Sie sind auf Seite 1von 12

7 Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation in the 21

st
Century
Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation
in the 21
st
Century

In the last six decades, India-US equation has gone through many ups and downs,
mostly downswings till the 1990s. The transition of India-US relations from divergence
in essence in the 1950s to considerable convergence by the beginning of the 21
st
century is indeed a fascinating, complex and compelling story. Today, the two countries
can be called friends, not allies. By way of contrast, Pakistan and the US can be
seen as allies, not friends. Two decades of liberalization and globalization since
1990s has brought the two estranged democracies closer than ever before. As the
reform process widened and deepened (under successive governments), the country
moved closer to the US ideologically and politically at home and abroad. The most
significant development in the growing proximity between the two countries since
the 1990s is the India-US Nuclear Deal. However, Indo-US cooperation in this sector
is at a dead end now. Since the time of President Clinton, the number, variety, scope
of the ever-growing linkages (called initiatives, dialogues, agreements, partnerships,
and joint military exercises, etc.) between the two sides are staggering indeed.
Though the two countries have no territorial or fundamental conflicts to keep them
apart, both governments are wary of each other on many counts and do not see eye-
to-eye on most of the crucial challenges confronting the world today. Convergence at
the cosmic level and divergence at the concrete level will continue to be the key
hassle in India-US relations at the present and in the future. This paper takes a close
look at the India-US equation in 21
st
century.
2013 B Ramesh Babu. All Rights Reserved.
B Ramesh Babu*
* Specialist in American Politics and International Relations. Currently he is a short-term Visiting Professor,
Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad, and Scholar in Residence, Foundation for
Democratic Reforms, Hyderabad. Formerly, he was the Sir Pherozeshah Mehta Professor of Politics at the
University of Bombay. E-mail: brameshbabu08@gmail.com

This is a revised and updated version of the paper presented by the author at an international conference
on India-US Relations in the 21
st
Century, held from January 11 to 13, 2012, at Osmania University
Centre for International Programs (OUCIP), Hyderabad.
U
pswings and downswings have been a recurring feature of the Government-
to-Government relations between India and the United States of America
during the half century of Cold War. However, people-to-people relations
between the two countries continued to widen and deepen throughout the decades.
This trend gathered a significant momentum after the Immigration Act of 1965, which
ended the historic policy of immigration based on race and nationality quotas. The
Land of Opportunity opened its gates to men and women of talent and skills, which
led to the immigration of doctors, engineers, scientists, academicians and skilled
professionals from all over the world (including India) over the decades. These
quality immigrants enhanced the accumulated talent pool of the nation
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2013 8
immeasurably and transformed USA into the knowledge society as we know it
today. This is the foundation of the enormous scientific and technology edge and
the consequent strategic and military superiority America enjoys over the other
nations. This crucial dimension should be kept in mind while considering the issue
of Americas decline today.
Indias freedom struggle evoked much interest and some excitement in America
because of the uniquely peaceful nature of the Mahatmas mobilization of the millions
against the British rule. However, the protracted Cold War and the bipolarization of
world soon after Indias independence put the two governments at loggerheads.
Indias anxiety not to lose its newly won freedom and its determination to retain a
degree of autonomy in the context of the no holds barred global confrontation
between the two superpowers of the post-war years were not appreciated in the US
and the West. On its part India did not appreciate the strategic concerns and the
ideological anxieties of the Americans. Consequently, the bilateral relations between
the two countries at the political level swayed up and down depending on the issues
and events of the day. This is rather puzzling because India and America, the two
multi-ethnic and pluralist democracies of continental dimensions have a great deal
in common. The two countries continued as estranged democracies because of the
not so gradual unfulfillment of mutual expectations in the context of the cold war, which
dragged on for a half century. The transition of India-US relations from divergence
in essence to considerable convergence by the beginning of the 21
st
century is indeed
a fascinating, complex and compelling story
1
, which need not distract us here because
our focus now is on the present and the future. Today, the two countries can be
described as friends, not allies. By way of contrast, I would characterize Pakistan
and America as allies, not friends, especially since the assassination of Osama bin
Laden in the garrison town of Abbottabad, near Islamabad.
