2010 GTZ Report Region VIII Needs Assessment Chemical Accident Prevention

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Needs Assessment Study on Chemical Accident Prevention

and Preparedness in Region VIII, Philippines

A study carried out for the the GTZ by:

Mark Hailwood, Karlsruhe, Germany
Jean C. Borromeo, Quezon City, Manila, Philippines

Date: 19
th
August 2010
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Disclaimer

Whilst every care has been taken to ensure the accuracy of the report, no guarantee can
be given for the individual facts, particularly as many have been gathered through
interviews and also these may change as situations evolve. The opinions expressed are
the personal views of the consultants and may not be attributed to any organisations in
which they are employed or with which they are directly associated. Any statements which
may be construed as alluding to a situation of non-compliance may not be used as a basis
for legal enforcement.

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Table of Contents
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 4
2 Scope and Terms of Reference .......................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Scope of the Assessment ..................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Excerpt from the Terms of Reference ................................................................................. 5
2.3 Fulfilling the Terms of Reference ....................................................................................... 6
3 Description of Eastern Visayas ......................................................................................................... 7
3.1 Geography ............................................................................................................................ 7
3.2 Economy ............................................................................................................................... 9
3.3 Natural Hazards in Eastern Visayas ..................................................................................... 9
3.3.1 Typhoon .................................................................................................................. 10
3.3.2 Flooding .................................................................................................................. 10
3.3.3 Landslides ............................................................................................................... 11
3.3.4 Earthquakes ............................................................................................................ 11
3.3.5 Volcano ................................................................................................................... 12
3.3.6 Tsunami ................................................................................................................... 12
4 Facilities selected and visited .......................................................................................................... 13
5 General Findings from site visits .................................................................................................... 14
6 Potential impact of natural hazards on facilities ............................................................................ 14
7 Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................................... 17
7.1 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 17
7.2 Recommendations .............................................................................................................. 19
8 Bibliography and References .......................................................................................................... 21
9 Annexes ........................................................................................................................................... 23
9.1 Maps ................................................................................................................................... 23
9.2 Facility Data Sheet ............................................................................................................. 30
9.3 Specific Facility Information ............................................................................................. 32
9.3.1 Tacloban JO Terminal ............................................................................................. 33
9.3.2 Petron Tacloban Depot ........................................................................................... 35
9.3.3 Coca-Coal Bottlers Phils. Inc. (CCBPI) Tacloban Plant ........................................ 37
9.3.4 Palo Asia Ice Plant .................................................................................................. 39
9.3.5 Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD).......................................................... 41
9.3.6 Leyte Agri Corporation ........................................................................................... 43
9.3.7 Tongonan Geothermal Power Plant (Energy Development Corporation - EDC) ... 45
9.3.8 Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp. .............................................. 47
9.3.9 Philippine Phosphate & Fertilizer Corp. (PHILPHOS) .......................................... 50
9.3.10 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Roaster Plant) .............................................. 53
9.3.11 Speciality Pulp Manufacturing, Inc. (SPMI) ........................................................ 55
9.3.12 Pryce Gases, Inc. .................................................................................................. 57
9.3.13 San Jose Ice Plant ................................................................................................. 59
9.4 Relevant Regulations .......................................................................................................... 61

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1 Introduction

Chemical accidents have the potential to have a significant impact not only on the facility
and its workforce, but also on the local population and environment. Chemical accidents
worldwide have lead to the development of a number of international initiatives and
regulatory frameworks since the 1980s. In particular the OECD Guiding Principles on
Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response, and the UNEP Awareness
and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level (APELL) initiative are two important
activities mentioned here. Increasingly there has been concern that natural disasters may
initiate accidents within facilities handling hazardous substances, which lead to releases
which have a damaging impact on the local communities and the environment.

It has already been recognised, that in developing countries the effects of natural disasters
often impact upon vulnerable communities which do not have sufficient resilience to
prepare for, mitigate and recover from such events. The impact of a natural disaster on a
facility handling hazardous substances in the vicinity of these communities can therefore
have devastating effects on an already exposed population.

This Needs Assessment Study addresses the types of facilities handling hazardous
substances which exist in the Region of Eastern Visayas, Philippines; the degree to which
the hazards presented by the chemical substances and their associated processes have
been adequately identified and the risks assessed; the potential impact of natural disasters
on these facilities and the awareness of the operators of the impact; the position of the
facility within the local community and the communication and information exchange which
takes place. The facilities which were visited are located in mainly rural areas. Even the
fuel depots at Anibong, Tacloban City are at the edge of the city. Tacloban, although
called a city, is in fact a relatively small town, without the resources and infrastructure
normally associated with a major urban development.

The study makes recommendations on further work which may be undertaken in the field
of chemical accident prevention and preparedness, and natural hazards to further
community risk reduction in the Eastern Visayas region.

2 Scope and Terms of Reference

2.1 Scope of the Assessment

The Needs Assessment Study is based on desk top research and on site visits to a
selection of facilities handling hazardous chemicals in the Eastern Visayas Region which
took place between 28
th
July and 5
th
August 2010. The chemical facilities considered are
those with substantial quantities of hazardous chemicals and range from ice manufacturing
plant to large scale chemical processing of the fertilizer and the copper smelting and
refining industries. Household chemicals, e.g. cleaning agents and small scale
commercial activities, e.g. gasoline filling stations, hardware stores, engine cleaning
activities, LPG dealerships are excluded from the study. The study covers the Eastern
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Visayas Region; however there is little industry of significant size handling hazardous
chemicals outside of the Province of Leyte.

The information given in this report is based on publicly available information sources and
on data provided by the facilities visited. The site visits were enabled and supported by
the DENR-EMB 8.

2.2 Excerpt from the Terms of Reference

Objectives of the Needs Assessment

a. To provide an overview of the most important locations in Region VIII where
and which hazardous chemicals are handled or stored and in which
quantities.
b. To identify current practices and gaps on chemical accident risk management
in Region VIII.
c. To identify capacity-building needs to improve chemical accident risk
management in order to reduce the risk of such accidents.

Tasks
- Conduct of a desk study regarding relevant information such as maps of the high-
risk locations, accident statistics, transcription of applicable laws and regulations,
and other relevant technical data.
- On the ground survey to identify strengths and weaknesses in existing chemical
accident risk management and elaboration of recommendations to improve
chemical accident risk management. The consultant shall visit at least 10 facilities
for the assessment (e.g. petroleum storage, LPG storage/distribution, food
processing [with ammonia refrigeration], copper smelting/metal processing,
hazardous waste facility, water treatment [chlorine]).
- Production of a comprehensive and implementation-oriented report, including
recommendations for capacity building needs.

Output

The consultant shall produce a needs assessment report. With regard to Region VIII, the
report shall include an overview of:
a. The location and names of the most important facilities handling or storing
dangerous chemicals in amounts that have the potential of threatening the
lives and health of communities, material assets or the environment.
Household size chemicals are excluded from this study. SMEs should be
included, but covered only in the desk study. Findings regarding them should
be given in a summarized manner.
b. A list of the most important hazardous chemicals handled or stored with
indicative quantities in Region VIII.
c. Main uses of hazardous substances.
d. Profile of bigger companies (assets at least 100 Million Pesos) using
hazardous substances (number of workers, main products and production
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capacity).
e. Profile of petrochemical storage facilities (excluding gas stations for cars).
f. Existing safety management and emergency preparedness practices,
including a description of codes of conduct, prevention programmes, and
actual practices (Are designated safety officers present? What is the
qualification of those officers?).
g. Use of hazard labels in both products and transport vehicles.
h. Description of current hazard and risk communication/information practices
in the companies operation.
i. Description of awareness and practices related to Safer Production and
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), especially with regard to product
stewardship, stakeholder engagement, communication, and reporting.
j. Description of supply chain management practices, business to business
partnership practices and roles of business associations.
k. Capacity of governmental oversight agencies responsible for the adherence
of private companies to regulations pertaining to chemical accident
prevention.
l. Identification of the main risk factors, taking into account accident history,
location and risk of domino effect, level of awareness to underlying risks like
natural hazards.
m. The report should clearly describe the main problem areas to cover and
include recommendations for capacity building needs to be supported by
GTZ and UNEP within a period of 12 months.
n. Other relevant information such as maps of the high-risk locations, accident
statistics, transcription of applicable laws and regulations, and other relevant
technical data should be included in a technical annex.

2.3 Fulfilling the Terms of Reference

Some of the requirements of the Terms of Reference (ToR) can not be fulfilled or only to a
limited degree, as the data or statistics envisaged within the ToR do not exist. It was
already recognised within the UNEP project on the Flexible Framework for Chemical
Accident Prevention and Preparedness that there is no consistent chemical hazard
classification and labelling system in place in the Philippines. The National Fire Code
requires a system based on the NFPA Hazard Diamond, parallel to which there are
currently efforts underway to implement the GHS. Accident statistics relevant to chemical
accidents are only available in a highly aggregated form. Slips, trips, cuts and falls - the
classic workplace accidents have little relevance to chemical accident prevention. A short
profile / description is provided for each of the facilities visited. However the criteria of
assets of at least 100 Million Pesos was not used as this is not directly related to the
chemical accident potential and would have excluded some of the smaller facilities such as
ice-plants.

The most important hazardous chemicals in the Eastern Visayas Region, based on volume
and number of facilities using them, are:
Petroleum fuels (gasoline, kerosene, diesel)
LPG
Chlorine
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Ammonia
Sulphuric acid
Sodium hydroxide

As has been described in the Country Assessment Report on Chemical Accident
Prevention and Preparedness Programme in the Philippines there is no clear demarcation
of authorities responsible for overseeing the prevention of chemical accidents. DOLE and
its agencies are responsible for overseeing workplace safety, DENR and its Agencies are
responsible for overseeing hazardous impact on the environment and the fire departments
are responsible for general safety involving fire prevention and hazardous chemicals. LGU
are responsible for enforcing the municipal or city ordinances where they have been
instituted. Coordination between these various governmental bodies in the field of
prevention and preparedness is not well developed; however in emergency response
cooperation is required. Oversight of chemical process safety, that is the design,
construction and operation of chemical facilities in a safe and controlled manner, is not
explicitly assigned to any particular agency or agencies.

