Dewey and Vygotsky: Society, Experience, and Inquiry
in Educational Practice by Michael Glassman tailed analyses of important similarities and differences. It is true that Dewey is not a developmentalist in the same way that Vygotsky is. But his educational theory comes close in spirit to Vygotskys major questions concerning education, which were pursued with the greatest vigor by those who followed him (e.g., Davydov, 1997; Leontiev 1981). These questions include: How and why does natural human activity serve as the major impetus for learning? And how, through understanding that activity, can we promote and guide human learning? (It is important to sepa- rate the word activity from the Activity Theory of A. N. Leontiev, 1981, a student and colleague of Vygotsky. In this paper the term activity is used in its broadest possible sense, the state of being active rather than passive.) The similarities between Dewey and Vygotsky, however, belie one difference of extraordinary import to educators in general, but especially for those inclined towards the use of activity as a major teaching strategy. The difference revolves around the ques- tion of how educators view the process of activity in relation to the consequences of activity. Are these consequences goals to be carefully planned and then brought about through active men- toring on the part of the social interlocutor (i.e., a more seasoned member of the community who fosters social interaction with a purpose)? Or are they temporary destinations of little educa- tional import in and of themselves? I believe that the issues that separate these two theorists, who see activity as being of such vital importance, could not be more profound. It raises the question of whether teachers should ap- proach students as mentors who guide or direct activity, or facil- itators who are able to step back from childrens activity and let it run its own course. It crosses into such areas as culturally and eco- nomically heterogeneous classrooms, and well as cultural/social historical attitudes towards education. A comparison of Dewey and Vygotsky highlights strong reasons why education should be an active and context specic process, but it also forces educators to think long and hard about how and why they use activity in the classroom. In this paper I compare Dewey and Vygotsky on three specic conceptual issues that relate directly to educational processes and goals. These issues are the roles of social history, experience/ culture, and human inquiry in the educational process. Both of these theorists believe that, in the context of educational processes, none of these issues can stand without the other two. The dif- ference between Dewey and Vygotsky involves the relationships among these three issues. For Vygotsky human inquiry is em- bedded within culture, which is embedded within social history. The educational process works, more or less, from the outside in. John Dewey and L. S. Vygotsky share similar ideas concerning the re- lationship of activity and learning/development, especially the roles everyday activities and social environment play in the educational process. However, the two theorists are far apart in their concep- tion of the relationship between process and goals in education. Dewey concentrates on means in education, believing that it is the ability of the individual to question through experience that is most important for the human community. Vygotsky, while recognizing the importance of (especially cultural) process in education, sees so- cial and cultural goals as being integrated into social pedagogy. This paper compares Dewey and Vygotsky on three key points that re- late directly to educational processes and goals. First, the two the- orists are compared on the role of social history and the tools it pro- duces. Dewey sees social history as creating a set of malleable tools that are of use in present circumstances. Vygotsky believes that tools developed through history have a far more lasting impact on the social community. Second, the two theorists are compared in their conceptualizations of experience/culture. Dewey sees experience as helping to form thinking, whereas Vygotsky, in his cultural historical theory, posits culture as the raw material of thinking. Third, the two theorists are compared on their perspectives on human inquiry. Dewey sees the child as a free agent who achieves goals through her own interest in the activity. Vygotsky suggests there should be greater control by a mentor who creates activity that will lead the child towards mastery. These differences are then explored in terms of how they might impact actual classroom strategies and curriculum. The work of Soviet psychologist L. S. Vygotsky has had a growing impact on education in the United States. Many of Vygotskys ideas that have had the greatest resonance for educa- tors, such as bringing everyday activities into the classroom and focusing on the importance of social context in learning, bear a striking resemblance to the work of John Dewey, especially his writings on education (e.g., 1912, 1916). It is something of a mystery, then, that there has been so little discussion comparing the theories of Vygotsky and Dewey. There have been a few at- tempts to merge Dewey with Vygotsky (e.g., Rogoff, 1993) or to place Dewey within a larger sociocultural framework (Cole, 1996), but for the most part these works have not included de- Educational Researcher, Vol. 30. No. 4, pp. 314 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 3 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER 4 It is social history, and, most important, the tools developed through our social history that helps to determine our everyday culture (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). The social interlocutor stands as a mediator between tools developed through social history and individual human inquiry. The interlocutor uses the everyday culture, which itself is a product of social history, to guide the thinking of the neophyte. Dewey would applaud Vygotskys emphasis on everyday cul- ture as the lynchpin of the educational process. Deweys notion of experience is equivalent to Vygotskys conception of culture. (In his attempt to revise his 1925 book Experience and Nature 25 years later, Dewey suggested he could use the term culture in place of experience.) However, in contrast to Vygotsky, Dewey emphasizes human inquiry, and the role that it plays in the cre- ation of experience/culture and, eventually, social tool systems. I believe Dewey would be very cautious about educators stressing how individual thinking might be embedded within social his- tory. One of the major purposes of education is to instill the abil- ity and the desire for change in experience, and possible resultant changes in social history, through individual inquiry. The differences between the two theorists are easily recogniz- able when one compares Vygotskys conception of the zone of proximal development (Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984 ) and the Dewey-inspired model of long term projects (Katz & Chard, 1989, 2000). In many ways, these two educational models oper- ationalize the theoretical underpinnings of the two thinkers. The zone of proximal development, especially as it has been interpreted in the West, focuses on the role of the adult as social interlocutor who is also a representative of society. These adults mentor chil- dren in specic, culturally appropriate activity (Berk & Winsler, 1995). The role of the educational process is to prepare children for more complex activity in the larger social community. In long term projects children are immersed in everyday activ- ities. It is expected that the activities of the children will eventu- ally coalesce around a topic that is of interest to them. The topic need not be of any relevance to the demands of the larger social community, or even have meaning or interest for the teacher. As a matter of fact, the teacher should step back from the process once children display a relevant interest and act as facilitator rather than mentor. It is the students who must drive the inquiry based on their own goals. The children learn that they control and are responsible for inquiry in their lives, and they determine what goals are important and the ways in which they can (or can not) be met (Dewey, 1916). It is a process that will be played out over and over again over the course of their lifetime experience. After providing some historical context for these two men, the remainder of this paper focuses primarily on Vygotskys and Deweys visions of social history, experience/culture, and human inquiryconcepts that are central to understanding the differ- ences between their approaches to the processes and goals of education. These differences are illustrated by examining the ed- ucational models of the zone of proximal development and long term projects. Dewey and Vygotsky in Historical Context There are historically based explanations for both the strong sim- ilarities and the strong differences between Dewey and Vygotsky. Although it would probably be a mistake to claim that all, or even