Era of Globalization
Starting from the years of Lyndon Johnson and Indira Gandhi, the estranged
democracies became engaged democracies. Rajiv Gandhi carried forward the
1
President Franklin Roosevelt took considerable interest in Indias remarkable freedom struggle. He used
to nudge Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the issue of Indias independence after the War much to the
discomfiture of the latter. President Harry Truman deleted Indias name from the Asian Exclusion Laws
list as a gesture of goodwill to the soon to be independent India. American media covered Mahatma
Gandhis unique non-violent movement for Indias independence. The bilateral relationship began in
1947 with a legacy of much goodwill and mutual expectations. However, the Cold War and Pakistans
induction into Americas military alliance network queered the pitch. Indias policy of non-alignment with
a perceived pro-USSR tilt did not help matters. Be that as it may, Americas economic aid to India and
trade and commerce between the two was not interrupted. People-to-people relations grew at a steady
pace. After the Immigration Act of 1965 was passed, there was a quantum jump in the flow of doctors,
engineers, skilled professionals, and academicians to the US. By all accounts, President Lyndon Johnson
and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi hit it off well. At the highest level, it was decided that the public
bickering would stop at both ends and only positive aspects would be highlighted. See B Ramesh Babu
(1983), Mutual Carping to Reciprocal Restraint: Speculations on the Future of Indo-US Relations, Indian
Journal of American Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 107-118.
9 Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation in the 21
st
Century
rightward shift initiated by his mother and India began to move closer to the US.
2
Two decades of liberalization, privatization and globalization launched under the
leadership of P V Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh in 1991 ushered in the real
breakthrough in the relations between the two countries. In tune with much of the
rest of the world, India went in for liberalization, i.e., marketization of economics
(and much else) and globalization of markets (and much else). As the American model
reform process widened and deepened under successive governments, India moved
more and more close to the US politically, ideologically (and even culturally) at home
and also in the international arena.
3
The demise of the Soviet Union marking the end of the bipolar world and the
collapse of communism as a credible model of growth and development reinforced
Indias drift towards the US politically and ideologically. The then prevalent trend of
rightward shift was a global phenomenon, and saw the rise of Ronald Reagan in
the US and Margaret Thatcher in UK. It is important to acknowledge that in the
context of the growing proximity between the two nations, it was India that moved
farther than the US. During the two decades of globalization since 1991, party
fortunes shifted back and forth in both the countries. But the rising trend of closer
relations between the engaged democracies gathered momentum under the
leadership of P V Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh on the
Indian side and Bill Clinton and George W Bush, on the American side.
Since the time of President Bill Clinton, the growing number, variety, scope of the
growing linkages (called initiatives, dialogues, agreements, partnerships, and bilateral
and joint military exercises) between the two nations are staggering indeed. Almost
every conceivable activity of the State and society (from Ayurveda to atomic energy,
rural roads to global security, HIV to toilets in village schools), has under the umbrella
of India-US relations. In a way, this can be seen as a logical outcome of an evolving
engagement between natural allies, two open societies that have developed
people-to-people contacts across the board since the beginning. In fact, this
dimension of the bilateral relationship between India and USA is unique
4
and quite
unlike our equation with the former Soviet Union and Russia today, which is essentially
a government-to-government relationship. It is the broad and deepening array of
2
B Ramesh Babu (1987), Rajiv-Reagan Summit Diplomacy at the Top, in P M Kamath (Ed.), India-US
Relations: Dynamics of Change, pp. 153-171, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi.
3
B Ramesh Babu (Ed.) (1996), Changing Global Political/Ideological Context and Afro-Asia: Strategies for
Development, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi.
