CONCEPTS OF PERSON:

AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS OF PERSON, SELF AND HUMAN BEING,

AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
A
thesis
submitted
to the
University
of
Manchester for
the
degree
of
Phd.
in
the
Faculty
of
Arts, in
the
year
1985, by Catherine C. McCall.
THE UNIVERSITY
OF MANCHESTER
ABSTRACT OF THESIS
submitted
by
... .C
at.
he
Ufo
.
G..: -`'1cCa. ll.
........ .... .... ....... .
for
the
Degree
of
.
Phd..............
and entitled
Concepts.
of
Person: An Analysis
of
Concepts
of
Person, Self
and
Human Being,
and
Their Relevance to
.............................. .... ..... ..
Theories
of
Personal- Identity.
..................
............. ........ ..............
Date
of submission
.... ....... .
1.9 85
This thesis
maintains
that
a precise understanding of
the
nature
of
the
concept of
'person'
as onnosed
to the
concerts
of
'self'
and
'human
being',
will
dissolve
some of
the
problems
and paradoxes which are
frequently
encountered
in
theories
concerning
the
concept of person and personal
identity.
The
accounts offered
by different
philosophers vary
in
their
assumu-
tions
regarding
what a person
is,
thus
problems arise as a
result of
both
the lack
of clarity concerning
the
nature of
'person'
and
the lack
of consistency
between
writers
in
their
use of
the term.
In
support of
the
above contention, a selection of
theories
concerning
the
concept of
'person'
and personal
identity is
presented and criticised.
The
author
has
selected
the theories
of
P. F, Strawson, D, C. Dennet, D. Parfitt
and
J. Perry,
amongst
others, as representative of
different types
of
theories to be
found in
this
field.
It is further
argued
that
many of
the
confusions which
arise
in
consideration of personal
identity
result
from
a
misinterpretation of
J. Locke's
account of personal.
identity.
This
work
therefore
presents an exposition of
Locke's
account
which
isolates
oossible sources of misunderstanding.
It is
held that the
objections
levelled by J. Butler
and
T. Reid
against
certain
interpretations
of
Locke's theory
can
be
sustained against
modern
theories
which
fail to distinguish between the
concer: Dt of
'person'
and personal
identity,
and
the
concept of
'self'
and
the
continuity of consciousness.
The
author
proposes an alternative analysis which
difEeren-
tiates
between the
concepts of
'self', 'person',
and
'human
being',
whilst maintaining
that there
exists only one ontological
entity--the
individual--which is
the
subject of conception under
different
modes of
thought.
DECLARATION
No
portion of
the
work referred
to
in
this thesis
has been
submitted
in
support
of an application
for
another
degree
or qualification of
this
or any other
university or other
institute
of
learning.
Signed
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I
would
like
to
acknowledge
the
University
of
Manchester
whose grant of a
Postgraduate Scholarship in Arts
made possible
this thesis.
I
would
further
like
to thank the
Institute for
the
Advancement
of
Philosophy for Children for
their
support and encouragement.
Many
thanks
also
to
all
those
individuals,
too
numerous
to
mention
here,
from
whose comments and criticism
I have benefitted
throughout the
prepara-
tion
of
this thesis.
Finally I
would particularly
like
to thank
R. J. Caponigro, Jackie Caterwell
and
David Lamb,
whose
help,
advice and support,
both
professional and per-
sonal,
have been invaluable,
and without whom
this thesis
would not
be.
ii
DEDICATED TO OLIVIA AND KEITH
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter One: Introduction
...........................................................
1.1. Aims
............................................................................
Chapter Two: The Nature
of
Persons, Selves,
and
Human Beings
...................................................
7
2.1 Introduction
.................................................................
7
2.2 Concepts
as
Modes
of
Understanding
.................................
8
2.3 Interrelation
of
Concepts
.................................................
9
2.4 Differentiation
of
Concepts According
to
Function
................
10
2.5 Core Properties
.............................................................
11
2.6 Description
of
Terms
......................................................
12
2.61 Individual
...........................................................
12
2.62 Person
................................................................
12
2.63 Self
....................................................................
14
2.64 Human Being
.......................................................
15
Chapter Three: Problems
of
Personal Identity
...................................
18
3.1 Introduction
.................................................................
18
3.2 Ambiguity
of
"Same Person"
..........................................
19
3.3 Personal Identity Questions
.............................................
21
3.31 Individual Reidentification
......................................
21
3.32 Individual Identification
.........................................
21
3.33 Individual Individuation
and
Naming
........................
22
3.34 Class Differentiation
..............................................
22
3.4 Conclusion
..................................................................
23
Chapter Four: Strawson's Analysis
of
the
Concept
of
Person
................
28
4.1 Introduction
.................................................................
28
4.2 Person
as a
Basic Particular
.............................................
29
4.3 The Primitiveness
of
the
Concept
of
Person
.........................
32
4.4 M-Predicates
and
P-Predicates
.........................................
34
4.5 The Central Role
of
Intentional Predicates
...........................
36
4.6 Two Main Characteristics
of
Strawson's Account
..................
37
4.7 Conclusion
..................................................................
39
IV
Chapter Five: An Assessment
of
Strawson's Arguments
.......................
41
5.1 Introduction
.................................................................
41
5.2 Two Kinds
of
Arguments
.................................................
42
5.3 Unclarity in Strawson's Notion
of
"Basicness"
.....................
43
5.4 Strawson's Failure
to
Establish Person
as a
Basic Particular
..........................................................
44
5.5 The Distinction Between Persons
and
Material Objects
.............
47
5.6 Holistic Usage
of
the
Word "Person"
................................
49
5.7 Circularity in Strawson's Argument Concerning
M-
and
P-Predicates
....................................................
51
5.8 Strawson's Failure
to
Differentiate Persons from
Sentient Creatures
......................................................
52
5.9 Conclusion
..................................................................
54
Chapter Six: Criticism
of
Strawson's Analysis
...................................
58
6.1 Difficulties With
the
Meaning
of
"Concept"
........................
58
6.2 Conclusion
..................................................................
66
Chapter Seven: Moral Personhood
.................................................
69
7.1 Introduction...
.. 0......... 0.... o ... 0 ................ o ................. 0 .....
69
7.2 Intentional Systems,
....... 0.0. o............. 0. o...........................
71
7.3 Six Conditions
of
Personhood
..........................................
72
7.31 Persons
as
Rational Beings
......................................
72
7.32 Persons
as
Intentional Systems
.................................
72
7.33 Persons
as
Beings Which Exhibit Reciprocity
...............
73
7.34 Second-Order Intentional Systems
.............................
73
7.35 The Capacity for Verbal Communication
....................
74
7.36 Moral Agency
......................................................
76
7.37 Person
as a
Normative Ideal
....................................
79
7.4 Conclusion
..................................................................
81
Chapter Eight: Assessment
of
Dennett's Arguments
............................
84
8.1 Introduction
.................................................................
84
8.2 Confusion
of
Moral
with
Virtuous
.....................................
85
8.3 Conditions
of
Moral Personhood
......................................
87
V
Chapter Nine: Criticism
of
Dennett's Analysis
...................................
90
9.1 Introduction
.................................................................
90
9.2 The Intentional Stance
....................................................
92
9.3 Persons
as
Human Beings
................................................
95
9.4 Rationality
as
the
Standard
of
Personhood
..........................
97
9.5 Conclusion
..................................................................
99
Chapter Ten: Persons
and
Human Beings
.........................................
102
10.1 Introduction
.................................................................
102
10.2 The Nature
of
the
Distinction Between Persons
and
Human Beings
.......................................................
102
10.3 The Relevance
of
Humanoid Biology
to
Personhood Properties
..................................................
104
10.4 Conclusion
..................................................................
106
Chapter Eleven: Locke's Account
of
Personal Identity
........................
109
11.1 Introduction
.................................................................
109
11.2 Public
and
Private Identities
.............................................
110
11.3 Confusion in Locke's Treatment
of
Personal Identity
.............
112
11.4 Misunderstandings
of
Locke's Criteria
................................
115
11.5 Memory
as a
Lockean Criterion
of
Personal Identity
..............
117
11.6 Locke's Types
of
Identity
................................................
119
11.7 Conclusion
..................................................................
121
Chapter Twelve: Physical
and
Psychological Criteria
of
Personal Identity
..................................................
125
12.1 Introduction
.................................................................
125
12.2 J. Perry
and
Body Swops
.................................................
126
12.3 Two Notions
of
Personal Identity
......................................
129
12.4 Two Meanings
of
"Same Person"
.....................................
131
12.5 Physical Instantiation
of
Personal Identity
...........................
135
12.6 Memory
and
Self Identity
................................................
136
12.7 Conclusion
..................................................................
138
vi
Chapter Thirteen: Parfit's Theory
of
Personal Identity
........................
141
13.1 Introduction
.................................................................
141
13.2 The Non-Importance
of
Personal Identity
...........................
142
13.3 Reconstruction
of
Person
................................................
145
13.4 Parfit's Examples Underdescribed
.....................................
147
13.5 Survival
and
What Matters
..............................................
151
13.6 Conclusion
..................................................................
154
Chapter Fourteen: Assessment
of
Parfit's Analysis
.............................
158
14.1 Introduction
.................................................................
158
14.2 Precedents for Parfit's Analysis
........................................
159
14.3 Butler
and
Reid: Objections
to
Psychological Criteria
of
Personal Identity
....................................................
163
14.4 It is No Longer I: The Unitary Nature
of
Persons
..................
164
14.5 Consequences
of
Parfit's Use
of
Imaginary Examples
.............
166
14.6 Person: What Type
of
Concept?
........................................
168
14.7 Conclusion
..................................................................
170
Chapter Fifteen: Conclusion
.........................................................
174
Bibliography
.............................................................................
191
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 AIMS
In
modern philosophy
there
has been
a resurgence of
interest in
an area of
philosophy which
has
come
to
be known
as
"personal identity".
Many
philosophers
have
written about
the
nature of persons, or
human be-
ings,
and
the
conditions of
identity
which pertain
to
individuals
or selves or
persons.
However,
a critical examination of such
literature
reveals a
lack
of
clarity concerning
the
nature of
the
subject.
Frequently,
a philosophical
theory
is
presented
by
one writer,
to
be
criticised
by
others who appear
to
be
using a
different
concept or notion of what a person
is. Thus
theories
are
presented, criticised, and
defended by
philosophers who
hold fundamentally
different
assumptions concerning
the
nature of
the
subject of
those theories.
'
The
main aim of
this
work
is
to
analyse
the
concepts of person, self, and
human being,
and
to
use such analysis
to
unravel some of
the
confusions
which are
to
be found in
philosophical
theories,
which use unclear notions of
what
it
means
to
be
a person.
Whilst
the term
person
is
used
by
philosophers
in
particular and specific
ways which vary according
to the type
of
theory
being
proposed,
it is
more
generally used
by
people as
the
singular noun which refers
to
another specific
being
of
the
same
biological
species.
In its
ordinary use
the term
is
understood
though
underdefined,
but it becomes
problematic when used
in
contexts where questions of
identity,
social, moral, or
legal
rights, are at
stake.
2
In
such contexts much
depends
upon
the
definition
of
the term
person, and
the
definition
of person
depends
on philosophical analysis of
the
nature of
person.
This
thesis
attempts
to
clarify what
is
actually meant
by
the term
per-
son, and
the
related
terms
self, and
human being, by investigating
the
nature
of
the
concepts, with which, and
through
which, we understand ourselves
and others.
In
this
respect,
the
project
is both
constructive and critical: con-
structive
in
that
an analysis of
the
concept of person
is
presented,
the
use of
which,
it is
claimed, will
dissolve
some of
the
problems and paradoxes which
occur
in
the
literature
on personal
identity,
and critical
insofar
as certain phi-
losophical
views of person,
investigated in light
of
the
analysis offered, are
found
to
be
confused or ambiguous.
As
the
amount of philosophical writing relating
to the
concept of person
and
to
personal
identity is
very
large (and
growing monthly),
this
work
does
not attempt
to
present an extensive review of
the
available
literature. Rather,
samples of
literature
are used
to
illustrate
the
kinds
of confusion which result
from
a
lack
of clarity concerning
the
nature of persons.
Thus,
the
following
chapter
in
this
work presents an analysis of
the
com-
mon modes of conception
through
which and
by
which, we understand
ourselves and others as
biological,
social, and self conscious entities.
In
chapter
three
some of
the
common problems which arise
in
considera-
tions
of personal
identity
are outlined and
discussed. Since
many of
the
pro-
blems
and questions concerning
the
criteria of personal
identity
arise
from
and
depend
upon assumptions made about
the
nature of persons, and
the
status of
the
concept of person, chapter
four
reviews one of
the
more
influen-
tial
analyses of
the
concept of person, which
is
presented
by P. F. Strawson,
in his book, Individuals (1959). 2 An
assessment of
the
arguments with which
Strawson
supports
his
analysis
is
presented
in
chapter
five. Chapter
six
presents a criticism of
Strawson's
analysis.
3
Chapter
seven
investigates
several
theories
of person which emphasise
the
moral
dimension
of personhood.
This
chapter summarises
the
analysis of
person put
forward by D. C. Dennett in Conditions
of
Personhood (1976), 3
and also makes reference
to
J. Rawls' Justice
as
Reciprocity (1971), 4
and
to
H. Frankfurt's Freedom
of
Will
and
The Concept
of
Person (1971). 5
Chapter
eight presents an assessment of
the
arguments which
Dennett
presents
to
support
his "six
conditions of personhood,
"
and
in
chapter nine
Dennett's
analysis
is
criticised.
One
of
the
criticisms of
the
analyses put
for-
ward
by both Dennett
and
Strawson
concerns
the
fact
that
both
analyses
fail
to
account
for
one of
the
most
important features
of persons as we
know
them: that
is
that
persons are
human beings. Therefore
chapter
ten
in-
vestigates
to
what extent
the
features
of our conceptualisation of
individuals
as persons
is dependent
upon
the
particular
biological
structure and
function-
ing
of
individuals
as
human beings. The failure
to take
account of
the
biological
nature of
individuals is
most prevalent
in
modern philosophical
literature
on personal
identity,
which emerges
from
what
is
often
thought to
be
a
Lockean
tradition.
Locke is frequently
cited as
the
precursor of
two
types
of
theory
concerning personal
identity. First
that
memory
is
the
main
Z-DD
criterion of personal
identity,
and second
that the
identity
of persons
is
con-
stituted of psychological characteristics.
Chapter
eleven presents an exposi-
tion
of
Locke's
account of personal
identity in
which
it is
argued
that
both
of
these
interpretations
are mistaken.
This
chapter
demonstrates
that
Locke
held
that the
identity
of a person
is
established
by
the
identity
of
"the
man,
"
as a changing object partaking of one
life. It is further
argued
that,
according
to
Locke,
consciousness constitutes self
identity
and
is
therefore
not a
criterion of
identity. '
Chapter
twelve
develops
the
discussion
of physical and psychological
criteria of personal
identity,
with particular emphasis on
the theories
presented
by J. Perry in Personal Identity (1975), '
and
S. Shoemaker in Per-
sonal
Identity
and
Memory (1959). 8
4
Chapter
thirteen
outlines
the
views put
forward by D. Parfit in Personal
Identity (1971). 9 Parfit's
theory that
what matters about personal
identity is
survival and a relationship of psychological connectedness,
is found
to
be
an
inadequate
account of personal
identity,
on
the
grounds
that
it fails
to
ac-
count
for
the
fact
that
persons as normally
found in
the
world are also
human
beings. Since
the
identity
conditions of
the
beings described by Parfit
are not
those
which pertain
to
individuals
who are
human beings
and persons, strictly
speaking,
his
theory
is
not a
theory
of personal
identity.
In
chapter
fourteen it is
argued
that the
criticisms of
"successive
self"
theories
presented
by Butler'
and
Reid"
can also
be levelled
against
Parfit's
theory.
The
concluding chapter suggests
that the
inconsistencies
and
lack
of clarity
found in
the
personal
identity
theories
and
theories
of person presented
in
the
preceding chapters can
be
avoided.
It is
suggested
that
an adequate
theory
of
personal
identity
should
be based
on an analysis of
the
concept of person
which
takes
into
account
the
different
ways
in
which
the
individual is
con-
ceived,
i.
e., as a person and as a self-conscious
being
and as a
biological
enti-
ty.
5
NOTES
1. A
sample of such
theories
are considered
in
this
work.
For further
ex-
amples, see:
A. J. Ayer, The Concept
of a
Person,
and
Other Essays
(London: Macmillan,
1963); H. W. Johnstone, Jr., "Persons
and
Selves, " in Phil. Phenom. Res. 28: 205-212 (1967); H. D. Lewis, "Per-
sons
in Recent Thought, " in The Search For Absolute Values 2v. I. C. F.
(ed. ) (New York: I. C. F., 1977); J. Margolis, "Persons: Notes
on
Their
Nature, Identity,
and
Rationality, " in S. J. Phil. 18: 463-472 (1980); R.
McKeon, "Person
and
Community: Metaphysical
and
Political, " Ethics
88: 207-217 (1978); J. N. Mohanty, "Subject
and
Person, " in Int. Phil.
Quart. 20: 265-274 (1980); T. Richard, "Models
of
the
Person, " in Can.
J. Phil. 10: 623-635 (1980); A. Plantinga, "Things
and
Persons, " Rev.
Metaph. 14: 493-519 (1961); R. Puccetti, "On Saving Our Concept
of a
Person, " Philosophy 55: 403-407 (1980); A. Quinton, "Two Concep-
tions
of
Personality, " Rev. Int. Phil. 22: 387-402 (1968); I. Scheffler,
"Ethics, Personal Identity,
and
Ideals
of
the
Person, " Can. J. Phil. 12:
229-246 (1982); M. Spencer, "The Idea
of
the
Person
as a
Collective
Representation, " Human Stud. 4: 257-272 (1981); B. Williams,
"Another Time, Another Place, Another Person, " in Perception
and
Identity (ed. ) G. MacDonald, (Ithica: Cornell Univ. Press, 1970).
2. P. F. Strawson, Individuals:
an
Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1959).
3. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in The Identities
of
Persons, (ed. ) A. O. Rorty, (University
of
California Press, 1976).
4. J. Rawls, "Justice
as
Reciprocity, " in Utilitarianism, (ed. ) S. Govorvitz,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971).
5. H. Frankfurt, "Freedom
of
the
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person, " J.
Phil. 68: 5-20(1971).
6. J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (second
edition,
1694).
6
7. J. Perry, "The Problem
of
Personal Identity, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal
Identity, (University
of
California Press, 1975).
8. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " J. Phil. 56: 868-881
(1959).
9. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " Phil. Rev., (1971),
printed
in J. Perry
(ed. ) Personal Identity.
10. J. Butler, The Analogy
of
Religion, (1736).
11. T. Reid, Essays
on
the
Intellectual Powers
of
Man, (1785).
7
CHAPTER
TWO
THE NATURE OF PERSONS, SELVES AND HUMAN BEINGS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes an analysis of
the
concepts of person, self, and
human being,
which
it is hoped
will
help
to
clarify
both
what
the terms
refer
to,
and
the
way
in
which
they
function
as concepts which enable us
to
understand ourselves
in different
modes.
It is
proposed
that
whilst
there
exists only one ontological entity, a
biological,
social, and self-conscious
being,
this
entity
is
thought
of and con-
ceived
in different
ways.
The
terms
person, self, and
human being,
when
referring
to the
concepts or ways of conceiving of an
individual, have dif-
ferent, distinct
meanings.
But
although
the
meanings are
distinct,
they
are
in-
terrelated.
It
will
be
argued
that the terms
refer
to the
individual,
and
that the
difference in
meaning
between
the terms
does
not emerge
from
the
fact
that
they
refer
to
different
or separable entities,
but
rather emerges
from
the
dif-
ferent
modes of conception under which
individuals
are understood.
8
2.2 Concepts
as
Modes
of
Understanding
Three
specific
terms
are used
in
this thesis to
refer
to
individual
people
(henceforth
called
individuals):
person, self, and
human being. The
terms
represent
three
ways of understanding
individuals. They
stand
for
three
aspects of cognising or perceiving a single entity-the
individual.
Although I have
chosen
to
look
at
three
aspects or ways of understanding
individuals, I do
not claim
that these
modes of understanding are exhaustive.
There
may
be
other modes of understanding people.
There
probably will
be
others
in
the
future. Moreover,
the
concepts named above overlap
to
a
large
extent, and are seldom
found in isolation. That is, it is
seldom
that
an
in-
dividual is
actually
thought
of, or conceived of, as only a self-conscious
be-
ing,
or as merely a
human being
who
is
not a person and a self-conscious
be-
ing. (Such
cases
do
occur as,
for instance,
when reference
is
made
to
com-
atose patients who
do
not appear
to
function
except as
biological
entities,
'
but
they
are not
the
norm.
)
9
2.3 Interrelation
of
Concepts
Having
made
the
assumption
that there
exists one entity
(the individual), it
must
be
emphasized
that the
division
of
the
individual
along
three
modes of
understanding
is
to
some extent artificial.
That is,
although
the
concept of
person represents a particular mode, or way of understanding
the
individual,
and can
be investigated
as such,
this
does
not entail
the
existence of such a
thing
as a person apart
from
the
individual,
which
is
also a
biological
entity,
and a self-conscious
being. Moreover,
the
concept of person could not exist
in isolation, it is
a
derivative. The fact
that there
are concepts of person, of
self, and of
human being is dependent
upon
the
existence of
individuals
as
such.
The
concepts of person, self, and
human being
amount
to
ways of
thinking
about or understanding
individuals. The
object of
thought, that
which
is being
thought
about,
is
the
individual. If
one accepts
that
it is
not
possible
to think
about nothing,
that
if
one
thinks
one
is
thinking
about
something,
it is
easier
to
see
that the
object of
the
different
modes of concep-
tion-the
object of
the
concepts of person, self, and
human being-is
the
one
being,
the
individual.
The
enterprise of analysing
different
ways of conceiving
individuals is
analogous
to the
dissection
of a
body in
a
laboratory
with
the
purpose of
in-
vestigating
the
lungs, liver,
and
heart
separately.
Just
as
different
organs and
their
related
functions
can
be
conceived of as
being in
some senses
indepen-
dent
and
in
some senses
dependent
upon each other, and at
the
same
time
be-
ing dependent
upon
their
integrated function
within
the
organism as a whole,
so
the
concepts of person, self, and
human being have distinct functions,
whilst remaining
interdependent. Neither
the
biological
organs, nor
the
con-
cepts under consideration, can exist
independently. Biological
organs
depend
upon a
living
organism
for
their
existence and
their
particular
functioning.
Whilst investigation
of organs
independently from
the
whole organism may
reveal some specific aspects of each organ,
the
functioning
organs could not
be
understood
without
an understanding
of
their
interrelationship,
and
their
relationship
to the
organism as a whole.
Similarly, the
existence of
the
con-
10
cepts of self, person, and
human being depend
upon
the
existence of
the
in-
dividual
who
is
so conceived.
In
order
to
understand the
concepts and their
interrelationships,
it is
necessary to
understand their
relationship to the
in-
dividual. Neither hearts
nor persons are
to
be found
existing
independently
in
the
natural world,
but
exist as parts of a whole.
'
2.4 Differentiation
of
Concepts According
To Function
Having
emphasised
that the
concepts of self, person and
human being
represent
different
ways of conceiving one entity-the
individual-this
analysis maintains
that the
functioning
of each
is distinct. The different
con-
cepts represent
different
ways of understanding
the
individual. Individuals
have
many
different
properties, and consideration of certain
types
of proper-
ties
occurs when
the
individual is
conceived of under
different
modes.
Thus,
for
example, considering
the
rights which are allocated
to
individuals
general-
ly involves
considering such
individuals
as persons.
The
concept of person
thus
has
a
distinct function
which
is
not shared
by
the
concept of
human be-
ing. Questions
concerning social rights and obligations may not arise when
considering
the
biology
of an
individual. An
analysis of
the
concepts, which
takes
account of
these
differences,
may
help
clarify some of
the
problems
which arise
in
consideration of philosophical
theories
concerning persons.
Whilst
the
concepts
to
be
analysed are artificial,
(in
the
sense of
being
non-
natural),
they
are not arbitrary.
These
particular modes of understanding
the
individual
seem
to
be
evident
in
much
literature, both
philosophical and non-
philosophical.
There is
evidence
from
everyday experience
that
people are
thought
of
in
these
modes.
For
example, while children are
thought
of as self
conscious
beings,
often
they
are not
thought
of as persons.
In
many cultures
the
properties attributable
to
persons are not ascribed
to
children.
2.5 Core Properties
Although
the
meaning of
the terms
person, self, and
human being
may
vary
in
use,
there
are certain properties attributed
to
each, which are central
to the
meaning of each
term
and which
differentiate
each
from
the
others.
These
are core properties, and as such are
distinguishable. Central
to this
work
is
the
claim
that
confusion
between
the
properties which
distinguish
between
the
different
modes of understanding
individuals leads
to
needless
paradoxes and problems.
'
12
2.6 Description
of
Terms
2.61 Individual
The
term
individual is
used
to
refer
to the
single entity which
is
the
subject
of cognition
in
various modes.
An individual
may
be
perceived as a self con-
scious
being,
as a person, as a
human being, jointly
or separately,
but it is
maintained
here
that there
exists one entity,
however
many
different
ways
there
may
be
of understanding or of perceiving such a
being. '
2.62 Person
In
this
work
the term
person refers
to
a particular way of understanding
in-
dividuals. The individual,
as person,
is
what
is
cognised of
the
individual by
others.
The individual,
recognised as a person,
is
a public entity.
In
this
sense
the
person
is
a
third
person entity-whatever
is known,
attributed, or
thought
of
the
individual
constitutes
that
individual
as a person.
Thus
the
identity
of an
individual
as a person
is
what
is determined by
third
persons, as
this
mode of understanding of
individuals
encompasses
that
which
is
attributed
to
an
individual by
others.
An individual
cognised as a
person
is
named
by
others, acquires one or many personal names
by baptism
or
"tagging" (for
example,
by
ritual,
"I
name you
Joseph, "
or
by
a vocal
act,
"I'll
call you
Joey, "
or
by
acquiring a nickname.
) Thereafter, he is
recognised as a person
by
that
name.
Both
what constitutes a person-personhood-and
the
conditions
for
identifying
and reidentifying persons-personal
identity-are
to
be found in
the
public
domain. Persons
are social
beings,
created and constituted, and
found
only
in
society.
'
The individual
can only exist as a person
in
a social situation.
' The
proper-
ties
which constitute personhood, properties concerning agency, accoun-
tability,
responsibility
for
action, capacities such as
the
ability
to
plan
future
actions, consistency
in decision-making,
only operate within a social
framework. ' The Natural Man,
the
unsocialised
individual,
cannot
be
ac-
13
countable, as
there
is
no-one
to
be
accountable
to.
A
non-social
individual
will not
be
granted rights, as
there
would exist no others
to
grant rights;
it
will
make no
difference
whether
he is
responsible
for
past action, or can plan
future
action, as such capacities
do
not affect anyone else.
In
other words,
those
aspects of social
life
which make
it important
to
grant rights,
to
allocate
responsibility,
to
judge
a
being
a person,
do
not exist
for
an
individual in
isolation.
Similarly,
the
conditions of
identity
of a person,
the
properties which are
used
to
identify
a person, and
to
reidentify and
individuate
the
person
from
others, presuppose
the
existence of other similar
beings from
which
the
per-
son
is
to
be individuated. Self identity
may
be
a
logical
relation, a
thing
being
identical
with
itself, but
personal
identity involves judgements
made
by
others, concerning consistency of personality, abilities, which are properties
only
instantiated in
a society.
14
2.63 Self
Throughout
this text, the term
self refers
to those
aspects of an
individual
which constitutes self consciousness.
This
concept concerns
the
ability of
in-
dividuals
to
reflect upon
their
actions,
thoughts,
intentions,
and so on.
As
a
second order activity, reflection upon action assumes
the
existence of a sub-
ject
who performs
the
action-(if not a subject who performs
the
reflection)-and
it is
this
subject which
is
conceptualised as
the
self.
'
The
concept of a self represents
the
experiential nature of
the
individual:
the
individual does
not merely react
to the
environment,
but
experiences
himself
or
herself
so
doing. The
self
is
thus the
location
of experience,
the
aspect of an
individual
which can reflect upon experience, which
"has"
those
experiences,
but
which
is
not
identified
with
the
experience.
The
use of
I
as a
first
person
indicator
refers
to the
concept of self.
In
this
respect
the
self
is
essentially private.
Thus, for instance,
the
status of
"privileged
access"
in
reports of mental states such as,
"I
am
in
pain,
"
or
"I
am
happy, " is
a
direct
result of
the
experiential nature of such reports.
Third
person reports of
the
same phenomenon, such as,
"He is in
pain,
"
are
descriptive,
and whether
these
reports
describe behaviour
or
dispositions
they
can
be
challenged, evidence can
be
presented
in favour
or against
the
descrip-
tion.
But first
person reports
differ in
this
respect;
they
do
not
describe
a
state, or
bit
of
behaviour,
or a
disposition; they
state an experiential
fact;
first
person report statements cannot
be
contradicted
by
others, need not
be
supported
by
evidence.
'
The
term
I
refers
to the
experiencing
individual,
not
the
person.
The
person
is
a public construction,
and no matter what
identity is
attributed
to the
in-
dividual
as person,
the
experiencing self remains constant.
'
15
2.64 Human Being
The
term
human being
will
be
used
to
refer to the
individual
as a
biological
entity, a member of a certain species.
As human beings, individuals
grow, change, and age, according to the
biological laws
which govern such processes.
As
a
biological
entity,
the
human being is
a physical object, and
is
therefore
identified
and reidentified
using
the
same
kind
of criteria which are used
to
identify
other physical ob-
jects-criteria
which
include description
and ostensive
definition.
The individual is identified
as a
human being,
according to
its biological
characteristics; whether one
is
a
human being depends
upon whether one can
be identified
as a member of
the
species
homo
sapiens
(whether
one
has
a
conjunction of certain characteristics and properties).
The individual is in-
dividuated from
others of
the
same species
by
means of spatio-temporal
criteria
(as
are most objects), and
thereafter
reidentified as
the
"same, "
or at
least
as a continuous object,
by
means of
description
and spatio-temporal
continuity.
The
problems which affect reidentification of
human beings, for
example,
to
what extent a changing object
is
the
"same, "
are
thus
no
different from
those
affecting spades and cows.
In fact judgements
concerning
the
identity
of
human beings
are possibly easier
because
of
the
phenomenon of
finger-
prints which uniquely
identify individual human beings (and
some apes).
Tags
or
brands
may
have
to
be
used
to
identify
other
types
of animals and ob-
jects.
16
NOTES
1. Some
philosophers
distinguish between bodies
which are
inhabited by
persons and
live bodies
which are not.
An
example of
the
latter
case
would
be
a ventilated
body,
where circulation and other vital systems are
maintained until asystole.
For
a
further discussion
and comment on
this,
see
D. Lamb, Death, Brain Death
and
Ethics, (Croom Helm: London
1985. )
2. For
a
further
explanation of
the
relationship referred
to
here,
see
L.
von
Bertalanfly, General Systems Theory, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1967),
and
D. Lamb, Hegel: From Foundation
to
System, (Nijhoff: The Hague,
1980)
pp.
138-146.
3. See
my
The Concept
of
Person
and
its Use in Psychology,
unpublished
Msc. dissertation, (U. W. I. S. T., 1981).
4. For
an example of
how
one entity can
be
conceived of under
different
modes of
thought
and
be
ascribed
different
types
of predicate, see
F.
Cowley, "The Identity
of a
Person
and
His Body, " J. Phil. 68: 678-683,
(1971). Cowley illustrates
this
point with an analogy
between
a person
and a statue.
The S-predicates
such as
"is
a work of art,
"
or
"is
a good
likeness, "
are applied
to the
statue.
Should
the
statue
be
melted
down,
these
predicates are no
longer
applicable,
but
although
this
is
so,
the
statue
is
not an entity
distinct from
the
bronze (the S-predicates
are ap-
plicable
to the
bronze
under a certain
description). In
an analogous way
the
person
is
not an entity separate
from his body.
5. For
another view on
this,
see
J. Margolis, Persons
and
Minds, (Dor-
drecht: Reidel, 1977).
6. See W. C. Smith, "Thinking About Persons, " Humanitas 15: 147-152,
(1979). Smith
argues
that
individuals
only
become
persons
in
a com-
munity, and considers person
to
be
a
transcendant
concept.
17
7. For
a
further discussion
on
this,
see
G. Langford, "Persons
as
Necessarily Social, " J. Theory
of
Soc. Behav. 3: 263-283, (1978).
Langford
presents a view
that
persons must
be
socially related
to
others
in
order
to
be
persons.
8. For
another view of self as a mode of understanding
individuals,
see
G. J. Stack, "The Self
as
Construct
or
Project, " J. Thought. 7: 26-39,
(1972).
9. For
a
different
analysis of
the term,
I,
see
R. Lawrie, "Personality, "
Phil. Phenom. Res. 34: 307-330, (1974).
10. For
an alternative analysis of self, see
B. Smart, "Persons
and
Selves, "
Phil. Stud. 26: 331-336, (1974). Smart distinguishes between
persons and
selves
but
allows a plurality of selves.
18
CHAPTER
THREE
PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents some of
the
problems which arise
in
the
considera-
tion
of
the
identity
conditions which pertain
to
persons.
It begins
with an
examination of one source of
"personal identity"
problems, namely
the
am-
biguity
which
is
often
found in
the
use of
the
phrase,
"the
same person.
" The
remainder of
this
chapter
is
concerned with
isolating
some of
the
problematic
questions
in
personal
identity: individual identification, individual
reiden-
tification,
individual individuation
and naming, and class
differentiation.
19
3.2 Ambiguity
of
"Same Person"
Much
philosophical analysis concerning
the
nature of persons
is
conducted
from
the
point of view of
the
problems which arise considering personal
iden-
tity.
' Writers in
this
field
of philosophy often attempt to
establish
the
kinds
of criteria which are, or could
be,
used
to
determine
the
continued
identity
of
a person.
' Philosophers
are also concerned with
the
problems which arise
when such
identity
cannot
be
assured.
'
Jonathan Glover describes
the
problem of personal
identity
as:
...
the
question of what,
if
anything
justifies
the
view
that,
despite
physical and mental changes,
I
remain
the
same person
over a period of
time; the
related question of what
kind
of
alterations
in
some-one would make
it
no
longer
reasonable
to
regard
him
as
the
same person.
'
There is
some ambivalence
in Glover's
use of
the
phrase,
"the
same per-
son,
"
and
it is indicative
of an ambivalence which
is
the
source of one of
the
problems of personal
identity. The
phrase can refer
to
either
the
identity
of a
person as a persisting object-as a
human being-or
to the
stability of
the
personality of
that
individual. The
phrase,
"the
same person,
" is
often used
ambiguously,
in
which case
the
question
is
confused, and
it is
sometimes used
ambivalently,
in
which case
the
question
is
avoided.
The first
part of
Glover's
statement above assumes
that the
person retains
identity
through
change,
that there
is
one subject who changes.
Glover, here,
appears
to
be
regarding
the
individual
as a physical object, a
human being,
who
is
subject
to
personality changes and
to
biological
maturation or
physical alteration.
