PEOPLE vs.

VERA
FACTS:
Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC
and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed
the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another
request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera
has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides
that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.
Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that
only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of
the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards
and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides that only in those provinces
in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer may the probation
system be applied.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of
penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion
which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of
equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary
of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall
be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only
means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of
probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer
is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.

BIRAOGO vs. PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence
of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office
of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an
entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth Commission
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant
or erode the latters jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing
is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of
the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source
of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to
existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement
of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

ALMONTE vs. VASQUEZ
Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as
chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all
evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget
and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in
connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been written by
an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of
Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the
"Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all
money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to
ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate
monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]
In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on the
anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum but was denied.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies,
and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and salary
vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating their equal
protection of laws.

Held:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to withhold the
identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar, there is no claim that
military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of
the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets
it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that
compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The plantilla and
other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of the people of the
Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in
all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the
Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can
be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is
apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject
to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or
dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor
and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners' right
against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are
public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government officials in whose
possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of
funds for personal service has already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should
object to the examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.