1

Implications of New Cultural Theory for Comparative Foreign Policy

Greg Ryan
Middle Tennessee tate !niversity
gfryan"mtsu#edu
Midwestern Political cience $ssociation
%&&' $nnual Conference
Panel(1)() Comparative Foreign Policy* New $pproaches
aturday+ $pril , )*&& am ( '*,& am
%
INTRODUCTION: BASIC ISSUES, METHOD AND OUTLINE
In his attempt to provide a new understanding of the wor-ings of the international
system+ $le.ander /endt claims that to understand state 0ehavior in the international system+
one must 0e aware of 0oth the constitutive effects of the international system that influence a
given state and the domestic factors at wor- within that state 11'''* %)2# 3is claim illuminates
two important criticisms that have 0een raised concerning the state of theory in the field of
international relations+ the ina0ility of rational choice attempts to e.plain much of what is
interesting and important pertaining to international relations 1Green and hapiro 1'',2 and the
poverty of analy4ing international relations at a single level of analysis# These two criticisms are
also relevant to foreign policy studies+ an outgrowth of international relations and decision
ma-ing studies 1nyder+ et al+ 1'5%2# Foreign policy studies are in some ways even more
comple. than international relations+ 0ecause of the necessity and comple.ity of analy4ing and
integrating factors 0oth inside and outside the state 1Gerner 1''6* 172# Most attempts to create a
general theory of foreign policy have either 0een weighted more toward internal factors such as
perception and cultural influences 18egg and Morrison 1')12 or e.ternal factors pertaining to
systemic influence 1/alt4 1'7'9 /endt 1'''2# The o0:ective of this study is to develop a model
of foreign policy analysis that gives e;ual consideration to 0oth the cognitive or constructivist
1inside2 factors and systemic 1outside2 influences+ and also to illuminate the relationship 0etween
the two#
The model proposed in this study involves several specific varia0les of analysis# First+
instead of assuming that states are sociali4ed into an international system with a fi.ed nature as
do structural realists 1/alt4 1'7'2+ the proposed model<s conception of the international system
is one that changes and reformulates itself through time 1/endt 1'''9 =oslows-i and =radocwil
>
1'',2# Factors influencing change include technological advances and evolving ideas of
community 1=ennedy 1')72+ and :ust as the prevailing system affects the foreign policy of states+
so may the actions of states cause changes in the nature of the international system# $n e.ample
of one such epoch in international relations is the period 0etween the Napoleonic /ars and the
First /orld /ar+ when the modern idea of the nation 0egan to crystalli4e and wars 0egan to 0e
fought 0etween ?peoples@ instead of 0etween ?-ings@ 1Palmer 1')5* 11'2#
The second factor in foreign policy decision ma-ing to 0e assessed is the political culture
of the state involved# /hile many domestic political considerations may have implications for
foreign policy+ such as 0ureaucratic politics 1$llison 1'719 Aestler 1'7%2 pu0lic opinion 1Russett
and Graham 1')'2+ interest group effects 1Aietrich 1'''2+ media effects 1Ba-o0sen 1''62+ and
regime type 1Mansfield and nyder 1''69 Cneal+ et al+ 1''59 /alt4 1'572+ this study will focus
on political culture and how it affects perception of situations# $ccording to ahlins 11')62+
culture is ?Dhistorically reproduced in action@ 1p#vii2# Arawing on the wor- of Clifford Geert4
11'7>2+ who proposed that culture should 0e understood as system of sym0ols+ ahlins articulates
a concept of culture that is 0ased on sym0ols which undergo reinterpretation during periods of
environmental change# In this way+ cultural system and cultural practice are lin-ed 1ewell+ Br#+
1'''2# This is the case+ according to Michel Foucault+ 0ecause ?Dit is part of the function of
memory and culture to 0e a0le to reactuali4e any o0:ects whatever that have already featured#
Repetition is always possi0le9 repetition with application+ transformation@ 11'))*,62# The
proposed model in this study see-s to integrate the two concepts related a0ove+ the transforming
nature of the international system and a mallea0le conception of culture+ so that foreign policy
may 0e 0etter analy4ed#
,
/hat would corro0orating evidence for such a model loo- li-eE The answer that this
study proposes is a specific pattern of decision ma-ing that e.hi0its itself over time# $lso
important is a consideration of other factors that are 0elieved to affect decision ma-ing# Fy
analy4ing 0oth culturally influenced patterns of decision ma-ing and contending influences on
decision ma-ing in competition+ it is hoped that at the very least a 0etter understanding of
cultural effects on foreign policy can 0e gained# Cne way to do this is 0y e.amining specific
decision opportunities within the pattern# This re;uires an in depth consideration of the factors
relevant in a specific society at a certain point in time+ thus marrying comparative politics and
international relations theory# Therefore+ comparative case study is an appropriate method for
demonstrating how factors may operate differently in different societies#
The framewor- that I am going to use to test my model is immediate e.tended deterrence+
a situation in which an attac-er contemplates military action against another country and a third
party commits itself to the defense of the country threatened with attac-# Prior research has
0een underta-en to compile case lists for immediate e.tended deterrence 18e0ow and tein 1'))9
3uth and Russett 1'),9 1'))2+ facilitating the tas- of selecting compara0le cases for analysis#
8e0ow and tein<s list of cases is more rigorously ;ualified and demonstrates that
many of the cases in the 3uth and Russett set are in dou0t+ implying that immediate e.tended
deterrence is not amena0le to large(n study without 0eing vulnera0le to charges of conceptual
stretching 1artori 1'7&2# Instead+ a small(n study of cases is more appropriate so that the
concept of immediate e.tended deterrence can 0e 0etter understood# /hile not 0eing a0le to
develop grand theory+ a study of this type is capa0le of generating partial generali4ations
18i:phart 1'712#
6
The cases are the Tur-ish decision to ac;uiesce to $merican pressure in 1'5, and the
Chinese decision to challenge Russian deterrence in defense of Gietnam in 1'7'# Foth cases are
confirmed 0y 0oth 3uth and Russett and 8e0ow and tein# The cases were chosen 0ecause the
decisions made in 0oth cases do not conform to the rational model of decision ma-ing+ they do
conform to a pattern of foreign policy decision ma-ing during a specified era and these patterns
of decision ma-ing stretch over a period lasting 0eyond the reign of any one leader# These and
their ;ualifications will 0e 0riefly e.plained 0elow in the following manner# First+ the general
historical elements of the Tur-ish and Chinese cultures in the form of patterns that have endured
over many centuries will 0e introduced# Then+ I will discuss the foreign policy decisions of the
Tur-ish and Chinese governments during a specific era of decision(ma-ing+ the First /orld /ar
until the conclusion of the Cold /ar+ that conform to a more specific pattern# Finally+ the
specific deterrence encounter decisions will 0e 0riefly analy4ed# The characteristics that I want to
focus on are the Tur-ish desire for identification with civili4ation and the Chinese need to
demonstrate the supremacy of their culture# Foth of these cultural traits have grown out of the
historical and geographical characteristics uni;ue to each of these countries+ and as related
a0ove+ these traits have 0een illustrated in different ways at different times#
Foth cases fall into the period 0etween the First /orld /ar and the end of the Cold /ar+
and it is the nature of this era that I will analy4e for its effects on the cultures and foreign policy
decisions of China and Tur-ey# This historical delineation is 0orrowed from 3untington+ who