The
second part of
the
statement queries
the
continued
identity
of
the
individual
as person,
by implying
that
alterations
in
someone
could change
their
identity, in
other words,
that the
identity
of a person
resides
in
their
personality.
In
the
second
formulation
there
may
be
two
sub-
jects,
the
old and
the
new persons.
20
The
problem of
identity
through
change,
to
which
Glover
alludes
in
the
first
part of
his formulation,
affects most objects
in
the
natural world.
Even
the
most stable objects change over
time
(mountains
erode, rocks crack, con-
tinents
move, etc.
),
and most everyday objects change within each person's
lifetime. Yet judgements
are made about
the
continued
identity
of objects.
Decisions
about object
identity
are usually made according
to
criteria of spa-
tio-temporal
continuity.
Decisions
of
identity
which
treat
persons as continu-
ing
objects are usually made on similar grounds, using
bodily
continuity
in
space and
time
as criteria of
identity. However,
as
A. Rorty has
pointed out:
...
we
have
more
bodily
continuity
than
we can properly use.
We
are after all
bodily
continuous with our corpses, and
indeed
with
their
decay
and
dessication. s
The
second problem,
that
of
identity
of personality over
time,
involves
similar
difficulties
with criteria
for judging
what
is
and what
is
not
to
be
counted
the
same personality.
If
there
is
a
temporal
continuity of personality,
of characteristics, propensities, abilities and
traits,
how is
one
to
judge
that
an
individual has,
or
is,
a
different
personality?
21
3.3 Personal Identity Questions
The
ambiguity
in
the
phrase, the
same person,
highlights
an
important
feature
of
discussions
about personal
identity:
that there
are
different
ques-
tions
at
issue
concerning personal
identity.
3.31 Individual Reidentification
The
question of
individual
reidentification
involves isolating
the
criteria
used
to
reidentify
the
same person
(however
conceived)
in different
contexts
or at
different
times.
Persons
are
taken to
be
persisting objects, which can
be
reidentified; what
is
under question
is
the
criteria
for doing
so.
Criteria
need
to
be
established,
for instance
after war or
disaster,
which
would enable
the
reidentification of survivors who may
have lost
their
papers, or
in
cases of
inheritance
where
it
may
be
unclear whether an
in-
dividual is
who s/he claims
to
be.
3.32 Individual Identification
Questions
about personality stability concern
the
problem of
individual
identification-what
sort of characteristics are used
to
identify
a person
essentially.
Although
a person may
be
reidentified as a persisting object,
this
identity
may not under certain circumstances
be
taken to
be
the
"real" identi-
ty
of
the
person.
As Amelie Rorty
explains:
...
it
might
be
possible
that
an
individual be
considered
reidentifiable
by
the
memory criterion,
but
not
be
considered
reidentifiable as
the
same person
because
all
that
she con-
sidered essential
had
changed:
her
principles and preference
rankings were
different, her
tastes,
plans,
hopes,
and
fears. She
remembered
her
old principles of choice well enough and so,
by
the
memory criterion might consider
herself
the
same old per-
son;
but by
grace or reeducation she could
be
counted on
to
choose and act
in
a new way.
'
JOHN
R'
LANU=
U, giV
R5[TY
A iy
OF
r. ANGHOTEP
22
3.33 Individual Individuation
and
Naming
Further
questions at
issue
concerning personal
identity include
the
problem
of
individual differentiation
or
individuation:
what criteria are used
to
distinguish between
persons who
have
the
same general
description?
Connected
with
the
problem of
individuation
is
the
related problem of
naming: of
the
reference and meaning of proper names which name persons.
Is
a proper name equivalent
to
a collection of
descriptions,
such as,
for in-
stance,
"the
man who shot
Lincoln, " "who likes
eating raw carrots,
"
and so
on, so
that
whomever
fits
the
collection
is
said
to
be
the
referent of
that
name?
Or does
a proper name name
its
object
directly? '
3.34 Class Differentiation
There is
also a
deeper
question
involved in
personal
identity,
and
that
is
the
problem of class
differentiation:
which
features
or properties of persons
distinguish
them
as a class of entities
from
other sorts of entities which share
some of
the
features
common
to
persons?
Properties
which we associate with
persons, such as
being intelligent, having
emotions,
having
physical
descrip-
tions,
making choices,
being
responsible
for
actions, and
having intentions,
are often attributed
to
other entities-to corporations,
'
robots,
' dogs,
com-
puters,
'
chimpanzees,
"
corpses,
' 2
and so on.
Given
that there
is
a wide range
of properties attributable
to
persons,
it
can
be
asked whether
there
are any
properties which are unique
to
persons.
If
such properties could
be identified,
they
might constitute an essential
description
of personhood, what
it is
to
be
a person, such
that
any entity
which possesses such properties must
be judged
to
be
a person.
Alternatively,
personhood might amount
to
a conjunction of such essential properties and
other properties, and even
to
a conjunction of properties, none of which
is
itself
an essential property.
' 3
23
3.4 Conclusion
Discussion
of
the
various questions at
issue in
personal
identity
make use
of explicit or
implicit
concepts of person.
Whilst
many
discussions
are con-
cerned with
investigating
the
boundaries
of our concept of person, and
in do-
ing
so make use of
fictional
examples, some assumptions about what
it is
to
be
a person are necessarily made,
if
only
to
set
limits
upon what
is
possible.
Before
addressing
the
issues
which arise
in discussions
of personal
identity
theories,
it
seems necessary
to
look
at what
the
concept of person
itself
en-
tails,
and what
the
role of
the
concept of person
in
our
language
and concep-
tual
scheme amounts
to.
The following
chapter,
therefore,
looks
at
the
analysis of
the
concept of
person which
is
proposed
by P. F. Strawson in Individuals, (1959). '
24
NOTES
1. Analyses
offered
by
several
different
philosophers will
be
examined
throughout the
following
chapters.
For
other examples, see:
P. T. Mac-
Kenzie, "Personal Identity
and
the
Imagination, " Philosophy 58: 161-74
(1983); R. G. Swinburn, "Personal Identity, " Proc. Aris. Soc.
74: 231-274 (1973-74).
2. For
examples of
the
range of criteria of personal
identity
which are pro-
posed, see:
D. Wiggins, Identity
and
Spatio-Temporal Continuity, (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 1967); B. Gert, "Personal Identity
and
the
Body, "
Dialogue (Canada) 10: 458-478 (1971); K. Amerikas, "Criteria
of
Per-
sonal
Identity, " Can. J. Phil. 7: 47-69 (1977); H. Sahoo, "A Note
on
Personal Identity, " Indian Phil. Quart. 8: 1-5 (1981); P. Kitcher, "The
Crucial Relation in Personal Identity, " Can. J. Phil. 8: 131-145 (1978);
M. Miri, "Memory
and
Personal Identity, " Mind 82: 1-21 (1973). Wig-
gins,
Gert, Sahoo
and
Amerikas
argue
that
bodily identity is
either a
primary or a necessary condition of personal
identity,
while
Kitcher dis-
cusses
the
importance
of a
type
of
broad
psychological relation
in
guaranteeing
the
continuity of personal
identity
over
time.
Miri discusses
the
memory
theory
of personal
identity.
3. For
examples of
differing
types
of problems which emerge
in
considera-
tion
of criteria of personal
identity,
and
the
differing
analyses
to
which
such problems are subjected, see:
J. Shaffer, "Persons
and
Their
Bodies, " Phil Rev. 75: 59-77, (1966); H. W. Noonan, Objects
and
Identi-
ty:
An Examination
of
the
Relative Identity Thesis
and
its Consequences
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980); E. J. Borowski, "Identity
and
Personal
Identity, " Mind 85: 481-502, (1976).
4. J. Glover, (ed. ), The Philosophy
of
Mind (Oxford Univ. Press, 1967)
p.
1.
5. A. Rorty, (ed. ), The Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California
Press, 1976)
p.
2.
6. Ibid.,
p.
2.
25
7. For
a
further discussion
of naming, see
S. Kripke, "Naming
and
Necessity, " in Semantics
of
Natural Language D. Davidson
and
Har-
man
(ed. ), (Dordrecht,
1972).
Kripke
argues that
proper names are rigid
designators,
which
designate
the
same object
in
all
"possible
worlds" and
that the
identity
between
rigid
designators is
a necessary relationship.
He
maintains,
against
B. Russell
and
G. Frege,
that
proper names are not equivalent
with
bundles
of
descriptions, because descriptions
are non-rigid
designators
and
the
relationship
between
non-rigid
designators
and
the
objects
they
refer
to
is
a contingent relationship.
According
to this
analysis,
individuals
are conceived of as
both human
beings, i.
e., enduring
biological
entities, and persons.
The identity
of
the
individual
as person consists of
just
those
descriptions
which are at-
tributed to the
individual by
others.
I
would argue against
Kripke
that
if
the
proper name refers
to the
individual
as person,
the
name names
the
person
directly. However,
the
descriptions
which amount
to the
identity
of
that
person are changeable.
In
other words,
the
relationship
between
the
name and
the
person
is
not contingent
but
the
descriptions
which
make up
the
"bundle"
can change.
I
agree with
Kripke
that
when a
name
is
referring
to the
individual
as a
human being, it is
a necessary
relationship-a rigid
designator.
The
question concerns not whether proper names are rigid or non-
rigid
designators
with respect
to
descriptions, but
whether
the
name
names an
individual
as person or as
human being.
8. In
much of recent
literature,
analogies
have been drawn between
persons
and corporations.
For
examples of such
literature
see:
J. I. Biro "Per-
sons as
Corporate Entities
and
Corporations
as
Persons, " Nature
and
System 3: 173-180, (1981); J. B. Wilbur, "The Foundations
of
Corporate
Responsibility, " J. Bus. Ethics 1: 145-55 (1982); R. C. Manning, "Cor-
porate
Responsibility
and
Corporate Personhood, " J. Bus. Ethics 3:
77-84, (1984).
26
9. See for
example,
A. Sloman
and
M. Croucher, "Why Robots Will Have
Emotions, " Proc. 7th Int. Conf. Artificial Intelligence (Univ. British
Columbia, Vancouver,
(1981),
and
A. Sloman, "Towards
a
Grammar
of
Emotions, " New Universities Quarterly, (1982).
10. The debate
about whether machines
(computers
or programs)
"really"
have
the
personhood properties which some people attribute
to them
has
a
long
tradition. For
some recent examples of
the
debate,
see:
M. Boden,
Artificial Intelligence
and
Natural Man (Harvester Press, 1977)
and
Minds
and
Mechanisms: Philosophical Psychology
and
Computational
Models (Harvester Press, 1981); D. C. Dennett, Content
and
Conscious-
ness
(London: Routledge
and
Kegan Paul, 1969),
and
Brainstorms
(Montgomery, Vt: Bradford Books, 1978); P. W. Frey, "An Introduc-
tion to
Computer Chess, " in Chess Skill in Man
and
Machine P. W.
Frey, (ed. ), (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1977); D. R. Hofstadter,
Godel, Escher, Bach (New York: Basic Books, 1979); S. Hook, (ed. ).
Dimensions
of
Mind (New York: Collier, 1960); J. R. Lucas, "Minds,
Machines
and
Godel, " Philosophy 36: 112-127 (1961); J. McCarthy,
"Ascribing Mental Qualities
to
Machines, " in Philosophical Perspec-
tives
in Artificial Intelligence, (ed. ) M. Ringle, (N. J.: Humanities Press,
1979); J. C. Marshall, "Minds, Machines
and
Metaphors, " Soc. Stud.
of
Science 7: 475-88 (1977); A Newell
and
H. A. Simon, "GPS,
a
Program
That Simulates Human Thought, " in Computers
and
Thought (ed. ) A.
Fiegenbaum
and
V. Feldman,
pp.
279-96 (New York: McGraw Hill,
1963); G. Robinson, "How
to
Tell Your Friends from Machines, " Mind
(1972) 504-518,
and
"Fools Intelligence, " New Universities Quarterly
Vol. 36, No. 3 (1982) 208-216; J. R. Searle, "Minds, Brains
and
Pro-
grams,
" The Behav.
and
Brain Sciences 3: 417-454, (1980).
27
11. See, for
example,
E. H. Lenneberg, "A Neurophyschological Com-
parison
Between Man, Chimpanzee
and
Monkey, " Neurophychologia
13: 125 (1975).
12. For
example, see
R. A. Belliotti, "Do Dead Human Beings Have
Rights? " Personalist 60: 201-210 (1979).
13. For
an examination of
this
question, see my
The Concept
of
Person
and
its Use in Psychology,
unpublished
Msc. dissertation (U. W. I. S. T.,
1981).
14. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959).
28
CHAPTER
FOUR
STRAWSON'S
ANALYSIS
OF THE CONCEPT
OF PERSON
4.1 Introduction
0 ne of
the
most
influential
attempts at analysis of
the
concept of person
has been
put
forward by P. F. Strawson in Individuals, (1959). ' Unlike
many modern writers,
Strawson does
not
take
as
his
starting point problems
which arise
from
personal
identity
puzzles,
but
rather starts
his
analyses
from
what
he
terms
descriptive
metaphysics.
This
chapter summarises
Strawson's
analysis emphasising
four
major arguments which are presented
in
Individuals.
29
4.2 Person
as a
Basic Particular
Strawson
puts
forward
two
distinct but
connected arguments concerning
the
role which person plays
in
our conceptual scheme.
One
argument con-
cerns
the
notion
that
person
is
a
basic
particular,
the
other
that the
concept of
person
is
a primitive concept.
In describing his book
as an essay
in "descriptive
metaphysics,
" Strawson
differentiates between
this
and
"revisionary
metaphysics.
" Descriptive
metaphysics
is ".
..
content
to
describe
the
actual structure of our
thought
about
the
world,
"
whereas revisionary metaphysics
is "...
concerned
to
produce a
better
structure.
"2 Strawson
explains
that:
...
there
is
a massive and central core of
human
thinking
which
has
no
history-or
none recorded
in
the
histories
of
thought; there
are categories and concepts which
in
their
most
fundamental
character, change not at all
....
It is
with
these,
their
interconnexions,
and
the
structure
that they
form,
that
a
descriptive
metaphysics will
be
primarily concerned.
'
In
the
first
part of
Individuals,
Strawson is
concerned
to
uncover or reveal
these
categories and concepts, which
do
not change.
His
argument
is
aimed at
establishing
the
primacy of
two
concepts:
that
of material
bodies,
and
that
of
persons.
These
concepts are seen as primitive.
As he
explains,
the
argument
...
aims at establishing
the
central position which material
bodies
and persons occupy among particulars
in
general.
It
shows
that,
in
our conceptual scheme as
it is,
particulars of
these two
categories are
the
basic
or
fundamental
particulars,
that the
concepts of other
types
of particular must
be
seen as
secondary
in
relation
to the
concepts of
these.
'
30
Strawson does
not explain what
kind
of a
thing,
entity,
being,
or object, a
particular
is, but
states
that
...
we
think
of
the
world as containing particular
things,
some of which are
independent
of ourselves.
'
He
sets
the
question of
identifying
and
individuating
particulars
in
the
con-
text
of
language
and communication:
Very
often, when
two
people are
talking,
one of
them, the
speaker, refers
to
or mentions some particular or other.
Very
often,
the
other,
the
hearer, knows
what, or which, particular
the
speaker
is
talking
about
...
6
The
expressions used
to
make references
to
particulars
include
proper
names, some pronouns, some
descriptive
phrases
beginning
with
the
definite
article, and expressions compounded of
these.
When
the
speaker uses such a
phrase
to
refer
to
a particular
he has
made an
identifying
reference, and
if
the
hearer knows
which particular
is being
talked
about,
the
speaker
has iden-
tified the
particular.
So,
according
to
Strawson,
the
activity of
identifying
particulars
involves
not only referring
to them
in
some way,
but
com-
municating
the
reference accurately.
Moreover, in
order
to
claim
that
a class of particulars exists at all, one
must
be
able
to
individuate
and
identify
members of
that
class, and com-
municate
the
information
to
others.
The
communication may
be
achieved
in
a secondary manner.
As Strawson
explains:
Thus
a speaker may,
in
referring
to
a certain particular, speak of
it
as
the thing
of a certain general
kind
which uniquely stands
in
a certain specified relation
to
another particular.
He
may,
for
example, refer
to
a
house
as
"the house
that
Jack built. "
31
This is
the
ground of
Strawson's
argument
for
the
basicness
of certain par-
ticulars.
If
the
only way
in
which one could communicate the
identity
of a
particular
is by
reference
to
another,
but
not vice versa,
the
second particular
is basic. In
the
case of
"Jack's house, "
the
individual house is identified by
the
relation
it holds
to
Jack. The house
could
be
any
house, but
the
hearer
can
identify Jack,
and
from
this
information,
which
house is being
talked
about.
This is
not
the
only way of referring
to
Jack's house, for
example,
the
house
could
be identified
as number sixteen.
However,
the
possibility of
referring
to
particulars
in
such a secondary way suggests
to
Strawson:
...
the
possibility
that the
identifiability
of particulars of
some sorts may
be in
some general way
dependent
on
the
iden-
tifiability
of particulars of other sorts.
'
If it
turned
out
that this
should
be
the
case,
then
some particulars would
be
"ontologically
prior"
to
others, more
"fundamental
or more
basic"
than the
dependent
sorts of particulars.
It is
thus
possible,
for Strawson,
that there
should
be
an ontological
hierarchy
of particulars.
Furthermore,
we can
... inquire
more
directly
and
in
greater
detail
whether
there
is
reason
to
suppose
that
identification
of particulars
belonging
to
some categories
is in fact dependent
on
identification
of par-
ticulars
belonging
to
others, and whether
there
is
any category
of particulars which
is basic in
this
respect.
'
Statements
concerning experiences make reference
to
particulars of
this
kind,
that
is,
particulars which are
identifiabily-dependent
upon other par-
ticulars.
The dependent
type
is
the
class of what might
be
called
"private
particulars"-comprising
the
perhaps overlapping
groups of sensations, mental events, and,
in
one common ac-
ceptance of
this term,
sense-data.
The
type
on which
it is
dependent
is
the
class of persons.
'
32
4.3 The Primitiveness
of
the
Concept
of
Person
Having
established
that
mental states, which
he
calls private particulars,
are
individuated
only
by
reference
to their
relations
to
persons, which are
basic
particulars,
Strawson devotes
a
further
chapter
to
investigating
the
con-
cept of person
itself. His
earlier
thesis, that
person
is
a
basic
particular,
is
ex-
panded.
The
earlier claim
that
mental states are
dependent
particulars, and
that
one cannot
individuate
mental states except
by
reference
to the
person
whose state
it is, is
used
to
counter a
dualist
thesis that
persons are a com-
pound of
two
substances.
The
observation
that
mental states are
in-
dividuated, in
this
secondary way,
is
used
to
counter what
Strawson
terms the
"no
ownership" view.
In formulating his
main claim
that the
concept of person
is
primitive,
Strawson invites
us
to:
...
think
of some of
the
ways
in
which we ordinarily
talk
of
ourselves, of some of
the things
we ordinarily ascribe
to
ourselves.
"
These include
actions,
intentions,
sensations,
thoughts,
feelings,
perceptions,
memories,
location,
position, and physical characteristics.
Strawson
then
asks:
Why
are one's states of consciousness ascribed
to
anything at
all?
....
Why
are
they
ascribed
to the
very same
thing
as cer-
tain
corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation,
etc.
? 12
33
Strawson
assumes
that
states of consciousness and physical characteristics
are ascribed
to the
same
thing; that the
word
"I, "
used
in his
examples of
"I
am
in
pain,
" "I
am on
the
sofa,
"
and so
forth,
always
has
the
same reference
and meaning.
It
could
be
argued
that
"I, "
while referring
to the
same object
in both
cases,
has
a
different
meaning or connotation, and some would argue
that the
referent
in
the two
cases
is different. (Strawson
needs
to
demonstrate
that
neither of
these
is
the
case, and
he fails
to
do
so.
) For Strawson, "I"
refers
to
a
basic
particular, and
the
recognition of
the
reference of
the
word
"I" leads
us
to the
fact
that:
What
we
have
to
acknowledge
...
is
the
primitiveness of
the
concept of a person.
' 3
He
explains
further
that
what
he
means
by
the
concept of a person:
...
is
the
concept of a
type
of entity such
that
both
predicates
ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing cor-
poreal characteristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally ap-
plicable
to
a single
individual
of
that
single
type.
14
States
of consciousness cannot
be
ascribed at all, unless ascribed
to
a person:
...
the
concept of
the
pure
individual
consciousness-the pure
ego-is a concept
that
cannot exist; or, at
least,
cannot exist as
a primary concept
in
terms
of which
the
concept of a person
can
be
explained or analysed.
It
can exist only,
if
at all, as a
secondary non-primitive
concept, which
is
to
be
explained,
analysed,
in
terms
of
the
concept of person.
' S
The
concept of a person
is
primitive with respect
to the
concept of an ego,
in
the
same way as person
is
a
basic
particular with respect
to
private particu-
lars;
the
primitiveness
and
basicness
concern
the
unit which
is individuated.
34
4.4 M-Predicates
and
P-Predicates
As Strawson
notes, merely
demonstrating
the
primitiveness of
the
concept
of person
leaves
the
characterisation of person
"very
opaque.
" In
order
to
describe further
what sort of entity a person
is, Strawson
explains
that there
are
two
sorts of predicates which are ascribed
to
persons:
The first kind
of predicate consists of
those
which are also pro-
perly applied
to
material
bodies
to
which
we
would not
dream
of applying predicates ascribing states of consciousness.
"
These
predicates are called
M-Predicates,
and
include descriptions
of col-
our,
height, length, location,
and so
forth.
The
second
kind
consists of all other predicates we apply
to
persons.
"
These, Strawson
calls
P-Predicates,
and
includes
such as
"is
smiling,
"
and
"is
going
for
a walk,
"
as well as attributions of states of consciousness and
mental states.
What
all
P-Predicates have in
common
is
that they
...
imply
the
possession of consciousness on
the
part of
that
to
which
they
are ascribed.
' 8
P-Predicates
have
another
important feature,
which
involves
the
basis
upon which
they
are ascribed, as
Strawson
explains:
...
it is
essential
to the
character of
these
predicates
that they
have both first-
and
third-person
ascriptive uses,
that they
are
both
self-ascribable otherwise
than
on
the
basis
of observation
of
the
behaviour
of
the
subject of
them,
and other-ascribable
on
the
bases
of
behaiour
criteria.
' 9
35
Strawson
emphasises that to
learn
the
use of
these
predicates
is
to
learn
both
aspects of
their
use,
to
be
able
to
ascribe
the
predicates to
oneself and
to
others.
Although
the
criteria
for
ascription may
be different, in
that
one
does
not need
to
observe one's own
behaviour in
order
to
make statements which
ascribe
P-Predicates,
such as,
"I
am
happy, "
the
predicate
has
the
same
meaning as when
it is
ascribed to
another,
for
example,
"He is happy. "
Strawson
maintains
that
philosophical problems arise
from
a
failure
to
recognise
this
aspect of
P-Predicates. As he
explains:
It is
not seen
that these
predicates could not
have
either aspect
of
their
use,
the
self-ascriptive or
the
non-self ascriptive,
without
having
the
other aspect.
Instead,
one aspect of
their
use
is
taken
as self sufficient, which
it
could not
be,
and
then
the
other aspect appears as problematical.
So
we oscillate
bet-
ween philosophical scepticism and philosophical
behaviourism. 20
The
predicates
derive
their
character
from
the
basic
particulars
by
means
of which
they
can
be identified
and
individuated. In
the
case of
P-Predicates,
as
Strawson describes
them, these
particulars are persons.
36
4.5 The Central
Role
of
Intentional
Predicates
Having
stated that
we
do have
a primitive or
basic
concept of a person,
Strawson
enquires:
...
what
is it in
the
natural
facts
that
makes
it intelligible
that
we should
have
this
concept?
"
In
order
to
answer this
question,
he isolates
a particular group of
P-Predicates
which
...
release us
from
the
idea
that the
only
things
we can
know
about without observation or
inference,
or
both,
are private
experiences.
22
This
group of predicates are what might
be
called
"action"
predicates;
predicates which
involve doing
something and which
indicate
a characteristic
pattern of movement
...
while not
indicating
at all precisely any very
definite
sensa-
tion
or experience
...
such
things
as
"going for
a walk,
"
"coiling
a rope,
" "playing ball, " "writing
a
letter. "23
These
sorts of movements are seen as actions,
interpreted in
terms
of
inten-
tion,
and are central
to the
concept of person which we
have,
as
Strawson
says:
...
it is
easier
to
understand
how
we see each other, and
ourselves, as persons,
if
we
think
first
of
the
fact
that
we act,
and act on each other, and act
in
accordance with a common
human
nature.
34
37
4.6 Two Main Characteristics
of
Strawson's Account
Two
main characteristics
of
the
concept of person emerge
from Strawson's
account:
that the
concept
is basic
and primitive, and
that
it is
a social con-
cept.
Concerning
the
notion of primitiveness,
it is
clear
from his
account of
the
concept
that
Strawson does
not equate
"primitive"
with
"simple. " When
individuating
or
identifying
persons, one
is,
according to
Strawson, isolating
a
basic
particular which
is
complex; any attempt
to
break down
the
concept
into
simple constituents
destroys
the
meaning of person.
Strawson's basic
argument
is
concerned with
the
individuation
of persons.
Whilst he does
not
suggest any criteria
by
which persons are
to
be identified
and
individuated, he
emphasises
the
fact
that
persons are
individuated holistically;
that
states of
mind or experience can only
be identified
with reference
to
persons.
In his
discussion
of persons as
basic
particulars,
he
notes
that:
...
the
notion of
identification
of particulars
is
...
crucial:
primarily
in
the
sense of
distinguishing
one particular
from
others
in
thought,
or observation;
but
also
in
the
original
speaker-hearer senses.
25
Strawson's discussion
of
the
concept of person
is located in
the
social
framework
of
language
and communication.
For Strawson, it is
essential
in
identifying
a particular and
the
concept of a particular
that the
identification
is
communicated,
that
both
the
speaker and
the
hearer
make
the
same
iden-
tification.
Thus
the
concept of person under
discussion is
a public concept,
arising
in
a social environment.
That
the
concept
is
social, according
to
Strawson's description, is highlighted by
the
importance he
places on
inten-
tional
predicates, which
he
places
in "a
central position
in
the
picture.
"
These intentional
predicates are action predicates, which concern activities
which are
interpreted by
others
in
certain ways; public activities, such as go-
ing for
a walk, or writing a
letter.
38
The importance
of
the
social aspect of
Strawson's
analysis of person
is
stressed
by Hide Ishiguro in her
essay,
The Primitiveness
of
the
Concept
of
Person, in
which she
develops
an analysis of what
Strawson
calls
"the
social
aspect of
being
a person.
" Ishiguro
suggests
that
Strawson's
notion of
primitive should
be
understood as meaning
"indispensible, "
and she sum-
marises
her
argument
in
three
steps:
[a] We
get
the
concept of person
by
some understanding of
ourselves and of
beings,
typical
beings,
with whom we can
identify
ourselves as
being
of a
kind.
[b] This
means
that
we can
distinguish
persons
from
other
things
without
being
able
to
articulate what
kind
of material
objects
they
are
by
neutral physical
features.
[c] This in
turn
shows
that
it is indispensible
that
we
have
the
sortal concept of a person.
26
Strawson
agrees with
Ishiguro
on
the
major point
that
"in
order
to
be
a per-
son, one must see oneself and others as persons.
" It is
this
feature
which
underlies
the
peculiar nature of
P-Predicates, that they
are
both
self- and
other-ascribable, although on
the
basis
of
different
criteria.
Thus, for
Strawson,
the
concept of person
is
a social concept, not only
because it
must
be
communicable,
but because it is
a concept which arises
from,
and within,
social
interaction. Strawson
makes
this
clear
in his Reply
to
Mackie
and
Hid
Ishiguro
when
he
summarises such an
interpretation
thus:
...
persons are essentially
beings
which possess abilities and
dispositions
of certain
kinds;
which are self conscious, capable
of ascribing
to themselves certain properties; and which are
capable of entering
into,
and
find
themselves entering
into,
cer-
tain
kinds
of relationships,
involving
mutual communication,
with each other,
taking each other
thereby, to
be
creatures of
the
same
kind
as
themselves.
26
39
4.7 Conclusion
It
would appear
that
four
main arguments present
themselves
in
Strawson's
account of
the
concept of person.
First,
that
person
is
a
basic
par-
ticular
in
our conceptual scheme.
Second,
that the
concept of person
is
primitive
in
relation
to
concepts of experience, or mental states, and
to
con-
cepts of
body. Third,
that
person
is
to
be defined
as
the
kind
of entity
to
which
both M-
and
P-Predicates (as described by Strawson)
are equally ap-
plicable.
A further important
aspect of persons which
falls
under
this
argu-
ment
involves
the
particular nature of
P-Predicates:
that they
must
be both
self- and other-ascribable.
Fourth,
that
a certain
type
of
P-Predicate is
essen-
tial to
our understanding
the
primitive nature of our concept of person, and
that type
comprises
"action"
predicates which
imply
the
possession of con-
sciousness on
the
part of
the
subject of whom
they
are predicated.
However,
there
are some problems with
the
arguments which
Strawson
uses
to
establish
his
claims about
the
concept of person.
These
will
be in-
vestigated
in
the
next chapter.
40
NOTES
1. P. F. Strawson,
Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959).
2. Ibid.,
p.
9
3. Ibid.,
p.
10
4. Ibid.,
p.
11
5. Ibid.,
p.
15
6. Ibid.,
p.
16
7. Ibid.,
p.
17
8. Ibid.,
p.
17
9. Ibid.,
p.
41
10. Ibid.,
p.
41
11. Ibid.,
p.
89
12. Ibid.,
p.
90
13. Ibid.,
p.
102
14. Ibid,.
P.
102
15. Ibid.,
p.
103
16. Ibid.,
p.
104
17. Ibid.,
p.
104
18. Ibid.,
p.
105
19. Ibid.,
p.
108
20. Ibid.,
p.
109
21. Ibid.,
p.
111
22. Ibid.,
p.
111
23. Ibid.,
p.
111
24. Ibid.,
p.
112
25. Ibid.,
p.
87
26. H. Ishig
uro,
"The Primitiveness
of
the
Concept
of
Person, " in
Philosophical Subjects, (ed. ) Z. Van Straaten (O. U. P., 1980),
p.
74
27. P. F. Strawson, "Reply
to
Mackie
and
Hide Ishiguro, "in Philosophical
Subjects, (ed. ) Z. Van Straaten (O. U. P., 1980),
p.
269
41
CHAPTER
FIVE
AN ASSESSMENT OF STRAWSON'S ARGUMENTS
5.1 Introduction
This chapter
looks
at several problems which arise
in
the
arguments
Straw-
son uses
to
establish
that
person
is
a
basic
particular, and
that
our notion
of person
is
primitive.
In
order
to
demonstrate
that
person
is
a
basic
par-
ticular,
it is
necessary
to
be
clear on at
least
three
points:
[1]
the
ontological
status of a particular-what a particular
is; [2] in
what sense
"basic" is
to
be
understood;
[3] how "person" is
to
be differentiated from
other
basic
par-
ticulars
in
a non-circular manner.
This
chapter maintains
that
Strawson is
not clear on any of
these three
points.
Furthermore, if Strawson is
analysing
"person"
as a concept which
is
used
in
everyday
language,
then
his
analysis should account
for
our ordinary use
of
the
word.
However, it
seems
that
his
account
fails
to
characterise what
is
ordinarily understood
by
the
word
"person, "
as
it
allows entities which are
normally
distinguished from
persons
to
fall
under
the
concept as
he describes
it.
42
5.2 Two Kinds
of
Arguments
Strawson's
analysis of person
is broadly dependent
upon
two
different
kinds
of argument.
The first
concerns
the
notion
that
person
is
a
basic
par-
ticular
(and hence
the
concept of person
is basic. ) The
second argument,
whilst relying on
the
first, is
concerned with
demonstrating
the
holistic
nature
of
the
concept of person;
that
an adequate
description
of
how
the
concept of
person
is
used should account
for
the
complexity of
its
use.
It is
worth
look-
ing
at
both
strands of argument, as
there
appear
to
be
some problems
in
the
way
Strawson
constructs
them.
43
5.3 Unclarity in Strawson's Notion
of
"Basicness"
The
notion of
basicness,
which
Strawson
employs
to
demonstrate
person
as a particular
in
our conceptual scheme,
has been
criticised
by B. Williams in
Strawson
on
Individuals (1961). Williams finds
the
notion of
basicness
unclear, as
he
explains:
...
the
basicness in
question
is
one of
identification, but
...
Strawson finds it "unobjectionable"
to
say
that
basic
par-
ticulars
are
"ontologically
prior"
(p. 59). However, it is
not
clear
how
much
this
permissive gesture
in fact
permits, since
it
is
not clear
to
what senses of
"ontologically
prior"
it
extends.
'
Williams
comments
further
that:
It is
not easy
to
make entirely precise
the
connexions
between
Strawson's
argument and questions of ontology.
On
the
one
hand, it is
certain
that
he is
not concerned with one sort of
"on-
tological
priority"
that
philosophers
have discussed, by
which
X is
ontologically prior
to
Y if X
could exist without
Y, but
not
Y
without
X
....
On
the
other
hand, he is
not merely con-
cerned with
the
structural priorities
in language, for
so
far
as
these
are concerned conceptual
dependence is
as
important
as
identification dependence
....
It
seems rather
that
what
he is
concerned with
is
structural
dependencies in language in
so
far
as
these
are concerned with statements or presuppositions of
existence,
i.
e., what
things
we must
take
as existent
if
we are
to
take
other
things
as existent.
'
Williams
remarks
that
Strawson
uses
identification
as
the
criterion
for
establishing ontological priority, without producing any argument
to
show
that
identification is
the
only, or chief, criterion.
44
5.4 Strawson's Failure
to Establish Person
as a
Basic Particular
Even if
we were
to
accept
identification
as
the
criterion
for basicness, 3
there
are
further difficulties
with
Strawson's
argument
that
persons are
basic
particulars.
Strawson
claims
that
material
bodies
are
basic
particulars, and
describes
the
conditions under which
they
are
identified
and
individuated,
but he fails
to
show
how
persons are
to
be identified
as a separate class of
basic
particulars.
His
argument
for
the
basicness
of persons
is
not constructed upon
the
conditions
for identifying
and
individuating
persons
but
upon
their
basicness
with respect
to
"private
particulars.
"
In
order
to
assess
Strawson's
argument concerning
the
basicness
of persons
as particulars,
it is
necessary
to
clarify what
Strawson
means
by
a particular.
Initially, Strawson declines
to
explain
his
use of
the
word particular,
but
ex-
plains
that
...
in
mine, as
in
most
familiar
philosophical uses,
historical
occurrences, material objects, people and
their
shadows are all
particulars, whereas qualities and properties, numbers and
species are not.
'
However, he
continues
by
stating:
That it
should
be
possible
to
identify
particulars of a given
type
seems a necessary condition of
the
inclusion
of
that type
in
our
ontology.
For
what could we mean
by
claiming
to
acknowledge
the
existence of a class of particular
things
and
to talk to
each
other about members of
this
class,
if
we qualified
the
claim
by
adding
that
it
was
in
principle
impossible for
any one of us
to
make any other of us understand which member, or members,
of
this
class
he
was at any
time talking
about?