4
Traditionally, the immigrants from Europe (Ireland, Italy, Poland, Germany, etc.) sought to influence
American policy towards the country of their origin. America also utilized their services during the
two world wars. Influence of the Jewish lobby on the US policy towards West Asia is well known.
Cuban immigrants played a big part in American efforts to oust Castro. Asian-Americans (including
Indian-Americans) are the latest ethnic minorities seeking to influence American policy towards the
country of their origin. America also uses their presence for its advantage. Naturally, this is a two-
way street!
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2013 10
linkages between people at all levels, NGOs and civil society groups, professional
bodies of all kinds between the two sides that create a penumbra of high mutual
expectations, which invariably remain unfulfilled, a distinctly complicating factor in
India-US relations.
However, it must quickly be added that the above-mentioned multiple linkages
between the two Governments vary in importance from time to time. Their high-
sounding nomenclature does not necessarily match their significance in reality. For
example, the so-called Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) has not moved
forward as expected. On the American side, there is much talk of interoperability
between the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) of the two countries. But, there
is no consensus even on the basic objectives of such an arrangement beyond joint
action against piracy in the Indian Ocean (off Somalia) and, may be, on coastal
terrorism. Even on the commonly agreed issue of action against international
terrorism, India is not sure where the US stands on terrorism emanating from
Pakistan. Even this notional area of agreement becomes all the more slippery with
respect to terrorism directed against Jammu and Kashmir! On the other side, India
is certainly not willing to join forces with the many misadventures and misguided
policies of America in West Asia, Gulf, Pak-Af region, and elsewhere, especially when
the US has become a retreating hegemon on the decline!
The Nuclear Deal
Now let us look at the recent and most significant paradigm shift in the bilateral
relations to understand the scope and limits of cooperation between the two nations.
By all accounts, the India-US Nuclear Deal of 2008 is indeed a landmark in the
evolution of the bilateral relations. It certainly was a crucial shift in Americas long
established nuclear non-proliferation policy. Naturally, India responded by moving
very close to the US. The Nuclear Deal was the outcome of protracted and highly
contested bilateral negotiations spanning the terms of two Prime Ministers belonging
to the two national parties (BJP and Congress) and the coalition governments led
by them. The prolonged Talbot-Sinha negotiations laid the foundation and defined
the contours of the Nuclear Deal in the making as well as the overarching range
of defense cooperation between the two countries. President George W Bush
expended a great deal of his political clout and conservative credentials to prevail
upon the Congress to go along in meeting Indias objections and reservations at
various stages of the four-way interactive dialogue, i.e., between the two
Governments and public opinion in both the countries simultaneously. But for
President Bushs sustained commitment to bring democratic India to the American
side in the global scenario against China (and totalitarianism) and his repeated
personal intervention in the tortuous negotiations between the two sides as well
as among the different viewpoints within his Administration and the Congress, the
Nuclear Deal would not have seen the light of the day. It should be noted that
11 Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation in the 21
st
Century
the Deal was finally passed by the Congress only towards the fag end of President
Bushs second term.
5
It is also necessary to emphasize that but for the strong commitment of the
President and his Administration, the Deal would not have emerged unscathed from
the corridors of the International Atomic Emergency Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). China tried its best (or was it its worst) to block the Deal
at every stage of the tortuous negotiations in the two international bodies. China
yielded most reluctantly only when it realized that President Bush was determined
to prevail.
6
The US proved once again that it was the only power that could change
the rules of the game. The Russians and the French were eagerly waiting in the wings
to corner their share of Indias nuclear trade once America used its considerable
clout to clear the decks for the Deal. America was and continues to be the only game
changer at the global level. This massive fact should be borne in mind when
Americas decline in world politics is under scrutiny.
On the Indian side, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh deserves the highest
possible praise for the eventual fruition of the Nuclear Deal. He and his negotiators
intervened time and again to overcome obstacles (big and small). The Prime Minister
even put his Governments future on the anvil. After trying his best for over two
years to persuade the Left parties to go along, he finally put them on notice and
challenged them to withdraw their support and pull down the Government on the
issue. The Prime Minister finally prevailed by winning the vote of confidence in the
Parliament with the support of the BJP and SP and some Independents. However,
the victory was tarnished by the unprecedented happenings on the floor of the
House.