most, of the similarities and differences between Vygotsky and Dewey have historical roots, it might be an even greater mistake to ignore the impact of history on their thinking. Deweys educational philosophy was, in many ways, a critical reaction to the burgeoning educational system in the United States between 1870 and 1910 (Handlin, 1959). Public school- ing developed for a number of reasons during this period, in- cluding the need for vocational training to meet the demands of the industrial revolution and the desire to identify and maintain a specically American culture. The time frame of the develop- ment of public schooling in the United States coincided with the emergence of the progressive movement (Popkewitz, 1987), but initially schooling did not reect the internal values of that movement (Handlin, 1959). There was a distinct separation be- tween the school culture and the everyday culture of the indi- viduals for whom the public education infrastructure was being created (e.g., newly arrived immigrants from Southern and East- ern Europe). Public education was highly mechanistic (Pepper, 1942), with students learning subjects completely divorced from their every- day reality in stilted and articial environments. Deweys educa- tional philosophy was originally a critique of this dichotomous model of education (Handlin, 1959). Dewey combined the Hegelian idea that activity and thought were both part of a single experience with the pragmatists notion that activity must be un- derstood within the moment for its specic purposes, and not as a means to an ideological end. The human condition is enhanced when individuals engage in the everyday activity of their social community in a thoughtful and positive way, to the point where they are able to change that community through the force of their own actions. In order for a society to progress it must cul- tivate the individual, sometimes at the expense of its own present social organization (Dewey, 1954). Despite the obvious emphasis of individual over social com- munity by leading progressives such as Dewey, the progressive movement, and many of the Marxist-based movements, became political allies in the United States during the early part of the twentieth century. This may have been the result of the two po- litical movements having only a supercial understanding of each other (Novak, 1975). At the same time there was a good deal of interest in Dewey among those attempting to modernize the ed- ucational system of pre-Revolutionary Russia, such as the First Moscow Settlement (Brickman, 1964; van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). Much of Deweys early works were translated into Rus- sian, including School and Society (1900) and a 50-page booklet based on Education and Democracy (1916). The combination of these two factors probably led to a Deweyan inuence on early Soviet educators such as Blonsky and the young Vygotsky. In 1928 Dewey visited the Soviet Union (although the schools were closed for vacation for most of the time he was there). Prawat (2001) recounts how Dewey visited Second Moscow University during this trip at the time Vygotsky was a rising young star there. Dewey certainly met with Blonsky, Vygotskys compatriot, and Prawatt (2001) builds a fairly strong circumstantial case that Dewey actually met with Vygotsky. This only adds to the proba- bility that Dewey inuenced Vygotskys early work. The period between 1928 and 1931 led to a souring of the re- lationship between Dewey and official Soviet education. In his 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 4 MAY 2001 5 subsequent articles about his 1928 visit Dewey praised the So- viet system as being far superior to the American system in bring- ing the everyday world of the child into the classroom. How- ever, he also offered a devastating critique that in many ways defines the difference between his own educational philosophy and Vygotskys educational perspective. Dewey felt the Soviet educational system was being used for specic propaganda pur- poses, that is, the education system was being used to develop good Soviet citizens that understood and t into the communist social order (Dewey, 1964). Vygotsky did not see education as propaganda based, but he did see it as an important and denite tool in the development of the new man (Kozulin, 1990). Deweys critique may have started a rift that came to fruition in 1931 when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of- fered an official resolution condemning progressive educational practices (e.g., the project method) advocated by Dewey and his followers. What followed was the de-Deweyization of the offi- cial educational system within the Soviet Union (Brickman, 1964). This short history offers some possible reasons for similarities between Dewey and Vygotsky, such as the focus on activity, the importance of the everyday activities of the child in the educational process, and the importance of history. The young Vygotsky was working within an educational structure that had been inuenced by Deweys ideas for a number of years. The important differ- ences between the two theorists may be partially attributed to the divergence between progressive education and Marxist ideology on key issues, such as socially determined goals in activity (Novak, 1975; Popkewitz & Tabachnik, 1981). Society and History Both Vygotsky and Dewey agree that the human condition is based in social interactions. Humans are initially social beings who slowly develop their individual selves through their relation- ships (experiences) with others. Dewey (1916) makes the argu- ment that humans are only human through their social intercon- nectedness with each other (and actually suggests that helplessness is, in some ways, a positive attribute because it helps to foster this interconnectedness). The essential questions that need to be asked involve how these extraordinary connections come about, and how the individual begins to take control of them (Dewey, 1925). Vygotsky suggests that it is the ability to develop coop- erative activity through complex social relationships that sepa- rates mature humans from all other animals (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). Humans are best understood as products of these com- plex relationships. For Dewey (1916), the individual mind must be understood as a creative development of social life. The social is primary in that it comes rst, whereas the development of the individual follows as a shadow of social relationships. Dewey is in many ways fol- lowing his friend and mentor Mead (1934). But he also speaks to a larger issue that seems to have been common in the early part of the twentieth century (it is an important component of Vygotskys theory as well). The general argument is that human beings originally are born social creatures and develop their sense of self through their social relationships. An important difference be- tween Dewey and Vygotsky lies in how much power this indi- vidual organizer eventually has over future social activities. This difference is captured in the way Deweys idea of cultural in- strumentality (Eldridge, 1998) compares with Vygotskys theory of cultural historical development (Kozulin, 1990). For Dewey culture and history provide a malleable set of means (e.g., tools) that can be used to achieve immediate or easily viewed ends (see Eldridge, 1998, for an in-depth discussion of Deweys instrumentality). These tools have worth only to the degree to which they can be used to successfully navigate a given situation. For Vygotsky (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993) cultural history provides for a (relatively) more static set of tools and symbols that should eventually enable members of a society to move beyond pure in- strumentality, to a higher level of cognitive awareness. Tools are means for specic, culturally approved consequences that act as way stations on the path to a socially dened end. Deweys cul- tural instrumentality was criticized for its emphasis on means over ends in social historical development (Eldridge, 1998; Novak, 1975). Dewey posits that education leads to free inquiry, and free inquiry leads to a richer society, but he lacks a description of ex- actly what a richer society looks like. Vygotsky, on the other hand, is susceptible to the criticism Dewey (1964) makes of the entire Soviet educational systemthat social goals can easily be turned into propaganda that services the society. Dewey, Tools, and Long Term Projects It is an individuals social history that provides what Dewey termed intellectual tools (Eldridge, 1998). These are the so- cially developed tools such as morals, ideals, values, and customs that serve as reference points for the individual as she attempts to navigate life situations. But these are only reference points, in that they inform immediate activity, but in an atmosphere of free inquiry they do not limit it. The meaning of tools, in a Deweyan framework, is directly re- lated to their value in a given situation. When the tools no longer have pragmatic value they are modied or rejected by the indi- viduals using them. By making