suggests that during this period ?Dthe conflict of nation states was supplemented 0y the conflict
of ideologies+ first among fascism+ communism+ and li0eral democracy+ and then 0etween the
latter two@ 11''5*6%2+ and also Morgenthau+ who finds that international relations after the First
/orld /ar was characteri4ed 0y a completely different moral climate than 0efore the war 11'5>*
5
%6'2# There is little argument that the First /orld /ar was a watershed event in international
relations 1Miller 1'',* ,,2# This study will show that the characteristics of that war and their
effects on the international system initiated and sustained an environment that can 0e
differentiated from other periods of history+ and that these characteristics had a mar-ed impact
on culture and foreign policy decision ma-ing#
The following sections will first consider the nature of cultural and foreign policy studies
and the potential for com0ining these fields+ the ideological nature of the international system in
the %&
th
century+ patterns in Tur-ish and Chinese foreign policy and a comparison of the
decisions made in the immediate e.tended deterrence cases listed a0ove#
CULTURAL STUDIES AND FOREIGN POLICY
Aespite o0:ection to the use of culture as a factor influencing policy 1Haston 1'572+
several nota0le studies involving cultural factors 1$lmond and Ger0a 1'5>9 Inglehart+ 1'719
Thompson+ Hllis and /ildavs-y 1''&2 have 0een underta-en# These studies and the present one
can 0e understood as advocating the importance of culture 0ecause social entities are 0ased on
systems of interrelations among individuals 1Carrithers 1''%*%&2+ individuals use these systems
to operate in their environments 1Triandis 1'',*162+ all humans have the in0orn capacity to
0ecome cultural+ and that humans can only view reality through culturally constructed filters
1Charon %&&1* 52# $s culture serves as a medium for organi4ing -nowledge and e.perience+ it
provides the a0ility to categori4e and discriminate 0ut not to distinguish myth from fact
1Mantovani %&&&*%2# Regarding the focus on national culture in this study+ it is assumed that
national and ethnic cultures are more significant than other cultures due to ?Dtheir degree of
7
regulation of 0ehavior+ attitudes+ and values+ and the consistency and clarity of regulation and
tolerance of other cultures@ 1Tse+ et al# 1'))*)%2#
The -ey 0uilding 0loc- that cultures are constructed on is the sym0ol# ym0ols provide a
means for attaining culture 1Charon %&&1*5%2 and for individual comprehension of the self+
others and the world itself 1Geert4 1'7>*%6&2# For the purpose of this study+ a sym0ol is defined
as ?Dany structure of signification in which a direct+ primary+ literal meaning designates+ in
addition+ another meaning which is indirect+ secondary+ and figurative and which can 0e
apprehended only through the first@ 1Riceour 1'7,* 1%(1>2# ym0ols+ then+ facilitate a collective
identity while simultaneously providing a fle.i0le construct for ma-ing sense of new information
and circumstances# They retain and e.pand their meaning through their fle.i0ility+ allowing
mem0ers of a culture to 0oth maintain an idea of shared history and confidence in the future of
society 1Csepeli 1''7*5'2#
New cultural theory+ stemming from the structural study of language 1aussure 1'6'2 and
the metaphorical ;uality of words 1Riceour 1'7,2+ see-s to ?Ddefine the pragmatic conte.ts
which sym0ols are employed for sa-e of revealing governing patterns that utilitarian
manipulation or principles or adaptation to the environment do not readily e.plain@ 1Fiernac-i
1'''*5'(7&2# In other words+ new cultural theory ta-es 0oth constancy and adaptation into
account in its e.planation of events over time# Cne of the seminal efforts in the field of new
cultural theory that serves to demonstrate how cultural sym0ols allow for the adaptation and
maintenance of cultural attitudes is ahlins< Islands of 3istory 11')62# In his account of Captain
Coo-<s landings in 3awaii during 177) and 177'+ ahlins e.plains how Huropean intervention
acted as stimulus for updating and e.panding 3awaiian cultural sym0ols pertaining to the
monarchy and its relationship to the outside world# Coo-<s ships arrived in the islands for two
)
consecutive years during the month of a mythical festival involving a 0attle 0etween the
islanders their native deity+ and while these circumstances led to tragic death of Coo-+ they also
ena0led the grafting of Huropean monarchical traditions onto indigenous 3awaiian legends
leading to a conception of the 3awaiian monarchy which was more in line with conceptions in
the rest of the world# Coo- was perceived as the mythical deity who would die at the end of the
festival+ and his death confirmed that he indeed was a legendary god# In other words+ the Coo-
e.pedition provo-ed an evolution in 3awaiian society which reali4ed a new e.pression of an
older indigenous cultural construct while simultaneously 0ecoming more integrated into the
international system#
Fecause foreign policy 0orrows from other disciplines+ many different influences on
foreign policy have 0een investigated+ including organi4ational structure 1$llison 1'719 Aeslter
1'7%2+ regime type 1Cneal et al# 1''59 Mansfield and nyder+ 1''62+ pu0lic opinion 1Russett and
Graham 1')'2+ interest groups 1Aietrich 1'''2+ and the media 1Ba-o0sen 1''62# 3owever+ while
some studies have given attention to psychological and sociological influences on decision
ma-ing+ such as the effects of pree.isting 0eliefs 13ere- 1')52+ personal stress 1M# 3ermann
1'7'2+ and group effects 1Banus 1'7%2+ foreign policy scholars generally have 0een reluctant to
use cultural theories or focus on cultural aspects of foreign policy decisions 13udson 1'5,*52#
This is unfortunate 0ecause+ as studies of national style indicate+ cultural analysis and
anthropological theory may 0e a useful tool 0oth for understanding how a country perceives its
role in the world 1Frown and Is-owit4 1'77*1512+ and the marriage of cultural anthropology to
traditional foreign policy analysis has the potential of yielding 0etter e.planations of foreign
policy decisions 1=ra-au 1'),*%662# This is e.actly what this study intends to do#
'
THE 20
TH
CENTURY AND THE INFLUENCE OF IDEOLOGY
The preceding section dealt with societal cultures and the impact that cultural
perspectives have on societal reaction to outside stimuli# Now the nature of the stimulus+ the
international system+ will 0e considered# The main contention here is that 0y the early part of the
twentieth century the international system had evolved 0eyond a specific Huropean conte.t and
had 0ecome a generali4ed system imposing conditions on all of the world<s states# Inherent in
this assumption is the idea that the international system changes and imposes different conditions
at different times# Changes occur due to advances in technology and related changes in
organi4ational forms#
There is general agreement across international relations schools of the thought+ including
realists 1=egley 1''6* chapter %2+ neorealists 1/alt4 1'7'2 and neoli0eral institutionalists
1Iacher and Matthew 1''6*1&)2 that the international system imposes effects on states that are
manifested in policy outcomes# $lthough political scientists have not demonstrated a
widespread interest in dividing international relations into specific periods 1Fu4an and 8ittle
%&&&2+ there have 0een some significant efforts in this area# $mong these are Rosecran4 11'5>2+
which argues that nine chronologically separate international systems e.isted 0etween 17&& and
1',6+ and 8uard 11'752 who ma-es demarcations similar to this study+ arguing that different
ideological circumstances dominated from 15,) to 17)'+ 17)' to 1'1,+ and 1'1, through the
twentieth century+ as does 3untington 11''52#
$lthough several ma:or conflicts were fought in Hurope in the hundred years 0etween
Napoleon<s demise and the 0eginning of /orld /ar I+ including the Crimean and Franco(
Prussian /ars+ peace largely reigned in Hurope during this period# Competition among Huropean
1&
states too- place outside Hurope involving conflict over colonial territory+ 0ut there was general
