Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30188 October 2, 1928
FELIPE TA!O, E"UAR"O #UENO, #AUTISTA TA!O, #ERNAR"O SOL"E $%& 'ICENTE
ELUM, petitioners,
vs.
NICOLAS CAPISTRANO, $ct(%) $* +,&)e o- F(r*t I%*t$%ce o- Or(e%t$. Ne)ro*. ALFRE"O #.
CACNIO, $* Pro/(%c($. F(*c$. o- Or(e%t$. Ne)ro*, $%& +UAN GA"IANI, respondents.
Abad Santos, Camus and Delgado and Teopisto Guingona for petitioners.
Araneta and Zaragoza for respondents.
The respondent Judge in his own behalf.

OSTRAN", J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition enjoinin the respondent jude fro! !a"in
coni#ance of certain civil and cri!inal election cases in which the petitioners are parties.
The petitioners allee that the respondent jude, previous to this date, was appointed jude of
the Court of $irst %nstance of &riental Neros, to hold office durin ood behavior and until he should
reach the ae of '( )ears* that he now has reached that ae and, therefore, under the provisions of
section +,- of the Ad!inistrative Code as a!ended, is dis.ualified fro! actin as a jude of the
Court of $irst %nstance. The petitioners further allee that in view of the !an) election protests and
cri!inal cases for violation of the election law filed in the Court of $irst %nstance of &riental Neros
arisin in the Court of $irst %nstance of &riental Neros arisin fro! the last election of /une (, +01-,
the 2onorable 3i4to de la Costa was dul) desinated and acted as au4iliar) jude of the Province of
&riental Neros* that between the au4iliar) jude and the respondent jude herein there was an
understandin, and the assin!ent of the said au4iliar) jude was !ade with this understandin, that
the said au4iliar) jude so desinated would hear and ta"e coni#ance of all election protests and
cri!inal actions then pendin or to filed arisin fro! the said last eneral election, and that the
respondent 2onorable Nicolas Capistrano would tr) and hear the ordinar) cases pendin in the said
court, but, notwithstandin this understandin or aree!ent, the respondent jude tried and is still
tr)in to ta"e coni#ance of the election protests an cri!inal actions in said court* that the respondent
jude declared in open court that he will tr) the cri!inal cases herein !entioned for the reason that
the au4iliar) jude refused to tr) the sa!e on the round that the preli!inar) investiations were held
before hi!, when, in truth and in fact, the said au4iliar) jude did not !a"e the state!ent i!puted to
hi! and was and is still willin to tr) the election protests and cri!inal cases for violation of the
election law pendin in the court of the Province of &riental Neros* that the respondent 2onorable
Nicolas Capistrano, in spite of the fact that he was holdin and is now pretendin to hold the office of
jude of the Court of $irst %nstance of &riental Neros, too" reat interest and active part in the filin
of cri!inal chares aainst the petitioners herein to the unjustifiable e4tent of appointin a deput)
fiscal, who then filed the proper infor!ations, when the provincial fiscal refused to file cri!inal
chares aainst the petitioners for violation of the election law for lac" of sufficient evidence to sustain
the sa!e* that said respondent is neither a jude de jure nor de fato, but that, notwithstandin this
fact, he continues to hold the office of jude of the Court of $irst %nstance of &riental Neros and
pretends to be dul) .ualified and actin jude of the said province* and that he has tried, and
continues to tr), to act as such jude and that there is reasonable round to believe that he will ta"e
coni#ance of the cases in .uestion unless he be restrained b) order of this court* that in actin as a
dul) .ualified jude notwithstandin the facts alleed in the fifth, si4th, and seventh pararaphs
hereof, the respondent jude acted and is about to act without and in e4cess of jurisdiction and also
after the loss of jurisdiction.
To this petition the respondents de!ur on the round that the facts stated in that 5+6 none of the
facts alleed in the petition divest the respondent jude of his jurisdiction to ta"e coni#ance of the
cases referred to in the co!plaint, and 516 even ad!ittin as true, for the sa"e of this de!urrer, the
facts alleed in pararaph 7 of the petition, the respondent jude is still a de fato jude and his title
to the office and his jurisdiction to hear the cases referred to in the petition cannot be .uestioned b)
prohibition, as this writ, even when directed aainst persons actin as judes, cannot be treated as a
substitute for !uo warranto, or be rihtfull) called upon to perfor! an) of the functions of that writ.
