took
place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children
particularly Charleston, Lucita's favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot be
impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies
of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parent's doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of
their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in
relation to their marital and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive
respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling
on December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for
herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that marriage
is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the
preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated
in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and convincingly proven,
can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses. 14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the
present petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear
evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the
RTC when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to
remove from William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to
transfer the same to Lucita's family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of
20 years and forego the companionship of William and her children just to serve the
interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical
violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. 15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, 16 as well as a
Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of
abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par.
(4) of the Family Code. 17 Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given
ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel and
refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration
of petitioner's in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor. 18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions. 19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds
the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to
adopt the facts as determined by the lower courts. 20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion. 21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional
circumstances, the general rule applies. AHDacC
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are
borne out by the records or are based on substantial evidence. 22 In this case, the findings
of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.
As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day
that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for
being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children. 23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when
William displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when
William threw a steel chair at Lucita; 24 threw chairs at their children; 25 slapped Lucita
and utter insulting words at her; 26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; 27
pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed
the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray; 28
shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of
their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table; 29 got mad at
Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with
steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago,
wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston; 30 and the December 9
and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling. 31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the
first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14,
1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it
is only on the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts
of my body, sir. 32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay
the said incidents. 33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the
Court gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of
consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as
trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses
on the stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. 34 Indeed, it is settled that the
assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and
weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying. 35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
[William]'s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence
committed by him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office
secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon
defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could
not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives
with defendant and depends upon him for support. 36
Parenthetically, William claims that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of
their relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to
discredit and label a witness's testimony as biased and unworthy of credence 37 and a
witness' relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his
or her testimony. 38 Considering the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by
Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the
trial court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is
in order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita
was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents
and her siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such
reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her
parents' and siblings' financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more
probable is that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that
Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC, EDCTIa
. . . it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship,
abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if
there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance. 39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label
him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If
there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita's
decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in
the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the
family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of
the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties
have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code
is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. 40 As it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of
strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 41 The Constitution itself however
does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it
remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the
constitutional provisions that protect the same. 42 With the enactment of the Family
Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as
well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. 43
As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation, the Court
has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief
she is entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. ESCTIA
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 30-44; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and
concurred in by Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
2. Rollo, p. 46.
3. See records, p. 1.
4. Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
5. Records, p. 2.
6. Rollo, pp. 49-51 (RTC Decision).
7. Id. at 53 (RTC Decision).
8. Rollo, p. 56.
9. Id. at 55.
10. Id. at 40-44.
11. Rollo, pp. 40-42.
12. Id. at 46.
13. Id. at 8-9.
14. Rollo, pp. 9-24.
15. Id. at 149-152.
16. Id. at 157-169.
17. Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following
grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
xxx xxx xxx
Rollo, pp. 210-236.
18. Id. at 221.
19. Id. at 188-203.
20. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006.
21. Id.
22. Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405-406 (2003).
23. TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 29-32.
24. TSN, Lucita Ong, June 11, 1997, p. 14.
25. Id. at 20.
26. Id. at 21.
27. Id. at 23.
28. TSN, Linda Lim, June 25, 1997, p. 5.
29. Id. at 5-6.
30. Id. at 7-8.
31. TSN, Lucita Ong, May 9, 1997, pp. 9-11, 16.
32. Id. at 21.
33. See TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 11, 53; TSN, Kingston Ong,
September 24, 1997, pp. 16-18.
34. Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333 (2001).
35. Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523, June 15, 2006; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R.
No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 364.
36. Rollo, p. 56.
37. Roca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at 334.
38. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, December 8,
2003, 417 SCRA 196, 207.
39. Rollo, p. 55.
40. Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following
grounds
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
41. Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180 (1996).
42. Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 35 at 372.
43. Id. at 372.

Copyright 2005 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 169698. November 29, 2006.]
LUPO ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision
1 dated April 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69797, as
reiterated in its Resolution 2 of September 16, 2005, reversing an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 61, in an action for Judicial Partition
of Real Property thereat commenced by the herein petitioner Lupo Atienza against
respondent Yolanda de Castro. cTCaEA
The facts:
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Lupo Atienza, then the President and General Manager of
Enrico Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation, hired the services of
respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as accountant for the two corporations.
In the course of time, the relationship between Lupo and Yolanda became intimate.
Despite Lupo being a married man, he and Yolanda eventually lived together in
consortium beginning the later part of 1983. Out of their union, two children were born.
However, after the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.
On May 28, 1992, Lupo filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for
the judicial partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in Bel-
Air Subdivision, Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 147828 of
the Registry of Deeds of Makati City. In his complaint, docketed in said court as Civil
Case No. 92-1423, Lupo alleged that the subject property was acquired during his union
with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the property is co-owned by
them.
Elaborating, Lupo averred in his complaint that the property in question was acquired by
Yolanda sometime in 1987 using his exclusive funds and that the title thereto was
transferred by the seller in Yolanda's name without his knowledge and consent. He did
not interpose any objection thereto because at the time, their affair was still thriving. It
was only after their separation and his receipt of information that Yolanda allowed her
new live-in partner to live in the disputed property, when he demanded his share thereat
as a co-owner. DHIcET
In her answer, Yolanda denied Lupo's allegations. According to her, she acquired the
same property for Two Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,600,000.00) using her
exclusive funds. She insisted having bought it thru her own savings and earnings as a
businesswoman.
In a decision 3 dated December 11, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by
declaring the contested property as owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering
its partition between the two in equal shares, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 147828 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City to be owned in
common by plaintiff LUPO ATIENZA and the defendant YOLANDA U. DE CASTRO
share-and-share alike and ordering the partition of said property between them. Upon the
finality of this Decision, the parties are hereby directed to submit for the confirmation of
the Court a mutually agreed project of partition of said property or, in case the physical
partition of said property is not feasible because of its nature, that either the same be
assigned to one of the parties who shall pay the value corresponding to the share of the
other or that the property to be sold and the proceeds thereof be divided equally between
the parties after deducting the expenses incident to said sale.
The parties shall bear their own attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED. CAcEaS
From the decision of the trial court, Yolanda went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 69797, therein arguing that the evidence on record preponderate that she purchased
the disputed property in her own name with her own money. She maintained that the
documents appertaining to her acquisition thereof are the best evidence to prove who
actually bought it, and refuted the findings of the trial court, as well as Lupo's assertions
casting doubt as to her financial capacity to acquire the disputed property.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in its decision 4 of April 29, 2005,
reversed and set aside that of the trial court and adjudged the litigated property as
exclusively owned by Yolanda, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The subject property is hereby declared to be exclusively owned by
defendant-appellant Yolanda U. De Castro. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In decreeing the disputed property as exclusively owned by Yolanda, the CA ruled that
under the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code vis-à-vis the evidence on record
and attending circumstances, Yolanda's claim of sole ownership is meritorious, as it has
been substantiated by competent evidence. To the CA, Lupo failed to overcome the
burden of proving his allegation that the subject property was purchased by Yolanda thru
his exclusive funds.
With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA in its Resolution of
September 16, 2005, 5 Lupo is now with this Court via the present recourse arguing that
pursuant to Article 144 6 of the Civil Code, he was in no way burdened to prove that he
contributed to the acquisition of the subject property because with or without the
contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner thereof, adding that under Article
484 7 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them
during their extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in
common and governed by the rules on co-ownership, which apply in default of contracts,
or special provisions. aEAcHI
We DENY.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because
petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article
148 8 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are
married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, . . . only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions . . . 9 Proof of actual contribution is required.
10
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties
who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to
their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof,
their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. 11
Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the
Civil Code. 12 Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred
before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 13
The applicable law being settled, we now remind the petitioner that here, as in other civil
cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party's own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure
of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable
relief can be granted only after the court is convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
warrant such relief. 14 Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence. 15
It is the petitioner's posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire
the property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2)
corporations to raise the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his
submissions are burdened by the fact that his claim to the property contradicts duly
written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March 24, 1987, the Deed of
Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated April
27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property,
to the exclusion of the petitioner. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Contrary to the disquisition of the trial court, [Lupo] failed to overcome this burden.
Perusing the records of the case, it is evident that the trial court committed errors of
judgment in its findings of fact and appreciation of evidence with regard to the source of
the funds used for the purchase of the disputed property and ultimately the rightful owner
thereof. Factual findings of the trial court are indeed entitled to respect and shall not be
disturbed, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
overlooked or misinterpreted that would otherwise materially affect the disposition of the
case. DEcTIS
In making proof of his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete evidence be
formally entered. Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to the purchase
money used as consideration for the disputed property, [Lupo] diverted the burden
imposed upon him to [Yolanda] by painting her as a shrewd and scheming woman
without the capacity to purchase any property. Instead of proving his ownership, or the
extent thereof, over the subject property, [Lupo] relegated his complaint to a mere attack
on the financial capacity of [Yolanda]. He presented documents pertaining to the ins and
outs of the dollar accounts of ENRICO and EURASIAN, which unfortunately failed to
prove his actual contribution in the purchase of the said property. The fact that [Yolanda]
had a limited access to the funds of the said corporations and had repeatedly withdrawn
money from their bank accounts for their behalf do not prove that the money she used in
buying the disputed property, or any property for that matter, came from said
withdrawals.
As it is, the disquisition of the court a quo heavily rested on the apparent financial
capacity of the parties. On one side, there is [Lupo], a retired sea captain and the
President and General Manager of two corporations and on the other is [Yolanda], a
Certified Public Accountant. Surmising that [Lupo] is financially well heeled than
[Yolanda], the court a quo concluded, sans evidence, that [Yolanda] had taken advantage
of [Lupo]. Clearly, the court a quo is in error. (Words in brackets supplied.)
As we see it, petitioner's claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis
because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase
thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary
proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so
and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the
petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by
sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it;
mere allegation is not evidence. HCETDS
True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-
ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioner's evidence in support of his
claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court's finding that the
disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast
to petitioner's dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership
when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to
purchase the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a
businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail.