5
45
To distinguish
one member of a class of similar
things
from
another
is
to
individuate
that thing
as well as
to
identify it. Moreover,
that
particulars are
things
which are
individuated from
one another, and
identified,
seems
to
in-
dicate
that they
are
discrete. That is
to
say, particulars are countable
in-
dividual
things.
Strawson later
stresses
that:
...
we must
have
criteria or methods of
identifying
a par-
ticular
encountered on one occasion, or
described in
respect of
one occasion, as
the
same
individual
as a particular en-
countered on another occasion.
6
Thus,
as
Strawson describes
them,
particulars are
things
which can
be
reidentified as well as
individuated. A
particular must
be
something which
is
uniquely
identified,
can
be
picked out
from
other similar
things,
and exists as
a unique,
discrete
thing through time.
Strawson's
argument
for
the
basicness
of person
is
constructed upon a
relationship
between
particulars, which
he
characterizes as
"identifiability-
dependence. " This
relationship establishes an
"ontological" hierarchy in
which person
is basic.
He
explains
the
relationship
thus:
Suppose, for instance, it
should
turn
out
that there
is
a
type
of
particulars,
,
such
that
particulars of
type

cannot
be iden-
tified
without reference
to
particulars of another
type,
a,
whereas particulars of
type
a can
be identified
without
reference
to
particulars of
type
.... This fact
could
reasonably
be
expressed
by
saying
that
in
our scheme
u-particulars were ontologically prior
to
-particulars,
or were
more
fundamental
or more
basic
than they.
'
46
Strawson
states
that there
are
"in fact"
two
classes of particulars
between
which
this
relationship
holds:
the
basic
class
is
the
class of persons, and
The dependent
type
is
the
class of what might
be
called
"private
particulars"-comprising the
perhaps overlapping
groups of sensations, mental events and,
in
one common ac-
ceptance of
this term,
sense
data. '
It is here
that the
difficulty in Strawson's
argument
lies. For it is hard
to
see
how
groups of sensations, mental events, and sense
data,
can qualify as par-
ticulars
at all.
A
particular, according
to
Strawson's
earlier
description, is
something
which can
be identified
and reidentified, and moreover,
the
identification
and reidentification must
be
communicable.
Whilst it
may
be
possible
to
make a case
for
experiences
being discrete, in
that
it
may
be
possible
to
in-
dividuate
experiences
for
oneself,
it is hard
to
see
how
these
experiences
(or
mental events or sense
data)
could
be
reidentified, or
how
one could com-
municate
the
reidentification
to
others.
Sense data,
and mental events,
do
not
appear
to
possess
the
right sort of unitary nature or
duration
through time to
be
characterised as particulars
in
the
first
place.
'
Whilst it
might
be
the
case
that
experiences cannot
be identified
except
in
relation
to the
person
to
whose
history
they
belong,
this
in itself
cannot sus-
tain the
argument
for
the
basicness
of persons, as
the
argument concerns a
relationship
between
particulars, and experiences would need
to
qualify as
particulars prior
to the
establishment of
their
relationship
to
persons
for
the
argument
to
be
acceptable.
47
5.5 The Distinction Between Persons
and
Material Objects
Strawson's
characterisation of
the
relationship which establishes
the
"on-
tological"
hierarchy
among particulars requires
that the
fundamental
par-
ticular
be identifiable
without reference
to the
secondary particular.
Thus
persons, as
basic
particulars, must
be identifiable
without reference
to
ex-
periences, or mental events.
Strawson does
not suggest conditions
for identi-
fying
and reidentifying persons as such;
however, he does describe
the
criteria
for
the
identification
of particulars:
...
particular
identification in
general rests ultimately on
the
possibility of
locating
particular
things
we speak of
in
a single,
unified, spatio-temporal system.
'
Thus basic
particulars
...
must
be
three-dimensional
objects with some endurance
through time.
"
Moreover,
Of
the
categories of objects which we recognise, only
those
satisfy
these
requirements which are or possess material
bodies. ' 2
As
a class of
things,
persons are
basic
particulars
insofar
as
they
"exhibit
some resistence
to touch.
" However,
it is
not clear
how
persons can
be dif-
ferentiated from
material objects.
' 3 Strawson
later
characterises persons as
entities
to
which
both
states of consciousness
and corporeal characteristics
48
are ascribed
(p. 102). What differentiates
persons
from
material
bodies
ap-
pears
to
be
the
possession of states of consciousness on
the
part of persons.
As Strawson
points out:
...
there
seems nothing needing explanation
in
the
fact
that
the
particular
height,
colouring, physical position which we
ascribe
to
ourselves should
be
ascribed to
something or other;
for
that
which one calls one's
body is,
at
least,
a
body,
a
material
thing. It
can
be
picked out
from
others,
identified by
ordinary physical criteria and
described in
ordinary physical
terms.
' 4
What
needs explanation
is
that
...
one's states of consciousness, one's
thoughts
and sensa-
tions,
are ascribed
to the
very same
thing
...
11
Yet
thoughts
and sensations are
"private
particulars" whose relationship
to
persons
is
such
that,
as
basic
particulars, persons must
be identified
without reference
to them.
Strawson's
argument
that
persons are
basic
particulars
fails
to
be
convinc-
ing for
two
reasons.
First,
as experiences
do
not qualify as particulars,
the
relationship which requires
to
hold between
two
kinds
of
particulars in
order
to
demonstrate
persons as
basic
cannot
be
established.
Second,
the
condi-
tions
which
Strawson
outlines
for identifying
and
individuating
particulars
do
not
differentiate between
material
bodies
and persons.
49
5.6 Holistic Usage
of
the Word "Person"
The
second
type
of argument
in Strawson's
analysis of person
is found in
his
chapter,
"Persons. " This
argument stresses
the
holistic
nature of
the
con-
cept of person, and relies upon
how
the
word person
is
actually used.
As
Strawson
explains,
his
purpose:
...
in declaring
the
concept of a person primitive, was
...
to
resist certain
kinds
of reduction of
the
concept.
' 6
The
reductions referred
to
are as
follows: first,
what
Strawson
calls
the
"Cartesian"
reduction of
the
concept of person
to
a concept of a combina-
tion
of
two
sorts of
things,
an ego and a
body-(though Descartes
never
talk-
ed about concepts, only people); and second,
the
"no-ownership"
reduction
of
the
concept of a person
to the
concept of a material
body. " Neither
of
these
reductions can account
for
the
fact
that
we
do
ascribe states of
consciousness and corporeal characteristics
to the
same
thing
(according
to
Strawson. ) The
concept of a
body
and
the
concept of a pure
individual
con-
sciousness might
have
a
"logically
secondary existence"
dependent
upon
the
primitive concept of person.
' 8
We
speak of a
dead
person-a
body-and in
the
same secon-
dary
way we might at
least
think
of a
disembodied
person.
A
person
is
not an embodied ego,
but
an ego might
be
a
disem-
bodied
person, retaining
the
logical benefit
of
individuality
from having been
a person.
' 9
Strawson is here
talking
about what might
be
called
the
social concept of
person,
2
what
is
meant
by
the
word person
in
ordinary use.
However, in
or-
dinary language, the
word
"person" is
not used
in
quite
this
way.
The
con-
cept of a person-what
is
meant
by
the
word
"person"-does
not amount
merely
to
some primitive or
basic
unit.
We do
not speak of a
dead
person
in
the
same way we speak of a corpse.
" The
use of
the
word
"person" in
refer-
ring
to
someone
who
is dead
communicates a set of qualities and properties
50
which
is
quite
distinct from
the
kind
of properties
indicated by
the
use of
the
word
"body"
or
"corpse. " Dead
persons
have
social rights which are
dif-
ferent
to those
of corpses,
for
example, a person can
be found
accountable
after
death, in
a way
in
which a corpse cannot
be
said
to
be
accountable.
22
It is hard
to
see
how, in
our ordinary use of
the
words, a corpse or a
body is
in
some way secondary
to
a person.
Whilst
a
dead
person
is
secondary
to
a
person,
in
the
sense
that
a
dead
person
is
a
former
person, when
talking
of
such an
individual
as a person rather
than
as a corpse, one
is
referring
to
a set
of properties such as
likes
and
dislikes,
personality characteristics, wishes and
desires,
which are not characteristic of corpses.
A dead
person may
be
talked
of
in
a secondary way,
but
a corpse
is
not secondary, a corpse acquires
characteristics which were not present
in
the
person under any
description,
for instance,
characteristics of
decay
and
disintegration. "
It is
not clear, either,
in
what sense an ego or self can
be
seen as a
disem-
bodied
person.
The distinction between
what
is
normally meant
by
the
word
"ego"
or
"self, "
and
the
word person, seems
to
be
concerned with
the
nature
of self consciousness compared
to the
public nature of person, rather
than
with questions of embodiment-selfs
can
be
embodied,
(usually
are)
but
that
may not
be
the
aspect of an
individual
which
is being
referred
to
when
the
word
"self" is
used.
Strawson's
characterisation of a
disembodied
person
describes
a ghost, rather
than
a self.
24
51
5.7 Circularity in Strawson's Argument
Concerning M-
and
P-Predicates
Strawson
claims
that
if
the
primitiveness of
the
concept of person
is
understood,
it is
easier
to
see
how
the
concept arises.
However, he does
not
provide any criteria
by
which persons are
identified
or
distinguished from
other entities.
For Strawson,
states of consciousness are central
to the
con-
cept of person, and
to
how
we understand ourselves as persons.
States
of con-
sciousness are revealed
in intentional
actions.
Action
predicates are
impor-
tant
because
they
demonstrate
that the
attribution of consciousness
does
not
necessarily
imply
the
possession of
"private
experiences.
" However,
Strawson's
argument concerning states of consciousness seems
to
be
circular.
For Strawson,
persons are entities
to
which
both M-
and
P-Predicates
apply.
M-Predicates
apply also
to
material objects.
P-Predicates
apply only
to
per-
sons and
imply
the
possession of consciousness.
But Strawson's definition
of
M-Predicates is just
that they
are predicates which apply
to
objects
to
which
we would not
dream
of attributing consciousness.
It
would appear
then that
persons are
those
entities
to
whom
P-Predicates
are applied, and
P-Predicates
are
those
which apply only
to
persons
(or
to those to
whom we
would not attribute consciousness.
)
52
5.8 Strawson's Failure
to Differentiate
Persons From Sentient Creatures
Moreover,
as
Strawson does
not put
forward
any other
identifying
condi-
tions
of persons, other
than the
attribution of
P-Predicates,
any entity
to
which such predicates can
be (meaningfully)
applied
falls
under
the
concept
of
"person. " As Strawson
notes:
Whatever
the
facts
of
the
matter may
be,
the
concept of a per-
son
is
such as not
to
exclude
the
possibility of persons of a quite
different
constitution
from
that
of a standard
human being. 25
The
nature of
the
concept of person
depends, it
seems, upon
how
we use
language. If
we can meaningfully ascribe
P-Predicates,
within
the
structure
of
the
language
as
it is,
the
entity
to
which such predicates can
be
ascribed
is
understood
to
be
a person.
Yet in
our
language
as
it is, P-Predicates
can
be
meaningfully ascribed
to
dogs
and
to
computers, etc., without
those
entities
being
thought
of as persons
(by
most people.
) For instance, it
can
be
said
meaningfully
that the
dog is
unhappy,
is
missing
his
master and wants
to
go
out
for
a walk,
26
and
Artificial Intelligence
programmers can make claims
that they
have designed
programs which understand natural
language. " Such
uses of
language
may
be
thought to
be inaccurate but
they
are not mean-
53
ingless. Yet
our ordinary concept of person
is
surely
distinct from
that
of
animals or artifacts.
Strawson's
account
fails
to
make such a
distinction. This
criticism of
Strawson's
account
is
made
by Frankfurt
who claims
that:
What
philosophers
have lately
come
to
accept as analysis of
the
concept of a person
is
not actually analysis of
that
concept at
all.
Strawson,
whose usage represents
the
current standard,
identifies
the
concept of a person as
"the
concept of a
type
of
entity such
that
both
predicates ascribing states of conscious-
ness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics
...
are
equally applicable
to
a single
individual
of
that
single
type.
"
But
there
are many entities
besides
persons
that
have both
men-
tal
and physical properties.
As it happens
...
there
is
no com-
mon
English
word
for
the type
of entity
Strawson has in
mind,
a
type that
includes
not only
human beings but
animals of
various
lesser
species as well.
"
54
5.9 Conclusion
It
would appear
that there
are some problems with
the
arguments
Strawson
uses
in his
analysis of
the
concept of person.
Although his
claim
that the
con-
cept of person
is
primitive
is
an attractive proposition,
the
arguments
he
uses
to
support
his
claim are not convincing
in
at
least
three
major aspects.
First, if
we accept
his definition
of a particular,
it is
not clear
how,
as par-
ticulars,
persons are
to
be distinguished from
material objects, except
by
their
possession of consciousness, yet
Strawson's
argument
for
the
basincess
of
person relies on
the
relationship
between
persons as particulars, and states of
consciousness as a
distinct
group of private particulars.
So
two
conditions
need
to
be fulfilled: [a]
that
persons are particulars
independently
of
their
possession of states of consciousness,
in
which case
they
are
in-
distinguishable,
on
Strawson's
criteria of particulars,
from
material objects.
[b]
that
states of consciousness can
be located independently in
a spatio-
temporal
framework,
to
qualify as particulars,
in
order
that,
as particulars,
they
can
then
be
said
to
be identifiably dependent
on persons, and
hence
per-
sons can
be
said
to
be basic.
Second, Strawson's
arguments concerning
the
nature of persons as
those to
whom
both M-
and
P-Predicates
are equally applicable, are circular, persons
being
those
entities
to
whom we
do
attribute states of consciousness, and
material objects
those to
whom we
do
not.
Third, Strawson's description
of persons
fails
to
distinguish
them
from
other sentient
beings (or
robots),
"
as
P-Predicates
are applied
to
both. A
ma-
jor
requirement
of any analysis of what
it is
to
be
a person
is
that
such an
analysis should account
for
what
is distinctive
of persons.
Such
analyses
have
been
offered
by H. Frankfurt, T. Penelhum,
and
D. C. Dennett,
and will
be
considered
below.
55
NOTES
1. B. Williams, "Strawson
on
Individuals, " in Problems
of
The Self:
Philosophical
Papers, 1956-1972, (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973)
p.
113.
2. Ibid.,
p.
114
3. For
a revisionary analysis of
the
ontological priority of particulars see
B. A. Brody, "On The Ontological
Priority
of
Physical Objects, " Nous
:
139-156 (1971).
4. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959)
p.
15.
5. Ibid.,
p.
16.
6. Ibid.,
p.
31.
7. Ibid.,
p.
17.
8. Ibid.,
p.
41.
9. For
a
further discussion
of
Strawson's description
of
the
relationship
between
private particulars and persons, see
D. Coder, "Strawson, Par-
ticulars,
`No Subject'
and
`No Ownership', " Phil. Stud. 23: 335-342
(1972).
10. P. F. Strawson, Individuals,
p.
38.
11. Ibid.,
p.
39.
12. Ibid.,
p.
39.
13. There is
a
further
anomaly
in Strawson's
analysis which concerns
his
claim
that the
concept of person
is
primitive and
that
physical attributes
are ascribable
to
persons, and also
that
persons possess material
bodies
and material
bodies
are
basic
particulars.
According
to
N. Burstein in
"Strawson
on
the
Concept
of a
Person, " Mind 80: 449-552 (1971),
these
two
claims amount
to
a
duplication
of physical properties, and
thus,
for
example,
180 lb. John Smith
would weigh
360 lb.
-180
lb.
of person and
180 lb.
of material
body.
14. P. F. Strawson, Individuals,
p.
89.
15. Ibid.,
p.
89.
16. P. F. Strawson, "Reply to
Mackie
and
Hide Ishiguro, " in Philosophical
Subjects (ed. ) Z. Van Straaten, (O. U. P., 1980)
p.
272.
56
17. Contrast D. S. Clarke, "A Defense
of
the
No-Ownership Theory, "
Mind, 81: 97-101 (1972).
18. J. A. Driscoll
argues
in "Strawson
and
the
No-Ownership Theory, "
Stud. Phil.
and
Hist. Phil. 5: 351-363 (1970),
that
Strawson has
misunderstood
Wittgenstein's
position, and criticises
Strawson's
analysis.
19. P. F. Strawson, Individuals,
p.
103.
20. For
more on
the
notion
that
Strawson is discussing
a social concept, see
D. Van de Vate, "Strawson's Concept
of a
Person, " S. J. Phil. 7: 9-24
(1969).
21. For
an example of
discussion
on
this topic,
see
W. R. Carter, "Death
and
Bodily Transfiguration, " Mind, 93: 412-18 (1984).
22. Here I do
not mean
to
indicate
that
a new entity comes
into being
on
the
death
of a person,
but
that the
individual
conceived of as person,
dead
or alive,
is
attributed
different kinds
of properties
than the
individual
conceived of as a corpse.
23. For
a
further discussion
of
the
differentiation
of corpses
from live in-
dividuals
and
the
problem of when
to
call an
individual (person
or
human being) dead,
see:
L. Becker, "Human Being: The Boundaries
of
a
Concept, " Phil.
and
Public Affairs 4: 334-359 (1975); D. Lamb,
"Diagnosing Death, " Phil.
and
Public Affairs 7: 144-153 (1978); D. M.
Black, "Brain Death, " New England J. Medicine 299: 338-344 (1978);
M. B. Green
and
D. Wikier, "Brain Death
and
Personal Identity, " Phil.
and
Public Affairs 19: 105-133 (1980); C. M. Culver
and
B. Gert, "The
Definition
and
Criterion
of
Death, " in Conceptual
and
Ethical Issues in
Medicine
and
Psychiatry (O. U. P., 1982). Although
there
is debate in
both
medical and philosophical
literature
on
the
definition
of
death-is
it
an event or a process or a philosophical concept-there exist un-
mistakable signs of organic processes which occur only
in
corpses.
For
a
discussion
of
the
"biology"
of
death,
see
J. G. Hoffman, The Life
and
Death
of
Cells (London:
Hutchinson, 1958). For
a
discussion
of
defini-
57
tions
of
death,
and
in
particular
brain-related death,
see
D. Lamb,
Death, Brain Death
and
Ethics (Croom Helm: London, 1985),
and
C.
Pallis, ABC
of
Brainstem Death, (B. M. S.: London, 1983).
24. For
a
further discussion
of what
kind
of entity survives
death,
see
A.
Flew, "Survival: Part 2, " Proc. Aris. Soc. 49: 231-247 (1975).
25. P. F. Strawson, "Reply
to
Mackie
and
Hide Ishiguro",
p.
272.
26. See D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in The Identities
of
Persons, (ed. ) A. Rorty, The Identities
of
Persons, (University
of
California Press, 1976). Dennett's
views are
discussed in
chapters seven
and eight.
27. See A. Newell
and
H. A. Simon, "GPS, A Program That Simulates
Human Thought, " in "Computers
and
Thought, (ed. ) A. Fiegenbaum
and
V. Feldman (New York: McGraw Hill, 1963).
28. H. Frankfurt, "Freedom
of
the
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person" J.
Phil., 5-20 (1971).
29. A. J. Ayer has
argued
in The Concept
of a
Person,
and
Other Essays
(London: Macmillan, 1963),
that
a child
brought
up
by
a robot would
learn
to
ascribe
P-Predicates incorrectly
to
it. Ayer's
view
is discussed by
R. Ableson in "Person, P-Predicates
and
Robots, " Amer. Phil. Quart.
3: 306-311 (1966).
58
CHAPTER
SIX
CRITICISM OF STRAWSON'S ANALYSIS
6.1 Difficulties With
the Meaning
of
"Concept"
0 ne of
the
major philosophical
difficulties
with
Strawson's
analysis
is
that
it is
not clear what exactly
he is
talking
about when
he
uses
the term
con-
cept, and
it is
not clear either what
kind
of analysis
he is
putting
forward.
Strawson introduces his book
with an announcement
that
his
pro-
ject-descriptive
metaphysics-will
describe "the
actual structure of our
thought
about
the
world".
' This
sounds as
though
he is
about
to
embark on
experimental cognitive psychology.
It
may
be
asked
how he is
going
to
discover [a]
what
[content]
and
[b] how [structure]
we
think
about
the
world?
Strawson's
next paragraph offers some
further
explanation,
that
descrip-
tive
metaphysics
differs from "what is
called philosophical, or
logical,
or
conceptual analysis
...
only
in
scope and generality".
' Strawson
seems
to
assume
that
conceptual analysis
is
the
same as
logical
analysis, and
that
somehow
this type
of analysis
is identical
to
philosophical analysis.
This is
an
enormous assumption.
Many
philosophers who
believe
they
are
doing
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59
philosophical analysis may not recognise
their
activity under
Strawson's
description,
or rather, prescription, that:
Up
to
a point,
the
reliance upon a close examination of
the
ac-
tual
use of words
is
the
best,
and
indeed
the
only sure, way
to
philosophy.
'
For Strawson
what
distinguishes "metaphysical" (presumably descriptive
and revisionary) analysis
from "philosophical, " "conceptual, "
or
"logical"
analysis,
is
that the
...
structure which
the
metaphysician wants revealed
...
does
not readily
display itself
on
the
surface of
language, but
lies
submerged.
'
Presumably Strawson is here
talking
of
the
structure of our
thought
about
the
world.
One
might reasonably wonder where
this
structure
lies
submerged-in
"depth
grammar,
"
or
in
people's
"minds, "
or
in language
and,
if in language,
as spoken or as
in
the
dictionary?
A
project which
intends
to
reveal such submerged structures might
be
ex-
pected
to
make clear what
the
structures are submerged
in
or under.
However, Strawson does
not make
this
clear.
He
states, on
the
one
hand,
that:
...
when we ask
how
we use
this
or
that
expression, our
answers,
however
revealing at a certain
level,
are apt
to
assume, and not
to
expose,
those
general elements of structure
which
the
metaphysician wants revealed.
'
60
And he begins his
own project
by
stating that:
...
our ontology comprises objective particulars
[my italics]
and
that
part of
his
aim:
...
is
to
exhibit some general and structural
features
of
the
conceptual scheme
in
terms
of which we
think
about particular
things.
[my italics]'
But,
on
the
other
hand, he immediately describes
the
"identification"
of
particulars
in
terms
of
the
use of
language:
...
when a speaker makes an
identifying
reference
to
a par-
ticular,
and
his hearer does,
on
the
strength of
it, identify
the
particular referred
to, then,
I
shall say,
the 'speaker
not only
makes an
identifying
reference
to,
but
also
identifies,
that
par-
ticular.
'
From
this
it
seems
that
what
there
is (ontology) is
particulars;
that
we
think
about
these
particulars
(our
conceptual scheme);
but
that
identifying
what
there
is, is
speaking of, and
being
understood about, what
there
is. Strawson
seems
to
assume
that the
structure of
thought
is
to
be found in language
use.
In his discussion
of
the
concept of person,
Strawson
tells
us
that:
...
the
facts in
question
do
not explain
the
use
that
we make
of
the
word
"I, "
or
how
any word
has
the
use
that
word
has.
They do
not explain
the
concept we
have
of person.
[my
italics]'
Here Strawson
appears
to
be
engaged
in
what
he has
earlier
termed
"philosophical, logical,
or conceptual analysis,
"
as opposed
to
descriptive
metaphysics.
He is
examining
the
use of words.
61
Strawson
continues
by
attributing
to
Descartes this
particular style of
philosophising
(generally known
as
linguistic
philosophy).
A
possible reaction at
this
point
is
to
say
that the
concept we
have is
wrong or confused
...
that the
usage we
have,
where-
by
we ascribe, or seem
to
ascribe, such
different kinds
of
predicate
to
one and
the
same
thing,
is
confusing,
that
it
con-
ceals
the true
nature of
the
concepts
involved
....
This
reac-
tion
can
be found in
two
very
important
types
of view about
these
matters.
The first
type
is Cartesian,
the
view of
Descartes
and of others who
think
like him. '
However (as
mentioned earlier),
Descartes
never
talked
of
the
"usage
we
have"
of words;
he
talked
of people.
His
method may
have been
epistemolo-
gical;
his
conclusions-the particular
brand
of
dualism he
propounded-
were metaphysical, concerned with what
there
is,
not with
how
we
talk
of
things,
or with what words mean.
In
the
passages cited above,
Strawson is
assimilating
"concept"
with
"the
use
that
we make" of a word.
If, by "concept, " Strawson
really
does
mean
"word
usage,
" his
analysis
(conceptual
or metaphysical or whatever), might
be
expected
to
start
from
an
empirical survey of
how English
speakers use
the
word
"person. " But
Strawson's investigation is
not
based
on evidence of actual use,
but
on what
Strawson
says
is
actual use.
It is
not clear whether
the
statements
he
makes
about use are
intended
to
be descriptive,
or prescriptive,
for
example, when
he
states:
So,
then, the
word
"I"
never refers
to this, the
pure subject.
Does
this
statement mean
that
no-one ever uses
the
word
"I"
to
mean a
pure subject, or
that
if
they
did
they
would
be
making a mistake?
Whatever kind
of analysis
Strawson is
engaged
in,
whether
it is
conceptual,
logical,
philosophical
or metaphysical analysis,
it is
not
descriptive. When he
makes statements
about what words refer
to,
or what
"we
speak of",
'
as a
62
matter of
description he is incorrect. For instance,
people use
the
words
"cor-
pse" and
"person" differently
and
to
mean
different
things.
The
meta-
physical assumptions, which appear
to
underlie
the
use of
the
words
"corpse"
and
"dead
person,
"
are not
those
which
Strawson is describing,
that
is,
the
way people actually use
these
words reveals
that they
do
not
take
"person"
to
be
primitive
in
relation
to
body (dead
or alive.
)"
It
may
be
that
Strawson is
actually engaged
in "revisionary
metaphysics,
"
which, under
his description, is
concerned
to
produce a
better
structure of
our
thought
about
the
world.
Strawson's
analysis,
in
which
the
concept of
person sometimes means
"the
usage of
the
word person,
"
though
usage
by
whom and under what circumstances
is
not made clear,
is
not
descriptive.
Moreover,
what
he
means
by "the
concept of person"
is
not
how in-
dividuals
are conceived;
he is
not
talking
of a conception of
the
actual
beings
(individuals), but
of something
"submerged. " One
might expect a
"descrip-
tive
metaphysician" analysing a
"concept"
to
describe how
the things
which
exist,
the
ontological entities, are actually conceived, or
thought
of.
It is
the
contention of
this
work
that
one can assume
the
existence of a
type
of entity,
the
individual,
and
that the
individual is
thought
of as person or self or
human being (and
possibly conceived of
in
other ways.
) The
concept of per-
son amounts
to the
way
in
which
individuals
are
thought to
be
persons,
the
concept of self amounts
to the
way
in
which
individuals
are conceived of as
self-conscious
beings. If
concepts are understood
in
this
manner, as standing
for how
something
is
thought
of,
then
it becomes
clear
that:
[a]
there
is
a con-
3
cept of
"self"; ` [b]
that
it is
not
"secondary"
to the
concept of
"person"; "
[c]
that the
concept of person
is
not an ontological entity;
individuals
are on-
tological
entities, which are granted or
denied
the
status of person,
that
is,
conceived of as persons or not conceived of as persons; and
[d]
that
if
person
is
a concept,
it
cannot
be'
a particular
in Strawson's
sense.
63
It is Strawson's failure
to
make clear what
he
means
by "concept"
which
leads him
to
suggest
that the
"concepts"
of an ego
(or
self) and a
body
are
secondary
to the
"concept"
of person.
In
criticising what
he
terms the
"no
ownership"
doctrine
of self,
Strawson
states
that:
...
one
does
genuinely ascribe one's states of consciousness
to
something, viz. oneself.
14
and
that
if
states or experiences
...
can
be identified
as particular states or experiences at all,
they
must
be
possessed or ascribable
in just
that
way which
the
no-ownership
theorist
ridicules,
i.
e.,
in
such a way
that
it is
logically impossible
that
a particular state or experience
in fact
possessed
by
someone should
have been
possessed
by
anyone
else.
' S
Strawson
explains
the
failure
of
the
no-ownership
theory thus:
When I
say
that the
no-ownership
theorist's
account
fails
through
not reckoning with all
the
facts, I have in
mind a very
simple,
but in
this
question, a very central
thought:
viz.,
that
it
is
a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of conscious-
ness
...
to
oneself,
in
the
way one
does,
that
one should also
ascribe
them,
or
be
prepared
to
ascribe
them, to
others who are
not oneself.
[my italics] 16
What
sort of
"fact" is
the
"thought" Strawson
mentions?
Is it
a
psychological
fact, is
ascription a psychological activity?
And in
what
"way"
does
one
do it,
that
is,
ascribe?
If
this
is
a psychological observation,
it
may
be
countered
that
individuals do
not
"ascribe"
states of consciousness
to
64
themselves, they
know
their
own states of consciousness.
On
the
same page
Strawson
states
that:
...
`in
pain' means
the
same whether one says
`I
am
in
pain,
'
or
`He is in
pain.
' The dictionaries do
not give
two
sets of
meanings
for
every expression which
describes
a state of con-
sciousness
...
[my italics]"
Here,
the
"facts"
about states of consciousness, which
Strawson
presents,
are obviously
linguistic facts
about
the
English language. Are
we
to
infer
from
the
use of
language
that
in
some cultures,
in
some
languages,
there
are
individuals
who conceive of
themselves
as self-conscious
beings,
selves,
but in
others, where
the
adjectival phrase appropriate
to the
first
and
third
person
personal pronouns
happens
to
be
the
same,
individuals do
not conceive of
themselves
as selves?
' 8
Strawson is
aware of
the
difficulties in his
vague use of
"ascription, "
as
he
says:
...
how
can
it be
right
to talk
of ascribing
in
the
case of
oneself?
For
surely
there
can
be
a question of ascribing only
if
there
is
or could
be
a question of
identifying
that to
which
the
ascription
is
made; and
though there
may
be
a question of
iden-
tifying the
one who
is in
pain when
that
one
is
another,
how
can
there
be
such a question when
that
one
is
oneself?
' 9
65
Strawson
answers:
But
this
query answers
itself
as soon as we remember
that
we
speak primarily
to
others
...
20
However,
the
fact
that
we communicate our states of consciousness
to
others,
in
a
language,
one of whose
features is
to
fail
to
distinguish in
words
the
first
and
third
person predicates
"is in
pain,
" (as in I
am
...
or
he
is
...
) does
not answer
the
objection
that
individuals
conceive of
themselves
as, and use
the
word
"I"
to
refer
to,
a self-conscious entity.
Z'
Strawson's
own
testimony, that
we
do differentiate
self
from
others-we
don't have
to
identify
self-might
lead
one
to
suppose
that
"the
way" one
does
experience states of consciousness of self
is different from
the
way one
does
ascribe states of consciousness
to
others.
66
6.2 Conclusion
Strawson
says
that
his
remarks
(quoted
above):
...
are simply
intended
to
help
to
make
it intelligible
to
us
...
that
we
have
the
conceptual scheme we
have. 22
However, it is
not clear
that
[a]
we
have
the
"conceptual
scheme"
he
outlines,
if his
remarks are
to
be
taken
as
descriptive,
or
[b] if
we are
to take
his
remarks as prescriptive,
that
our conceptual scheme, should
it include for
example a concept of self, or a concept of pure ego, would
be
mistaken and
in
need of
therapeutic
diagnosis in
order
to
make
it intelligible
to
us
that
we
have
such a conceptual scheme.
The
unclarity
has its
roots mainly
in Strawson's
ambiguous use of
"con-
cept" and
"conceptual. " If it
were clear
that
he is
using
"concept"
to
mean
"use
of words"
his
analysis would
be interesting but, I
would suggest,
mistaken.
If he is
using
"concept"
to
mean
how
a
thing
is
thought
of, or con-
ceived, much of
his
analysis
is
redundant,
dealing
as
it does
with word usage.
67
NOTES
1. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1959)
p.
9.
2. Ibid.,
p.
9.
3. Ibid.,
p.
9.
4. Ibid.,
p.
10.
5. Ibid.,
p.
10.
6. Ibid.,
p.
15.
7. Ibid.,
p.
16.
8. Ibid.,
p.
94.
9. Ibid.,
p.
94.
10. Ibid.,
p.
103.
11. See
chapter
five.
12. That is,
that the
word self stands
for
a particular way of conceiving
in-
dividuals
as conscious reflective
beings.
13. It follows from
the
outline given
in
chapter
two that
it is
quite possible
that
individuals
could
be
conceived of as self conscious entities without
being
conceived of as persons.
Such
a conception of an
individual
may
result
in denying her/him
certain social or
legal
rights as a person while
behaving
towards the
individual
as though
s/he were self conscious and
self reflective.
(A
variant of
this
appears
to
occur under apartheid
law in
S. Africa. )
14. Ibid.,
p.
97.
15. Ibid.,
p.
97.
16. Ibid.,
p.
99.
17. Ibid.,
p.
99.
18. For
a
discussion
of self-reference
in
particular
languages
and cultures,
see
D. Cannon, "Dwelling in
the
World Through Language, " Int. Phil.
Quart. 12: 19-42 (1972).
68
19. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1959)
p.
100.
20. Ibid.,
p.
100.
21. For
a
further discussion
of self-reference, see
N. Rotenstreich, "Self
Ascription
and
Objectivity, " Philosophia (Israel) 10: 189-198 (1981),
and
H. Noonan, "Identity
and
The First Person, " in Intention
and
In-
tentionality,
(ed. ) C. Diamond (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1979).
22. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (London: Methuen, 1959),
p.
112.
69
CHAPTER
SEVEN
MORAL PERSONHOOD
7.1 Introduction
This chapter summarises
the
analysis of
the
concept of person put
forward
by D. C. Dennett in Conditions
of
Personhood (1976), '
with references
also
to
H. Frankfurt's Freedom
of
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person (1971), 2
and
to
J. Rawls Justice
as
Reciprocity (1971). 3
Dennett's
analysis
is
similar
to the
analysis
in Individuals, in just
two
respects:
the
central position of
intentional
predicates,
in
the
notion of what
it is
to
be
a person; and
the
fact
that the
concept of person
is
not coextensive
with
the
concept of a
human being. Whilst
the
latter is implicit in Strawson's4
analysis,
Dennett
explicitly states
that
At
this time
and place
human beings
are
the
only persons we
recognise
...
but
on
the
one
hand
we can easily contemplate
the
existence of
biologically
very
different
persons
...
and on
the
other
hand
we recognise conditions
that
exempt
human
beings from
personhood
....
For instance, infant human be-
ings,
mentally
defective human beings,
and
human beings
declared insane by licensed
psychiatrists are
denied
per-
sonhood
...
5
70
In
this
sense
the
concept of person
is
a social concept; entities are not
found
to
be
persons,
but
rather
denied
or granted
the
status of
"person, "
and
the
status
is
granted according
to
what
"we, " in
our particular societies,
decide
to
be
the
criteria of personhood.
As Dennett
remarks:
It
might
turn
out,
for instance,
that the
concept of person
is
only a
free-floating honorific
that
we are all
happy
to
apply
to
ourselves, and
to
others as
the
spirit moves us, guided
by
our
emotions, aesthetic sensibilities, considerations of policy and
the
like
...