confidence that these conflicts could 0e contained 1Craig 1'57*1&2# The prevailing view was that
Hurope was progressing toward a more advanced and a0undant civili4ation in which competition
would produce 0enefits for all 1Palmer 1'67* 55&2+ and even as late as mid(1'1, the possi0ility
of general was disregarded due widespread confidence in the effects of continental economic
integration# 3owever+ during the late nineteenth century Huropean intellectual and ethical ideas
were transformed 0y Aarwin<s theory of evolution 1Mosse 1'))*%)'2# Cne manifestation of this
was Nietch4e<s concept of the ?superman+@ which advocated use of power free from moral
restraint# $lso+ rapid technological change led to the development of increasingly deadlier
weapons+ such as the machine gun+ and more diverse and faster delivery systems+ such as
aircraft+ su0marines and greatly e.panded railroad systems# Though the Russo(Bapanese /ar of
1'&,(&6 foreshadowed the greatly increased capacity for destruction that would occur in the First
/orld /ar+ this was not generally understood# Rivalry among Huropean states increased after
German unification and victory over France in the Franco(Prussian /ar in 1)7&+ leading to a
system of alliances that increased the possi0ility of minor conflicts e.panding into general war#
This is e.actly what happened in the summer of 1'1, following the assassination of
$ustro(3ungarian $rchdu-e Ferdinand in ara:evo# er0ia<s religious and historical ties to
Russia ensured war 0etween Russia and $ustria(3ungary+ triggering the fulfillment of alliance
responsi0ilities of countries allied to either Russia or $ustria(3ungary+ effectively plunging all
ma:or Huropean Powers into general war on the Huropean continent itself# 3opes of ;uic-
victory were ;uic-ly e.tinguished as the technological advances in weaponry manifested
themselves in a heretofore ine.perienced level of slaughter and stalemate# $fter the initial
German thrust into France via Felgium and the French counterattac- at the Marne River+ 0attle
11
lines hardened+ trenches were dug shell(poc-ed+ carcass strewn territory 0etween the opposing
trenches ac;uired the la0el ?no man<s land#@ Fy 1'17 all involved had spent more in treasure and
0lood than they 0elieved possi0le at the outset of war# /hile going on seemed ridiculous+ giving
up seemed even more so+ if only 0ecause this would mean the tremendous e.pense had 0een for
nothing# This provo-ed governments to do everything possi0le to maintain popular support for
the war+ including highly successful propaganda efforts to demoni4e the enemy 1Craig 1'57*1,2#
Though the /estern $llies had not gone to war to ?save civili4ation@ in 1'1,+ this is e.actly
what they were claiming in 1'17 1=ennan 1'51* 62# Hspecially after the entrance of $merica into
the war+ /estern war aims crystalli4ed around the idea of ma-ing the world ?safe for
democracy#@ In 1'17+ as the /est 0egan wholesale efforts to legitimi4e the war as a democratic
crusade+ Russia left the war and was immediately convulsed with communist revolution# /hile
the Russian Revolution was an un;uestiona0ly 0rutal affair+ it represented another vision of hope
for war weary countries# 8enin<s ?Dultimate o0:ective of the classless society in a warless world
has the same hopeful and utopian ;uality as /ilson<s search for a peaceful community of
sovereign democratic nations of une;ual power@ 1Mayer 1'6'* >'>2#
Fy war<s end in late 1'1)+ the civili4ational norms that had e.isted 0efore 1'1, had
e.isted prior to 1'1, had 0een undermined and the world was transformed into a place where the
indirect and spiritual effects of the war had ?Dpenali4ed victor and van;uished in roughly e;ual
measureD@ with the damage ?Dgreater than anything at sta-e in the issues of the war itself@
1=ennan 1'51*'2# The Huropean 0alance of power system was 0anished and the international
ideologies that manifested themselves during 1'17+ /ilsonian li0eralism and communism+ now
were viewed as two via0le ways of dealing with the pro0lems in the postwar era# The war had
demonstrated that ideology was integral for the mo0ili4ation of an entire national citi4enry
1%
1Cassels 1''5* 1>)2+ and leaders reali4ed that to compete and survive in international politics
they had to espouse some sort of ideology# It is not surprising then that the two ma:or ideologies
of /ilson and 8enin came into immediate conflict following the war+ when the /estern $llies
sent armies to Russia in 1'1' to assist the enemies of the Folshevi-s# Ideology was the prime
motivation for intervention+ and it initiated the enduring clash 0etween the capitalist /est and
the communist Hast that dominated international relations for most of the twentieth century+ the
genesis of the so(called Cold /ar 1chuman 1'5%*7'()&2#
The interwar period was mar-ed 0y the increasing significance and integration of the
international economy+ mutual suspicion 0etween the /est and the oviet !nion+ and the rise of
a third ideological alternative+ fascism# The failure of capitalism to solve national economic
crises was demonstrated in the international depression of the 1'>&s+ opening the door for
nationalistic appeals for a strong state# $s fascist regimes in Italy+ Germany+ pain and Bapan
consolidated power+ the /estern democracies and the oviet !nion vainly hoped that fascism
would destroy their international ideological rival+ and+ hence+ decided to largely appease fascist
regimes# Great Fritain avoided supporting the democratically elected 0ut socialist leaning
Popular Front government in the panish Civil /ar+ while talin was eventually compelled to
supply aid to the Popular Front 0ecause it had 0ecome increasingly identified with international
communism 1!lam 1'5)*%,,2# General Franco<s fascists+ however+ received significant aid and
support from 3itler and Mussolini+ demonstrating that ideological affinity was compelling
influence in e.pansion of a nominally civil war# The Fritish and French decision to a0andon
C4echoslova-ia to Na4i aggression in 1'>) convinced talin that the /estern democracies were
turning a 0lind eye to fascism in hopes that it would destroy oviet Russia# This drove talin to
ma-e his own arrangement+ the Na4i(oviet Pact of 1'>'# Germany<s attac- on France in 1',&
1>
seemed to confirm talin<s wisdom+ 0ut the tenuousness of this 0argain was revealed when 3itler
turned on the oviet !nion in the summer of 1',1# This and Bapan<s surprise attac- against !
Pacific Fleet at Pearl 3ar0or in Aecem0er 1',1 finally served to unite oviet Russia and the
/estern democracies in an eventually successful effort to eradicate fascism#
/ith the defeat of fascist Germany and Bapan in 1',6+ the ideological conflict 0etween
the /est and oviet Russian was ;uic-ly re:oined# This was aptly demonstrated 0y the division
of Germany+ oviet domination of Hastern Hurope+ the foundation of N$TC and the
esta0lishment of the People<s Repu0lic of China# Auring the decades 0etween 1',6 and 1')'+
ideological conflict was the dominating factor in international relations# The capitalist /est and
the communist Hast offered economic and military aid to countries throughout the developing
world+ often resulting in the leader of a particular country adopting a particular ideological stance
in order to o0tain aid# 3ot wars in =orea+ Gietnam and $fghanistan all had strong ideological
elements# For what other reason would the ! overtly intervene in wars in far away Hast $sia+ or
covertly in $fghanistan+ other than ideologyE imilarly+ what reason other than ideology would
have motivated oviet involvement in Cu0aE
Two of the main outcomes of the increased influence of ideology in international
relations 0etween /orld /ar I and the fall of the oviet !nion were the profusion of
international organi4ations that were esta0lished during the period and increased instance of the
use of military force 1at least to a much greater degree than in the 1'
th
century2# These
characteristics are the most salient for the purposes of this study+ and they will now 0e