She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with
her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which
reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.
All told, the Court finds and so holds that the CA committed no reversible error in
rendering the herein challenged decision and resolution.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed issuances of the CA are
AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner. EDATSC
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
 1. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga with Associate Justices
Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Fernanda Lampas-Peralta, concurring,
Rollo, pp. 26-34.
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 64-70.
4. Supra note 1.
5. Supra note 2.
6. Art. 144 — When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
7. Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or
right belongs to different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title.
8. Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under [Article 147], only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in
such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another,
his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they
lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of the cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share
of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default or of waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. The foregoing rules on
forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
9. Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 135.
10. Agapay v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302, 311-312 (1997).
11. Family Code, Article 148; Adriano v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 474, 484-485
(2000), citing Agapay v. Palang, supra note 10, citing Tolentino, I Civil Code Of The
Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence, 500 (1999 edition); Tumlos v. Fernandez,
G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718, 733-734.
12. Jacinto Saguid v. Hon. Court of Appeals, The Regional Trial Court, Branch 94,
Boac, Marinduque and Gina S. Rey, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
13. Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra, citing the Family Code, Article 256.
14. Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 989, 1001 (1999), citing
Pascua v. Florendo, 220 Phil. 588 (1985); Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-40098,
August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 425.
15. Id., citing P.T. Cerna Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91622, April 6,
1993, 221 SCRA 19.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-LORINO,
respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J p:
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated September 23, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73884, which affirmed on appeal an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal in a summary judicial proceeding
thereat commenced by the herein respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino for the declaration
of the presumptive death of her absent spouse, Francisco Lorino, Jr., based on the
provisions of Article 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage. DCIEac
The facts may be summarized, as follows:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria for brevity), and her husband were married
on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three (3) children, namely: Francis
Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima. famcd2005
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual
drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with
friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husband's violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind and
decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to support
the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard
of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his
relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal under the rules on
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code,
which petition was docketed in the same court as Special Proceeding No. 325-00 SM.
DHIaTS
On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, inter alia, the publication of the
petition in a newspaper of general circulation, thus:
A verified petition was filed by herein petitioner through counsel alleging that she
married Francisco Lorino, Jr. on June 12, 1987 but because of the violent character of his
husband, she decided to go back to her parents and lived separately from her husband.
After nine (9) years, there was absolutely no news about him and she believes that he is
already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a Court declaration that her
husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.
Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby set for
hearing before this Court on September 18, 2000 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning at which
place, date and time, any or all persons who may claim any interest thereto may appear
and show cause why the same should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in this
province once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and be posted in the bulletin boards
of the Hall of Justice and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal, all at the expense of the
petitioner. HICSaD
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of this Order together with a copy of
the petition. Further, send a copy of this Order to the last known address of Francisco
Lorino, Jr. at 719 Burgos St., Sta. Elena, Marikina City.
SO ORDERED 1
The evidence in support of the summary judicial proceeding are: the order of publication
dated August 28, 2000 (Exhibit "A"); affidavit of publication dated September 16, 2000
(Exhibit "B") 2 ; copies of the newspapers where the order appeared (Exhibits "C" to "E-
1") 3 ; a deposition dated September 4, 2000 of Gloria taken in Hong Kong (Exhibit "G")
4 ; Gloria's affidavit dated October 21, 1999, also executed in Hong Kong (Exhibit "G-
1") 5 ; and a certification by Department of Foreign Affairs Authentication Officer,
Catalina C. Gonzalez, dated November 3, 1999, therein certifying that the signature of
Vice Consul Adriane Bernie C. Candolada, appearing below the jurat in Gloria's affidavit
of October 21, 1999, is authentic (Exhibit "G-2") 6 .
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court in view of the facts and circumstances obtaining, finds the
petition with merit and hereby grants its imprimatur to the petition. Judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to
Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to all restrictions and conditions provided
therein. IADaSE
SO ORDERED. 7
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of
Article 247 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory,
the Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines, nevertheless filed
a Notice of Appeal. 8 Acting thereon, the RTC had the records elevated to the Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 73884.
In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied
the Republic's appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DENIED.
Accordingly, the appealed November 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal in Spec. Proc. No. 325-00 SM is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 9
Without filing any motion for reconsideration, petitioner Republic directly went to this
Court via the instant recourse under Rule 45, maintaining that the petition raises a pure
question of law that does not require prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
ITDSAE
The foregoing factual antecedents present to this Court the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DULY ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL ON A FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; and
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR A JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE
FAMILY CODE WERE DULY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
The Court rules against petitioner Republic.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules,
to wit:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings.
Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes of RTC, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal duly complied with
the above-cited provision by expeditiously rendering judgment within ninety (90) days
after the formal offer of evidence by therein petitioner, Gloria Bermudez-Lorino.
The problem came about when the judge gave due course to the Republic’s appeal upon
the filing of a Notice of Appeal, and had the entire records of the case elevated to the
Court of Appeals, stating in her order of December 18, 2001, as follows:
Notice of Appeal having been filed through registered mail on November 22, 2001 by the
Office of the Solicitor General who received a copy of the Decision in this case on
November 14, 2001, within the reglementary period fixed by the Rules, let the entire
records of this case be transmitted to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
IaSAHC
SO ORDERED. 10
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period
within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by
express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and
executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course to the
Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of
Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec, 11 "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it
is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family
Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the
parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to
appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001. SAHIaD
It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its Special Fourth
Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting Chairman and ponente, denied the
Republic's appeal and affirmed without modification the final and executory judgment of
the lower court. For, as we have held in Nacuray vs. NLRC: 12
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land (citing
Nunal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 26).
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the
bar, let it be stated that the RTC's decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a
notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals
acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on
that ground.
This judgment of denial was elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Although the result of the Court of Appeals’ denial of the appeal would
apparently be the same, there is a big difference between having the supposed appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be
appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of
merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an
Entry of Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the
matter to this Court on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed
until this Court makes the final pronouncement. ECaSIT
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on
ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November
7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the
Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the
judgment was not appealable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ ., concur.
Panganiban, J ., In the result. Certiorari under Rule 65, not review under Rule 45, is the
OSG's remedy.
Footnotes
1. Records, p. 9.
2. Records, pp. 10-11.
3. Records, pp. 12-15.
4. Records, pp. 37-40.
5. Records, p. 42.
6. Records, p. 41.
7. RTC Decision, p. 2; Records, pp. 51-52.
8. Records, p. 53.
9. Rollo, pp. 22-26.
10. Records, p. 56.
11. 211 SCRA 907 [1992].
12. 270 SCRA 9 [1997].

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 5 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151967. February 16, 2005.]
JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. MASTER IRON WORKS &
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV, Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J p:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 59045, which reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Branch 260, in Civil Case No.
94-2260 and the Resolution of the CA denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the said decision. IDETCA
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married
on January 15, 1983. 3 Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private
corporation. A little more than a year and seven months thereafter, or on August 31,
1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale for
P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco,
covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon located at St. Martin de
Porres Street, San Antonio Valley I, Sucat, Parañaque, Metro Manila. One of the lots was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 36519, with an area of 342 square
meters, while the other lot, with an area of 360 square meters, was covered by TCT No.
36518. 4 The purchase price of the property was paid to the Bank via Check No. 002334
in the amount of P320,000.00 drawn and issued by the Commercial Bank of Manila, for
which the Imus Bank issued Official Receipt No. 121408 on August 31, 1984. 5 On the
basis of the said deed of sale, TCT Nos. 36518 and 36519 were cancelled and, on
September 4, 1984, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 (60550) and 87977
(60551) in the name of "Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco." 6
On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record Entry No. 85-18003 at the
dorsal portion of the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by
Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two
parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that
he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property. 7 On January 13, 1986,
Josefina mortgaged the said property to Leonila Cando for a loan of P157,000.00. 8 It
appears that Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the deed. 9
On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach
Out Trading International, bought 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master
Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. On
November 27, 1990, MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the RTC of Makati City
for the return of the said commodities, or the value thereof in the amount of P768,750.00.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-3251. On January 8, 1992, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of MIWCC and against Eduardo. The fallo of the decision
reads:
Accordingly, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff Master Iron Works And
Construction Corporation against the defendant [Eduardo] Francisco ordering the latter as
follows:
1. To replace to plaintiff 7,500 bags at 50 kilos/bag of Portland cement or, in the
alternative, to pay the plaintiff the amount of P768,750.00; HCDAcE
2. In either case, to pay liquidated damages by way of interest at 12% per annum
from June 21, 1990 until fully paid;
3. To pay P50,000.00 as actual damages; and
4. To pay attorney's fees of P153,750.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 10
The decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 became final and executory and, on June 7, 1994,
the court issued a writ of execution. 11 On June 14, 1994, Sheriff Roberto Alejo sold at a
public auction one stainless, owner-type jeep for P10,000.00 to MIWCC. 12 Sheriff Alejo
issued a Notice of Levy on Execution/Attachment over the lots covered by TCT No.
