No.

_________
================================================================
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
DR. JEFFREY D. ISAACS,
Petitioner,
v.
TRUSTEES OF DARTMOUTH COLLEGE,
DARTMOUTH-HITCHCOCK MEDICAL CENTER,
MARY HITCHCOCK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,
and DR. CHRISTINE T. FINN,
Respondents.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
AND APPLICATION FOR
INJUNCTION PENDING RESOLUTION
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
JEFFREY ISAACS
3553 West Chester Pike, #177
Newtown Square, PA 19073
Telephone: (610) 202-1460
Email: jdi.99@dartmouth.edu
Petitioner
================================================================
i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

On January 15, 2012, Petitioner Jeffrey David
Isaacs transmitted to Dartmouth College a request to
preserve electronic evidence under Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Three days later,
Dr. Isaacs physician email account disappeared, de-
spite the fact he was actively employed as a doctor at
Dartmouth-Hitchcock hospital. In two more days, his
medical charts at Dartmouth-Hitchcock would disap-
pear. Isaacs filed a claim against Dartmouth in the
United States District Court for New Hampshire, as-
serting that he witnessed an elaborate fraud carried
out over six months. Recognizing that discarded elec-
tronic evidence harmed his case and permanently
ended his medical career, he sought an injunction
under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to return to the program at Dartmouth that ousted
him. When the New Hampshire District denied the
injunction, the Petitioner noticed an appeal to the
First Circuit. The First Circuit blocked the filing of
an appeal brief, citing their lack of jurisdiction over
the matter.
1) Does First Circuit jurisdiction cover an interlocu-
tory injunction seeking redress from discovery non-
compliance, as defined under Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure?
2) Does the language of Rule 37 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which prescribes just orders up
to default judgment, directly authorize an injunctive
sanction as a remedy?
ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued

3) Is it in the public interest to deny the right to
appeal an injunction seeking redress from substantial
and intentional ESI (electronically stored informa-
tion) loss?
4) Were sanctions indicated for Dartmouths overall
pattern of ESI destruction, including data from an
actigraph medical device lost the same week the
hospital physicians email account was deleted?
5) Under 18 U.S.C. 1503, should the New Hamp-
shire District Court or the First Circuit have granted
Petitioners request to investigate this obstruction of
justice?

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... v
OPINIONS BELOW ............................................... 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ........................ 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRO-
VISIONS .............................................................. 2
INTRODUCTION ................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................ 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
AND ISSUING AN INJUNCTION PENDING
RESOLUTION IN THE LOWER COURTS ....... 12
I. The First Circuit erroneously barred an
appeal citing lack of jurisdiction to review
an injunctive sanction for E-Discovery non-
compliance .................................................... 12
II. The First Circuit set an undesirable prece-
dent by failing to recognize that ESI de-
struction is a form of civil obstruction of
process .......................................................... 21
III. The proposed injunction to return Dr. Isaacs
to his training program was an appropri-
ate sanction to address and to discourage
willful ESI discovery noncompliance .......... 23
IV. After the District Court let Dartmouth off
the hook for e-discovery sanctions, ten sub-
sequent deponents refused to answer ques-
tions or recall any substantive facts ........... 26
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued
Page
V. No administrative procedures were fol-
lowed nor does an Administrative Record
exist with regard to the termination of Dr.
Isaacs. The All Writs Act allows this Court
to mitigate Applicants loss of career pend-
ing resolution ............................................... 34
CONCLUSION ....................................................... 40

APPENDIX
First Circuit Court of Appeals Judgment Filed
March 31, 2014 ................................................. App. 1
District Court Order Filed November 4, 2013 ...... App. 3
First Circuit Order of Court Filed May 5, 2014 ... App. 12


v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Banks v. Enova Fin., 2012 WL 5995729 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 30, 2012) .................................................... 24
Barnhill v. U.S., 11 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1993) ........... 23
Barrette Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Michigan Resin
Representatives, No. 11-13335, 2013 WL
3983230 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2013) ......................... 23
Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Specialties, Inc., 2012 WL 3217858 (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) .................................................... 22
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) ....................................................................... 38
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 409
U.S. 1235 (1972) ...................................................... 38
E.E.O.C. v. Frys Electronics, Inc., 2012 WL
1642305 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2012) ...................... 24
Fishman v. Schaeffer, 429 U.S. 1325 (1976) .............. 38
Lux v. Rodrigues, 131 S. Ct. 5 (2010) ......................... 38
Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy, Inc. v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commn, 479 U.S. 1312
(1986) ....................................................................... 38
Pringle v. Adams, 2012 WL 1103939 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 2012) ......................................................... 25
Scott v. IBM Corporation, 196 F.R.D. 233
(D.N.J. 2000) ........................................................... 23
Zubulake V, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July
20, 2004) ...................................................... 22, 23, 40
vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Continued
Page
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. 1503 ................................................... 19, 21
28 U.S.C. 1292 ........................................................... 2
28 U.S.C. 1651(a) ..................................................... 38
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ............. 11

RULES
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure ................................................ 5, 13, 14, 15, 17
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure .............................................................. 5, 6, 12
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The First Circuit decision denying Isaacs appeal
for lack of jurisdiction is reprinted in the Appendix
(App.) 1a-2a. A motion for rehearing en banc is re-
printed at App. 12a-13a. The New Hampshire District
Court order denying an injunctive sanction is re-
printed at App. 3a-11a. These opinions are not re-
ported.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The New Hampshire District Court denied a pre-
liminary structural injunction on June 8, 2012 to
mandate Dartmouths adherence to its due process
bylaws. A preliminary injunction specified in a Mo-
tion for Sanctions was denied on November 4, 2013.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292, the First Circuit had
jurisdiction over the District Courts denial of in-
terlocutory injunctions. The First Circuit entered a
Judgment on March 31, 2014 citing lack of jurisdic-
tion and forbidding the Petitioner from filing the
Opening Appellate Brief. A Petition for Rehearing En
Banc was denied on May 5, 2014.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1) to review this
Petition. Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651,
this Court has authority to grant injunctive relief
pending final resolution of the matters.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------
2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
28 U.S.C. 1292 Interlocutory decisions
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c)
and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district
courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of
the Canal Zone, the District Court of
Guam, and the District Court of the Vir-
gin Islands, or of the judges thereof,
granting, continuing, modifying, refus-
ing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing
to dissolve or modify injunctions, except
where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court . . .
RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE DISCLOSURES OR
TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY; SANCTIONS
(b) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT OR-
DER.
(2) Sanctions Sought in the District
Where the Action Is Pending.
(A) For Not Obeying a Discovery Order.
If a party or a partys officer, director, or
managing agent or a witness designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4) fails to obey
an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or

3
37(a), the court where the action is pending
may issue further just orders. They may in-
clude the following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced
in the order or other designated facts be
taken as established for purposes of the ac-
tion, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party
from supporting or opposing designated
claims or defenses, or from introducing des-
ignated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in
part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until
the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding
in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against
the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the
failure to obey any order except an order to
submit to a physical or mental examination.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

INTRODUCTION
Medical residency is difficult. Petitioner Jeffrey
David Isaacs commenced a surgery residency in June
2010 at the University of Arizona. Within several
days, he was told he lacked the technical skills to
4
become a surgeon. Peculiarly, Dr. Isaacs had no
difficulty performing the single surgical procedure he
had been assigned at Arizona a subcuticular suture
for a cancer patient. During medical school, Dr. Isaacs
achieved higher national medical board scores than
the average neurosurgeon and honors on most of
his clinical rotations. Nonetheless, he reluctantly
resigned from the Arizona program after a month, at
the recommendation of his Program Director.
Unable to obtain another surgery post, Dr. Isaacs
accepted a residency position offered by the Dart-
mouth College Department of Psychiatry. Within
days, Dr. Isaacs supervisors at Dartmouth placed
him under informal, then formal, probation. At that
point, Petitioner alleges he was ordered to conduct
heinous acts that coincided with his own medical
deterioration. Isaacs became a patient at Dartmouth-
Hitchcock, during the six months he worked there as
a doctor. Unable to stay awake more than three hours
at a time, he was prescribed a wearable actigraph
device to monitor his deteriorating health. Cardiac
arrhythmias began at this point; a later study at
the University of Pennsylvania detected ventricular
tachycardia, an often fatal cardiac condition.
Isaacs persevered with his training at Dartmouth
for six months. His primary instructor gave him
above average marks for his work with patients.
However, on January 13, 2012 his Program Director,
Respondent/Defendant Finn, informed him that he
would likely be fired for allegedly forgetting to use his
stethoscope on one patient.
5
The Petitioner suddenly realized that for reasons
very different from his medical skills and knowledge,
he was unwanted in the eyes of his Program Direc-
tors at Arizona and Dartmouth. In 2006, Isaacs had
unknowingly intercepted questionable communica-
tions between a Director of the National Institutes of
Health and The White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy Committee on Counterterrorism,
and the Dean of his medical school. This interception
occurred when Isaacs emails utilized a new return
receipt technology named ReadNotify. This unleashed
fury from the Dean and the NIH Director, and a re-
taliation lawsuit ensued for two years in the Central
California District. Five years later, someone didnt
want Isaacs to become a licensed physician because of
his prior litigation and subsequently leaked sealed
records to Arizona and Dartmouth.
Realizing the gravity of the situation, Isaacs sent
a letter to Dartmouths President Jim Yong Kim re-
questing an investigation under the Dartmouth Busi-
ness Ethics Code that Kim himself had written. The
letter instructed Dartmouth to preserve electronic
evidence, pursuant to FRCP 34, in the event the
matter went to court. Several days after this evidence
preservation request, Petitioner Isaacs entire Dart-
mouth email account was flagged for deletion. That
same week, Dr. Isaacs actigraph results disappeared
from his patient chart at Dartmouth.
In mid-March 2012, Isaacs emailed Dartmouth
relaying his concern about Kims inaction on the Eth-
ics investigation request. Isaacs began to be suspicious
6
of Dartmouths silence, particularly as he was never
given any formal notice of Administrative Leave.
Likewise, the person he was imploring for help Jim
Yong Kim worked for ten years at the International
Health faculty of Harvard Medical School with the
aforementioned NIH defendant. A week after email-
ing his concern, and several days before Kims nomi-
nation to the World Bank became public, Isaacs was
terminated from Dartmouths training program. It
is believed Dr. Isaacs was the first resident in Dart-
mouth history to be terminated before the peer
review Fair Hearing required under Dartmouth
accreditation bylaws.
As a sanction for deleting important evidence,
Petitioner applied to the District Court for a prelimi-
nary injunction that would permit his return to work.
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
for sanctions up to and including summary or default
judgment. The District Court refused to investigate
the matter. The First Circuit barred Isaacs from even
filing an appeal, citing lack of jurisdiction. Unable
to participate in the federal Medicare funded residen-
cy training system, Dr. Isaacs has effectively been
banned forever from becoming a practicing physician.
The Supreme Court is the last remaining hope to
correct nearly a decade of injustice Petitioner faced in
his training to become a doctor.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------


7
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Chronologically, this case commences with events
that transpired in 1997. The Petitioner suffered a
concussion after being assaulted by an intoxicated
Dartmouth College student. Without any prior medi-
cal history, new concentration difficulties necessitated
that the Petitioner drop his pre-med curriculum,
prompting his professor to write the following to the
Dean of Students:
Im concerned about a 99, one Jeff
Isaacs, who recently dropped my class
(Chemistry 5). He seemed distraught, almost
in tears, about having to drop and told me
about having been hit in the head during
break I believe, and its subsequent effect on
his studies. I got the impression that this kid
really needs help and thought Id better let
you know. (USCA Appendix p. 66).
The Dartmouth administration failed to inter-
vene despite the warning. Nonetheless Isaacs did
earn an A.B. Honors degree in Computer Science
without delay. The Petitioner ultimately completed
his pre-med studies through a circuitous route span-
ning some seven years, in efforts to fulfill his long-
term goal of becoming a brain surgeon. These seven
years included obtaining his commercial pilot license,
working as an investment banker at Merrill Lynch in
New York City, working at an internet startup group
in Paris that yielded Europes first Internet IPO,
completing an MBA program at Wharton, and per-
haps most significantly, receiving a full scholarship to
8
Vanderbilt Law School where Isaacs was enrolled
for just under a year. Isaacs graduated from medical
school in 2010, where his score of 241/99 on the
United States Medical Licensing Exam surpassed the
average neurosurgeon. As a medical student, he re-
ceived honors in most of his two years of competitive
clinical medical student rotations at the Cleveland
Clinic (orthopedics & emergency medicine), Mount
Sinai School of Medicine (neurosurgery and ophthal-
mology), and St. Georges University of London (der-
matology, obstetrics and radiology).
The Petitioner returned to Dartmouth in July
2011 to pursue neuroscience research and preventa-
tive medicine as a resident physician with the Dart-
mouth College Department of Psychiatry. During his
employment, the Petitioner spent 90% of his time
working with one Dr. Donald West, who gave him
pretty much superior evaluations (Isaacs Deposition
p. 113). The other 10% of the time comprised of his
first week of employment on the internal medicine
ward, roughly two dozen after-hours on-call shifts, as
well as his final week at Dartmouth, ending January
13, 2012. It is this 10% of Petitioners time at Dart-
mouth, which was managed by senior Program Direc-
tors with knowledge of Keck, that is under dispute
in the underlying lawsuit and alleged to have consti-
tuted a major fraud against Isaacs and the Medicare
reimbursement system.
On Friday January 13, 2012, the Petitioner was
admitted to the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Emergency
9
Room. In the ED, the Plaintiff frantically hand-wrote
a criminal complaint:
At approximately 10AM this morning I
learned of illegal workplace behavior I have
been subjected to by DHMC staff and Dart-
mouth College professors. (USCA Appendix
p. 211).
This is where the case and understanding how
a generally well achieving doctor suddenly suc-
cumbed to a medical breakdown becomes compli-
cated. In 2010, Isaacs worked as a surgeon at the
University of Arizona and Tucson Veterans Admin-
istration Hospital for six weeks, at which point he
voluntarily resigned. By his third day of work at
Arizona, he was told he was far behind his peers and
faced peculiar criticisms of poor technical ability, de-
spite only ever being asked to do one technical proce-
dure at Arizona and doing a perfect job (Isaacs
depo. p. 117):
I was only asked to do one technical proce-
dure in surgery, which was suturing a port-
a-cath at Arizona that was a subcuticular
suture they asked me to do. I remember that
very well because in the Caribbean first se-
mester seven years back my anatomy lab tu-
tor, it was Dr. Stam, taught me how to do a
subcuticular on a cadaver. I had only done
that once. I practiced it four times in front of
her, and that was the last subcuticular I did
until being asked to do one in Arizona. And I
remember being surprised that I remem-
bered the procedure so well that I actually
did a very good subcuticular.
10
After leaving Arizona, the Petitioner sent an elec-
tronic CV (called ERAS) applying for a residency at
Dartmouth. Simultaneously, the Petitioner requested
that the Accreditation Committee for Graduate Med-
ical Education investigate his time at Arizona. Arizona
Surgery had already been on the most serious level of
ACGME probation for intimidation of residents. The
Petitioner was unsure whether the mistreatment he
received there was a result of the general practices
that caused Arizona to be on probation, or another
issue more specific to himself, involving a federal
legal dispute dating back to 2006.
In 2006, Petitioner had enrolled as a medical
student at the University of Southern California Keck
School of Medicine. He became involved in an un-
fortunate dispute with a classmate of his, one Amy
Baughman. A relationship turned sour rather quickly,
and involved dispute resolution with an Associate
Dean of Students. In short, Plaintiff claimed that Ms.
Baughman was attempting to repair her reputation
at his expense. During their disputes, Ms. Baughman
had warned Plaintiff I got into medical school
through connections, and Ill get a residency through
connections. Her father was a director of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health Neurosciences Division
(NINDS) and the White House Counterterrorism
Office. At some point, Petitioner sent a cease & desist
notice to Baughman, using what was then a new
return receipt email service called ReadNotify. That
same day, the return receipt indicated the email went
to the NIH, and then to an office at USC Zilkha
11
Room 101, followed by Baughman obtaining a USC
Undergraduate Student Association stay away or-
der against Petitioner.
A strange scenario occurred where two medical
school classmates had a stay away order in a tight-
knit class of one hundred sharing lectures and labor-
atories. Baughman appeared to leverage the stay
away order to taunt the Petitioner. After some time,
Petitioner discovered that the Zilkha Neurosciences
Institute Room 101 was unoccupied, but had previ-
ously been occupied by the Dean of Keck, one Brian
Henderson. Henderson had been promoted to Dean
after raising tens of millions in NIH funds for the
creation of Zilkha. Petitioner realized that Baughman
had garnered support of the Dean. Classmates were
becoming distressed by the entire situation. Appar-
ently, Baughman did have connections to medical
school and residency (she is now a physician at Har-
vard Massachusetts General Hospital).
The Petitioner sought to resolve the issue and
back off, so he telephoned Baughman and apolo-
gized, essentially taking responsibility for the entire
dispute. He was disciplined for apologizing, which
technically violated the stay away order issued by the
school. A year of nightmare litigation ensued during
which Isaacs continued medical studies at three
different international medical schools, including
the Duke/National University of Singapore, and St.
Georges London. Finally, Petitioner and the Keck
medical school reached an agreement to seal his dis-
ciplinary records from Family Educational Rights and
12
Privacy Act (FERPA) disclosure. A subsequent global
settlement agreement was reached with Keck, in ex-
change for discharging all contracts and agreements,
of any nature whatsoever.
Between the two settlement agreements, Peti-
tioner could move on and treat Keck as a nullity. It
was at this point in mid-2008 that Petitioner achieved
the 241/99 on USMLE and commenced his clinical
rotations in neurosurgery related fields. All was
seemingly well, until Dr. Isaacs Program Directors
at Arizona and Dartmouth learned about his prior
litigation against a Director of the NIH and a Cal-
ifornia medical school. They felt they needed to
protect other residents at their hospital from the
Petitioner, and organized a pathologically elaborate
fraud to oust him. The evidence supporting this
assertion was destroyed and buried by ten law firms.
Petitioners only option to recover his medical career
was to seek an injunction, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37, as a sanction for evidence destruction.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
AND ISSUING AN INJUNCTION PENDING
RESOLUTION IN THE LOWER COURTS
I. The First Circuit erroneously barred an
appeal citing lack of jurisdiction to review
an injunctive sanction for E-Discovery non-
compliance.
On January 15, 2012, Dr. Isaacs sent Jim Yong
Kim an email requesting preservation of key electronic
13
evidence, including relevant Dartmouth-Hitchcock
emails:
I shall be requesting expedited discovery.
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, I hereby request that all
electronic records relevant to my employ-
ment (including GIM/Psych Program Director
email/phone logs, Department of Psychiatry
internal communications) be immediately au-
dited and preserved. (USCA Appendix p. 238).
Three days later and two months before Dart-
mouths own email policy would allow the DHMC
Outlook account was deleted by Dartmouth employee
Christine Fitts, operating under instruction from
Defendant Christine Finn.
The Rule 34 request prompted a spiteful reaction
to delete Isaacs email account. His litigation history
against Keck already the subject of fascination for six
months, Jim Yong Kim responded to the Rule 34
request (via an intermediary) by instructing Finn to
delete the account. At her deposition, Finn initially
denied ever having communicated with Jim Yong Kim
(Finn depo. p. 137):
Q. Do you remember if Jim Yong Kim re-
ceived any letter such as this [the Rule 34
request] on January 15th?
MR. CHABOT: Objection, foundation.
A. I dont know what he was provided with,
no.
14
Q. If he was provided with this letter, did
he tell you to preserve, according to these
instructions, last paragraph, preserve all
e-mails?
MR. CHABOT: Same objection.
A. Ive never had any interactions with Dr.
Kim about this or any other matter.
Q. Around that time period, did anyone in-
struct you to save all e-mails, not to delete
anything relating to this lawsuit?
A. No, I dont think so.
Finn changed her testimony when presented
with this email she wrote on January 17th, asserting
knowledge of the Rule 34 email to Kim:
Today, [Isaacs] sent an email to Jim Kim..
Ive not seen the document, but from what I
hear . . . it is completely ridiculous (USCA
Appendix p. 370).
Finn therefore admitted that, at the time she de-
leted his emails, she knew generally about the Rule
34 letter to preserve evidence (Finn depo. p. 165):
Q. Ill rephrase it. Earlier did you testify
that you did not know if Jim Yong Kim re-
ceived Exhibit A [the Rule 34 request],
wasnt that your testimony earlier?
A. Yes. . . .
Q. Okay. But do you think you generally
knew or there was some communication
15
about that e-mail coming into Dr. Kim that
got to you?
A. Apparently.
Q. Okay. So you want to revise your earlier
testimony, is that right?
In short, Finn was evading the question about
her knowledge of the Rule 34 email by changing the
subject to whether or not she personally could con-
firm Jim Yong Kims receipt of the email. Such decep-
tive responses were typical of all deponents behavior
in forty some hours of depositions.
Perhaps more disconcerting than Finns response
was the testimony of Dr. William Torrey, the Harvard
Medical School educated 30(b)(6) deposition designee
for Dartmouth College. Dartmouth simply had no ex-
planation for why three Dartmouth employees (Fitts,
Finn, & Jim Yong Kim) deleted the emails [Torrey
30(b)(6) depo. p. 87]:
Q. So is it correct that on January 16, in
this document, the plaintiff requested e-mails
be held for litigation, based on what you are
reading?
A. Right, right. Thats what this said.
Q. Okay. And is it correct that Christine
Fitts, several days later, on or about January
17, conveyed or communicated something
that led the DHMC IT department to believe
they should delete the e-mail account of the
plaintiff ?
16
MR. PYLES: Objection to form.
MS. PEAHL: Objection to form. And I also
object its not a 30(b)(6) question.
A. I just dont have any idea.
Q. Does it appear that Dr. Kim was negli-
gent in receiving the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 34 to preserve electronically
stored information?
MS. PEAHL: Objection to the form and
DR. ISAACS: Im asking the Trustees if
they have a position on whether anyone, in-
cluding Jim Yong Kim was negligent. I dont
see how you can object to that.
MR. PYLES: Respectfully, I do. I object
form.
DR. ISAACS: Well, I can rephrase. I mean,
we can narrow down the form, if youd like
me to keep doing that, but maybe give him a
chance to answer
Q. Okay. That was a question about negli-
gence. Do the Trustees have any knowledge,
belief or opinion regarding intentional de-
struction of e-mails?
A. I wouldnt be able to answer for the
Trustees.
Q. No, you are are not you are answer-
ing for the Trustees.
A. I dont know the answer.
17
Q. Okay. So you heard that the premature
you heard that the DHMC e-mail policy
was not, for whatever reason, was not fol-
lowed?
A. Yeah, thats my understanding.
Q. Okay. But you dont know or you dont
have knowledge or opinion whether it was
negligent or intentional?
MR. PYLES: Object to form.
Q. (BY DR. ISAACS) Was it negligent, the
deletion?
MR. PYLES: Same objection.
A. I dont know anything about it.
The testimony of Finn, and the written evidence,
confirmed that Finn deleted the emails days after the
Rule 34 request. Months before Finns deposition,
Kaplan testified to a vastly different story in the Oc-
tober 31st hearing concerning the Motion for Sanc-
tions. Knowing sanctions are typically exempted for
automatic deletion processes, Kaplan completely fab-
ricated that a PeopleSoft automated process deleted
the emails. This was in stark contrast to the evi-
dence, and Finns own admission to manually delet-
ing the emails. The District Judge turned a blind eye
to the Defendants contradictory excuses:
I deal directly with the folks in the IT group
there. I asked a series of questions, not the
least of which was if there was absolutely no
limitation on the amount of money that I
18
could give you or expend in order to secure
those records, how could we do it? And their
IT group came back and told me that they
could not, that there was a write-over, thats
the way the system works . . . It was an au-
tomatic process. A process, I believe its
called PeopleSoft, went into place and 30
days thereafter his Outlook account was de-
leted. (Statement of Ed Kaplan, Transcript
p. 18).
Attorney Kaplan also negotiated that he wanted
to choose his own forensic investigator in response to
the motion request for forensic analysis of Dart-
mouths IT systems :
MR. KAPLAN: This isnt the first time that
Ive been involved in computer issues. How
about if the Court is inclined to have us
have an independent individual look at it, I
need to ask a preliminary question, which is,
is the independence of an independent per-
son destroyed by, if I can identify somebody
for the Court? I mean, because weve used
computer experts before in other litigation. I
mean, I can certainly find an independent
person, but Im not sure if its a person that I
locate that Ive automatically killed his or
her independence. But if thats okay, if thats
what the Court wants (Transcript p. 26).
Attorney Kaplan was begging to hire his own
investigator. It is rather disconcerting that the Dis-
trict Judge not only pondered Kaplans request to
investigate himself, but then denied any investigation
19
whatsoever. The Motion for Sanctions, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. 1503, sought U.S. Marshal and/or FBI pos-
session of the remaining evidence for forensic analy-
sis. The Defendants were let off scot-free with a
nontrivial obstruction of justice.
At the District Court hearing, Isaacs testified
that the emails evidenced his mistreatment over six
months. Furthermore, Isaacs was concerned that if
Dartmouth improperly deleted his Outlook account,
then they also deleted other smoking gun evidence
about how Dartmouth learned about Keck (Transcript
p. 32):
MR. ISAACS: Theres a problem that three
days after that email to Dr. Kim, a non-
automatic process occurred. And, you know, I
really feel from what Ive seen of the civil
procedure and civil discovery process, I
mean, [the FRCP] its an honor code at a lot
of levels, and it appears to me that honor
code was violated.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this. You just
said earlier to the Court that there really
wasnt anything in there, because youve got
all of it. You saw it all. You basically remem-
ber it. You wish you had your email account,
thats understandable. But if there were a
smoking gun in there, you would have seen
it. So what would motivate somebody at
Dartmouth to delete something that doesnt
contain any damning evidence against them?
MR. ISAACS: I also wanted to correct what
I said before. You asked what claims this all
20
applied to and I said the IIED claims. It also
applies to the fraud claim. I think there
would be evidence in those emails that there
was IIED. For sure they were emailing me
every day off. I dont recall all of them, but
there would be a pattern of that I was a
persona non grata there.
The District Judges denial of sanctions was min-
imal in explanation and simply ignored the dozens of
authoritative case law citations the Petitioner pro-
vided in his Memorandum of Law. She didnt provide
any reasoning, other than stating the emails werent
important, which defies common sense and is dis-
couraged by public policy:
All of plaintiff s requests for sanctions are
DENIED. The defendants have not violated
any court order to compel discovery. Sanc-
tions are inappropriate at this time . . .
As plaintiff candidly admitted, plaintiff is
generally aware of what was in his Outlook
account, as he previously saw the ingoing
and outgoing emails of that account. Plaintiff
stated that he cannot recall any smoking
gun email evidence in his Outlook account.
(USCA Appendix p. 334)
In essence, the judge ignored Isaacs testimony
and the obvious that a hospital physicians emails
would be important to demonstrate a pattern of un-
due criticisms and IIED. The District Judge erred in
concluding that Petitioner testified that the deleted
21
emails were not critical; he filed a lengthy motion for
sanctions because they were indeed important.
There exists concern that the District Court in
New Hampshire lacked sufficient courage to enforce
laws against the venerable Dartmouth College and
the President of the World Bank. An appeal to the
First Circuit is the legal systems solution to any de-
ficiency that may have existed in the New Hampshire
District. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292, the First Cir-
cuit had clear jurisdiction over the District Courts
denial of this denied injunction. FRCP 37 in no way
restricts a District Court from issuing an injunctive
sanction. Therefore, the First Circuit erred in refus-
ing to allow the Petitioner to file an appeal.