The round upon which the petition rests !a) be reduced to three propositions. 5+6 That the
assin!ent of the Au4iliar) /ude, 3i4to de la Costa, to 8u!auete was !ade with the
understandin that the he was to hear and ta"e coni#ance of all election contests and cri!inal
causes for violation of the election law and that the respondent jude was to ta"e coni#ance of the
ordinar) cases and that there was an understandin between the! that this arrane!ent was to be
followed.
516 That the respondent jude too" reat interest and an active part in the filin of the cri!inal
chares aainst the petitioners herein to the unjustifiable e4tent of appointin a deput) fiscal
who filed the proper infor!ations when the reular provincial fiscal refused to file the! for lac"
of sufficient evidence.
596 That the respondent jude is alread) over '( )ears of ae and has, therefore, auto!aticall)
ceased as jude of the Court of $irst %nstance of &riental Neros and that he is neither a
jude de jure nor de fato.
5a6 But little need be said as to the first proposition. A writ of prohibition to a jude of an
interior court will onl) lie in cases where he acts without or in e4cess of his jurisdiction
5section 11', Code of Civil Procedure6, and it is obvious that a !ere :understandin: as
to the distribution of cases for trial did not deprive the respondent jude of the
jurisdiction conferred upon hi! b) law. %t !a) be noted that it is not alleed that another
jude had ta"en coni#ance of the cases in .uestion or that the) had been definitel)
assined to trial before such other jude.
5b6 The second proposition is e.uall) untenable."awph#l.net That the respondent jude
too" reat interest and an active part in the filin of the cri!inal chares aainst the
petitioners to the e4tent of appointin a deput) fiscal when the reular provincial fiscal
refused to file the proper infor!ations, did not dis.ualif) hi! fro! tr)in the case in
.uestion. 3ection +'70 of the Ad!inistrative Code provides that :when a provincial
fiscal shall be dis.ualified b) personal interest to act in a particular case or when for an)
reason he shall be unable, or shall fail, to dischare an) of the duties of his position, the
jude of the Court of $irst %nstance of the province shall appoint an actin provincial
fiscal, . . . .: 5E!phasis ours.6
The deter!ination of the .uestion as to whether the fiscal has failed to dischare
his dut) in the prosecution of a cri!e !ust necessaril), to a lare e4tent, lie within the
sound discretion of the presidin jude, and there is no alleation in the petition that
such discretion was abused in the present instance. %t is true that it is stated that the
appoint!ent of the actin fiscal was :unjustifiable,: but that is onl) a conclusion of law
and not an alleation of facts upon which such a conclusion can be for!ed and !a),
therefore, be disrearded. %t follows that in appointin an actin fiscal, the respondent
jude was well within his jurisdiction.
5c6 The third round upon which the petition is based is the !ost i!portant and !erits
so!e consideration. %t is well settled that the title to the office of a jude, whether de
jure or de fato, can onl) be deter!ined in a proceedin in the nature of !uo
warranto and cannot be tested b) prohibition. But counsel for the petitioners !aintains
that the respondent jude is neither a jude de jure nor de fato and that, therefore,
prohibition will lie. %n this, counsel is undoubtedl) !ista"en.
The respondent jude has been dul) appointed to the office of /ude of the Court of $irst
%nstance of &riental Neros, but section +,- of the Ad!inistrative Code, as a!ended, provides that
:/udes of the Court of $irst %nstance and au4iliar) judes shall be appointed to serve until the) shall
reach the ae of si4t);five )ears.: %n view of this provision and assu!in, as we !ust, that the
alleations of the petition are true, it is evident that the respondent is no loner a jude de jure, but
we do not thin" that it can be successfull) disputed that he is still a jude de fato.