87976 (60550) and 87977 (60551) for the recovery of the balance of the amount due
under the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 90-3251. 13 On June 24, 1994, the
sale of the property at a public auction was set to August 5, 1994. 14
On July 3, 1994, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim 15 over the two
parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal property, and that her
husband Eduardo had no proprietary right or interest over them as evidenced by his
affidavit of waiver, a copy of which she attached to her affidavit. She, likewise, requested
Sheriff Alejo to cause the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution/attachment
earlier issued by him. cSEaDA
On July 7, 1994, Josefina filed the said Affidavit of Third Party Claim in the trial court
and served a copy thereof to the sheriff. MIWCC then submitted an indemnity bond 16 in
the amount of P1,361,500.00 issued by the Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The
sale at public auction proceeded. MIWCC made a bid for the property for the price of
P1,350,000.00. 17
On July 28, 1994, Josefina filed a Complaint against MIWCC and Sheriff Alejo in the
RTC of Parañaque for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2260. She alleged then that
she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo in Civil Case
No. 90-3251; hence, the levy on execution of the property was null and void. She
reiterated that her husband, the defendant in Civil Case No. 90-3251, had no right or
proprietary interest over the said property as evidenced by his affidavit of waiver
annotated at the dorsal portion of the said title. Josefina prayed that the court issue a
temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin MIWCC from
causing the sale of the said property at public auction. Considering that no temporary
restraining order had as yet been issued by the trial court, the sheriff sold the subject
property at public auction to MIWCC for P1,350,000.00 on August 5, 1994. 18 However,
upon the failure of MIWCC to remit the sheriff's commission on the sale, the latter did
not execute a sheriff's certificate of sale over the property. The RTC of Parañaque,
thereafter, issued a temporary restraining order 19 on August 16, 1994. cEITCA
When Josefina learned of the said sale at public auction, she filed an amended complaint
impleading MIWCC, with the following prayer:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable
Court that, after hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants and the same be in the following tenor:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the following
amounts:
A. The sum of P50,000.00 representing as actual damages;
B. The sum of P200,000.00 representing as moral damages;
C. The sum of P50,000.00 or such amount which this Honorable Court deems just as
exemplary damages; aACHDS
D. The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
2. Declaring the levying and sale at public auction of the plaintiff's properties null
and void;
3. To issue writ of preliminary injunction and makes it permanent;
4. Order the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the titles as a result of the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 90-3251.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just under the premises. 20
In its answer to the complaint, MIWCC cited Article 116 of the Family Code of the
Philippines and averred that the property was the conjugal property of Josefina and her
husband Eduardo, who purchased the same on August 31, 1984 after their marriage on
January 14, 1983. MIWCC asserted that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver to
evade the satisfaction of the decision in Civil Case No. 90-3251 and to place the property
beyond the reach of creditors; hence, the said affidavit was null and void. ESTcIA
Before she could commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her
marriage to Eduardo in the RTC of Parañaque, Metro Manila, on the ground that when
they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo was already married to one Carmelita
Carpio. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-0169.
Josefina and Carmelita testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169. Josefina declared that during
her marriage to Eduardo, she acquired the property covered by TCT Nos. 87976 (60550)
and 87977 (60551), through the help of her sisters and brother, and that Eduardo had no
participation whatsoever in the said acquisition. She added that Eduardo had five
children, namely, Mary Jane, Dianne, Mary Grace Jo, Mark Joseph and Mary Cecille, all
surnamed Francisco. jur2005cd
On September 9, 1996, the RTC of Parañaque rendered judgment 21 in Civil Case No.
95-0169, declaring the marriage between Josefina and Eduardo as null and void for being
bigamous. SDTIaE
In the meantime, Josefina testified in Civil Case No. 94-2260, declaring, inter alia, that
she was able to purchase the property from the Bank when she was still single with her
mother's financial assistance; she was then engaged in recruitment when Eduardo
executed an affidavit of waiver; she learned that he was previously married when they
already had two children; nevertheless, she continued cohabiting with him and had three
more children by him; and because of Eduardo's first marriage, she decided to have him
execute the affidavit of waiver.
Eduardo testified that when his wife bought the property in 1984, he was in Davao City
and had no knowledge of the said purchases; he came to know of the purchase only when
Josefina informed him a week after his arrival from Davao; 22 Josefina's sister, Lolita
Castillo, told him that she would collect from him the money his wife borrowed from her
and their mother to buy the property; 23 when he told Lolita that he had no money, she
said that she would no longer collect from him, on the condition that he would have no
participation over the property, 24 which angered Eduardo; 25 when Josefina purchased
the property, he had a gross monthly income of P10,000.00 and gave P5,000.00 to
Josefina for the support of his family; 26 Josefina decided that he execute the affidavit of
waiver because her mother and sister gave the property to her. 27
On December 20, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding the levy on the subject
property and the sale thereof at public auction to be null and void. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, THIS COURT finds the Levying and sale
at public auction of the plaintiff's properties null and void. ETHCDS
The court orders the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay plaintiff the following
amounts:
a. The sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages;
b. The sum of P50,000.00 representing as moral damages;
c. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. The sum of P60,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
The court orders the cancellation of whatever entries appearing at the Titles as a result of
the enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 90-3251.
SO ORDERED. 28
The trial court held that the property levied by Sheriff Alejo was the sole and exclusive
property of Josefina, applying Articles 144, 160, 175 and 485 of the New Civil Code. The
trial court also held that MIWCC failed to prove that Eduardo Francisco contributed to
the acquisition of the property. cAaDHT
MIWCC appealed the decision to the CA in which it alleged that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REAL ESTATE
PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE AUCTION SALE ARE PARAPHERNAL
PROPERTIES OWNED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE JOSEFINA FRANCISCO;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RECEPTION OF
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE WITH REGARD TO THE ANNULMENT OF PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE WITH EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LEVY ON
EXECUTION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THE
PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS NULL AND VOID; TEAcCD
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO
PAY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE FOR ALLEGED IMPROPER LEVY
ON EXECUTION. 29
The CA rendered judgment setting aside and reversing the decision of the RTC on
September 20, 2001. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision, dated 20 December 1997, of the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 260, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0126.
SO ORDERED. 30
The CA ruled that the property was presumed to be the conjugal property of Eduardo and
Josefina, and that the latter failed to rebut such presumption. It also held that the affidavit
of waiver executed by Eduardo was contrary to Article 146 of the New Civil Code and,
as such, had no force and effect. Josefina filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision, which was, likewise, denied by the CA. ITEcAD
Josefina, now the petitioner, filed the present petition for review, alleging that:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE EXISTS A CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
EDUARDO FRANCISCO;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES WERE NOT PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF
PETITIONER;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISTURBING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSION BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS
DECISION OF DECEMBER 20, 1997, THE SAME BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. 31
The threshold issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the subject property
is the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco; and (b) whether or
not the subject properties may be held to answer for the personal obligations of Eduardo.
acADIT
We shall deal with the issues simultaneously as they are closely related.
The petitioner asserts that inasmuch as her marriage to Eduardo is void ab initio, there is
no occasion that would give rise to a regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The
petitioner adds that to rule otherwise would render moot and irrelevant the provisions on
the regime of special co-ownership under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, in relation to Article 144 of the New Civil Code.
The petitioner avers that since Article 148 of the Family Code governs their property
relationship, the respondents must adduce evidence to show that Eduardo actually
contributed to the acquisition of the subject properties. The petitioner asserts that she
purchased the property before her marriage to Eduardo with her own money without any
contribution from him; hence, the subject property is her paraphernal property.
Consequently, such property is not liable for the debts of Eduardo to private respondent
MIWCC. TSacAE
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the appellate court was correct in ruling
that the properties are conjugal in nature because there is nothing in the records to
support the petitioner's uncorroborated claim that the funds she used to purchase the
subject properties were her personal funds or came from her mother and sister. The
respondents point out that if, as claimed by the petitioner, the subject properties were,
indeed, not conjugal in nature, then, there was no need for her to obtain marital
(Eduardo's) consent when she mortgaged the properties to two different parties sometime
in the first quarter of 1986, or after Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver.
We note that the only questions raised in this case are questions of facts. Under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in and resolved by the Court.
The Court may, however, determine and resolve questions of facts in cases where the
findings of facts of the trial court and those of the CA are inconsistent, where highly
meritorious circumstances are present, and where it is necessary to give substantial
justice to the parties. In the present action, the findings of facts and the conclusions of the
trial court and those of the CA are opposite. There is thus an imperative need for the
Court to delve into and resolve the factual issues, in tandem with the questions of law
raised by the parties. HEISca
The petition has no merit.
The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The
evidence on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property to the petitioner on August 31, 1984 and titles over the property were, thereafter,
issued to the latter as vendee on September 4, 1984 after her marriage to Eduardo on
January 15, 1983.
We agree with the petitioner that Article 144 of the New Civil Code does not apply in the
present case. This Court in Tumlos v. Fernandez 32 held that Article 144 of the New
Civil Code applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void
from the very beginning. It does not apply to a cohabitation that is adulterous or amounts
to concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there exists a prior
conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful wife. In this
case, the petitioner admitted that when she and Eduardo cohabited, the latter was
incapacitated to marry her. SHIcDT
Article 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, on which the petitioner anchors her
claims, provides as follows:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are in bad
faith. ADaSEH
Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by
expressly regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of
adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256 of the Family Code, the law can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The petitioner failed to
prove that she had any vested right over the property in question. 33
Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of
Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be
conjugal property. 34 Article 105 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that the
Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before the code took effect, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws. 35
Thus, even if Eduardo and Carmelita were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the property still cannot be considered conjugal property because
there can only be but one valid existing marriage at any given time. 36 Article 148 of the
Family Code also debilitates against the petitioner's claim since, according to the said
article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party
has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that the parents prove their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate
interest thereon. 37
We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce
preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property:
First of all, other than plaintiff-appellee's bare testimony, there is nothing in the record to
support her claim that the funds she used to purchase the subject properties came from
her mother and sister. She did not, for instance, present the testimonies of her mother and
sister who could have corroborated her claim. Furthermore, in her Affidavit of Third-
Party Claim (Exh. "C"), she stated that the subject properties "are my own paraphernal
properties, including the improvements thereon, as such are the fruits of my own
exclusive efforts . . .," clearly implying that she used her own money and contradicting
her later claim that the funds were provided by her mother and sister. She also stated in
her affidavit that she acquired the subject properties before her marriage to Eduardo
Francisco on 15 January 1983, a claim later belied by the presentation of the Deed of
Absolute Sale clearly indicating that she bought the properties from Imus Rural Bank on
31 August 1984, or one year and seven months after her marriage (Exh. "D"). In the face
of all these contradictions, plaintiff-appellee's uncorroborated testimony that she acquired
the subject properties with funds provided by her mother and sister should not have been
given any weight by the lower court. THacES
It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age, it is
doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she
claimed in her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later
claimed that the funds were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in
a desperate effort to shield the subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment
creditor. 38
Aside from her bare claims, the petitioner offered nothing to prove her allegation that she
borrowed the amount of P320,000.00 from her mother and her sister, which she paid to
the Imus Bank on August 31, 1984 to purchase the subject property. The petitioner even
failed to divulge the name of her mother and the sources of her income, if any, and that of
her sister. When she testified in Civil Case No. 95-0169, the petitioner declared that she
borrowed part of the purchase price of the property from her brother, 39 but failed to
divulge the latter's name, let alone reveal how much money she borrowed and when. The
petitioner even failed to adduce any evidence to prove that her mother and sister had
P320,000.00 in 1984, which, considering the times, was then quite a substantial amount.