6
Dennett's
analysis of person
leads him
eventually
to the
conclusion
that the
concept of person
is
not merely an
honorific, but
that
it is
a normative con-
cept.
For Dennett,
an account of what
it is
to
be
a person must account
for both
"the
notion of an
intelligent,
conscious,
feeling
agent,
"
and
"an
agent who
is
accountable, who
has both
rights and responsibilities.
"' Dennett
concludes
that:
The
moral notion of a person and
the
metaphysical notion of a
person are not separate and
distinct
concepts
but just
two
dif-
ferent
and unstable resting points on
the
same continuum.
'
71
7.2 Intentional Systems
In
outlining the
conditions an entity must satisfy
to
be judged
a person,
Dennett
makes use of
the
notion of an
Intentional System. An Intentional
System is
a system whose
behaviour
can
be
explained
by
ascribing
to
it inten-
tional
predicates such as
those
concerned with
beliefs, desires, hopes
and
fears. However,
as
Dennett
points out:
...
Intentional
systems are obviously not all persons.
We
ascribe
beliefs
and
desires
to
dogs
and
fish
and
thereby
predict
their
behaviour,
and we can even use
the
procedure
to
predict
the
behaviour
of some machines.
'
For Dennett, it is
a necessary condition
for
an entity
to
be
counted a person
that
intentional
predicates can
be
supplied
to
it, but it is
not a sufficient con-
dition. The
attribution of
intentional
predicates amounts
to
adopting an
In-
tentional
stance
towards
an entity;
to
be
an
Intentional
system
is
to
be
treated
as an
Intentional
system, and
to treat
an entity as an
Intentional
system
is
to
assume
that
entity
is
rational.
72
7.3 Six Conditions
of
Personhood
However,
persons are not merely
Intentional Systems. Dennett
outlines six
conditions
(criteria) for
the
ascription of personhood.
As he
summarises:
...
being
rational
is being Intentional is being
the
object of a
certain stance.
These
three together
are a necessary
but
not suf-
ficient
condition
for
exhibiting
the
form
of reciprocity
that
is in
turn
a necessary
but
not sufficient condition
for having
the
capacity
for
verbal communication, which
is
the
necessary con-
dition for having
a special sort of consciousness, which
is
...
a
necessary condition of moral personhood.
'
7.31 Persons
as
Rational Beings
That
persons are rational
beings,
and
that
being
rational
is
a necessary con-
dition
of
being
a person,
is
a
"theme"
which
Dennett
attributes
to
Kant
and
Rawls in
their
ethical
theories,
and
to
Aristotle
and
Hintikka in
their
metaphysical
theories.
7.32 Persons
as
Intentional Systems
Being
an
Intentional
System, that
is, being
a system
(object, being)
to
which
intentional
predicates are ascribed,
is
one of
the
features
of
the
concept of
person, as
described by Strawson (see
chapters
three,
four,
and
five
above).
The
third
condition,
being
an object of a certain stance, assumes
to
some ex-
tent that
"person"
is
an
honorific; that
whether something counts as a per-
son
depends in
some way on an attitude
taken towards
it;
that
our
treating a
being in
a certain way
is in fact
constituitive
of
its being
a person.
Dennett
at-
tributes variations
of
this theory to
D. M. Mackay, " A. Rorty, 12 H.
Putman, ' 3 W. Sellars, ' 4 A. Flew, ' S T. Nagel' 6
and
D. Van de Vate. "
73
7.33 Persons
as
Beings Which Exhibit Reciprocity
Reciprocity is, for Dennett,
the
capacity of an
Intentional System
to
reciprocate
the
Intentional
stance
towards
other objects.
An
entity which
satisfies
the
condition of
being
able
to
reciprocate an
Intentional
stance
is
a
second-order
Intentional System,
which can
have beliefs, desires,
and
inten-
tions
about
beliefs, desires,
and
intentions. For
an entity
to
be
a second-order
Intentional System, its behaviour
must
be
sufficiently sophisticated
to
require
explanation
in
terms
of second-order
intentions.
7.34 Second-Order Intentional Systems
The
capacity
for having intentions
about
intentions is
not a sufficient con-
dition
of
being
a person
however,
as animals exhibit such capacities,
for in-
stance
in deceptive behaviour. As Dennett
explains:
Where
an animal
is
trying to
induce behaviour in
another
which
true
beliefs
about
the
other's environment would not
in-
duce,
we cannot
"divide
through"
and set an explanation
that
cites only
first-level Intentions. ' 8
As
an example of such
deception, Dennett
cites a case
...
where a
low-nesting bird
will
feign
a
broken
wing
to
lure
a
predator away
from
the
nest.
' 9
Although
such
behaviour is instinctual,
the
fact
that
we can ascribe second-
order
intentions in
our explanation means
that the
entity
is
a second-order
In-
tentional
System. However, to
have
a means of
deceiving
predators
does
not
entail
being
conscious of
the
deception. The
second-order explanation simply
describes "an
order which
is
there"
when such
behaviour is
exhibited.
Dennett
claims
that some version of reciprocation
is
expressed
in,
or
im-
plied
by,
the theories of
J. Rawls, 2 Mackay, Z' Strawson, 22
and
Grice. 23
74
7.35 The Capacity
for Verbal Communication
To be
a person an entity must not only
be
a second-order
Intentional
System; it
must also exhibit
the
capacity
for
verbal communication.
For Den-
nett, verbal communication
is
not simply
transmission
of
information
by
the
use of symbols;
it is
communicating
intentions by
means of
language. Mean-
ing
something
by
saying something
involves
what
Dennett
calls
third-order
intentions. In
order
to
mean something
by
saying something, the
speaker
must get
the
hearer
to
recognise
his (the
speaker's)
intentions in
saying
something.
This "order"
underlies communication.
It is in
this
sense
that
a
transaction
with a computer
does
not amount
to
communication, as:
Achieving
one
's
ends
in
transmitting
a
bit
of
Fortran
to the
machine
does
not
hinge
on getting
the
machine
to
recognise
one's
intentions. 24
Similarly,
a computer
does
not mean anything
by "saying"
something;
the
computer
does
not
intend
the
user
to
understand
the
intention behind
the
print-out.
The
situation of
interacting
with a machine
is
not
like
that
of
being
faced
with a
foreign language,
where
the
novice can gain purchase on
the
meaning of a sentence or phrase
by
understanding
the
intentions behind
the
utterance.
Although
the
interaction
resembles verbal communication,
it lacks
the
framework
necessary
for
communication
to take
place.
To
say
that
an en-
tity
is
a
third-order
Intentional System is
not
to
say
that
it is
conscious of such
complicated
intentions, but
that
its behaviour is
explained
by
the
attribution
of
this
level
of
intention. As Dennett
explains,
third-order
intentions:
...
are
intentions
that
exhibit
"an
order which
is
there"
when
people communicate,
intentions
of which we are not normally
aware.
.. .
25
75
These intentions
are a
"precondition
of verbal communication.
" Dennett
attributes such a
theory (of
what
is involved in
communication,
)
to
Grice. In
his
paper,
Utterer's Meanings
and
Intentions, 26 Grice formulates
a
theory
of
"non-natural"
meaning, which
he initially defines
as
follows:
...
"U
meant something
by
uttering x"
is
true,
if for
some au-
dience A, U
uttered x
intending
(1) A
to
produce a particular response, r.
(2) A
to think
(recognise)
that
U intends (1).
(3) A
to
fulfill (1)
on
the
basis
of
his fulfillment
of
(2). 27
Dennett
explains
that third-order
intentions
are a necessary
but
not suffi-
cient condition
the
occurrence of what
E. Goffman
calls
"encounters, "
that
is,
situations of mutual recognition, which are a necessary
but
not sufficient
condition
for instances
of verbal communication.
Dennett
tells
us, moreover,
that:
It is
no accident
that
Grice's
cases of nonnatural meaning
fall
into
a class whose other members are cases of
deception
or
manipulation
...
As Grice
points out,
these
cases share with
cases of nonnatural meaning a reliance on or exploitation of
the
rationality of
the
victim.
In
these
cases success
hinges
on
in-
ducing
the
victim
to
embark on a chain of reasoning
to
which
one contributes premises
directly
or
indirectly. In deception
the
premises are
disbelieved by
the
supplier;
in
normal communica-
tion they
are
believed. Communication, in Gricean
guise, ap-
pears
to
be
a sort of collaborative manipulation of audience
by
utterer;
it depends,
not only on
the
rationality of
the
audience
who must sort out
the
utterer's
intentions, but
on
the
audience's
trust
in
the
utterer.
Communication,
as a sort of
manipulation, would not work, given
the
requisite rationality
of audience, unless
the
audience's
trust
in
the
matter were well-
grounded or reasonable.
Thus
the
norm
for
utterence
is
sinceri-
ty;
were utterences not normally
trustworthy, they
would
fail
of
their
purpose.
28
76
7.36 Moral Agency
To have
the
capacity
for
verbal communication
is
a necessary condition
for
an entity's
being
a moral agent,
that
is,
one who
is
accountable
for
actions
and
has
rights and responsibilities.
For:
...
only
those
capable of participating
in
reason-giving can
be
argued
into,
or out of, courses of action or attitudes, and
if
one
is incapable
of
"listening
to
reason"
in
some matter, one can-
not
be held
responsible
for it. 29
Dennett
claims, moreover,
that:
The
capacities
for
verbal communication and
for
awareness of
one's actions are
thus
essential
in
one who
is
going
to
be
amen-
able
to
argument or persuasion, and
...
such reciprocal ad-
justment
of
interests
achieved
by
mutual exploitation of ration-
ality,
is
a
feature
of
the
optimal mode of personal
interaction. 30
Although the
capacity
for
verbal communication
is
a necessary condition
for
an entity's
being
a moral agent,
this
alone
does
not,
in Dennett's
analysis,
suffice
to
ensure moral agency on
the
part of any entity.
For Dennett, to
be
a
moral agent, one must
be "self
conscious,
" in full, be
able
to
reflect on one's
self.
That
persons are moral agents appears
to
be
the
feature
which
distinguishes
persons
from
animals and other
third-order
Intentional
Systems,
and
in
order
to
be
a moral agent an entity must
be
capable of
second-order
volitions.
This thesis, concerning
the
nature of persons,
is
put
forward by H. Frankfurt
in "Freedom
of
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person, 73' in
which
he
argues
that
having freedom
of will
is
essential
to
being
77
a person, and
that
one
has freedom
of will only when one can
have
the
will
one wants
to
have. As he
explains:
Besides
wanting and choosing and
being
moved
to
do
this
or
that,
men may also want
to
have (or
not
to
have)
certain
desires
and motives.
They
are capable of wanting
to
be different in
their
preferences and purposes,
from
what
they
are
...
No
animal other
than
man,
however,
appears
to
have
the
capacity
for
reflective self-evaluation
that
is
manifested
in
the
forma-
tion
of second-order
desires. 32
Frankfurt
explains
that there
are cases
in
which a person might
be
said
to
want
to
have
a particular
desire
even
though
he
would not want
that
desire
to
be
effective,
to
be his
will, and
there
are cases where a person may want
to
have
a
desire
which
he does
not
have
and wants such a
desire
to
become his
will.
For instance,
someone may want
to
desire heroin in
order
to
know
what
it
would
be like
to
desire heroin, (if,
say, one was an experimental
psychologist or counsellor working with
heroin
addicts), without actually
wanting
this
desire
to
be
effective, whereas one might want
to
desire healthy
food
and exercise, and want
this
desire
to
be
one's will.
One
could also want
to
not
desire
to
smoke cigarettes, and one could want
to
not
desire lots
of
money, and so
forth. People have freedom
of will at
the
level
of second-order
desires
or volitions, when
those
second-order
desires
or volitions can
be
satisfied.
As Dennett
explains:
Persons do
not always
have free
will, and under some circum-
stances can
be
responsible
for
actions
done in
the
absence of
freedom
of
the
will,
but
a person always must
be
an
"entity for
whom
the
freedom
of
its
will may
be
a problem"-that
is,
one
capable of
framing
second-order volitions, satisfiable or not.
33
78
In
order
for
an entity
to
be
capable of adopting a stance
towards
itself, in
order
to
change
itself, in
other words,
to
be
capable of second-order voli-
tions,
such an entity must
be
a
"genuine
self-consciousness":
Acting
on a second-order
desire, doing
something
to
bring it
about
that
one acquires a
first-order desire, is
acting upon
oneself
just
as one would act upon another person
....
One's
stance
towards
oneself and access
to
oneself
in
these
cases
is
essentially
the
same as one's stance and access
to
another.
34
Thus, for Dennett,
an entity must
be
a
third-order
Intentional System
which
is
capable of second-order volition,
in
order
to
be
considered a moral
agent.
Dennett
makes use of
Frankfurt's
term
"wanton"
to
describe
entities
which
have first-order desires but
no second-order volitions and
he
notes
that
"our intuitions
support
the
opinion
that
all nonhuman animals, as well as
small children and some mentally
defective
people, are wantons.
"35
79
7.37 Person
as a
Normative Ideal
Although human beings (except
the
young and
the
insane) fulfill
the
re-
quirements which
he
outlines as conditions of personhood, personhood
is
unobtainable even
for
those
capable of moral agency.
This is because, for
Dennett, the
concept of person
is
normative.
Dennett
comes
to this
conclusion
through
a consideration of
Rawl's
derivation
of
justice,
citing
the
following
passage:
To
recognise another as a person one must respond
to
him
and
act
towards
him in
certain ways; and
these
ways are
intimately
connected with
the
various prima
facie duties. Acknowledging
these
duties in
some
degree,
and so
having
the
elements of
morality,
is
not a matter of choice or of
intuiting
moral
qualities or a matter of
the
expression of
feelings
or
attitudes
...
it is
simply
the
pursuance of one of
the
forms
of
conduct
in
which
the
recognition of others as persons
is
manifested.
36
Dennett
understands
by
this
argument
that:
...
the
concept of person
is itself inescapably
normative or
idealised;
to the
extent
that
justice does
not reveal
itself in
the
dealings
and
interactions
of creatures,
to that
extent
they
are
not persons.
37
Dennett takes the
view
that the
concept of person, or personhood,
represents a mode of social
being;
whether an entity
is
a person or not can
80
only
be
revealed
by
the
nature of
its interaction
with others.
The
problem,
for
Dennett, lies here, in
that:
...
our assumption
that
an entity
is
a person
is
shaken precise-
ly in
those
cases where
it
matters: when wrong
has been done
and
the
question of responsibility arises.
For in
these
cases
the
grounds
for
saying
that the
person
is
culpable
(the
evidence
that
he did
...
wrong of
his
own
free
will) are
in
themselves
grounds
for doubting
that
it is
a person we are
dealing
with at
all.
38
81
7.4 Conclusion
In "Conditions
of
Personhood, " Dennett
presents what
he
calls six
themes
concerning
the
conditions which would
have
to
be
satisfied
in
order
to
judge
(or
call) something a person.
If
we
take
Frankfurt's
second-order volition
criterion
to
be distinct from
third-order
Intentions,
and
there
appear
to
be
grounds
for
so
doing, Dennett has
put
forward
seven necessary conditions of
personhood.
One
curious
feature
of
Dennett's
argument
is
that
whilst
he
opens
"Condi-
tions
of
Personhood"
with
the
statement
that,
"I
am a person, and so are
you.
That
much
is beyond doubt, " he
concludes with
"we
cannot even
tell
in
our own cases
if
we are persons.
" These
two
statements contradict each
other, and
there
are some
further
anomalies
in his
arguments which require
examination.
Such
examination will
be
undertaken
in
the
next chapter.
82
NOTES
1. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in A. Rorty (ed. ) The
Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California
Press, 1976).
2. H. Frankfurt, "Freedom
of
Will
and
the
Concept
of
Person, " J. Phil.
68: 5-20 (1971).
3. J. Rawls, "Justice
as
Reciprocity" in S. Govonitz (ed. ) Utilitarianism
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971)
4. In P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959).
5. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
175.
6. Ibid.,
p.
176.
7. Ibid.,
p.
176.
8. Ibid.,
p.
193.
9. Ibid.,
p.
179.
10. Ibid.,
pp.
178-179.
11 D. M. MacKay, "The Use
of
Behavioral Language
to
Refer
to
Mechanical Processes, " British Journal
of
Philosophy
of
Science (1962)
pp.
83-103.
12. A. Rorty, "Slaves
and
Machines, " Analysis (1962).
13. H. Putman, "Robots: Machines
or
Artificially Creative Life? " Journal
of
Philosophy 61: 668-690 (1964).
14. W. Sellars, "Fatalism
and
Determinism, " in K. Lehrer, (ed. ) Freedom
and
Determinism (New York: Random House, 1966).
15. A. Flew, "A Rational Animal, " in J. R. Smythies (ed. ) Brain
and
Mind
(London: Routledge
and
Kegan Paul, 1968).
16. T. Nagel, "War
and
Massacre, " Philosophy
and
Public Affairs 1:
123-144 (1972).
17. D. Van de Vate, "The Problems
of
Robot Consciousness, " Philosophy
and
Ph
enomen ologicl
Research 32: 149-165 (1971)
.
18. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
183.
19. Ibid,,
p.
184.
83
20. J. Rawls, A Theory
of
Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press,
1971).
21. In D. M. MacKay, "The Use
of
Behavioral Language
to
Refer
to
Mechanical Processes, " Brit. J. Phil Science 89-103, (1962).
22. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959).
23. H. P. Grice, "Meaning, " Phil. Rev. 66: 377-388 (1957).
24. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
189.
25. Ibid.,
p.
189.
26. H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meanings
and
Intentions, " Phil. Rev. 78:
147-177 (1969).
27. Ibid.,
p.
151.
28. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
187.
29. Ibid.,
p.
191.
30. Ibid.,
p.
191.
31. H. Frankfurt, "Freedom
of
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person, " 1971.
32. Ibid.,
p.
7.
33. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
192.
34. Ibid.,
p.
193.
35. Ibid.,
p.
192.
36. J. Ra
wls,
"Justice
as
Reciprocity,
"
p.
259.
37. D. C. Dennett,
"Conditions
of
Personhood,
"
p.
190.
38. Ibid.,
p.
194.
JOHN RYL:
iL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY OF
MANCHESTEF
84
CHAPTER
EIGHT
ASSESSMENT
OF
DENNETT'S
ARGUMENTS
8.1 Introduction
This chapter
looks
at some of
the
arguments used
by Dennett
to
establish
his
six conditions of personhood.
It
will
be
suggested
that the
curious
contradiction
found between
the
first
and
last
sentences of
"Conditions
of
Personhood, "'
are partly
the
result of
his
confusing
the
meaning of what
it is
to
be
moral with
being
virtuous, and
that this
confusion reveals a
lack
of
understanding of
Frankfurt's
analysis of
freedom
of
the
will.
It
will also
be
argued
that
his interpretation
of
Rawl's derivation
of
justice
and of
Rawl's
analysis of what
it is
to
be
a person2
leads Dennett
to
present a
condition of personhood which cannot actually
be fulfilled by
any person,
that
is,
that
an entity needs
to
be
omniscient
to
be judged
to
be
a person; a
condition of sainthood rather
than
of personhood.
It
will
further be
argued
that there
is
an
internal inconsistency in Dennett's
arguments concerning
the
capacities and potentialities which
differentiate
persons
from
other entities,
in
that
whilst
Dennett
makes use of
descriptions
of what people actually
do
which
differentiates
them
from
animals and com-
puters, at
the
same
time
he
allows
that
such
descriptions
are applicable
to
non-persons.
85
8.2 Confusion
of
Moral
with
Virtuous
The final
statement of
"Conditions
of
Personhood, "
contradicts
the
open-
ing
statement.
Dennett
suggests
that
while
there
is
no
doubt
that
"I
am a per-
son, and so are you", nevertheless when considering
the
distinguishing
feature
of persons,
that they
are moral agents,
he
claims
that
"we
cannot
even
tell
in
our own cases
if
we are persons.
"
Using Frankfurt's3
analysis of persons as moral agents,
Dennett draws
the
conclusion
that
if
we
have
evidence
that
a person
did
wrong of
his
own
free
will, we
have
grounds
for doubting
that
it is
a person we are
dealing
with.
However, it is
not clear why
the
grounds
for
saying a person
is
culpable are
grounds
for doubting
personhood.
Dennett
explains
that:
The
moral notion of a person and
the
metaphysical notion of a
person are not separate and
distinct
concepts
but just
two
dif-
ferent
and unstable resting points on
the
same continuum.
This
relativity
infects
the
satisfaction of conditions of personhood
at every
level. There is
no objectively satisfiable sufficient con-
dition for
an entity's really
having beliefs,
and as we uncover
apparent
irrationality
under an
Intentional interpretation
of an
entity, our grounds
for
ascribing any
beliefs
at all wanes
....
In just
the
same way our assumption
that
an entity
is
a person
is
shaken precisely
in
those
cases where
it
matters: when wrong
has been done
and
the
question of responsibility arises.
'
This
passage appears
to
state why
it is
that
wrongdoers are not persons.
Earlier Dennett tells
us
that:
...
reciprocity
has
sometimes
been
rather uninformatively
ex-
pressed
by
the
slogan:
to
be
a person
is
to treat
others as per-
sons, and with
this
expression
has
often gone
the
claim
that
treating another as a person
is
treating
him
morally
...
but
86
this
conflates
different
sorts of reciprocity
...
as
Van de Vate
observes, one of
the
differences between
some
forms
of
manslaughter and murder
is
that the
murderer
treats the
victim
as a person.
I
The implication here,
as above,
is
that to treat
a person morally, or
to
be
a
moral agent,
is
to
be
virtuous.
However,
to
be
a moral agent
is
to
be
an agent
who
is
capable of actions which are
both "right"
and
"wrong, "
under what-
ever ethical system
the
agent recognises.
Dennett draws
an analogy
between
uncovering apparent
irrationality
under
an
Intentional interpretation
of an entity, and
discovering
conscious wrong-
doing in
a person.
But
even
if
we allow
Dennett's
own explanations
this
is
a
bad
analogy;
the
analogy ought
to
be
made
between discovering irrationality
in
an
Intentional
system, and
discovering
amorality
in
a person, or perhaps,
to
make use of
Frankfurt's
term,
discovering
that
what one
took to
be
a per-
son
is
a
"wanton. " It
would seem,
however,
that
evidence
that
someone
"did
wrong of
his
own
free
will"
is
evidence
in favour
of
his
personhood rather
than
grounds
for doubting it.
According
to
Frankfurt's
analysis
that
a person
has free
will when
he
or
she can act on second order
desires, Dennett's
wrongdoer,
the
person who
"did
wrong, was aware
he
was
doing
wrong, and
did
wrong of
his
own
free
will,
" is
acting according
to
second-order
desires, is
responsible
for his
ac-
tions,
is
a person.
87
8.3 Conditions
of
Moral Personhood
According
to
Dennett's descriptions
of
the
conditions of personhood,
human beings (with
some exceptions)
fulfill
the
conditions of
"metaphysical"
personhood,
but
these
are not sufficient conditions of moral
personhood.
6 However, in his discussion
of
Rawl's' derivation
of
the
prin-
ciples of
justice from
the
"original
position,
" Dennett
makes a case
for
con-
sidering morality
(or in
this
case,
justice) in
an analogous way
to
his
treat-
ment of
Intentionality. For Dennett, "There is "an
order which
is
there"
in
a
just
society,
"
as
there
is
an order which
is
there
in instances
of verbal com-
munication.
Justice
reveals
itself in
the
dealings
and
interactions
of
human
beings.
In Rawl's derivation,
the
principles of
justice
are
those
which would
be
chosen
by
rational, self-interested
individuals,
to
determine
and regulate
society.
The individuals in
the
original position are
ignorant
of
their
future
role
in
society,
their talents,
race, gender, or even
to
which generation
they
would
belong. This ignorance
guarantees
their
impartiality in
choosing which
principles
to
adopt.
According
to
Dennett:
The importance
of
Rawl's
attempt
to
derive
principles of
justice from
the
"original
position"
is,
of course,
that
while
the
outcome
is
recognisable as a moral norm,
it is
not
derived
as a moral norm.
'
Whilst
the
principles may
be derived
rationally,
the
original position of
im-
partiality
is itself
a moral position.
According to
Rawls:
To
recognize
another as a person one must respond
to
him
and
act
towards
him in
certain ways; and
these
ways are
intimately
connected with various prima
facie duties. Acknowledging
these
duties in
some
degree,
and so
having
the
elements of
morality,
is
not a matter of choice or of
intuiting
moral
88
qualities or a matter of
the
expression of
feelings
or
attitudes
...
it is
simply
the
pursuance of one of
the
forms
of
conduct
in
which
the
recognition of others as persons
is
manifested.
'
An
entity would appear
to
be
a person only
insofar
as
it is
recognised
by
others as a person, acted
towards
according
to
prima
facie duties. However,
many social activities
do
not reveal morality, most of
the time
individuals
are
engaged
in interactive behaviour
which
does
not reveal a moral order.
Den-
nett seems
to
understand
by Rawls'
account
that
entities are persons only
whilst engaged
in
certain
forms
of conduct.
But
according
to this
understan-
ding
most of
the time
human beings
would not
be
persons.
This
condition ap-
pears
to
require entities
to
live
the
lives
of saints
in
order
to
be fully
persons.
However, if
one understands
Rawls'
position as a variant of
"to be
a per-
son
is
to treat
others as persons,
"
then
it is
possible
to
make an analogy
bet-
ween
Rawls'
position and
Dennett's
explanation of
Intentionality. Insofar
as
morality
is
revealed
in human interaction,
which can
be
shown
to
display "an
order which
is
there,
"
then
it
can
be
seen
from Rawls'
account
that
per-
sonhood
is
revealed
in
an order which
is
there
in human interaction. This
revealed order explains why
it is
that
a murderer
treats
his
victim as a person.
A "wanton, " for
example, someone who
is insane,
and who cannot make
distinctions between
people and
furniture (both being disposable) is
not
thought to
have
committed murder.
A
verdict of manslaughter rather
than
murder
is
given
in
cases where
the
accused
is
thought to
be insane.
It
takes
a moral agent
to
commit murder,
tell
lies,
steal, or
insult. Whether
a person whose every
interaction
with others reveals virtue
is, in fact,
exercis-
ing
moral choice,
is
an
intriguing
question.
' Such behaviour is
not
the
norm,
and when
it is
thought to
occur
the
person who exhibits such
behaviour is
often
described
as
being blessed
with grace
(like being blessed
with
beauty)
as
though
such
behaviour
is
not voluntary.
Such
might
be
a condition of ex-
istence
aspired
to,
a normative
(Christian)
ideal,
as
Dennett
claims,
but it is
an
ideal
of sainthood
rather
than
a condition of personhood.
89
NOTES
1. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in A. Rorty (ed. ) The
Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California Press, 1976).
2. J. Rawls, "Justice
as
Reciprocity, " in S. Gorovitz, (ed. ) Utilitarianism
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971).
3. H. Frankfurt, "Freedom
of
the
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person, "
Journal
of
Philosophy 68: 5-20 (1971. )
4. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
pp.
193-194.
5. Ibid.,
p.
178.
6. For
an alternative analysis of moral personhood, see
R. Puccetti, Per-
sons:
A Study
of
Possible Moral Agents in
the
Universe (London: Mac-
millan,
1968),
and
S. Sapontzis, "A Critique
of
Personhood, " Ethics
91: 607-618 (1981).
7. As in J. Rawls, "Justice
as
Reciprocity" (1971).
8. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
191.
9. J. Rawls, "Justice
as
Reciprocity, "
p.
259.
10. Unfortunately, further discussion
of
this
question
lies
outside of
the
scope of
this
work.
90
CHAPTER
NINE
CRITICISM OF DENNETT'S ANALYSIS
9.1 Introduction
This chapter
looks
at
Dennett's
analysis of personhood as a metaphysical
concept.
It is
suggested
that
Dennett's
view
that the
concept of per-
sonhood
is
a social concept
(see
chapter eight), a
type
of
honorific
which
is
attributed
to
beings
according
to
certain criteria
(outlined
as six conditions of
personhood)
has
certain consequences which
he
appears
to
have
overlooked.
First, Dennett describes
the
attribution of personhood as analogous
to the
adoption of an
Intentional
stance
towards
a
being. However,
there
is
a
hid-
den
assumption
in
such an analogy.
The
assumption
being
that the
"we"
who
take the
Intentional
stance or attribute personhood
to
an entity are
human beings.
Second, if
personhood
is
the
kind
of concept
Dennett describes,
then
it is
a
concept attributed
by
social
individuals. Thus, the
question concerning what
kind
of entities or
beings
are conceived of
in
this
way
is
an empirical question
and not, as
Dennett
seems
to
suggest, a question of what possible entities
could satisfy metaphysical
conditions of personhood.
It is
observed
that
Den-
91
nett
has
somewhat arbitrarily omitted children
from
the
status of person-
hood, despite
the
fact
that the
conditions
he has
outlined are empirical condi-
tions, and
hence
any
judgement
about whether a
being fulfills
the
conditions
needs
to
be
made on evidence.
Dennett does
not provide such evidence.
Third,
since personhood
is
a social concept
it follows
that
it is
also socially
relative.
The
criteria used
to
determine
whether an entity
is
a person will
(and
does)
vary
between different
societies.
It is
argued
that
Dennett's
choice of
criteria
(conditions)
are relative
to
a particular culture
in
which rationality
is
taken to
be
an
important feature
of social
interaction.
92
9.2 The Intentional Stance
Dennett
outlines six
themes
which are
taken to
identify
necessary condi-
tions
of personhood:
'
the
first
that
persons are rational
beings;
the
second
that
persons are
beings
to
which
intentional
predicates are ascribed;
the third
that
persons are
beings
towards
whom a certain stance
is
taken; the
fourth
that
persons are
beings
who can reciprocate such a stance;
the
fifth
that
per-
sons are capable of verbal communication;
the
sixth
that
persons are self con-
scious.
Dennett
says
that
he has:
...
previously exploited
the
first
three themes,
rationally,
In-
tentionality
and stance,
to
define
not persons,
but
the
much
wider class of what
I
call
Intentional
systems
...
2
Dennett tells
us
further
that:
Noting to
which we could not successfully adopt
the
Inten-
tional
stance, with
its
presupposition of rationality, could
count as a person.
'
For Dennett
an
Intentional
system
is
anything
towards
which a certain
stance can
be
taken.
As he
explains:
An Intentional
system
is
a system whose
behaviour
can
be (at
least
sometimes) explained and predicted
by
relying on ascrip-
tions to the
system of
beliefs
and
desires (and
other
Intentional-
ly
characterised
features-what I
will call
Intentions here,
meaning
to
include hopes, fears, intentions,
perceptions, ex-
pectations,
etc.
). There
may
in
every case
be
other ways of
predicting
...
the
behaviour
of an
Intentional
system-for
in-
stance, mechanistic
or physical ways-but
the
Intentional
stance may
be
the
handiest
or most effective or
in
any case a
successful
stance
to
adopt
...
4
93
It is
unclear whether
Dennett intends
the
reader
to
understand that there
are such
things
as
Intentional Systems;
whether
Intentional Systems
are on-
tological
categories, or
that there
are other
things,
such as
human beings
towards
which an
Intentional Stance is
adopted.
' However, it is
clear
from
Dennett's
examples
that those
who
do
the
adopting are
in fact human beings.
Dennett
explains:
The
actual utility of adopting
the
Intentional
stance
toward
plants was
brought home
to
me
talking
with
loggers in
the
Maine
woods.
These
men
invariably
call a
tree
not
"it" but
"he, "
and will say of a young spruce,
"He
wants
to
spread
his
limbs, but don't let him
... ."
[my italics]'
Dennett
continues:
More
sophisticated
biologists
may choose
to
speak of
informa-
tion transmission
from
the tree's
periphery
to
other
locations in
the tree.
This is less
picturesque,
but
still
Intentional. [my
italics]'
All
of
Dennett's
examples which
illustrate
the taking
of an
Intentional
stance
towards
an entity actually show
human beings
adopting
the
stance.
Moreover,
the
language
used
by
the
loggers in his
example above
indicates
that this
stance
is
not a neutral
description, but
rather a personalising or an-
thropomorphising
of a non-human.
Dennett has
told
us earlier
that
whilst
he is
a
human being,
...
probably you are
too.
If
you
take
offense at
the
word
"probably"
you stand accused of a sort of racism,
for
what
is
important
about us
is
not
that
we are of
the
same
biological
species,
but
that
we are
both
persons
...
8
94
If
one
is
to
understand personhood
to
be
similar
to
Intentional System, in
this
respect,
that
it is
a stance
that
is
adopted
towards
entities, regardless of
their
biological
species
(or
of whether
they
are animals at all), a question may
be
raised concerning who, or what,
is
taking the
Intentional Stance (or
the
personhood stance), and
towards
whom or what.
If
a non-humanoid, such as
a
dolphin
or robot9 as suggested
by Dennett,
takes
an
Intentional/person-
hood
stance
towards
an entity,
does
this
amount
to that
entity
being
a per-
son?
Or,
conversely,
if
such an entity
declines
to take the
Intentional
stance
towards
a
human being, does
this
debar
such a
human being from
per-
sonhood?
The
assumption
in Dennett's
examples, and
in his
explanations of
the
In-
tentional
stance,
is
that those
who
take the
stance are
human beings. The
kind
of entities
toward
which such a stance
is
taken thus
depend
upon
the
judgement
of
the
person adopting
the
stance.
'
95
9.3 Persons
as
Human Beings
Since, in
order
to
be
a person, an entity must
be
an
Intentional
system, and
being
an
Intentional
system
is being
regarded as an
Intentional
system
by
other
human beings,
the
basic
criteria of personhood under
Dennett's
analysis are empirical, rather
than
metaphysical.
To discover
what sort of en-
tities
are persons one should
find
out
first
of all what
kind
of entities are
regarded as
Intentional
systems.
An
entity may
be denied
personhood,
in Dennett's
analysis, on
the
grounds
that
someone
(everyone? ) does
not use
the
heuristic device
of ascribing
second-order volitions, or
third-order
Intentions,
to them
when understand-
ing
or
describing
their
behaviour. But
as
Dennett himself
points out:
There is
no objectively satisfiable sufficient condition
for
an
entity's really
having beliefs,
and as we uncover apparent
irra-
tionality
under
Intentional interpretation
of an entity, our
grounds
for
ascribing any
beliefs
at all wanes, especially when
we
have (what
we always can
have in
principle) a non-Inten-
tional,
mechanistic account of
the
entity.
"
Explanations
of
behaviour
appear
to
depend
upon
the
perception and pro-
clivities of
the
observer, rather
than
upon nature or status of
the
observed.
For instance, infant human beings,
mentally
defective human
beings,
and
human beings declared insane by licensed
psychiatrists
are
denied
personhood,
or at any rate crucial
elements of personhood.
' 2
Here Dennett
is
assuming
that
children are not
to
be
considered as rational
entities.
But it follows from his
earlier account
that
at
least
the
basic
condi-
tion
of ascribing personhood,
that
of adopting
an
Intentional
stance
towards
96
an entity,
depends
upon
the
observer.