tools so dynamic Dewey is sug- gesting that there are no ends beyond the process of successful activity within the context of the immediate situationwhat Dewey termed the end-in-view (Eldridge, 1998). The easiest en- vironments in which humans can use these intellectual tools are those with the greatest degree of shared social history (en- abling individuals to use shared social ends as a central aspect of their activity). This allows members of the same group to share likes and dislikes, to maintain the same attitudes towards objects, to communicate without a disconnect. The historically dened intellectual tools work more often than not because new situ- ations and activities reect the same situations and activities these shared intellectual tools were based on. Those objects and ideas that fall outside of the shared history are considered suspect and/or of little worth (Dewey, 1916). But while environments with a high level of agreement between subjects are relatively comfortable, they are not benecial. They do not engage free in- quiry, which is the bedrock of Deweys democratic society. Dewey (1916) believes that this is a dangerous situation that leads to narrow-mindedness. This is a major reason Dewey (1916) posits diversity as an important aspect of a true educational experience. (He actually counted diversity as a tool in education.) Dewey sees progress/ 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 5 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER 6 development as occurring only through an equilibration/dis- equilibration process. For him, the state of disturbed equilibra- tion represents need (Dewey, 1938, p.27). In his theory of in- quiry Dewey suggests that it is this same type of disturbed equilibration that drives exploration of new ideas. Many hu- mans, however, nd suspending judgment and reconstructing the world disagreeable (Dewey, 1933). It is therefore incumbent on the educational structure to create diverse environments that demand social inquiry. There is a second, related reason that Dewey champions diversity. Dewey echoes Mead in his argu- ment that we see ourselves basically through a looking glass phe- nomenon (Dewey, 1930). Humans see themselves in the con- text of the way they are viewed by others. For Dewey the raison dtre for human activity is to make life better and more worth- while, both for themselves and, especially, for the general social community. If humans do not see themselves in the context of social views different from themselves, they are unable to recon- struct themselves in the face of a problematic society. Unable to change themselves, and, therefore, unable to change the world, humans can become slaves to their history and their habits. Dewey clearly understands the problems that diversity will cause (Dewey, 1916), and he does not believe that the problems, or their solutions, will lead to a greater absolute good. He believes that the process will lead to the process of free inquiry, and free inquiry itself is good. For Dewey, then, it is not that the means justify the ends, but that the means are the ends. The emphasis on process over product in the cause of free in- quiry is reected in one of the most important educational ap- proaches to emerge from Deweyan-based educational philoso- phies, long term projects (Katz & Chard, 1989). This educational format stresses the importance of engaging children, as members of communities, in projects based on subjects that interest them. It is the students, rather than the teacher, who choose direction, set goals, and determine effort. The goal of the project itself is relatively unimportant and can be changed through the com- bined activity of the children. This is not to say that teachers should not have an awareness of possible goals, but rather that they should regard these goals as possibilities that may or may not be fullled by those actually engaged in the project (i.e., the students). This is why I refer to the teacher in Deweyan educa- tional philosophy as a facilitator. The major function of the teacher is to keep students on a stable course in the process of their own discoveries. I will use two examples to highlight this application of Deweys philosophical approach to education. The rst exam- ple is a long-term project developed through toddlers interest and activity in construction (Glassman & Whaley, 2000). The second is a kindergarten project on shoes (Katz & Chard, 2000). These two projects are similar in that their goals were not set through teacher determination but developed over time through childrens interests. The actual goals (construction for toddlers and understanding the shoe business for kindergarten children) had little social meaning outside of the immediate activity. In many ways these goals were inconsequential to the long-term learning of the children. This is one of the reasons the teachers were able to focus on the process of education. In the construc- tion project, a group of toddlers in a mixed-age classroom (in- fants and toddlers) developed an interest in a nearby construc- tion site. The teachers and parents nurtured this interest through the introduction of construction type materials and class visits to the site. The toddlers worked with some of the older infants to develop their own construction site that served as a learning envi- ronment and playground. The project on shoes took place in a kindergarten classroom. The interest initially developed as a re- sult of discussions of new shoes some of the children wore at the beginning of the school year. A number of questions emerged through childrens and teachers exploration of their everyday lives. The questions came from the children, with the teacher play- ing the role of facilitator by maintaining a list. Special interests of the children were identied, such as the responsibilities of the sales person and the manner in which the shoes were displayed. The teacher arranged a trip to a real shoe store, and the children even- tually developed their own shoe store in the classroom. Vygotsky, Social Tools, and the Zone of Proximal Development Vygotsky has much the same view of the human as product of so- cial interaction, with one important difference. Whereas Dewey fears progressive human thinking being lost in the shared comfort of common history, Vygotsky is basically agnostic on the subject. This is because of how Vygotsky views tools and symbols in the context of development. He believes tools and symbols are used in the service of culturally dened goals that are far beyond the immediacy of Deweys end-in-view. Vygotsky sees the social as being of primary inuence in the life of the individual, much the same way that Dewey does. But Vygotsky (1987) sees tools and symbols as playing a much more active and determinate role in the lives of individuals. Free in- quiry is, in many ways, eclipsed by culturally signicant and ap- propriate inquiry (Vygotsky, 1987). Vygotsky agrees with Dewey that the society (or powers within the society) have a vested inter- est in the development and maintenance of these tools (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). Deweys solution is to educate the individual and diversify the social milieu so that these tools will be brought into question (a bottom-up/indeterminate approach). Vygotsky wants to use the educational process to teach new members of the social community how to use important, culturally developed tools in an effective manner (a top-down/determinate approach). This top-down approach was exemplied in Vygtosky and Lurias research expedition into Central Asia (Luria, 1971). In a highly controversial natural experiment Vygotsky and Luria attempted to gauge the impact of new tools on an isolated, homogenous population. They hypothesized that the introduction of new tools by a strong social organization (i.e., the Soviet Union) would lead to the development of a new type of citizen. The relative emphasis on specic, culturally determined prod- ucts in activity (i.e., the ability to use social tools) is in many ways at the heart of childrens learning in the zone of proximal develop- ment the title of a collected work by Rogoff & Wertsch, 1984. I use two examples from the Rogoff and Wertsch book to high- light the differences between long term projects and the zone of proximal development specically, and the educational philoso- phies of Dewey and Vygotsky in general. I chose these two ex- amples both because they have played important roles in current conceptualizations of the zone of proximal development and be- cause there is some similarity in ages of the children between these examples and the two long term projects (construction and 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 6 MAY 2001 7 shoes) mentioned earlier. One example deals primarily with in- fants (417 months of age) and their abilities to engage in joint social activity with adults using the cultural tool of a jack-in- the-box as a mediating device (Rogoff, Malkin, & Gilbride, 1984). In this study the same two babies interacted with a num- ber of adults over the course of a year. The emphasis was on how the adults used their