specifically considered# The paragraphs 0elow descri0e the opportunity that international
organi4ation mem0ership provided Tur-ey with as a means for identifying with /estern
1,
civili4ation and how escalated violence during the twentieth century influenced Chinese methods
of demonstrating Chinese greatness#
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 20
TH
CENTURY
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that Tur-ish foreign policy from /orld /ar
I until the end of the Cold /ar was influenced 0y a com0ination of traditional Tur-ish ways of
dealing with the world and international social environment during that period# $s the focus of
this paper is that culture affects decision ma-ing+ the cultural history that e.erted influence on
decisions regarding the Cyprus crisis of 1'5, must first 0e related# This relevant characteristic of
Tur-ish cultural history is that the Tur-s+ unli-e most national groups+ have not 0een consistently
identified with a larger civili4ation 0ut instead have sought mem0ership in different civili4ations
at different times# Prior to the First /orld /ar this was demonstrated in the role the Tur-s
played in the Cttoman Hmpire+ and following the war the Tur-s e.hi0ited this 0ehavior 0y
enthusiastically see-ing mem0ership in /estern international organi4ations and doing more than
was necessary to fulfill their o0ligations to those organi4ations#
everal scholars have commented on modern Tur-ey<s identity pro0lem+ and they
generally agree that these pro0lems have due to confusion in Tur-ish society concerning whether
Tur-ey should 0e indentified with the /est or the Islamic /orld# $spects of this pro0lem
include the am0iguous nature of Tur-ey<s geographical position 1Carley 1''5*>2+ value conflicts
within Tur-ey 0etween groups that lean toward the /est and those that strongly identify with
Islam 1Mardin 1'')*%1%2 and rapidly implemented policies of moderni4ation and seculari4ation
introduced 0y $tatur- 1Carley 1''5*11(1%2# Modern Tur-ey<s ;uest to understand itself has even
0een descri0ed as ?schi4ophrenic@ 1Poulton 1''7* chapter 1&2#
16
Given the Tur-ish nation<s migratory and diverse historical e.perience+ this is not
altogether surprising# Tur-ish tri0es originally inha0ited the $sian steppe+ :ust northwest of
China+ 0ut 0egan a western migration sometime around 6&& $A+ possi0ly due to Chinese
e.pansion# This e.tended migration involved not only a search for a homeland 0ut also social
acceptance# In other words+ physical dislocation led to social dislocation# This search for identity
provided the Tur-s with much interesting e.perience# Auring their tre- across central $sia+ many
Tur-s accepted+ and most later relin;uished+ a variety of religions+ including hamanism+
Fuddhism+ Budaism+ Christianity+ Manichaeism and Islam+ all of which influenced modern
Tur-ey<s national culture 1Fer-es 1'5,* 6&12# $lso+ 0efore 0ecoming part of the Cttoman
Hmpire+ the Tur-s made nota0le 0ut impermanent relationships with the Gree-s and Persians and
integrated many various smaller groups into their own+ leading once scholar to conclude that the
defining characteristic of Tur-ish culture in this period was a facility to enter into sym0iotic
relationships with other cultures+ and with the prestigious Gree- and Persian cultures in
particular 1Cahen 1'5'* >%&2# $dditionally+ during the pre(Cttoman period in $natolia+ the Tur-s
assimilated many other inha0itants of the region+ including 3ittites+ Gree-s+ $rmenians+
Mongols and =urds+ into their num0ers 13otham 1'7%*)2+ a fact supported 0y archeological
pro:ects concluding that the relics of as many as fifty ethnic groups could 0e found in the region
at one time or another 1Pope and Pope 1''7*1'(%&2#
3owever+ the Tur-s did not ma-e a lasting 0ond with any other nation until the rise of the
Cttoman Hmpire# It is interesting that instead of 0eing forced to convert+ as were many other
ethnic groups 1F# 8ewis 1'66*>%%2+ the Tur-s willingly accepted Islam 0ecause it gave them
?purpose@ and ?meaning@ 1=arpat 1'6'*>2# In other words+ the Tur-s were eager to su0merge
themselves within Islam 0ecause it was an advanced civili4ation+ materially and philosophically
15
superior to Hurope 1G# 8ewis 1'7,* %)2+ and 0ecause Islamic civili4ation granted them full
citi4enship 1F# 8ewis 1''>*)2# Partly due to their position on the frontiers of the Cttoman
Hmpire+ the Tur-s made important military contri0utions to the growth of the empire+ eventually
esta0lishing themselves as its political leaders#
Jet for all their military and political success+ the Tur-s still loo-ed to the other mem0ers
of the empire for cultural identification# This is evidenced 0y the fact that early Cttoman political
documents were in Persian 1=adafer 1''6*512+ and that even successful e.ploits of Tur-ish
military heroes were related within the conte.t of older $ra0ian military adventures 1=adafer
1''6*5>2# Nevertheless+ the Tur-s 0ecame increasingly integrated into the Cttoman Hmpire+
su0merging their identity in the Islamic faith more than the other ethnic groups 1F# 8ewis 1'66*
>%,2 and viewing themselves as the guardians of Islamic scripture 1$dnan($diver 1'61*11'2#
/hen the empire 0egan its decline in the seventeenth century+ the Tur-s were not -een to forsa-e
Cttoman mem0ership+ despite the their pro.imity and resulting e.posure to an increasingly
powerful Hurope# Instead+ the overriding goal of 0oth the nineteenth century Joung Cttoman
movement 10y Tur-s2 and the early twentieth century Joung Tur- movement was not to
esta0lish a separate Tur-ish state 0ut to restore the Cttoman Hmpire to its former glory 1Fer-es
1'5,* %%1 and >&62# 3owever+ the coming of /orld /ar I and the Cttoman alliance with the
Central Powers in the war led to Cttoman disintegration+ and now the Tur-s were forced to
contemplate a new path in the world#
/hen the Tur-ish Repu0lic emerged out of the chaos and carnage of /orld /ar I and its
aftermath+ it was confronted 0y an international environment that dictated that a state could
0ecome identified with a group of states 0y gaining mem0ership in international organi4ations of
which these countries were a mem0er# For Tur-ey+ a nation that had historically sought
17
affiliation with strong and esta0lished civili4ations+ it was clear that to 0ecome an accepted
mem0er of the /estern community+ it must gain mem0ership in /estern international
organi4ations# Considering Tur-ey<s identity pro0lem+ this served not only its security and
economic concerns 0ut also its ?psychological@ interests 1Firn0aum 1'75*1))2#
Though the Tur-s had strongly integrated themselves into the Cttoman Hmpire+ they did
not completely lose their distinct sense of identity# They retained their fol- customs and
language+ representing a potential 0asis for creating a Tur-ish state 1=arpat %&&&*%%2+ and in the
anarchic period following the First /orld /ar+ Mustafa =emal used those characteristics as a
0asis for esta0lishing the Tur-ish Repu0lic in 1'%%# Instead of retaining a strong Islamic focus+
=emal+ -nown to history as $tatur-+ em0raced secular reform# /hile this was seemingly a direct
repudiation of Tur-ish sentiment in the prewar era+ it can 0e argued that $tatur- was acting
much as Tur-s of the past when they accepted Islam centuries 0efore in that he was attempting to
align his people with a new and superior civili4ation+ the secular+ democratic /est# This was
further sym0oli4ed 0y the Tur-ish attempt to rid their language and law code of $ra0ic and
Persian influences and replace them with Huropean influences 1Gol-an and Is-owit4 1'',*1))2#
Bust as the Cttoman Hmpire had 0een economically+ philosophically and militarily
superior in the tenth century+ so was /estern civili4ation after /orld /ar I# Therefore+ it was
the overriding concern of the Tur-ish Repu0lic to 0ecome part of the /est 1Fer-es 1'5,*,5>2#
$tatur- claimed that gaining ?civili4ation@ was a fundamental need of the Tur-ish people
13otham 1'7%*%>2 and stated that all countries loo-ed to the /est for civili4ation 1Mango
1'''*>'52# The leading Tur-ish social theorist of the period echoed $tatur-+ claiming that