That Dennett does
not adopt a per-
sonhood stance
towards
children
is
seen
in his description
of
Frankfurt's
analysis:
Frankfurt introduces
the
marvelous
term
"wanton" for
those
"who have first-order desires but
...
no second-order voli-
tions.
" (Second-order
volitions
for Frankfurt
are all, of
course, reflexive second-order
desires. ) He
claims
that
our
in-
tuitions
support
the
opinion
that
all nonhuman animals, as well
as small children and some mentally
defective
people, are wan-
tons,
and
I for
one can
think
of no plausible
counterexamples.
' 3
However, Dennett does
not put
forward
reasons
for
making
the
assump-
tion that
children are
"wantons"
who
lack
capabilities
for
second-order voli-
tions,
and whose
behaviour does
not warrant explanation
in
terms
of
third-
order
Intentions. Since Dennett's
criteria of personhood
include
the
ascrip-
tion
of
Intentionality
to
an entity,
in
order
that
it
may
"count"
as a person,
it
could
be
asked upon what
basis
the
ascribers
take the
Intentional
stance
towards
(some)
entities
but
not
towards
others.
Dennett
tells
us
that:
We
ascribe
beliefs
and
desires
to
dogs
and
fish
and
thereby
predict
their
behaviour,
and we can even use
the
procedure
to
predict
the
behaviour
of some machines.
14
If
the
ascription of personhood or of
intentionality is
not
to
be
totally
ar-
bitrary,
a requirement ought
to
be
made
that
reasons
for
ascribing
inten-
tionality to
plants, or
to
computers,
but denying
personhood
to
children,
be
given.
The
explicit reason
for
the
ascription of
intentionality (to, for in-
stance,
trees),
is
the
utility of so
doing. If it is
useful
to
explain
the
"behaviour"
of
trees
or
dogs
as
intentional,
they
are
thus
Intentional
systems.
The
conclusion
to
be drawn
seems
to
be
that
it is
not useful
to
regard
children or mentally
defective human beings
as persons.
97
9.4 Rationality
as
the
Standard
of
Personhood
Dennett
seems
to
assume
that the
criteria upon which personhood
is
ascrib-
ed are essentially
those
concerned with
"rationality, " in
other words, con-
cerned with
"levels"
of cognition,
the
ability
to
give reasons, complexity of
decision
making, and so
forth. As he
explains, with regard
to
computers:
...
we can even use
the
procedure
(the
adoption of
the
Inten-
tional
stance)
to
predict
the
behaviour
of some machines.
For
instance, it is
a good,
indeed
the
only good, strategy
to
adopt
against a good chess-playing computer.
By
assuming
the
com-
puter
has
certain
beliefs (or information)
and
desires (or
preference
functions) dealing
with
the
game
in
progress,
I
can
calculate-under auspicious circumstances-the computer's
most
likely
next move, provided
I
assume
the
computer
deals
rationally with
these
beliefs
and
desires. ' S
Such
criteria may not capture all
that
is involved in
the
ascription of per-
sonhood.
As Amelie Rorty has
observed with regard
to
personal
identity:
A
society
that
focuses
primarily on
the
sorts of actions
that
are
thought to
follow from
rational choice will
locate
criteria
for
identification in
the
continuity of psychological
traits
believed
to
assure rational
choice
....
Questions
about
legal
rights
of
...
damaged individuals
can
be
raised:
the
wills and con-
tracts
made
by
the
senile,
the
insane,
or
the
permanently
infan-
tile
can
be invalidated. 16
Rorty
continues
by
explaining
that:
A
society's conception of agency
is
closely
linked
to the
sorts of
actions
that
are
taken as central
because
they
preserve or
enhance
that
society's conception of
its
proper survival and
development. In
a society of
hunters,
cripples are
thought
in-
98
capable of action;
but in
a society of religious ascetics, cripples
may
be
thought
most capable of
the
sort of action
that
defines
the true
person.
"
Similarly, if
one
takes
rationality
to
be
the
determining feature
of per-
sonhood, and
hence,
also rational
deliberation
about second- or
first-order
desires,
one may simply
be
reflecting a social attitude concerning
the
kind
of
citizen,
individual,
or member
deemed desirable in
that
particular society.
However,
although such an attitude may convey a social
ideal, it
can
be
argued
that
it does
not
fully
reflect
the
ordinary notion of what
it is
to
be
a
person, or what
is involved in
personhood.
Rorty has
argued
further
that:
For instance,
current
discussions
of responsible personhood
concentrate on
the
capacities
for deliberation,
on memory and
critical evaluation.
Because
we
take the
model of rational
choice
to
involve
an
individual's
selection of one among
deter-
minate alternatives, we
do
not stress
the
capacities
for im-
aginative construction and
formulation
of
indeterminate fu-
tures
....
And because
our paradigms of action are
those
performed
by individuals
rather
than
by
groups-of-individuals,
we
do
not stress
the
capacities
for
mutual sensitivity and adap-
tability.
I8
Rationality,
whether considered as a criterion of personhood or a criterion
to
be
used
in judgements
of personal
identity, is
one among many possible
criteria.
Rorty
remarks
that:
We
may consider
that
someone who
is
no
longer
able
to
weigh
probabilities may not
be
the
same person:
but
we
do
not
think
that
a person whose
imaginative faculties
are
damaged is
a
dif-
ferent
person.
19
However, if "we"
are a group of painters or sculptors, or
if "we"
are
in-
volved
in
theatre, opera or concert recital,
"we"
might very well consider
such a person, under
these conditions,
to
be
a
different
person.
99
9.5 Conclusion
Dennett holds
that
personhood
is
a metaphysical and a moral concept.
However, his
outline of
the
conditions of personhood
describe
not a
metaphysical concept
but
a social concept.
His
presentation of such condi-
tions,
particularly of
the
Intentional
stance,
describes
empirical states of af-
fairs. One
such empirical state of affairs would
be, for
example,
that
certain
people
do describe
certain entities such as
trees
or animals
in
a particular
manner.
If
we
take this
analysis
to
be
an accurate
description
of personhood,
then
what
is
needed
to
determine
what/who
is
a person
is
some
kind
of em-
pirical survey of attitudes, rather
than
as
Dennett
presents, some arbitrary
decisions
about which entities are
to
be
granted
the
status of persons.
In
this
work
it is
argued
that the
entities which are persons,
the
subjects of
conceptions of personhood, are
individuals
who are
human beings
and self
conscious entities.
That
whilst personhood
is
a way of conceiving of
in-
dividuals,
those
who
do
so conceive are
themselves
individuals
who are
in-
variably
human beings
and
that this
is
an empirical
fact.
Although Dennett
uses examples
in
which
those
adopting
the
Intentional
or personhood stance
towards
entities are
human beings,
this
is
never made
explicit.
For Dennett,
the
properties which
differentiate
persons
from
other
Intentional
systems concern second-order volitions and agency.
These
capacities are,
it
turns
out, attributed only
to
a restricted group of
human be-
ings. However, it is
arguable
that
even
Dennett's
examples of
Intentional
predicates
being
applied
to
non-humans,
in fact,
typically
derive
their
mean-
ing from
the
use of such predicates when applied
to
human beings. Thus
when
Dennett
speaks of a
tree
which
"wants
to
spread
his limbs, "
the
mean-
ing
of
the
Intentional
predicate
is derived
analogously
from
a phrase
describ-
ing
a
human
action.
It
may
be
the
case, as
Dennett
claims,
that
we can always
100
have
a mechanistic account of
the
behaviour
of an entity.
But
an
intentional
account such as
"wants
to
spread
his limbs, " has
a
different
meaning
from
a
mechanistic account such as
"information
transmission
from
the tree's
periphery
to
other
locations. " The former
account makes use of a metaphor
which alludes,
to
a person's
desires
to
spread
their
arms.
Chapter
ten
investigates
to
what extent such
Intentional
predicates, as well
as other predicates attributed
to
persons, are
dependent for
their
meaning
upon
the
subject of
the
predicate
being humanoid.
101
NOTES
1. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in A. Rorty (ed. ) The
Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California Press, 1976).
2. Ibid.,
p.
179.
3. Ibid.,
p.
180.
4. Ibid.,
p.
179.
5. For
an alternative criticism of
Dennett's
view
that
personhood
involves
the
adoption of
the
Intentional
stance
towards
a
being,
see
F. C. Young,
"On Dennett's Conditions
of
Personhood, " Auslegung 6: 161-177
(1979).
6. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, "
p.
180.
7. Ibid.,
p.
180.
8. Ibid.,
p.
175.
9. For
an an
interesting discussion
on
the
question of whether robots could
become
persons, see
D. Van de Vate's "The Problem
of
Robot Con-
sciousness,
" Phil. Phenom. Res., 32: 149-165 (1971).
10. See D. C. Wilson, "Functionalism
and
Moral Personhood: One View
Considered, " Phil. Phenom. Res. 44
:
521-530 (1984). Wilson
considers
the
results of applying
Dennett's
criteria of personhood and argues
fur-
ther that
an entity's
being
a person
should
amount
to
more
than that
en-
tity's
being
the
object of a stance or view
taken towards
it.
11. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood, "
pp.
193-194.
12. Ibid.,
p.
175.
13. Ibid.,
p.
192.
14. Ibid.,
p.
179.
15. Ibid.,
p.
179.
16. A. Rorty, The Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California Press,
1976)
p.
5.
17. Ibid.,
p.
5.
18. Ibid.,
pp.
9-10.
19. Ibid.,
p.
9.
102
CHAPTER
TEN
PERSONS AND HUMAN BEINGS
10.1 Introduction
This chapter
investigates
to
what extent
the
features
of our conceptualisa-
tion
of
individuals
as persons
is dependent
upon
the
particular
biology
individuals have
as
human beings. It
will
be
argued
that
a great many of
the
properties and characteristics proposed
by
philosophers as properties of per-
sons
in fact
require a
humanoid
physiology
to
be instantiated.
10.2 The Nature
of
the Distinction Between
Persons
and
Human Beings
In
their
accounts of
the
concept of person,
both Strawson'
and
Dennett2
make
distinctions between
what might
be
called
the
biological
entity, and
the
entity
to
which psychological characteristics can
be
applied.
Both
allow
that
persons need not
be human beings,
and yet
both
use accounts of what
human
beings do
and say, as a
basis for
the
attribution of personhood.
Both
analyses seem
to
miss one
important
aspect of
the
ordinary concept
of what a person
is:
that
a person
is
a
human being. Whilst
the
concept of
person and
the
concept of
human being
can
be distinguished, in
that they
describe individuals
under
different
sets of properties and characteristics,
it
would seem
that
an adequate account of
the
concept of person should make
it
clear
that
human beings
are persons.
The
ordinary notion of what a person
is
refers
to
everyday people who are
invariable human beings.
103
The
concept of person, or personhood, refers
to
a set of characteristics
which are
typical
of
human beings. These
characteristics, which
include
voli-
tion,
intentionality,
the
ability
to
feel
pain,
joy, depression,
malice
towards
others, moral
feelings
and attitudes, are sometimes extended
to
other entities,
but
this
does
not mean
that
other entities are persons.
They
remain
dogs,
dolphins,
ghosts, or robots.
The fact
that the
characteristics which are
typical
of
human beings
can
be
considered
in isolation from
specific
human beings
and can also
be
attributed
to
other entities,
has led
some philosophers
to
maintain
that the
concept of
person
is
separable
from
that
of
individual human beings.
This
philosophical position
has important
consequences,
in
that
it leads
philosophers
to
maintain
that
personal
identity is
separable
from
the
physical
or
biological identity
of an
individual. If it is
maintained
that the
identity
of
an
individual
as a person
is
the
same as
the
identity
of
that
individual
as a
human being,
or as a self conscious agent,
then
personal
identity
cannot
be
separated
from biological identity. That
this
is
attempted
by
many writers
in
personal
identity' is
a symptom of confusion concerning
the
ontological
nature of
individuals. Such
confusion
is
similar
to
committing
the
fallacy
of
misplaced concreteness, or
hypostatising, insofar
as such writers
take the
qualities and properties of
individuals,
which amount
to their
personalities
and
their
perceived
identity
as persons, and elevate such a collection of pro-
perties
to
a separate
identity,
somehow
independent
of
the
actual
individual
of whom
the
properties are predicated.
'
104
10.3 The Relevance
of
Humanoid
Biology
to
Personhood
Properties
If
one considers the type
of properties and characteristics
which are
deem-
ed
by
philosophers
such as
P. F. Strawson5
and
D. Dennettb (and in
chapters
twelve
and
thirteen, J. Perry, ' D. Parfit, 8 S. Shoemaker,
' D. Wiggins, " T.
Penelhum, "
and
H. D. Lewis, "), it becomes
clear
that
many of
the
properties
which are
taken to
be distinctive
of persons, and
those
which are
important
as
criteria of personal
identity,
are
in fact dependent
upon
the
entity of whom
such properties are predicated
having
a
humanoid biology.
Richard Rorty has
noted
that those
entities
to
whom psychological charac-
teristics
are attributed tend to
bear
some resemblance to
human beings:
Babies
and
the
more attractive sorts of animals are credited
with
"having feelings"
rather
than
(like
photoelectric cells and
animals which no one
feels
sentimental about-e. g.,
flounders
and spiders)
"merely
responding
to
stimuli.
" This is
to
be
ex-
plained on
the
basis
of
that
sort of community
feeling
which
unites us with anything
humanoid. To be humanoid is
to
have
a
human face
...
'"3
Williams' 4 has
noted
that the
predicate
"is
sitting
down"
cannot clearly
be
applied to
an object.
Strawson
cites
the
predicates
"is
sitting
down"
and
"is
coiling a rope" as examples of
the
kind
of
P-Predicate
which
frees
us
from
the
necessity of positing a sort of
Cartesian dualism
on
the
basis
of
"privileg-
ed access.
" However
such predicates
do
not
free
us
from
the
necessity of
positing
that the
entity
to
which
they
are ascribed
be humanoid in biology.
Not
only
is it
the
case
that
such predicates cannot
be
applied
to
objects,
they
cannot
be
ascribed accurately
to
entities with no
legs
or arms.
' S It is
quite
acceptable and meaningful
to
say,
for instance,
that the
book is
sitting on
the
table,
but
such a
form
of
figurative
or analogical
language does
not entail or
imply
that the
book is
an
intentional being. Fishes
cannot coil ropes or sit
105
down,
they
lack
the
requisite
biological form, but
cats may
be
said
to
sit
down,
they
have legs,
and can move
in
a manner similar enough
to
human be-
ings
to
allow
that the
predicate
"is
sitting
down" is being
used
literally
and
not
figuratively
when ascribed
to
cats.
Animals
with mobile
faces,
which appear
to
have
expressions, are at-
tributed
accompanying psychological characteristics.
Thus,
cats,
dogs, koala
bears, horses,
and monkeys, are ascribed
P-Predicates,
whereas
human be-
ings
who are comatose are often
denied
them.
Rorty has
commented
that
personhood
is:
...
a matter of
decision
rather
than
knowledge,
an acceptance
of another
being into fellowship
rather
than
a recognition of a
common essence.
' 6
If
one accepts
Dennett's
analysis of personhood as an attitude or stance
taken towards
an entity, or
Strawson's
analysis
that
a person
is
an entity
to
whom
both P-
and
M-Predicates
are ascribed,
then
one of
the
implicit
condi-
tions
of personhood
is
that the
entity
be humanoid in form. "
It is
not only
that
a person must
be
embodied, as
Strawson
maintains,
but
to
be
the
subject of
the
sorts of predicates commonly attributed
to
persons an
individual
must
be
embodied
in
a certain way, must
have
a
humanoid
physiology.
For instance,
although communication
in language
can
be
facilitated by
technological means,
in
the
"original
speaker-hearer
situation,
"
which
Strawson talks
of,
both
the
speaker and
the
hearer
need
to
have
a specific physiological
construction
in
order
to
be
able
to
emit
the
right
sort of sound, and
to
be
able
to
hear
sounds within a certain
frequency
range.
106
10.4 Conclusion
Is is here
maintained
that
an
individual
can
be
viewed or conceived of
in
different
ways.
The
conception of
individuals
as persons or as
human beings
amount
to
what
the
concept person and
the
concept
human being
mean.
When
there
are changes
in
the
public conception of
individuals
as persons
then the
concept person changes, and
the
properties which are attributed
to
persons change.
However,
this
chapter
has
argued
that
although
the
proper-
ties
of personhood may change, such properties are still attributed
to
in-
dividuals
who are
human beings. Moreover,
the
kinds
of properties which are
attributed
to
persons are
frequently dependent
upon
the
biological form
of
human beings. Should
the
form
of
human beings
change,
then the
concept of
human being
would change also.
In
such circumstances
different
types
of
properties might
be
attributed
to
persons and
to
human beings. It has been
argued
that
even
"intentional"
predicates, which are
thought to
indicate
self-
consciousness on
the
part of
the
subject, are often
dependent for
their
mean-
ing
not only on
the
subject
being
capable of second- or
third-order
reflection,
but
upon
the
subject
having
a
humanoid form.
The
theory that the
personal
identity-the identity
of
the
individual
as per-
son-is somehow separable
from
physical
identity-the identity
of
the
in-
dividual
as a
human being-is
often
thought to
have its
origins
in J. Locke's' $
analysis of personal
identity. Therefore,
chapter eleven will consider
Locke's
analysis of personal
identity,
and the
"memory
criterion" of personal
identi-
ty
which
is
often attributed
to
Locke.
107
NOTES
1. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959).
2. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in A. Rorty (ed. ) The
Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California Press, 1976).
3. See: M. Miri, "Memory
and
Personal Identity, " Mind 82: 1-21 (1973);
P. Kitcher, "Natural Kinds
and
Unnatural Persons, " Philosophy 54:
541-547 (1979); J. Perry, "Can The Self Divide, " J. Phil. 69: 463-488
(1972), "The Importance
of
Being Identical, " in The Identities
of
Per-
sons,
(ed. ) A. Rorty, (University
of
California Press, 1976); "Personal
Identity, Memory
and
the
Problem
of
Circularity, " in Personal Identity
(ed. ) J. Perry, (University
of
California Press, 1975); H. D. Lewis, "Sur-
vival:
Part I, " Proc. Aris. Soc. 49: 211-230 (1975), "Survival
and
Iden-
tity,
" in The Identities
of
Persons, (ed. ) A. Rorty,
op. cit.;
D. Parfit,
"Lewis, Perry
and
What Matters, " in The Identities
of
Persons, (ed. ) A.
Rorty,
op. cit.,
"Personal Identity, " in Personal Identity, (ed. ) J. Perry,
op. cit.,
"Personal Identity
and
Rationality, " Synthese 53: 227-241
(1983); S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " J. Phil. 56:
868-881 (1959), "Embodiment
and
Behavior, " in The Identities
of
Per-
sons,
(ed. ) A. Rorty,
op. cit.
4. See
chapters
twelve
and
thirteen
below for
more
detailed
arguments
about
this
mistake
in
the treatment of personal
identity.
5. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (London: Methuen, 1959).
6. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in A. Rorty (ed. ) The
Identities
of
Person (University
of
California Press, 1976).
7. J. Perry, (ed. ) Personal Identity (University
of
California Press, 1975).
8. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal Identity
(1975).
9. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Per-
sonal
Identity (1975).
10. D. Wiggins, "Locke, Butler
and
the
Stream
of
Consciousness:
and
Men
as
Natural Kind, " in The Identities
of
Persons, (ed. ) A. Rorty, 1976.
108
11. T. Penelhum, "The Importance
of
Self Identity, " J. Phil. 68: 667-678
(1971).
12. H. D. Lewis "Survival
and
Identity, " in A. Rorty (ed. ) The Identities
of
Persons (1976).
13. R. Rorty, Philosophy
and
the
Mirror
of
Nature (Oxford: Blackwell,
1980)
p.
189.
14. B. Williams, Problems
of
the
Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972
(Cambridge University Press, 1973).
15. For
a
discussion
of
the
necessity of
being
embodied, see
R. Reilly, "Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person, " Proc. Amer. Cath. Phil. Assn. 53: 71-77
(1979). Reilly
argues
that
having
a
body is fundamental
to
having
a will.
16. R. Rorty, Philosophy
and
the
Mirror
of
Nature (1980)
p.
38.
17. Contrast
the
analysis given
by P. Kitcher "Natural Kinds
and
Unnatural
Persons, " Philosophy 54: 541-547 (1970). Kitcher
argues
that
such con-
stitutionally
different
entities as computers,
dolphins
or aliens may some
day be
counted as persons.
18. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) P. H.
Nidditch (ed. ) (Oxford University Press, 1975).
109
CHAPTER
ELEVEN
LOCKE'S ACCOUNT
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
11.1 Introduction
0 ne of
the
earliest
discussions
concerning
the
concept of person,
and the
conditions of
identity
of persons,
is found in J. Locke's An Essay Con-
cerning
Human Understanding. ' There
are
two
important features
of
Locke's discussion
which are
frequently
misunderstood.
First, his
use of an
imaginary
example of
the transfer
of one soul
to
another
body. Second, his introduction
of
the
continuity of consciousness as
a criterion of personal
identity. Both features have
echoes
in
modern writing
on personal
identity. The first is
taken to
be
an example of an
identity
swop.
Writers
such as
S. Shoemaker'
take themselves to.
be developing
a
Lockean
tradition
when
they
use examples of
brain
transplants.
The
second
is
taken to
show
that
Locke is
a
"memory
theorist.
" Both
aspects of
Locke's
views are
investigated in
this
chapter.
110
11.2 Public
and
Private Identities
The idea
of a
body-swop, in
which
the
identity
of one person
is
somehow
instantiated in
another
body/person, is
taken to
have its
origins
in Locke's
example of
the
prince and
the
cobbler, which
is frequently
cited as a
demonstration
that
personal
identity (the identity
of a public object),
is
distinct from
physical
identity. In
talking
of
identity, Locke
says
that:
...
the
soul alone,
in
the
change of
bodies,
would scarce
to
any one
but
to
him
that
makes
the
soul
the
man,
be
enough
to
make
the
same man.
For
should
the
soul of a prince, carrying
with
it
the
consciousness of
the
prince's past
life,
enter and
in-
form
the
body
of a cobbler, as soon as
deserted by his
own
soul, everyone sees
he
would
be
the
same person with
the
prince, accountable only
for
the
prince's actions:
but
who
would say
it
was
the
same man?
The body
too
goes
to the
mak-
ing
the
man, and would,
I
guess
to
everybody
determine
the
man
in
this
case; wherein
the
soul, with all
its
princely
thoughts
about
it,
would not make another man:
but he
would
be
the
same cobbler
to
everyone
beside himself. '
In
this
passage,
Locke's
use of
"accountable"
refers
to the
day
of
judge-
ment, when
"the
secrets of all
hearts
shall
be laid
open.
" For Locke,
the
soul
is
accountable on
the
day
of
judgement, but "human laws"
punish according
to the
identity
of
the
man:
Just
as much
the
same person as a man
that
walks, and
does
other
things
in his
sleep,
is
the
same person, and
is
answerable
for
any mischief
he
shall
do in it. 4
Passage 15 is
often cited as an example of an
identity-swop, in
which
the
prince retains
his
personal
identity
although
in
the
body
of
the
cobbler.
However,
as
Locke
makes clear,
the
cobbler with
the
soul of a prince
is
taken
to
be
the
same cobbler
to
everyone
but himself. The
public
identity,
the
iden-
tity
of
the
man who would
be
answerable
to
human laws, is
that
of
the
physical
body,
not
the
soul.
This identity,
which
Locke later
calls
the
human
identity, has
not changed,
but
the
self
identity
of
the
cobbler
has
changed.
(He
thinks
he is
a prince.
)
112
11.3 Confusion in Locke's Treatment
of
Personal Identity
There is
some confusion
in Locke's
treatment
of personal
identity,
which
appears
to
arise
from his
use of
different
criteria at
different
points
in Bk. 2
chapter
27.
Initially, Locke's distinction
makes
it
clear
that
by "same
person"
he
means same self:
But
though the
same
immaterial
substance or soul
does
not
alone
...
make
the
same man; yet
it is
plain, consciousness, as
far
as ever
it
can
be
extended, should
it be
to
ages past, unites
existence and actions, very remote
in
time
into
the
same per-
son, as well as
it does
the
existences and actions of
the
im-
mediately preceding moment; so whatever
has
the
conscious-
ness of present and past actions,
is
the
very same person
to
whom
they
both belong. [my italics]'
And,
according
to
Locke:
Self is
that
conscious
thinking thing,
whatever substance made
up of
...
which
is
sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain,
capable of
happiness
or misery, and so
is
concerned
for itself,
as
far
as
that
consciousness extends.
6
Moreover,
Since
consciousness always accompanies
thinking,
and
it is
that
which makes everyone
to
be
what
he
calls self, and
thereby
distinguishes himself from
all other
thinking things:
in
this
alone consists personal
identity. '
and:
For it being
the
same consciousness
that
makes a man
to
be
himself to
himself,
personal
identity depends
on
that
only
....
For
as
far
as any
intelligent being
can repeat
the
idea
of
113
any past action with
the
same consciousness
it had
of
it
at
first,
and with
the
same consciousness
it has
of any present action; so
far it is
the
same personal self.
'
According
to
Locke,
personal
identity is
the
identity
of self-consciousness,
and
is
equivalent
to the
identity
of self.
But
this
identity is
essentially a
private
identity (until
the
day
of
judgement. ) On Locke's
account, public
identity is
the
identity
of
the
man.
But is
not
the
man
drunk
and sober
the
same person?
Why
else
is he
punished
for
the
fact
that
he
commits when
drunk
though
he be
never afterwards conscious of
it? 9
Locke's
explanation of
this
is
that
human laws:
...
cannot
distinguish
certainly what
is
real, what counterfeit:
and so
the
ignorance in drunkeness
or sleep
is
not admitted as a
plea.
For,
though
punishment
be
annexed
to
personality, and
personality
to
consciousness, and
the
drunkard
perhaps
be
not
conscious of what
he did,
yet
human judicatures justly
punish
him, because
the
fact is
proved against
him, but
the
want of
consciousness cannot
be
proved
for him. [my italics]"
Thus,
personal
(self) identity is
essentially private on
Locke's
account,
whilst
the
identity
of a man and
the
actions
he
commits are public.
Hence,
although a man may
be different
persons when
drunk
or sober,
depending
upon
his
own consciousness
of
his
actions,
he is
punished according
to
what
can
be
proven,
that
is,
what
is
public.
The
confusion
in Locke's
account arises,
in
part,
from
this
distinction,
which
is frequently
overlooked
by
commentators.
For
whilst
the
entity
114
punished
by human laws is
the
man, and
the
particular consciousness of ac-
tions
cannot
be
proved
for
or against,
in
cases
judged by human laws, Locke
later
states
that:
Person,
as
I
take
it, is
the
name of
this
self.
Wherever
a man
finds
what
he
calls
himself
there,
I
think,
another may say
is
the
same person.
It is
a
forensic
term,
appropriating actions
and
their
merit; and so
belongs
only
to
intelligent
agents
capable of
law,
and
happiness,
and misery.
"
Locke's
use of
the term
"forensic"
seems
to
have led
to
some confusion
concerning what
he
means
by
person.
For
saying
that
person
is
a
forensic
term,
appropriating actions and
their
merits, can
be
understood
to
mean
that
person
is
some
kind
of
legal
term,
which
designates
the
individual
to
be
punished.
Yet, Locke has
earlier made
it
clear
that
it is
not
the
person which
is
ac-
countable
to
human justice, but
the
man.
The
person or self
is
accountable
to
God.
Locke
continues:
And
therefore,
conformable
to this, the
apostle
tells
us,
that,
at
the
great
day,
when every one shall
"receive
according
to
his
doings,
the
secrets of all
hearts
shall
be laid
open.
" The
sentence shall
be justified by
the
consciousness all persons shall
have,
that they themselves,
...
are
the
same
that
committed
those
actions, and
deserve
that
punishment
for
them.
12
Thus,
although consciousness cannot
be
proved
in
a
human
court,
it
will
be
revealed on
the
day
of
judgement. As
a
"forensic term,
"
person
is
not
the
en-
tity
held
accountable
in
public
life, but is
equivalent
to
a soul or self con-
sciousness which
is
accountable
to
God.
Locke's
account of personal
identity is
not concerned with reidentifying
people,
it does
not give conditions
for judging
a person
to
be
the
same person
over
time.
Rather,
his
account
is
concerned with
the
unity of consciousness.
115
11.4 Misunderstandings
of
Locke's Criteria
There
are
two
misunderstandings of
Locke's
account of personal
identity
which are prevalent
in
modern works'
3
on personal
identity. Locke is
taken to
be
presenting psychological criteria, which are used
(a)
as criteria
for
the
reidentification of
individuals,
and
(b)
as criteria upon which
judgements
of
the accountability of an
individual for
past actions
is based;
criteria used
when
determining
whether
to
reward or punish someone.
Thus,
philosophers such as
J. Perry
assume
that
Locke is
a
"memory
theorist.
" Perry
states
that:
Locke
suggested
that
A is
the
same person as
B if
and only
if A
can remember
having
an experience of
B's. ' 4
Similarly, S. Shoemaker
considers puzzle cases of
"bodily
transfer,
"
one
of which
he
attributes
to
Locke. ' S In
these
puzzle cases, memory
is
the
main
criterion of personal
identity.
Considerable
attention
has been
paid,
in discussions
of per-
sonal
identity,
to
so-called
"puzzle
cases,
"
ostensible cases
of
what
I
will call
"bodily transfer"
....
Locke, it
may
be
recall-
ed,
thought
it
conceivable
that the
soul of a prince might
"enter
and
inform" the
body
of a cobbler,
"carrying
with
it
the
consciousness
of
the
prince's past
life, "
and said
that
if
this
happened the
cobbler would
become "the
same person with
the
prince accountable
only
for
the
prince's past actions.
"' 6
Both Perry
and
Shoemaker
are representative
of a
tradition
which
understands
Locke to
be
offering criteria
for
the
reidentification
of persons.
In
this tradition
Locke
is
taken to
be
advocating
the
primacy of psychological
criteria, and amongst
such criteria,
the
primacy of memory,
in determining
personal
identity.
JOH
V
RYLANU.,
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY OF
MANCHESTER
116
The
tradition
is based
upon a misreading of
Locke. First (as
shown above)
Locke is discussing
the
identity
of a private entity, which
he
calls variously
person, self, or soul, and not a public entity.
The few
remarks
Locke
makes
about
the
public
identity
of an
individual
show
that
it is
the
identity
of
the
man which constitutes
the
public
identity,
and
hence
the
criteria
for
reiden-
tification
of
the
public entity,
the
man, are physical criteria.
(See
above.
)
Locke
states, moreover,
that these
public criteria are
"justly"
used
in
determining
whether an
individual is
to
be
punished
for
past actions.
Second it is
not clear
that
it is
memory which
Locke is
using as
the
criterion
for identifying
person, or self.
Certainly,
memory
is
not
the
criterion used
to
reidentify
individuals;
the
psychological criteria proposed
by Locke (which
may
include
memory) are concerned with
the
continuity of consciousness,
the
identity
of
the
self.
And Locke does
not
talk
of memory as
the
criterion of
self
identity, but
rather of consciousness as
the
criterion of person.
117
11.5 Memory
as a
Lockean Criterion
of
Personal Identity
Citing
passages
27.9
and
27.17
of
the
Essay, Margaret Atherton
observes
that:
The first
thing to
notice about
these
passages
is
that
Locke
nowhere uses
the
words
"memory"
or
"remember. " In fact,
this
is
generally
the
case
throughout
his discussion
of personal
identity. He
speaks, as
he does here,
only of
consciousness
....
Locke
says
it is
thanks to
consciousness
that
a person
is
a
person, and
there
is
reason
to
understand
him here
as saying
that
memory creates a present self.
"
According
to
Atherton,
when
Locke
talks
of consciousness
being
extended
backwards (in
time,
) he is
not
talking
of memory.
So,
as
for instance
when
Locke
says
that:
...
as
far
as
this
consciousness can
be
extended
backwards
to
any past actions or
thought,
so
far
reaches
the
identity
of
that
person.
' 8
he is
not
talking
of memory
in
the
sense usually attributed
to
him,
that
is,
that
we can reidentify a person
by
establishing whether
that
person can remember
certain past events, and so
forth,
as
Perry' 9 has formulated, (see
above).
Rather, Locke is
talking
of
the
continuity of consciousness.
Locke
claims
that:
Personality
extends
itself beyond
present existence
to
what
is
past, only
by
consciousness, whereby
it becomes
concerned and
accountable, owns and
imputes
to
itself
past actions,
just
upon
the
same ground and
for
the
same reason
that
it does
the
pre-
sent.
20
118
Since
personality
becomes
accountable
for
past actions on
the
same
grounds as
for
the
present,
it is
reasonable
to
assume
that there
are not
two
conditions of personal
identity-memory
when past actions are concerned,
and consciousness when present actions are under consideration.
On Locke's
account,
there
is
one condition of
identity,
and
that
is
that
it is
the
same con-
sciousness which
is
extended
in
time.
In Locke's
account consciousness con-
stitutes
the
self.
119
11.6 Locke's Types
of
Identity
Early in
chapter
27, Locke distinguishes
different
types
of
identity:
...
it being
one
thing to
be
the
same substance, another the
same man, and a
third the
same person.
Z'
A
material object
is
the
same
if
there
is
no change
in its
physical construction:
The
same will
hold
of every particle of matter,
to
which no ad-
dition
or subtraction of matter
being
made,
it is
the
same.
22
However,
the
identity
of
living
things,
plants, animals, and man, consists
not
in
their
remaining
the
same material objects,
but in
their
"partaking
of
the
same
life. " Locke
says
that the
identity
of
the
same man consists
in:
...
nothing
but
a participation of
the
same continued
life, by
fleeting
particles of matter,
in
succession vitally united
to the
same organised
body. 23
The identity
of
the
person
is differentiated from
that
of
the
man.
Whilst
Locke
makes
it
clear
that the
same man
is
the
same
body,
united
by
partaking
in
one
life,
a person
is
the
same consciousness, united
by being
or partaking
in
the
same consciousness.
Locke is distinguishing between
what
is
meant
by being
the
same con-
sciousness, which
is
the
condition of personal
identity,
and
the
activity of
reflection, of
being
conscious of:
But
what which seems
to
make
the
difficulty is
this, that this
consciousness
being interrupted
always
by forgetfulness,
there
being
no moment of our
lives
wherein we
have
the
whole
train
of all our past actions
before
our eyes
in
one view,
but
even
the
best
memories
losing
the
sight of one part whilst
they
are view-
ing
another; and we sometimes, and
that the
greatest part of
120
our
lives,
not reflecting on our past selves,
being intent
on our
present
thoughts,
and
in
sound sleep
having
no
thoughts
at all,
or at
least
none with
that
consciousness
which remarks our
waking
thoughts; I
say,
in
all
these
cases, our consciousness
be-
ing interrupted,
and we
losing
sight of our past selves,
doubts
are raised whether we are
the
same
thinking thing
....
Which,
however
reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal
identity
at all.
As,
...
different
substances,
by
the
same consciousness
(where
they
do
partake
in it) being
united
into
one person, as well as
different bodies by
the
same
life
are united
in
one animal.
24
From
this
it is
clear
that
Locke does
not
intend
that
memory
be
taken
as a
criterion of personal
identity,
the
identity
of a person
is
to
be found in
the
continuity of one consciousness.