interactions to guide the infant(s) towards socially appropriate and rewarding social interaction. The second example involves childrens development of logi- cal (mathematical) operations through social interactions with their mothers (Saxe, Gearhart, & Guberman, 1984). In this study mothers taught their children (between 2.5 and 5 years of age) a number reproduction game. The goal of the game had a direct relationship to the type of mathematical skills that are considered important in the larger society. The logical operations study and the jack-in-the-box study have three things in common which are indicative of current conceptualizations of the zone of prox- imal development: (1) There is an emphasis on joint attention between the adult/mentor and the child/neophyte; (2) there is some recognition on the part of the adult of a (socially determined) goal to the activity and an attempt to set up sub-goals to reach that goal; and (3) there is a focus on the social relationship between the adult/mentor and the child/neophyte in reaching that goal. The starting point for childrens learning in both of these examples is the social tools that the children will eventually need to become socialized participants in their culture (Rogoff et. al., 1984, p. 31). The adults use their own experience/culture to guide the childrens inquiry. These two examples of the zone of proximal development, as well as the two earlier mentioned examples of the project ap- proach, will be used throughout the paper to illustrate, in con- crete terms, conceptual differences between Dewey and Vygotsky. These examples are especially important in examining the two theorists diverging viewpoints concerning the mentor/neophyte relationship and the adults role in problem solving. The Interaction Between History and Tools The role of tools in activity, and by extension the educational process, is closely related to the interaction between history and tool use. Dewey, as already mentioned, sees tools as historically based, but only valid so long as they are of use to the individual in the immediate situation. History is implicit in activity, but it is not determinate. Vygotsky sees history as playing a more piv- otal role in development and education (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). It is not the activity that gives meaning to historical arti- facts, but historical artifacts that give meaning to the activity. So- cial history is embodied in tools and symbols. These tools and symbols have meanings and serve as mediational markers setting frames of reference for individual thinking in context. It is the objects history within the social group that helps create mean- ing in the mind of the child (Vygotsky, 1987). The most omnipresent and important tool/symbol in the life of the individual is of course language. Vygotsky and Dewey sug- gest that the child learns language in social interaction and then thinks in terms of that language. Vygotsky, however, goes a step further than Dewey, emphasizing the importance of both history and context in the meaning each unit (word) of that language has in the thinking of the individual. Language by itself creates a con- text for activity and, especially, for reective thinking about (the consequences of) that activity. In Thinking and Speech (1987) Vygotsky takes pains to examine both the historical development of words over time, how this development is tied to specic cir- cumstances of use in activity, and the degree to which specic context can change the meaning of the word. The meaning of a specic word (e.g., grasshopper) in a poem is determined by the ways in which language emerged in a particular historical context (Vygotsky, 1987). Change the historical context, change the meaning of the exact same word, and change the meaning of the poem. Vygotskys theory of social meaning, then, has a strong connection to the past and an investment in the way in which the past creates the present and acts as precursor for the future. This means that the mind is essentially a living catalogue of his- torical incidence. There is little discussion of free inquiry in Vygotskys work be- cause the parameters of all inquiry are set by the culture as it is manifested through its tools and symbols. Changing the focus of inquiry requires a social organization as strong as the existing cul- ture that is able to implement new tools and symbols (e.g., the reasoning behind the expeditions to central Asia). The adult sees the jack-in-the-box as a potential instrument of amusement where Bugs Bunny pops out and is then forced back in. It is assumed that, as a result of social interactions, the child will see the jack- in-the-box the same way. There is only one way to engage in ac- tivity with the number reproduction game. The mother sees it as her responsibility to bring the child closer to this specic under- standing of socially sanctioned activity. Dewey is more concerned with the process of history than the specic goals a social community might achieve through history. There are two reasons that the process of history is emphasized. First, Deweys vision of the social is forward looking (Campbell, 1995): Dewey (1916, 1938) has tremendous faith in the process of free inquiry to overcome immediate problems as they occur. Second, Dewey sees the separation of process from goals as an unnecessary dualism (Eldridge, 1998). What is most important is actual activity in the moment and the way that activity leads to specic judgments that may or may not use historically de- ned tools. In the learning process the judgments concerning re- lationship between activity and consequence become intercon- nected with earlier activities to form a body of knowledge. That knowledge will then come into play in subsequent, intercon- nected activities (Dewey, 1916). However, the value of any his- torically developed knowledge is dependant upon the situation. In Deweys view, stressing specic goals in education can actu- ally be counter-productive because it may force students to focus on tools that may be of little use for future problems, instead of the process necessary to solve problem as they arise. There is little to be gained in a product sense from having children develop their own construction site, or build their own well run shoe store (except for the few who might become construction workers or shoe clerks). What is important in these activities is that children experience the way one end-in-view builds upon another to cre- ate an ever more satisfying experience. Experience/Culture The way in which experience is defined sets the context for Deweys entire educational theory; in some important ways 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 7 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER 8 experience is synonymous with education. As mentioned ear- lier, Deweys notion of experience is, in many ways, parallel to Vygotskys notion of culture. Deweys Experience as Culture Dewey (1916) sees experience as physical action and the conse- quences of that action, combined with the judgment of the con- sequences of that action (motivations). He abhors the dualism that often emerges between the actions a person takes and the way this person thinks about these actions. In his view they can- not be separated, in that where there is no mind, there is no way of thinking about things outside of the actual action in which an individual is engaged. To put it in a more academic tone, there is no such thing as method separate from content, or content sep- arate from method. A simple example might be eating a slice of pizza. A person from New York has a method of eating pizza that involves folding the pizza in half and lifting it up to his mouth. Take that person and put him in Chicago with deep dish style pizza and the method necessarily moves to knife and fork. The content and the method are part of a single activity. The person from New York might try to lift and fold the deep dish slice, but judgments resulting from consequences of the action would force him to adjust his action in subsequent situations. This has im- portant implications for Deweys ideas concerning the goals of education. If it is impossible to separate physical activity from its consequences, then it is useless, and possibly detrimental, to plan the physical activity of others in order to achieve a specic set of goals. The only viable goal for any activity is the end-in-view, which is ostensibly a part of the immediate activity rather than any plan. Dewey emphasizes process not only because he believes process is the essential quality in a democratic society, but also because from a non-dualistic perspective experience and process are one and the same thing. Dewey (1916) emphasizes the role of vital experience in edu- cation. He initially posits vital experience as an essential compo- nent of the educational process. This vital experience moves be- yond simple rote habit or capricious activity in that it involves consequences for both the individual and the environment. A person automatically reciting a times table (rote habit) or avoid- ing cracks in the sidewalk (capricious activity, if you