3 Description of Eastern Visayas

3.1 Geography
Eastern Visayas is one of the two regions of the Philippines having no land border with
another region, and is designated as Region VIII. It consists of six provinces, namely,
Biliran, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar and Southern Leyte. These
provinces occupy the easternmost islands of Visayas: Leyte, Samar and Biliran. The
regional center is Tacloban City.

The province of Biliran has a total land area of 555.4 square kilometers, making it the
fourth smallest province in the Philippines. It is composed of two major islands; Biliran
Island and Maripipi Island. Other islands include Higatangan Island and Dalutan Island
(uninhabited). Biliran Island lies off the northern coast of Leyte across Biliran Strait. To the
southeast is Carigara Bay, to the northeast is Samar Sea, and further on, the island of
Samar. To the west is the Visayan Sea, and Masbate lies 30 km to the northwest. The
main island features mountainous interiors with very narrow coastal areas. Mountain
ranges occupy the major portion of the island municipality of Maripipi. Only the
municipalities of Naval and Caibiran have wide plains extending about 7 km from the coast
suitable for agriculture. Mount Suiro, which has an elevation of 1,300 meters, is the highest
point on the island. Biliran has a combination of warm and cool climatic zones, thus the
prevailing climate is ideal for the cultivation of a wide range of agricultural crops. There is
no distinct dry season but the heavy wet season generally occurs in December.

The province of Eastern Samar occupies a total land area of 4,470.75 km2. It is bounded
on the north by Northern Samar, on the east by the Philippine Sea, on the west by Samar,
and on the south by the Leyte Gulf.

Northern Samar is bounded on the north by the San Bernardino Strait, on the east by the
Pacific Ocean, on the west by the Samar Sea, on the southwest by Western Samar and on
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the southeast by Eastern Samar. Its total land area is 3,498 km. The province is
composed largely of low and extremely rugged hills and small lowland areas. It also has
small and discontinuous areas along the coasts and its rivers are usually accompanied by
alluvial plains and valleys. The province is endowed with relatively rich and fertile soil that
most crops can grow on it.

Leyte is the largest province in the Eastern Visayas Region. It is situated in the island of
Leyte and is the oldest province in the region. The province is bounded on the north by
the Province of Biliran, in the east by the San Juanico Strait and the island of Samar, the
Visayas and Ormoc Seas in the west and Southern Leyte to its south. The province is
considered the regional centre of eastern Visayas where the regional and provincial
capital, Tacloban City, is situated. Tacloban City is the oldest and most metropolitan of
three other regional cities. Another city to its west, Ormoc City, is a chartered city which
enjoys substantial autonomy from the provincial government in the management of its
local affairs.

Leyte is a picture of heavily settled coastal plains and relatively deserted mountainous and
hilly interiors. Lowlands tend to lie in the coastal peripheries or in the alluvial plains and
deltas accompanying the large rivers. The largest contiguous lowland area is the Leyte
Valley in North eastern Central cordillera. An intricate system of short rivers drains the
valley towards Carigara Bay in one part and Leyte Gulf in the other. The second largest
lowland area in Leyte is Ormoc Valley, which lies along the western side of the island and
is rimmed by mountains. There are other lowland areas that are relatively smaller and they
are found along the coasts and near the mouths of rivers in Western and Southern Leyte.

Ormoc City is an independent component city, while the capital Tacloban was declared a
highly-urbanized city in 2008. Both cities govern themselves independently of the province
and their residents do not vote for elective provincial officials. Baybay attained cityhood in
2007 but reverted to its municipal status when the Supreme Court declared its city charter
unconstitutional in 2008; however, Baybay would regain its city status following the
reversal of the Supreme Court decision dated December 22, 2009

Southern Leyte (Filipino:Timog Leyte) is a province of the Philippines located in the
Eastern Visayas region. It occupies the southern quarter of the island of Leyte. It is
bounded by the province of Leyte to the north, by Surigao Strait to the east, Bohol Sea to
the south, and Canigao Channel, across from Bohol, to the west. Its total land area is
173,480 hectares or 1,734.8 sq. kilometres. Maasin City is the capital of the province.
Southern Leyte was once a sub-province of Leyte before it was divided from the latter.
Limasawa, an island to the south is part of the province where the first Christian mass was
held and is said to be the birthplace of Christianity in the Philippines. The province ranks
as the second least populated area in the region. According to 2007 census, the province
has a population of 390,847 a 1.13% growth compared to last 2000 census with a
population record of 360,160.

The province is characterized by relatively flat lands along the coastal areas where
population centres lie, but rugged and mountainous towards the interior. The province has
inland water-form features. Based on a national data, the province has an overall 93 rivers
including 18 majors namely Amparo River in Macrohon, Canturing River in Maasin City,
Das-ay and Pondol Rivers in Hinunangan, Divisoria River in Bontoc, Hitungao and
Lawigan Rivers in San Juan, Maag River in Silago, and Subang Daku River in Sogod
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which is the biggest river among others. The province has an inland lake called Lake
Danao located in the mountains of San Juan and Anahawan, towns in the eastern region.
Southern Leyte's geological features created several issues in the province after the
flooding of Subangdaku River and the disastrous mudslide in Guinsaugon. Organizations
have warned the province of the susceptibility to natural occurrences like landslides and
flooding.

3.2 Economy
The economy of Biliran is largely based on fishing. Being mountainous, Biliran can
support a variety of agricultural crops. The warm lowlands are suitable for palay production
and other tropical crops. The cool highlands are favourable to high-value crops such as cut
flowers and varieties of vegetable traditionally grown in Baguio City or Tagaytay City. The
principal raw material produced is copra and coconut oil. Processed goods include white
clay ceramics, dried fish, raw gulaman, and citronella oil. The untapped natural resources
of the island include geothermal power and the abundant sulphur and gypsum deposits.
Major industries include fashion bags, Romblon bags, shell-crafts, placemats, hotpads,
baskets, coasters and trays.

The main product of the province of Eastern Samar is Copra. Local agriculture includes
maize, rice, sugarcane, and various other vegetables.

In Northern Samar Coconut is the main commercial crop in the province, which is mostly
concentrated in coastal areas. Total coconut area for the year 2000 was 563,670
hectares. There is also significant production of rice, corn, bananas and root crops such as
cassava, sweet potato, gabi and ubi.

Leyte is one of the leading high-grade abaca fibre and pulp producers in the country. Pulp
is the leading abaca export with Japan, United States of America and European countries
as export markets.

Leyte ranks first in terms of area planted with coconut in the Eastern Visayas region with a
total of 200,837 hectares. This figure represents 32% of the region's total area planted with
coconut.

LIDE is a 435-hectare fully developed industrial area in Isabel, Leyte that houses two
major industries, the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation (PASAR),
and the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation (PHILPHOS). PASAR produces over
172,000 MT of copper cathodes per year.

3.3 Natural Hazards in Eastern Visayas

The Eastern Visayas is exposed to a number of natural hazard risks, and within recorded
history has suffered many disasters of varying type, some of the hazards are
interconnected, e.g. with typhoons leading to heavy rain fall and flooding, earthquakes
initiating landslides, particularly of volcanic material. The geographic location of the
Philippines on the so called Pacific Ring of Fire and in the tropical belt in which storms and
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typhoons occur are two of the key factors leading to the high level of natural disaster risk.
The two government agencies PHIVOLCS and PAGASA are in the process of developing
maps of the Philippines in which the areas affected by the various hazards are indicated.
This work also involves the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) of the Philippines and
many maps have already been completed.

3.3.1 Typhoon
Eastern Visayas together with Luzon are the regions most frequently impacted by tropical
cyclones. Within the region, the provinces of Northern Samar and Western Samar are
amongst the top twenty provinces nationally, highly at risk to the occurrence of tropical
depressions, tropical storms, typhoons and super typhoons.

Term Wind velocity
tropical
depression
below 60 kph
tropical storm 60-120 kph
typhoon 120-180 kph
super typhoon more than 180 kph

Typhoons bring a significant proportion of the region's annual rainfall and thus because of
their episodic nature can lead to either flash flooding of run-off from the hillsides or flooding
of swollen rivers when they burst their banks. PAGASA has a typhoon warning system
and tracks the path of tropical storms. The high winds may cause structural damage, for
example to roofs and light building structures or cause debris to be impacted on other
property (vehicles, buildings and structures. In coastal areas there may be an unusually
high tide due to the sea being driven against the coast, or at estuaries sea water may be
driven inland leading to flooding and saline contamination of agricultural land and/or
drinking water supplies.

3.3.2 Flooding
Flooding may occur as the result of rivers bursting their banks, run-off from the hills and
mountains or as the result of heavy precipitation onto sealed areas (e.g. large concreted
surfaces). Flood water may carry large amounts of debris (mud, rocks, trees, moveable
objects, etc.) with it and thus cause physical damage and contamination over a large area.

Subangdaku, the largest river in the Province of Southern Leyte, created an issue over the
area. By description, it can be considered a braided river comprising of several channels
from near areas that divide and reunite forming an alluvial fan with very wide floodplain.
As such, the river usually becomes hazardous during a typhoon or after heavy rain. The
river sometimes overflows spilling its waters on the low-lying towns of Liloan and San
Vicente and destroyed an ongoing flood control project worth millions of pesos. The river
has been known to meander along its course, ever changing its way over time. During the
time of its flooding, it caused destruction along both sides of its course. In 2001, a portion
of the road and river banks in Barangay San Miguel along the river were destroyed. It
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hampered the economic activities of the local residents as well as national because the
destroyed portion is part of the Philippine National Road.

On November 5, 1991, massive flash floods triggered by a tropical storm descended on
Ormoc City in Leyte, killing about 8,000 people, including some 4,000 who were never
found as walls of mud and water roared down the mountains, washing away shanties and
sweeping people into the sea.
3.3.3 Landslides
Landslides may occur as the result of heavy rains, seismic activity or a combination of
both. Deforestation (including illegal logging) has been made responsible for the unstable
soil situation of the mountain and hillside slopes in some areas.