Tur-ey was at least as influenced 0y Hurope and Islam 1Gol-ap 1'6'*1572# Hven the repu0lic<s
name+ Tur-ey+ was of Huropean origin and had long had a negative connotation in Hurope and
1)
$sia Minor# Tur-ey was committed to the /est+ despite the fact that no other former mem0er of
the Cttoman Hmpire followed suit 1F# 8ewis 1'66*>1>2#
If Tur-ey<s o0:ective was clear so was its method for attaining it+ 0inding itself to the
/est through mem0ership in international organi4ations# The first opportunity manifested itself
in the Tur-ish 0id to :oin the /ilsonian inspired 8eague of Nations# $lthough the most
influential mem0ers of the 8eague had sought to destroy the Tur-ish Repu0lic in its infancy+ and
then awarded Ira; land in an Ira;i(Tur-ish 0order dispute in 1'%5+ Tur-ey spent the 0alance of
the decade lo00ying for 8eague mem0ership+ finally succeeding in 1'>1# Then Tur-ey+ at the
0ehest of the 8eague+ participated in economic sanctions against Italy in 1'>6+ damaging its trade
relations with that country 1Aanilov 1')1*%%2#
Though Tur-ey remained neutral for most of /orld /ar II+ the Tur-s :oined the $llies in
1',6 0ecause this would ma-e them eligi0le to :oin the !nited Nations# Tur-ey also sought
N$TC mem0ership in 1','+ clearly seeing mem0ership in N$TC as a sym0ol of mem0ership in
the /estern community 1Tachau 1'),*7,2# $fter 0eing initially re0uffed+ the Tur-s sought to
prove their loyalty to /estern aims 0y enthusiastically sending a Tur-ish contingent to :oin the
!N forces in =orea# Though Tur-ey suffered retaliation from its communist neigh0or Fulgaria+
who forci0ly repatriated %6&+&&& Muslims to Tur-ey as act of revenge for Tur-ey<s =orean /ar
participation+ and significant war casualties+ this strategy succeeded# Tur-ey was awarded N$TC
mem0ership in 1'6%# ee-ing to reciprocate+ the Tur-s offered mem0ership in the Faghdad Pact
1Tur-ey+ Iran and Pa-istan2 to the !+ 0ut the ! refused# This reflected a trend in which the
Tur-s supported /estern policies 0ut the ! did not to respond in -ind# This developed 0ecause
the ?DTur-s had never really analy4ed+ the nature and limits of this friendship critically@ 1Hrden
1'7,* ',2# Given this fact+ it is not surprising that th Tur-s were the only N$TC country to agree
1'
to 0ase $merican nuclear missiles on their territory+ though this drew the ire of Tur-ey<s Islamic
neigh0ors# Not content to only support ! goals+ the Tur-s endorsed Fritish and French efforts
to hold onto their colonial empires in the Middle Hast+ undermining the independence hopes of
Third /orld countries who might have potentially emulated the recently independent Tur-ish
Repu0lic 1$hmad 1''>*11'2# imply put+ after /orld /ar II+ the Tur-s increasingly ?D
predicated their entire foreign policy on faith in the commitments from their allies# Garious
Tur-ish governments had gone to greater lengths to cooperate with their alliance partners+ even
0eyond formal treaty o0ligations 13arris 1'76*5&2#
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO AND DURING THE 20
TH
CENTURY
The specific aspect of Chinese culture to 0e e.amined is China<s traditional feeling of
superiority towards other states# The geographical+ historical and cultural circumstances of China
stand in mar-ed contrast to those of Tur-ey# $n important initial o0servation is that Hast $sia
developed in relative isolation from the rest of the world+ leading to distinctive patterns which
have 0een retained for thousands of years 1Reischauer and Fair0an- 1'5&9 Fianco 1'712# This
0eing the case+ it was natural that Chinese 0elieved that their culture was distinctive and superior
0ecause China was larger+ richer and more intellectually advanced than its neigh0ors 13arris
1''&*1%&2# In some instances China employed force to dominate its neigh0ors+ 0ut more often
than not China relied cultural superiority to influence neigh0oring states 13udson 1'5,*
>,&(>,12#
This was demonstrated 0y the fact that all countries having diplomatic relations with
China had to pay tri0ute and ac-nowledge Chinese superiority# $lso+ a foreign ruler who
received the seal of office from the Chinese emperor gained greater domestic legitimacy in his
%&
own country 1Michael and Taylo 1'65*6>2# Further evidence of Chinese superiority was the
adoption of Chinese manners and eti;uette 0y China<s neigh0ors+ the use of chopstic-s at ta0le
0eing a simple e.ample of this phenomenon 13udson 1'5,*>,%2# Hven when China was
militarily defeated+ Chinese cultural superiority eventually triumphed# This was demonstrated in
the fifth century when after successfully invading northern China+ the To0a Tatars adopted
Chinese customs+ dress and language 1Floodworth 1'55*>,62# imilarly+ the Mongol and
Manchu invasions of China in the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively+ were more
nota0le for the ?sinici4ing@ of the con;ueror than for foreign domination of China# $fter
overrunning China in 1%7'+ the Mongols ;uic-ly incorporated Chinese governmental procedures+
court ceremonies and Confucian rites+ and esta0lished an office to write the history of previous
dynasties+ a tas- underta-en 0y every new Chinese dynasty 1Ro0erts 1'''*1&)2# The Manchus
reorgani4ed their civil administration along Chinese lines even 0efore completing the invasion of
China in the middle 15,&s and adopted the Chinese tri0utary system of foreign relations once in
power 1Ro0erts 1'''*1652# This situation has 0een descri0ed 0y one scholar as one in which the
Chinese came to 0elieve ?Dif we 0ring them into our country+ if we treat them the right way+
they will recogni4e+ they will ac-nowledge the virtues of our civili4ation and they will 0ecome
sinici4ed as a result of it@ 13arris 1''&* 1%1(1%%2#
This all changed with the arrival of /estern power in $sia# $lthough initial contacts
0etween panish+ Autch and Hnglish traders conformed to Chinese e.pectations+ Fritish trade
representative 8ord McCartney<s refusal to -owtow 0efore the King emperor in 17'> mar-ed the
0eginning of /estern intransigence+ and more generally+ the 0eginning of China<s painful
moderni4ation process# In the words of Bohn =ing Fair0an-+ it was a tragedy for the Chinese that
?Dher ad:ustment to the 0ar0arians of Inner $sia was such a poor preparation for contact with
%1
the modern /est 11'5'*%62# Instead of ac-nowledging Chinese greatness+ the Fritish resorted to
coercion to open Chinese mar-ets+ resulting in the Cpium /ar of 1),&(1),1# Relatively easy
Fritish victory encouraged other Huropean powers to act ;uic-ly to e.tract their own concessions
from China# Bapan followed suit at the end of the nineteenth century+ defeating China in the ino(
Bapanese /ar of 1)',('6 and receiving Taiwan as a war pri4e# The first of half of the twentieth
century 0rought more humiliation at the hands of the /est and Bapan+ 0ut China never
completely a0andoned its ethnocentric outloo- 1Teng and Fair0an- 1'7>*>2# Clearly+ the Chinese
had to find some way to restore the greatness which they 0elieved was their natural right+ 0ut
howE
H.cluding the eruption of Chinese protest against foreign intervention in China that
culminated in the turn of the century Fo.er Re0ellion+ China generally was incapa0le of forming
a coherent foreign policy to resist foreign intrusion from the time of the Cpium /ar until the
1'>&s# $lthough China did not send any com0atants to Hurope during the First /orld /ar+ it
sent noncom0atant la0or 0attalions to assist the French# Following the war+ China lo00ied
delegates to the Gersailles Conference to restore handong Province+ which had formerly 0een
controlled 0y Germany+ to Chinese sovereignty# Instead of awarding handong to China+ the
Gersailles delegates gave it to Bapan# $lthough this led to large scale student demonstrations in
May 1'1'+ China<s Nationalist government decided to overloo- the matter and placate Bapan in
hopes of o0taining economic aid# It was in this atmosphere that the Chinese Communist Party
1CCP2 held its first meeting#
Auring the 1'>&s the Chinese Nationalists+ led 0y Chiang =aishe-+ focused their efforts