Briefl) defined, a de fato jude is one who e4ercises the duties of a judicial office under color
of an appoint!ent or election thereto 5Brown vs. &<Connell, 9' Conn., ,916. 2e differs, on the one
hand, fro! a !ere usurper who underta"es to act officiall) without an) color of riht, and on the other
hand, fro! a jude de jure who is in all respects leall) appointed and .ualified and whose ter! of
office has not e4pired 53tate vs. Carroll, 9- Conn., ,,0* 8enn) vs. Matton, 1 Allen =Mass.>, 9'+* ?an
3l)"e vs. $ar!ers< Mut. $ire %ns. Co., 90 @is., 90A6.
Apart fro! an) constitutional or statutor) reulation on the subject there see!s to be a
eneral rule of law that an incu!bent of an office will hold over after the conclusion of his ter!
until the elction and .ualification of a successor 511 R. C. B., pp. ((,;(6. @hen a jude in ood
faith re!ains in office after his title has ended, he is a de fato officer 53heehan<s Case, +11
Mass., ,,(6.
Appl)in the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before us, we cannot escape
the conclusion that, on the assu!ption that said facts are true, the respondent jude !ust be
considered a jude de fato. 2is ter! of office !a) have e4pired, but his successor has not been
appointed, and as ood faith is presu!ed, he !ust be rearded as holdin over in ood faith. The
contention of counsel for the petitioners that the au4iliar) jude present in the district !ust be
considered the reular jude see!s obviousl) erroneous.
%n these circu!stances the re!ed) pra)ed for cannot be ranted. :The rihtful authorit) of a
jude, in the full e4ercise of his public judicial function, cannot be .uestioned b) an) !erel) private
suitor, nor b) an) other, e4ceptin in the for! especiall) provided b) law. A jude de fato assu!es
the e4ercise of a part of the preroative of sovereint), and the lealit) of that assu!ption is open to
the attac" of the soverein power alone. Accordinl), it is a well established principle, datin fro! the
earliest period and repeatedl) confir!ed b) an unbro"en current of decisions, that the official acts of
a de fato jude are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure jude, so far as the public or
third persons who are interested therein are concerned. The rule is the sa!e in civil cri!inal cases.
The principle is one founded in polic) and convenience, for the riht of no one clai!in a title or
interest under or throuh the proceedins of an officer havin an apparent authorit) to act would be
safe, if it were necessar) in ever) case to e4a!ine the lealit) of the title of such officer up to its
oriinal source, and the title or interest of such person were held to be invalidated b) so!e accidental
defect or flaw in the appoint!ent, election or .ualification of such officer, or in the rihts of those fro!
who! his appoint!ent or election e!anated* nor could the supre!ac) of the laws be !aintained, or
their e4ecution enforced, if the acts of the jude havin a colorable, but not a leal title, were to be
dee!ed invalid. As in the case of judes of courts of record, the acts of a justice de fato cannot be
called in .uestion in an) suit to which he is not a part). The official acts of a de fato justice cannot b
attac"ed collaterall). An e4ception to the eneral rule that the title of a person assu!in to act as
jude cannot be .uestioned in a suit before hi! is enerall) reconi#ed in the case of a special jude,
and it is held that a part) to an action before a special jude !a) .uestion his title to the office of a
jude on the proceedins before hi!, and that the jud!ent will be reversed on appeal, where proper
e4ceptions are ta"en, if the person assu!in to act as special jude is not a jude de jure. The title of
a de fato officer cannot be indirectl) .uestioned in a proceedin to obtain a writ of prohibition to
prevent hi! fro! doin an official act nor in a suit to enjoin the collection of a jud!ent rendered b)
hi!. 2avin at least colorable riht to the office his title can be deter!ined onl) in a .uo warranto
proceedin or infor!ation in the nature of a !uo warranto at suit of the soverein.: 5+( R. C. B., pp.
(+0;(1+.6
The de!urrer to the petition is sustained, and inas!uch as it is evident that the wea"ness of
the petition cannot be cured b) a!end!ent the present proceedins are hereb) dis!issed with the
costs aainst the petitioners jointl) and severall). The preli!inar) injunction hereinbefore issued is
dissolved. 3o ordered.
A$ane%a, C. J., Johnson, Street, &alolm, 'illamor, (omualdez, and 'illa)(eal, JJ., onur.