[Modes of Judicial Review - Certiorari]

[G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998.]

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS,
respondents.
J. Regalado

Facts:
present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No.
III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that
he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin
Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor
was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January
22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was
not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the
owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995,
private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of
Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private
respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing
the business
labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on October
25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship
existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case
NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision
and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate
appropriate proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution
dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the present
petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion

Issue: WON NLRC decisions are appealed to CA under Rule 65 (YES, as per
hierarchy of courts doctrine)

Held:
that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special
civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC
The important distinction between them, however, and with which
the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil
action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of
this Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are
allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill
No. 1495
all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65

[Modes of Judicial Review - Certiorari]
[G.R. Nos. L-29959-60. January 30, 1971.]
THE POLICE COMMISSION, represented by its Chairman, Crispino M.
de Castro and Jose G. Lukban, Jolly Bugarin, and Vicente Raval,
members, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE ELOY B. BELLO,
GENARO C. FERRER, and EMERANO BONIFACIO, respondents.
J. Villamor

Facts:
a sworn complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, serious
irregularities in the performance of duty and/or serious neglect of
duty and incompetency was filed by certain persons with the
Board of Investigators of Binmaley, Pangasinan, against herein
respondents Genaro C. Ferrer and Emerano Bonifacio, Chief of
Police and Corporal, respectively, of the police force of Binmaley.
The said respondents filed a joint answer, after which hearings
were conducted. On March 15, 1967, the Board of Investigators
made a report of its investigation containing a finding that "the
charges imputed against respondents were not committed
deliberately or intentionally but, rather, were done through honest
mistake," and recommending to the Police Commission that "the
case be dropped with the admonition that the respondents . . .
should be more careful in the performance of their official duties."
After reviewing the records of the investigation in its
Administrative Case No. 26, the Police Commission rendered
decision on August 2, 1967, finding the respondents guilty of
serious neglect of duty and ordering their dismissal from the
service. The respondents filed motions for reconsideration, but
the same were denied
On November 19, 1968, respondents Ferrer and Bonifacio filed
with the court below two separate petitions for certiorari with
preliminary mandatory injunction (Civil Cases Nos. 14718 and
14719). In their petitions they contended that the Police
Commission had no jurisdiction to render a decision in the
administrative case on August 2, 1967, because at that time it
had not yet even published its Police Manual as required by
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 4864 (Police Act of 1966); and
that the Police Commission committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing them from the service. On November 21, 1968,
respondent Judge issued in each of the two cases an order
requiring the Police Commission to file an answer within ten days,
and another order ex parte directing the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. Pursuant to the latter orders,
the corresponding writs were issued on November 22, 1968,
upon the filing of a bond by each of herein private respondents
Police Commission filed a motion to dismiss with a prayer for the
dissolution of the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction. On
December 9, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order denying
the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 14718 and directing herein
petitioner to reinstate respondent Ferrer within twenty-four hours
from receipt of the order. On December 10, 1968, a similar order
was issued in connection with respondent Bonifacio's petition in
Civil Case No. 14719. On December 12, 1968, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration (no proof of service of summons)
present petition was filed with this Court. Sought to be annulled
are the orders of respondent Judge dated November 21, 1968,
requiring petitioner to file an answer and directing the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in each of the two
cases, the aforesaid writs issued on November 22, 1968, and the
December 9 and 10, 1968 orders denying petitioner's motions to
dismiss and ordering petitioner to reinstate private respondents.
Petitioner, likewise, seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from
carrying out and enforcing his order of December 14, 1968, and
from proceeding with the hearing of the cases
In directing issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction ex parte, respondent Judge stated in his twin orders of
November 21, 1968, that there was a prima facie showing in the
petitions that the Police Commission had no jurisdiction to render
a decision in Administrative Case No. 26; that it is alleged in the
petitions that if the petitioners (herein private respondents) are
not immediately reinstated, they will suffer irreparable damage
and injury; and that if the petitioners in the cases eventually win
and are found entitled to reinstatement, it will be difficult for them
to secure payment of back salaries, especially if the Municipality
of Binmaley will not have sufficient funds for the purpose

Issue: WON there is grave abuse of discretion, justifying the issuance of writ of
certiorari (YES)