on eliminating the CCP and its People<s 8i0eration $rmy 1P8$2+ even as Bapan invaded
Manchuria in 1'>1+ 3e0ei Province in 1'>7 and hanghai in 1'>)# The Chinese Communists+ on
%%
the other hand+ advocated resistance to Bapanese aggression as the most important national
o0:ective+ even as the Communists were struggling to survive against Nationalist military
campaigns# $s Bapan drove further into China in the late 1'>&s and early 1',&s+ 0oth Nationalist
and Communist Chinese 0ecame involved in active resistance to Bapanese aggression+ 0ut the
Communists gained a reputation as 0eing more successful# Many Chinese even came to 0elieve
the P8$ was a ma:or force in defeating Bapan in /orld /ar II 1!halley 1'))*5%2# /hatever the
facts+ the important point is that the Communists esta0lished a reputation among the Chinese
masses for aggressively opposing foreign intervention in China# This+ among other reasons+
persuaded many Chinese to support the Communists when the Chinese Civil /ar resumed after
1',6#
!pon victory and unification in 1','+ Mao Iedong and the communist leadership of the
People<s Repu0lic of China 1PRC2 reali4ed that the traditional Chinese method of cultural 0ut
pacific domination of other states was not an affective guide to PRC foreign policy# Instead+ the
CCP leadership maintained that China was indeed a great and special nation+ with the
implication that the two transcendent goal of Chinese foreign policy were rigid territorial defense
and a desire to 0ecome the most revolutionary of the world<s communist states 1Fair0an-+
Reischauer and Craig 1'56* )7'2#
Though Mao<s 0est -nown war strategy is the ?People<s /ar+@ this was not the strategy
that actually guided Chinese foreign policy during the Cold /ar# This is so 0ecause the People<s
/ar was only appropriate against incursions 0y a foreign power into Chinese territory+ and
although China was periodically threatened+ no country invaded China during the Cold /ar#
3owever+ there were several instances where Chinese 0orders were threatened# $lthough Mao
did not write a0out specific procedures to counter limited threats+ a clear pattern emerged in
%>
Chinese responses to those threats during the Cold /ar 1Gurtov and 3uang 1''%*%65(%6)2# This
pattern involved Chinese recognition of a perceived threat+ and then the underta-ing of a pre(
emptive attac- that would 0e followed 0y either a pause of negotiation or a prompt Chinese
withdrawal# The desired effect was to show pro0a0le aggressors that China had gained the
initiative or to ?teach the enemy a lesson#@ China employed this strategy in 1'6& against the
$mericans in =orea+ in 1'5% against India and again in 1'5' in 0order clashes with the oviets#
In the cases of =orea 1/hiting 1'5&2 and the 0order clashes with the oviets+ China calculated
that although the penalties might 0e severe+ it would 0e 0eneficial to ta-e military action# This
strategy provided an accepta0le means of territorial defense given the nature of limited threats to
China+ 0ut it also gave China the opportunity to demonstrate that it was a true leader in
worldwide communist revolution#
THE CASES COMPARED
The $merican attempt to deter a Tur-ish war against Greece over the Cyprus issue in
1'5, is the specific decision within the pattern to 0e analy4ed and compared# $lthough Russett
and 3uth identify Greece as the guardian state in this case+ historical accounts clearly show that
the !nited tates played a more significant role in the effort to deter the Tur-ish invasion 1Fall
1')%* >6&2# 8e0ow and tein do identify the ! as the guardian state and 0elieve it to 0e the
most impressive of the three cases they identified as 0eing successful immediate e.tended
deterrence encounters# The ! attempt to deter a Tur-ish attac- on Cyprus 1which conventional
wisdom held would automatically trigger a war with Greece2 came in the form of a letter from
President Bohnson which declared that the !nited tates would pull out of Tur-ey and e.pose it
to oviet invasion should Tur-ey initiate war over Cyprus# This communication+ forever after
%,
simply -nown as the ?Bohnson letter+@ caused Tur-ish president Inonu to immediately cancel
invasion plans# I am suggesting that Tur-ey<s strong affiliation with N$TC+ a sym0ol of its
affiliation with the /est+ was the deciding factor in Inonu<s decision# For while many in Tur-ey
were angered 0y the Bohnson letter and angry at N$TC+ the Tur-ish government 0elieved that
leaving N$TC would ?Dslow Tur-ey down on her road toward the fundamental goal of
0ecoming an e;ual mem0er of the /estern society of nations@ 1Gali 1'71*15,2#
The second decision to 0e analy4ed is the unsuccessful oviet attempt to deter the
Chinese invasion of Gietnam in 1'7'# Foth Russett and 3uth+ and 8e0ow and tein locate this
case in the category of unsuccessful immediate e.tended deterrence# 8i-e the $merican attempt
to deter Tur-ish action against Cyprus+ it involves a superpower playing the role of guardian
state# Auring the late 1'7&s the oviet !nion and Gietnam 0egan to esta0lish friendlier ties in
what was already a close relationship# $s Gietnam successfully invaded its western neigh0ors in
Indochina+ 8aos and Cam0odia 1who received Chinese support2+ China 0egan to feel that it was
0eing encircled# The Chinese 0egan to ma-e noises a0out invading Gietnam+ and the Russians
and Gietnamese signed a Treaty of Friendship# The treaty did not stipulate definite oviet
intervention if Gietnamese 0orders were violated+ 0ut oviet Premier Fre4hnev did ma-e it clear
that this was a possi0ility that China must -eep in mind 1Gil-s 1''%* %1)2# $ccording to simple
power calculations+ if Tur-ey gave in to $merican threats of removing N$TC protection+ China
would definitely yield to a much more powerful contiguous state that could easily invade
Chinese territory# Jet this was not the case# Conceiva0ly+ China had much more to lose than
Tur-ey did for going its own way+ 0ut prior patterns of Chinese action led China to act in a
contrary manner# 3owever+ Chinese foreign policy called for a much different way of dealing
with stronger states than did the precepts of $tatur- to which the Tur-s adhered# $s with the
%6
Tur-ish case+ however+ I will demonstrate that China<s uni;ue perceptions a0out itself and its
place in the world led to the decision to underta-e punitive action against Gietnam#
Cyprus is located in the Mediterranean ea off Tur-ey<s southeastern coast and is
populated 0y 0oth Tur-s and Gree-s# 3istorically part of the Cttoman Hmpire+ it was ceded to
Great Fritain after /orld /ar I# Though relations 0etween Gree-s and Tur-s on Cyprus were
amica0le under Fritish rule+ this was to change as Fritish power e00ed after /orld /ar II# In
1'6' Cyprus gained limited independence with a constitution stipulating that minority rights
would 0e upheld 0y the guarantor powers of Tur-ey+ Greece and Great Fritain# 3owever+ in the
fall of 1'5> the Gree- president of Cyprus+ Ma-arios+ 0egan to campaign for changes in the
Cypriot constitution that would deny the rights of Cypriot Tur-s+ leading to ethnic violence
0etween Cypriot Gree-s and Tur-s# In Aecem0er 1'5> fighting 0ro-e out+ with a total of >&&
dead on 0oth sides# Fritain sent troops to the Cypriot capitol of Nicosia soon after to contain
hostilities+ 0ut then 0oth Gree- and Tur- Cypriots demanded a0andonment of the Cypriot
constitution+ with Tur-ey advocating partition of the island# /aning resources led the Fritish to
as- for ! intervention+ and the !N organi4ed a peace-eeping force 1!NFICJP2 to ta-e over at
the re;uest of the !# This did not deter 0oth Greece and Tur-ey from ma-ing plans to send
military forces to Cyprus to protect their respective populations on the island as fighting
continued in $pril and May of 1'5>#
$lthough the Tur-s lac-ed landing craft and were ine.perienced in amphi0ious
operations 13arris 1')6*1))2+ 0y late spring it seemed certain Tur-ey would nevertheless invade
1Bames %&&%*1&52+ possi0ly on Bune 5 1Filge 1'76* 1512# In order to prevent the first ever war
0etween N$TC mem0ers+ possi0ly provo-ing oviet intervention+ in Bune $merican president