Margaret Atherton
understands
Locke's
position
to
be:
...
that
what makes me
different
at
this
moment
from
any
other person
is
that
my
thoughts
are
identical
with my con-
sciousness of
them.
No
one else can
have
my consciousness,
any more
than
any organism can
have
my
life. Even if
the two
of us
have
the
same
idea
of red, we
have it
via a
different
con-
sciousness.
Thus
consciousness,
like life for
an organism.
is
the
individuating feature
of a person, present
from
the
beginning
of
the
person.
25
121
11.7 Conclusion
In his discussion
of personal
identity, it is
clear
from
the text that
Locke is
not
talking
of
the
public
identity
of an
individual
when
he
talks
of
the
person
or self.
He does
not put
forward
criteria
for
the
reidentification of persons,
which must
be in
some sense public criteria;
the
public
identification
and
reidentification of
individuals,
and
the
judgement
of accountability of
that
individual for
past actions, are
both based
on
the
identity
of
that
individual
as
"man. "
According
to
Locke,
the
identity
of a man
is
established
by
the
use of
criteria concerning spatio-temporal continuity;
the
individual is
the
same
man
if he is
the
same organism, partaking of
the
same
life.
The identity
of
the
individual
as self concerns
the
individual
partaking of
the
same consciousness
through time.
This is
a
"private" identity in
that
it
cannot
be
proved, nor
the
"want"
of
it be
proved
for
or against
the
in-
dividual in
a
human
court.
The
only conditions under which such an
identity
becomes known
to
another
is
on
the
day
of
judgement. Moreover,
the
identi-
ty
of
the
individual
as man or as person cannot
be
established
by
considering
memory claims.
As Locke
points out,
there
are
lapses in
memory within
the
life
of an
individual.
Although it becomes
clear, on close reading of chapter
27
of
Locke's Essay
Concerning
the
Human Understanding, that
Locke did distinguish between
what
determines
the
public
identity
of
the
individual, "the
man,
"
and what
determines
the
identity
of
the
self or private
individual, "the
person,
"
the
distinction is
obscured
by Locke's
use of
the
word
"person"
to
mean entity
whose
identity is
assured
by
partaking of
the
same consciousness
through
time.
The
use of
the
word
"person" in
this
way, coupled with
Locke's
confusing
definition
of
"person"
as a
"forensic term,
" has led
to
a
tradition,
mistaken-
ly
thought to
be Lockean,
in
which personal
identity is
thought to
be
established
by
the
use of psychological
criteria.
122
This
tradition
has led
to
a
discussion
of personal
identity in
terms
of
psychological and physical criteria of
identity. Some
philosophers
have
developed
what
is
mistakenly
thought to
be
a
Lockean
tradition
by
arguing
that
not only
is
personal
identity distinct from
physical
identity, but
that
per-
sonal
identity depends
upon psychological criteria
in
a way
in
which physical
identity does
not.
This
work maintains
that the
questions concerning psychological versus
physical criteria
for
personal
identity,
and
the
problems which ensue
therefrom,
arise
from
a misunderstanding of
the
nature of
individuals
and
the
ways
in
which
individuals
are
thought
of, and perceived
by
others and
by
themselves.
Therefore,
the
next chapter
investigates
some modern philosophical
writing on personal
identity,
with particular regard
to the
psychological/physical criteria question, and some of
the
problems which
arise
in
the
use of such a
dichotomy
when
discussing
the
identity
conditions
for,
or
the
nature of,
individuals.
123
NOTES
1. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) (ed. )
P. H. Nidditch (Oxford University Press, 1975).
2. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Per-
sonal
Identity (University
of
California Press, 1975).
3. J. Locke, Essay (2nd
edition)
(1694)
chapter
27: 15.
4. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 22.
5. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 16.
6. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 17.
7. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 9.
8. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 10.
9. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 22.
10. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 22.
11. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 26.
12. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 26.
13. Such
work,
includes
articles cited above
by S. Shoemaker, J. Perry, B.
Williams
and
A. Quinton.
14. J. Perry, "Personal Identity, Memory,
and
the
Problem
of
Circularity"
in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal Identity (University
of
California Press, 1975)
p.
135.
15. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Per-
sonal
Identity.
16. Ibid.,
p.
121.
17. M. Atherton, "Locke's Theory
of
Personal Identity, " Midwest Stud.
Phil. (1983)
p.
274.
18. J. Locke, Essay,
ch.
27: 9.
124
19. J. Perry, "Personal Identity, Memory,
and
the
Problem
of
Circularity. "
20. J. Locke, Essay,
ch.
27: 26.
21. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 7.
22 Ibid.,
ch.
27: 2.
23. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 6.
24. Ibid.,
ch.
27: 10.
25. M. Atherton, "Locke's Theory
of
Personal Identity, " Midwest Stud.
t
Phil. (1983)
p.
283.
125
CHAPTER
TWELVE
PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA OF
PERSONAL IDENTITY
12.1 Introduction
his
chapter
looks
at several
discussions
of personal
identity
which use
fictional
examples
to
investigate
physical and psychological criteria of
personal
identity. The distinction
which was outlined
in
chapter eleven,
bet-
ween public and private
identity, is highlighted. It is further
suggested
that
many
fictional
examples are underdescribed, and
that
characteristics which
are
taken to
be
purely psychological
turn
out on
investigation
to
be
capable
of
instantiation
only
in
certain
types
of physical
bodies.
126
12.2 J. Perry
and
Body Swops
J. Perry
opens
his introduction
to
"The Problem
of
Personal Identity"
(1975),
with
the
following
story:
Imagine
the
following. Elected
to the
Senate from
your
home
state, you
have become
a
key
member of
the
Committee
on
Health, Education,
and
Welfare. This
committee meets
tomor-
row
to
vote on a
bill
to
fund
a
feasibility
study of a new method
for
manufacturing shoes, which
is
alleged
to
produce a
high
quality,
inexpensive
shoe
that
never wears out.
Your
support of
the
bill is
essential;
it has faced
the
bitter
and unflagging op-
position of
the
American Cobblers Association (ACA), led by
their
high
pressure
lobbyist, Peter Pressher,
and a number of
committee members
intend
to
vote against
it.
The
morning of
the
committee vote you wake up, open your
eyes, and glance at
the
clock on
the
shelf
beyond
the
bed.
Something is
strange.
The bump in
the
covers you
take to
be
your
feet
seems strangely
distant. As
you get out of
bed
you
hit
your
head
on a shelf
that
used
to
be
a good
three
or
four inches
above
it. You
notice you are wearing a
leather
apron, which
you are certain you
didn't
wear
to
bed. Puzzled,
you go
to the
mirror.
Staring
out you see not your
familiar
clean-shaven
face
and squatty
body, but
the
strapping
frame
and
bearded
countenance of
Peter Pressher.
You don't know
what
to think.
Are
you
dreaming? Is
this
some
kind
of a
trick?
But
you perform various
tests to
eliminate
these
possibilities.
No doubt
can remain:
the
body
you
have looks just like
the
body Peter Pressher
normally
has;
it
seems
to
be
that
very
body.
Hearing laughter,
you
turn toward
your
living
room.
There
on
the
sofa sits a person who
looks
exactly
like
you.
That is
ex-
actly
like
you used
to
look, down
to the
inevitable
magenta
hollyhock (your
state's
flower) in
the
lapel. Before
you can
speak,
he
says,
"Surprised, Senator? I've
made sacrifices
for
the
Cobblers
before. Getting
this
squatty
body
must
take the
prize.
But I'll
vote
to
kill
that
bill
this
afternoon, and
it
will
be
worth
it
...
"
127
He
speaks with your own
deep
and resonant voice,
but
the
syntax and
the
fanatic
overtones are unmistakably those
of...
"Peter Pressher!
...
"
"Right, Senator, it's
me.
But
as
far
as
the
rest of
the
world
will ever
know, it's
really you.
We
snuck
into
your apartment
last
night and my
brother Bimbo,
the
brain
surgeon, carefully
removed your
brain
and put
it in
my
body-or
should
I
say
your
body. And
vice-versa.
It's
a new operation
he's
pioneer-
ing; he
calls
it
a
"body-transplant.
"
"You'll
never get away with
it
...
"
"Forget it. You have
two
choices.
You
can go around telling
people
that
you're you,
in
which case
I
will sue you and my
family,
thinking they
are your
family,
will sign papers
to
have
you put away.
Or
you can start acting
like
me-become
Peter
Pressher-we
think
you'd make a good
lobbyist. Almost
as
good a
lobbyist
as
I'll
make a senator!
"'
Perry
uses
this
story
to
demonstrate how
puzzle cases, of which
this
is
an
example,
"Seem
to
disprove
the
view
that
a person
is just
a
live body. "' He
suggests
further
that:
If
we can
have
the
same person on
two
different
occasions
when we
don't have
the
same
live body,
then
it
seems
that
a
person cannot
be identified
with
his body,
and personal
identi-
ty
cannot
be identified
with
bodily identity. '
The
emphasis
in Perry's
story
is
on public
identity. The
motivation
behind
Peter Pressher's
transplant
operation
is
the
desire
to
acquire a
different,
specific public
identity.
The
purpose of
the
exercise
(the body-swop)
would
be foiled
should
Pressher
also undergo a change of self
identity. There
would
be
no point
in
his
assuming
the
public
identity
of
the
senator
if he
also acquired
the
senator's private
identity,
that
is, if he
acquired
the
psychological
characteristics,
the
intentions, desires, hopes,
and memories of
the
senator.
128
Thus, far from demonstrating
that
personal
identity is distinct from bodily
identity, Perry's
story relies on
the
fact
that
public
identity is
taken to
be
bodily identity.
The
object of
the
"body-transplant"
operation will only
be
achieved
if
the
committee members
believe
that the
person
debating
the
funding
of a
feasibility
study
is
the
senator.
From
the
public point of view,
the
person
must
be
taken to
be identical
with
the
physical entity
for
the
ruse
to
work.
If it
were
the
case
that the
identity
of an
individual
was
dependent
upon
the
psychological characteristics of
that
individual (including
their
hopes, fears,
intentions,
and preferences),
then
Peter Pressher
could not
hope
to
vote on
the
issue
of
fund
raising at all.
His
attitude
towards the
bill
would reveal
his identity
to
be
that
of
Peter
Pressher,
who
is
not entitled
to
vote.
There
would
be
no point
in his
acquiring
the
body
of
the
senator.
129
12.3 Two Notions
of
Personal Identity
Perry's
story4 makes use of
two
different
notions of personal
identity,
one
concerning
the
public
identity
of an
individual,
which relies upon
the
reiden-
tification
of
the
person according to
physical criteria, the
other using
psychological criteria, which are essentially private.
That
this
is
so can
be
seen
by looking
at one of
the
remarks made
by
one of
Perry's
characters, who
says
that,
"...
as
far
as
the
rest of
the
world will ever
know, it's
really
you.
"5
The
story,
however, highlights
the
importance
of psychological character-
istics in inter-personal
affairs.
What
really matters
in
the
story are
the
desires
and
intentions
of
the two
characters, and
these
depend
upon what sort of per-
son each of
the two
characters
is.
Thus,
the
personalities of
the
characters are
important
to
others.
What is
important
about
the
identities
of
the two
individuals is
the
particular
character
traits
each
displays. Other
people
(such
as
those
who make up
the
electorate)
judge
the
future
actions of
the
individuals
concerned on
the
basis
of
their
character
traits.
But
these
are
the
character
traits
of
the
individual
identified
according
to
physical criteria.
So,
the
senator
is in
a position
to
make an
important
public
decision,
which
will materially affect
the
lives
of others, as a result of
his being
the
kind
of
person
he is,
and
having
the
personality
he does have. The
voters
in his home
state presume continuity of personality when
they
elect
him,
and
in
this
sense
the
personalities of
the
senator and
the
lobbyist
are public; such personalities
are revealed
in
actions which are
both
observable and observed
by
others,
and which reveal
decisions
and choices made
by
the
respective
individuals.
Should
the
voters
discover
that the
individual identified
as
the
senator
does
not
take
decisions
according
to the
previously perceived personality, or avow-
ed
intentions,
they
simply will not re-elect
him. It is
unlikely
that
anyone
would question
his identity, just
the
consistency
and continuity of
his
per-
sonality.
130
Thus,
although the
psychological characteristics of an
individual
are
im-
portant,
there
are problems
in
constructing a
theory
of personal
identity in
terms
of such
traits,
alone;
that
is independent
of physical
identity.
It
would seem
that
puzzle cases which
involve body
transfers
demonstrate
the
importance
of continuity of personality
in human
affairs,
but fail
to
establish
that
identity
can
be judged in
terms
of psychological characteristics
alone.
It is
quite possible
for
an
individual
to
undergo a radical change of
personality whilst retaining
the
same
identity,
as,
for instance, in
cases of
"conversion, " ("Born-Again" Christians,
as an example.
)
Problem
cases arise when an
individual
not only appears
to
possess a
dif-
ferent
personality,
but
also seems
to
have different
memories.
But
even
in
such cases,
the
decision, if
there
is
one, concerning
the
identity
of
the
in-
dividual, is
made according
to
physical criteria.
For
example, one might
hear
of
the
curious case of
John Smith,
who seems
to
remember
being Mozart,
and
is
suddenly able
to
write extraordinary music with great ease,
but
the
psychologists and
the
musicologists, et.
A,
who visit, or correspond with
Mr. Smith, do
not address
their
letters
to
Mr. Mozart. '
131
12.4 Two Meanings
of
"Same Person"
There
are
two
kinds
of answer
to the
question,
"Is he
the
same person?
"
One
assumes
the
numerical
identity
of
the
individual
concerned,
but
ques-
tions the
continuity of personality.
The
other
does
not assume numerical
identity; in
these
cases more
than
one
individual is involved. Puzzle
cases
often
ignore
the
question as
to
how
the
identity
of
the
second or
third
in-
dividual is,
or
has been,
established.
For
example,
if it
were
to
be
accepted
that
somehow one person, say
Mr. Smith,
really
is Mozart, despite
the
physical evidence
that
he is Mr. Smith,
a question remains concerning
the
criteria upon which
the
identity
of
Mozart
was or
is
established.
The
sceptic
may argue
that
since
Mozart
was a
human being,
and as a member of
the
class of
homo
sapiens, one of
the
properties of which
is
mortality, a
limited
life-span, he
could not
be
alive
today.
Witnesses
to
Mozart's death
could
be
cited
to
show
that
Smith
cannot claim
to
be
the
human being
called
Mozart.
Bernard Williams
addresses
this
problem
in "Personal Identity
and
In-
dividuation, " (1973),
where
he
argues
that:
...
bodily identity is
always a necessary condition of personal
identity. '
According to
Williams,
psychological characteristics
and memory can only
be
used as criteria of
identity
where such
identity has
previously
been
established
by
physical, observable criteria.
When discussing
the adequacy of
memory as a criterion of
identity, Williams draws
attention
to two
features
of
memory:
(I) To
say
"A
remembers x,
"
without
irony
or
inverted
com-
mas,
is
to
imply
that
x really
happened;
in
this
respect,
"remember"
is
parallel
to
"know. "
(II) It does
not
follow from
this,
nor
is it
true, that
all claims
to
remember,
any more
than all claims
to
know,
are veridical;
for,
not everything
one seems
to
remember
is
something one really
remembers.
'
132
Williams describes
an
imaginary
case of a man
(Charles),
who suddenly
undergoes a radical change of character, and claims
to
remember witnessing
certain events and
doing
certain
things
of which
he had
no earlier
knowledge.
Regarding
this
case,
Williams
points out
that:
By
principle
(II),
we
have
no reason without corroborative
evidence of some
kind
to
believe Charles
when
he
now claims
to
remember
A
or
E;
so we must set about checking.
9
In
order
to
check
Charles'
memory claims, we need
to
discover if
there
are
any public records of
the
events, and of
Charles'
presence at
the time.
But
such corroboration of
Charles'
memory claims
involves
evidence
that
Charles
was physically present at
the time.
As Williams
remarks:
We
are
trying to
prise
apart "bodily"
and
"mental"
criteria;
but
we
find
that the
normal operation of one
"
mental"
criterion
involves
the
"bodily"
one.
1
If
the
events
Charles
claims
to
have
witnessed were unwitnessed,
then the
explanation of
Charles'
memory claims might
have
to
be
made
in
terms
of
clairvoyance.
However, if
the
events were witnessed:
...
we could
begin
to
advance
to the
idea
that
Charles had
a
new
identity, because
we would
have
the
chance of
finding
someone
for him to
be identical
with.
"
Williams
next supposes
that
Charles'
memory claims
fit
the
life history
of
Guy Fawkes. However,
when
it
comes
to
Charles
claiming
he is Guy Fawkes,
Williams
points out
that:
...
it is logically
impossible that two
persons should
(correct-
ly)
remember
being the
man who
did A
or saw
E; but it is
not
logically
impossible that two
different
persons should claim
to
remember
being
this
man, and
this
is
the
most we can get.
' z
133
In
other words, whilst veridical memory might
individuate
persons,
memory claims cannot.
It is
possible
for
two
people
to
make similar or
"iden-
tical"
memory claims.
Whilst "we
can
draw
a
distinction between identity
and exact similarity,
"
in
the
case of material objects,
this
distinction
cannot
be
made
in
the
case of
character.
Williams
explains
that this
is because:
...
to
say
that
A
and
B have
the
same character
is just
to
say
that
A's
character
is
exactly similar
to
B's.
Moreover,
...
if
we are
to
describe Charles'
relation
to
Guy Fawkes in
terms
of exact similarity of everything except
the
body,
we are
going
to
have difficulty in finding
a suitable
description in
terms
of
his
memory claims.
We
cannot say
that
he has
the
same memories as
Guy Fawkes
...
nor can we say
that the
memory claims
he
makes are
the
same as
those
made
by Guy
Fawkes,
as we
have little idea
of what memory claims
Fawkes
in fact
made, or
indeed,
of
how
much
he
at various
times
remembered.
' 3
Not
only are we
ignorant
of
Fawkes'
memory claims,
in
order
to
describe
Charles'
memories as
fitting Fawkes' life
we must
know
what
Fawkes did,
and
...
what
Fawkes
did
could only
be known by
references
to
witnesses of
Fawkes'
activities, and
these
witnesses must
have
seen
Fawkes' body. In
order
for
their
accounts
to
be
connected
into
the
history
of one person,
it is
necessary
to
rely upon
the
continuity of
this
body. 14
134
According
to
Williams, Charles' identity
cannot
be decided
on grounds of
his
memory claims.
Such
memory claims must
be
corroborated, and can only
be
corroborated according
to
evidence
based
on witness of some
body being
present at certain events or
doing
certain actions.
Given
that this
is
so,
We
can
...
say
that
Charles has
the
same character, and
the
same supposed past as
Fawkes;
which
is just
the
same as
to
say
that they
are
in
these
respects exactly similar.
This is
not
to
say
that they
are
identical
at all.
The
only case
in
which
identity
and exact similarity could
be distinguished
...
is
that
of
the
body-"same body"
and
"exactly
similar
body"
really
do
mark a
difference. Thus I
should claim
that
omission of
the
body
takes
away all content
from
the
idea
of personal
identity. ' S
135
12.5 Physical Instantiation
of
Personal Identity
There is
a
further
problem
in
trying to
isolate
psychological characteristics
from
physical
identity,
and use
the
former
as criteria
for
personal
identity.
This
problem concerns
how far
the
character of an
individual is instantiated
physically.
Whether
one
individual's
character could
be instantiated in
a
dif-
ferent individual's body is
open
to
question.
There
may not
be
too
much
dif-
ficulty in imagining
the
characters of
identical
twins
being
revealed
to
be in
each other's
bodies (in how
many such cases would anyone notice anything
different? ),
since
the
bodies
of
identical
twins
are exactly similar,
though
not
identical. But how
could
the
character of, say, a professional
footballer be in-
stantiated
in
the
body
of a grandmother crippled
by
arthritis?
Body
transfer thought
experiments are often underdescribed.
Commenting
on
Shoemaker's famous "Brownson" body-swop, A. Rorty
asks:
Won't Brown's
passion
for dancing
the
flamenco be
affected
by
the
discomfort
of expressing
it in Robinson's hulking,
lumbering body? Suppose Robinson's body
suffers
from
an
overproduction of adrenalin: will
Brownson's
memories
take
on an
irascible
tone?
' 6
Williams
makes a similar point when
discussing
the
idea
of a
body-swop
between
the
emperor and
the
peasant:
How
would
the
peasant's gruff
blasphemies be
uttered
in
the
emperor's cultivated
tones,
or
the
emperor's witticisms
in
the
peasant's growl?
...
the
emperor's
body
might
include
the
sort of
face
that
just
could not express
the
peasant's morose
suspiciousness,
the
peasant's a
face
no expression of which
could
be
taken
for
one of
fastidious
arrogance.
"
As Williams
remarks:
...
when we are asked
to
distinguish
a man's personality
from
his body,
we
do
not really
know
what
to
distinguish from
what.
' I
136
12.6 Memory
and
Self Identity
Allowing
that
psychological traits
and memory are not sufficient criteria
for
the
establishment of personal
identity, it
might still
be
argued that there
is
a special sense
in
which
they
are criteria
by
which an
individual
can establish
self
identity.
Shoemaker
explains
that:
...
it is
when one considers
the
way one
knows,
or seems
to
know,
one's own
identity
that
it becomes
plausible
to
regard
personal
identity
as something
logically independent
of
bodily
identity. One does
not
have
to
observe, or
(it
seems)
know
anything about,
the
present state of one's
body in
order
to
make past
tense
statements about oneself on
the
basis
of
memory.
' 9
Shoemaker
appears
to
be
making a case
for
memory as a criterion of self
identity;
that
is, for
the
particular nature of
the
individual
as s/he experiences
her/his
self as a conscious
being. But it is
only
in
the
sense
that
an
individual
directly
experiences conscious states, whether
these
states are memory states
or physical states, and
does
not need
to
observe
them, that
such a case can
be
made.
As
the
individual
cannot
directly
experience
the
conscious states of anyone
else,
there
is
no question of
differentiating between directly
experienced
states which
"belong
to" that
individual
and
those
"belonging
to"
another.
Whatever is directly
experienced
is
an experience of
that
individual. Hence,
there
can
be
no question of
differentiation,
and where
there
is
no
differentia-
tion, there
is
no
identity.
137
Moreover,
should a case arise wherein an
individual has doubts
about
his
personal
identity,
memory will not serve as a criterion upon which
to
make a
decision
concerning
the
identity
of
that
individual.
As Williams
demonstrates:
Suppose
a man
to
have had
previously some set of memories
S,
and now a
different
set,
Si. This
would presumably
be
the
situation
in
which
he
should set about using
the
criterion
to
decide
the
question of
his identity. But
this
cannot
be
so,
for
when
he has
memories
S,
and again when
he has
memories
S1,
he is in
no
doubt
about
his identity,
and so
the
question
does
not even occur
to
him. For it
to
occur
to
him, he
would
have
to
have S
and
SI
at
the
same
time,
and so
S
would
be included in
S1,
which
is
contrary
to the
hypothesis
that they
are,
in
the
rele-
vant sense,
different. 2
Even if
there
were some sense
in
which an
individual
could
have incompati-
ble
memories, s/he could not make any
decisions
about
her/his
own
identity,
based
on memories; s/he would
have
to
ask others, or
discover by
means of
some
"objective"
record, which set of memories constituted
her/his identity.
An individual
remembering
his/her
own past action,
for instance
of
jump-
ing
the
high jump, does
not remember witnessing
the
action,
but doing it. It is
not
the
case
that
s/he remembers someone
jumping
and can
identify
that
per-
son.
S/he does
not remember someone
jumping, but
rather recalls
doing
something.
S/he does
not
have
a
"third
person" view of
the
event,
does
not
know, for instance,
what
the
jumping
action
looked like. Since
s/he
does
not
witness
the
jump
nor see
the
jumper,
there
is
no
basis
upon which s/he could
identify
the
jumper. In
this
sense, one
does
not make
judgements
of
identity
concerning oneself.
As Shoemaker
remarks:
...
while
it is
true that
one
does
not use
bodily identity
as a
criterion when one says on
the
basis
of memory
that
one
did
something
in
the
past,
this
is
not
because
one uses something
else as a criterion,
but it is
rather
because
one uses no criterion
at all.
2'
138
12.7
Conclusion
It
would appear
that
physical
identity,
the
identity
of
the
individual
as a
biological
entity,
the
human being, is, in fact,
the
criterion which
is
used
when making
judgements
concerning personal
identity. ',
Thus, just
as an adequate analysis of
the
concept of person
includes
a
description
of
the
properties and characteristics which are
typical
of
human
beings,
so an analysis of
the
identity
of a particular person
includes
the
iden-
tity
of a particular
biological
organism.
The
general characteristics of persons
are revealed
in human beings
and
in
their
actions, and
the
particular
identity
of a person
is instantiated in
a particular
body.
139
NOTES
1. J. Perry, "The Problem
of
Personal Identity, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal
Identity (University
of
California Press, 1975)
pp.
3-4
2. Ibid.,
p.
5
3. Ibid.,
p.
5
4. Ibid.,
pp.
3-4
5. Ibid.,
p.
3
6. For
an alternative analysis of memory and personal
identity,
see
R. Puc-
cetti,
"Memory
and
Self Identity: A Neuropathological Approach, "
Philosophy 52: 147-153 (1977). Puccetti
argues
that the
"self-concept"
(if
not self
identity
through time)
can survive memory
loss.
7. B. Williams, "Personal Identity
and
Individualism, " in Problems
of
the
Self (Cambridge University Press, 1973)
p.
1
8. Ibid.,
p.
3
9. Ibid.,
p.
5
10. Ibid.,
p.
5
11. Ibid.,
p.
6
12. Ibid.,
p.
8
13. Ibid.,
pp.
9-10
14. Ibid.,
p.
10
15. Ibid.,
p.
10
140
16. A. Rorty, The Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California Press,
1976)
p.
3
17. B. Williams, "Personal Identity
and
Individuation"
(1973)
p.
12
18. Ibid.,
p.
12
19. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Per-
sonal
Identity (1975)
p.
123
20. B. Williams, "Personal Identity
and
Individuation" (1973)
p.
13
21. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " (1975)
p.
124
22. For further
examples of
different
views on
the
criteria of personal
identi-
ty,
see:
L. N. Oaklander, "Perry, Personal Identity
and
the
`Characteristic' Way, " Metaphilosophy 15: 35-44 (1984); K. Wallace,
"Shoemaker
and
Personal Identity, " Personalist 54: 71-74; B. Smart,
"Personal Identity in
an
Organised Parcel, " Phil. Stud. 24: 420-423
(1973); J. Morreall, "My Body, My Memory
and
Me, " Phil. Stud.
(Ireland) 28: 221-228 (1981).
141
CHAPTER
THIRTEEN
PARFIT'S THEORY OF PERSONAL
IDENTITY
13.1 Introduction
This
chapter outlines
the
views put
forward by Parfit in "Personal Iden-
tity,
"'
concerning
the
non-importance of personal
identity. Parfit
argues
that
what matters about personal
identity is
survival and a certain rela-
tionship
of psychological connectedness.
Like Perry
and
Shoemaker (and
many others),
Parfit
uses
imaginary
ex-
amples to
demonstrate
that
identity is
not
important. It is
argued,
in
this
chapter, that the
examples which
Parfit
uses are severely underdescribed,
to
the
extent
that the
entities which
he is describing
are
totally
unlike
human be-
ings
or persons
in important
respects, and
thus
cannot
be
used as examples on
which
to
build
a
theory
of personal
identity.
142
13.2 The Non-Importance
of
Personal Identity
Whilst Williams
concludes
that
physical
identity
is
a necessary
condition
of
personal
identity, ' Derek Parfit
argues that
personal
identity
is
not
impor-
tant.
According
connectedness.
"
to
Parfit
what
is important
is "psychological
Parfit
opens
his discussion in "Personal Identity"
by
observing that
we
can
imagine
cases which
"...
are not covered
by
the
criteria of personal
identity
that
we actually use.
"' For Parfit,
these
imaginary
cases
demonstrate
that
sometimes questions of
identity
of persons
have
no answer, and
that
it is
not
important
that there
should
be
an answer
in
terms
of
identity.
As he
observes of nations and machines:
Our
criteria of
identity
of
these
do
not cover certain cases.
No
one
thinks that
in
these
cases
the
questions
"Is it
the
same na-
tion?
"
or
"Is it
the
same machine?
"
must
have
answers.
4
Parfit
appears
to
be drawing
an analogy
between
the
concept of a person
and
the
concept of a nation
(one
which
he
reiterates
in later
publications.
)'
He is
assuming
that
person
is in
some sense a conventional concept,
that
a
person
is
what we
decide it
to
be. 6
Parfit
claims
that
belief in
particular
identities
may
be
the
result of
belief in
self
identity,
that
some people:
...
believe
that the
nature of
their
own
identity
through time
is,
somehow, such as
to
guarantee
that
in
these
cases questions
about
their
identity
must
have
answers.
This belief
might
be
ex-
pressed as
follows: "Whatever happens between
now and any
future
time,
either
I
shall still exist, or
I
shall not.
Any future
experience will either
be
my experience or
it
will not.
"'
This belief is
not really a
belief
about personal
identity but
rather a
belief
about
the
continuity of consciousness.
However, Parfit is
concerned
to
143
demonstrate
that
".
..
questions about such matters as survival, memory,
and responsibility"8
do
not presuppose personal
identity,
and since these
are
questions which matter,
it is
not personal
identity
which
is important, but
a
different
relationship which
happens
to
run parallel with
identity
under nor-
mal circumstances.
This is
the
relationship of psychological
connectedness.
As he
explains:
Judgements
of personal
identity have
great
importance.
What
gives
them their
importance is
the
fact
that they
imply
psychological continuity.
This is
why, whenever
there
is
such
continuity, we ought,
if
we can,
to
imply it by
making a
judge-
ment of
identity.
If
psychological continuity
took
a
branching form,
no
coherent set of
judgements
of
identity
could correspond
to,
and
thus
be
used
to
imply,
the
branching form
of
this
relation.
But
what we ought
to
do, in
such a case,
is
take the
importance
which would attach
to
a
judgement
of
identity
and attach
this
importance directly
to
each
limb
of
the
branching
relation.
So
this
case
helps
to
show
that
judgements
of personal
identity do
derive
their
importance from
the
fact
that they
imply
psychological continuity.
'
Parfit
suggests
that
a person's
life history
should
be
regarded as
the
history
of successive selves, related
by
psychological continuity.
He further
suggests
a revised way of
thinking
about
the
continued existence of a person,
in
which
the
survival of self would
be
a matter of
degree,
and would
depend
upon
the
degree
of psychological
connectedness
between
selves.
144
Basing his discussion
on a set of
imaginary beings, Parfit
explains
that
on
his
...
way of
thinking, the
word
"I"
can
be
used
to
imply
the
greatest
degree
of psychological connectedness.
When
the
con-
nections are reduced, when
there
has been
any marked change
of character or style of
life,
or any marked
loss
of memory, our
imaginary beings
would say,
"It
was not
I
who
did
that,
but
an
earlier self
...
"
This
revised way of
thinking
would suit not only our
"im-
mortal"
beings. It is
also
the
way
in
which we ourselves could
think
of our
lives. '
145
13.3 Reconstruction
of
Person
Parfit
appears
to
be
attempting to
reform the
notion
of what a person
is.
He is
not merely
describing,
or analysing, the
concept
of person,
or clarifying
the
criteria upon which we make
identity judgements,
but
appears to
wish
to
deny
that there
is
a continuing
entity understood
as person.
The
reform which
Parfit
wishes
to
make
involves
two
major
factors.
First,
that the
notion
that
individuals
can
be identified,
and reidentified
is
to
be
dissolved. There
are
to
be
no criteria
for judging
the
continuity
of person.
Second,
since
there
is
to
be
no enduring
identity,
and
in fact,
no enduring
entity,
there
is
no
basis for
the
allocation of praise or
blame for
past actions,
nor
is
there
any
basis for
expectation of consistency
in future
actions of any
individual. The
person
is
to
be dissolved into
a series of successive selves,
some of whom
hold
no responsibility
for
past actions, on
the
grounds
that
the
continuity of psychological characteristics
has been broken by
cir-
cumstance or
by
will.
The
analysis presented
here
suggests
that the
concept of person amounts
to
how individuals
are conceived of as persons.
The
criteria
for identity,
and
the
attributes and properties which constitute personhood, are not,
however,
merely conventional.
That
an
individual
can
be
reidentified as
the
"same
per-
son"
depends
on
the
endurance of
the
individual
as an ontological entity.
But
the
conceptualisation of
the
individuals,
as persons,
is
open
to
reconstruc-
tion.
However, Parfit's
analysis of personal
identity does
not merely amount
to
a reconstruction of
the
notion of person, or
the
way we conceive of
in-
dividuals
as persons.
The
analysis attempts
to
dissolve
the
notion of person
completely.
146
This is
to
be done by
a reduction of
the
concept
of person to
a series of
selves.
Amelie Rorty has
pointed out
that:
Descriptive
analysis of personal
identity
affects the
allocation
of obligations and rights;
but
the
analysis of persons
is itself
af-
fected by
the
allocation of obligations and rights.
"
and
That
reformers can negotiate
the
extension of
the
class of per-
sons certainly
does
not make
the
concept of person merely con-
ventional
...
11
It
will
be
argued,
in
chapter
fourteen,
that the
concept of agency, and
the
allocation of responsibilities and rights,
is intimately bound
up with
the
no-
tion
of what a person
is,
and of
how
the
individual is
perceived as a self con-
scious entity.
Further,
that
Parfit's
analysis, should
it
succeed
in dissolving
the
notion of person,
that
is,
making a conceptual change
in how
we view
in-
dividuals, has
serious consequences
for
the
concept of agency, and
thus
would
have
social and political consequences.
147
13.4 Parfit's Examples Underdescribed
In
order
to
dissolve
the
concept of person,
Parfit
uses several
imaginary
ex-
amples.
The first
example
draws from
the "...
much
discussed
case of
the
man who,
like
an amoeba,
divides. "' 3 Parfit
then
discusses
Wiggins'
example
in
which:
My brain is divided,
and each
half is housed in
a new
body.
Both
resulting people
have
my character and apparent
memories of my
life. "
Considering
this
example,
Parfit
asks:
What happens
to
me?
There
seem only
three
possibilities:
(1) I
do
not survive;
(2) I
survive as one of
the two
people;
(3) I
sur-
vive as
both. ' S
Parfit
suggests
that the
first
two
descriptions
of what
happens
are
im-
plausible, and
the third
implausible if
survival
implies identity, but he has
set
out
to
show
that
survival
does
not
imply identity.
Parfit's
next example
involves
a
divided brain
and consciousness:
Suppose
that the
bridge between
my
hemispheres is brought
under my voluntary control.
This
would enable me
to
discon-
nect my
hemispheres
as easily as
if I
were
blinking. By doing
this
I
would
divide
my mind.
And
we can suppose
that
when
my mind
is divided I
can,
in
each
half, bring
about reunion.
16
148
Following his discussion
of
the
division
of
his
consciousness
into
two
streams, and
Wiggins'
case of
the
half brain
each
in
a
different body, Parfit
says:
My first
conclusion,
then,
is
this.