dismiss the possibility that it will break your mothers back) are activities without educational worth. Worthwhile, or vital, experience in education is activity in which the link between action and consequence is intercon- nected with previous and future (related) activities. The conse- quence or end-in-view is still tied to the immediate situation. But the process of inquiry used to reach this end-in-view not only has a connection with, but has been enriched by, previous inquiry in some way. An important aspect of vital experience is a difficulty or a problem that must be solved in a way that can lead to both a satisfactory conclusion and an enriched future inquiry. Dewey (1925) later developed an alternative conceptualiza- tion based on primary and secondary experiences, which has im- portant implications for educators as well as his own ideas con- cerning education. Primary experiences are the gross, everyday activities in life that have consequences. These experiences are broad and crude and involve a minimum of reective activity. Primary experience helps to create an aggregate of related activ- ities that necessarily leads to systematic, regulated thinking about that activity. Dewey terms this more reective activity secondary experience. Secondary experience claries the meaning of pri- mary experience, organizing it so that there is a useful accumu- lation of knowledge (Dewey, 1925). Secondary experience can run the gamut from judgments of the relationship between ac- tion and consequence(s) in early activity, to the development of hypotheses and theories to explain and examine later activities. There is a bi-directional relationship between primary experi- ence and secondary experience, in that primary experience serves as the basis for secondary experience, but it also serves as tests for secondary experience. Hypothesis as intellectual tool serves as an exemplar for both vital experience and secondary experience. Individuals engage in interconnected primary experience until they slowly organize it into a hypothesis about how things work in the world. The development of the hypothesis (deductive rea- soning) becomes an end-in-view for activity. Once the hypothe- sis is developed it becomes a natural part of inquiry into other problems. At rst it serves as a tool for organizing thinking about future experiences (inductive reasoning), and maintains its iden- tity as secondary experience. Eventually the boundary between organizing the experience and the experience itself will blur and the hypothesis will become completely integrated into the activ- ity itself. According to Dewey (1916) one of the most important roles of education is to teach children how to maintain these relation- ships between experiences so that they are constantly both amass- ing and testing new knowledge. The teacher must use interest to help students recognize and achieve aims, and then use aims to develop continued motivation for engaging in activity. Particu- lar types of thinking are not especially important because that thinking will eventually need to be reconstructed to meet the needs of the situation (Dewey, 1916). What is important is that secondary experience is derived from knowledge and knowledge is the reconstruction of secondary experience through primary experience. The knowledge storehouse is dynamic because sec- ondary experience (should be) dynamic (primary experience con- tinuously forcing reconstruction in order to deal with the imme- diate situation). Social history can, to a certain extent, limit the types of expe- riences possible. But a major purpose of the educational process is to show that it is possible for experience to move beyond so- cial history (Dewey, 1916). In the shoe project there was little, if anything, in the social history of the classroom or the children to suggest that a large part of their curriculum would involve creat- ing a shoe store. One experience gave momentum to the next ex- perience. The questioning of friends and relatives about shoes led to the development of a shoe store. The development of a shoe store led to questions concerning specic issues of how exactly a shoe store operates. Specic questions about how a shoe store op- erates led to a eld visit to a shoe store in the community. The children had to reect on their initial questions about how a shoe store operates in order to set up their own shoe store in the class- room. They merged their prior experiences of their shoe store with their eld trip to a community shoe store. Just as importantly, the knowledge gained from each primary experience became part of 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 8 MAY 2001 9 secondary experience as the children followed the natural mo- mentum of their project. This ability of the teacher to step back and simply facilitate, rather than guide or mentor the children, can be an extraordi- narily difficult task, especially as children grow older and adults become more concerned with what students must know. Long term projects, in a reection of Dewey, focus on how students can know. Vygotskys Culture as Experience Vygotsky takes a very similar approach to experience/culture. If Dewey could have renamed his conception of experience as cul- ture, Vygotsky might have renamed his conception of culture as (Deweys) experience. Vygotsky recognizes two levels of cul- ture, much the same way that Dewey sees two levels of experi- ence. There is the culture that emerges through everyday con- cepts, and there is the culture that emerges through scientific concepts (Vygotsky, 1987). Everyday concepts, the result of every- day activity, have much in common with primary experience. It has the same double barreled nature in that it involves both ac- tion and the motivation for action. Vygotsky (1987) carefully de- nes activity as both the actions that humans take and the sub- text of those actions, which are driven by desired consequences. (Vygotsky took the idea of sub-text to action at least partially from Stanislavskys works on training actors [Glassman 1996].) Each true activity involves action and sub-text. Vygotsky does not explicitly deny that rote habit and capricious actions have little or no impact on the cultural development of the child, but his em- phasis on subtext and motivation certainly imply this. (The re- lationship between action and motivation would become one of the central themes of A.N. Leontievs [1981] work on Activity Theory.) The relationship between action and consequence moves to the internal plane of thinking over time. The individual builds this relationship up through life experience. Such relationships are based on specic historical circumstances. Thus a child in one cul- ture (i.e., involved in one set of experiences) may see the action of demanding attention from a social interlocutor as related to the consequence of getting what she wants. A child from another cul- ture may see the same action as leading to the consequences of os- tracism or punishment. There are also subtle, within-culture vari- ations in these relationships. It is this accumulated historical experience that mediates all future activity. The thinking of in- dividuals becomes reconstructed on the basis of new situations, but this reconstruction is still based in the everyday history of the individual. Vygotskys Scientic Concepts as Secondary Experience Scientic concepts (Vygotsky, 1987) is in many ways parallel to Deweys (1925) conceptualization of secondary experiences. Moreover, secondary experience is a complex, multi-level phe- nomenon for Vygtosky. Part of the reason for this may be that it plays a much more distinct, and possibly more important, role in (vital) experience for Vygotsky than it does for Dewey. At the center of Vygotskys secondary experience is his tool par excel- lance, language. Vygotsky does not explicitly posit an individual organizing principle for everyday experience. One is not really necessary for a couple of reasons. First, while Dewey sees experi- ence as focused on the solving of problems, Vygotsky (1978) sees experience as emerging through direct communication between social interlocutors and neophytes. At some points Vygotsky (1997) suggests that true experience can only come from the in- dividuals own understanding of the world, but in his later, more mature works he de-emphasizes the individuals relationship to the world, and emphasizes the relationship to the social system. This is most clearly reected in Vygotskys (1987, 1994) claim that young children think in complexes. The complex is founded on factual associations which can be revealed through direct ex- perience (Vygotsky, 1994, p.220). The child at this stage does not so much accumulate and reconstruct thinking as an indi- vidual in building a body of knowledge, but accepts knowledge gained through social intercourse. It is in many ways the social sys- tem itself that serves as the organizing principle for accumulated thinking, or knowledge. Vygotsky does not share Deweys pre- occupation with individualism. In Vygotskys conception of sec- ondary experience there is no need for the type of individual re- ection (natural, immediate, and an integral part of activity) explored by Dewey. While language serves as an organizing principle for experience, it does not have the same reective qualities as Deweys secondary experience. Language creates meaning within activity through history rather than through individual reection in the moment. This does not mean that there is no vehicle for organization through individual reection in Vygotskys theory. Vygotsky sug- gests individually generated organizing principles through the de- velopment of scientic concepts (Vygotsky, 1987). However, sci- entic concepts are more a goal of standardized education than a natural part of the thinking process. The zone of proximal development seems, in some ways, con- cerned with establishing specic experiential/cultural tools that will eventually serve the child in her social purposes. This is not to say that interest plays no part in the zone of proximal devel- opment. The mentor is dependent on the childs interest for con- tinued activity, but the mentor does not stand back and wait for interest to emerge. In Saxe et. al.s (1984) description of the re- lationship between mother and child during the counting game it is the mother who reaches for knowledge accumulated through everyday experience with the child to use as teaching strategies (the relationship between secondary experience and primary experi- ence). It is the mentor who draws on the relationships between primary and secondary experience to bring important social tools, representing the seeds of mathematical scientic concepts, to the child. Process is important, but not as important as drawing the child closer to socially dened goals. Scaffolding (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976), a term often used in conjunction or in place of zone of proximal development (e.g., Berk & Winsler, 1995), is an appropriate description of this type of phenomenon. The mentor builds a scaffold, piece by piece, so that the child can engage in un- derstanding and development of scientic concepts on her own. Experience/Culture and Development For Dewey, the development of individually generated organiz- ing principles begins very early in life, whereas Vygotsky ties them closely to the development of conceptual thinking in ado- lescence (1994) and suggests that it is best to wait for adolescence to gear pedagogical strategies to the development of individual 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 9 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER 10 mastery (1987). While Dewey sees the difference between pri- mary experience and secondary experience as relative (Campbell, 1995), Vygotsky seems to see the difference in more absolute terms (at least over the course of an individuals history). There is a relationship between everyday concepts and scientic concepts, but there are also qualitative differences and strict boundaries be- tween complexive thinking and conceptual thinking. Complex- ive thinking is based on categorizing objects solely on the basis of the immediate situation, and conceptual thinking is based on a more abstract understanding. According to Vygotsky, the qualitative jump that humans make in adolescence to conceptual thinking is based on the abil- ity to use words and signs as internal mediators. The functional use of words and signs helps the adolescent by allowing him to take charge of his own psychological processes and master the ow of his own psychological processes so that their activity can be directed for the purpose of solving the problems he is faced with (Vygotsky, 1994, p. 212). Adolescence is the rst point at which humans are able to use thinking to make true individual judgments concerning their own activities. The development of this conceptual thinking does not occur naturally through expe- rience, but is dependent on specic types of social interactions (Vygotsky, 1994). Vygotsky (1987) suggests the best style of social interaction for the development of conceptual thinking is direct pedagogy; the teaching of abstract ideas and problems connected with the process of growing into the cultural, professional, and so- cial life of adults(Vygotsky, 1994, p. 213). Thus, development of the ability to analyze, hypothesize about,and test primary or every- day experience is actually separated from everyday experience. There are two points to be made here. The rst is that Dewey would certainly agree that human organization of primary expe- rience is mediated through words and signs and that there is an important relationship between the use of language and thinking that emerges through experience (Dewey, 1925). But for Dewey language is more an integral part of experience than a tool that acts as a central organizing theme for experience. The second point is that Vygotsky certainly sees a necessary relationship be- tween experience that results from everyday activity and individ- ual organization of that activity, especially the cumulative impact of that experience on all subsequent thinking. But the develop- mental aspect of his work suggests a qualitative break between thinking and thinking about thinking that could not help but seep into his conceptualization of education. Human Inquiry Both Vygotsky and Dewey see inquiry as based in progressive problem solving. The individual is forced to confront issues that are not easily reconciled by current thinking. Interest is the only true motivation that can force this type of confrontation, push- ing the mind from comfort into conict. The only way to bring stability back to the situation through activity is to reconstruct thinking about activity so that it meets the needs of that situa- tion. It makes little sense to dene the development of thinking or knowledge as a static, additive process. Thinking is something to be used in situations to solve problems. Dewey is most adamant on this point: The only use of thinking is the better living of life. Vygotsky offers a similar, but slightly different perspective: Thinking leads to greater social cohesion and the advancement of the social group (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). For Dewey much of the action that we engage in during our lifetimes is habit. That is, it is does not require conscious recogni- tion of the relationship between action and consequences. This is as it should be, because consciously thinking about the activities with which you are engaged is exhausting and creates awkward- ness in action (Dewey, 1922). Yet what allows life to progress, what allows for better living, is what occurs when something goes wrong, when our habits, for whatever reasons, break down. For Dewey education is based in preparing the student not only to face these moments of vital experience when habit is of little use, but to actually desire them, and to enjoy them when they occur (Dewey, 1916). Humans, however, are comfortable in their habits. It is easier, though less worthwhile, simply not to consciously engage in vital experiences; or if it becomes necessary to actually solve a prob- lem, not to pursue the next problem, especially if there are bar- riers and/or obstacles. It is interest that drives the human being from habit and into worthwhile vital experience. This is the rea- son Dewey places interest at the center of the educational process (Dewey 1900, 1916). Interest is not something that can be arti- cially created within the educational context, but must come from the interaction between the person and the situation. There must be enough interest so that the individual is able to recognize an indeterminate situation and be motivated by the doubt inherent in that particular situation, the proverbial fork in the road (Dewey, 1920). There follows a process of reasoning whereby the individual works out the problem through a series of stages (Dewey, 1938). Vygotsky also saw interest as a key to the educational process (1997). Vygotsky speaks of the importance of instincts in educa- tion, but in borrowing the term instinct he is not really talking about hereditary animal instincts, but has in mind the childs needs and the intimately associated realm of the childs interests (Davydov, 1997, p. xxxii; emphasis in original text). Interests are an expression of the childs organic needs (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 87). Vygotsky from a very early point saw interest as an inher- ent characteristic of the individual, and perhaps the primary driv- ing motivation in activity. This echoes Deweys view of interests as childrens native urgencies and needs (Dewey, 1912, p. 23). Interest for both theorists is intrinsic to the activity and natural to the child. It cannot be created for the child from without. How- ever, Vygotsky maintains a very broad conception of interests, suggesting that in early childhood it is interest in mastery of the immediate environment; in later childhood it is interest in ad- venture, and in puberty interest in oneself (Vygotsky, 1997). Vygotsky echoes one of Deweys ideas, stating, In youth , ones eyes are always wide open to the world, which underscores the greater maturity of youth towards life (ibid., p. 88). Dewey sug- gests that it is in youth that