Moreover, the petitioner's third-party-claim affidavit stating that the properties "are the
fruits of my own exclusive effort before I married Eduardo Francisco" belies her
testimony in the trial court and in Civil Case No. 95-0169. cECTaD
We note that, as gleaned from the receipt issued by the Imus Bank, the payment for the
subject property was drawn via Check No. 002334 and issued by the Commercial Bank
of Manila in the amount of P320,000.00. 40 The petitioner failed to testify against whose
account the check was drawn and issued, and whether the said account was owned by her
and/or Eduardo Francisco or her mother, sister or brother. She even failed to testify
whether the check was a manager's check and, if so, whose money was used to purchase
the same.
We also agree with the findings of the CA that the affidavit of waiver executed by
Eduardo on February 15, 1985, stating that the property is owned by the petitioner, is
barren of probative weight. We are convinced that he executed the said affidavit in
anticipation of claims by third parties against him and hold the property liable for the said
claims. First, the petitioner failed to prove that she had any savings before her
cohabitation with Eduardo. Second, despite Eduardo's affidavit of waiver, he nevertheless
affixed his marital conformity to the real estate mortgage executed by the petitioner over
the property in favor of Leonila on January 13, 1986. 41 Third, the petitioner testified that
she borrowed the funds for the purchase of the property from her mother and sister. 42
Fourth, the petitioner testified that Eduardo executed the affidavit of waiver because she
discovered that he had a first marriage. 43 Lastly, Eduardo belied the petitioner's
testimony when he testified that he executed the affidavit of waiver because his mother-
in-law and sister-in-law had given the property to the petitioner. 44
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. caEIDA
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Wenceslao I. Agnir, Jr. (retired), with Associate
Justices Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Mariano C. Del Castillo, concurring.
2. Penned by Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
3. TSN, 24 January 1995, pp. 13-14. (Exhibit "H")
4. Exhibit "D."
5. Exhibit "E."
6. Records, pp. 149, 151. (Exhibits "A" and "B")
7. Dorsal portion of TCT Nos. 87976 and 87977.
8. Records, pp. 236-239. (Exhibits "13" to "13-D")
9. Id. at 238. (Exhibit "13-D")
10. Id. at 221.
11. Id. at 222. (Exhibit "2")
12. Id. at 45.
13. Id. at 223. (Exhibit "3")
14. Id. at 224. (Exhibit "4")
15. Id. at 153.
16. Id. at 227. (Exhibit "6")
17. Id. at 229. (Exhibit "8")
18. Id. at 56.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 32.
21. Id. at 287-289.
22. TSN, 11 July 1995, p. 15.
23. Id. at 10-12.
24. TSN, 14 July 1995, p. 14.
25. TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 19-20.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 29-32.
28. CA Rollo, pp. 41-42.
29. Id. at 21.
30. Rollo, pp. 39-40.
31. Id. at 13.
32. 330 SCRA 718 (2000).
33. Id. at 733.
34. Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses,
is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
35. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004.
36. Tumlos v. Fernandez, supra.
37. Ibid; Malang v. Moson, 338 SCRA 393 (2000).
38. Rollo, pp. 34-35.
39. Exhibit "G-1."
40. Exhibit "E."
41. Exhibit "13-D."
42. TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 11-12.
43. TSN, 30 May 1995, pp. 8-9.
44. TSN, 11 July 1995, pp. 29-30.

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 5 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005.]
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO,
respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on
June 3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748
(97). EIcSDC
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San
Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-
2802. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife. 3
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot
in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a
Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent. 4
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial
sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder.
After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its
vice-president, consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an
Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. 5
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to
the subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain
Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because
Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises. HTIEaS
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 29, San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate
Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale,
Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In
the latter's Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the
allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a) The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed before
Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as Doc. No. 212; Page No.
44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.
(b) The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on April
20, 1995.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant over the
residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-
091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary
Public Octavio M. Zayas. ICHAaT
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of
the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed. jur2005cda
SO ORDERED. 6
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired
during the marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership. 7 The
appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was
constituted without the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article
124 of the Family Code. Thus, it upheld the trial court's order to reconvey the subject
property to respondent. 8 With respect to the damage to respondent's car, the appellate
court found petitioner to be liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences
of the acts or omissions of the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task. 9 All told,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorney's fees for lack of basis. 10
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Court's consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER
THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE. ESHcTD
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR.
THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY. 11
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this
case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the
other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have
intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership. 12 Thus,
petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.'s share in the conjugal partnership. TcIaHC
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, 13 it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires
the consent of both the husband and wife. 14 In applying Article 124 of the Family Code,
this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As
shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as
an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her late
husband. 15 With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. 16
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in
a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties
and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. 17 Unlike
the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a
suppletory manner, 18 the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract
of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter
(on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. 19
Thus, the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed,
foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the
former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on partnership apply only when the
Family Code is silent on the matter. THCASc
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject
property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article
124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. 20 Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in
declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of
respondent's consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it
redounded to the benefit of the family. 21
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be
held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing
then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to
make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband
alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit. 22
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. 23 Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). 24
Petitioner's sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to
finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his
family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than
petitioner's bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the
benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the
payment of the principal obligation. TSEHcA
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that
the proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner
never claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party
adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it
would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. 25 A party
may change his legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not
require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory. 26
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. TICDSc
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by J. Juan Q. Enriquez and concurred in by JJ. Eugenio S. Labitoria,
Chairman, and Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo, p. 34.
2. Penned by Judge Bienvenido Reyes.
3. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 36.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. As quoted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 34-35.
7. Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 5; Rollo, p. 38.
8. Id. at 6; Rollo, p. 39.
9. Ibid.
10. Id. at 7; Rollo, p. 40.
11. Rollo, p. 24.
12. Rollo, p. 26.
13. 353 Phil. 578 (1998).
14. Id. at 374.
15. Article 119, The New Civil Code.
16. Article 105, Family Code.
17. Article 106, Family Code.
18. Article 90, Family Code.
19. Article 108, Family Code.
20. Recaña, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123850, January 5, 2001, 349 SCRA
24, 33.
21. Rollo, p. 27.
22. Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 942, 952
(1998), citing Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969).
23. Id. at 954, 286 SCRA 272, 283 (1998).
24. Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr., 378 Phi. 1009 (1999).
25. Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949 (1997).
26. Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. Court of Appeals, 205 Phil. 789 (1983).

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 0 5 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127358. March 31, 2005.]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005.]
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA
SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J p:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed
by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by
stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated. 1
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads: cCaATD
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and
void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5
million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date
of this decision plus attorney's fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00,
plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiff's separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank
[and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net
amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from
the date of this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila
Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family
name Singh. cd1upfam05
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties. EHaCTA
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was
pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly
support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. 3
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support
pendente lite to P20,000. 4 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the
said Resolution. 5
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioner's
appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial court's decision. 6 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which
increased the monthly support for the son. 7 Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to
question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari 8 and the Petition for Certiorari 9
were ordered consolidated by this Court. 10
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN
THE AMOUNT OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1
MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT
ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND P50,000.00
EXPENSES OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE,
WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS; ESIcaC
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS
RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS
AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES,
ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE
HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE
CHILD (WHO WAS ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS
TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE
CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON. 11
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
REFUSED TO SET RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR
THE PARTIES' SON FOR HEARING. 12
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVY'S
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES. 13
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVY'S
SUPPORT, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF
EXPENSES SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONER'S
OBJECTIONS THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS
ENTITLED TO A P5,000 INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO
MINIMAL." 14
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE
CANNOT AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVY'S SUPPORT. 15
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated: AcSCaI
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the
testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those
of the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that
he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his
first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but
also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work
such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendant-
appellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as
proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the
aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after
and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial court's decision on the ground that unlike those arising
from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may
not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme
Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital
obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be
made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its
discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed
for. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court. 16
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the
Civil Code, which read as follows: caADIC
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219 17 of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article
21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must
willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence
done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages
were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would
have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based
on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel
Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus: aEHTSc
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . . 18
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his
incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless,
said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral
damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity,
and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the
same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set
of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere
act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully
concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of
marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived
the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful
act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis
in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary
damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed
in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 19
With respect to the grant of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation the trial court
explained, thus: ISCaDH
Regarding Attorney's fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the
plaintiff's act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of
litigation to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable
that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11) 20
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully
justified, the award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise
fully justified. 21
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological
incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be
considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are
grounded on petitioner's psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental
incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence,
neither can be a ground for attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the
award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the
shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the
trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the
conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The
Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso
facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572-573, 586). Thus, speaking through
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous
proceedings. ASTcEa
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art.
117 of the Family Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among
others they are the following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common
fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of
the spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from
the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory
of what are the parties' conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each
spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked
first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co.
received separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of
P3,701,500.00 which after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net
amount of P3,675,335.79 and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11). Not having shown debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said
retirement/separation pay, under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the
conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in
the marriage settlement or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such
share as provided in this Code." In this particular case, however, there had been no
marriage settlement between the parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid
forfeiture of the defendant wife's share in the conjugal partnership properties. The
previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential
house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their Compromise Agreement
dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial Decision dated August 6,
1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all demands for past
support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in favor of the
plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of liquidation of
the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom their only
child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half (1/2)
portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive
legitime. TAScID
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in
the conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2)
share of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of
their conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor,
industry, work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par.