In December 2003, a landslide in San Francisco, Southern Leyte destroyed most of the
town, killing 154 people. The incident was caused by heavy rains in the province.

At about 10:30 in the morning on February 17, 2006, a cliff face of a ridge straddling the
Philippine Fault collapsed in a combination rockslide-debris avalanche event, translocating
and subsequently burying Guinsaugon village in the town of Saint Bernard, Southern
Leyte. Up to ten smaller landslides had occurred within the previous week in the vicinity of
St. Bernard, but Guinsaugon was the worst-hit community Barangay Guinsaugon, a
village within the municipality of St. Bernhard with 2,500 people, was almost completely
levelled and everything from trees to homes was destroyed, killing more than 1000 of its
residents. Many rescuers from national and international responded to the incident.
However, rescue efforts were greatly hampered by poor road conditions and lack of heavy
equipment. Survivors also reported a lack of coordination of rescue efforts. The Philippine
Government again stated their inability to cope with disasters.

3.3.4 Earthquakes
A number of seismic fault lines run through the Eastern Visayas Region. Earthquakes of
relatively low magnitude are a common occurrence.

The United Nations (OCHA) in cooperation with the European Commission (JRC-IPSC)
operates a Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) -
http://www.gdacs.org . The following table gives a list of earthquakes documented in this
system for 2009 2010 in Eastern Visayas. This shows that Eastern Visayas is a seismic
active region with significant events.

Estimated
population within
100 km
Event date Magnitude Depth Coordinates
2.34 million 20 July 2010
21:50 UTC
4.9 M 75 km 11.75, 125.36
1.44 million 19 July 2010
21:46 UTC
4.8 M 63 km 11.3, 125.67
2.97 million 04 July 2010 4.6 M 54 km 11.19, 125.17
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03:42 UTC
2.29 million 09 March 2010
06:00 UTC
5.2 M 40 km 11.25, 125.45
3.14 million 26 August 2009
09:16 UTC
4.9 M 56 km 11.38, 124.43
3.27 million 29 January 2010
22:43 UTC
5.3 M 53 km 10.93, 124.89
2.59 million 19 September
2009 14:43 UTC
4.8 M 96 km 11.39, 125.34
1.11 million 20 October 2009
18:15 UTC
4.7 M 84 km 12.11, 125.62
1.07 million 02 December
2010 20:27 UTC
5.4 M 39 km 12.21, 125.57
0.05 million 21 April 2009
18:47 UTC
4.9 M 39 km 12.27, 126.27

For a comparison of the various scales used in measuring earthquake intensities and their
description, see the PHILVOCS website.

3.3.5 Volcano
According to PHIVOLCS there are four active or potentially active volcanoes located in the
Eastern Visayas Region:
Biliran (Biliran Island) - active
Cabalian (near San Juan)
Cancanajag (near Canhandugan)
Maripipi (PHIVOLCS describes this as being near Tacloban, but it would appear that
this is actually the island of Maripipi in Biliran Province)

Biliran volcano's single historic eruption was from a flank vent in 1939. There are five
solfatara fields on the island. The solfatara on the west side of Mt. Guinon contained more
than 400 tones of sulphur in 1880.

3.3.6 Tsunami
The Philippine Trench is a marine trench to the east of the Philippines. The Philippine Sea
Plate is subducting under the Philippine Mobile Belt (a complex portion of the tectonic
boundary between the Eurasian Plate and the Philippine Sea Plate, comprising most of the
country of the Philippines within which a number of crustal blocks or microplates which
have been sheared off the adjoining major plates are undergoing massive deformation.)
Thus any major undersea earthquake associated with this geological feature has the
potential to lead to a Tsunami on the Eastern Coast of the Eastern Visayas Region, i.e.
Samar. The short distance from the trench to the coastline, however means that the time
for warnings and actions to be taken is very short indeed (very few minutes).

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4 Facilities selected and visited

The facilities visited in this study were selected based on the criteria specified in the ToR to
represent a wide range of types of industries situated in Region VIII. The specific facility
names were lifted from the list of Hazardous Wastes Generators registered with the
Environmental Management Bureau Regional Office No. 8 (EMB VIII). Cross reference
was also made with the list of hazardous establishments provided by the Occupational
Safety and Health Centre of the Department of Labour and Employment.

These selected facilities are all required to designate a Pollution Control Officer (PCO)
under existing environmental regulations. Among the duties of a PCO are: facilitate
compliance of establishment with the DENR requirements such as attending to the
requirements of the establishment prior to the construction of pollution control facilities;
monitor activities pertaining to the construction of pollution source and control facilities;
supervise the proper operation and maintenance of pollution control facilities; report within
reasonable time to the Department the breakdown of any pollution control facility; prompt
submission of Self Monitoring Reports (SMRs); keep abreast with the requirements of the
Department and the latest available technology on pollution abatement; act as liaison with
the city/provincial/municipal or local pollution control officers; and attend the meetings for
Pollution Control Officers which may from time to time be called by the Department.

The consultants recognize that the sugar refineries, and coconut oil mills and refineries
may also present a significant chemical accident potential; however within the time
constraints of the study, an on-site visit to these facilities was not possible.

Other facilities in Region VIII that have been identified as having significant chemical
accident potential are:

Facility Address
Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. Brgy. Sto. Nino, Tanauan, Leyte
Pryce Gases, Inc. Tacloban Plant Tacloban City
Petron Isabel Depot LIDE, Isabel, Leyte
Petron Ormoc Depot Bo. Linao, Ormoc City
Hideco Milling Company, Inc.* Montebello, Kananga, Leyte
Southern Industrial Gases Brgy. Dayhagan, Ormoc City
GCC Ice Plant Ormoc City
Visayan Oil Mill Brgy. Hilapnitan, Baybay, Leyte
SC Global Coco Products Brgy. Hilapnitan, Baybay, Leyte
Pulp Specialty Philippines, Inc. Brgy. Tinag-an, Albuera, Leyte

*sugar mills present an explosion hazard rather than a potential release of chemicals which are toxic or
hazardous to the environment.

There are also a number of diesel power plants scattered all over the Region that have
fuel storage tanks, the individual capacities of which have not been identified. Natural
disasters could trigger the release of their contents thereby contaminating the
environment.
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5 General Findings from site visits

1. Whilst the identity of the hazardous chemicals in use in the facility is generally
correctly given, the quantities, in particular for refrigeration units, may be unknown.

2. The use of GHS classification and labelling is generally only applied if this is the
system adopted by the chemical supplier. In a number of cases not even
compliance with the hazard diamond system required by the Fire Code of the
Philippines could be identified.

3. Systematic hazard identification and risk assessment is carried out only in a very
few cases.

4. Whilst some general awareness of which natural hazards affect the Region of
Eastern Visayas exists, there is little awareness of specific potential effects on
individual facilities and installations unless this has been identified as a high
operational risk.

5. There is often a lack of awareness of the need for emergency planning and thus a
lack of communication with emergency responders or the local community.

6. Some facilities do have good hazardous chemical management practices in place
and a strong CSR programme with links to the community and fire departments.

7. There is a large gap between the most developed practices (chemical
manufacturing and processing facilities, petroleum tank storage terminals) and
those of simpler facilities (water treatment plant and ice plant).

6 Potential impact of natural hazards on facilities

The following table identifies some of the significant impacts which natural hazard events
can have on facilities handling hazardous chemicals. These hazards need to be assessed
systematically within the facility risk management programme, to adopt appropriate
measures to prevent or mitigate the potential impact, and to draw up emergency plans to
respond to such an event. It should be noted that a community which has been impacted
by a natural disaster is extremely unlikely to be able to respond in any form to the effects
of the natural disaster on a facility handling hazardous chemicals. In addition it should be
noted that electricity, telecommunication and piped water supplies are also likely to be
disrupted.

Natural Hazard Potential Impact
15
Typhoon 1. High winds may destroy light structures and roofs of
buildings.
2. Wind may turn loose objects or debris into missiles causing
impact damage to buildings, structures vehicles or people.
3. Disruption to the power supply may damage plant and
equipment, particularly if this is intermittent disruption
leading, for example to the burn out of electrical motors or
pumps.
4. Sudden inundation with large amounts of rain water may
lead not only to river floods or run-off, but also to localised
flooding of sealed surfaces or containment areas which
may in turn lift tanks or other structures which are not
sufficiently well anchored.
Flooding 1. Flooding due to run-off from hillsides and mountains may
contain a large amount of mud, rock and other material
which can have a physical impact on the equipment and
plant of a facility.
2. Moving water may wash away vehicles or structures which
are not securely anchored. Empty tanks may be torn from
their anchoring if they become sufficiently buoyant
(depending on depth of water).
3. Electrical and electronic equipment is likely to be
permanently damaged or to short-circuit if exposed to flood
water.
4. Flood water may lead to a break down in electricity supply
and to telecommunications by either water penetrating the
distribution equipment or sweeping away the distribution
masts.
Land Slide 1. Land slides often occur in conjunction with heavy rain
and/or earthquakes. The physical impact of a land-slide
may be to damage (including bury) plant or equipment.
Infrastructure (telecommunications, electricity, water or
pipelines between plant may also be physically interrupted.
Volcano 1. The impact of a volcanic eruption may be through the
release of gases, ash, rock, or lava from the volcano itself,
or through lahar flows from the crater and the volcano
slopes. Lahar flows may take place a long time after the
eruption and therefore pose a continuing threat to the
surrounding communities and facilities.
16
Earthquake 1. Earthquake impact on a facility handling hazardous
chemicals may affect the structure of the plant and/or the
buildings surrounding the plant. The impact of falling
masonry, etc. may cause significant damage to the plant,
although the earthquake had no direct effect. This can lead
to the release of chemicals to the environment. If a
significant storage vessel is breached then it may not be
possible to readily stop the flow of chemicals, which then
pose a further fire or explosion hazard or have toxic effects
on people or the environment.
2. An earthquake may also lead to liquefaction of the ground
upon which the facility is built. This means that the stability
of the structure is endangered and that plant and building
may collapse. Also a land slide from slopes at a higher
level than the facility due to liquefaction cannot be ruled
out.
Tsunami 1. A tsunami is the result of an undersea seismic event or
landslide. The impact of a tsunami is most significant for
near-coastal facilities due to flooding and physical damage
by the tsunami wave(s).
2. If a tank ship is off-loading to a pipeline during a tsunami
event, then there is an extremely high risk of loss of
containment as the ship will have a rapid vertical movement
and may be thrown against the jetty or otherwise physically
displaced. Tank ships are used to off-load petroleum
products (LPG, gasoline, kerosene, diesel) and bulk
ammonia.

In order to provide a qualified prediction of the potential impact of natural hazards on a
particular facility handling hazardous chemicals relevant data, in the form of cartographic
mapping, at a suitable scale needs to be made generally available. Because the hazard
zones are not delimited by consistent borders for each hazard type, overlapping occurs,
which means as a result that the presentation in on map simultaneously of all of the
relevant natural hazards is not useful. Publicly accessible topographic maps of a scale of
1:50 000 or better with relevant details of roads, buildings, rivers, contour lines, etc. are not
readily available. The natural hazard (flooding, earthquake, ground shaking, tsunami,
land-slide, storm surge, etc.) mapping is only available within specialist agencies, which
are currently developing these maps as part of international and national cooperation
projects. Many of the natural hazard maps are now available. Without this information the
barangays, local governments and operators of facilities are hampered in drawing reliable
conclusions as to the actual hazards / types of hazard for which appropriate measures
should be adopted.

As an example of this the natural hazard maps for the Tacloban City area of Eastern
Visayas are considered (See Annex 9.1). Located at Anibong, on a peninsular to the west
of Tacloban City, there are two petroleum tank storage depots for diesel, kerosene,
gasoline and LPG. Considering the natural hazards maps, the following impacts on the
location could be expected:

17

Map 1: Earthquake-Induced
landslide hazard
Not susceptible
Map 2: Flood hazard Prone to flooding
[Note: this may be due to the fact that elevation is less
than 20 m and not due to directly observed flood risk]
Map 3: Ground shaking
hazard
Susceptibility: PEIS intensity VII; however as there are
white spaces towards the end of the peninsular it is
unclear how far this evaluation extends.
Map 4: Liquefaction hazard High susceptibility; however not at the end of the
peninsular. There is a note that the map should not be
used for site specific evaluations.
Map 5: Rain-Induced
landslide hazard
Not susceptible
Map 6: Storm surge hazard Western half of the peninsular coastline is susceptible
Map 7: Tsunami hazard Most of the Peninsular is affected, based on a scenario
with a 4m wave offshore, NE of Tacloban.

From this consideration, it is clear that, for the assessment of individual facilities, more
detailed assessments and maps are required for these areas. These assessments need
to take account of defensive measures, drainage channels, construction techniques and
facility engineering, etc. The current maps are at the best indicative and do not appear to
take account of localised situations. For each map a clear description of the basis of the
assessment and modelling used is needed; particularly where data has been interpolated
over a large grid or raster.

7 Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Conclusions

1. Whilst GHS is implemented within facilities of the chemical manufacturing industry,
this system of chemical hazard classification and labelling has not yet become
widespread. GHS is only passed along the value chain to a limited extent. Where
labelling of packaging by the supplier is in place this will be used by the operator,
however there appears to be little attempt to address the issues related to products
imported without any standardised hazard classification. Often a consistent
approach to hazard classification and labelling is lacking
2. The use of systematic methods of hazard identification, e.g. HazOp, on a regular
basis is generally lacking. Only isolated cases were identified. Systematic
approaches for identifying and/or assessing the potential impact of natural disasters
on the facilities was not identified. Consideration in individual cases, particularly
where personal or company experience of natural disasters existed was more
prevalent.
18
3. The refrigeration units which were seen did not have the general appearance of a
high standard of repair and maintenance. Often missing guards on rotating
machinery could be observed. Corrosion, in one case quite extensive, was
common. None of the operators knew the actual quantity of ammonia in the
system. Knowledge was limited to an approximation of the amount and frequency
with which the system was topped-up.
4. Emergency planning for ice-plants and for facilities carrying out water treatment was
non-existent. In one case the intended PPE for emergency response was over 15
years old, the operators had never been trained in its use, emergency drills with it
had never been carried out and the instructions for use were in Japanese (which
could not be read or understood by anyone on site.) Only the petroleum depots and
the L.I.D.E in Isabel had regular contact with the local fire departments.
Consideration of providing information to the local population via the municipalities
and barangays on the correct behaviour and response in an emergency did not
have any formal structure.
5. The authorities charged with overseeing the activities of these hazardous facilities
are the LGU (City, Municipal or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office CENRO, MENRO, PENRO), DENR-EMB, DOLE-OHSA, Fire Department,
BFP. From the visits the impression was gained, that there is a great need for
further development and training in the field of safety generally and process safety
in particular. Without adequate training and supply of the necessary PPE it is not
possible for the field inspectors to carry out effective inspection and enforcement
and the role of leading by example is weakened. There was no coordination
between the various government agencies.
6. The lack of enforcement of building and land use planning regulations has in some
cases led to a build up of illegal residences close to and against the perimeter wall
of the facility. This means that the most vulnerable citizens are put at most risk of
the effects of a chemical accident. This indicates the urgent need for awareness
raising within the municipalities and barangays and the development of a political
will to take action.
7. Whilst travelling through the communities, numerous localities could be identified
where hazardous chemicals were used and /or stored. These quantities (small
scale commercial) may be sufficient to lead to serious damage and loss of life or
injuries within the community or in the event of a natural disaster such as flooding to
lead to widespread contamination. The types and quantities of substances are
generally unknown. The technical measures applied to the storage may be merely
to prevent theft, however prevention of fire hazards, leaks, and containment of
losses and leaks does not appear to be of major concern. For the local government
agencies to establish any emergency planning or response or to determine effective
land-use plans they need to be sufficiently aware of the location of various hazards
within the community.
8. Eastern Visayas is not one of the highly industrialised or wealthy regions of the
Philippines. Thus, it should be remembered that for many of the region's
inhabitants the demands of everyday life: earning enough to feed oneself and ones
dependants, having sufficient clothing and shelter, maintaining sanitary and healthy
living conditions, obtaining child education, etc. are already serious concerns and
the issues related to potential chemical accidents or potential natural disasters are
extremely remote from their perception of reality. This means that education and
19
awareness programmes for the local communities will have limited effects so long
as other demands cannot be adequately addressed.
9. The current level of mapping is not sufficient to provide reliable assessments of the
natural hazard risks at individual facilities and appears only to be able to deliver an
indication for a particular area. For a more detailed assessment a scale of between
1: 25 000 and 1: 5 000 would appear more appropriate.

7.2 Recommendations

1. All projects involving the assessment of industry should involve and be co-ordinated
with the relevant local regulatory agencies, e.g. EMB or Labour Inspectorate. This
enables a better guarantee of access to the facilities and at the same time respects
the position of the enforcement body in their relationship with the industry. It also
avoids situations which may conflict with local enforcement policy.
2. With respect to potential chemical accidents, efforts should be made to develop
communication between the industry and the host community and local government
offices. In the event of an emergency, residents and agencies within the potentially
affected communities need to know what are the appropriate behaviours and
actions to be taken. This needs planning beforehand to establish communication
channels, warning signals and appropriate response plans. This needs to involve
the barangays, municipalities / cities, local medical services, emergency
responders, neighbouring facilities, and places with large numbers of people such
as schools, hospitals, shopping malls, etc. It should be born in mind that, the local
disaster coordinating councils only meet once a calamity has been declared,
therefore this current mechanism for exchanging information is not suitable in its
present form.
3. The use of industry associations and trade organisations to share best practice and
establish codes of practice is a potential for chemical accident risk reduction which
should be considered. The site visits within this needs assessment study
highlighted that many concerns are not just held by one individual site, but
moreover are typical for particular trade or industry branches. Examples are:
(a) Water Districts and the handling of liquid chlorine from supplier through
transportation to the facility, including emergency planning;
(b) Ammonia refrigeration systems, e.g. ice plants and cold storage, in particular the
safe design and operation of the facilities and emergency planning;
(c) Chemical industry (SPIK) with reference to the further dissemination and
promotion of the GHS classification and labelling system;
4. Developing a chemical hazard map within each of the barangays. This is the first
step in developing a chemical accident risk map and should focus on the
existence of chemicals (location) and quantities. In particular small commercial
quantities e.g. LPG dealerships, agro-chemical dealers, gasoline stations,
warehousing, hardware stores (solvents, paints, pesticides, etc.) should be
included. Household quantities should not be covered. As the smallest unit of local
government in the Philippines, the barangays are best placed to know which
20
activities are being carried out in their jurisdiction. The use of simple, standardised
data collection software would enable the collation of the data within a municipality /
city and provide an over view of risk hot-spots in the neighbourhood.
5. Training and capacity building within local and regional government agencies,
taking into account the following issues:
(a) fundamentals of process safety
(b) GHS classification and labelling
(c) systematic hazard identification (e.g. HazOp Studies)
(d) PPE for the inspection of hazardous facilities safety shoes/boots, safety
glasses/goggles, ear protection (hearing), gloves, hard hat
(e) coordination and cooperation between different regulatory agencies in the field
of safety i.e. DENR-EMB, DOLE-OSHC, fire department, LGUs
There is a need for capacity building amongst those inspectors tasked with safety
issues at hazardous facilities. It is important that they are able to recognise critical
aspects of process safety. To carry out their task on-site it is necessary that
appropriate PPE is worn by the inspectors for their own safety and health
protection. Suitable PPE is often not readily available in the Philippines or easily
covered within existing budgetary constraints.
6. There appears to be a need to develop awareness of the potential impact of natural
hazards on industrial facilities. The problems leading to this situation are several,
including the limitations of real, economically viable measures to prepare for or to
reduce the impact of a natural disaster beforehand; the extreme limitations of the
facility operator to respond to the effects of a natural disaster on their facility it
should be recognised that the local municipality / city is unlikely to be able to
provide any help whatsoever as it too will be dealing with the effects of the natural
disaster on their constituents and infrastructures.
This could possibly be carried out in conjunction with regular training of Pollution
Control Officers (PCO) of regulated industries. In addition support of existing CSR
activities by chemical facilities has the potential to strengthen links between
facilities, communities and their local government agencies (see UNEP APELL).

21
8 Bibliography and References

UNEP (2009) Responsible Production Handbook: A framework for chemical hazard
management for small and medium sized enterprises, United Nations Environment
Programme

UNEP (2008) Assessing the vulnerability of local communities to disasters: An interactive
guide and methodology

UNEP (1988) Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level (APELL): a
Process for Responding to Technological Accidents

OECD (2003) Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and
Response, 2
nd
Edition, Paris

NEDA (2005) Region 8 Physical Framework Plan 2005-2030

Bankoff, G. (2002) Cultures of disaster: society and natural hazard in the Philippines, Pub.
Routledge Curzan, ISBN: 0700717617

UNEP, ADPC, DENR (2010) Country Situation Report on Chemical Accident Prevention
and Preparedness Programme in the Philippines

Internet sites:

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology
http://www.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph
National Disaster Coordinating Council

http://ndcc.gov.ph/home
Occupational Safety & Health Center http://www.oshc.dole.gov.ph

Bureau of Fire Protection

http://www.bfpresponse.gov.ph/
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

http://hlurb.gov.ph/services/
Eastern Visayas Information Sharing Network

http://www.evis.net.ph/
Environmental Management Bureau

http://www.emb.gov.ph/
Mines and Geosciences Bureau

http://www.mgb.gov.ph/
Official Website of the Province of Leyte

http://www.leyte.org.ph/
Official Website of the Province of Samar

http://samar.lgu-ph.com/
Official Website of the Province of Southern
Leyte
http://www.southernleyte.ph/
22
Official Website of the Province of Eastern
Samar
http://www.easternsamar.gov.ph/
Global Disaster Alert and Coordination
System
http://www.gdacs.org/
From Tragedy to Resiliency: A Journey from
the Guinsaugon Landslide
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/sec
tion/230_Philippinesstbernardcasestu
dy.pdf

Report on the effects of landslide and
flooding incidents in Visayas and Mindanao,
12 Jan 2004
http://ocha-
gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SI
D/OCHA-64CUDX?OpenDocument

23
9 Annexes

9.1 Maps

Map 1: Earthquake-Induced landslide hazard

24
Map 2: Flood hazard

25
Map 3: Ground shaking hazard

26
Map 4: Liquefaction hazard

27
Map 5: Rain-Induced landslide hazard

28
Map 6: Storm surge hazard

29
Map 7: Tsunami hazard

30
9.2 Facility Data Sheet
Facility Documentation

1. Facility
1.1 Name: __________________________________

1.2 Location: __________________________________

1.3 Activity: __________________________________

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) _______________

2. Technical / Chemical Hazard
2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: ______________________________

2.2 Substances

No. Name of hazardous
substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
Quantity (kg) Comments

2.3 Hazard Identification / Classification
GHS or other form of chemical classification used? Yes / No
Systematic hazard identification and assessment for processes, installations, facility,
e.g. HazId / HazOp? Yes / No
Risk assessment (risk matrix)? Yes / No
Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description).

3. Natural Hazards
3.1 Assessment of potential (Yes / No)
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding
Earthquake
Volcano
Tsunami
Land slide

31
3.2 Impact of natural hazard on chemical facility (description).

3.3 Impact of natural hazard on infrastructure (power supply, telecommunications, etc.
(description).

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description).

32
9.3 Specific Facility Information

The following section contains structured information about the hazard situation and
perception as provided by the company in filling out the Facility Data Sheet (See 9.2). The
information has been corrected and added to as a result of the site visit. Specific
observations made during the site visit are recorded below the data sheet. Any
observations made are the personal opinions of the contractors and in no way are they
grounds for enforcement actions by the relevant regulatory agencies.

In some of the tables there are gaps, this may be for a number of reasons.
a) No knowledge or awareness of the hazards was expressed by the operator.
b) No measures have been taken or there is no potential impact on the facility. There is
the possibility that the facility is sufficiently resilient if the maximum level of flooding is only
10 20 cm.
c) In one particular case (Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. - Roaster Plant) it would not be
appropriate, due to the environmental hazard currently posed by the site, for the
consultants to make any detailed comments or estimates of the situation, as this is an
issue for the enforcement agencies, who have been made aware of the issues.
33
9.3.1 Tacloban JO Terminal

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Tacloban JO Terminal

1.2 Location: Brgy. 70, Rawis, Anibong, Tacloban City

1.3 Activity: Petroleum Distribution

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) approximately 75-100
meters

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Receipt and distribution of petroleum
products

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Petroleum products Toxic, Flammable 6,500,000 Main products
2. Petroleum additives Toxic, Flammable 8,000 to 10,000 Added to main
products
3. Lubricants Toxic, Flammable 30,000 to 50,000 Packed products
4. Liquid petroleum
gas
Flammable 500,000 Stored in 2 horizontal
cylindrical tanks, filled
into bottles.


1. Refer to Hazard and Control Sheets
2. Health Risk Assessment

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes Terminal ERP Low
34
Earthquake Yes Low-high Terminal ERP Low-high
Volcano None None None None
Tsunami No history No history None None
Land slide Yes Low Terminal ERP Low

Strong earthquake may have high impact on terminal facility, this is mitigated
by facility design that was made according to global engineering standards

(description).
Flood, typhoon and earthquake may cut power supply and
telecommunications. The terminal has business continuity plan that may be
activated during specifc emergencies.

Floods, typhoon, earthquake and landslides may occur that will have a low to
high impact on local community.

Observations from Site Visit
The JO Terminal is a Joint-Operation of tank storage installations owned by Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corp. and Chevron Philippines Inc. The site management is carried out by
Shell and is very much governed by the Shell corporate concepts, e.g. Life Saving Rules.
HazOp is carried out for all new activities, including the demolition and construction of a
new office. Within the LPG filling installation the Life Saving Rules are also displayed in
Tagalog as are a number of other safety related signs and posters.
Petroleum storage tank filling is based on manual calculation and the use of electronic Hi-
and Hi-Hi-Alarms. There is no automatic shut off of the valves / pumps to prevent
overfilling. The level of product and the direction of flow (filling / emptying) is computer
monitored.
The storage tank design is an internal floating roof for gasoline tanks and free ventilation
for diesel and kerosene tanks. P/V-Valves with flame arrestors or vapour recovery
systems are not installed.
LPG Tank filling is controlled using overfill-protection including automatic shut off systems.
Although the facility appeared well equipped to deal with small to medium sized fires, it
appears that a major fire or a major release of liquid hydrocarbon is beyond the current
emergency planning scenarios and a specific strategy for dealing with these had not been
developed.
Mutual cooperation agreements exist with the neighbouring facility. The local barangay is
responsible for crowd control within the emergency agreements. There was a test in 2008
and the agreement is within the barangay ordinance. The facility has regular engagement
with the fire department. The CSR work of the facility with the local community is well
developed including, e.g. safety training for the local community on the use of fire
extinguishers, first aid, correct use of LPG in the home.
35
9.3.2 Petron Tacloban Depot

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Petron Tacloban Depot

1.2 Location: Brgy. 69, Rawis, Anibong, Tacloban City

1.3 Activity: Petroleum receipt and distribution

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) classified as industrial
zone

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: receiving, storage, and delivery of
various petroleum products

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Petroleum
Hydrocarbons
Fire 3 (high)
Health2 (moderate)
5,000,000
2. Liquid petroleum
gas
Fire-4 (extreme)
Health-1 (slight)
430,000

Aspect/Impact Register, Environmental Control Plan

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding
Earthquake Yes Yes Yes Yes
Volcano
Tsunami
Land slide

36

(description).


The chemical hazard classification and signage adopted for documentation is that of the
NFPA and of the UN ADR. However within the installations there was little hazard signage
beyond NO SMOKING.
Petroleum storage tank filling is not carried out by Petron employees. This work is
contracted on a 2-yearly basis to a third party. Hi-Hi-Shut off is only in place for LPG.
There is no computer monitoring of the product levels. Levels are controlled using a float-
level gauge and by dipping.
PV-Valves without flame arrestors are in place on gasoline tanks and are overhauled every
5 years with a visual inspection annually. Gasoline tanks have an internal floating roof,
diesel and kerosene tanks are free vented
Illegal residence has built up along the outside perimeter wall of the site.
Petron has CSR activities within the local community, supporting fire fighting and
education programmes.

37
9.3.3 Coca-Coal Bottlers Phils. Inc. (CCBPI) Tacloban Plant
The CCBPI Tacloban Plant was built in March 1952 and was inaugurated in September
1953. It is sited within 2.40 hectares land with a workforce of 115. The plant supplies
Coca-Cola products in returnable glass bottles and fountains for the whole of Leyte and
Samar. The plant has a water treatment unit for processing potable water from LMWD,
bottle washing units, manufacturing units for producing the Coca-Cola beverages and two
bottling lines. There is also a waste water treatment unit in operation.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. Tacloban Plant

1.2 Location: Rotunda, Fatima Village, Tacloban City

1.3 Activity: Beverage manufacture

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.): outside perimeter wall
of the plant

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: QA laboratory testing, refrigeration, fork-
lift trucks

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Ammonia Toxic/corrosive
2. LPG for fork lifts Flammable < 50 kg
3. Sodium Hypochlorite
(solid chlorine)

4. Caustic Soda, 2.5%

Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description).The plant has
its own Envromental Aspect-Impact Assessment and Occupational Health
and Safety Hazards/Risks Assessment system

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of Local Effects Measures Possible impact
38
potential hazard known adopted on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes No - Orientation and
training on land
and water
pollution control

- containment

Earthquake Yes No
Volcano No No
Tsunami No No
Land slide No No

Impact on water and land pollution

(description).
Impact on water and land pollution


CCBPI has a strong focus on management systems ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001, FSSC
22000. The Plant Operations Manager holds the top responsibility for safety.
The major deficiencies are to be found in the ammonia refrigeration plant. Equipment
containing large quantities of liquid ammonia, together with a refill ammonia bottle were
situated within the bottling plant. The ammonia plant shows pronounced signs of
corrosion. This is of particular concern as, in the event of an ammonia leak, both people
and product would be exposed to the hazardous chemical. Outside of the bottling plant
there are two large compressor units, and some distance away an evaporator-condenser.
This equipment leads to a large energy consumption due to energy losses from the
compressor and in the length of piping. A complete modernisation of the ammonia
refrigeration would present the opportunity to markedly reduce the risk to people and
product and reduce the energy consumption of the cooling requirements. At the same
time robustness and protective measures could be built in (e.g. automatic/emergency shut-
off systems, structural protection) to deal with the risks presented by natural hazards.
Before any modifications take place a hazard identification and risk assessment process
should be carried out.

39
9.3.4 Palo Asia Ice Plant
The Palo Asia Ice Plant produces block ice primarily for the fishing industry as well as tube
ice for the food chain. The water is piped from LMWD and frozen in brine banks which are
cooled using ammonia refrigeration units. The block ice unit is twenty years old and the
tube ice unit is ten years old. The ice plant is located in Palo, a suburb of Tacloban.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Palo Asia Ice Plant

1.2 Location: Palo, Leyte

1.3 Activity: Production of block and tube ice

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) Next to the plant is the
DPWH office

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Ammonia refrigeration unit

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1 Ammonia Toxic, hazardous to
environment
Uncertain, ca. 20
tonnes
Two installations

Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description). None

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes
Earthquake Yes No
Volcano No No
Tsunami No No
Land slide No No
40


(description).


The ice plant is ca. 20 years old. It does not appear to have had regular improvements
made to it. The electrical wiring, including the high-tension power supply is of a
questionable standard. There is no electronic control system or ammonia detection. The
operator relies on the sense of smell for leak detection. Maintenance and inspection of the
herring bone cooling-piping in the brine bank is not carried out due to the prohibitive
costs of draining and refilling the brine bank. The cooling water system (cooling tower)
shows signs of significant corrosion.
There appears to be a lack of understanding both of the potential impacts of a major
ammonia leak and of the consequences of a natural disaster for the plant.

41
9.3.5 Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD)
LMWD operates a water treatment works in Barangay Hibunawon, Jaro, Leyte. The
facility was built under a JICA development programme about 15 years ago. The works
comprises chemical treatment, flocculation, settling, filtration and final chlorination before
storage for distribution in the LMWD potable water network.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: LMWD

1.2 Location: Barangay Hibunawon, Jaro, Leyte

1.3 Activity: Treatment of raw water to produce potable water

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) remote, > 1 km

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Chlorination of potable water

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1 Chlorine Toxic 4,000 Max. 4 x 1 t Chlorine
tanks


3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes No Use of the flood
early warning
system installed
by GTZ & rain
gauge
Impact is on the
turbidity of the
raw water, not on
chlorine storage
facility
Earthquake Yes Yes
42
Volcano No No
Tsunami No No
Land slide Yes No


(description).


The LMWD site is in a remote location, the nearest population being over 1 km away. The
facility was built within a JICA project in 1995. This project provided chemical emergency
response equipment (chemical suits and chlorine mitigating equipment); however none of
the staff currently employed has been trained in the use of the emergency equipment, nor
can they read the Japanese instructions. The equipment is not maintained or tested.
There is no on-site emergency plan or designation of a safe room suitable for shelter in
place. In the event of an emergency, the emergency responders from Tacloban (ca. 1 hr.
drive) will have to travel up the same valley as the chlorine cloud is likely to travel down.
This situation makes an emergency response, without adequate planning and information,
extremely difficult and hazardous.

Generally the site appears to be well maintained and managed, however the handling of
chlorine does not appear to have received sufficient attention. The remote location is
positive with respect to effects on local communities; however it has disadvantages when a
response to an emergency by external agencies is required.

This issue could however be addressed by the industry association(s) related to water
treatment as many locations could be in a similar position. A standard code of practice
could address the whole process of chlorine handling from ordering of shipments through
transportation, storage and emergency planning.

43
9.3.6 Leyte Agri Corporation
Leyte Agri Corp. is the first bio-ethanol plant in the Philippines established in 2001, is
primarily engaged in the manufacture of food-grade (beverage and industrial) alcohol from
sugar cane molasses. Its distillery in Ormoc City ably contributes to the economic
development of both the community, and the local and national governments. It has a total
manpower of 85 employees. Leyte Agri Corp. is now focused on the bio-ethanol market. It
has commissioned its 30,000 liters per day production line. The bio-ethanol plant, the first
of its kind in the Philippines, was inaugurated on August 27, 2008.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Leyte Agri Corporation

1.2 Location: AA Compound, Ipil, Ormoc City

1.3 Activity: Bio-ethanol production

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) Facility compound is
located along the national highway of Brgy. Ipil, Ormoc City, bounded on the
west by a barangay road, a private road on the east, an open land on the
northwest and national road on the south.

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: bio-ethanol production and handling of
sulphuric acid

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Ethanol flammable 100,0000 Produced by order
2. Sulphuric Acid corrosive 4,000 Manually poured into
the fermentation tank
3. Ammonia corrosive/toxic 40 Used in CO
2

liquefaction

Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description). None

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of Local Effects Measures Possible impact
44
potential hazard known adopted on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes Regular cleaning
of drainage
canal & proper
garbage
disposal

Earthquake Yes Yes Emergency
management
guide in place

Volcano No
Land slide No
Typhoon Yes


(description). Possible cut-off of power supply and communication lines.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). Destroyed houses, cut-
off of power supply and communication lines.

Leyte Agri Corp. claim to work to Shell Standards as Shell is a major customer; however
there was little evidence to back up this claim. The major ethanol tank stands within a
concrete walled bund. This bund has a soil and grass floor and also contains the liquid
pump for the ethanol and the switches to control the pump. This is a poor design as it not
only requires the operator of the pump to regularly enter the bund, but also ignores the fact
that the concept of a bund is to retain fire-fighting water in the event of a fire or released
product in the event of a tank failure. As the bund does not have an impermeable base
any liquid retained in the bund is likely to drain to ground water. The operator was not
aware of any design requirements regarding the construction or capacity of the bund.
The site has suffered flooding (max. depth 50 cm) in the past, this was not sufficient to
over-top the bund wall, which is approximately 1 m high. Not only is there are risk of the
bund wall being over-topped and the tank becoming buoyant, but also with any great depth
of water across the site, there is the potential that the 20 l carboys containing sulphuric
acid may be swept away, or damage occurring to other parts of the facility.
One activity of particular concern was the manual handling of concentrated sulphuric acid
in 20 l carboys with only limited PPE. This is a serious risk to the personnel and could be
easily mitigated using technical measures, e.g. pumps, bulk tank with piping to the
fermentation tanks, etc.
GHS training had been provided to the PCO but the system has not been further
implemented within the facility.
45
9.3.7 Tongonan Geothermal Power Plant (Energy Development
Corporation - EDC)

1. Facility
1.1 Name: EDC/Leyte Geothermal Production Field

1.2 Location: Tongonan, Ormoc City

1.3 Activity: Geothermal: fluid collection/recycling systems (FCRS), drilling,
power plant operation

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) approximately 2-15 km

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Laboratory, FCRS, drilling, power plant
operations

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Caustic soda corrosive Approx. 10,000 Ave. 15 m
3
/mo.
2. Iso pentane flammable Approx. 500,000 Volume in tanks
3. Hydrochloric acid Corrosive Vol. Depends on
wells to be
acidized
Use depends on well
performance/evaluati
on
4. Ammonium
bifluoride
Corrosive

Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description). Company risk
assessment done every year (this reduces insurance premiums)

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes Yes None
Earthquake Yes Yes Yes None except
high intensity
earthquakes
46
Volcano N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tsunami N/A N/A N/A N/A
Land slide Yes Yes Yes None

Impact is minimal unless buildings and facility where chemical are stored are
destroyed.

(description). Impact is minimal/remote as measures are in place to minimize if
not avoid impact of natural hazards.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). Impact maybe felt by
the community as some structures are made of materials that can easily be
destroyed.

The geothermal plant supplies a total of 1,202 MW of electrical power. Geothermal brine
is considered hazardous to the environment, so measures are in place to avoid releases
and to provide a retention volume if the sink well (for the cooled brine is not operational
for any reason. Other potentially hazardous materials include hydrogen sulphide H
2
S
which is contained in the geothermal brine/non-condensible gases. In the steam released
to atmosphere there is a maximum of 0,025% H
2
S contained (average 0,018%). Hydrogen
sulphide dispersion modelling has been carried out and an off-site release is highly
unlikely.
For the transportation of steam and geothermal brine between the equipment and
installations carbon steel piping is used. Land slide mitigating measures such as
reinforced protection at exposed locations and pipeline sectioning is used. In 30 years of
operation no incidents with structural failure have been recorded.
A visit was made to the bottoming plant, which utilizes the lower temperature brine after
the high pressure steam has been separated. Here iso-pentane is used as a heat
exchange medium to drive a gas turbine. The control room is located close to installations
containing large quantities of iso-pentane. It is therefore necessary to be aware that
windows which look out onto the plant should be avoided or made blast-proof for the event
of an explosion. Similarly, to protect the control room and the personnel within it is
essential to ensure that no pentane or hydrogen sulphide are drawn into the control room
through ventilation or air conditioning systems.
The site uses good practice for controlling the delivery of hazardous chemicals to the
facility; stipulating the route to be taken and inspecting the road worthiness of the vehicle
on arrival at the facility. This is important as the facility encompasses rugged terrain which
requires effective breaks and good tyres and safe securing of loads.

47
9.3.8 Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp.

The Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation owns and operates the only
copper smelter and refinery in the Philippines. PASAR's primary product is electrolytic
copper cathode, which the company has been producing for 25 years. Its original copper
cathode brand PASAR was registered in 1984 with the London Metal Exchange (LME) as
Grade A Copper and in the Commodity Exchange Division of the New York Mercantile
Exchange (NYMEX) as COMEX Grade 1 Copper. In 2007, PASAR began converting its
tankhouse from conventional starting sheet electrorefining to ISA Process. The tankhouse
was fully converted to ISA Process in March 2008; consequently, production of the
PASAR Brand ceased effective 20 March 2008. The ISA-type cathodes now being
produced in the refinery carry the brand name PSR ISABEL, which has been newly
registered with the LME as Grade A Copper.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: PASAR

1.2 Location: Leyte Industrial and Development Estate (LIDE), Isabel, Leyte

1.3 Activity: Copper smelting and refining

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) About 1.5 km
The plant is situated on the tip of the peninsula, where the Leyte Industrial
Development Estate (LIDE) is located. The town of Isabel is about three kilometres
from the plant at the north-western side.

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Acid plant operation, smelting operation,
refinery operation

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1 Sulphuric acid Toxic, corrosive
2 Electrolyte Toxic, corrosive
3 Copper Melt Heat, toxic gas release

Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description). Included in
the Management Systems implemented in the company ISO 14001 and
OHSAS 18001
48

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes Yes Yes
Volcano No No No No
Tsunami Yes No No No
Land slide No No No No

Earthquakes: Cause instability to tanks' and pipelines' foundations resulting
in leaks or spillages of chemical substances

(description).
Floods: Causes power cables and other electrical equipment to be
submerged in water resulting in short circuits
Earthquakes: Could topple power and communication lines resulting in power
outages or communication systems failure.

Disruption of basic services such as water, electricity, communication and
food supply

Observations during site visit

Strong implementation of management systems in place: ISO 9001, ISO 14001, OHSAS
18001 are all certified. A loss prevention management (process safety) is also in place.
The management systems are not yet integrated, but this is under consideration.

There is a keen interest to avoid and reduce emissions due to the economic value of the
products (gold, silver, copper, selenium) which are produced. Sulphuric acid is also
produced within the process and sold. Waste water is neutralised with lime to form
gypsum which is sold to cement production.

For gypsum waste which is contaminated with heavy metal wastes and ferro-arsenates a
concrete bunker has been constructed in which the waste is stored in a packaged form.
The concrete bunker is constructed of reinforced concrete to withstand earthquakes and
prevent leaching of the hazardous wastes.

PASAR carries out a large amount of CSR work with the local communities, particularly in
the field of safety. There is an emergency response team which assists the community in
cases of calamity. Every month training is carried out in first aid, fire safety or emergency
49
response. There is also close communication with the municipal disaster coordination
council. Within the L.I.D.E. a safety and security council and an environmental council for
exchanging information between the facilities of the industrial estate has been established.
The municipality is currently not involved in these committees.

Considering the structures and the current level of CSR work there is good potential to
institute an APELL programme in the L.I.D.E. neighbourhood. There is currently no
structured sharing of information on the correct behaviour and actions to be taken in an
emergency arising from a chemical accident. Such a process could also encompass other
risks such as natural hazards.

50
9.3.9 Philippine Phosphate & Fertilizer Corp. (PHILPHOS)

The PHILPHOS fertilizer plant is the Philippines leading producer of phosphatic fertilizer
and has one of the largest processing capacities in the ASEAN region with a rated
capacity of approximately 1.17 million metric tons per annum. The complex covers an area
of 180 hectares within the 435-hectare Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) in
Isabel, Leyte, the largest industrial estate in the country.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Philippine Phosphate and Fertilizer Corp. (PHILPHOS)


1.3 Activity: Fertilizer manufacturing

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) roughly 3 km from
Isabel town proper

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: fertilizer manufacturing (reactors, large
storage tanks)

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Sulfuric acid Toxic/corrosive Contained in large
storage tanks and
pumped to end-users
by pipeline
2. Phosphoric acid Harmful/corrosive
Ammonia Toxic/corrosive

Risk management / risk reduction measures taken / planned (description). Periodic
inspection of facility is conducted. Repairs done in tanks depending on
inspection results.

3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
51
facility
Flooding No No
Earthquake Yes Yes Standby power
generator
Possible
damage
Volcano No No
Tsunami Yes Yes Standby power
generator
Possible
damage
Land slide No No

3.2 Impact of natural hazard on chemical facility (description). Possible damage of
piping systems and storage tanks depending on magnitude, although the
design took into consideration these possibilities and the possibility of
collapse is very remote.

(description). High magnitude earthquake may cut off power lines and access
roads as well as landline communication networks.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). High magnitude
earthquake may damage storage tanks and acid spills will contaminate the
nearby sea water and ammonia gas will be vented in to the atmosphere.

The PHILPHOS site is based around a number of individual installations which are
operated independently to produce the various components of NP/NPK fertilizers. These
are:
a) CAL-SUL sulphuric acid plant (Lurgi technology) - 1984
b) Sulphur burning (Monsanto technology) - 1997
storage of 98% Sulphuric acid in 2 x 9,000 t tanks
c) Phosphoric acid plant (Prayon technology : Mark IV dihydrate) 1984
d) Ammonium Sulphate (Struther Wells technology)

PHILPHOS is committed to Responsible Care (RC) RC in the Philippines is managed by
SPIK. GHS classification and labelling is used throughout the company.
GHS needs to be communicated along the supply chain, a particular example is the supply
of ammonia to customers.
There are however deficiencies in the use of regular, systematic hazard identification and
risk assessment techniques (e.g. HazOp, Risk Matrix) as well as knowledge of dispersion
modelling for accident scenarios (SO
2
, NH
3
)
52
PHILPHOS is committed to CSR and is also involved in the safety committee and
environment committee of L.I.D.E.
The company could co-operate well with their neighbouring facility PASAR in an APELL
programme.
53
9.3.10 Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. (Roaster Plant)
The facility inside the Leyte Industrial Development Estate (LIDE) is a 50,000-t/a Roaster
Plant built in 1982 designed to reduce the arsenic content of copper concentrate. Since
PASAR was going to buy most of the roasted copper concentrate, called Calcine, the
Roaster was built next to the PASAR facilities in Isabel, Leyte. At the time of this study, it is
no longer operational and the plant is in ruins. There is still a significant stockpile of
arsenic-bearing wastes.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. - Roaster Plant


1.3 Activity: storage of hazardous wastes, i.e. arsenic trioxide and antimony
trioxide (resulting from the previous operation of the roaster
plant)

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) located within the
Leyte Industrial Development Estate which is approximately 3 km from nearby
community.

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Storage of hazardous waste

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Arsenic trioxide Toxic 5,000,000 Exposed to the
elements
2. Antimony trioxide Toxic No data Buried/covered with
concrete


3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
54
facility
Flooding No No
Earthquake Yes Yes
Volcano No No
Tsunami Yes No
Land slide Yes No

3.2 Impact of natural hazard on chemical facility (description). Strong rains may lead
to leaching/washing out of toxic components of the stored wastes since the
roofing over them is already corroded and partly destroyed.

(description). High magnitude earthquake and strong winds may topple the
building where the hazardous wastes are stored as well as the other
structures.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). Toxic leachate from the
stored wastes may contaminate the nearby sea.

The buildings and structures on the Lepanto site are in a dilapidated and ruined state.
Within some large open sided storage shed there are arsenic bearing wastes which have
been sheeted over with tarpaulin. The roofs of the sheds are no longer completely intact
and the wastes are partially exposed to the elements. There are signs of leaching of
mineral salts from the wastes as blue, green and white trails lead from the sheds down hill
over broken concrete paths. These are strong indications that heavy metal salts (probably
also containing arsenic) are being released to the environment.
Some of the walls are out of vertical alignment and bulging out or in. These walls could
collapse at any time. The effect on the remaining structure is uncertain. A tropical storm
or typhoon could cause significant damage to the remaining structures with a potential
disastrous release to the environment.

55
9.3.11 Speciality Pulp Manufacturing, Inc. (SPMI)
Specialty Pulp Manufacturing, Inc. (SPMI), a company based in the Philippines, is
engaged in the manufacture, sale, and export of food grade and non-food grade bleached
and unbleached specialty pulp, mainly from abaca or Manila Hemp (Musa textilis Nee) as
well as other natural long fibers such as sisal (Agave sisalana), kenaf (Hibiscus
cannabinus), and jute (Corchorus olitrius).

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Specialty Pulp Manufacturing Inc. (SPMI)

1.2 Location: Brgy. Hilapnitan, Baybay, Leyte

1.3 Activity: Manufacturing of food grade quality pulp from natural fibers
(abaca and sisal)

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) The pulp mill is located
in Brgy. Hilapnitan, Baybay, Leyte with a lot area of 4.9 hectares and bound by
Camotes Sea at the northeast side and a few kilometres away from the
concentration of populace/local villagers of Brgy. Hilapnitan and Brgy. Bunga.

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: digestion of fibers and treatment of raw
water

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Sodium hypochlorite Corrosive 20,020
2. Calcium
hypochlorite
Oxidizer 19,523
3. Liquid chlorine Toxic, Corrosive 4,400
4. Hydrogen peroxide Oxidizer/corrosive 78,083
5. Caustic soda Corrosive 111,799


3. Natural Hazards
56
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes Yes Yes
Volcano N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tsunami N/A N/A N/A N/A
Land slide N/A N/A N/A N/A

3.2 Impact of natural hazard on chemical facility (description). Accidental chemical
spillage and exposures to the environment.

(description). The buildings were designed and constructed in a way that
would minimize damaged from earthquake.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). An accidental chlorine
leak that maybe triggered by a natural disaster would affect the workers of the
coconut mill across the plant.

The main pulp making process is the cooking of abaca fibre with sodium hydroxide and
sodium sulphite to separate the lignine from the cellulose. This is then made into an abaca
fibre board for sale, mainly for the food industry. The raw water for the process is treated
with chlorine to remove any bacterial contaminants.
The chlorine storage is a cage designed for two 1 tonne chlorine drums, however four
drums may be on site at any one time. The cage is designed to be locked and procedures
do not permit unauthorised persons to enter the location; however there appear to be
issues in enforcing this procedure as this was also the point to which an improvised
electrical extension cable had been wired. No emergency plan for dealing with a chlorine
leak or catastrophic release is in place. No chlorine gas detection or alarm is installed.
Natural hazard impacts have so far been limited to flooding (10 20 cm deep) with no
impact on the chemical facility. Tree planting measures are attempting to limit this impact.
To limit the effects of earthquakes the buildings are made up of reinforces concrete units
horizontally separated by a 10 cm gap to allow for movement.
57
9.3.12 Pryce Gases, Inc.

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Pryce Gases, Inc.

1.2 Location: Sitio Wangag, Barangay Damulaan, Albuera, Leyte

1.3 Activity: Refilling/ bottling of LPG, production of acetylene and industrial
oxygen

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.)

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: bottling of LPG, generation and bottling
of acetylene gas, air separation and
bottling of industrial liquid oxygen

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)

1. LPG Flammable 1,000,000 Imported from Asian
countries
2. Acetylene Flammable 392
3. Calcium carbide Reactive 20,000 Reacted with water to
generate acetylene


3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes, minimal
Earthquake No No
58
Volcano No No
Tsunami No No
Land slide No No

3.2 Impact of natural hazard on chemical facility (description). Strong magnitude
earthquake may destroy the piping system that may lead to LPG leak.

(description). Strong typhoons may cut off power supply and communication
network.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). Strong typhoons may
destroy houses, cut off power supply and communication network.

The LPG gas storage takes place in two raised horizontal, cylindrical tanks. LPG is
offloaded by ship at the company jetty and transferred by pipeline to the storage tanks.
The tanks in turn supply a road tanker filling station and a bottling shed. The road tanker
transports a daily delivery of ca. 8 tonnes LPG to a satellite bottling plant in Tacloban.
The LPG storage tanks are not fitted with overfill-protection. Neither the tanks storage nor
the bottling shed are fitted with gas detection devices and alarms. This equipment is
however important for the safe operation of large LPG storage facilities.
The air separation plant produces liquid oxygen (LOX) of two qualities, 99.9% and 99.5%
as industrial gases.
Acetylene is generated in batches. 5 x 100 kg drums of calcium carbide are reacted with
water to form acetylene, which is collected in a gasometer. This gas is then compressed
using a two-stage compressor to fill the acetylene bottles. The bottles contain a porous
medium and acetone to stabilise the acetylene. Each bottle contains 7kg acetylene. One
batch is 56 gas bottles.
There does not appear to be a high degree of risk awareness on site and operation is
mainly rule based.

59
9.3.13 San Jose Ice Plant

1. Facility
1.1 Name: Leyte San Jose Ice Plant and Marketing Corp.

1.2 Location: Brgy. 83, Paraiso, San Jose, Tacloban City

1.3 Activity: Block and cube ice manufacturing

1.4 Description of local area (distance to residential area, etc.) the plant is within a
mixed commercial/residential area. The owner lives on site, within the facility.

2.1 Activity using hazardous substances: Ammonia refrigeration

2.2 Substances

substance
Hazard type (toxic,
flammable, etc.)
1. Ammonia Corrosive/toxic Uncertain, ca.
5,000 10,0000
amount


3. Natural Hazards
Awareness of
potential hazard
Local Effects
known
Measures
adopted
Possible impact
on chemical
facility
Flooding Yes Yes
Earthquake Yes No
Volcano No No
Tsunami No No
Land slide No No
Typhoon Yes Yes Shut down the
ammonia plant
Intermittent
power supply
60
(vacuum to
receiver), shut
off electrical
power
burns out motors

3.2 Impact of natural hazard on chemical facility (description). High magnitude
earthquake may break/uncouple ammonia piping system leading to an
ammonia leak.

(description). Strong typhoons may cut off power supply and communication
network.

3.4 Impact of natural hazard on local community (description). Heavy and continuous
rain may flood the area and strong typhoons may cut off power supply and
communication network.


The ammonia refrigeration plant is 30 years old and the quantity of ammonia contained
within it is unknown. Its production capacity is 320 blocks of ice (ca. 40 t) per day. The
plant has no ammonia detection system and reliance is placed on sense of smell. The
owner lives on site and has a personal interest in the safe operation of the facility.
The original two compressors have been replaced by a single compressor which is more
efficient. At a number of points rotating, unguarded machinery, which have the potential to
cause serious injury, were noted.
Cube ice is produced with water from the LMWD, block ice is produced using water from a
deep well which is treated with sodium hypochlorite to remove bacterial contamination.
There is no emergency plan for dealing with major releases of ammonia. There is no
contact to emergency responders who would respond in an emergency.

61
9.4 Relevant Regulations

RA 6969: Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990
Presidential Decree (PD) 1152, the Philippine Environmental Code, which took effect in
1977, provided a basis for an integrated waste management regulation starting from waste
source to methods of disposal. PD 1152 has further mandated specific guidelines to
manage municipal wastes (solid and liquid), sanitary landfill and incineration, and disposal
sites in the Philippines.

In 1990, the Philippine Congress enacted the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and
Nuclear Wastes Control Act, commonly known as Republic Act (RA) 6969, a law designed
to respond to the increasing problems associated with toxic chemicals and hazardous and
nuclear wastes. RA 6969 empowers the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), among others, to regulate, restrict, or prohibit the importation,
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, transport, treatment, and disposal of toxic
substances and hazardous and nuclear wastes in the country. The Act seeks to protect
public health and the environment from unreasonable risks posed by these substances in
the Philippines.

Apart from the basic policy, rules and regulations of RA 6969, chemicals and hazardous
waste management must also comply with the requirements of other specific
environmental laws, such as PD 984 (Pollution Control Law), PD 1586 (Philippine
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) System Law), RA 8749 (Clean Air Act) and RA 9003
(Ecological Solid Waste Management Act) and their implementing rules and regulations.

PD1586: Philippine Environmental Impact Statement System
PD 1586 which established the countrys Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) system
classifies certain projects or areas including those which involve the use of chemicals and
the generation or management of hazardous wastes as environmentally critical projects.
For such projects or areas, an environmental compliance certificate (ECC) issued by the
President or his representative, either the DENR Secretary or Director or Regional Director
of the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), is required prior to development and
project implementation/operation. The ECC contains the key conditions which must be
satisfied by the project proponent in order to protect or enhance the environment. The
basis for the ECC is the EIS and an environmental risk assessment (ERA). The ERA
discusses the hazardous substances and situations of the project; consequences of major
accidents, their probability of occurrence, and estimation of the risk; and safety
management system for the project.

RA 10121: Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act

This is a new law replacing PD 1566, previously the overarching regulation of the country
on disaster management that instituted the policy on self-reliance among local officials and
constituents in responding to disasters. RA 10121 was signed into law last May 27, 2010
strengthening the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System. This
62
basically shifts the focus from disaster response and recovery towards disaster risk
reduction, preparedness and mitigation.

The salient points of this Act include the use of calamity funds by the local government
units (LGUs) beyond the previous cap of five percent based on their internal revenue
allotment (IRA) for disaster reduction, preparedness and mitigation. It also provides that if
LGUs cannot use up their calamity funds, the money will not go to the general fund but
instead to their trust fund and accumulates over time.

The name of the National Disaster Coordinating Council will be changed to the National
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council which is also applicable to the regional,
provincial and LGU levels.

The implementing rules and regulations of this new law however, have yet to be finalized.

RA 9514: Revised Fire Code of the Philippines of 2008
RA 9514 establishes a Comprehensive Fire Code of the Philippines, Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 1185 and for other purposes which was enacted in 19 December
2008. The decree assigns the enforcement of the Fire Code to the Bureau of Fire
Protection (BFP). Under the Code, the owners, administrators or occupants of buildings,
structures, and their premises or facilities and other responsible persons are required to
comply with a fire safety inspection by the BFP; the implementation of fire safety measures
for the manufacture, storage, handling, or use of hazardous materials; safety measures for
hazardous operation and processes; and fire safety construction, protective, and warning
system.

The Code requires that where no specific requirements have been established, storage,
handling, and use of hazardous chemicals shall be in accordance with internationally
recognized good practice. Also, all hazardous chemicals as defined in the Code shall bear
especially designed and colour coded labels consisting of four diamonds arranged into one
large diamond with the first, indicating the toxicity and health hazards; the second, its
flammability; the third, its reactivity; and the fourth, fire-fighting and first aid instructions.

RA 7160: The Local Government Code of 1991

The act reinforced the responsibilities of local chief executives on disaster management.

PD 442: Labor Code of the Philippines
PD 442 is a decree revising and consolidating labor and social laws to afford protection to
labor, promote employment and human resources development and ensure industrial
peace based on social justice. The Occupational Safety and Health Standards were
promulgated by the Department of Labor and Employment under Article 162 of this Decree
for the guidance and compliance of employers and employees alike. Under these
Standards, the following are considered "hazardous workplaces:"

a. Where the nature of work exposes the workers to dangerous environmental elements,
contaminants or work conditions including ionizing radiation, chemicals, fire, flammable
63
substances, noxious components and the like;

b. Where the workers are engaged in construction work, logging, fire fighting, mining,
quarrying, blasting, stevedoring, dock work, deep-sea fishing and mechanized farming;

c. Where the workers are engaged in the manufacture or handling of explosives and other
pyrotechnic products;

d. Where the workers use or are exposed to power driven or explosive powder actuated
tools;

e. Where the workers are exposed to biologic agents such as bacteria, fungi, viruses,
protozoas, nematodes, and other parasites.

RA 6541: The National Building Code of the Philippines
The purpose of this Code is to provide for all buildings and structures, a framework of
minimum standards and requirements by guiding, regulating, and controlling their location,
siting, design, quality of materials, construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance,
including their environment, utilities, fixtures, equipment, and mechanical electrical, and
other systems and installations. This is in line with the declared policy of the State to
safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with the principles of
environmental management and control.

2010 GTZ Report Region VIII Needs Assessment Chemical Accident Prevention

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2010 GTZ Report Region VIII Needs Assessment Chemical Accident Prevention

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Needs Assessment Study on Chemical Accident Prevention

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