we are truly able to nd interest in things with an open awareness, and that we lose this openness as we mature (Dewey, 1916). Vygotskys broad conception of interest, however, means that the social interlocutor can have far more control in developing specic situations that are indeterminate for the neophyte (but not for the mentor, thus giving the mentor a certain amount of 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 10 MAY 2001 11 directional control). The task is not so much in recognizing what is of interest to the child and following through with it (as it is for Dewey). It is in creating learning situations where the child can recognize the possibilities of his or her own possible mastery of the activity (moving the situation from indeterminate to de- terminate) through interaction with the social interlocutor. It may be in the area of inquiry that the differences between long term projects and the zone of proximal development as ed- ucational models are most apparent. The long-term project is based on the idea that true doubt stems from interest. Dewey (1938) sees doubt as the direct result of activity within an inde- terminate situation (i.e., a situation that does not have an easily recognized end-in-view). Initially, recognition of an indetermi- nate situation requires a breaking of habits (which usually comes about as the result of interest). The progressive problem solving that follows is a natural outgrowth of vital experience that is no longer moving in a determined direction for the actor. Key to the educational experience is getting the student to recognize that this cycle of interest-doubt-problem solving is benecial and worthy of pursuit. The more the child confronts interesting in- determinate situations as the result of her own unique experi- ence, the more condent she becomes in her own process of in- quiry. This is especially important as activities become more complex and there are difficult barriers between doubt and prob- lem solving. The child develops a sense of discipline as a result of prior success (Dewey, 1916; Glassman & Whaley, 2000). A long-term project, even in toddlerhood, sets the childs ac- tivity on an important life trajectory. In the construction project, described earlier, children followed through on their initial inter- ests and made important discoveries. Through a series of ends-in- view, a simple initial interest in a construction site was turned into a complex construction site. The children developed a construc- tion site playground far beyond anything the toddlers, or the adults that surrounded them, could have initially comprehended. The shoe project, with slightly older children, shows how com- plexity of experience begins to enter into inquiry by creating bar- riers that demand more disciplined problem solving. The initial interest in shoes was so amorphous, and the possible directions the activities could take so wide ranging, that maintaining the momentum of the project was probably fragile on a number of occasions. The balancing of interest and discipline in inquiry be- comes a greater challenge for students and teacher as activities be- come more complex, making long term projects more difficult to manage. A complimentary methodology developed by the Reggio Emilia schools in Italy uses documentation of the project (e.g., taking pictures of activities and products at various stages of the project and showing them to the students at later, difficult junc- tures to re- energize them) to maintain the activity (Rinaldi, 1998). The use of documentation allows the teacher to breathe new life into a project without controlling its context or direction. The mechanism for the zone of proximal development reects the same type of doubt as outlined by Dewey (1938). There is a problem in immediate activity that is beyond the reach of cur- rent thinking. The problem causes doubt and the child is forced to work through this doubt, and reconstruct thinking, in order to complete the activity. The completion of the activity, achieve- ment of the aim, potentially creates a new problem to be solved. The emphasis is on dynamic progress rather than static abilities. However, there are two important differences between Dewey and Vygotskys thinking as far as education is concerned. The first is that Dewey (1938) believes that doubt is discovered by the individual in unique, naturally evolving situations. (Dewey ex- plicitly states that the doubt must be the result of the situation it- self.) Problems will necessarily emerge because situations change and children (as well as adults) will be forced to confront them through the natural momentum of activity (Dewey, 1916). For Vygotsky the indeterminate situation is the plan and product of the mentor. Doubt is not discovered by the individual, but sown by the society through complementary actions of the social inter- locutor. Related to this is Vygotskys idea that the social inter- locutor takes an active role in guiding the thinking of the child through the zone of proximal development. In short, in some way or another I propose that the children solve the problem with my assistance (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). This can be done through teachers offering of demonstrations that they ask their students to repeat, or through presenting leading questions. In any case the teacher is both guide and mentor. The importance of the mentor/neophyte relationship for human inquiry is shown in both examples of the zone of proxi- mal development used in this paper. The adults interacting with the infants and the mothers interacting with their children at- tempted to create doubt through their own development of (a series of) indeterminate situations. The adult/mentors also had a rm idea of the possible direction(s) they would like the problem solving to take once the doubt was sown. This is important be- cause the problem solving was related to the type of problems the children would have to deal with in the larger society later in life. In Rogoff et. al.s (1984) infancy study the adults knew the problem the child needed to solve was how to use the jack-in- the-box in a socially appropriate manner. The adults also under- stood that in order to get the child to solve this social problem, some type of doubt about a situation involving the jack-in-the- box must be established, and that it was in some way incumbent on them as adults to do this. The adult managed the childs in- volvement with the toy even at the early ages (Rogoff et. al. 1984, p. 37). Thus, the adults negotiate how and at what level the baby was to participate in the means-end behaviors of winding the handle to get Bugs Bunny to pop out of the jack-in-the-box (ibid, p. 38). The relationship between the interest-doubt-problem-solving cycle and social expectations is even more dominant in the (math- ematics) conceptual issue task (Saxe et al., 1984). The adults in- volved understand that the concepts they are helping their chil- dren with are basic components they will need for later learning of scientic concepts. The adults feel an obligation to take a strong hand in both instilling doubt and the problem solving process that follows it. Interest (and to a lesser extent discipline) while certainly important, play secondary and, to a certain extent, decorous roles. The socially created goal was of great importance for the mothers, so much so that mothers of low ability children structured their tasks differently than mothers of high ability children (instituting a number of additional sub-goals). In both cases the mothers of- fered directives to their children to get them as close to the pro- posed goal as possible within the context of their abilities. Inter- estingly enough Saxe et al. (1984) report that in initial unassisted 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 11 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER 12 performances children not only made errors, but actually con- ceptualize[d] the task quite differently than adults d[id] (p. 22). Nowhere was it even suggested that the children might gain more by following through on their own conceptualizations of the task. There are, I believe, important philosophical, political, and ed- ucational reasons for the differences in how involved society should be in a students inquiry in the educational process. Vygotsky (1987; Luria, 1971) believed in grand social goals for the educa- tional process that Dewey (1916, 1964), in many ways, disdained. For Vygotsky The new structures of social lifeincluding the industrialization of work activity, compulsory school and collec- tive forms of everyday lifebecame seen as determinants of the nascent forms of behavior and cognition of a new man (Kozulin, 1990, p. 277). If more powerful tools can come into existence through activity, then it is almost a moral obligation for the teacher to act as mentor and establish the types of activities that will en- gender these new tools. The mentor devises cooperative activities that will allow the child to acquire the plane of consciousness of the natal society (Tharp & Gallimore, 1988, p. 30). Conclusion Dewey and Vygotsky are