7
The Nuclear Deal ended four decades of Indias isolation in the realm of civilian
nuclear trade. A singular and unprecedented exception was made for India in the
application of the harsh terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Deal
must be seen as the most significant achievement of Indian diplomacy,
notwithstanding the continuing controversies over its merits and pitfalls. Popular and
expert opinions in both countries accused their respective governments of giving away
too many concessions to the other side. This in effect meant that the gains and
5
During July-November 2008, I was in the US as a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and George
Washington University. My mission was to study the Presidential elections firsthand and write for newspapers
and magazines at home. I utilized the opportunity to study the developments related to the Nuclear Deal
on a daily basis. Obama-McCain race hogged all the headlines and the Deal received meager attention
in the American media.
6
During the negotiations, China declared that it would offer a similar deal to Pakistan. Subsequently, China
not merely kept its word, but went way beyond.
7
During the proceedings on the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha, there were unprecedented displays
of bundles of cash allegedly used to buy the necessary votes to secure the requisite majority for the
Government. This was certainly the most shameful chapter in the history of our Parliament.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2013 12
losses to the two sides were about even and that was the best Deal that could have
been dealt on the Nuclear Deal at that time.
8
It must be added that even as the negotiations with the US were in progress,
France and Russia came forward to open up nuclear trade with India. In fact, the
deal with France was signed much before the American law on civilian nuclear
cooperation had been enacted by the US Congress. The Central Asian Republic of
Khazakhasthan went farther and invited India to join in mining, research and
production in the field of nuclear energy. Launching parallel negotiations with credible
alternative sources of nuclear energy was a very clever strategy on our part and it
worked to our advantage. During the tortuous and protracted negotiations with the
American side, the author had occasion to suggest that India should adopt the
strategy of collecting the gate pass from the US and allowing Russia and France
to set up the nuclear reactors in the country.
9
It is well known that the French and
the Russian technologies are more advanced (in that order) than what could be
offered by the US, which had not built a new nuclear reactor for over three decades.
10
Moreover, the former are more inclined to offer better terms than the US. It may be
added further that non-proliferation is a long established priority in American foreign
policy and the countrys anti proliferation lobby is active and powerful.
Aftermath of the Deal
While the Nuclear Deal was an important landmark in the transformation in India-
US relations, the state of affairs on the civilian nuclear front since then have been
disappointing to say the least. President Obama was not as enthusiastic over the
Deal as his predecessor President Bush. After all, it was a policy inherited from the
previous Administration. As the Democratic Senator from Illinois earlier, Obama was
lukewarm in his support to the India-US Civilian Nuclear Deal. He felt that the Bush
Administration yielded too much to India on the non-proliferation front. Senator
Obama went along with the majority despite his reservations. Naturally, the new
President was more preoccupied with the crucial issues confronting him, i.e., the
economic meltdown, rising unemployment and the gloomy prospects for the future
of American economy (and that of the world).
On the Indian side, the issues of radiation, adverse impact on environment,
unresolved challenges in storing nuclear waste, reprocessing of the spent fuel, and
above all the touchy controversies over surrendering too much to the Americans
8
B Ramesh Babu (2007), The Nuclear Deal: A Paradigm Shift in India-US Relations, The IUP Journal of
Governance and Public Policy, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 9-23. This was a part of the special double issue brought
out by the author as the Editor of the Journal, which was based on the papers and proceedings of a national
seminar conducted by the author; B Ramesh Babu (2009), India-US Nuclear Deal: A Paradigm Shift in the
Bilateral Equation and Beyond, pp. 63-68, Pentagon Press, New Delhi.
9
The authors unsolicited advice to the GOI to that effect was sent through e-mail to the Press Secretary to
the Prime Minister during the thick of the negotiations on this point of serious contention between the two
sides.