2 of the Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the
outstanding shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and
the Provident Group of Companies. 22
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to
give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company
and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latter's share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties
had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps
were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement
benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon
his retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued
from plaintiff-appellant's service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while
he was married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is
true with the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the
time he was married to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her
share in the conjugal partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial
court. 23
Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code,
providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains,
as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated,
partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. ASICDH
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City, 24 this Court expounded on
the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and
specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so
applied in previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation. SacDIE
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision
(in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any
of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that —
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in
co-ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share
in the co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by
any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture
shall take place upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the
marriage. aCHDAE
xxx xxx xxx
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court
which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed
with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a
reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home"
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102
and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the
liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code,
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code,
i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that
somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away
with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then
illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family
Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases,
it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident property relations,
on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment)
and, on the other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to
ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of
Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as
it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family
home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in
force and effect regardless of the property regime of the spouses. 25
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the
parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property
of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. AECIaD
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura,
it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005 26 and
has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also
now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously
stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review
(G.R. No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving
respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust
Co. and one-half of petitioner's shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the
Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals'
Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support
pendente lite in favor of the parties' son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and
ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 54.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 76.
3. Rollo (G.R. No. 127358), pp. 7-8.
4. Id. at 136.
 5. Id. at 138.
6. Id. at 144.
7. Id. at 153.
8. G.R. No. 127449.
9. G.R. No. 127358.
10. Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 100.
11. Id. at 32.
12. Rollo (G.R. No. 127358) p. 11.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 20.
16. Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 81-82.
17. ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32,
34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
18. Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34.
Emphasis supplied.
19. Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
20. Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 67.
21. Id. at 82.
22. Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 69-71.
23. Id. at 82-83.
24. G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996, 260 SCRA 221.
25. Id. at 226-234. (Emphasis in the original.)
26. Javy Singh Buenaventura was born on May 27, 1980; Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p.
56.

Copyright 2005 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005.]
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A.
Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA, in her personal capacity, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari 1 are the February 27, 2004 decision 2 and the May
14, 2004 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which
dismissed petitioner's original action for annulment of judgment 4 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
AIDTSE
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C.
Herrera filed a petition 5 for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of
"Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit: (1) the surname "Herrera" as appended to the name
of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba
Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child's mother,
Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the
challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he
learned of the existence of said birth certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with
Ezperanza C. Santos and never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo
Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented certifications from the Civil Registrar
of Mandaluyong City 6 and the National Statistics Office, 7 both stating that they have no
record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition, 8 impleading Armi
and "all the persons who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition." 9
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing on
January 24, 1997, and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her
address appearing in the birth certificate which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila,
and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor General. The full text of
the order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia,
that the following entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned
therein;
2. The surname "Herrera" appended to the child's name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for
hearing on January 24, 1997 at nine o'clock in the morning before this Branch at Rooms
447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All interested parties are hereby notified of the
said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the Petition should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila,
and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079. aETADI
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the City of Manila with copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the
address indicated in the subject Certificate of Live Birth.
SO ORDERED. 10
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court
issued an Amended Order 11 with substantially the same contents, except that the hearing
was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997. A copy of said Amended Order was published in
"Today", a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its January 20, 27, and February
3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita,
Manila, on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Solicitor
General.
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the
Solicitor General appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other hand
was not present. The return of the notice sent to her had the following notation:

This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server] personally
served a copy of the Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated January 13, 1997
to the private respondent, Armi Alba Herrera at . . . 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, but
failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent is no longer residing at said
given address. 12
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and executory
on June 2, 1997. 13 The dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entry under the name of the child, the
surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO
ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982,
Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper
correction and entry.
SO ORDERED. 14
Private respondent filed a motion 15 for amendment of the decretal portion of the
decision to include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of
petitioner minor. This was granted in the August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the entries under the name of the child, the
surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas Herrera are ordered
deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and the entry under the date
and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered
deleted or cancelled.
SO ORDERED. 16
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of
judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to know of the decision of the trial
court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her son was enrolled as
a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order
directing the change of petitioner minor's surname from Herrera to Alba. EDcICT
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza
Towers Condominium, 1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such was her
residence when she and private respondent cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to
1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was born on March 8, 1985. Even after their
separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998; and that
Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on June 14, 1991 as part of his
support to petitioner minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth certificate of their son, was entered in said
certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister, Corazon Espiritu. She
stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence
of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her
from opposing the petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported
cohabitation with Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as "false statements
coming from a polluted source." 17
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among
others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and
purposely deprived them of their day in court. It further held that as an illegitimate child,
petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother. 18 Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments may
be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud. 19
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her
minor child depends on the nature of private respondent's action, that is, in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while
an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subject that
person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. 20
Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res, 21 which concerns the status
of a person, 22 like a petition for adoption, 23 annulment of marriage, 24 or correction of
entries in the birth certificate, 25 as in the instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. 26 The
service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. 27
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the
latter jurisdiction over the res. Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil
registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the
institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, with the proper
Regional Trial Court. 28 Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial
court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter. aSTHDc
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication
thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the
requirement of due process, the essence of which is an opportunity to be heard. Said
address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi.
Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing therein
are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the
order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which
binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem
proceeding is validated essentially through publication. 29 The absence of personal
service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial court's compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change of
entries in a minor's birth certificate to reflect the name of the minor's real father as well as
to effect the corresponding change of her surname. In seeking to annul said decision, the
other children of the alleged father claimed that they are indispensable parties to the
petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to annul the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition which was sustained
by this Court on the ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an indispensable
party, the failure to implead her was cured by the publication of the order of hearing.
Thus —
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her
interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June
was the daughter of Armando would affect her ward's share in the estate of her father. It
cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy's existence at the time she filed
the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner
under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the
legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina
amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part
to comply with Section 3 as quoted above. ADaSET
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which
requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The
Court of Appeals correctly noted:
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of
January 7, 1985. The actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred
jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. While "nobody
appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the December 6, 1984 hearing, that did
not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue
trying the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues
until termination of the case.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not
against a person. The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the
whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world
as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 30
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondent's alleged concealment of
Armi's present address, was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here, Armi contended that private
respondent is aware of her present address because they lived together as husband and
wife in the condominium unit from 1982 to 1988 and because private respondent
continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her claim, she presented (1)
private respondent's title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to
private respondent for payment of homeowner's or association dues; (2) a photocopy of a
January 14, 1991 deed of sale of the subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent
title issued to the latter. However, these documents only tend to prove private
respondent's previous ownership of the unit and the subsequent transfer thereof to Armi,
but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does the sale prove that the
conveyance of the unit was part of private respondent's support to petitioner minor.
Indeed, intimate relationships and family relations cannot be inferred from what appears
to be an ordinary business transaction. HTacDS
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale 31 stated that Armi resides at 1175 L.
Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent
has knowledge of Armi's address because the former objected to the offer of the deed for
being a mere photocopy. 32 The counsel for petitioners even admitted that they do not
have the original of the deed and that per certification of the Clerk of Court, the Notary
Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notarized document as
required by the rules. 33 The deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing knowledge of
Armi's address to private respondent inasmuch as the authenticity thereof was neither
admitted by private respondent nor proven by petitioners.
While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they were
only attached as annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before the
Court of Appeals. More importantly, said letters/notes do not have probative value
because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic writing of
private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits 34 of Armi and her sister, Corazon
Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the
affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such
affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written
statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-
examination. 35 Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of
Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and
without probative value. aTADCE
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove. 36 Armi's claim that private respondent is aware of her present address is anchored
on the assertion of a live-in relationship and support to her son. Since the evidence
presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported cohabitation and support, it
follows that private respondent's knowledge of Armi's address was likewise not proven.
Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the court that which
was not shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed
the petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of failure to establish extrinsic
fraud.
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an
action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, where only questions of law may
be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
therefore erroneous. The special civil action of certiorari will not be allowed as a
substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45, which should be
instituted within 15 days 37 from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution. The
wrong choice of remedy thus provides another reason to dismiss this petition. 38
Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court's
decision. In an action for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court
that something may indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled. 39
Under Article 176 40 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9255,
which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the
father's surname. In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, 41 it was held that an illegitimate
child whose filiation is not recognized by the father, bears only a given name and his
mother's surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child identifies him as such.
It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his father's surname, reflecting
his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an
illegitimate child because she was never married to private respondent. Considering that
the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is
therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his
mother. cADEHI
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not warrant
the annulment of the trial court's decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the
May 14, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Penned by now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Cancio C. Garcia
with Associate Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Danilo B. Pine, concurring. (Rollo, pp.
43-67).
3. Rollo, pp. 88-89.
4. Penned by Judge Vicente A. Hidalgo, Rollo, pp. 122-125.
5. Rollo, pp. 97-103.
6. Dated October 7, 1996, CA Rollo, p. 375.
7. Dated October 16, 1996, CA Rollo, p. 376.
8. CA Rollo, p. 365-372.
9. Id. at 365.
10. Rollo, pp. 189-190.
11. Id. at 104-106.
12. Id. at 191, dorsal side (emphasis supplied).
13. Id. at 129.
14. Id. at 125.
15. Filed on July 8, 1997, Rollo, pp. 130-133.
16. Rollo, p. 134.
17. CA Rollo, p. 119.
18. The decretal portion thereof, provides:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and is accordingly
DISMISSED for lack of merit." (CA Rollo, p. 674)
19. SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. (n)
20. Ramos v. Ramos, G.R. No. 144294, 11 March 2003, 399 SCRA 43, 47-48.
21. Valmonte v. CA, 322 Phil. 96, 106 (1996).
22. Republic v. Elepano, G.R. No. 92542, 15 October 1991, 202 SCRA 748, 751.
23. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.