Bohnson sent Tur-ish president Inonu a letter stating that if Tur-ish intervention on Cyprus did
%5
provo-e oviet intervention+ N$TC would not 0e o0ligated to protect Tur-ey 1Fall 1')%* >612#
In reaction to the ?Bohnson letter+@ Tur-ey cancelled plans to invade Cyprus#
To understand why Tur-ey cancelled the planned invasion of Cyprus+ the nature and seriousness
of the $merican threat+ and the potential oviet threat on which it was 0ased+ must first 0e
evaluated# Bohnson certainly sought to deter Tur-ish intervention on Cyprus+ 0ut it was only a
threat contingent upon oviet action# $t the time+ a oviet move against Tur-ey or any other
state in /estern Hurope was unli-ely# 1The only country the oviet !nion openly invaded during
the entire Cold /ar was $fghanistan+ a non(N$TC mem0er#2 Instead+ it was typical for the
oviets to maintain a low profile in these types of disputes while providing aid to the party it
favored 13osmer and /olfe 1')>* 166(1652# In fact+ when hostilities flared again on Cyprus in
$ugust of 1'5,+ Ma-arios as-ed for oviet intervention and was re0uffed 1Cohen 1'',*
%),(%)62# 3owever+ in eptem0er Russia did give the Gree- Cypriots anti(aircraft weapons+
conforming to its 0ehavioral pattern in these situations# Hven then+ the oviets also may have
sought to reassure Tur-ey that these weapons could 0e used for defensive purposes only
1/ynfred and Gil0ert 1'5'* %%2# In light of these facts+ the threat of oviet invasion against
Tur-ey in response to Tur-ish actions against Cyprus seems du0ious indeed#
$s unli-ely as oviet intervention was+ it is even less li-ely that the ! would have
refused to help Tur-ey if oviet intervention occurred# For two decades it had 0een an
overarching goal of ! foreign policy to defend /estern Hurope from oviet e.pansion+ would
the ! have a0andoned /estern Hurope to punish Tur-eyE $lso+ while the ! was the leading
mem0er of N$TC+ it could not force other states to comply with a decision that would have 0oth
violated the N$TC charter and represented a direct threat to the security of /estern Hurope# In
addition to stating that ! support of Tur-ey was uncertain in the event of Tur-ish action against
%7
Cyprus and resultant oviet intervention+ Bohnson also stated that Tur-ey had no right to use
weapons against Cyprus that were provided 0y the ! for defensive purposes only# Could this
have compelled Tur-ey to stand downE In a material since+ it is unli-ely# Tur-ey already
possessed the weapons and could have made future weapons purchase from /estern Hurope if
the ! cut off aid# 3owever+ the psychological conse;uences of the ! potentially cutting of aid
may have affected the Tur-ish attention+ as one scholar commenting on the ! suspension of aid
to Tur-ey following the 1'7, Cyprus crisis claims that suspension ?Dwould leave deep
psychological scarsDthat would haunt the relationship for a long time to come@ 13arris
1'76*7%2#
$s 0oth oviet intervention and corresponding $merican a0andonment were 0oth
unli-ely+ other reasons+ including psychological ones+ must 0e considered# President Inonu<s
response to Bohnson reflected 0oth disillusionment concerning the supposed special relationship
0etween the two countries and refle.ive defense of Tur-ey<s commitment to /estern
international organi4ations 1Inonu 1'55* >'& and >'%2# This may provide an answer to why
Tur-ey cancelled the invasion of Cyprus in 1'5,# Instead of acting ?naively@ as one scholar
claimed 1Celi- 1'''* .iii2+ Tur-ey may have simply 0een acting as it had in the past+ placating a
strong country of the civili4ation with which Tur-ey wished to 0e identified# Inonu himself was
li-ely to have this attitude+ as he was more westerni4ed than past Tur-ish leaders 1Gol-an and
It4-owit4 1'',* 1)'(1'&2 and refused to ?D;uestion the N$TC alliance+ for to do so would
have meant ;uestioning the very foundations on which the Tur-ish regime rested@ 1$hmad1''>*
,&72#
If Tur-ey was compelled 0y psychological reasons to forego an invasion that would not
have li-ely 0een credi0ly opposed 0y the ! and other /estern powers+ what would China do in
%)
a situation vis(L(vis the oviet !nion in which the oviet threat of action against China was
more dangerous and more credi0leE It is this that now must 0e considered# Though the Chinese
have fre;uently committed 0order incursions into Gietnam throughout history+ China and
Gietnam maintained a close relationship from 1',' to 1'76 due to their common interest in
defeating /estern imperialism# Their common front wea-ened somewhat 1'5' due to the death
of 3o Chi Minh+ who had 0een particularly adept at maintaining good relations with China and
Russia+ and further deteriorated with Gietnamese victory in the outh in 1'76# This is 0ecause
Gietnam increasingly tilted toward the oviet !nion in the ino(oviet split 0ecause ?DMoscow
was very powerful+ strongly anti(Chinese and very far awayD@ allowing Gietnam ?Dto preserve
its con;uests and -eep as independent as possi0le@ 1Griffith 1')%*1,12#
Throughout the second half of the 1'7&s+ China and Gietnam maneuvered to dominate
outheast $sia+ with Gietnam fearing traditional Chinese encroachment and China see-ing to
prevent encirclement 0y Russia and Gietnam# Gietnam negotiated a ?Treaty of Friendship and
olidarity@ with 8aos in $ugust 1'77+ as the PRC sought to foster a strong Cam0odia+ controlled
0y the =hmer Rouge+ to resist Gietnamese hegemony in Indochina 1Jahuda 1')>*%%52# In
Aecem0er 1'77 Gietnam 0egan military operations against Cam0odia in response to =hmer
Rouge 0order incursions+ leading to total withdrawal of all Chinese aid to Gietnam in 1'7)# In
Novem0er 1'7) Gietnam and the oviet !nion signed a ?Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship+@
e.plicitly involving economic assistance and naval refueling rights+ 0ut the implicit intent of the
treaty was containment and deterrence of China 1Iagoria and imon 1')%*16)2# Though the
treaty did not ma-e any stipulation for military assistance in case of attac-+ 0oth oviet leader
Fre4hnev and Gietnam<s 8e Auan stated that China would have to a0ide 0y the treaty<s
implications 1Gil-s 1''%*%1)2# The Chinese Polit0uro met during the last wee-s of 1'7) to
%'
decide how to respond to the treaty+ and Aeng Miaoping and others ultimately decided to mount a
preemptive stri-e against Gietnam along the lines of earlier Chinese 0order dispute responses#
Though Aeng 0elieved oviet intervention might 0e provo-ed+ he predicted oviet attac-s would
0e limited 1Chen 1')7* )72#
$s Chinese leaders were deciding to punish Gietnam+ Gietnam overran Cam0odia# Aeng
visited the ! to complete diplomatic normali4ation 0etween the two countries+ and while there
told President Carter that China would launch a limited attac- on Gietnam 1Carter 1')%*%&52#
Aeng<s visit to the ! drew criticism from oviet Russia on &) Fe0ruary+ including a warning
against ?overstepping the for0idden line@ in Gietnam 13su 1')>* )%62# The warning went
unheeded as P8$ tan-s crossed the Gietnamese 0order on 17 Fe0ruary with the purposed of
?teaching Gietnam a lesson#@ Harly Chinese attac-s met wea- resistance as Gietnamese 0order
troops were largely ine.perienced+ and as the P8$ too- the village of 8ao Cai+ %6-m inside
Gietnam+ it 0ecame apparent that the Chinese o0:ective was the capture of the larger village of
8ang on# Fy the second wee- of hostilities the Chinese had driven ,&-m inside Gietnam+ 0ut
were 0ecoming 0ogged down as more e.perienced Gietnamese troops were rushed to the front#
ee-ing a way to declare victory and get out+ the P8$ increased artillery 0arrages against 8ang
on and reinforced P8$ infantry in the area+ hoping to ta-e 8ang on 0efore withdrawing# Cn &6
March the P8$ 0egan retreating without having achieved any of its military o0:ectives+ though
China claimed otherwise 1Chen 1')7* 11>(1162# $s the short and 0rutal war ended 10etween
si.ty and seventy thousand -illed2+ it was clear that Gietnam was gaining the advantage#
$s if Gietnamese opposition wasn<t enough+ the threat of Russian intervention hung in air
throughout the short war# Cn 1) Fe0ruary Moscow demanded a Chinese withdrawal+ and !