10
Recently, there were reports that the US has sanctioned the building of two nuclear reactors in the country.
13 Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation in the 21
st
Century
came to the fore. The tragic coincidence of the historic anniversary of the horrendous
Bhopal disaster did not help matters. The controversial Nuclear Liability Act passed
by the Parliament proved to be a damper to the civilian nuclear industry in America.
There was a lot of pressure on the country to dilute the liability parameters of the
Law. But, the Parliament refused to budge. While some progress was made in the
End User negotiations, there is a long way to go before Americas nuclear industry
will come into the country in a hurry or in a big way. In fact, there is a revival of
reasoned and spirited opposition to nuclear energy all over the world, including
India.
11
There is a growing demand for the promotion of safer and more dependable
non-conventional sources of energy instead.
The Macro Picture
While the prospects for bilateral cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy area seem
unsatisfactory, the broader picture of India-US engagement looks good and is poised
for all round growth and improvement. Though the massive $10.4 bn combat aircraft
deal is bagged by France, many lucrative and mega weapons purchase deals have
been going the American way. The near exclusive dependence on Russia (and USSR
earlier) is being systematically reduced and sources of supply are greatly diversified.
Israel and the US have become the preferred suppliers and big collaborators in the
field of advanced weapons and newer technologies in recent years.
Commercial and trade relations between the two countries have been growing
rapidly and across the board. The significantly large bilateral trade has been rising
rapidly year after year. One of the interesting features of Indias relations with the
US is the ever-growing cooperation in research and development, science and
technology, health and medicine, rural development and higher education.
12
There
is hardly an area of human endeavor which is outside the ambit of bilateral
cooperation between the two countries. Moreover, the spectrum of cooperation
transcends government-to-government relations. In fact, this equation extends to
private sector, civil society and to individuals in every walk of life. In this context, the
role and reach of Indian-Americans in the promotion of bilateral relations and in
influencing public policies in both countries towards each other deserves due
recognition and understanding. It is not possible or even necessary to document this
dimension of the bilateral equation in a short paper of this kind. India-US Nuclear
11
For example, the well-known nuclear scientist and a former top official in the countrys nuclear
establishment, Dr. Gopalakrishnan questioned the wisdom of importing plutonium-based reactors from
abroad. He asserted that India was ready and able to build thorium-based Fast Breeder reactors envisaged
by Dr. Homi Babha, which would avoid dependence on foreign countries. He advocated the promotion of
non-conventional sources of energy on a war footing. Dr. Gopalakrishnan was interviewed on NDTV on
February 18, 2012. He is not alone in this respect.
12
The author presented a paper on the issue at the three-day India-US Summit on Higher Education held in
Mumbai during July-August 2010. Scores of Corporate leaders, University Vice-Chancellors, political
leaders, top administrators and distinguished academicians from both the countries participated. It was
a mega event which received wide media attention in India.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2013 14
Deal and the opening up of higher education, insurance and retail trade may be
mentioned by way of examples.
13
However, it is necessary to add that this is not a one-way street. This kind of
influence is exerted by and through interest groups, influential sections, and
prominent individuals on either side, which may not always and necessarily be in
the national interests and the welfare of the people on either side. Moreover, such
pressure by particular interests on public policies is not confined to foreign elements.
In fact, the influence of domestic lobbies and interest groups is far more extensive
and intensive than that exerted by external elements. In this context, open societies
are more vulnerable than the authoritarian systems, though the latter are not immune
from the influence of vested or particular interest groups. Sometimes having an inside
track to the powers that be in a closed society is more effective and by the same
token, could be more sinister.
The China Factor
Let us get back on track and take a brief look at another complex and compelling
dimension of the India-US equation, i.e., the China factor.