148311, 31 March 2005.
24. Romualdez-Licaros v. Licaros, 449 Phil. 824, 835 (2003).
25. Barco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120587, 20 January 2004, 420 SCRA 162,
173.
26. Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, G.R. No. 141423, 15 November 2000,
344 SCRA 838, 851.
27. Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 98,
104.
28. Barco v. Court of Appeals, supra at 174-175; 177-178.
29. Id., p. 173.
30. Supra, note 25 at 172-174 (emphasis supplied).
31. CA Rollo, pp. 52-53. The photocopy marked as Exhibit "C" cannot be found in
the CA Rollo. At any rate, petitioners admitted that the deed of sale they offered was not
a duplicate original or certified true copy but a mere photocopy (TSN, 7 November 2001,
CA Rollo, pp. 526-527).
32. Comment on Formal Offer of Exhibits, CA Rollo, p. 316.
33. TSN, 20 November 2001, CA Rollo, pp. 555-557.
34. CA Rollo, pp. 108-109; 37-42.
35. Dela Torre v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 819, 829 (2000).
36. Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 449 Phil. 664, 666 (2003).
37. Sec. 2 of Rule 45 states:
SEC. 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from,
or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time
after notice of the judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of
thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition. (1a, 5a)
38. Linzag v. CA, 353 Phil. 506, 524 (1998).
39. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Sixth Revised Edition, p. 560.
40. Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
41. Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005.

Copyright 2005 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 3868. September 18, 1908.]
FRANCISCO MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO MARTINEZ, defendant-
appellant.
Carlos Ledesma and Ramon Fernandez for appellant.
Vicente Ilustre for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. SHIPS AND SHIPPING; OWNERSHIP. — Upon the record of the second trial
of this case, the first appeal being reported in 1 Phil. Rep., 647: Held, That the additional
evidence presented is not such as to change the former result and that all the evidence is
insufficient to destroy the title deeds by which the ownership of the vessels was conveyed
to the defendant.
DECISION
WILLARD, J p:
A former appeal in this case is reported in 1 Phil. Rep., 647. After the case was
remanded, a new trial was had, additional evidence was introduced, and judgment was
ordered in favor of the plaintiff. From that judgment the defendant has appealed.
The complaint prayed that the ownership of the steamer Balayan and of the coasting
vessel Ogoño be declared to be in the plaintiff as the administrator of the conjugal
partnership formerly existing between himself and his deceased wife, Germana Ilustre. In
the former decision the court said (1 Phil. Rep., 651):
"4. In conclusion we may say that even on the supposition that a written and recorded
title to vessels may be overcome by parol evidence, that offered in this case was
insufficient to accomplish such a result."
If the additional evidence received at the second trial adds nothing to the force of the
evidence received at the first trial, the result upon this appeal must necessarily be the
same as the result of the former appeal.
The first witness presented by the plaintiff, Gervasia Alvarez, in her direct examination
and in the first part of her cross-examination, testified only to conversations between
herself and the plaintiffs Francisco Martinez, but in the latter, part of her cross-
examination she stated that Pedro Martinez, the defendant, had stated to her husband in
her presence, some time after his mother's death, that his father had bought the steamer
Balayan. The manner in which this evidence was given shows that it is entitled to no
credence. Moreover, Pedro Martinez in his testimony denied that he had ever made any
such statement.
The testimony of Francisco Martinez at the second trial was substantially the same as it
was at the first trial. The testimony of Valentina Pasca and Gil Aviar was to the effect
that the plaintiff was the manager of the boat and that the defendant, although he lived
with his father at that time in Batangas, had nothing to do with the management of his
father's business. Similar evidence was offered at the first trial, and with reference to it
the court said in its first opinion (1 Phil. Rep., 650):
"It was found as a fact that the father had exercised acts of ownership over the vessel.
That finding is entirely consistent with the legal ownership by the son. The exercise of
such acts could not transfer such ownership from the son."
This is all the additional testimony which the plaintiff offered and it is very apparent that
it is not sufficient to change the result at which the court arrived on the first appeal.
The appellee in this appeal relies upon the letter written by the defendant to the plaintiff
in which the former states that one Sloan desires to buy the vessel and the defendant asks
if the plaintiff wishes to sell it. The effect of this letter was considered in the former
appeal and it was there said that it could not affect the result there arrived at.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and judgment is ordered acquitting the
defendant of the complaint, with the costs of the first instance. No costs will be allowed
to either party in this court. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Carson and Tracey, JJ., dissent.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-31885. December 27, 1982.]
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF BAGUIO-BENGUET, BRANCH III, HONORABLE FRANCISCO
MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, and MARIA LORETO DIAZ, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Virgilio F. Bautista for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
On December 9, 1969, private respondent, surviving legitimate child of the late Chaoli,
filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for the insertion of the phrases "Filipino
citizen, of legal age, widow and a resident of Gumatdang, Itogon, Benguet Province"
after the registered Owner's name "Chaoli" in Original Certificate of Title No. 1324. The
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, opposed
the petition. The trial court ordered the amendment of the title to contain the stated
phrases. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the petition states
no cause of action and that there is no action or proceeding provided for by law for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship or status of a person. Respondent Court denied the
motion. Hence, the present recourse.
The Supreme Court held that the correction or insertion of substantial errors affecting the
civil status or citizenship of a person can only be made in an adversary suit and not in a
summary action or administrative proceeding pending with the land registration court.
Assailed orders set aside and the petition of private respondent dismissed.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; LAND TITLES AND DEEDS; ACT 496; RELIEF GRANTED IN
SECTION 112, SUMMARY IN NATURE. — The proceedings under Section 112 of Act
No. 496 are summary in nature and are allowed only when a scrutiny of the allegations
discloses that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be tried because they are so
patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The relief provided in said section can
only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties or there is no adverse claim or
serious objection on the part of any party in interest, for otherwise the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs and because controversies arising after the entry of the original
decree of registration are beyond the limited authority of a land registration court to pass
upon (Sangalang vs. Caingat, 25 SCRA 180).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIEF GRANTED IN SECTION 112 CONTEMPLATES
CORRECTIONS OF MERE CLERICAL ERRORS. — Section 112 of Act No. 496 is
similar to the proceeding under Article 412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108
of the Revised Rules of Court which calls for correction of mere clerical, innocuous or
harmless error in a person's certificate of birth. The proceedings therein are summary in
nature and contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical in
nature, but certainly not controversial issues, such as citizenship. Corrections of
substantial errors such as those that affect civil status or citizenship cannot be granted
except only in an adversary suit.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, there is no question
about the controversial nature of the petition before the respondent court. The civil status
and more importantly, the citizenship of Chaoli should be threshed out in a proper
proceeding where all the persons who may be affected therein are notified and
represented. Administrative Case No. 1426, re-petition to insert civil status and other
personal circumstances in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet
Registry of Deeds is not an adversary suit. It is not a proper action in which an alleged
omission regarding civil status and citizenship may be inserted. There was no issue.
dispute or controversy between contending parties which the lower court was called upon
to decide. The mere naming of the Benguet Registry of Deeds and the Solicitor General,
as respondents, did not ipso facto convert the same into an adversary suit.
DECISION
RELOVA, J p:
On December 9, 1969, respondent Maria Loreto Diaz, as the surviving legitimate child of
the late Chaoli, filed with respondent court a petition for the insertion in the Original
Certificate of Title No. 1324, after the registered owner's name "CHAOLI", the following
phrase and words "Filipino citizen of legal age, widow and a resident of Gumatdang,
Itogon, Benguet Province," which phrase and words do not appear and/or are not
contained in the aforementioned Original Certificate of Title No. 1324.
Petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Benguet
Province, entered its oral opposition to the petition. After the hearing on March 2, 1970,
respondent court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Benguet is hereby ordered to
amend the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324, in such a manner that after the word and
name `CHAOLI' the following phrase `Filipino Citizen, of legal age, widow and a
resident of Gumatdang, Itogon, Benguet Province,' be inserted in the said certificate of
title upon payment by the Petitioner (herein private respondent) of the necessary fees in
accordance with law. This Court, before the finalization of this Order, welcomes as stated
previously any authorities which the Fiscal may submit and which may aid this Court to
reverse this Order. Let the Original Certificate of Title be returned to the Petitioner and/or
her counsel for the abovestated purpose."
Petitioner Republic filed with respondent court a motion for reconsideration of the latter's
order, dated March 2, 1970, or the ground that "there is no action or proceeding provided
for by law for the judicial declaration of the citizenship or status of a person, and that the
petition states no cause of action."
Respondent court, for lack of merit, denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari with prayer that the orders, dated March 2, 1970 and
March 24, 1970, in Administrative Case No. 1426, B. L. No. F-49844, Patent No. 16499,
of respondent Court of First Instance of Baguio-Benguet, be set aside and that the petition
for respondent Maria Loreto Diaz in said case, be dismissed.
Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) in exercising jurisdiction over the petition
filed before it and in finding that petitioner herein had a cause of action; and, (2) in
ordering the amendment of Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 which, in effect
declared private respondent's mother a Filipino, when there is no proceedings available
for the purpose of obtaining such a declaration of citizenship.
It is the position of the petitioner Republic that the petition in the lower court partakes of
the nature of a summary proceeding where the parties affected were not notified and
afforded protection on whatever interest they have; and that the insertions sought in the
Certificate of Title are controversial, and such being the case, respondent court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petition in said summary proceeding.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that pursuant to Section 112 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, respondent court is legally vested with
power to act as a land registration court; that pursuant also to said Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act, private respondent Maria Loreto Diaz, as the only surviving
legitimate child of Chaoli, filed with respondent court a petition to insert the civil status
and other personal circumstances of Chaoli in OCT No. 1324 (Free Patent); and that the
citizenship, civil status and other personal circumstances of the late Chaoli are not in
issue in the case, inasmuch as the same had already been considered in the administrative
proceedings which resulted in the issuance of said certificate of title in the name of the
late Chaoli.