The
relation of
the
original
person
to
each of
the
resulting people contains all
that
interests
us-all
that
matters-in any ordinary case of survival.
This is
why we need a sense
in
which one person can survive as
two.
"
After
considering what matters
is
survival
in
such cases,
Parfit
returns
to
his
examples of
imaginary beings. He
considers
the
case of
fusion,
where:
Two
people come
together.
While
they
are unconscious,
their
bodies
grow
into
one.
One
person
then
wakes up.
' 8
Parfit
then turns to
his
second
in
this
new
batch
of
imaginary beings:
These beings
are
just like
ourselves except
that they
reproduce
by
a process of natural
division. "
The
next example
is
that
of a second
kind
of
being:
These
reproduce
by fusion
as well as
by division. And let
us
suppose
that they
fuse
every autumn and
divide
every spring.
20
Finally, Parfit
considers a
third
kind
of
being:
There
are a number of everlasting
bodies,
which gradually
change
in
appearance.
And direct
psychological
relations,
as
before, hold
only over
limited
periods of
time.
2'
Parfit
uses
the
above examples
to
illustrate
how
one can
"prise
apart"
the
relation
involved in
survival
from
that of
identity.
149
However,
whatever
it is
which survives
in his
examples,
it
cannot really
be
described
as a person.
None
of
the
beings
whose survival
is discussed
are real-
ly "just like
ourselves.
"" People do
not
divide
and
fuse
together; beings
which
fuse
every autumn and
divide
every spring
would not
be
recognisable
as people.
(In fact, it is hard
to
see
how
they
would
be
recognisable
at all.
)
That Parfit
should
be led
to
believe
that
such
beings
are anything
like
us
seems
to
be
a result of
his failure
to
recognise the
importance
of
human
biology in
what
is
considered
to
be
a person.
23
All
of
his imaginary
examples are considerably underdescribed.
For
exam-
ple,
if
we
take the
case of
the
beings
which
divide
every autumn and
fuse
every spring, and relate such
beings
to
persons,
how
would
they
develop?
Suppose Baby Jones is born. After
six months,
he has begun
to
recognise
his
mother,
he is beginning
to
discriminate between
objects and people,
but
this
skill of
discrimination depends
upon
his
recognition of one person,
his
mother.
At
six months,
Baby Jones fuses
with
Baby Brown. What happens?
Parfit describes
the
psychology of
fusion
thus:
...
some
things
must
be lost. For
any
two
people who
fuse
together
will
have different
characteristics,
different desires
and
different intentions. How
can
these
be
combined?
We
might suggest
the
following. Some
of
these
will
be
com-
patible.
These
can coexist
in
the
one resulting person.
Some
will
be incompatible. These, if
of equal strength, can cancel
out, and
if
of
different
strengths,
the
stronger can
be
made
weaker.
And
all of
these
effects might
be
predictable.
"
So, Baby Brown has
also
just learned to
discriminate his
mother
from
all
the
other elements
in his
environment,
and can
begin
the next crucial stage
in
his
psychological
development.
Upon fusing, however, these two traits,
of equal strength
in both babies,
cancel each other out.
For the
six-month-old
Brownjones
baby,
there
is
no
one
individual it
can
discriminate.
Its development
cannot proceed.
150
After
one year,
Baby Brownjones has
possibly
developed
as much as a six-
month-old
baby. Then Baby Brownjones
divides,
and
Babies Brones
and
Jown begin
to
develop
the
abilities to
discriminate
objects, and so
forth.
Neither baby
can start
to
learn how
to
walk or
talk
until
they
have
acquired
the
basic
psychological skills.
At
a year and a
half it is
getting too
late,
and
they
are about
to
be fused
with
two
more confused and retarded
babies.
If
we are
to
suppose
that
Parfit's dividing
and
fusing
entities
(in
their
various
differentia)
are
"just like
us,
"
we must suppose they
have
a
human
biology, just like
us.
Human beings develop in
a certain way.
But, Parfit's
imaginary beings do
not stand a chance of
developing
speech or motor coor-
dination.
Whether
one accepts psychological stage
developmental
theories
of
the
maturation of
human beings,
the
biological
maturation of
babies is
a prere-
quisite condition
for
the
infant
to
be
capable of speech, or alternative
forms
of
language
communication.
Entities deprived
of such
biological
maturation
may
be
allowed
to
be
conscious,
thinking
creatures,
but
they
will
be incapable
of articulating second-order
intentions
or volitions, etc.
25 Lacking
such
capacities,
Parfit's imaginary
entities will
fail
to
have
recognisable per-
sonalities, which could
be
transferred
from
one
body
to
another.
They
would
not
be
persons.
Given
that there
is
no physical continuity upon which
to
make
judgements
of
individual identity,
and no recognisable personality con-
cerning which
decisions
of personal
identity
would
be
made, consideration of
Parfit's imaginary beings
would seem
to
be
of
little help in
solving problems
which may arise
in
cases of personal
identity.
Parfit
opens
"Personal Identity"
by
stating
that:
We
can,
I
think,
describe
cases
in
which,
though we
know
the
answer
to
every other question, we
have
no
idea how
to
answer
a question about personal
identity. These
cases are not covered
by
the
criteria of personal
identity that
we actually use.
26
However,
the
cases
Parfit
proceeds
to
describe
concern
beings
which
do
not conform
to the
concept of person which we actually use.
151
13.5 Survival
and
What Matters
Parfit bases his
proposed reformation
of
the
concept
of person
upon an
argument
that
what matters about personal
identity is
the
survival of a
kind
of psychological relationship.
Hence, for Parfit,
psychological
continuity
is
not only more
important
that
bodily identity,
but
can
be
separated
from
physical
identity.
Parfit
appeals
to
a principle put
forward by Williams,
which
he
paraphrases as
follows:
...
an
important judgement
should
be
asserted and
denied
only on
importantly different
grounds.
27
Referring
to
Wiggins' imaginary
case, where a
brain is
split
in
two,
and
each
half is housed in
a
different body, Parfit
tells
us
that:
If
psychological continuity
took
a
branching form,
no coherent
set of
judgements
of
identity
could correspond
to,
and
thus
be
used
to
imply,
the
branching form
of
this
relation
...
this
case
helps
to
show
that
judgements
of personal
identity do derive
their
importance from
the
fact
that they
imply
psychological
continuity.
It helps
to
show
that
when we can, usefully, speak
of
identity,
this
relation
is
our ground.
28
Parfit
summarises
Williams'
argument
for
the
importance
of physical
iden-
tity29 thus:
Williams
applied
(his)
principle
to
a case
in
which one man
is
psychologically continuous with
the
dead Guy Fawkes,
and a
case
in
which
two
men are.
His
argument was
this.
If
we
treat
psychological continuity as a sufficient ground
for
speaking of
identity,
we shall say
that the
one man
is Guy Fawkes. But
we
could not say
that the two
men are, although we should
have
the
same ground.
This disobeys
the
principle.
The
remedy
is
to
deny
that the
one man
is Guy Fawkes, to
insist
that
sameness of
body is
necessary
for identity.
152
Williams's
principle can yield a
different
answer.
Suppose
we regard psychological
continuity as more
important
that
sameness of
the
body. And
suppose that the
one man really
is
psychologically
...
continuous
with
Guy Fawkes. If he is, it
would
disobey
the
principle to
deny
that
he is Guy Fawkes, for
we
have
the
same ground as
in
a normal case of
identity.
In
the
case of
the two
men, we again
have
the
same
important
ground.
So
we ought
to take the
importance
from
the
judge-
ment of
identity
and attach
it directly
to this
ground.
30
But,
regarding psychological continuity as more
important
than
bodily
identity does
not make
it
a ground or criteria of
identity.,,
The
point of
Williams'
arguments
is
that
we cannot
judge
personal
identity
on purely psychological criteria, no matter
how important
they
are.
The
judgement
that
it is Guy Fawkes
whom
Charles is
supposed
to
be
continuous
with can only
be
made
by
reference
to
witnesses of
Guy Fawkes'
actions,
in
which case
Guy Fawkes' identity is based
on
his
physical
identity. Otherwise,
there
is
no method
by
which one can
determine
the
veracity of
Charles'
memory claims.
In
the
case of
the two
men,
Charles
and
Robert,
the
decision
as
to
whether
they
are psychologically continuous with
Guy Fawkes
must also
be
made
in
terms
of witnesses of
Guy Fawkes'
actions,
that
is, in
terms
of reports which
identify Guy Fawkes
according
to
physical criteria.
And it is
the
case
that two
physically
distinct individuals
canot
be identical
with one
individual.
The
major argument
here is
that
we cannot simply
".
..
suppose
that
one
man really
is
psychologically
(and
causally) continuous with
Guy Fawkes";
we need some criteria upon which
to
judge
whether
Charles is,
as
he
claims,
psychologically continuous with
Guy Fawkes,
and
that
criterion
turns
out
to
be based
on witness of
the
physical
identity
of
Guy Fawkes.
153
For Parfit,
some
kind
of survival of psychological relations
is
what mat-
ters, and physical continuity and
identity does
not matter.
As he
explains:
I have
tried to
show
that
what matters
in
the
continued ex-
istence
of a person, are,
for
the
most part, relations of
degree.
And I have
proposed a way of
thinking
in
which
this
would
be
recognised
32
To
recognise
the
nature of
the
relations which matter
in
the
continued ex-
istence
of a person one needs
to
drop
the
language
of
identity,
and
talk
of
past and
future
selves.
Parfit
explains
that
according
to this
new way of
thinking
If I
say,
"It
will not
be
me,
but
one of my
future
selves,
" I do
not
imply
that
I
will
be
that
future
self.
He is
one of my
later
selves, and
I
am one of
his
earlier selves.
There is
no underlying
person who we
both
are.
33
It
might seem
from
these two
statements
that
what matters
in
the
continued
existence of a person
is
that there
is
no person.
154
13.5 Conclusion
One
of
the
consequences
of
Parfit's
abandonment
of personal
identity is
that
it
would
be impossible
to
apportion
blame
or praise, or
to
allocate
responsibilities.
An
entity whose
life history
was a series of successive selves,
some of whom
deny
ownership, as
it
were, of
the
actions of
former
selves,
could not
be
given any responsibility.
How
would such an entity
"keep its
word"?
In
what sense could
it be
said
that the
entity spoke the truth,
or
had
certain
intentions? Since
these
are aspects of
human
existence which matter
to
other
individuals in
a society,
it
might seem
that to
others, at
least,
per-
sonal
identity
matters.
These,
and other consequences of accepting
Parfit's
proposed conceptual reformation, will
be investigated
more
fully in
chapter
fourteen.
Parfit is
not engaged
in descriptive
analysis of personal
identity,
or
the
concept of person,
but
rather
has
undertaken
the task
of reforming
the
cur-
rent notion of personal
identity,
and what
it
means
to
be
a person,
by dissolv-
ing
the
notion
that there
is
such a
thing
as a continuing person.
If
one accepts
the
analysis put
forward in
this
work,
that the
concept of
person amounts
to
how
an
individual is
conceived of as person,
Parfit's
con-
ceptual reformation of personal
identity
affects
the
ontological status of
the
concept of person very
little. This is because
whilst
individuals
may cease
to
be
regarded as persons
in
the
sense
in
which
they
are now so regarded,
in
other words, should our notion of personhood
be
expanded or changed,
the
questions which arise concerning
the
identities
of
individuals
are not merely
concerned with
those
respects
in
which
individuals
are viewed as person.
The
properties and characteristics which are
taken
by
any society
to
amount
to
personhood, and which,
in
particular cases, are viewed
by
others as compris-
ing
the
personality of an
individual,
are properties, psychological or other-
wise, of
individuals
who are also
biological
entities and self conscious agents.
155
One
cannot separate
the
personality of an
individual from
that
individual,
any more
than
one can separate
biological
entity
from
the
individual
whose
biology
one
is
considering.
Thus, despite
conceptual reformation,
individuals
will still
be
conceived
of,
by
others,
in
certain ways, and such conceptions will amount to
what
it is
to
be
a person,
just
as
the
manner
in
which each -individual
is
perceived
by
others,
the
personality
traits,
likes, dispositions,
and so
forth,
which are at-
tributed to that
individual,
will amount
to that
individual's
personal
identity.
Parfit's theory, that there
is
no
"underlying
person" who endures
through
time,
does
not accurately
describe
the
way
in
which
individuals
are conceived
of at present.
However, his
notion of successive selves may reflect
how
(some) individuals
conceive of
themselves,
not as persons
but
as selves.
That
there
are precedents
for
this
point of view will
be discussed in
the
following
chapter.
156
NOTES
1. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " Phil. Rev. 80: 3-27 (1971),
printed
in J.
Perry, Personal Identity, (University
of
California Press, 1975).
2. See
chapter
twelve.
3. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal Identity,
(1975)
p.
199.
4. Ibid.,
p.
199.
5. For
example, see
D. Parfit, Persons
and
Reasons, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1984).
6. For
a criticism of
this
notion of
`person, '
see chapter
fourteen.
7. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
p.
199.
8. Ibid.,
p.
200.
9. Ibid.,
p.
207.
10. Ibid.,
p.
218.
11. A. Rorty, The Identities
of
Persons, (University
of
California Press,
1976)
p.
6.
12. Ibid.,
p.
6.
13. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
p.
200. This
example
is drawn
from S. Shoemaker,
"Self-Knowledge
and
Self-Identity,
" (Ithica, New
York, 1963)
p.
22.
14. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
p.
200.
15. Ibid.,
p.
201.
16. Ibid.,
p.
202.
17. Ibid.,
p.
206.
18. Ibid.,
p.
212.
19. Ibid.,
p.
213.
20. Ibid.,
p.
216.
21. Ibid.,
p.
217.
22. Ibid.,
p.
213.
23. See
chapter
ten.
157
24. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
p.
212.
25. For
a
discussion
of
the
capacities of second-order
intentions
and second-
order volitions, see chapters seven and eight.
26. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
p.
199.
27. Ibid.,
p.
207.
28. Ibid.,
p.
207.
29. For
a
discussion
of
the
importance
of physical
identity in determining
the
identity
of a person see chapter
twelve.
30. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
pp.
207-208.
31. See
above.
32. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " (1975)
p.
219.
33. Ibid.,
pp.
218-219.
158
CHAPTER
FOURTEEN
ASSESSMENT
OF PARFIT'S ANALYSIS
14.1 Introduction
This chapter presents several criticisms of
Parfit's
views concerning per-
sonal
identity. It is
argued
that
Parfit's
reduction of persons
to
a series
of successive selves
has
precedents
in J. Butler'
and
T. Reid's2
objections to
memory theories
of personal
identity. Further, Butler
and
Ried's
objections
to
such
theories
can
be brought
against
Parfit's
analysis.
Parfit's
method of using
imaginary
examples
to
demonstrate his
theory
of
successive selves
is
criticised on
the
grounds
that the
world envisaged
is
not
consistently
described. And
the
analogy made
by Parfit between "nations
or
machines" and
"persons" is
criticised as
being
misleading as
to the
nature
of
the
concept of person.
Finally it is
suggested
that the
notion of agency and
the
allocation of
responsibilities and of rights are
intimately bound
up with
the
concept of per-
son,
that
is,
with
how
we conceive of
individuals
as persons and as self-
conscious
beings. Should Parfit's
analysis succeed
in dissolving
the
concept
of person,
in
other words, making a conceptual change
in how
we view
in-
dividuals, it
would also
dissolve
our notion of agency and would
have far
reaching social consequences.
159
14.2 Precedents For Parfit's Analysis
Parfit's
view
that the
concept of person can
be
reduced to that
of a series of
successive selves, which
he
enlarges
in Reasons
and
Persons (1984), ' has
some
precedents.
In
the
first
appendix
to
The Analogy
of
Religion (1736), J. Butler
explains
that:
...
by
reflecting upon
that
which
is
myself now, and
that
which was myself
twenty
years ago,
I discern
they
are not
two,
but
one and
the
same self.
But
though
consciousness of what
is
past
does
thus
ascertain
our personal
identity
to
ourselves, yet,
to
say
that
it
makes per-
sonal
identity,
or
is
necessary
to
our
being
the
same persons,
is
to
say,
that
a person
has
not existed a single moment, nor
done
one action,
but
what
he
can remember;
indeed
none
but
what
he
reflects upon.
'
This
point was also noticed
by Locke' in his discussion
of personal
identi-
ty.
Butler
shows
that
whilst self-consciousness and self reflection may
be
con-
nected with
the
individual
conceived of as self, and whilst reflection on
the
past may
"ascertain
our personal
identity
to
ourselves,
"
memory cannot
be
a
criterion of personal
identity, because:
...
consciousness of personal
identity
presupposes,
and
there-
fore
cannot constitute, personal
identity,
any more
than
knowledge, in
any other case, can constitute
truth,
which
it
presupposes.
'
160
Butler
explains
how
the
view
that
memory
is
a criterion
of personal
identity
might
have
arisen, thus:
This
wonderful mistake may possibly
have
arisen
from hence,
that to
be
embued with consciousness,
is inseparable
from
the
idea
of a person, or
intelligent
being.
For,
this
might
be
ex-
pressed
inaccurately
thus-that
consciousness
makes personali-
ty;
and
from hence it
might
be
concluded to
make personal
identity. '
Here Butler is distinguishing between
personality and personal
identity,
and
he
continues
by
explaining that:
...
though the
successive consciousnesses which we
have
of our
own existence are not
the
same, yet are
they
consciousnesses of
one and
the
same
thing
or object; of
the
same person, self, or
living
agent.
The
person, of whose existence the
consciousness
is
felt
now, and was
felt
an
hour
or a year ago,
is discerned
to
be,
not
two
persons,
but
one and
the
same person
...
8
Thus, for Butler,
the
identity
of
the
person
is
the
identity
of
the
object,
self, and
living
agent-the
individual-whose
existence
is felt. That
the
capacities
for
consciousness, reflection, and memory are properties of per-
sons or
intelligent beings does
not mean
that those
capacities amount
to
what
it is
to
be
an ontological entity.
They
are predicated of
the
ontological entity.
We
can
be
conscious of our own existence as person, self, or
living
agent,
but
it is
a consciousness of something.
Butler
traces the
notion
that
consciousness constitutes person
to
Locke's
discussion
of personal
identity,
of which
he
says:
Mr. Locke's
observations upon
this
subject appear
hasty;
and
he
seems
to
profess
himself dissatisfied
with
the
suppositions,
which
he has
made relating
to
it. But
some of
those
hasty
obser-
vations
have been
carried
to
a strange
length by
others
...
9
161
Butler describes
the
"strange length"
to
which this
notion
has been
car-
ried, and shows
that
such
theories
imply
that:
...
our present self
is
not,
in
reality, the
same with
the
self of yes-
terday,
but
another
like
self or person coming
in its
room, and
mistaken
for it;
to
which another self will succeed tomorrow. '
Butler
uses
the theory that
we are constructed out of successive selves as a
reductio ad absurdum
to
counter
the
idea
that
memory or consciousness con-
stitutes personal
identity. However,
the
strange
length
to
which
the
memory
theory
can
be
carried pressages
Parfit's
theory
of successive selves.
T. Reid
also points out
that the
basic
error
in
theories
which use memory or
psychological criteria of personal
identity is
that:
...
personal
identity is
confounded with
the
evidence we
have
of our personal
identity. "
Reid
also mentions
the
strange consequences which
follow from
understan-
ding Locke
to
be
saying
that
personal
identity is
constituted
by
consciousness
alone:
...
if
the
intelligent being
may
lose
the
consciousness of
the
actions
done by him,
which
is
surely possible,
then
he is
not
the
person
that
did
those
actions; so
that
one
intelligent being
may
be
two
or
twenty
different
persons,
if he
shall so often
lose
the
consciousness of
his former
actions.
' 2
Both Butler
and
Reid
make reference
to
formulations
of a
theory
of per-
sonal
identity
which state
that the
person
is
nothing
but
a series of successive
selves.
Both
criticise such a
theory on grounds of
inconsistency,
and
because
of
the
consequences which would
follow
should such a
theory
be
true.
JOHN RYL ND
UNIVERSITY
L? 'RARY
OF
MANCHESTER
162
D. Parfit
reiterates
his
position concerning successive selves
in Reasons
and
Persons (1984),
thus:
On
my proposed way of
talking,
we use
"I, "
and other pro-
nouns,
to
refer only
to the
parts of our
lives
to
which, when
speaking, we
have
the
strongest connections.
When
the
connec-
tions
have been
markedly reduced-when
there
has been
a
significant change of character, or style of
life,
or of
beliefs
and
ideals-we
might say,
"It
was not
I
who
did
that,
but
an
earlier self.
"13
In
such a way of
talking
Parfit's
self
(as Butler
put
it) "is
not
in
reality
the
same self with
the
self of yesterday.
"
163
14.3 Butler
and
Reid: Objections
to Psychological
Criteria
of
Personal
Identity
Butler
objected to the
consequences
of allowing that
persons are nothing
but
a series of selves.
As he
explains:
Nor is it
possible
for
a person
in his
wits
to
alter
his
conduct,
with regard
to
his health
or
his
affairs,
from
a suspicion, that
though
he
should
live
tomorrow, he
should not,
however,
be
the
same person
he is
today. ' 4
Reid
objects
that:
Consciousness,
and every
kind
of
thought,
are
transient
and
momentary, and
have
no continued existence; and,
therefore,
if
personal
identity
consisted
in
consciousness,
it
would certain-
ly follow,
that
no man
is
the
same person any
two
moments of
his life;
and as
the
right and
justice
of reward and punishment
are
founded
on personal
identity,
no man could
be
responsible
for his
actions.
' S
Dissolving
personal
identity
through time to
a series of successive selves
has
the
consequence, as
Reid
points out,
that
it is impossible
to
apportion
reward or punishment,
blame
or praise,
the
idea
of a person
being
responsi-
ble for
past actions
becomes
redundant.
Moreover,
as
Butler
remarks,
it
would no
longer be
possible
to
plan
for
one's own
future,
nor
to
predict
the
action of others and plan accordingly.
The
social consequences of
this
change
in
our way of
thinking
would
be
enormous,
16 for
example,
it
would
be im-
possible to
elect any person
to
positions of responsibility, or
to
interview
anyone
for
a
job,
or
to
expect any promises
to
be kept,
or
to
enter
into
a
legal
contract, or
to
imprison
murderers on
the
grounds either
that
it is
unsafe
for
such characters
to
be free
to
act according
to their
nature as revealed
by
past
behaviour,
or on
the
grounds
that
one must punish a person
for
past
misdeeds,
for
retribution, or
to
prevent others
from indulging in
similar
behaviour.
164
14.4 It Is No Longer
I: The Unitary
Nature
of
Persons
Parfit's
claim that
we might
say,
"It
was not
I
who
did
that, but
an earlier
self,
""
echoes
St. Paul's
statement that
"... if I do
what
I do
not want,
it is
no
longer I
that
do it, but
sin which
dwells
within me.
"' e Both St. Paul
and
Parfit
assume a
frame
of reference
with regard to the
individuation
and
iden-
tity
of selves or persons which
in
practice allows the
disowning
of actions.
That
one can
disown
responsibility
for
actions
by
the
reduction of personal
identity
to
separate selves,
is
an objection
brought
against
St. Paul by Gareth
Matthews. Commenting
on
the
above passage
from Romans, Matthews
notes
that:
In
a certain way,
then,
my sinful self may make my righteous
self possible.
If
that
is
so,
disowning
the
actions of my sinful
self
is hypocrisy
twice
over-it
is hypocrisy in
that the
sinful
deeds
are also my own.
It is
also
hypocrisy in
that
I,
as
the
righteous
judge,
owe my
distinct identity
to
having
repressed
the
impulses I
now assign
to
my
dissociated
self.
"
Matthews
objects
to
St. Paul's dissolution
of personal
identity
on
two
grounds:
first
that
it has
consequences concerning responsibility, and second
that
it ignores
an
important feature
of
human
nature.
Matthews
agrees with
Freud
that:
If I
seek
to
classify
the
impulses
that
are present
in
me accord-
ing
to
social standards
into
good and
bad, I
must assume
responsibility
for both
sorts.
"
T. Penelhum
makes a similar criticism of
Parfit's theory.
Accepting Frank-
furt's
analysis
that
what
is distinctive
of persons
is
their
capacity
for
second-
order volitions,
Penelhum
explains
that:
...
a
being
capable of second-order volitions and
the
conflicts
they
engender
is
also capable of radical resolutions of such con-
flicts,
radical
failures in
restoring
them,
and consequently of
165
marked changes
in
personality.
One
and the
same person need
not change
substantially
in
personality,
but he is
necessarily
susceptible to
such change.
Z'
Penelhum discusses
a notion of self
identity
which
is distinct from
personal
identity,
and according to
which:
...
someone
has
achieved self
identity
(or "found himself") if
his
choices and aspirations
are
integrated in
a certain way.
22
For Penelhum,
an account of personal
identity
must
include
criteria
by
which one can
judge
whether certain events are part of a person's
life history.
But, in Parfit's
proposed way of
talking,
such criteria are missing.
As
Penelhum
explains:
The form
of
life distinctive
of persons
has
to
allow
for
the
in-
clusion, within
the
history
of one and
the
same
individual
per-
son, of
the
kinds
of
transition
which, on
Parfit's
recommenda-
tion,
would constitute
the
passage
from
one self
to
another.
The
concept of a person must
therefore
be
wider
than the
con-
cept
(or
wider
than this
concept) of a self.
23
It is
the
fact
that
we are capable of second-order volitions, of
deciding
what
kind
of wishes we want
to
have,
etc.,
that
distinguishes
persons
from
"wantons, "
who merely
have first-order
volitions.
And
this
capacity allows
us
to
make changes
in
our personal
identity. Hence, Penelhum
argues, an en-
tity
which
is
a person must
be
capable of extreme personality change, which
involves "a
significant change of character, or style of
life,
or of
beliefs
and
ideals, "
whilst remaining
the
same person, and
being
responsible
for
the
con-
sequences of action undertaken
before
and after such changes.
166
14.5 Consequences
of
Parfit's
Use
of
Imaginary
Examples
Parfit
uses examples
of
beings
who
divide, fuse, divide
and
fuse,
to
demonstrate his
theory
concerning
personal
identity.
He
uses
these
examples
as puzzle
cases
which
he hopes
will
demonstrate
that
questions
of
identity
are
not
important because
there
is
no one person to
retain
identity
through time.
However, in his
construction
of
these
puzzle cases,
Parfit invents
the
con-
ditions
under which
the
identity
of
his imaginary
beings is
unimportant.
His
invention has
several consequences.
First, in
the
imaginary
world of
these
be-
ings,
the
normal spatio-temporal
conditions
in
which and
by
which physical
continuity
is judged do
not exist.
It follows from
the
non-existence of
these
conditions that Parfit's
world
is
a world where certain physical
laws do
not
hold,
whereas
these
laws do hold
in
the
actual world.
A
complete
description
of such a world-a world where
two
bodies
can simply
fuse into
one-would
fail
to
yield any criteria of
iden-
tity.
It is
not
just
that
personal
identity
would not
be important in
such a
world,
it
would
be impossible
to
establish
the
identity
of anything.
As Penelhum
remarks:
Often
...
philosophers who
imagine
puzzle cases
do
not
im-
agine worlds
in
which
the
special
features
of
their
puzzles are
general
features
of
the
worlds,
but
merely
imagine
a world
in
which
the
criteria of personal
identity
remain what
they
are
now and
in
which strange events
take
place
that
seem
to
involve
a conflict among
these
criteria or some sort of
failure in
their
application.
24
In Parfit's
world,
the
physical criteria of personal
identity fail because
the
normal physical
laws
which ensure spatio-temporal continuity
fail. Because
Parfit's beings
are not subject
to the
same
laws
as
human beings,
there
can
be
no physical criteria of personal
identity. But lacking
such criteria,
there
can
be
no criteria of
identity
at all, and without criteria of
identity,
as
Parfit
points out,
there
is
no unity of person.
167
For Penelhum, Matthews,
and others, unity of person
is
essential
in
our
understanding of what
it is
to
be
a person.
This is because
the
most
important
properties which
distinguish
persons
from
other sentient creatures
include
the
distinctive
capacity
for
self-reflection and
for forming
second-order
desires.
Self-reflection
assumes some unity of person.
Following B. Williams"'
arguments,
the
unity of person can only
be
guaranteed
by
physical
identity.
Penelhum
points out
that
in
order
to take
account of what
it is
to
be
a person,
imaginary
worlds would
have
to
yield criteria according
to
which
it
could
be
judged
whether some event was part of a person's
biography. Moreover,
If
some
imaginary
world could not yield such criteria,
then the
account of
it
could not
legitimately include
mention of
beings
who could qualify as persons
...
26
Parfit's imaginary
world cannot yield such criteria.
168
14.6 Person: What Type
of
Concept?
In introducing his
thought
experiments,
Parfit
remarks
that
whilst no one
thinks
"...
the
questions:
`Is it
the
same nation?
'
or
`Is it
the
same
machine?
"
must
have
answers, some people
believe
that
in
this
respect
they
are
different. "27 The difference
referred to
by Parfit
concerns not only ques-
tions
of re-identification,
but
the
nature of
the
concepts of person and
machine or nation.
Whilst
the
identity
of nations or machines may
be "up for
question,
" it
seems as
though
what a person
is, is
not
just
a matter of conven-
tion.
Artifacts
are categorised under
functional descriptions, for
example, a
watch
is
a
time-keeping
instrument,
or a pen
is
a writing
implement,
and such
descriptions
give a nominal essence and are
distinguished from
natural
kind
descriptions inasmuch
as
the
latter
are
thought to
name entities which
have
a
real essence
(Locke's distinction. ) D. Wiggins
points out
that:
For
a
theory
of
individuation
this
is
an
important difference,
and
it
results
in
a related and
important difference between
natural
things
and artifacts
in
respect of conditions of
identity
through time.
28
The belief
that
persons are
different from
artifacts stems partly
from
the
belief
that
persons
have
a
distinctive history,
a particular
future,
a natural
development
over
time-a
personal
identity. Whereas
when artifacts change
over
time,
identity
questions are pointless
because
there
is
no such
thing
as
the
natural
development
of an artifact.
The
concept of person appears
to
be
more
like
that
of a natural
kind
than
of an artifact.
However,
as
Wiggins
argues:
...
if
person
is
a natural
kind, then
when we consider
the
pro-
blem
of
the
identity
of persons
through change,
the
whole
logic
of
the
situation must exempt us
from
taking
into
account any
but
the
class of situations
which conform
to the
actual
laws
of
169
the
actual world.
For
these
serve, and nothing
but
these
can
serve,
to
define
the
class of persons
....
And
this
seems
to
ex-
cuse us
from
allowing the
spontaneous occurences of
delta for-
mations of
the
consciousness
of persons.
The
conditions of
persons' existence seems
...
to
exclude
this.
29
According
to
H. Putman
natural
kinds
are
defined in
terms
of natural
laws. Wiggins
explains:
...
x
is
af
(horse,
cypress
tree,
orange, caddis
fly) if
and only
if
that
x
is
grouped
by
the
most explanatory and comprehen-
sively
true
scientific
theory
with a set of arbitrarily selected nor-
mal exemplars of
the
kind f. But if
the
correct articulation of
natural
kinds
ultimately
depends
on good
theory,
and good
theory
is
part and parcel of
true
statement of natural
laws,
then
it follows from Putman's
proposal
that
any putative
definition
of a natural
kind f
will stand or
fall
with
the
existence of some
set of
laws
which collect
together
its
actual extension.
Unless
there
are such
laws,
the
putative name
has
no extension, nor
even
the
sense
it is
required
to
have. If
there
are such
laws,
on
the
other
hand,
then their
holding is
nothing
less
than
con-
stitutive of
the
existence of
fs. 3
In describing
persons as
the
kind
of entities which can
divide
and
fuse
together
or
both, Parfit is
treating the
concept of person as
though
it
were an
artifact-type concept similar
to the
concept of a machine.
In his
examples
im-
aginary
beings
are not subject
to the
natural
laws
to
which
human beings
are
subject.
Parfit has in
a sense
"de-natured" the
concept of person.
He has
tried to
dissolve
the
way we conceive of
individuals
as persons so as
to
make
it
impossible
that
individuals
are natural entities.
Whilst
the
concept of person
is
not equivalent
to the
concept of
human being,
entities which are not sub-
ject
to the
same natural
laws
as
human beings
are not recognisable as persons
either.
As Wiggins
observes:
In
place of an animal or organism with a clear principle of
in-
dividuation
one
finds
an artifact whose
identity
may
be
a mat-
ter
of convention,
or even caprice.
Certainly
we
do
not, at
this
limit, find
a person
...
31
170
14.7 Conclusion
Parfit
suggests
that the
word
"I" be
used
to
imply "the
greatest
degree
of
psychological connectedness,
"
and
that this
way of
thinking ".
..
is
also
the
way
in
which we ourselves could
think
about our
lives. " He
explains
moreover,
that:
If I
say
"It
will not
be
me,
but
one of my
future
selves,
" I do
not
imply
that
I
will
be
that
future
self.
He is
one of my
later
selves, and
I
am one of
his
earlier selves.
There is
no underlying
person who we
both
are.
32
The
selves which
Parfit
talks
about are constructed out of psychological
properties.
However,
as
Butler
and
Reid have
shown, psychological proper-
ties
such as memory and consciousness could not constitute personal
identity
as
they
presuppose an entity of whom
they
are predicated.
Not
only
is
such a
theory
based
on a mistaken assumption,
the
conse-
quences of accepting
it
would
include
the
abdication of notions of agency and
responsibility, and would render any planning
for
one's
future futile. A. Ror-
ty
reiterates
these
points when she states
that:
...
we need
to
know
whom
to
regard and whom
to
punish
for
actions performed when
"they"
were acknowledgedly
dif-
ferent in
some respects
from
the
present population.
But
we
have
more
forward-looking
reasons as well: we want
to
know
what
traits
remain constant so
that
we can
know
what
to
expect
from
the
persons around us
....
And for
ourselves, we are
in-
terested
in
our own
identity because
we make choices
that
will
affect our
futures:
we set
in
motion a
train
of actions whose
consequences
involve "our"
well-being,
without
knowing
whether we shall
have, in
the
future,
the
desires
and
beliefs
that
now
direct
our planning.
33
171
Parfit is
prescribing a new way of
thinking
about persons which would
eliminate any notion of an enduring entity
to
whom psychological or physical
predicates could
be
attributed.
He is
not
describing
persons or
how
we
think
of
individuals
as persons, nor
is he describing
what
there
is in
the
world.
But
if
the terms
"person"
and
"self" have
meaning,
they
have it by
virtue of
be-
ing
words
in
a
living language
which relates
to the
actual world.
It has been
argued
throughout this text that there
are enduring enti-
ties-individuals-and that
individuals
are conceived of as persons and as
selves.
Such
a view presents a
difficulty for Parfit's
theory
in
that
although
the
concepts of person, self, and
human being
may change,
they
are modes of
conceiving
individuals
who are enduring entities.
Parfit's
analysis cannot ac-
count
for
enduring entities of whom
the
psychological properties which
amount
to the
concept of self or person are predicated.
Parfit's
claim
that
there
is "no
underlying person" may
be
true
insofar
as person or personality
is
constituted
by
properties attributable
to
an
individual by
others, and
is
thus
changeable.
However, there
is
an enduring entity, and
identity
through time
is
a quality of
that
entity-the
individual. While Parfit
at ninety may
be
a
dif-
ferent
person
(or
even self)
from Parfit
now,
he
will
be
the
same
individual.
172
NOTES
1. In J. Butler, The Analogy
of
Religion (1736),
printed
in J. Perry, (ed. )
Personal Identity, (University
of
California Press, 1975).
2. In T. Reid, Essays
on
The Intellectual Powers
of
Man (1785),
printed
in
J. Perry, (ed. ) Personal Identity, (1975).
3. D. Parfit, Reasons
and
Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
4. J. Butler, The Analogy
of
Religion (1736),
printed
in J. Perry, (ed. ) Per-
sonal
Identity (1975)
p.
100.
5. See
chapter eleven.
6. J. Butler, The Analogy
of
Religion, in J. Perry (1975)
p.
100.
7. Ibid.,
p.
100.
8. Ibid.,
p.
102.
9. Ibid.,
p.
102.
10. Ibid.,
p.
102.
11. T. Reid, "Of Memory, " in Essays
on
the
Intellectual Powers
of
Man
(1785),
printed
in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal Identity,
p.
115.
12. Ibid.,
p.
115.
13. D. Parfit, Reasons
and
Persons (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984)
p.
305.
14. J. Butler, The Analogy
of
Religion
(1736), in J. Perry (ed. ), Personal
Identity, (1975)
p.
103.
15. T. Reid, "Of Memory, " (1785),
in J. Perry, (ed. ), Personal Identity,
(1975)
pp.
116-117.
16. I
am unable
here to
give
full justice to this topic.
17. D. Parfit, "Personal
Identity,
" in J. Perry, (ed. ), Personal
Identity,
(1975. )
18. Romans 7: 15-24
19 G. Matthews,
"It is No Longer
I That
do It
...
" Faith
and
Philosophy
1: (1984).
p.
48.
173
20. S. Freud, "Moral Responsibility for
the
Content
of
Dreams, " Collected
Papers 5, (New York: Basic Books, 1959).
p.
154.
21. T. Penelhum, "The Importance
of
Self Identity, Journal
of
Philosophy
(1871)
p.
672.
22. Ibid.,
p.
675.
23. Ibid.,
p.
672.
24. Ibid.,
p.
677.
25. In B. Williams, Problems
of
the
Self (Cambridge University Press,
1973).
26. T. Penelhum, "The Importance
of
Self Identity" (1971)
p.
677.
27. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " in J. Perry, (ed. ), Personal Identity
(1975)
p.
199.
28. D. Wiggins, "Locke, Butler
and
The Stream
of
Consciousness:
and
Man
As Natural Kind, " in A. Rorty, (ed. ) The Identities
of
Persons (Univer-
sity of
California Press, 1976)
p.
159.
29. Ibid.,
p.
158.
30. Ibid.,
p.
158.
31. Ibid.,
p.
163.
32. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " in J. Perry, (ed. ), Personal Identity
(1975)
p.
219.
33. A. Rorty, The Identities
of
Persons (University
of
California Press,
1976)
pp.
4-5.
174
CHAPTER
FIFTEEN
CONCLUSION
f
one reviews
the
literature
on personal
identity
and
the
concept of person,
it becomes
apparent
that
whilst
there
are almost as many
theories
of per-
sonal
identity
as
there
are philosophers writing
in
this
field,
there
is
a
lack
of
common ground or common understanding of
the
nature of person.
The
term
person
is
used
by different
philosophers
in
specific and particular
ways which vary according
to the type
of
theory
which each philosopher
is
proposing, and within such
theories
person acquires a
different
meaning.
This
work
has investigated
a sample of
theories
which present an analysis of
the
concept of person or of personal
identity. The
analysis of person put
for-
ward
by P. F. Strawson, '
attempts
to
establish
that
persons are
basic
par-
ticulars
in
our conceptual scheme.
D. C. Dennett's2
analysis
takes
person
to
be both
a metaphysical and a moral concept which can
be
applied
to
any enti-
ty
which satisfies certain conditions which
he
outlines.
H. Frankfurt'
pro-
poses
that
men or persons are
distinguished from
other
intelligent beings by
their
possession of
free
will, which
involves
the
capacity
for
reflective self-
evaluation.
For J. Rawls, '
to
be
a person
is
to
be
acted
towards
in
a certain
way,
to
be
recognised as a person.
A. Rortys
suggests
that the
person
is
the
175
unified centre of choice and action,
and
is
a social concept.
As
such
the
definition
of person varies
historically,
and across cultures, and may refer
to
groups of
individuals
as well as
to
single
human beings. That
person
is
a
term
which refers
to the
agent of an action
is
also suggested
by J. Locke's6
ac-
count.
However, for Locke,
person
is
a
term
which also refers
to the
self as
constituted
by
consciousness.
J. Perry'
claims
that
persons are
distinct from
physical entities and
that
personal
identity is
also
distinct from bodily identi-
ty.
This
position
has been
criticised
by B. Williams, '
who argues
that
bodily
identity is
always a necessary condition of personal
identity. D. Parfit9
at-
tempts to
dissolve
the
notion of person
to that
of a series of successive selves,
and claims
that there
is
no such
thing
as a continuous person.
T. Pehelhum'
argues
that the
concept of person
is
wider
than the
concept of self, and
that to
be
a person an entity must
be
capable of radical changes
in
personality which
do
not entail a change
in identity. D. Wiggins''
proposes
that
persons are
natural
kinds,
subject
to
natural
laws
and
therefore the
concept of person
is
not a conventional concept.
The
volume of
literature
on
this topic
and
the
variety of analyses available
suggests
that there
are unresolved problems concerning
the
nature of persons.
The
aim of
this
work
is
to
present an analysis which
is based
on
the
way per-
son
is
understood and used
in
real-life situations, and which will account
for
the
puzzling
features
of person as
they
are
in
this
world, rather
than
in im-
aginary situations.
It is here
claimed
that
since
the
problems concerning per-
son originate
in
real, observable situations, an analysis or
theory
of person or
of personal
identity
should
be
applicable
to those
situations,
that
is,
should
"work" in
actual problem cases and not
just in imaginary
situations where
conditions are
totally
unlike
those
in
the
real world.
Person has
a well-understood
meaning
in
ordinary conversation.
It is
used
as a singular noun which refers
to
a social
being
of a certain
biological
species.
In its
ordinary context
the
word
is
understood.
The
problems and
paradoxes which abound
in
philosophical
thought experiments
do
not arise
in
ordinary, everyday
life. However, there are some actual situations
in
which
176
the
meaning of person
becomes
problematic.
For instance, in
contexts where
questions arise concerning the
identity
of a person who
has
undergone some
change, or where an
individual
appears to
be lacking
some of
the
capacities
normally attributed to
persons.
Even in
the
latter
case, questions seldom arise
concerning
the
meaning of person unless some social
decision is
to
be
made,
such as
the
decision
as
to
whether
to terminate
ventilation of a
"brain dead"
patient
in hospital,
or a
decision
concerning the
legal
rights or status of an
in-
dividual
who
has been declared insane. The dilemmas
revealed
in
such situa-
tions
seem
to
show
that
for
an entity
to
count as a person,
it is
not enough
to
be identified
as a member of a particular species; the
meaning of
the
word
person
is
not co-extensive with
the
meaning of
human being.
In
such situations,
decisions
concerning
the
future
of
the
individuals in
question may
be
taken
upon criteria which are
determined by
a particular
definition
of person, and such
definitions
may
be determined
according
to
a
philosophical analysis of
the term.
For
example,
in
considering whether
to
terminate the
ventilation of an
individual
who
is determined
to
be "brain
dead, "
a
doctor
may present
the
facts,
that
here is is biological
entity whose
vital
functions
are
being
maintained
by
machines and whose
brain has ir-
reparably
deteriorated
and shows no sign of
functioning. It
may
be
possible
to
maintain
the
organism
for
many years,
but
the
decision
whether
to
do
so
depends
not upon a medical
(or
rather,
biological) judgement, but
upon
whether
the organism
has
or could
in
the
future have
certain capacities.
The
decision is
made more complex
by
the
fact
that
it
turns
out
that these
capacities are not shared
by
all members of
the
species who are
"unventilat-
ed.
" The
capacities may
include
the
ability
to think,
make
decisions,
to
com-
municate, and many others, and
they
frequently
reflect
the
kinds
of proper-
ties
attributable
to
persons which are
deemed by
a particular culture
to
be im-
portant
to that
culture's survival.
Since
not all members of
the
species
have these
capacities,
the
lack
of such
capacities alone cannot constitute
the
criteria upon which
a
decision
to ter-
minate ventilation
is
made.
The
problem
is frequently
cast
in
terms
of
177
whether such an
individual
is
a person.
The importance
of
determining
whether
the
individual
is
a person
derives from
the
social and moral
implica-
tions
of
terminating
the
life
of a person.
Generally
speaking,
it is deemed
to
be
murder
to
kill
a person
intentionally,
and whilst
the
ventilated organism
maybe said
to
be biologically
"alive, "
the
question
may arise as
to
whether
the
intentional
cessation
of
life is
murder, and the
question of whether
it is
murder appears
to
depend
upon whether
the
organism
is deemed
to
be
a per-
son.
Similar
questions arise when considering
such
issues
as abortion, and
in
vitro
fertilisation
practices which
involve
the
"artificial"
creation of zygotes,
not all of which can
be brought
to term. In both
cases, questions concerning
whether
the
intentional
termination
of
life is
murder may
depend
upon
whether
the
zygote or
fetus,
the
biological
entity,
is
conceived of as a person
or not.
Whilst
many other
factors
also
influence
such
decisions,
the
per-
sonhood
issue is
one of
the
main
features. (In
the
case of
in
vitro
fertilisation,
techniques
of suspending animation
have facilitated
the
suspension of
decision. )
Problematic
situations such as
those
outlined above reveal
that the term
person refers not only
to the
biological
entity,
but
to
a cluster of properties
which are
(often but
not always) predicated of
the
entity.
(Here,
predicated
is
taken to
mean a
description
applied correctly or
incorrectly
to
an object,
in
speech.
) The
type
of
descriptions
which are predicated of
individuals
as per-
sons are not merely physical attributes which can
be
recorded and measured;
such attributes can
be
predicated of many physical objects.
What is distinc-
tive
about person as a
term
applied
to
an entity or object
in
the
world
is
that
it
refers also
to
properties or attributes which are
thought
of
the
entity.
Thus
person, whilst
it is
a word which names or picks out an entity,
derives its
distinctive
meaning
from
a conception of
that
entity.
Person
means a way of
understanding
individuals
who are understood
in
other ways.
The
concept of
person amounts
to this
understanding.
It
represents a mode of understanding
a particular
kind
of entity.
To
conceive of an
individual
as a person
is
to
at-
tribute to that
individual
a cluster of properties which constitute
the
concept
of person.
178
The
mode of understanding
which amounts
to the
concept of person can
change.
Advances in
neurophysiological
and
biological knowledge influence
the
conception of person, as,
for instance,
the
biology
of
human beings is
understood
in
more complexity.
Moreover,
technical
advances
facilitate
the
conception of
individuals
as
persons
who previously may not
have been
so
conceived.
Thus, both
the
meaning of person and
the
class of
individuals
who
are conceived of as persons can change.
The
analysis presented
in
this
work proposes
that there
are many ways of
conceiving of
individuals. The
concepts of person, self, and
human being
can
be
said
to
represent
three
different
modes of understanding
individuals,
and
there may well
be
other modes of understanding.
The
meanings of
the terms
are
interrelated
as all
three
represent ways of understanding and
talking
about
the
same entity.
The
concept of person represents an understanding of
individuals
as
intentional beings
who are granted rights and
have
obligations,
who
display
psychological characteristics, are capable of second-order reflec-
tion
and volition, and so
forth. Because
these
properties are attributed
to the
individual by
others and occasionally
denied by
others,
the
understanding of
individuals
as person
is
a public understanding.
The individual is
a person as
long
as others conceive of
the
individual
through this
mode of understanding.
The
concept of self represents
the experiental nature of an
individual. In-
sofar as
the
individual
experiences
his
or
herself, is
conscious of actions,
thoughts, memories, or
intentions, the
subject of
the
experience-the
in-
dividual-is
a self-conscious
entity.
An individual does
not observe or
witness
him/herself
eating a meal
but
experiences
the
action, and
does
not
remember witnessing
a person eating
the
meal who can
be identified
as
him/herself, but
rather remembers
experiencing
the
eating of
the
meal.
The
individual is located
in
time and space, and can
be identified, but
the
ex-
periences cannot
be identified
apart
from the
individual
who
has
those ex-
periences.
Not
only
do
the
experiences
have
no
independent
duration, they
are not observable
and so no criteria
can
be
established
for
the
purpose
of
in-
dividuating
or
identifying
experiences.
179
The
concept of
human being
represents a way of understanding
individuals
as
biological
entities.
As biological
entities,
individuals demonstrate
specific
patterns of growth and maturation, and are subject
to
changes
determined by
the
biology
of
the
species.
For
the
sake of analysis, the
meanings of
the terms
person, self, and
human being
can
be distinguished insofar
as
they
represent
different
modes
of conceiving
the
same
individual. But
the
individual is
the
subject of all
the
properties which constitute
these
concepts, conjointly.
If it is
the
case
that
person,
human being,
and self, whilst
having distinguishable
meanings are
terms
which apply
to the
same entity, one would expect
the
meanings of
the
terms to
be interrelated. It is
curious
that
in
many analyses of person and per-
sonal
identity,
whilst
the terms
person and self are often used
interchange-
ably,
both
are
taken to
refer
to
something which
is
not an entity of which
physical and
biological
properties can
be
predicated.
Yet,
on
investigation,
many of
the
properties which are attributed
to
persons are only meaningful
when
instantiated in
a
humanoid
physiology.
This is
so
both in
the
case of
what person means-the concept of person, and
in
consideration of personal
identity-the identity
of an
individual
with regard
to
his
personality.
Two
major
types
of confusion can arise as a result of unclarity regarding
the
nature of
individuals
and
the
concepts which apply
to them.
The first
type,
(henceforth
called
Type 1), is
the
confusion
between
the
individual
and
the
properties which are attributed
to the
individual. Frequently
the
proper-
ties
which constitute
the
concepts of person, self, or
human being
are
hived
off, as
it
were, and
treated
as
though they
were properties of a
distinct
entity.
This form
of
hypostatising
results
in
treating the
concepts as
though they
referred
to
distinct
entities
which themselves were subject
to
specific criteria
of
identity. The
second
type
(henceforth
called
Type 2), is
a
further develop-
ment of a
Type 1
confusion,
and
involves the
failure
to
recognise
the
interre-
lation between
the
concepts
through which
the
individual is
understood.
Here
one group of properties, or one concept,
is isolated
and an explanation of
the
individual from
the
point of view of
the
properties
which constitute one mode
180
of understanding
individuals
is
taken to
account
for
the
whole.
Often
arguments are constructed
in
which the
assumption
of one group of proper-
ties
is
taken to
deny
the
legitimacy
of others.
Whilst it
may
be
possible to
pro-
duce
an explanation solely
in
terms
of one mode of understanding, this
does
not vitiate against other modes of understanding.
So, for
example, a
"strict"
behaviourist
account of
the
actions of an
individual, in
which
the
individual
is
understood as a
biological
entity, a
human being,
whilst an adequate ac-
count
from
the
point of view of
the
individual
as
human being,
should not
be
used
to
deny
the
properties which amount to
conceiving the
individual
as per-
son-e. g.,
intentional
properties, psychological properties, and so
forth.
An
example of
Type 1
confusion
is
apparent
in
theories
which
deal
with
what
has been
called
the
"problem
of personal
identity. "12 If it is
accepted
that the
identity
of an object or entity
is determined by
spatio-temporal
criteria, and
that
such criteria apply
to
physical objects,
then the
identity
of a
person
is determined by
the
identity
of
the
object-the enduring entity-who
is
conceived of as a person.
That
an
individual is
conceived of as a person
amounts
to the
attribution
to that
individual
of certain
kinds
of properties,
such as
intentionality,
the
capacity
to think
and
to
make
decisions,
psychological attributes, and so
forth.
An individual
may also
be
conceived of as a particular personality.
In
other
words,
the
individual is
attributed specific personality
traits,
can
be
thought
of as a specific personality.
But
the
particular personality of an
individual
also amounts
to
what
is
thought
of
that
individual by
others, and
to this
ex-
tent
is determined by
others.
In
writings on personal
identity
problems,
the
individual
and
the
individual's
personality are
frequently
confused.
Strictly
speaking,
the
personality
has
no
identity; it is
not an object,
but
a collection
of
descriptions
attributed
to
an
individual,
and a collection of
descriptions
has
no spatio-temporal continuity.
The individual
of whom
the
descriptions
are predicated
has
spatio-temporal
continuity, and can
thus
be identified.
Failure
to
make
this
distinction leads
to
confusion concerning personal
iden-
tity.
As
outlined
in
chapter
two,
many philosophers use
the
phrase,
"the
181
same person,
" in
an ambiguous
manner, to
mean
both
the
spatio-temporal
continuity of
the
individual,
and stability of personality.
Identity
questions
may arise concerning the
former but
not
the
latter,
yet many writers
in
this
field
appear
to
find it
problematic that
personality may change and
draw
the
inference
that
if
a personality
is
changed,
the
identity
of
the
individual is
changed.
This
position
involves
the
assumption that
a personality
is
subject
to
identity
conditions, which
in
turn
assumes that
a personality
is
somehow
independent
of
the
individual
whose personality
it is. This form
of
hypostasising leads
to the
position
that the
identity
of persons
in
general can
be
separated
from
the
identity
of physical
individuals. But if
there
is
to
be
such a
thing
as a personal
identity distinct from individual identity,
then there
must
be
such
things
as persons
distinct from individuals. Persons, it
then
follows,
are subject
to
different identity
conditions
from individuals. From
this
basis
the
search proceeds
for identity
conditions which apply
to
persons,
independently from
the
identities
of
individuals
who are spatio-temporal ob-
jects. Criteria
such as
the
continuity of memory or psychological connected-
ness are presented as candidates
for
conditions of
identity
of persons.
The
search
for
such conditions of
identity
and
the
problems which arise
therein,
are cast as personal
identity
problems.
Yet if
one
distinguishes between
the
object which can
be identified
and
the
properties attributable
to that
object,
there
is
no
"problem"
concerning
the
identity
of persons or of personalities.
P. F. Strawson's13
analysis
is
an. attempt
to
demonstrate
a
distinction bet-
ween person and other material objects.
Strawson
uses
four
main arguments
in
the
presentation of
his
analysis.
The first
argument
is
that
person
is
a
basic
particular
in
our conceptual scheme.
This
argument was criticised on
the
grounds
that
Strawson
does
not explain
three
major points:
the
first
concerns
the
ontological status of a particular,
Strawson does
not explain what a par-
ticular
is,
nor
does he
explain what
he
means
by "ontologically
prior.
"
Secondly, it is
not clear what
Strawson
means
by "basic, "
and
third,
Strawson does
not make
it
clear
how
person
is
to
be differentiated
from
other
basic
particulars
in
a non-circular
manner.
Strawson's
second major argu-
182
ment
is
that the
concept of person
is
primitive
in
relation
to
concepts of ex-
perience and mental states, or
to
concepts of
body. In
order
to
demonstrate
the
basicness
of persons as particulars,
Strawson
argues
that
persons are
basic in
respect
to
private particulars
(mental
states),
but in doing
so,
Strawson
renders persons
indistinguishable from
material objects, as
in
order
to
qualify as particulars, states of consciousness must
be identifiable in
time
and space, and are
therefore
distinct from
persons.
Strawson's
third
major
argument
is
that
person
is
to
be defined
as
the
kind
of entity
to
which
both
M-and P-predicates
are equally applicable.
One is
to
determine
persons as
those
entities
to
whom we attribute states of consciousness and material ob-
jects
those to
whom we
do
not.
This
argument
is
circular.
The definition
of
P-predicates
are
those
we attribute
to
persons and not
to
material objects, yet
the
definition
of person
is
the
entity
to
which
P-predicates
are attributable.
The
analysis presented
in
this
work suggests
that
what
is
ordinarily meant
by
person
is determined by
what
Strawson identifies
as
P-predicates, but
that
the term
person amounts
to
a
bundle
of predicates, qualities or attributes
which are
thought
of as an
individual. Strawson
attempts
to
make an ontolo-
gical
distinction between
persons and material objects on
the
basis
of
these
predicates.
Strawson's
arguments
fail
to
support such a
distinction because
his
criteria of
identity
of particulars are spatio-temporal, and as spatio-
temporal
objects, persons are not
distinguishable from
other
kinds
of
material objects.
That there
is
a conceptual
distinction between
persons and
material objects
does
not
imply
that there
is
an ontological
distinction.
Strawson
presents
his
arguments
as an analysis of
how "we"
ordinarily use
language. Ordinarily the term
person
is
not problematic.
However,
as men-
tioned
earlier
in
this
chapter,
it
may
become
problematic
in
certain social
contexts.
These
contexts
may
involve
situations
where social, moral, or
legal
rights and
duties
are at stake.
In
ordinary
usage
there
is,
as yet, no real pro-
blem
concerning whether
dolphins,
or robots,
or
dogs,
and so
forth,
are per-
sons.
Person
is
a
term applied
to
human
beings;
in
some situations
doubts
may arise as
to
whether
a
human
being
can
be
attributed
the
kinds
of proper-
183
ties
which constitute person,
but Strawson's
analysis allows
that
any entity
to
whom certain predicates are attributed
is
a person.
This does
not accord with
the
ordinary meaning of person.
The
attempt
to
establish person as an on-
tological
entity rather
than
a way of conceiving
individuals
who are also
human beings
overlooks
the
fact
that the
properties which constitute person
are properties of
individuals
who are also self-conscious
human beings. To
overlook
the
fact
that
persons are also
human beings is
a variant of
the
Type
2
mistake outlined above.
One does
not recognise or encounter persons
in
the
world, and
then
deter-
mine whether
they
are
human beings,
or
dolphins,
or martians, yet
the
analyses presented
by both Strawson
and
D. C. Dennett14
suggest
that this
could
be
the
case.
Dennett
shows
that
many of
the
predicates which con-
stitute person are also attributed
to
other entities, and
to
computer programs,
It
can
be
argued
that the
description in intentional
terms
of an animal's
behaviour,
or a
tree's
growth, or a computer's
functioning is
a metaphorical
use of
language
wherein
the
meaning of
the
description
relies on a metaphor
between
such entities and
human beings. But
even
if
such
intentional descrip-
tions
are not metaphorical,
they
do
not amount
to
descriptions
of persons.
Dennett
suggests
that the
metaphysical and moral notion of person are
resting points on
the
same continuum, and suggests
that
persons are
distinguished from
other
higher-order
intentional
systems
by
their
capacity
for
second-order volition, which
in
turn
is
a condition of morality.
But Den-
nett concludes
that
"we"
cannot
judge
whether we are persons.
This
conclu-
sion seems
to
result
from
a variant of a
Type 2
mistake,
in
that
Dennett
fails
to
observe what
his
examples
actually
demonstrate-that the
entities of
whom
the
moral properties
are predicated
are
human beings. Although Den-
nett
does
not suggest
that
persons
are
distinct
entities,
he does
treat the
pro-
perties which constitute
personhood
as
if
they
were
independent
of
the
object
of whom
the
properties
are predicated.
Writers
such as
Strawson
and
Dennett
who consider
the
concepts of person
cite examples of properties
which
are attributable
to
persons,
which,
in fact,
184
require a
human body
to
be instantiated.
What is distinctive
about the
mean-
ing
of such predicates
as
"coiling
a rope,
"
or
"spreading
his limbs, " is
not
only
that they
are
intentional
predicates,
but
they
also require
to
be instan-
tiated
in human-like form
or
body
to
have
the
meaning they
do have. Failure
to
recognise
this
aspect of person predicates, can
be
traced to
a
Type 2
mistake
in
the theories
which propose that
whilst such predicates are at-
tributable to
persons, those
persons need not
be human beings.
A
similar
(Type 2)
confusion can
be found in
the
analyses presented
by
per-
sonal
identity
theorists
such as
S. Shoemaker,
' S J. Perry, ' 6
and
D. Parfit, "
who make use of
imaginary
examples of personalities attributed to
one
in-
dividual
and
instantiated in
another.
But
the
particular attributes which com-
pose an
individual
personality need
to
be instantiated in
some physical
form,
and should
the
form
or
biology
of
the
donor individual be different from
the
form
of
the
recipient,
it is hard
to
see
how
some
of
the
attributes could
be
predicated of
both. For
example,
how is
the
ballet dancer's love
of graceful
movement
to
be instantiated in
the
overweight
long distance lorry driver? To
what extent can
the typical
expression of one
face be
shown
in
another?
Can
the
quality of a
laugh be
reproduced
in
an
individual
whose
jaw
construction
is
entirely
different?
Those
theorists
attempt
to
demonstrate
that
a personality
is distinct from
the
individual
whose personality
it is by
the
use of
imaginary
examples
in-
variably underdescribe
those
examples.
Locke' 8 is
taken
by
many personal
identity
theorists to
be
the
originator of
the
"body-swop"
theories
of per-
sonal
identity
which maintain
that the
identity
of a person
is
established not
according
to
spatio-temporal criteria,
but
according
to
psychological charac-
teristics
which could
be distinguished from
the
individual.
It has been
argued
in
chapter eleven
that this
is
a misunderstanding of
Locke's
theory
of
identity in
several
important
respects.
Locke
makes
it
clear
that the
identity
of an
individual is determined by his identity
as a man,
that
185
is, by
public criteria,
based
on evidence which can
be judged in
a court.
The
identity
of a man consists of
his
partaking of
the
same
life,
which
is judged by
spatio-temporal continuity.
Misunderstanding
of
Locke's
theory
of
identity
may stem
from
the
fact
that
he
uses
the
phrase,
"same
person,
"
as equivalent
to
"self, "
or
"same
personal self.
" The "self" is
constituted
by
con-
sciousness extended
in
time.
Many
writers
have interpreted Locke
as propos-
ing
that
memory
is
the
criterion of personal
identity. However,
a careful
reading of
the text
shows
that
Locke does
not use
the term
memory.
He
writes of consciousness.
Moreover, Locke distinguishes between being
the
same consciousness, which
is
the
condition
that
establishes
the
same self, and
the
activity of reflection,
being
conscious of, which cannot serve as a
criterion of
identity
at all,
because,
as
he
points out,
there
are many
lapses
of
conscious reflection.
The
analysis proposed
in
this
work suggests
that the
private nature of con-
sciousness,
the
extent
to
which
it is inaccessible
to
others, ensures
that
it
can-
not
be
a criterion of
identity
of a public object.
In
this
sense
the
concept of
self
differs from
a concept of person.
Both Locke
and
Parfit
stress
the
importance
of experience or self-con-
sciousness,
but Locke
maintains
that
identity
and
hence
accountability, are
to
be judged
according
to the
identity
of
the
man
(the
public entity), whereas
Parfit
argues
that
because
survival or continuing consciousness
is
more
im-
portant
for
the
self
than
identity judgements
made
by
others,
there
is
no en-
during
entity which
is
subject
to
identity
conditions.
The distinction between
the
self as
the
location
of experience
and
the
identity
of
the
individual, is
taken
by Parfit to
imply that
identity is
not
important. Parfit
claims
that
whilst
there can
be
some
form
of continuity
of consciousness,
there need
be
no
identifiable individual to
be
conscious.
Parfit
appears
to
have
confused
the
properties which
constitute
self-consciousness
with
those which constitute
the
concept of person.
He
suggests
that a person's
life history
should
be
regarded as
the
history
of successive
selves,
yet a
life history
is
public and
the
self
is
not.
Moreover,
both
person
and self are concepts
which
apply
to and
186
draw
their
meaning
from individuals
who are
identifiable
and who can
be in-
dividuated in
time
and space.
There
appears to
be
a confusion
in Parfit's
analysis similar to
a
Type 2
confusion
as outlined above.
That is,
that
Parfit
is
arguing
from
the
point of view of
the
individual
understood as a self-
conscious
being,
to
deny
the
existence of
the
kinds
of properties which con-
stitute
the
individual
understood as a person and a
human being. Parfit
argues
that
from
the
first
person perspective, the
public
identity
of an
in-
dividual is
not
important
(what
matters
is
whether
future
experiences are my
experiences or not.
) However,
the
fact
that there
are experiences at all
assumes
the
existence of a subject of experience, and
the
subject of ex-
perience
is
the
individual. That
the
individual
can
be
understood as a self-
conscious
being,
and
that
concern about survival can
be
explained
from
this
understanding,
is
a partial account.
The individual
who
is
the
subject of ex-
perience
is
an entity which
is
also understood as a
human being,
and as a per-
son.
And
the
individual is
subject
to
identity
conditions, even
though these
are not
important from
the
point of view of
the
experiencing self.
Parfit
uses examples of
imaginary beings
to
illustrate his
theory.
The be-
ings in his
examples
do
not conform
to
actual physical
laws
as we
know
them,
and
thus
are not subject
to the
same
identity
conditions as
individuals
who
are conceived of as persons.
It has been
argued
that
insofar
as
the
entities
which
Parfit discusses
are
totally
unlike
individuals
who are
human beings
and persons,
the theory
which
he derives from
these
examples
does
not apply
to
persons at all.
Parfit
attempts
to
dissolve
the
notion of person and of
the
existence of an enduring ontological entity which can
be identified, but he
does
so at
the
cost of credibility.
What he describes is
a condition which could
not
hold in
this
world where enduring entities
do
exist, and can
be identified,
and as such can
be held
accountable
for
their
actions.
In
order
for
an
individual to
be held
accountable
for
actions,
it
must
be
possible
to
reidentify
the
individual. As T. Reid"
and
J. Butler2
pointed out,
should psychological characteristics
such as consciousness
of actions
be
taken
as
the
criteria of
identity
of
individuals,
no continuity
of
identity
can
be
esta-
187
blished,
and
therefore
accountability
for
actions could not
be determined.
Thus,
the
results of
treating
the
concepts through
which
individuals
are
understood as
though
they
referred to
distinct
entities
has important
social
consequences.
Since individuals
are
the
entities which can
be individuated,
identified,
and reidentified, the
individual is
the
location
of agency.
Even in
cases where an
individual's
personality
has
radically altered, the
identity
of
the
individual
can
be
established
by
saptio-temporal
criteria, and
the
location
of agency
is
assured.
Whether
the
agent,
the
individual
who performed the
action,
is held
responsible
for
the
consequences of
the
action
is
a
different
question
from
the
question of
identifying
the
agent.
The decision
whether
to
reward or punish an
individual for
actions committed at a
time
when
the
per-
sonality of
that
individual
was
judged
to
be different,
or
in
circumstances
in
which
the
individual
cannot remember
the
actions,
does
not
depend
upon a
decision
as
to the
identity
of
the
individual, but
rather upon what
type
of
social or moral
theory
one
holds
with regard
to
reward or punishment.
If individuals
were not reidentifiable,
the
social
framework in
which
reward, punishment and other public
institutions
can
function
would not ex-
ist. Our
understanding of
individuals
as persons may change,
for
example,
in
light
of new psychological
theories,
or religious
beliefs,
and such changed
understanding may
lead
to
a revision of political, social or
legal
practices,
but
the
public nature of
those
practices require
that the
participants
be
publicly
reidentifiable.
The
social,
legal
and moral
implications
of
treating
persons as
distinct
en-
tities
whose conditions of
identity
are
different from
those
of
individuals
would
include
the
destruction
of
the
public arena
in
which reason-giving,
justification,
and
the
determination
of criteria
for decisions
exist.
In
summary, although
the
concept of person can change, and
is
variable
between different
cultures,
it is
a mode of understanding
individuals
who are
natural
kinds. Therefore, the
concept
is
not purely conventional,
but
con-
structed
by
the
prevailing understanding
of a
type
of
being
which
is
also
understood
in
other ways.
The
analysis presented
here has distinguished
two
188
other modes of understanding
individuals
which are often confused with
the
understanding of
individuals
as persons.
These
modes of understanding
amount
to the
concepts of self, and
human being,
and whilst
the
meanings of
the
concepts are
interrelated by
virtue of
their
being
modes of understanding
the same object,
the
way
in
which
the
concepts
function differ. It is
quite
possible
to
give an account of
individuals from
the
point of view of any one
of
these
modes of understanding,
but
such accounts will
be incomplete
and
frequently
unnecessarily problematic.
If it is
recognised
that
individuals
are
the
subject of all of
the
properties which amount
to the
concepts of person,
human being,
and self, many of
the
puzzle cases concerning personal
identity
will not arise.
Moreover,
many of
the
questions which arise
in
considering
legal,
social, political, medical, or ethical problems, which appear
to
depend
for
their
resolution upon
definitions
of person, will
be
seen
to
be
answerable
not
in
terms
of an analysis of
the
concept of person
but in
a clear understand-
ing
of rights and
duties,
of criteria of
judgement,
of
justification,
and so
forth,
appropriate
to those
areas of
decision-making.
Locke's famous
question of whether a man should
be
punished
for
actions
committed when
he
was asleep or
drunk (that is,
not conscious of
his
actions)
is
not answered
by determining
whether
he is
the
same person,
but by
a con-
sideration of
the
purposes
of punishment.
Questions
concerning
the
appro-
priateness of punishment
can only arise within a society or social group where
the
possibility of
the
individuation
and reidentification
of agents
is
assumed..
189
NOTES
1. P. F. Strawson,
Individuals:
An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics (Lon-
don: Methuen, 1959).
2. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " in A. Rorty (ed. ), The
Identities
of
Persons, (University
of
California Press, 1976).
3. H. Frankfurt, "Freedom
of
the
Will
and
the
Concept
of a
Person, " J.
Phil. 68: 5-20 (1971).
4. J. Rawls, "Justice
as
Reciprocity, " in S. Gorovitz (ed. ) Utilitarianism,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1971).
5. A. Rorty, The Identities
of
Persons, (University
of
California Press,
1976).
6. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd
edition
(1694).
7. J. Perry, "The Problem
of
Personal Identity, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal
Identity, (University
of
California Press, 1975).
8. B. Williams, Problems
of
the
Self: Philosophical Papers 1956-1972,
(Cambridge University Press, 1973).
9. D. Parfit, Reasons
and
Persons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
10. T. Penelhum, "The Importance
of
Self-Identity, " J. Phil. 68: 667-678
(1971).
11. D. Wiggins, "Locke, Butler
and
the
Stream
of
Consciousness, " in A.
Rorty (ed. ) The Identities
of
Persons, (1976).
12. See J. Glover (ed. ) The Philosophy
of
Mind, (Oxford University Press,
1976).
a:
190
13. P. F. Strawson, Individuals, (1959).
14. D. C. Dennett, "Conditions
of
Personhood, " (1976).
15. S. Shoemaker, "Personal Identity
and
Memory, " J. Phil., 56: 868-881,
(1959).
16. J. Perry, "The Problem
of
Personal Identity, " (1975).
17. D. Parfit, "Personal Identity, " in J. Perry (ed. ) Personal Identity,
(1975).
18. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd
edition,
(1694).
19. T. Reid, "Of Memory, " in Essays
on
the
Intellectual Powers
of
Man,
(1785).
20. J. Butler, The Analogy
of
Religion, (1736).
191
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