Held:
writs in question were improvidently issued, and that, moreover,
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
had no power to issue such writs against the Police Commission,
which holds office in Quezon City
it is improper to issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to a
final hearing except "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right
is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear
strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and
unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and
remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the
effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to reestablish and
maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties,
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to
establish a new relation."
Did private respondents have a clear legal right to be reinstated
to their former positions in the municipal police force of Binmaley?
We do not think so. The principal ground on which their petitions
in the lower court are predicated is lack of jurisdiction of the
Police Commission to render a decision in Administrative Case
No. 26, petitioners contending that the Police Commission had no
such jurisdiction because it had not yet published a Police Manual
when it rendered its decision on August 2, 1967
Section 26 of Republic Act No. 4864 (Police Act of 1966): "SEC.
26. Saving clause. All pending administrative cases
involving police service and personnel shall be absorbed by the
Police Commission one hundred days after the publication of the
Police Manual containing rules and regulations relative to such
matters
Police Manual mentioned in the law, Section 9, Rule XXIII:
"SECTION 9. Saving Clause. All administrative cases
involving members of the police force pending before the city or
municipal boards, or those with the city or municipal mayors, shall
be turned over to the Board of Investigators concerned, and those
with the Civil Service Board of Appeals, to the Police Commission
within one hundred (100) days after the publication of this Manual
promulgated only or, December 30, 1967, or sometime after
the rendition of the decision by the Police Commission in its
Administrative Case No. 26
considering that private respondents voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Board of Investigators, whose
decisions are subject to review by the Police Commission, they
are now barred under the doctrine of estoppel by laches from
questioning the jurisdiction of the said Commission
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan has no jurisdiction to issue
writs of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Police
Commission, which holds office in Quezon City, outside the
territorial boundaries of said court
(RELEVANT TOPIC)
private respondents' petitions for certiorari in the lower court are
predicated on two grounds, namely, that the Police Commission
had no jurisdiction to render a decision in Administrative Case No.
26, and that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
respondent Ferrer, on the flimsy pretext of command
responsibility, and, with respect to both private respondents, in
wantonly overruling the findings and hideously ignoring the
recommendations of the Board of Investigators. The first ground
is closely interwoven with the November 21, 1968 orders for the
issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory injunction, and was
squarely raised by the parties to the present cases as art issue
and ruled upon by this Court.
Allegations: without herein private respondents' presence or
knowledge, the Board of Investigators met in session on March 2,
1967, and took ex parte the testimony of Pat. Graciano Aquino,
upon which the Police Commission subsequently relied in arriving
at its conclusions; that "the respondent Police Commission
instead of appreciating the valid acts of the Board enunciated in
its findings and recommendations, said respondent depressed
the valid portions of the proceedings of the Board and then gave
bloated significance to the result of that isolated illegal act of the
Board, which is the testimony of Pat. Graciano Aquino taken in
the absence of, and without due notice to the petitioner " and that
the Police Commission, "basing its conclusion from loosely
connected, distorted and insufficient facts, with very apparent
prejudice and hostility, ARBITRARILY DISMISSED the petitioner
from the service for some highly imagined, or at most, very minor,
administrative offense
While findings of fact of administrative bodies are entitled to great
weight and should not generally be disturbed, there is grave
abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari
when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrarily or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an
evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law
Considering the allegations of private respondents, as mentioned
above, in their petitions, and considering, further, that the Board
of Investigators of Binmaley which heard the witnesses had
recommended the dismissal of the case against both
respondents, we feel without expressing an opinion on the
merits of the cases in relation to the second ground that for
this Court to issue a writ of prohibition permanently prohibiting
respondent Judge from proceeding with the cases, as prayed for
by petitioner Police Commission, will be to deprive the private
respondents of their day in court; for then they can no longer be
in a position to prove their allegation that petitioner committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing them. While it has been
shown that the court below exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the
writs of preliminary mandatory injunction, it has not likewise been
shown in the present petition nor has it been alleged therein
that the entire proceedings in the court below are without or in
excess of the lower court's jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. In passing it must be mentioned that the doctrine in
support of the theory of non-jurisdiction is not applicable to this
aspect of the proceedings, the power of judicial review not being
confined to the court of first instance of the locality where the
office of petitioner is maintained, to the exclusion of the court of
first instance in the locality where private respondents reside
Dispositive: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the writ of certiorari is
granted, and, accordingly the orders of respondent Judge in Civil
Cases Nos. 14718 and 14719 dated November 21, 1968, insofar as
they direct the issuance of the writs of preliminary mandatory
injunction, and the orders issued pursuant thereto, are declared null
and void; the orders of December 9 and 10, 1968, are likewise
declared null and void insofar as they require petitioner to reinstate
private respondents; and respondent Judge is permanently
prohibited from carrying out and enforcing his order of December 14,
1968. The writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied insofar as
petitioner seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with
the cases, and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
in relation to the hearing of the cases is hereby dissolved


[Modes of Judicial Review - Certiorari]
[G.R. No. 78591. March 21, 1989.]
PURE FOODS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, REMIGIO CLAVIO, ANDRES CATUBAY,
VIRGILIO UMALI, ORLANDO REY and JORGE DEL ROSARIO,
respondents.

Facts:
Private respondents Remigio Clavio, Andres Catubay, Virgilio
Umali, Orlando Rey and Jorge del Rosario were employees of
petitioner Pure Foods Corporation.
Petitioner hired private respondents Clavio and Catubay as
drivers, starting 1979 and 1976, respectively; Umali as utility man,
starting 1978; Rey as delivery man, starting 1973; and Del
Rosario as checker, starting 1978. Despite their specific
appointments, there were times when respondents Umali and Del
Rosario were required by their superiors to perform the duties of
a dispatcher
Of all the employees involved from the packaging to the delivery
of the goods, only private respondents were indefinitely
suspended for alleged pilferage as early as March 18, 1981,
immediately after the aforesaid incident and without prior
investigation. Thereafter, their suspension was continued until
their dismissal without any notice to them or clearance from the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment.
On May 13, 1983, an order was issued by Director Severo M.
Pucan directing petitioner to reinstate private respondents to their
former position with full backwages from the date of their
dismissal until actual reinstatement, and to pay said complainants
their unpaid wages prior to their dismissal.
Petitioner appealed the order to the Office of the then Minister,
Ministry of Labor and Employment. Acting on said appeal, former
Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued an order setting
aside the aforesaid order of Director Pucan and indorsing the
complaint to the NLRC-NCR-Arbitration Branch for compulsory
arbitration as the nature of the case was not suited for summary
proceeding, the issues involved being evidentiary in nature which
could be threshed out in a formal hearing.
Labor Arbiter: "WHEREFORE, finding that except for Remigio
Clavio, the dismissal of the other complainants to be justified,
their complaint impugning the same should be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED. However, for failure to furnish them with a clearance
application for their termination as well as the belated filing of the
same with MOLE, respondent Pure Foods Corporation, should,
(sic) as it is hereby, ordered to pay Virgilio Umali, Jorge del
Rosario, Orlando Rey and Andres Catubay their separation pay of
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service (sic) their
respective services and to reinstate Remigio Clavio to his former
position with one and half (sic) (1-1/2) years of backwages."
NLRC: In favor of private respondents: "WHEREFORE, premises
considered the Decision appealed from is, as it is hereby modified
as aforediscussed. Consequently, respondent is hereby ordered
to reinstate VIRGILIO UMALI, JORGE DEL ROSARIO,
ORLANDO REY and ANDRES CATUBAY to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay their
backwages equivalent to three (3) years each without
qualifications and deductions. Further, respondent is directed to
show proof of immediate compliance to the mandate of this
Decision after ten (10) days from receipt thereof
Petitioner contends that respondent commission committed a
grave abuse of discretion in totally reversing the findings of facts
of the labor arbiter.
respondents preemptively contend that the questioned decision of
the public respondent has long become final and executory, for
failure of petitioner to file its motion for reconsideration within the
10-day reglementary period, hence the same is no longer legally
susceptible of any amendment, alteration and/or modification.
Respondents consequently pray for the dismissal of this special
civil action for certiorari

Issue: WON certiorari was proper in this case (NO)

Held:
In the case at bar, a motion for reconsideration was belatedly filed
by petitioner by reason of which the motion was denied by public
respondent. In a futile attempt to elide and gloss over an obvious
mistake or fatal omission, petitioner then filed this special civil
action for certiorari by imputing to public respondent a supposed
grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of facts of the
labor arbiter.
This procedural maneuver is fatally flawed and unavailing on both
counts. The unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction is that certiorari
will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of
respondent. In the present case, the plain and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision and the resolution thereof, which was not only
expected to be but would actually have provided adequate and
more speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari. 11
This remedy was actually sought to be availed of by petitioner
when it filed a motion for reconsideration albeit beyond the 10-
day reglementary period. For all intents and purposes, petitioner
cannot now be heard to say that there was no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy available to it and that it must, therefore, be
allowed to seek relief by certiorari. This contention is not only
untenable but would even place a premium on a party's
negligence or indifference in availing of procedural remedies
afforded by law
The filing of such a motion is intended to afford public respondent
an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it
by way of a re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the
case. Petitioner's inaction or negligence under the circumstances
is tantamount to a deprivation of the right and opportunity of the
respondent commission to cleanse itself of an error unwittingly
committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. An
improvident resort to certiorari cannot be used as a tool to
circumvent the right of public respondent to review and purge its
decision of an oversight, if any. Neither should this special civil
action be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences
of petitioner's own negligence or error in the choice of remedies.
Having allowed the decision to become final and executory,
petitioner cannot by an overdue strategy question the correctness
of the decision of the respondent commission when a timely
motion for reconsideration was the legal remedy indicated.
In asserting that there was grave abuse of discretion, petitioner
adverts to alleged variances in the factual findings of the labor
arbiter and the respondent commission. This is inapt and
erroneous. Firstly, errors of judgment, as distinguished from
errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil
action for certiorari. Secondly, a careful perusal of the records of
this case readily reveals that if there is any error by public
respondent in its analysis of the facts and its evaluation of the
evidence, it is not of such a degree as may be stigmatized as a
grave abuse of discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, 12 and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. 13 For
certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law traditions
It is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question
involved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either the want or excess
thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is so
grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, and
it must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or
to act at all, in contemplation of law, 15 as to be equivalent to
having acted without jurisdiction
It is, therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to adduce a sufficiently
strong demonstration that the respondent commission acted
whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to and even
decisive of the controversy, before certiorari will lie. In this,
petitioner has failed.
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. 16
The reason for the rule is simple. When a court exercises its
jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is
committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would
deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would
be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of
justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of
certiorari
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The
decision of Labor Arbiter Raymundo R. Valenzuela, dated May
16, 1986, insofar as it orders the reinstatement of private
respondent Remigio Clavio and the payment of his backwages of
one and a half years is AFFIRMED. The decision of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission of March 23, 1987 and its
resolution of May 20, 1987 are likewise AFFIRMED