We find merit in the petition. In the case of Sangalang vs. Caingat, 25 SCRA 180, this
Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that "the
proceedings under Section 112 of Act No. 496 are summary in nature and are allowed
only when a scrutiny of the allegations discloses that the issues presented by the
pleadings need not be tried because they are so patently insubstantial as not to be genuine
issues. The relief provided in said section can only be granted if there is unanimity among
the parties or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in
interest, for otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an
ordinary case or in the case where the incident properly belongs and because
controversies arising after the entry of the original decree of registration are beyond the
limited authority of a land registration court to pass upon."
In the case at bar, there is no question about the controversial nature of the petition before
the respondent court. The civil status and more importantly, the citizenship of Chaoli
should be threshed out in a proper proceeding where all the persons who may be affected
therein are notified and represented, Section 112 of Act No. 496 is similar to the
proceeding under Article 412 of the New Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court which calls for correction of mere clerical, innocuous or harmless
error in a person's certificate of birth. The proceedings therein are summary in nature and
contemplate corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical in nature, but
certainly not controversial issues, such as citizenship. Corrections of substantial errors
such as those that affect civil status or citizenship cannot be granted except only in an
adversary suit.
Administrative Case No. 1426, re-petition to insert civil status and other personal
circumstances in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324 of the Benguet Registry of
Deeds is not an adversary suit. It is not a proper action in which an alleged omission
regarding civil status and citizenship may be inserted. There was no issue, dispute or
controversy between contending parties which the lower court was called upon to decide.
The mere naming of the Benguet Registry of Deeds and the Solicitor General, as
respondents, did not ipso facto convert the same into an adversary suit.
WHEREFORE, the Orders, dated March 2, 1970 and March 24, 1970, in Administrative
Case No. 1426 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet are SET ASIDE and
the petition of private respondent Maria Loreto Diaz to insert the civil status and other
personal circumstances of her mother Chaoli in the Original Certificate of Title No. 1324
of the Benguet Registry of Deeds is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., reserves his votes.
Melencio-Herrera, J., in the result.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112483. October 8, 1999.]
ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF LEGASPI CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO
VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON, RICARDO
VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:
Petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
31976 1 , affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City 2 , which
rendered inofficious the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of herein petitioner,
to the extent that it impairs the legitime of Victor Imperial, and ordering petitioner to
convey to herein private respondents, heirs of said Victor Imperial, that portion of the
donated land proportionate to Victor Imperial’s legitime. LLjur
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square meter parcel of land
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral
Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his
acknowledged natural son, petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and
proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that
despite the contract’s designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the transaction was in fact a
donation.
On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio filed a complaint for
annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the
then Court of First Instance of Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner
herein into signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay on November
3, 1961 3 , under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the legality and validity of the
rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2) petitioner agreed to sell a designated
1,000-square meter portion of the donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a
bank, for the convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio’s death, it was agreed
that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray burial costs.
On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment, Leoncio died, leaving
only two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his acknowledged natural son, and an
adopted son, Victor Imperial. On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of
Leoncio in the above-mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of
judgment. On March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.
Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and without issue,
survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the
disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his
only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for
annulment of the donation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as
Civil Case No. 7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue
of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Albay. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
On October 18, 1989, Cesar and Teresa filed an amended complaint in the same case,
Civil Case No. 7646, for "Annulment of Documents, Reconveyance and Recovery of
Possession" with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, seeking the nullification of
the Deed of Absolute Sale affecting the above property, on grounds of fraud, deceit and
inofficiousness. In the amended complaint, it was alleged that petitioner caused Leoncio
to execute the donation by taking undue advantage of the latter’s physical weakness and
mental unfitness, and that the conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner impaired
the legitime of Victor Imperial, their natural brother and predecessor-in-interest. 4
In his Answer, petitioner: (1) alleged that Leoncio had conveyed sufficient property to
Victor to cover his legitime, consisting of 563 hectares of agricultural land in Manito,
Albay; (2) reiterated the defense of res judicata, and (3) raised the additional defenses of
prescription and laches.
Plaintiff Cesar Villalon died on December 26, 1989, while the case was pending in the
Regional Trial Court, and was substituted in this action by his sons, namely, Antonio,
Roberto, Augusto, Ricardo and Cesar, Jr., all surnamed Villalon, and his widow, Esther
H. Villalon.
The RTC held the donation to be inofficious and impairing the legitime of Victor, on the
basis of its finding that at the time of Leoncio’s death, he left no property other than the
32,837-square meter parcel of land which he had donated to petitioner. The RTC went on
further to state that petitioner’s allegation that other properties existed and were inherited
by Victor was not substantiated by the evidence. 5
The legitime of Victor was determined by the trial court in this manner:
Considering that the property donated is 32,837 square meters, one half of that or 16,418
square meters becomes the free portion of Leoncio which could be absorbed in the
donation to defendant. The other half, which is also 16,418 square meters is where the
legitime of the adopted son Victor Imperial has to be taken.
The proportion of the legitime of the legitimate child (including the adopted child) in
relation to the acknowledged natural child (defendant) is 10 is to 5[,] with the
acknowledged natural child getting ½ of the legitime of the legitimate (adopted) child, in
accordance with Art. 895 of the New Civil Code which provides: LibLex
"The legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the natural
children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate
children or descendants."
From the 16,418 square meters left (after the free portion has been taken) plaintiffs are
therefore entitled to 10,940 square meters while defendant gets 5,420 square meters. 6
The trial court likewise held that the applicable prescriptive period is 30 years under
Article 1141 of the Civil Code 7 , reckoned from March 15, 1962, when the writ of
execution of the compromise judgment in Civil Case 1177 was issued, and that the
original complaint having been filed in 1986, the action has not yet prescribed. In
addition, the trial court regarded the defense of prescription as having been waived, this
not being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial.
Thus, the dispositive portion of the RTC’s Decision of December 13, 1990 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Deed of Absolute Sale otherwise known as
Doc. No. 8; Book No. 14; Page No. 1; Series of 1951 of the Notarial file of Pompeyo B.
Calleja which is considered a donation, is hereby reduced proportionately insofar as it
affected the legitime of the late Victor Imperial, which share is inherited by the plaintiffs
herein, to the extent that plaintiffs are ordered to be given by defendant a portion of
10,940 square meters thereof.
In order to avoid further conflict, the 10,940 share to be given to plaintiffs should include
the portion which they are presently occupying, by virtue of the extended lease to their
father Ricardo Villalon, where the bungalow in question stands.
The remaining portion to be given to plaintiffs may come from any other portion that
may be agreed upon by the parties, otherwise, this court will appoint a commissioner to
undertake the partition.
The other 21,897 square meters should go to the defendant as part of his legitime and by
virtue of the reduced donation.
No pronouncement as to damages as they were not sufficiently proved.
SO ORDERED. 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.
Before us, petitioner questions the following findings of respondent court: (1) that there
was no res judicata, there being no identity of parties and cause of action between the
instant case and Civil Case No. 1177; (2) that private respondents had a right to question
the donation; (3) that private respondents’ action is barred by prescription, laches and
estoppel; and (4) that the donation was inofficious and should be reduced.
It is an indispensable requirement in res judicata that there be, between the first and
second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. 9 A perusal of
the records leads us to conclude that there is no identity of parties and of cause of action
as between Civil Case No. 1177 and Civil Case No. 7646. Civil Case No. 1177 was
instituted by Leoncio in his capacity as donor of the questioned donation. While it is true
that upon his death, Victor was substituted as plaintiff of the action, such does not alter
the fact that Victor’s participation in the case was in representation of the interests of the
original plaintiff, Leoncio. The purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is to
ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of the estate 10 , or his heir, as in this
case, for which no court appointment is required. 11 Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that
there is substantial identity between Leoncio and private respondents, being heirs and
successors-in-interest of Victor, is unavailing.
Moreover, Leoncio’s cause of action as donor of the property was fraud, purportedly
employed upon him by petitioner in the execution of the donation. While the same
circumstances of fraud and deceit are alleged in private respondents’ complaint, it also
raises the additional ground of inofficiousness of donation.
Contrary to petitioner’s contentions, inofficiousness of donation does not, and could not,
form part of Leoncio’s cause of action in Civil Case No. 1177. Inofficiousness as a cause
of action may arise only upon the death of the donor, as the value of the donation will
then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor-deceased. 12
Consequently, while in Civil Case No. 1177, Leoncio sought the revocation in full of the
donation on ground of fraud, the instant case actually has two alternative causes of action.
First, for fraud and deceit, under the same circumstances as alleged in Leoncio’s
complaint, which seeks the annulment in full of the donation, and which the trial court
correctly dismissed because the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 1177 served as
a ratification and waiver on the part of Leoncio of whatever defects in voluntariness and
consent may have been attendant in the making of the donation. The second cause of
action is the alleged inofficiousness of the donation, resulting in the impairment of
Victor’s legitime, which seeks the annulment, not of the entire donation, but only of that
portion diminishing the legitime. 13 It is on the basis of this second cause of action that
private respondents prevailed in the lower courts.
Petitioner next questions the right of private respondents to contest the donation.
Petitioner sources his argument from Article 772 of the Civil Code, thus:
Only those who at the time of the donor’s death have a right to the legitime and their
heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction of inofficious donations. . .
As argued by petitioner, when Leoncio died on January 8, 1962, it was only Victor who
was entitled to question the donation. However, instead of filing an action to contest the
donation, Victor asked to be substituted as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1177 and even
moved for execution of the compromise judgment therein. prcd
No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the foregoing acts. It must be
remembered that at the time of the substitution, the judgment approving the compromise
agreement has already been rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the
compromise judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.
More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit repudiation of
inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of the heir. Thus, under Article
1051 of Civil Code:
The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by
petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings.
Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter’s death, his
act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot be considered an act of
renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from
subsequently seeking the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor’s
heirs, upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right
shall be transmitted to his heirs.