sources reported that Russia was pondering a limited invasion of China 1Baco0sen 1')1*')2# Fy
>&
%% Fe0ruary oviet aircraft were overflying the 0attlefield+ additional oviet ships were en route
to the outh China ea+ a oviet military delegation arrived in 3anoi and 0oth 3anoi and
Moscow stated Russia would fulfill treaty o0ligations if Chinese action continued# Fy the second
wee- of hostilities+ oviet ships and aircraft carrying military aid arrived in Gietnam+ and Pravda
warned that the war might ?e.pand@ unless China withdrew 1Baco0sen 1')1*1&%2#
From a strictly military standpoint+ it is difficult to see why China undertoo- its punitive
invasion of Gietnam# The P8$ was far from a modern force+ and encountered su0stantial
organi4ational+ logistical+ and communications pro0lems during the operation 1hort 1')%* >>%2#
Gietnam had a 0attle tested+ superior fighting force and the oviet !nion had an immense
technological advantage+ particularly in aircraft and missiles# To understand why China attac-ed
Gietnam one must loo- 0eyond the military 0alance of power# In response to ;uestions 0y
/estern military e.perts concerning the prudence of the operation+ one scholar claims that China
0elieved its credi0ility was at sta-e and wanted to ?Dshow the world that China did not fear war
or the threat of oviet intervention 13su 1')>*%72# $nother commentator claims China attac-ed
Gietnam to ?Dreassert the traditional Chinese prerogative of ?chastising the 0ar0arians within
the traditional Chinese areas of hegemony@ 1Benc-s 1'7'* )&>2# The fact that China retreated
does not mean the Chinese were not ris- acceptant# The possi0ility of uncontrolled escalation
was present throughout the conflict+ as it was in the =orean /ar+ ino(Indian /ar and the !ssuri
River clashes with the oviets in 1'5'# China<s decision to attac- Gietnam and su0se;uent
withdrawal conforms to the pattern of these earlier operations# The ino(Gietnamese /ar
specifically and the pattern generally can only 0e e.plained 0y ta-ing 0oth China<s traditional
feeling of superiority and the tenets of %&
th
century revolutionary Mar.ism into account#
>1
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The implications of this study fall into three 0road categories# First+ this study can
provide a model for overcoming the division 0etween nomothetic 1historical2 and ideographic
1anthropological2 studies# Fy ta-ing 0oth time and place into account+ the proposed model
allows for 0oth change and constancy in yielding answers to ;uestions regarding why societies
ma-e the policy choices that they do# $lso+ the model provides possi0le solutions to some of
international relations theory<s current pro0lems regarding change and prediction# It does this 0y
offering a way to integrate the cultural perspectives of specific states with the prevailing social
characteristics of the international system# /hile there have 0een many calls for theory in 0oth
international relations and foreign policy studies to accommodate perceptual factors 1$l-er 1''%9
3aas 1''79 /e0er 1''62+ not many concrete proposals of models that would actually do this
have 0een put forward# This model is one that could 0e employed for understanding and also
predicting foreign policies of specific states#
The third implication of this study is that area and actor specific information is important
and useful for the practice of foreign policy# /hile many international relations scholars have
neglected the importance of area specific information+ foreign policy practitioners disagree and
disregard much of grand international relations theory 0ecause of the lac- of emphasis on area
specific factors 1George 1''>* 1>&2# Fy creating a model that heavily relies on actor specific
information+ it is hoped that foreign policy studies can 0e made more useful for foreign policy
practitioners# More specifically+ this study contri0utes to the general understanding of immediate
e.tended deterrence and in what cases it will 0e effective# The immediate e.tended deterrence
studies noted a0ove 13uth and Russett+ 1'),9 1'))9 8e0ow and tein+ 1'))2 focus on the actions
>%
and outloo- of the defending party+ not the attac-ing party# This study focuses solely on the
perceptions of the attac-ing party# This is important for those practicing immediate e.tended
deterrence 1the defending party2 0ecause the effectiveness of a particular deterrence strategy is
dependent on the intentions of the adversary against whom the strategy is underta-en 1$.elrod
1'),* >&2# /ithout a particular understanding of how a potential adversary is interpreting the
deterring signals it sends+ a defending state is more li-ely to fail in its efforts to deter an attac- on
a friendly third party#
This is particularly relevant to decision ma-ing in $merican foreign policy 0ecause of the
! role as glo0al superpower# $lthough foreign policy issues such as terrorism are increasingly
important+ much of $merican foreign policy involves preventing or moderating conflict in
various regions of the world# $s different crises arise+ an enhanced understanding of a specific
country<s foreign policy orientation may aid ! officials in deciding which threats are more
serious than others and whether diplomatic initiatives are li-ely to 0e successful or not#
>>
/CR= CITHA
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8ittle Frown#
$.elrod+ Ro0ert# 1'),# Hvolution of Cooperation. New Jor-* Fasic Foo-s#
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Fueno de Mes;uita+ Fruce# 1')1# The /ar Trap# New 3aven* Jale !niversity Press#
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tudy of International Relations# C.ford* C.ford !niversity Press#
Cahen+ Claude# 1'5)# Pre(Cttoman Tur-ey# New Jor-* Taplinger Pu0lishing Company#
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Routledge
Celi-+ Jasemin# 1'''# Contemporary Tur-ish Foreign Policy# /estport+ Connecticut* Praeger#
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Csepeli+ Gyorgy# 1''7# National Identity in Contemporary 3ungary# New Jor-* Colum0ia
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Aanilov+ Gladimir# 1')1# ?=emalism and /orld Peace+@ $tatur-* Founder of the Modern tate+
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Aietrich+ Bohn /# 1'''# ?Interest Groups and Foreign Policy* Clinton and the China MFN
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Haston+ Aavid# 1'57# ?The Current Meaning of Fehavioralism+@ Contemporary Political
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Fair0an-+ Bohn =ing+ and Hdwin C# Reischauer and $l0ert Craig# 1'56# Hast $sia* The Modern
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Foucault+ Michel# 1'))# Politics+ Philosophy+ Culture* Interviews and Cther /ritings+
1'77(1'),# New Jor-* Routledge#
Geert4+ Clifford# 1'7># The Interpretation of Cultures# New Jor-* Fasic Foo-s+ Inc#
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The 8egacy of China+ Raymond Aawson+ ed# C.ford* C.ford !niversity Press# >,&(>5%#
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%'(,5#
Inglehart+ Ronald# 1'71# ?The ilent Revolution in Hurope* Intergenerational Change in Post(
Industrialist ocieties+@ $merican Political cience Review# 56* ''1(1&17#
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3oughton Mifflin#
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Baco0sen+ G#C# 1')1# ino(oviet Relations ince Mao* The Chairman<s 8egacy# New Jor-*
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Bames+ $lan# %&&%# =eeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1'5>(5,# New Jor-* Palgrave#
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((((1'66# ?Tur-ey* /esterni4ation+@ !nity and Gariety in Muslim Civili4ation+ Gustav von
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Mango+ $ndrew# 1'''# $tatur-* The Fiography of the Founder of Modern Tur-ey# New Jor-*
Cverloo- Press#
Mansfield+ Hdward+ and Bac- nyder# 1''6# ?Aemocrati4ation and /ar+@ Foreign $ffairs+ 7,+
No# >+ 7'('7#
Mantovani+ Giusseppe# %&&&# H.ploring Forders* !nderstanding Culture and Psychology#
Philadelphia* Taylor and Francis#
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Michael+ Fran4 and George Taylor# 1'65# The Far Hast in the Modern /orld# New Jor-* 3enry
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Miller+ 8ynn# 1'',# Glo0al Crder* Galues and Power in International Politics# Foulder+ CC*
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Aemocracy+ Interdependence+ and International Conflict+@ Bournal of Peace Research+ >>+ 11(%)#
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Repu0lic# New Jor-* New Jor- !niversity Press#
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Reischauer+ Hdwin and Bohn =ing Fair0an-# 1'5&# Hast $sia* The Great Tradition# 1Golume 12#
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$pproach to the tudy of International Relations# New Jor-* The Free Press of Glencoe#
Tachau+ Fran-# 1'),# Tur-ey* The Politics of $uthority+ Aemocracy+ and Aevelopment# New
Jor-* Praeger#
Teng+ su(Ju and Bohn =# Fair0an-# 1'7># China<s Response to the /est* $ Aocumentary
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Thompson+ Michael+ Richard B# Hllis+ and $aron /ildavs-y# 1''&# Cultural Theory# New Jor-*
/estview Press#
Triandis+ 3arry C# 1'',# Culture and ocial Fehavior# New Jor-* McGraw 3ill+ Inc#
Tse+ Aavid =# et al# 1'))# ?Aoes Culture MatterE $ Cross(Cultural tudy of H.ecutives Choice+
Aecisiveness+ and Ris- $d:ustment in International Mar-eting+@ Bournal of Mar-eting+ 6%+
1)1(1'6#
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!halley+ tephen+ Br# 1'))# 3istory of the Chinese Communist Party# tanford+ C$* 3oover
Institution Press#
!lam+ $dam# 1'5)# H.pansion and Coe.istence* The 3istory of oviet Foreign Policy+
1'17(1'57# New Jor-* Praeger#
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3op-ins Press#
Gol-an+ Gami- and Norman It4-owit4# 1'',# Tur-s and Gree-s* Neigh0ors in Conflict#
3untingdon+ Hngland* The Hothen Press#
((((1'7'# Theory of International Politics# Reading+ M$* $ddison /esley#
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/e0er+ Cynthia# 1''6# timulating overeignty* Intervention+ the tate and ym0olic H.change#
Cam0ridge* Cam0ridge !niversity Press#
/endt+ $le.ander# 1'''# ocial Theory of International Politics# Cam0ridge* Cam0ridge
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/ynfred+ Boshua and tephen Gi0ert# 1'5'# $rms for the Third /orld* oviet Military $id
Aiplomacy# Faltimore* Bohns 3op-ins !niversity#
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,1