14
Though not openly
acknowledged for obvious reasons, the bilateral equations among the three are
inextricably intertwined and interactively influence one another all the time. At the
global strategic level, the US and China are rivals, though China certainly is miles
behind the Lone Superpower in every constituent of power. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, successive American Presidents have seen China differently depending
upon their political, ideological, strategic, and personal perceptions. Presidents
Reagan, Bush Senior and Bush Junior saw China as a hostile totalitarian dictatorship.
Presidents Clinton and Obama looked at China in a more nuanced manner, though
equally wary of the new communist giant on the rise. However, one of the dominant
realities of the post-Cold War world is the unprecedented scale of mutual economic
interdependence between the US and China. The two national economies have a
symbiotic relationship that can also be seen as a mutual hostage equation! While
one can discuss the many nuances inherent in this complex equation at great length,
what is most relevant for our purposes here is its impact on and implications for
the evolving India-US equation.
President George W Bush was rather categorical in this respect. For him, China
was a hostile communist dictatorship and an enemy in the global strategic scenario.
Candidate Bush famously asked India is a democracy, isnt it? Then, why is it not
13
The authors presence in Washington DC during July-November 2008 gave him the opportunity to study
in-depth the critical role and reach of Indian-Americans in the passage of the Deal through the Congress
and the top echelons of the Bush Administration. He had also occasions to write letters to the key players
in the two Houses of Congress at critical stages of the proceedings on the Deal.
14
Lisa Curtis and Dean Cheng (2011), The China Challenge: A Strategic Vision for US-India Relations,
July 18, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #2583, Washington, DC; and India, US Share Objectives
on China: US Report, The Times of India, September 18, 2011, p. 14.
15 Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation in the 21
st
Century
on our side? Beginning with his second Administration, Bush tried his best to
broaden and deepen Americas relations with India on all fronts. He set aside the
non-proliferation concerns of the nations foreign policy establishment and went all
out for the Nuclear Deal with India, as pointed out earlier. But, for his sustained
initiative and repeated personal intervention the Nuclear Deal would not have
emerged from the Congress and the entrenched anti-India enclaves in the State
Department and the Pentagon. However, for Obama, the newly elected President at
that time, the Nuclear Deal was what he inherited from the previous Administration.
He had other and more grandiose ideas on Americas role in global management.
He began his term by going to China and inviting her to be a partner in managing
global affairs. He went to the extent of publicly asking China to play a major role
in South Asia. China spurned his offer and refused to fall into the trap of Americas
global hegemony. Obviously, China has its own reasons. But, this is not the place
to examine them even briefly.
Naturally, Obamas new fangled dalliance with China did not go well with India,
which made its hostility known to the policy makers in Washington DC in no uncertain
terms. Later on Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as his special envoy to Pakistan
and India, a step which was contrary to the established policy of de-hyphenating
Americas relations with India and Pakistan. India did not feel compelled to welcome
Holbrooke to the country and said so in public. Here again good sense prevailed
in the long run and Obama Administration resiled from the policy of re-hyphenisation
misadventure, not the best way to begin a new chapter in Americas relations with
India. Not only did China repulse Obamas overtures, it went a step further in
demonstrating its anti-US posture. It unveiled a strategy of asymmetry vis--vis
America, which involves the acquisition of the capacity to destroy superior enemys
intruding weapons in outer space. By destroying its own satellite in space, China
demonstrated that it is capable of defending itself against enemys First Strike. Then,
it is reasoned, that there is no need to match the enemy weapon to weapon, rocket
to rocket, etc. China reinforced its aggressive posture by compelling Japan to
apologize for the mishap near Korea and also by being tough with the US on the
submarine incident in the China Sea. In response to the not so peaceful rise of China,
President Obama and his top military leadership changed their tack after two years.
In a recent speech President Obama declared that America is an Asia-Pacific power
and it would not allow any power to challenge its naval and air supremacy in the
vast region stretching from Americas west coast to Malacca Straits. America
reactivated its maritime cooperation with India to protect the high seas and sea lanes
in the Indian Ocean. The US joined hands with Japan and Australia to form an
alliance of sorts to counter China. India was invited to join this partnership and
engage in joint naval exercises. While India is not averse to such naval engagement,
it is reluctant to openly join any such formal military alliance aimed against China
or any other nation or group of nations.