Be that as it may, we find merit in petitioner’s other assignment of errors. Having
ascertained this action as one for reduction of an inofficious donation, we cannot sustain
the holding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the applicable
prescriptive period is thirty years, under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. The sense of
both courts that this case is a "real action over an immovable" allots undue credence to
private respondents’ description of their complaint, as one for "Annulment of Documents,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of Property", which suggests the action to be,
in part, a real action enforced by those with claim of title over the disputed land.
Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of
title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals 14 , we declared that what is
brought to collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the
time it was donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which
conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration
or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee. 15
What, then, is the prescriptive period for an action for reduction of an inofficious
donation? The Civil Code specifies the following instances of reduction or revocation of
donations: (1) four years, in cases of subsequent birth, appearance, recognition or
adoption of a child; 16 (2) four years, for non-compliance with conditions of the
donation; 17 and (3) at any time during the lifetime of the donor and his relatives entitled
to support, for failure of the donor to reserve property for his or their support. 18
Interestingly, donations as in the instant case, 19 the reduction of which hinges upon the
allegation of impairment of legitime, are not controlled by a particular prescriptive
period, for which reason we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription.
Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required
under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of
compulsory heirs.
From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? The case of Mateo vs. Lagua, 29
SCRA 864, which involved the reduction for inofficiousness of a donation propter
nuptias, recognized that the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death
of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.
It took private respondents 24 years since the death of Leoncio to initiate this case. The
action, therefore, has long prescribed.
As for the trial court’s holding that the defense of prescription had been waived, it not
being one of the issues agreed upon at pre-trial, suffice it to say that while the terms of
the pre-trial order bind the parties as to the matters to be taken up in trial, it would be the
height of injustice for us to adhere to this technicality when the fact of prescription is
manifest in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the findings of fact of the lower courts.
20
A perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that not only has prescription set in, private
respondents are also guilty of estoppel by laches. It may be recalled that Leoncio died on
January 8, 1962. Fifteen years later, Victor died, leaving as his sole heir Ricardo Villalon,
who also died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no indication of any
interest to contest the donation of his deceased father. As we have discussed earlier, the
fact that he actively participated in Civil Case No. 1177 did not amount to a renunciation
of his inheritance and does not preclude him from bringing an action to claim his
legitime. These are matters that Victor could not possibly be unaware of, considering that
he is a lawyer. 21 Ricardo Villalon was even a lessee of a portion of the donated
property, and could have instituted the action as sole heir of his natural son, or at the very
least, raised the matter of legitime by way of counterclaim in an ejectment case 22 filed
against him by petitioner in 1979. Neither does it help private respondents’ cause that
five years have elapsed since the death of Ricardo in 1981 before they filed their
complaint with the RTC. cdll
Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to
assert it. 23 We find the necessity for the application of the principle of estoppel by
laches in this case, in order to avoid an injustice.
A final word on collation of donations. We observe that after finding the donation to be
inofficious because Leoncio had no other property at the time of his death, the RTC
computed the legitime of Victor based on the area of the donated property. Hence, in its
dispositive portion, it awarded a portion of the property to private respondents as Victor’s
legitime. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Our rules of succession require that before any conclusion as to the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, the following steps must be taken: (1) the net estate of
the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all the payable obligations and charges
from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; (2) the
value of all donations subject to collation would be added to it. 24
Thus, it is the value of the property at the time it is donated, and not the property itself,
which is brought to collation. Consequently, even when the donation is found inofficious
and reduced to the extent that it impaired Victor’s legitime, private respondents will not
receive a corresponding share in the property donated. Thus, in this case where the
collatable property is an immovable, what may be received is: (1) an equivalent, as much
as possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality; 25 (2) if such is
impracticable, the equivalent value of the impaired legitime in cash or marketable
securities; 26 or (3) in the absence of cash or securities in the estate, so much of such
other property as may be necessary, to be sold in public auction. 27
We believe this worth mentioning, even as we grant the petition on grounds of
prescription and laches.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 31976,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 7646, is
reversed and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rendered by the Seventh Division. Penned by Associate Justice Nathanael P. De
Pano, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. and Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez.
2. Branch 10; presided by Judge Antonio A. Arcangel.
3. Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43.
4. Annex C-1 of Petition; Rollo, 52-53.
5. Ibid., 66-67.
6. RTC Decision; Rollo, 68-69.
7. Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides: "Real actions over immovables prescribe
after thirty years. . ."
8. RTC Decision; Rollo, 69-70.
9. Casil vs Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 264; Municipality of San Juan vs. Court of
Appeals, 279 SCRA711; Cartlet vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 97.
10. Torres, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 793.
11. Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 16.
12. Under Article 771 of the Civil Code, "(d)onations which in accordance with the
provisions of Article 752, are inofficious bearing in mind the estimated net value of the
donor’s property at the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to the excess, but
this reduction shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of the
donor, nor shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits. . ."
13. See Mateo vs. Lagua, 29 SCRA 864.
14. 286 SCRA 217; see also Civil Code, Art. 1071.
15. Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, op. cit.
16. Civil Code, Art. 763.
17. Id., Art. 764.
18. Id., Art. 750.
19. Governed by Articles 752 and 771 of the Civil Code, which read thus:
ARTICLE 752. . . . (N)o person may give or receive, by way of
donation, more than what he may give or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation.
ARTICLE 771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions
of Article 752, are inofficious bearing in mind the estimated net value of the donor’s
property at the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to the excess, but this
reduction shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of the donor,
nor shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits. . . .
20. See Revised Rules of Court, Rule 118, Sec. 3 and Rule 9, Sec. 1 which
respectively provide:
Pre-trial order . . . After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an
order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order
shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and control the course of
the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
(Emphasis supplied)
Defenses and objections not pleaded. — . . . (W)hen it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is an action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or
that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall
dismiss the claim.
21. Amended Complaint, Annex C-1 of Petition; Rollo, 52.
22. Motion to Dismiss Complaint, Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 56-57.
23. Madeja vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540.
24. Civil Code, Art. 908; Vizconde vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Mateo vs. Lagua,
supra.
25. Civil Code, Article 1073, which provides:
"The donee’s share of the estate shall be reduced by an amount equal to
that already received by him; and his co-heirs shall receive an equivalent, as much as
possible, in property of the same nature, class and quality."
26. Civil Code, Art. 1074:
"Should the provisions of the preceding article be impracticable, if the
property donated was immovable, the co-heirs shall be entitled to receive its equivalent in
cash or securities, at the rate of quotation; and should there be neither cash nor
marketable securities in the estate, so much of the other property as may be necessary
shall be sold at public auction. . . "
27. Id. LLphil

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EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-7821. May 25, 1956.]
Heirs of Gervacio D. Gonzales, namely: PILAR GONZALES DE DARCERA, FELIX
GONZALES, RICARDO GONZALES, JOSE GONZALES, FRANCISCO GONZALES
and CHARLITOS GONZALES, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ARCADIO ALEGARBES,
EUSEBIO BANDEBAS and JUANITO QUIRANTES, defendants-appellees.
Adaza & Dalman for appellants.
Lood & Gayapa for appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; SISTER AND BROTHER OF DECEASED.
— Articles 2217 and 2206 (3) of the new Civil Code do not grant the sister and brother of
the deceased a right to recover moral damages.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
This is an action to recover at least P3,000 as compensation for the death of Gervasio D.
Gonzales who on 27 June 1953 was run over by a bus known as "Dapitan Transit No. 11"
at Irasan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and died, as a result, it is alleged, of reckless,
negligent and careless driving of its chauffeur; P10,000 for moral damages; P2,000 for
exemplary damages; and P2,000 for attorney's fees, and costs. The first five plaintiffs are
the sister and brothers of the deceased and the last is his minor son and the third and
second defendants are the chauffeur and the owner of the bus, respectively, attached to
the line operated by the first defendant. The plaintiffs pray that plaintiff Francisco
Gonzales be appointed guardian ad litem for the minor son of the deceased. This petition
for appointment of a guardian ad litem was not acted upon.
After summons the defendants appeared and moved for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the plaintiffs, the first five being the sister and brothers of the deceased,
described as his heirs in the caption of the complaint, and the last who is a minor child of
the deceased, not being represented by a guardian, have no legal capacity to sue. The
defendants contend that under the laws of descent collateral relatives are excluded when
the decedent is survived by a descendant. Acting upon the motion to dismiss, the Court
held that the first five plaintiffs who are the sister and brothers of the deceased have no
right of action against the defendants and that the last, a minor son of the deceased,
should be duly represented by his mother. For that reason the Court dismissed the
complaint unless the complaint be amended within 15 days from date of the entry of the
order. In their motion for reconsideration the first five plaintiffs claim that under article
2217 of the new Civil Code they are entitled to moral damages, and that the mother of the
minor son of the deceased could not legally and morally represent the minor, because she
and the deceased had been living separately for 15 years due to her bad character and
faithlessness and had never been reconciled. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence this appeal.
The ground stated in the motion to dismiss is lack of capacity to sue. This is not the
proper and legal ground for a motion to dismiss in this case, because it does not appear on
the face of the complaint that the first five plaintiffs are suffering from any disability. The
defendants most likely rely on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
insofar as the first five plaintiffs are concerned, because they contend that under the laws
of descent collateral relatives are excluded from inheriting if and when the decedent is
survived by a descendant who is the only one entitled to sue for damages arising out of or
from the death of the decedent caused by a wrongful or tortuous act of the defendants.
Upon the ground that the complaint states no cause of action the motion to dismiss is well
taken. Article 2217 and article 2206 (3) of the new Civil Code do not grant the sister and
brothers of the deceased a right to recover moral damages. But the trial Court failed to act
upon the petition for the appointment of a guardian ad litem prayed for in the plaintiffs'
complaint. It should have acted on the petition, because Charlitos Gonzales, a minor son
of the deceased, is entitled to bring the action.
The order appealed from is affirmed insofar as it dismisses the complaint filed by the
sister and brothers of the deceased and set aside insofar as it dismisses the complaint filed
by the minor son of the deceased and the case remanded to the court below with
instructions to proceed according to law and to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor,
without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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