extraordinarily close on the importance of everyday activity in the educational process. At the same time they are miles apart on how and why that activity should be used in the classroom. A careful consideration of the two theorists ex- plodes the myth of a dichotomy between the individual and the social in development; and yet Dewey is unrepentant in the de- gree to which he promotes individualism, whereas Vygotsky sees the social organization as the central agent of change. This crucial difference between Vygotsky and Dewey might best be explored through a chapter where Vygotsky (1978) discusses the interaction between learning and development. Vygotsky ex- amines three possible relationships between learning and develop- ment: that processes of learning are independent of development, that learning is development, and that learning and development are two inherently different but related processes (ibid p. 81). For Dewey it is education the drives development. It is a dy- namic force in helping students to create their own primary ex- periences that will lead naturally to the secondary experiences of inquiry and the organization of knowledge. From an education perspective there is little to be gained by getting the child to sim- ply exhibit the required product of activity (Dewey, 1912). What is important is the process, and the disposition of the child in ac- tivity towards that process. This is especially true of the interest/ motivation for the activity; the desire to engage in an activity, achieve an aim, despite obstacles and/or barriers (Dewey, 1916). It is society, certainly, that provides the context and the imme- diate, supercial motivations for particular activities. But ulti- mately context and specic motivation are ethereal and not as important to learning and development as the ability to harness this motivation, so the very fact of interest becomes a motivating force for problem solving over the entire lifetime, no matter what the situation. This allows the child to grow into a human whose subject is the betterment of life (for the self and the society), rather than simply a member of a social group that is subject to the needs of that group. The purpose of education is to teach in- nately social animals to be individuals within a society. There is a darker political side to Deweys emphasis on process. He be- lieved that, ultimately, social and cultural groups establish goals and end points for their own benet. If you accept the social or- ganization as the nal arbiter for education goals, individuals are forever trapped within that organization. Vygotsky (1978) uses the zone of proximal development as an alternative for his described three interactions between learning and development. He sees learning as a tool in the developmen- tal process. The process of learning allows the child to fulll her developmental potential. It is therefore important for teachers/ mentors to be a proactive force and take greater control in the ed- ucational process, just as they would be a proactive force in the use of any other tool (e.g., the teacher wields pedagogy just as the builder wields a hammer). For Dewey the teacher is one of a number of possible sieves that the social environment can pour through in the general development of activity. That is why it is important for teachers to take the less dominant, facilitator roles exhibited in the best long term projects. For Vygotsky the teacher/ mentor uses the social environment to build activities that will lead to mastery. Vygotsky might have joined some of Deweys critics in seeing faith in process and free expression as naive in a complex social environment. The society and the individual are both more successful if education leads to individual and society working together towards a greater good. This general difference between Vygotsky and Dewey in the relationship between the roles of process and goals in learning and development highlights three important educational issues: the role of social history as opposed to individual history in the classroom; whether or not the teacher should take the general at- titude of facilitator or mentor; and whether the source of change is the individual or the social community. Individual history and social history are both important in the educational process, and it is sometimes difficult to separate the two, but there are differences with important implications. The difference between the two types of histories speaks directly to the issue of diversity in the classroom. If the role of social history is seen as preeminent then it is difficult to escape the importance of shared historical artifacts in the classroom. This includes not only language, but also childhood tools and symbols such as toys and games. The greater the shared history the higher the level of communication between teacher and students and between peers. This is especially important for a model such as the zone of prox- imal development where the mentor plays such an important role in establishing indeterminate situations that will both be of interest to the student and benecial to the students role in the larger society. If individual history is emphasized, a diverse student popula- tion (and even differences between teacher and students) is some- thing to be consciously pursued, even at the expense of initial communicative abilities. Rather than bringing in artifacts from the outside world, teachers might be more inclined to concentrate on the development of peer projects that lead to self-generated in- determinate situations. If clear communication is pursued and realized then the bur- den for development of specic activities falls squarely on the shoulders of the mentor(s). The mentor must nd the right ques- tions, the proper situations that will allow the students to achieve 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 12 MAY 2001 13 their promise. Deweys vision of the teacher as facilitator (1916) is at once more distant and more immediate than Vygotskys mentor. The learning situation develops through the natural so- cial evolution of activity in the childs life. The teachers role is more distant in that there should be little control over content of specic activities. It is more immediate because the teacher dis- covers the doubt of indeterminate situations along with the child. Dewey makes it very clear that the major task of education is to develop an individual thinker out of a social being (1916). Progress is made when the individual questions a social system she no longer believes works. Dewey recognizes that the classroom is an inherently social organization that is representative of the larger social community. But the child must recognize herself as a viable agent of change for that social organization. In order to do this the student must realize that she has some element of control over classroom activity. The fact that the classroom is made up of a number of individuals with different social histories means that agency for change is relatively limited. Individuals may desire to take activities in directions they cannot go. This is perhaps the most important of all educational experiences; it forces the indi- vidual to reconstruct her thinking about the situation in order to maintain even a partial role as agent for change. For Vygotsky the classroom is also a social organization that is representative of the larger social community. But instead of the individual as agent for change in the social organization, it is the social organization, and the larger social community, that is the agent for change in the individual. The purpose of educa- tion is to meld children into the larger social structure so that they become productive members of the community. Change of the larger social structure itself is historical and based on the cumula- tive effort of the social group over time (Vygotsky & Luria, 1993). Dewey and Vygotsky left a legacy of ideas that continue to in- uence educators in their attempts to create a better classroom. At the core of this legacy is the importance of everyday activities to all human beings. 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Valsiner (Eds.), The Vygotsky reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Vygotsky, L. S. (1997). Educational psychology (R. Silverman, Trans.) Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. (Original work published 1926) Vygotsky, L. S., & Luria, A. R. (1993). Studies on the history of be- havior: Ape, primitive and child. (Victor I. Golod & Jane E. Knox. Hillsdale, Eds. and Trans.) NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Wood, D. J., Bruner, J., & Ross, G. (1976). The role of tutoring in prob- lem solving. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 17, 89100. AUTHOR MICHAEL GLASSMAN is Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Development and Family Sciences, 135 Campbell Hall, 1781 Neil Ave., Columbus, OH 43210; glassman13@osu.edu. His research interests include child development and early childhood education. Manuscript received February 7, 2000 Revision received March 5, 2001 Accepted March 7, 2001 0027-02/Glassman (p3-14) 5/8/01 12:43 Page 14