The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. VII, No. 3, 2013 16
Since the end of the bipolar world, and the dawn of globalization, India has
been following a policy of multi-alignment, i.e., building linkages with all the major
powers of the world, according to the then External Affairs Minister and a senior
leader of the Congress Pranab Mukherjee.
15
Explaining the rationale behind the
new policy, Shyam Saran, the special envoy of the Prime Minister, perceived greater
strategic space for India in the emerging international order that is more diffused
and diversified. The new approach of multi-alignment also fits well with our own
instinctive preference for a multipolar world, which includes a multipolar Asia,
Saran pointed out.
16
In fact, this has been Indias response to the post-Cold War
world in which all the major powers have been re-examining and re-aligning their
relations with all the others. It seems as though all the major powers are adopting
a policy of wait and watch in the era of transition in the global power structure.
They are keeping their options open till the post-Cold War global strategic
architecture attains a degree of durational stability, which could possibly take some
time.
US-China-India Tripod
In this era of global strategic transition, the evolving trilateral relationship among
the US, China, and India is an important game changer for the future of the world.
All the three have several crucial issues of conflict and equally compelling compulsions
to work with one another. In this complex and almost intractable adversarial tripod,
India can be seen as a swing state. To be effective in such a possible and tricky
role, India has to return to the path of robust economic growth. The country has
to grow stronger quickly in terms of the size and technological underpinnings of its
economy. It has to learn to govern itself more efficiently and be free from corruption
and put the mega scandals of recent years behind her. Above all, welfare of the
people and socioeconomic equity must receive the highest priority. Inclusive growth
should not be mere slogan. A poor and hungry India cannot be a major power,
let alone swing the global balance of power! India has to make every effort to
reach an amicable modus Vivendi on the border with China. It should become an
acceptable and credible leader in South Asia, which calls for a mutually beneficial
vision for the region as a whole.
17
All this is certainly tall order even in normal times.
With the multiple deficits (leadership deficit, trust deficit, democratic deficit, and
governance deficit) bedeviling the country now and in the recent past, the tall order
is visibly out of our reach any time soon.
15
India on the Upward Spiral of Improving Ties with All Major Powers, Pranab, The Hindu, January 18,
2007, p. 1.
16
Shyam Saran (2009), Geopolitical Consequences of Current Financial and Economic Crisis, an address
delivered at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, February 28, available at http://meaindia.nic.in/
speech/2009/02/28ss02.htm; and Raja Karthikeya (2011), Raising Multipolar Stakes: Indian Diplomacy
Charts a New Course in Line with the Demands of Age, The Times of India, January 4, p. 10.
17
B Ramesh Babu (2007), South Asian Union: A Vision, Mission, and Agenda, in A Subrahmanyam Raju
(Ed.), Reconstructing South Asia, pp. 273-287, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi.
17 Friends, Not Allies: India-US Equation in the 21
st
Century
However, I believe that if the conflictual mindset of the global leaders steeped in
power politics could be set aside, a perspective of cooperation for mutual benefit
could become the guiding star of national policies. Then conceiving and evolving a
cooperative tripod of US-China-India as the fulcrum of a stable and peaceful world
order would not be a mirage. Conflicts between and among the three are not
inevitable, nor are they irreconcilable. A reinvigorated India should dedicate itself to
such a new possibility. This indeed is very difficult, but not unattainable. A possible
roadmap for such a destination will be my research goal for the future.
Let me conclude by saying that India-US relations are on track and will continue
to grow wider and deeper in the immediate future and in the long run, irrespective
of who is in power on either side. However, convergence at the conceptual level and
divergence at the concrete level will continue to be the enduring hurdle along the
way. If there is another war between India and China in the Himalayas, which cannot
be ruled out entirely, the global strategic picture will be completely different!
Reference # 55J-2013-07-01-01

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen