Reason and Revolution - Crisis

It is in the very nature of a beginning to carry with itself a measure of complete arbitrariness. Not only
is it not bound into a reliable chain of cause and efect, a chain in which each efec timmediately turns
into the cause for future developments, the beginning has, as it were, nothing whatsoever to hold on to;
it is as though it came out of nowhere in either time or space. For a moment, the moment of beginning,
it is as though the beginner had abolished the sequence of temporality itself, or as though the actors
were thrown out of the temporal order and its continuity.
The problem of beginning, of course, appears frst in thought and speculation about the origin of the
universe, and we know the Hebrew solution for its perplexities - the assumption of a Creator God who
is outside his own creation in the same way as the fabricator is outside the fabricated object. In other
words, the problem of beginning is solved through the introduction of a beginner whose own
beginnings are no longer subject to question because he is 'from eternity to eternity'.
This eternity is the absolute of temporality, and to the extent that the beginning of the universe reaches
back into this region of the absolute, it is no longer arbitrary but rooted in something which, though it
may be beyond the reasoning capacities of man, possesses a reason, a rationale of its own. The curious
fact that the men of the revolutions were prompted into their desperate search for an absolute the very
moment they had been forced to act might well be, at least partly, infuenced by the age-old thought-
customs of Western men, according to which each completely new beginning needs an absolute from
which it springs and by which it is 'explained'. (Arendt, On Revolution, p.206)
Here is Constant (note reference to private happiness against freedom [not
liberty!] and to guarantees [our liberties]:
La libert individuelle, je le rpte, voil la vritable libert moderne. La libert politique en est la
garantie; la libert politique est par consquent indispensable. Mais demander aux peuples de nos
jours de sacrifer comme ceux d'autrefois la totalit de leur libert individuelle la libert politique,
c'est le plus sr moyen de les dtacher de l'une et quand on y serait parvenu, on ne tarderait pas leur
ravir l'autre..
Le commerce rend l'action de l'arbitraire sur notre existence plus vexatoire qu'autrefois, parce que nos
spculations tant plus varies, l'arbitraire doit se multiplier pour les atteindre; mais le commerce
rend aussi l'action de l'arbitraire plus facile a luder, parce qu'il change la nature de la proprit, qui
devient par ce changement presque insaisissable.
Le commerce donne la proprit une qualit nouvelle, la circulation: sans circulation, la proprit
n'est qu'un usufruit; l'autorit peut toujours infuer sur l'usufruit, car elle peut enlever la jouissance;
mais la circulation met un obstacle invisible et invincible cette action du pouvoir social.
Les efets du commerce s'tendent encore plus loin: non seulement il afranchit les individus, mais, en
crant le crdit, il rend l'autorit dpendante.
L'argent, dit un auteur franais, est l'arme la plus dangereuse du despotisme, mais il est en mme
temps son frein le plus puissant; le crdit est soumis l'opinion; la force est inutile; l'argent se cache
ou s'enfuit; toutes les oprations de l'tat sont suspendues. Le crdit n'avait pas la mme infuence
chez les anciens; leurs gouvernements taient plus forts que les particuliers; les particuliers sont plus
forts que les pouvoirs politiques de nos jours; la richesse est une puissance plus disponible dans tous
les instants, plus applicable a tous les intrts, et par consquent bien plus relle et mieux obie; le
pouvoir menace, la richesse rcompense: on chappe au pouvoir en le trompant; pour obtenir les
faveurs de la richesse, il faut la servir: celle-ci doit l'emporter.
Par une suite des mmes causes, l'existence individuelle est moins englobe dans l'existence politique.
Les individus transplantent au loin leurs trsors; ils portent avec eux toutes les jouissances de la vie
prive; le commerce a rapproch les nations, et leur a donn des moeurs et des habitudes peu prs
pareilles: les chefs peuvent tre ennemis; les peuples sont compatriotes.
Que le pouvoir s'y rsigne donc; il nous faut de la libert, et nous l'aurons; mais comme la libert qu'il
nous faut est difrente de celle des anciens, il faut cette libert une autre organisation que celle qui
pourrait convenir a la libert antique; dans celle-ci, plus l'homme consacrait de temps et de force a
l'exercice de ses droits politiques, plus il se croyait libre; dans l'espce de libert dont nous sommes
susceptibles, plus l'exercice de nos droits politiques nous laissera de temps pour nos intrts privs,
plus la libert nous sera prcieuse.
De la vient, Messieurs, la ncessit du systme reprsentatif. Le systme reprsentatif n'est autre chose
qu'une organisation l'aide de laquelle une nation se dcharge sur quelques individus de ce qu'elle ne
peut ou ne veut pas faire elle-mme. Les individus pauvres font eux-mmes leurs afaires: les hommes
riches prennent des intendants. C'est l'histoire des nations anciennes et des nations modernes. Le
systme reprsentatif est une procuration donne un certain nombre d'hommes par la masse du
peuple, qui veut que ses intrts soient dfendus, et qui nanmoins n'a pas le temps de les dfendre
toujours lui-mme. Mais a moins d'tre insenss, les hommes riches qui ont des intendants examinent
avec attention et svrit si ces intendants font leur devoir, s'ils ne sont ni ngligents ni corruptibles,
ni incapables; et pour juger de la gestion de ces mandataires, les commettants qui ont de la prudence se
mettent bien au fait des afaires dont ils leur confent l'administration. De mme, les peuples qui, dans
le but de jouir de la libert qui leur convient, recourent au systme reprsentatif, doivent exercer une
surveillance active et constante sur leur reprsentants, et se rserver, des poques qui ne soient pas
spares par de trop longs intervalles, le droit de les carter s'ils ont tromp leurs voeux, et de rvoquer
les pouvoirs dont ils auraient abus.
Car, de ce que la libert moderne difre de la libert antique, il s'ensuit qu'elle est aussi menace d'un
danger d'espce difrente.
Le danger de la libert antique tait qu'attentifs uniquement s'assurer le partage du pouvoir social,
les hommes ne fssent trop bon march des droits et des jouissances individuelles.
Le danger de la libert moderne, c'est qu'absorbs dans la jouissance de notre indpendance prive, et
dans la poursuite de nos intrts particuliers, nous ne renoncions trop facilement notre droit de
partage dans le pouvoir politique.
(De la libert des anciens).
Quite by contrast, if labor is seen in its real immanent meaning as living
labor, then its objectifcation cannot be used in exchange for its freedom.
Living labor can be exchanged for dead labor only through the violent
suppression of its freedom. In this sense, freedom is no longer seen as a
transcendental or ontological entity but rather as the immanent objectifcation
of living labor. Freedom can no longer be mistaken for freedom of the Will in
that the Will is no longer the expression of individuality as acquisitiveness
and possession, but rather individuality as creation and fulflment. Labor
then becomes art; techne becomes poiesis, though not as individual
ownership of the means of production. Instead, labor (living labor) becomes
reconciled with its multi-versality in its particularity because it is no longer
devoted to the satisfaction of human needs seen as wants independent of
living labor, but rather it becomes the most basic need of being human.
It is in order to escape from the gravitational orbit of equilibrium that the
freedom of the entrepreneur is needed for Schumpeter. Indeed, the entire point
to Neoclassical value theory is precisely the ability of the capitalist-entrepreneur
to free himself from immediate consumption by deferring it and thereby
substituting it with labor-saving tools. It is not the renunciation of
Schopenhauer whose society is entirely eristic and the State can only keep
individuals from descending back into the bellum civium. For Neoclassical theory
the State can reward the productivity of labor by protecting the deferral of
consumption of the capitalist entrepreneur. But Schumpeter sees this deferral
or renunciation, this A-skesis (ascending, climbing), as still limited to the
Statik framework of general equilibrium analysis, insufcient to explain the
Dynamik features of the capitalist economy, its development, its ability to
defeat stagnation. For Schumpeter the deferral or saving of the Neoclassics
is inadequate to explain value and profts because these can arise only from the
creativity, from the authorship (auctoritas, augere, to grow, to initiate
[legislation in the Roman Senate]) of the entrepreneur who elevates and
therefore frees himself from the gravitational pull of the circular fow
(Kreislauf), reaching thereby the heights of innovation by distinguishing his
individuality-personality (Unternehmer-Personlichkeit) from that of the
mass (this is the way Schumpeter himself describes the process in the
suppressed [to smoothe his Harvard appointment] chapter 7 of the Theorie). Not
labor but enterprise is the gateway to freedom and proft as against
interest and rent.
Weber shares the same Neoclassical platform as Schumpeter. But for him it is not
the entrepreneurs creativity that counts; it is instead the technical expertise
that invariably generates bureaucratic control not in a purely formal-
rational manner (Zweck-rationalitat) but rather as an expression of conficting
interests over the iron cage. These conficting self-interests are purely
Hobbesian and Nietzschean, they replicate the universal Eris of Schopenhauer in
answer to German Classical Idealism from Leibniz onwards.
[Arendt seems to think, incidentally, that there is transcendence in all this
which is right for Rousseau and the Idealists, but incorrect for Hobbes and
Nietzsche who are immanentists (or materialists) as was Spinoza. (Russell
argues [in his Treatise on Leibniz] that the German philosopher was a pantheist.
That may be so, but his pantheism was more a monism whereby Nature is
swallowed up by Spirit, by God. Leibnizs monism is purely rational-logical
whereas Spinozas is derived from a multiplicity of powers refecting the com-
penetration of God and Nature: Deus sive Natura.)]
With Classical theory, the capitalist appears redundant or a nefarious barrier
to the freedom of living labor from the start, because if labor is the source of
value, then it soon becomes clear that labor cannot be measured by its pro-
duct. Yet even Marxs version preserves socially necessary labor time and the
reproduction of society. Whence is derived the surplus value that
capitalists exploit from workers. For Schumpeter, surplus is the domain of
entrepreneurial creativity. In contrast, Marx introduces the use value of
living labor (a pleonasm because use value for Marx re-fers already to a
potential free-dom). - So here the sphere of necessity is labor-power and that of
potential freedom is living labor (Grundrisse); whereas surplus value, which
is spent on the reproduction of the capitalist class and the expansion of the
labor force (cf. Kaleckis capitalists earn what they invest or get what they
spend), is both exploitation and potential for freedom. But if value is
determined by socially necessary labor time, then even surplus value is
necessary so that the social question boils down to one of distribution of
income which is what the neo-Ricardians argue, with politics determining
the wage and therefore the rate of proft. If one stuck to this Marxian theory of
value, then the purpose of living labor would be, as it was for Rodbertus and the
idiotic saraband of neo-Ricardian epigones that followed after him, nothing other
than control over the distribution of surplus value which validates Webers
elitarian and organicist position (shared by Arendt and the Heideggerians who
then denounce Technik!) on the inevitability of bureaucratic control over the
production of value through the rational organisation of formally free labor. (On
all this, see Grossman.) As we saw in Part One, once the Law of Value is
assumed, it matters little whether value is produced in the factory or
realised in the market: the process of capitalist production becomes
technical because production and consumption, valorisation and realisation of
value are homologated as quantities in short, there is no crisis in capitalist
production, no antagonism in the wage relation, no Politics in the social
question.
This is the wheel of necessity, the Economics as science of choice: the
removal of freedom intended as reconciliation and its renunciation as
universal Eris in the dismal science. Even the Weberian leitender Geist is an
ofcial, a worker! And that is precisely why he cannot be a Schumpeterian
entrepreneur riding on mere Subjectivity, on Individualitat and Unternehmer-
Personlichkeit. The leitender Geist and its politics of responsibility is the
immanent Un-freiheit of Nietzsches will to power. Here in Weber we encounter
the Hobbesian problematic that Nietzsche had already overcome. In Hobbes
the absolute is all Euclidean, axiomatic: the legitimacy and legality of the
Sovereign is founded upon the dira necessitas of the social contract which is
philosophically made freely, as in Montesquieu, but coerced externally by
the ob metum mortis, the fear of imminent and violent death. The State is the
ultima ratio in foro externo (the inter-national state of nature), it is driven by the
raison detat, whilst it preserves the law for its subjects in foro interno: similarly,
the subjects are free in foro interno (the psyche), but not free in foro externo,
because subject to the law. (Bobbio, in Da Hobbes a Marx, chpts.1 and 2, discusses
this paradox in Hobbes between the jusnaturalism of the forum internum and
the positivism of the forum externum such that individuals follow reason in
preserving their lives by exiting the status naturae, but then, once they freely and
rationally con-vene on the status civilis and alienate their free-dom, they are
entirely subject to the laws of the ab-solute State [the deus mortalis a legibus
solutus] that are not subject to any Natural Law. The Hobbesian State becomes
then a machine that refects the mechanical confict of indvidual bodies in
the state of nature. The same paradox is to be found in Adam Smith where the
jusnaturalism of the Labour Theory of Value comes into confict with the
positivism of market prices as the ultimate arbiter of Value, and is ultimately
resolved by the mechanicism of the invisible hand whereby prices merely
show but do not explain, point to but do not tell, the social synthesis [co-
ordination or Gleichschaltung] much in the way that Srafa referred to a sun-dial
that points to time but does not cause or explain it [cf. Amartya Sen on
Wittgenstein and Srafa]. We have here the purest form of positivism in the style
of the early Wittgenstein.)
It is exactly the same in Weber that is why he is more the descendant of Hobbes
than of Machiavelli (pace Aron). The leitender Geist is certainly no Principe because
Machiavellis problematic of virtus and fortuna cannot be homologated even
remotely (historically, politically, philosophically) with the Lebenswelt, the Kultur,
the Zivilisation of late nineteenth-century capitalism
This compromise, this dis-cutio or dia-lectic that Weber envisages almost
socratically, is what Schmitt denies is possible (remember accusations of
dithering and flibuster he aims at it): the State cannot have both legitimacy
and legality at the same time either the laws are arbitrary and illegal or else
the legislator is illegitimate. Only potestas can give legitimacy to law provided
we accept the legitimacy of the power to decide over the exception which
itself has no legal legitimacy and therefore no legitimate legality and is
therefore the suspension of natural laws, the realm of freedom that
emanates from one Will. This Schmittian stance is confrmed by the very
nature of parties (Parteienwesen or party system) which, as Michels stresses
(in Political Parties), intensify the division of the civil society into friend and
foe because, we add, political parties re-present only the economic liberties
of their electorates subject to the Constitution, which is no longer a constituent
power!
For Weber and Schumpeter, the scientifc inevitability of capitalism identifed
absolutely with the market economy is what makes the potestas and the potentia
of the State indisputable or common-sensical. But Weber sides a little more
with Hobbes and Nietzsche on the pessimistic side, whereas Schumpeter is
more Lockean in his optimism but then is as elitarian (by this I mean the
theory of elitism rather than the practice someone can believe
theoretically in the necessity of elites without being elitist) as Weber or
Pareto and Mosca. For Hobbes the State prevents or ab-solves the state of nature
(Bobbio says that it is both too early and too late to be legitimate
jusnaturally), for Locke it simply protects it (especially the estate). There is no
initium in the Treatises, as Arendt observes, no revolution; and the State is one
virtually by acquisition, one that merely con-frms the possessive
individualist status quo of the state of nature into the new civil society. But there
is an initium in Hobbes because the con-ventum, the social contract, erects a
Commonwealth that is a state by institution diametrically opposed to the state
of nature and yet, unlike Lockes, is necessitated by it, and therefore turns
into a state by axiomatic acquisition, to prevent the inevitable civil war! There is
no civil society in Hobbes (and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche) as there is in
Locke, Smith and Hegel: the political convention is pulverised by the scientifc
hypothesis. Hobbes is the scientifc-logical reductio ad absurdum of bourgeois
possessive individualism.
So Weber needs a constitution in his political re-construction of Germany
because without it though it needs a minimum of inner assent, which may
well be constituted by the dira necessitas, by the ob metum mortis, the fear of death -
there could be no civil society or State, whereas Schumpeter (his
entrepreneur) does not because the market economy is the nature of the thing,
it is the social synthesis. Weber does not have to explain confict, but then has
difculty explaining how parliamentary democracy is able to function,
whereas Schumpeter needs only to presume that it may not function to come
up with elitarian democracy or with an authoritarian state to guarantee the
market mechanism. We know that Weber eventually concedes defeat. The defeat
was pre-announced in Michelss introduction to Politischen Parteien.
Nevertheless, Weber has forgotten the Nietzschean lesson (HATH) on the
Demokratisierung, the fact that if everyone wants to be equal the State is
thereby dissolved, the Vergeistigung becomes utopian, and so also the
Parlamentarisierung (Cacciari, DCP, p55f, p64f, Lo Stato e puro mezzo,
strumento della salus publica) The Hegelian Vergeistigung is caught up in the
apory of a Freiheit whereby the Will wants to attain the freedom of the will,
but in reconciling itself with reality rationally then becomes freedom from
the will, which is the very antithesis of what liberalism and socialism ofer
because their operari ends up in the desert of the opus, of nihilism, the
crystallised spirit, the Ent-seelung and Ent-zauberung. (Tocqueville, Arendt,
Constant examples.)
vero infatti che la caratteristica essenziale dei sistemi partitici,
sotto altri aspetti tanto diversi, "che essi 'nominano' i candidati
agli incarichi elettivi o al governo rappresentativo", e pu
essere anche esatto dire che "l'atto stesso della presentazione delle
candidature sufficiente a dar vita a un partito politico" 9 4 . Perci
fin dai suoi inizi il partito come istituzione presuppone o che la
partecipazione dei cittadini alla vita pubblica sia garantita da altri
organi pubblici o che tale partecipazione non sia necessaria e i
ceti recentemente ammessi della popolazione si accontentino di essere
rappresentati o infine che tutte le uestioni politiche nel
welfare state siano ridotte a problemi amministrativi, da trattarsi
e decidersi a opera di esperti! nel ual caso anche i rappresentanti
del popolo non possiedono un'autentica area d'azione ma
sono semplicemente funzionari amministrativi, i cui compiti, ben"
#$%
che& si svolgano nel pubblico interesse, non sono sostanzialmente
diversi dall'attivit' gestionale nell'azienda privata. (e risultasse
esatto l'ultimo di uesti presupposti ) e chi potrebbe negare
che nelle nostre societ' di massa la sfera politica si sia in larga
misura inaridita e sia stata rimpiazzata da uella "amministrazione
delle cose" che *ngels pronosticava per una societ' senza classi+ )"
allora senza dubbio i consigli si dovrebbero considerare istituzioni
ataviche, senza alcuna importanza nel campo delle vicende umane.
Ma le stesse considerazioni, o altre molto simili, si dovrebbero
ben presto fare per il sistema dei partiti; infatti l'amministrazione
e la gestione aziendale, i cui compiti sono dettati dalle
necessit insite in ogni processo economico, sono essenzialmente
non solo non politiche ma anche non partitiche.
In this sense, affluence and wretchedness are only two sides of the same coin; the bonds
of necessity need not be of iron, they can be made of silk. Freedom and luxury have
always been thought to be incompatible, and the modern estimate that tends to blame
the insistence of the Founding Fathers on frugality and 'simplicity of manners'
(Jefferson) upon a uritan contempt for the delights of the world much rather testifies to
an inability to understand freedom than to a freedom from pre!udice. ,-. .rendt, "n
#e$olution, ch.#, p.$9#/
01.
2n3evolution
%I&t is beyond doubt %'(& that the young )ar* became con$inced that the reason why the
French #e$olution had failed to found freedom was that it had failed to sol$e the social
+uestion. From this he concluded that freedom and poverty were incompatible. ,is most
e*plosi$e and indeed most original contribution to the cause of re$olution was that he
interpreted the compelling needs of mass po$erty in political terms as an uprising, not for
the sake of bread or wealth, but for the sake of freedom as well. -hat he learned from the
French #e$olution was that po$erty can be a political force of the first order. ,ch.1,
pp.0$"1/
4he sub5ect"matter of the *conomics 6 its sub5ectum, its substratum, its nervus rerum 6 is
the 7s8stem of needs and 9ants:, it is the sphere of 7necessit8:, of 7pro"duction: that
7gravitates: ultimatel8 around 7reproduction:. ;hether 7labor: is seen as the source of
7value: or 9hether value is seen as arising from the 7saving: of 7labor:, the fundamental
realit8 remains that 7labor: is at the heart of 7the social uestion:. 4hat 7freedom and
povert8: ma8 be incompatible is a problem or 7social uestion: that ma8 be resolved
simpl8 b8 eliminating povert8! but if 7freedom and lu<ur8: also are incompatible, as
.rendt suggests, then humanit8 has an even greater problem 6 and freedom has found an
insurmountable barrier=
;hat .rendt means here, if one subtracts the sill8 9ordiness, is that 7the pursuit of
lu<ur8: or 7private happiness:, ma8 tend to shrin> the social, 7public: space or universe
of human beings so as to render them a"political 6 9ith the conseuent neglect of the
forms of political acti$ity that 7freedom: must stand for, in opposition to 7passive:
liberties. 4o be 7free: is for .rendt to engage activel8 in the political life of one&s
communit8. 4o be 7at libert8: to do something, instead, is to be the passive beneficiar8 of
a right or benefit 7conceded: to oneself b8 the po9ers that be. ?n this sense, one ma8 sa8
that 7freedom: and 7the pursuit of lu<ur8: ma8 9ell be at odds, but not be necessaril8
7incompatible:=
;ith @lassics and Aeoclassics, the sphere of 7happiness: or 7utilit8: is al9a8s 7private:
because 7labor: can be 7divided: so the 9hole point of the 7socialit8: of social labor is
lost. 4he private sphere is 9hat must be protected from the (tate 6 the escape from the
state of nature and its necessit8. 7Breedom: is confused 9ith 7libert8:. 4here is no notion
of 7public happiness: because 7happiness: or 7utilit8: or 7pleasure: is limited to the
oi>os 6 the household ,.lberti in .ella Famiglia, to Bran>lin/.
.rendt rebu>es ;eber ,implicitl8/ because the latter assumes that the 7frugalit8: of the
Bounding Bathers 9as purel8 Puritanical 6 9hen in fact it could have been the 7opposite:
of retreat from the 9orld, of 7renunciation:! it could have been due to a greater concern
for 7public happiness: and therefore 7freedom: than for 7private happiness: and
therefore 7lu<ur8:. 4his again 9ould contrast 9ith ;eber&s interpretation of the spirit of
capitalism. -ere the 7citizen: 9ould prevail over the 7bourgeois:. ;e note that in ;eber
this 7antithesis: does not even begin to e<ist.
.t the same time, .rendt is chastising Car< for euating 7freedom from povert8: 9ith
7freedom: itself. (o the mere fact that people are de"livered from povert8 and lifted into
lu<ur8 does not mean that 7freedom: 9ill be instored. -ere .rendt is divorcing 79ealth:
or 7value: 6 economic action 6 from political institutions! " 9hich is something that
neither Car< nor ;eber seem able to do because the8 tie 7the most basic needs:,
including that for 7freedom:, to 7the care for material or e<ternal goods:, and thereb8
7reduce: the notion of 7freedom: to that of a 7material or e<ternal good:.
4his helps e<plain 9h8 in ;eber there is concern for parliamentar8 democrac8 onl8 to
the e<tent that it is 7functional: to 7the rational organisation of labor: and ultimatel8 to
7the iron cage:. Doth the ascetic ideal and the iron cage are 7irrational:. ;eber sees the
7freedom: of 7labor: onl8 as 7autonomous mar>et demand: and not in broader
7political: terms. 4his is .rendt&s reproach to ;eber. Dut she forgets, as Car< 9ould
pointedl8 remind her, that her o9n high"bro9 conception of 7freedom: does not deal
integrall8, let alone fairl8, 9ith 9hat is the most important aspect of human e<istence
under capitalism! " 9age labor, 9hich ;eber confuses 9ith human living labor.
4here can be precious little 7freedom: if one is under the 8o>e of 7the rational
organisation of Efree& labor under the regular discipline of the factor8:, as ;eber defines
7capitalism:. .rendt succeeds onl8 in demonstrating her 7povert8 of philosoph8: b8
mista>ing Car< 9ith Proudhon, the bathetic author of 74he Philosoph8 of Povert8:= 4hat
povert8 and freedom are t9o different concepts is blatantl8 evident. Dut that Car< ever
made the mista>e of confusing deliverance from povert8 9ith freedom 9hen in fact he
9as stating merel8 that 7freedom: offers ver8 little solace to those 9ho are poor, is an
accusation un9orth8 of .rendt&s other9ise admirable intellect.
4he crucial difference bet9een Car< and Proudhon is that Car< did not 9aste time
7philosophising: about povert8, preferring instead to find out the social 7causes: behind
its indisputable e<istence in capitalism. .nd the difference bet9een Car< and ;eber is
that, having found out that capitalism reduces 7living labor: to 7labor po9er: 6 that is, in
;eber&s o9n 9ords, to 7the rational organisation of ,formall8/ Efree& labor under the
regular discipline of the factor8: ", Car< could see that the social po9er of the
bourgeoisie consists precisel8 in this violent 7reduction: of human living labor to mere
7labor po9er:. ;eber&s phrase 7free labor: is not an o<8moron because his 7labor: is an
entit8 that can be either 7free: or 7not free: because he 9rongl8 identifies all human
activit8 9ith 7labor po9er:. Bor Car<, instead, it is impossible for 7living labor: to be
an8thing but 7free:! it is onl8 under the violent command of the capitalist that living
labor is turned into 7labor po9er:.
4he problem is then to understand 9hat relationship there is bet9een 7freedom: and
7labor: in ;eber&s 9or>. ?f ;eber is concerned about 7profit: or 7capitalistic economic
action:, it is because it is this that 7provides: rationall8 for those 7freel8 e<pressed:
9ants and needs of 9or>ers that can be provided for most efficientl8 b8 7the rational
organisation of labor ,meaning, 7labor po9er:/ under the regular ,capitalist/ discipline of
the factor8:.
4here is a sense in 9hich the Aeoclassical notion of 7euilibrium: has to do 9ith the
7necessit8: of 7scarcit8: of 7provisions: in proportion to endless 79ants:. Doth
(chopenhauer and 3obbins understand the ;ill and 79ants:, respectivel8, as 7insatiable:.
Dut 9hereas (chopenhauer sees this as a motive 7to renounce: the 9orld of 9ants,
3obbins ta>es it more realisticall8 as the 7budget constraint: of Aeoclassical 4heor8 as
7the science of choice: 6 9hat ma>es 7choice: sub5ect to 7scientific and rational:
treatment.
Dut in order to escape from the 7gravitational orbit: of 7euilibrium: the 7freedom: of
the entrepreneur is needed. ?ndeed, the entire point to Aeoclassical value theor8 is
precisel8 the abilit8 of the capitalist"entrepreneur 7to free: himself from 7immediate
consumption: b8 7deferring: it and thereb8 7substituting: it 9ith 7labor"saving tools:. ?t
is not the 7renunciation: of (chopenhauer 9hose societ8 is entirel8 7eristic: and the (tate
can onl8 >eep individuals from descending bac> into the bellum civium. Bor Aeoclassical
theor8 the (tate can re9ard the productivit8 of labor b8 protecting the 7deferral of
consumption: of the capitalist entrepreneur.
Bor (chumpeter this 7deferral: is not sufficient because it belongs to the 7(tati>:! value
and profits can arise onl8 from the 7creativit8: of the entrepreneur 9ho 7elevates: and
therefore 7frees: himself from the gravitational pull of the 7static: and reaches the
heights of 7innovation: b8 distinguishing his 7individualit8"personalit8: ,Fnternehmer"
personalitat/ from that of the 7mass:. 4he (tate must therefore do more than 5ust protect
propert8 rights! it must also protect intellectual propert8 from the 7rentier: capitalists
,finance/. Aot 7labor: but 7enterprise: is the gate9a8 to 7freedom: and 7profit: as
against 7interest: and 7rent:.
;ith @lassical theor8, instead, the capitalist appears 7redundant: from the start, because
7labor: is the source of value. *ven Car<&s version preserves this 7sociall8 necessar8
labor time: and the 7reproduction of societ8:. 6 ;hence comes the 7surplus value: that
capitalists e<ploit from 9or>ers.
Dut Car< introduces the 7use value: of living labor. " (o here the sphere of 7necessit8: is
labor"po9er and that of potential 7freedom: is 7living labor: ,Grundrisse/.
Hannah Arendt on Constituent Power
I am re-proposing here for the benefit of friends an earlier piece on Hannah Arendt's discussion
of freedom and "the social question" or "social forces". These are notes on a much larger piece
on some of the conceptual and practical matters involving "Revolution". It is a topic that is
destined to become increasingly relevant in coming years as this miserable "system" implodes
and e are called upon to erect a ne one. It's the question of ne beginnings... Apologies for
the quotations in Italian from Arendt's "!n Revolution" "please use #oogle Translate$. This piece
ill be updated from time to time% so please &eep chec&ing. 'hat I am trying to do here is to toss
up some ideas about a new Constitution for our societies% and in the process find out hat is
going rong not merely from the strictly "economic" angle% but also in terms of the more strictly
"political" one - in terms of the inability of e(isting bourgeois social and political institutions to hide
the enormously "repressive" role of capitalist production in posing a barrier to our on equally
"enormous" productive potential) This notion of "capital as a barrier to production" is central to the
theory that e are developing and to the critique of capitalism that e are carrying out. *heers.
In this sense% affluence and retchedness are only to sides of the same coin+ the bonds of
necessity need not be of iron% they can be made of sil&. Freedom and luxury have always been
thought to be incompatible% and the modern estimate that tends to blame the insistence of the
,ounding ,athers on frugality and 'simplicity of manners' "-efferson$ upon a .uritan contempt for
the delights of the orld much rather testifies to an inability to understand freedom than to a
freedom from pre/udice. (H. Arendt, !n Revolution, ch.3, p.193)
62.
OnRevolution
0I1t is beyond doubt 0231 that the young 4ar( became convinced that the reason hy the ,rench
Revolution had failed to found freedom as that it had failed to solve the social question. ,rom
this he concluded that freedom and poverty were incompatible. His most e(plosive and indeed
most original contribution to the cause of revolution as that he interpreted the compelling needs
of mass poverty in political terms as an uprising% not for the sa&e of bread or ealth% but for the
sa&e of freedom as ell. 'hat he learned from the ,rench Revolution as that poverty can be a
political force of the first order. (ch.2, pp.612)
!he su"#ect$atter o% the &cono$ics ' its su"#ectu$, its su"stratu$, its nervus reru$ ' is the
(s)ste$ o% needs and wants*, it is the sphere o% (necessit)*, o% (production* that (+ravitates*
ulti$atel) around the (reproduction* o% a societ). ,hether (la"or* is seen as the source o% (value*
or whether value is seen as arisin+ %ro$ the (savin+* o% (la"or*, the %unda$ental realit) is that
(la"or* re$ains at the heart o% (the social -uestion*. !hat (%reedo$ and povert)* $a) "e
inco$pati"le is a pro"le$ or (social -uestion* that $a) "e resolved si$pl) ") eli$inatin+ povert).
"ut i% (%reedo$ and lu/ur)* also are inco$pati"le, as Arendt su++ests, then hu$anit) has an even
+reater pro"le$ ' and %reedo$ has %ound an insur$ounta"le "arrier0
,hat Arendt $eans here, i% one su"tracts the ver"osit), is that (the pursuit o% lu/ur)* or (private
happiness*, $a) tend to shrin1 the social, (pu"lic* space or universe o% hu$an "ein+s so as to
render the$ apolitical ' with the conse-uent ne+lect o% the %or$s o% political activity that
(%reedo$* $ust stand %or, in opposition to (passive* liberties. !o "e (%ree* is %or Arendt to en+a+e
activel) in the political li%e o% one2s co$$unit). !o "e (at li"ert)* to do so$ethin+, instead, is to "e
the passive "ene%iciar) o% a ri+ht or "ene%it (conceded* to onesel% ") the powers that "e. 3n this
sense, one $a) sa) that (%reedo$* and (the pursuit o% lu/ur)* ' not (lu/ur)* itsel%0 $a) well "e at
odds, "ut not "e necessaril) (inco$pati"le*0
,ith Classics and 4eoclassics, the sphere o% (happiness* or (utilit)* (%or the Classics (la"or* has
utilit) "ecause it (creates value* positivel), whereas %or 4eoclassics it (consu$es* the world so
that (utilit)* or (value* consists in the (saving o% la"or* instead, which there%ore has (disutilit)*) is
alwa)s (private* "ecause (la"or* can "e (divided* so the whole point o% the (socialit)* o% social
labor, its ph)lo+enetic interdependence, is lost. !he private sphere, civil societ) or the status
civilis, is what $ust "e protected %ro$ the 5tate, which as constituted %or this purpose
") political convention as a wa) o% prevention or escape from the state o% nature or status
naturae and its scientific hypothesis as the do$ain o% necessity. 6ut "ecause in this status civilis,
in this 5tate, the individuals co$posin+ civil societ) have necessarily alienated the (%reedo$* the)
en#o)ed in the state o% nature, now this (%reedo$* is reduced to and even confused ith (li"ert)*.
,hether it "e under Ho""es2s (7eviathan* or 5tate$achine, or else under 7oc1e2s consensual
(co$$onwealth*, what the 5tate protects are the (individual possessions* o% the individual ' li%e,
li"ert) and estate ' that these individuals possessed already in the state o% nature "ut were under
constant threat %ro$ a++ression. !here is no notion o% (pu"lic happiness* in this political theor)
"ecause (happiness* or (utilit)* or (pleasure* is li$ited to the oi1os ' the household (Al"erti
in 5ella ,amiglia, to 8ran1lin).
Arendt re"u1es ,e"er (i$plicitl)) "ecause the latter assu$es that the (%ru+alit)* o% the 8oundin+
8athers was purel) 9uritanical ' when in %act it could have "een the (opposite* o% retreat %ro$ the
world, the opposite o% (renunciation*. the (%ru+alit)* and (industr)* o% the 9uritans could have "een
due to a +reater concern %or (pu"lic happiness* and there%ore (%reedo$* than %or (private
happiness* and there%ore (lu/ur)*. !his a+ain would contrast with ,e"er2s interpretation o% the
spirit o% capitalis$. Here the (citi:en* would prevail over the ("our+eois*. ,e note that in ,e"er
this (antithesis* does not even "e+in to e/ist "ecause the 9olitical is identi%ied i$$ediatel) with
the protection o% the (needs and wants* o% civil societ) ' o% what he calls (%ree la"or*.
At the sa$e ti$e, Arendt is chastisin+ ;ar/ %or e-uatin+ (%reedo$ %ro$ povert)* with (%reedo$*
itsel%. 5o the $ere %act that people are delivered %ro$ povert) and li%ted into lu/ur) does not
$ean that (%reedo$* will "e instored. Here Arendt is divorcin+ (wealth* or (value* ' econo$ic
action ' %ro$ political institutions. which is so$ethin+ that neither ;ar/ nor ,e"er are prepared
to do "ecause the) tie (the $ost "asic needs o% social li%e*, includin+ that %or (%reedo$*, to the
sphere o% (social reproduction* in ;ar/ and (the care %or $aterial or e/ternal +oods* in ,e"er,
there") (reducin+* the notion o% (%reedo$*, the 9olitical, to the sphere o% the social relations o%
production, to &cono$ics.
!his helps e/plain wh) in ,e"er there is concern %or parlia$entar) de$ocrac) onl) to the e/tent
that it is (%unctional* to (the rational or+anisation o% la"or* and ulti$atel) to (the iron ca+e*. 6oth
the ascetic ideal and the iron ca+e are (irrational*. ,e"er sees the (%reedo$* o% (la"or* onl) as
(autono$ous $ar1et de$and* and not in "roader (political* ter$s. !his is Arendt2s reproach to
,e"er. 6ut she %or+ets, as ;ar/ would pointedl) re$ind her, that her own hi+h"row conception
o% (%reedo$* does not deal inte+rall), let alone %airl), with what is the $ost i$portant aspect o%
hu$an e/istence under capitalis$. wa+e la"or, which ,e"er con%uses with hu$an livin+ la"or.
!here can "e precious little (%reedo$* i% one is under the )o1e o% (the rational or+anisation o% <%ree2
la"or under the re+ular discipline o% the %actor)*, as ,e"er de%ines (capitalis$*. Arendt succeeds
onl) in de$onstratin+ her (povert) o% philosoph)* ") $ista1in+ ;ar/ with 9roudhon, the "athetic
author o% (!he 9hilosoph) o% 9overt)*0 !hat povert) and %reedo$ are two di%%erent concepts is
"latantl) evident. 6ut that ;ar/ ever $ade the $ista1e o% con%usin+ de-liverance (7atin, liber,
%reed slave) from povert) with freedom when in %act he was statin+ $erel) that an) (%reedo$* that
%ails to a"olish povert) o%%ers ver) little solace to those who are poor, is an accusation unworth) o%
Arendt2s otherwise ad$ira"le intellect. 9erhaps the %unda$ental %law in her entire thesis in !n
Revolution is the %act that her ethereal notion o% (%reedo$* is "rou+ht down to earth with a heav)
thud when she co$es to consider the leaden and corruptive role that (private interests* have
pla)ed in an) (Constitution* 1nown to hu$anit). ' ,hich once a+ain onl) serves to show that no
(Constitution* can preserve her notion o% (%reedo$* unless (the social -uestion* is resolved %irst '
which is e(actly what ;ar/ was ar+uin+0 (=n%ortunatel), Arendt does not tac1le this inelucta"le
pro"le$, %atal to her entire ar+u$ent, until the ver) end o% her "oo10 As Ca$us sa)s in 6a .este,
(too late to turn it to account*0)
!he crucial di%%erence "etween ;ar/ and 9roudhon is that ;ar/ did not waste ti$e
(philosophisin+* a"out povert), pre%errin+ instead to %ind out the social (causes* "ehind its
indisputa"le e/istence in capitalis$. And the di%%erence "etween ;ar/ and ,e"er is that, havin+
%ound out that capitalis$ reduces (livin+ la"or* to (la"or power* ' that is, in ,e"er2s own words, to
(the rational or+anisation o% (%or$all)) <%ree2 la"or under the re+ular discipline o% the %actor)* ,
;ar/ could see that the social power o% the "our+eoisie consists precisel) in this violent
(reduction* o% hu$an living labor to $ere (la"or power*. ,e"er2s phrase (%ree la"or* is not an
o/)$oron "ecause his (la"or* is an entit) that can "e either (%ree* or (not %ree* onl) in a (%or$al*
sense, +iven that he wron+l) identi%ies all hu$an activit) with (la"or power*. 8or ;ar/, instead, it
is i$possi"le %or (livin+ la"or* to "e an)thin+ "ut (philosophicall)) (%ree*. it is onl) under the violent
co$$and o% the capitalist that livin+ la"or is turned into unfree (la"or power*.
!he pro"le$ is then to understand what relationship there is "etween (%reedo$* and (la"or* in
,e"er2s wor1. 3% ,e"er is concerned a"out (pro%it* or (capitalistic econo$ic action*, it is "ecause
it is this that (provides* rationall) and $ost e%%icientl) %or those (%reel) e/pressed* wants and
needs o% wor1ers throu+h (the rational or+anisation o% la"or ($eanin+, (la"or power*) under the
re+ular (capitalist) discipline o% the %actor)*.
!here is a sense in which the 4eoclassical notion o% (e-uili"riu$* has to do with the (necessit)* o%
(scarcit)* o% (provisions* in proportion to endless (wants*. 6oth 5chopenhauer and Ro""ins
understand the ,ill and (wants*, respectivel), as (insatia"le*. 6ut whereas 5chopenhauer sees
this as a $otive (to renounce* the world o% wants (the 7ntsagung), Ro""ins ta1es it $ore
realisticall) as the ("ud+et constraint* o% 4eoclassical !heor) that allows it to "eco$e (the
science o% choice* ' what $a1es (choice* su"#ect to (scienti%ic and rational* treat$ent. 3t in order
to escape %ro$ the (+ravitational or"it* o% (e-uili"riu$* that the (%reedo$* o% the entrepreneur is
needed %or 5chu$peter. 3ndeed, the entire point to 4eoclassical value theor) is precisel) the
a"ilit) o% the capitalistentrepreneur (to %ree* hi$sel% %ro$ (i$$ediate consu$ption* ") (de%errin+*
it and there") (su"stitutin+* it with (la"orsavin+ tools*. 3t is not the (renunciation* o%
5chopenhauer whose societ) is entirel) (eristic* and the 5tate can onl) 1eep individuals %ro$
descendin+ "ac1 into the "ellu$ civiu$. 8or 4eoclassical theor) the 5tate can reward the
productivit) o% la"or ") protectin+ the (de%erral o% consu$ption* o% the capitalist entrepreneur. 6ut
5chu$peter sees this (de%erral* or (renunciation*, this As1esis, as still li$ited to the (5tati1*
%ra$ewor1 o% +eneral e-uili"riu$ anal)sis, insu%%icient to e/plain the (>)na$i1* %eatures o% the
capitalist econo$), its (develop$ent*, its a"ilit) to de%eat (sta+nation*.
8or 5chu$peter the (de%erral* or (savin+* o% the 4eoclassics is inade-uate to e/plain value and
pro%its "ecause these can arise onl) %ro$ the (creativit)* o% the entrepreneur who (elevates* and
there%ore (%rees* hi$sel% %ro$ the +ravitational pull o% the (circular %low* (?reislau%), reachin+
there") the hei+hts o% (innovation* ") distin+uishin+ his (individualit)personalit)* (=nterneh$er
personalitat) %ro$ that o% the ($ass*. !he 5tate $ust there%ore do $ore than #ust protect propert)
ri+hts. it $ust also protect intellectual propert) %ro$ the (rentier* capitalists (%inance). 4ot (la"or*
"ut (enterprise* is the +atewa) to (%reedo$* and (pro%it* as a+ainst (interest* and (rent*.
,ith Classical theor), instead, the capitalist appears (redundant* %ro$ the start, "ecause (la"or* is
the source o% value. &ven ;ar/2s version preserves this (sociall) necessar) la"or ti$e* and the
(reproduction o% societ)*. ' ,hence co$es the (surplus value* that capitalists e/ploit %ro$
wor1ers. 8or 5chu$peter, (surplus* is the do$ain o% entrepreneurial (creativit)*, instead. 6ut ;ar/
introduces the (use value* o% livin+ la"or. 5o here the sphere o% (necessit)* is la"orpower and
that o% potential (%reedo$* is (livin+ la"or* (@rundrisse) whereas surplus value is "oth e/ploitation
and (potential* %or %reedo$.
2A6 On Revolution
3t is in the ver) nature o% a "e+innin+ to carr) with itsel% a
$easure o% co$plete ar"itrariness. 4ot onl) i.s it not "ound into
a relia"le chain o% cause and e%%ect, a chain in which each e%%ect
i$$ediatel) turns into the cause %or %uture develop$ents, the
"e+innin+ has, as it were, nothin+ whatsoever to hold on toB it is
as thou+h it ca$e out o% nowhere in either ti$e or space. 8or a
$o$ent, the $o$ent o% "e+innin+, it is as thou+h the "e+inner
had a"olished the se-uence o% te$poralit) itsel%, or as thou+h the
actors were thrown out o% the te$poral order and its continuit).
!he pro"le$ o% "e+innin+, o% course, appears %irst in thou+ht
and speculation a"out the ori+in o% the universe, and we 1now
the He"rew solution %or its perple/ities the assu$ption o% a
Creator @od who is outside his own creation in the sa$e wa) as
the %a"ricator is outside the %a"ricated o"#ect. 3n other words,
the pro"le$ o% "e+innin+ is solved throu+h the introduction o%
a "e+inner whose own "e+innin+s are no lon+er su"#ect to
-uestion "ecause he is C%ro$ eternit) to eternit)C.!his eternit)
is the a"solute o% te$poralit), and to the e/tent that the "e+innin+
o% the universe reaches "ac1 into this re+ion o% the a"solute,
it is no lon+er ar"itrar) "ut rooted in so$ethin+ which, thou+h
it $a) "e "e)ond the reasonin+ capacities o% $an, possesses a
reason, a rationale o% its own. !he curious %act that the $en o%
the revolutions were pro$pted into their desperate search %or an
a"solute the ver) $o$ent the) had "een %orced to act $i+ht
well "e, at least partl), in%luenced ") the a+eold thou+htcusto$s
o% ,estern $en, accordin+ to which each co$pletel) new
"e+innin+ needs an a"solute %ro$ which it sprin+s and ") which
it is Ce/plainedC.
3n Ho""es the (a"solute* is all &uclidean. the le+iti$ac) and le+alit) o% the 5overei+n is %ounded
upon the (necessit)* o% the social contract ' which is (philosophicall)* %ree, as in ;ontes-uieu, "ut
coerced (e/ternall)* o" $etu$ $ortis. !he 5tate is the ulti$a ratio in %oro e/terno (the inter
national state o% nature) whilst it preserves (the law* %or its su"#ects in %oro interno. si$ilarl), the
su"#ects are (%ree* in %oro interno* (the ps)che), "ut not %ree (in %oro e/terno*, "ecause su"#ect to
the law. 3t is e/actl) the sa$e in ,e"er ' that is wh) he is $ore the descendant o% Ho""es than
o% ;achiavelli (pace Aron). !he leitender @eist is certainl) no 9rincipe.
!he sa$e can "e said o% 4iet:sche. 6ut here, as with ,e"er who copies hi$, the 5overei+n is
not (a"solved* (Heide++er in 8chelling) %ro$ the 9olitical "ecause the (scienti%ic h)pothesis*, the
(truth* o% the intuitus (7ei"ni:) in the identit) o% (laws* with (sel%evidence* or (necessit)* is
i$possi"le ' "ecause 4iet:sche denies that an)thin+ ' including logico-mathematics0 ' is (sel%
evident*0 The meaning of the Rationalisierung is all here) (;arcuse sees ri+ht, "ut he si$pli%ies
the pro"le$atic ") not tac1lin+ this (lin1le/no$os* "etween (la"or* as (la"or power* and as
(livin+ la"or* and the (socialit)* underl)in+ "oth0 Arendt, true to DasperianHeide++erian %or$,
does the sa$e0 (On Revolution* is dedicated to ?arl0 C%. Daspers2s notion o% (tuttocircon%ondente*
and Heide++er on (A"solute* in 8chelling9s) !he Ho""esian +eo$etric (5pino:a2s $ore
+eo$etrico) (s)ste$* is (sta+nant*, it is an (e-uili"riu$*, a 5chu$peterian ?reislau% that does not
allow %or (a re$nant o% <individual2 %reedo$* in the sense o% &ntwic1lun+ ' it is the i$possi"le (re
solution* or (e-uili"ration* or Eer+leichun+ or ("alance o% %orces* that (a"solves* the 5overei+n
%ro$ all need to #usti%) or %ound its le+iti$ac) and le+alit). the (laws o% the co$$onwealth*
"eco$e (sel%evident* li1e &uclid2s and can dispense with e/planation or %oundation ' the) are the
A"solute, the 5overei+n, the 8tate-4achine is the A"solute.
As Arendt re$ar1s, the (laws* o% 5tates and those o% $athe$atics di%%er (p.221F) "ecause the
latter descri"e the constitution o% the $ind ' the) do not0 (ps)cholo+is$). 6oth (laws* are
conventional (4iet:sche) "ut when #uridical laws are $ade a"solute the) become $athe$atics,
the) "eco$e (%ate*, which is the opposite o% what (truth* is supposed to "e0 5o, in %act, (sel%
evident truths* (De%%erson) are not (truths* at all (whence the De%%ersonian (we hold*) ' indeed,
their (a"soluteness* de$onstrates that there can be no truth e/cept (truth as a value*. (3% (truth*
e/isted we could not (thin1* it ' it would "e 7ei"ni:2s intuitus ori+inarius.) (5ee also her re$ar1s
on (the A"solute* and te$poralit) on p.23G o% 3talian translation where Arendt posits the hu$an
(initiu$* as a pure act o% will. and recall 5chopenhauer2s insistence that (the causal chain* has no
?antian (unconditioned "e+innin+* "ecause this is (toto +enere* di%%erent %ro$ (the chain o%
events* ' and $ust "e there%ore the thin+initsel%0 ;ar/ distin+uishes si$ilarl) "etween livin+
la"or and dead la"or. Also, the thou+ht o% the (unit)* o% the 8ounder, at p.23H and 239, is neither
;achiavelli2s nor Harrin+ton2s "ut +oes "ac1 to >escartes on the (;a1er* o% the world re-uired to
"e One to "e per%ect. Russell Ion 7ei"ni:J shows that this ($onis$* "elon+s to 7ei"ni: as well Ic%.
also Heide++er in (!he &nd o% 9hilosoph)* and ;%o7J.)
8or ,e"er the Rationalisierun+ (overco$es* the opposition o% %reedo$ and necessit). !he
(%reedo$* o% la"or is a ")product o% con%lict over the provision %or wants. And the (-uanti%ication*
o% this con%lict, to+ether with its speci%ication in ter$s o% how $uch is produced and what,
depends %or its ($a/i$isation* on the (rational or+anisation o% la"or* upon condition that it "e
(%ree* to %or$ulate its (choices* throu+h autono$ous de$and, not #ust in ter$s o% (+oods*, "ut
also in ter$s o% the (e/chan+e value* o% itsel%, o% (la"or*. 3t is the $ar1et $echanis$ that allows
this (os$osis* or (s)nthesis* o% the (necessit)* o% the provision %or wants* +iven the (insatia"ilit)*
o% the latter and the (scarcit)* o% the %or$er, and there%ore it is possi"le %or a Ho""esian co$$on
wealth to "e esta"lished in which the provision %or wants "eco$es (rational* throu+h capitalistic
econo$ic action.
!he -uestion that Arendt poses ") wa) o% i$plicit criticis$ o% ,e"er (so does ;arcuse in ter$s o%
(industrialisation* and (science*, or Heide++er with his <!echni12) is that (the iron ca+e* is ta1en ")
hi$ to "e naturaliter the entiret) o% the 9olitical, as it was %or Ho""es, in that (civil societ)* now
is identical with the 5tate "ecause the entire (tas1*, le+alit) and le+iti$ac), o% the 5tate is
precisel) this (+uarantee* o% the $ar1et $echanis$ as the ultima ratio, the scientific hypothesis o%
the sel%interests o% ato$ised individuals whose onl) ai$ in social li%e, in e/itin+ the state o%
nature, is the pursuit o% (private happiness* or (utilit)*. !he 9olitical "eco$es a"sor"ed into the
&cono$ic ' e/cept that the (%reedo$* o% la"or involves the (speci%ication* o% its wants and needs
not $erel) throu+h the $ar1et $echanis$ "ut also throu+h (co$pro$ise* in 9arlia$ent o% the
necessaril) con%lictin+ sel%interests that are %iltered ") the $ar1et.
!here%ore ,e"er does not thin1 that the $ar1et is capa"le o% "ein+ a ($echanis$* that
(develops* throu+h entrepreneurial (creativit)*. Rather, the (crisis* represented ") con%lict can "e
(ne+otiated* in a peace%ul "attle+round, in sparrin+ $atches in parlia$ent where") (the will to
power* o% individual leaders can "e acco$$odated and inte+rated in the overall (s)ste$ o%
production* and indeed "eco$e its ($otor*, its +uide and (+overn$ent*. !his is what political
parties as ($ass parties* are supposed to do. 6ut the (socialisation* o% production is si$pl)
inescapa"le precisel) "ecause o% the (s)ste$ o% wants and needs*, the iron ca+e, that has
%or$ed in (the Occident*.
Arendt sa)s that (the social -uestion* is separate %ro$ (%reedo$* ' hence her e%%ort to distin+uish
(power* %ro$ (authorit)*, potentia %ro$ potestas. ,e"er thin1s that this is (ro$anticis$* pure and
si$ple "ecause the 9olitical assu$es an increasin+l) technical character. ;ar/ instead insists
that the 9olitical is the tool that poses a "arrier to the develop$ent o% the %orces o% production, to
the (%reedo$* o% livin+ la"or, until these "rea1 loose %ro$ its strictures, or rather, the social
relations o% production co$e into contradiction with the 9olitical, and %orce the (a"olition* the
5tate. ;ar/ does not e/plain the process o% this (li"eration* o% livin+ la"or %ro$ wa+e la"or. "ut
Arendt assu$es naivel) that a revolution and a constitution can "e (%reed* %ro$ the (social
-uestion*0 6ut at the ver) end o% her re%lections, she has to capitulate and ad$it that (private
interests* will alwa)s inter%ere with (pu"lic* ones (ch.6, sec.3, p.291).
As such, the principle
inspires the deeds that are to %ollow and re$ains apparent
as lon+ as the action lasts. And it is not onl) our own lan+ua+e
which still derives CprincipleC %ro$ the 7atin principiu$ and
there%ore su++ests this solution %or the otherwise unsolva"le
pro"le$ o% an a"solute in the real$ o% hu$an a%%airs which is
relative ") de%initionB the @ree1 lan+ua+e, in stri1in+ a+ree$ent,
tells the sa$e stor). 8or the @ree1 word %or "e+innin+ is dp/Cli,
and ap/Cli $eans "oth "e+innin+ and principle. 4o later poet or
philosopher has e/pressed the inner$ost $eanin+ o% this coincidence
$ore "eauti%ull) and $ore succinctl) than 9lato when,
at the end o% his li%e, he re$ar1ed al$ost casuall)...
C8or the "e+innin+, "ecause it contains its own principle,
is also a +od who, as lon+ as he dwells a$on+ $en, as lon+ as he
inspires their deeds, saves ever)thin+.C 3t was the sa$e e/perience
which centuries later $ade 9ol)"ius sa), C!he "e+innin+ is not
$erel) hal% o% the whole "ut reaches out towards the end.CKHAnd
it was still the sa$e insi+ht into the identit) o% principiu$ and
principle which eventuall) persuaded the A$erican co$$unit)
to loo1 Cto its ori+ins %or an e/planation o% its distinctive
-ualities and thus %or an indication o% what its %uture should
holdC,K9 as it had earlier led Harrin+ton certainl) without an)
1nowled+e o% Au+ustine and pro"a"l) without an) conscious
notion o% 9latoCs sentence to the conviction. CAs no $an shall
show $e a Co$$onwealth "orn strai+ht that ever "eca$e
croo1ed, so no $an shall show $e a Co$$onwealth "orn
croo1ed that ever "eca$e strai+ht.C6A
@reat and si+ni%icant as these insi+hts are, their political
relevance co$es to li+ht onl) when it has "een reco+ni:ed that
the) stand in %la+rant opposition to the a+eold and still current
notions o% the dictatin+ violence, necessar) %or all %oundations
and hence supposedl) unavoida"le in all revolutions. 3n this
respect, the course o% the A$erican Revolution tells an un%or+etta"le
stor) and is apt to teach a uni-ue lessonB %or this
revolution did not "rea1 out "ut was $ade ") $en in co$$on
deli"eration and on the stren+th o% $utual pled+es. !he prin
21L On Revolution
ciple which ca$e to li+ht durin+ those %ate%ul )ears when the
%oundations were laid not ") the stren+th o% one architect "ut
") the co$"ined power o% the $an) was the interconnected
principle o% $utual pro$ise and co$$on deli"erationB and the
event itsel% decided indeed, as Ha$ilton had insisted, that $en
Care reall) capa"le M.. o% esta"lishin+ +ood +overn$ent %ro$
re%lection and choiceC, that the) are not C%orever destined to
depend %or their political constitutions on accident and %orceC .61
Here ,e"er is called directl) into -uestion %or his de%inition o% a (5tate* (in 9a6). 6ut once a+ain
Arendt $isses the point that (the social -uestion* intruded on the $a1in+ o% the =5 Constitution
#ust as $uch as it did on the dissolution o% the 8rench0 3nstead, she dwells on De%%erson2s
insistence %or (constituencies* that re$ind Arendt o% 7u/e$"ur+2s e/altation o% (soviets* (ch.6,
p3A6).
5o %or ,e"er (9a6) the 5tate is (necessaril)* the dispenser o% violence, which is its (power*
($eanin+ potestas), and the ($echanis$* is 1ept (alive* (the livin+ $achine) ") the leitender
@eist which is 4O! (%ree*, #ust as (la"or* is not (%ree* e/cept (%or$all)* so lon+ as its ($ar1et
de$and* re$ains (%ra$ed* within the parlia$entar) rules, the conventu$ (convention), that
(select* the 9oliti1er "ut prevent (prevention) the "ellu$ civiu$. =nli1e the Ho""esian
(5overei+n*, the 5tate$achine, ,e"er envisa+es a (parlia$entar) s)ste$* that can (select* and
(assi+n* responsibility so that (politics* does not "eco$e a +a$e o% (conviction*. Here (the
$achine* is a"le (to select* its (leadership* not ($echanicall)* "ut within (rules* that $aintain an)
(pro$ises* within the real$ o% (possi"ilit)* ' no (%alse prophets* (li1e !rot:1i). 4o ("eauti%ul souls*
li1e Arendt or Rosa 7u/e$"ur+ (e/alted in the %inal chapter o% On Revolution) either. 8reedo$
and necessit) are $uch $ore (speci%ic* or (rational* in ,e"er, down to the (constitutional desi+n
or 8ra+e*.
!his (co$pro$ise*, this (discutio* or (dialectic* that ,e"er envisa+es al$ost socraticall), is what
5ch$itt denies is possi"le (re$e$"er accusations o% (ditherin+* and (%ili"uster*). the 5tate cannot
have "oth le+iti$ac) and le+alit) at the sa$e ti$e ' either the laws are (ar"itrar)* or else the
le+islator is ille+iti$ate. Onl) potestas can +ive le+iti$ac) to law provided we accept the
(le+iti$ac)* o% the (power to decide over the e(ception*.
8or ,e"er and 5chu$peter as %or 7oc1e, the (scienti%ic* inevita"ilit) o% capitalis$ ' identi%ied
a"solutel) with the $ar1et econo$) ' is what $a1es the (potestas* and the potentia o% the 5tate
indisputa"le or (co$$onsensical*. !hus ,e"er sides a little $ore with Ho""es and 4iet:sche on
the (pessi$istic* side, whereas 5chu$peter is $ore 7oc1ean in his opti$is$ ' "ut then is
as elitarian as ,e"er or 9areto and ;osca. %or Ho""es the 5tate prevents the state o% nature, %or
7oc1e it si$pl) protects it (especiall) the (estate*). !here is no (initiu$* in the Treatises, as Arendt
o"serves. 6ut there is in Ho""es. 5o ,e"er (needs* a constitution whereas 5chu$peter (his
entrepreneur) does not. ,e"er does not have to e/plain con%lict, "ut then has di%%icult) e/plainin+
how (parlia$entar) de$ocrac)* is a"le to %unction, whereas 5chu$peter needs onl) to presu$e
that it ($a) not* %unction to co$e up with elitarian de$ocrac) or with an authoritarian state. ,e
1now that ,e"er eventuall) concedes de%eat.