I. The First Circuit set an undesirable prece-
dent by failing to recognize that ESI de-
struction is a form of civil obstruction of
process.
Petitioner cited 18 U.S.C. 1503 applicability to
discovery, prohibiting obstruction of justice. Section
1503s omnibus or catch-all clause is broadly writ-
ten (USCA Appendix p. 245):
Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force,
or by any threatening letter or communica-
tion, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or en-
deavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the
due administration of justice, shall be pun-
ished as provided in subsection (b).
The Court erred in denying Petitioners request
for forensic analysis and subsequent prosecution of
22
known evidence destruction. The District Court
simply chose to ignore precedent ESI case law, such
as that Petitioner had cited (Addendum p. 249) in
Bobrick Washroom Equipment, Inc. v. American
Specialties, Inc., 2012 WL 3217858 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2012), where that court ordered an independent fo-
rensics expert, at the Defendants expense, to conduct
a search of the defendants servers.
Petitioner made a direct case for an injunctive
sanction under a well-established ESI sanctions case,
Zubulake V, 2004 WL 1620866 (S.D.N.Y. July 20,
2004). The standard from Zubulake is as follows:
(1) party having control over evidence had duty to
preserve at time it was destroyed; (2) that the records
were destroyed with a culpable state of mind; (3) that
the destroyed evidence was relevant to partys claim
or defense so that trier of fact could find that it would
support that claim or defense. A culpable state of
mind, under Zubulake Second Circuit jurisdiction, in-
cludes either a) negligence when the data is relevant,
or b) intentional destruction.
As shown, Dartmouths 30(b)(6) deponent couldnt
deny negligent deletion at a minimum. There is little
dispute that a six-month Outlook email history was
relevant and could assist a jury in understanding the
evidence. Petitioner testified, based upon his knowl-
edge of the account, it contained evidence for an IIED
claim. There is no question Jim Yong Kim received
formal notice of the duty to preserve, two months be-
fore Petitioners termination. All conditions for sanc-
tions were indisputably met in this clear case of ESI
23
spoliation; the District Court erred in failing to rec-
ognize that Zubulake applied.
Case law prior to Zubulake similarly supported
sanctions against Dartmouth: While a litigant is un-
der no duty to keep or retain every document in its
possession, even in advance of litigation it is under a
duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should
know, will likely be requested in reasonably foresee-
able litigation. Scott v. IBM Corporation, 196 F.R.D.
233 (D.N.J. 2000).
The Motion for Sanctions also cited Barrette
Outdoor Living, Inc. v. Michigan Resin Representa-
tives, No. 11-13335, 2013 WL 3983230 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 1, 2013) (USCA Appendix p. 247), where sanc-
tions were issued solely on the suspicious timing of
the deletion of the ESI.

III. The proposed injunction to return Dr. Isaacs
to his training program was an appropriate
sanction to address and to discourage will-
ful ESI discovery noncompliance.
The Court has broad discretion to fashion an
appropriate sanction as long as it is proportionate
to the circumstances Barnhill v. U.S., 11 F.3d 1360,
1367 (7th Cir. 1993). At the point the Motion for
Sanctions was filed, it was known that Dartmouth
destroyed ESI evidence of Isaacs disability, specific-
ally, the two-week actigraph study. It was known that
electronic mail accounts were spoliated. Similarly,
Dartmouth refused to comply with the American
24
Recovery Reinvestment Act provisions requiring pro-
duction of the EPIC audit log. In short, all confidence
in the integrity of Dartmouths electronic discovery
production was lost. Petitioners only remaining hope
to win the case relied upon honest witness testimony
in the forthcoming depositions. Unfortunately, based
upon their pattern of behaviors, Petitioner correctly
surmised Dartmouths deposition witnesses might be
unreliable as well.
Accordingly, he moved for a sanction to return
him to his residency program at Dartmouth. Such an
injunction reflected the importance of destroyed evi-
dence that would have been critical to achieving the
permanent injunction Isaacs sought returning to
residency was the primary motive of the lawsuit.
With the evidence destroyed, Isaacs should have been
permitted considerable leeway in arguing what in-
formation might have been gleaned from the com-
puter hard drivers [sic] that were destroyed,
E.E.O.C. v. Frys Electronics, Inc., 2012 WL 1642305
(W.D. Wash. May 10, 2012). This leeway that ESI
was destroyed implicating mistreatment motivated
by the Keck lawsuit would have paved the way for
an injunction returning to Dartmouth.
An injunction would not have been the most
heightened form of sanctions available. Given the
broad discretion to enforce due process via sanc-
tions, the District Court may order a preliminary
injunction, summary judgment presumption, and/or
jury instruction appropriate to the scope of the case.
In Banks v. Enova Fin., 2012 WL 5995729 (N.D. Ill.
25
Nov. 30, 2012), the magistrate judge sanctioned the
defendant with a presumption at the summary judg-
ment stage about a critical voicemail, and if the case
went to trial, the magistrate recommended that the
jury be instructed with a spoliation charge. In
Pringle v. Adams, 2012 WL 1103939 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
30, 2012), the District Court granted summary dis-
missal of a claim after it was proven that evidence
was spoliated. Intentionally spoliated evidence may
be cause for dismissal or default judgment, on the
rationale that the lost evidence may have been the
critical smoking gun required to prove or disprove
a claim. In sum, an argument could be made that
Dartmouth should have lost the entire case based on
its suspicious ESI deletions. Isaacs, a pro se litigant,
didnt wish to make that case; he merely asked to
return to his job.
Petitioners medical symptoms lead Dartmouth
Psychiatrys Sleep Center to prescribe an actigraph
device study, a wearable medical diagnostic device
placed on his arm for two weeks in October 2011. In
January 2012, two weeks after Petitioner noticed this
lawsuit, Dr. Glen Greenough wrote in Isaacs DHMC
Patient Chart that the actigraph suffered device
failure and data was irretrievably lost three months
after the study. The actigraph device would have
provided forensic level evidence of Isaacs disabil-
ity. This data was inexplicably lost the same week
Isaacs email account disappeared. The District
Court erred in failing to recognize an impermissible
pattern of ESI deletion that occurred in the days
26
following Jim Yong Kims receipt of the Rule 34 re-
quest.
As required by ARRA, DHMCs computer system
(EPIC) maintains audit records detailing who and
when any DHMC staff accesses a patients electronic
medical chart. Petitioners motion for sanctions sought
to immediately compel production of this audit trail.
To elaborate, when the Petitioner was a patient in
the DHMC ED on January 13, 2012, he began to
receive numerous emails and pager messages from
colleagues regarding his hospitalization. This sug-
gested a HIPAA violation of his patient records, but of
more concern was obtaining the evidence of the
apparent curiosity to his medical chart in relation to
his mistreatment. This is the third type of ESI, in
addition to emails and actigraph data, that Dart-
mouth did not produce.

IV. After the District Court let Dartmouth off
the hook for e-discovery sanctions, ten
subsequent deponents refused to answer
questions or recall any substantive facts.
The depositions in this lawsuit began quite
strangely, with Dr. Khagi not able to recall whether
or not he knew, on Petitioners first day of work,
about the prior training in Arizona Surgery (Khagi
depo. p. 15):
Q: You have no knowledge that the plaintiff
was enrolled at a surgery program in Arizona?
A: I cant recall. I dont remember that.
27
Q: Wouldnt that be something youd re-
member, if someone was in a surgery resi-
dency?
A: My focus is on patient care, not so much
as knowing where all my residents did their
residency prior residencies. So, no, I cant
exactly recall.
Q: Is it possible that you knew that plain-
tiff was in Arizona for residency prior to his
starting with you?
A: Im sorry. Could you please Is it possi-
ble What do you mean by possible?
Chair of the Dartmouth College Department of
Psychiatry Alan Green was initially scheduled as the
30(b)(6) deponent in this case. Green was deposed
individually because Dr. Torrey was substituted in
for Green at the 30(b)(6). Strangely, Green professed
to have no understanding of the lawsuit:
Q: Do you know in your own words, could
you briefly summarize what you believe this
lawsuit is about?
A: Actually, I I really dont know. I under-
stand that theres a question about your ter-
mination from Dartmouth-Hitchcock residency.
But more than that, I really dont know
much about it.
Green was alleged to have had knowledge about
USC and AZ and to have stared at Petitioner for
nearly 30 minutes during an orientation day speech,
which he didnt recall:
28
Q: Do you recall if you gave a speech on the
plaintiff s first my being the plaintiff first
or second day of orientation?
A: I dont recall that.
Q: Okay. So you wouldnt recall what the
plaintiff has alleged to be abnormal eye con-
tact, 25 minutes, approximately, of eye con-
tact directed at the plaintiff during your
speech?
A: No.
As stated in the fraud claim against the depart-
ment, the unexpected attrition of four residents cre-
ated an incentive to keep the Petitioner employed for
six months, pending the hiring of his replacement. To
prove this claim, Petitioner required detailed knowl-
edge of how the Department receives funds from Med-
icare. Despite being a 30(b)(6) topic, Dr. Torrey was
unable to answer. When Department Chair Green
was asked, he, also, had no idea (Green depo. p. 32):
Q: And if a resident or four residents, in
the case of Dartmouth Psychiatry if four
residents were unexpectedly vacant, would
that [Medicare] money still come in?
A: That I dont know.
Q: Okay. Who would know that question at
Dartmouth?
A: I dont know that, either. I dont know.
Likewise, Green had never inquired why his
own department abandoned Isaacs as a patient and
29
lost actigraph data documenting his sleep disorder
(Green depo. p. 55):
Q: Are you aware of any investigation that
your department conducted as to why the pa-
tient was abandoned as a patient and why
his actigraph watch disappeared or malfunc-
tioned?
A: No.
Finally, Green was asked a central question of
the case did Defendant Finn know about Arizona
Surgery from a May 2011 document she signed
(p. 73):
Q. Do you know if Dr. Finn saw the New
Hampshire Board application that I filled
out in May of 2011?
A: No.
Q: You dont know whether she saw it or
not?
A: No.
Q: Do you think its worth investigating
whether or not she saw it?
A: I have no way of assuming that no.
The answer is, I dont know whether it is
worth investigating. I dont know.
As Dartmouths own ESI was not intact, Peti-
tioner sought to subpoena Defendant Finns mobile
phone call logs and her Gmail account. As Google
and Verizons ESI preservation is substantially more
30
reliable than Dartmouths, this would likely show
whether or not she discussed Arizona and USC with
any related individuals, and could also establish a
timeline for when she decided to terminate the Peti-
tioner. As stated in the Emergency Motion for Recon-
sideration, Counsel refused to let her testify:
Q. Okay. Could you state your phone num-
ber for the mobile phone.
MR. CHABOT: Only if youre going to agree
to seal this portion of the record.
DR. ISAACS: Thats fine. Its just for a sub-
poena.
MR. CHABOT: Youre not going to be issu-
ing any subpoenas. Youre past the close of
discovery.
DR. ISAACS: Thats not true.
MR. CHABOT: Yes, it is. You are. Youre not
going to answer, Im sorry. Were not going to
give you her home phone number.
DR. ISAACS: Thats not privileged though,
so she has to answer it or I will move for
sanctions.
MR. CHABOT: You can make whatever mo-
tion youd like, Dr. Isaacs. Were not going to
get into the irrelevant personal information.
DR. ISAACS: I thought we agreed to ex-
tend discovery until February.
MR. CHABOT: No, I dont think so.
31
MR. KAPLAN: There was an order issued
today.
DR. ISAACS: The order must have been
different than what we agreed to; is that
right?
MR. KAPLAN: No. It was exactly what we
agreed to.
DR. ISAACS: Well then, well talk about
that later. Thats different than my under-
standing. What carrier do you have, Verizon
or T Mobile?
MR. CHABOT: Same objection. Dr. Finn,
you dont need to answer that.
DR. ISAACS: Thats ridiculous. If you want
to come back about it.
MR. CHABOT: Dr. Isaacs, you appear to
know what her cell phone number is. Its all
the information that we are going to give
you. We are not going to give you the home
phone number.
DR. ISAACS: I dont want the home num-
ber, I want the cell phone number. Was that
a misunderstanding?
MR. CHABOT: Thats exactly it, youre just
going to have to make a request to the court
if you want that information.
Q. What e-mail and online services do you
use?
32
A. I have an e-mail account through work
through Hitchcock and Dartmouth.
Other than that? I have a Gmail account. What is
the Gmail account?
MR. CHABOT: Same objection. Were not
going to be giving that information out to
you, Dr. Isaacs.
DR. ISAACS: Because you dont want any
subpoenas to break your cover up. Thats not
a good reason, thats not a privilege.
MR. CHABOT: Thats not the reason were
asserting, Dr. Isaacs. Were asserting be-
cause its unduly burdensome given the ex-
treme amount of discovery weve provided
which despite all of your allegations has
never once shown a suggestion of anything
improper going on. Theres absolutely no rea-
son, based on the discovery youve given,
which has been nearly plenary, that you
should be able to explore any further e-mail
accounts, and thats our objection.
DR. ISAACS: Thats not a privilege.
MR. CHABOT: Unduly burdensome is an
objection. Youre right, its not a privilege, its
an objection.
DR. ISAACS: Youre directing her not to
answer an unprivileged question.
MR. KAPLAN: Dr. Isaacs, youre running
out of time, finish up. Youve got a minute by
my watch.
33
Similarly, Petitioner sought to learn the identity
of a graduate from Isaacs medical school who was
hired the same week Isaacs was terminated. Prior to
Isaacs, Dartmouth had never hired an individual
from his international medical school. The timing of
the hiring also suggested that the individual was
interviewed months before Isaacs termination, which
suggested Dartmouth was researching Petitioners
past in Arizona and California well before they claim
they learned about it. Attorney Kaplan ordered wit-
ness Dr. Harley Friedman not to disclose the name of
the individual: (Friedman depo. p. 92)
Q: Whats the name of the [DHMC resi-
dent] that went to my school, AUC?
MR. KAPLAN: No. Im not going to let him
identify other individuals.
DR. ISAACS: If you dont answer that
youre going to be under penalty of not an-
swering.
MR. KAPLAN: Thats fine. What he will do
if you want him to answer the question, he
will identify the person by initials and an-
swer the question.
DR. ISAACS: Im not agreeing to that.
MR. KAPLAN: Frankly, Dr. Isaacs, I dont
care what you agree to. Its my obligation to
direct the witness.
DR. ISAACS: Therell be a motion for sanc-
tions. Whats your objection? Whats your
privilege on that?
34
MR. KAPLAN: My privilege on this is that
the resident will maintain his confidential
basis, and Im not going to have him disclose
the name. If you want to know about a resi-
dent, he will identify him by his initials and
you will know exactly who he is.
DR. ISAACS: And not state a privilege. You
guys should be sanctioned severely for direct-
ing him not to answer a question without
stating a privilege.
MR. KAPLAN: You have my response. Doc-
tor. If you want to talk about a resident, use
the initials, not the name.
In sum, Petitioners case relied upon electronic
records to prove a rather complex fraud. By denying
sanctions substantiated by willful ESI destruction,
the New Hampshire District Court signaled to Dart-
mouth that it was turning a blind eye on discovery
noncompliance. Indeed, ten depositions were conducted
where Dartmouth witnesses inexcusably had no rele-
vant information or refused to provide information.

V. No administrative procedures were fol-
lowed nor does an Administrative Record
exist with regard to the termination of Dr.
Isaacs. The All Writs Act allows this Court
to mitigate Applicants loss of career pend-
ing resolution.
Dartmouth executed a termination of the Peti-
tioner without following any of Dartmouths own
internal administrative policies. No written record of
35
Administrative Leave was ever issued; as Petitioner
testified, he was informally blackmailed to resign on
January 13, 2012, leading to a breakdown diagnosed
the same day in the DHMC ED. Two months later,
Dartmouth issued a termination letter in mid-March
2013, skipping the peer review Fair Hearing process
required at Dartmouth. There is no ambiguity in De-
fendant Finns testimony regarding the complete lack
of written administrative documents (Finn Depo
p. 252)
Q. There was no written notice of this.
There was no administrative leave document
or notice of hearing offered to me that I
signed, right?
A. Correct.
The administrative leave matter had been dis-
cussed specifically on p. 247 of Finns Deposition:
Q. Okay. So when did you place the Plain-
tiff on administrative leave?
A. I need to review the exact date.
Q. Did you ever give the Plaintiff written
notification of administrative leave?
A. I dont recall.
Q. Isnt that a required part of administra-
tive leave, to give written notice?
A. I wasnt sure of the GME policies and
procedures.
36
Q. If you were blackmailing someone or co-
ercing them to resign, might you not give an
administrative leave document to them?
MR. CHABOT: Objection, calls for specula-
tion, states facts not in evidence.
Dartmouths seemingly absurd position is that in
the meeting where they blackmailed the Petitioner,
they handed him a generic copy of the Dartmouth
rule book, including the pages discussing the Fair
Hearing process.
A. On the day [Jan. 13 2012] that we met in
January you were provided with a printed
copy of the GME policies and procedures
around the grievance process which details
the fair hearing process.
Q. So by handing me that sheet of paper,
you were offering me a fair hearing?
A. Yes, and I encouraged you to follow up
with the GME office which you indicated you
were going to do apparently and then can-
celled.
The fact, based on the written record, is that Dr.
Isaacs never received any notice of Fair Hearing or
administrative leave prior to termination. His email
account disappeared while he was actively treating
patients, before he was ever formally placed on ad-
ministrative leave. In addition to evidence of his
abuse by his supervisors, the email account contained
important information about the ongoing medical
care Dr. Isaacs provided to his patients. One can only
37
conclude that the Respondents never had any serious
intention of giving Dr. Isaacs a proper fair hearing.
The termination occurred one week before Jim
Yong Kims nomination to the World Bank, in efforts
to discredit Isaacs. It is well established that a Dis-
trict Court must offer considerable deferral to the
administrative findings of an educational institution.
In this case, the District Court erred in accepting
Plaintiff s administrative termination as legitimate.
Plaintiff never participated in the Fair Hearing which
stipulates that nine fellow physicians must vote and
achieve a quorum for proper termination. As a matter
of law, Isaacs termination was faulty.
Early in the litigation, the Petitioner filed a mo-
tion seeking to enjoin certain defendants from ter-
minating [Isaacs] employment and enrollment in
their graduate medical education program, prior to
satisfying due process requirements. Plaintiff thought
this to be a straightforward injunction merely requir-
ing Dartmouth maintain his employment until proper
due process, i.e., the Fair Hearing, occurred. The
court denied the injunction (see Docket Item #35):
The problem or one of them, anyway is
that DHMC has already terminated Isaacs
from its graduate medical education program
and published the information in question.
A request for injunctive relief to prevent
actions that have already occurred is moot.
See, e.g., Newspaper Guild of Salem v.
Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 79 F.3d 1273,
1275 (1st Cir. 1996).
38
It is asserted that the District Court had clear
authority to require that Dartmouth follow its own
administrative procedures. An injunction merely or-
dering a GME student return to training, pending
a Fair Hearing, would seem to meet any possible
sliding-scale threshold requirements. The District
Court has vast powers to grant equitable relief.
Surely, an injunction requiring a school adhere, or
correct its own violation of its administrative rules
falls within the realm of possibility for an injunction.
As best as Plaintiff can ascertain, the District Court
erred in citing Newspaper Guild. Certainly the Court
was aware that, no later than Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it was commonplace for
District Courts to issue so-called structural injunc-
tions mandating adherence to a schools own adminis-
trative regulations.
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), authorizes
the Court to issue an injunction when (1) the circum-
stances presented are critical and exigent; (2) the
legal rights at issue are indisputably clear; and
(3) injunctive relief is necessary or appropriate in aid
of [the Courts] jurisdictio[n]. Ohio Citizens for Re-
sponsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn,
479 U.S. 1312 (1986) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (quot-
ing Fishman v. Schaeffer, 429 U.S. 1325, 1326 (1976)
(Marshall, J., in chambers); Communist Party of In-
diana v. Whitcomb, 409 U.S. 1235 (1972) (Rehnquist,
J., in chambers); and 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)) (alterations
in original). This extraordinary relief, see Lux v.
Rodrigues, 131 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., in
39
chambers), is warranted in cases involving the immi-
nent and indisputable violation of civil rights.
The Petitioner has spent over two years seeking
an injunction to return to federally funded graduate
medical education. His career had been delayed two
years in 2006 as a result of the controversy involving
the National Institutes of Health. A head injury set
back his medical career at least an additional two
years. There is not unlimited time to begin the in-
tense training of a physician; neurosurgery training
requires a minimum of seven years. Petitioners col-
leagues from medical school are now years ahead of
him. In short, if Petitioner is held back any more
years in training, there is the likelihood that he will
never be able to pursue his training.
Furthermore, Petitioner has suffered and con-
tinues to suffer serious medical ailments diagnosed
by the Respondents themselves. It is unknown but
seemingly likely that three or four more years of pro
se legal battles with Dartmouth could more per-
manently damage Petitioners health and/or career. If
the Court finds that the First Circuit indeed had
indisputably clear jurisdiction to hear an appeal,
Petitioner hereby requests the issuance of an injunc-
tion pending what could be a lengthy resolution in
the First Circuit and New Hampshire District.
--------------------------------- ---------------------------------


40
CONCLUSION
The past decade witnessed a surge in global
connectivity that fundamentally changed how we, as
a society, communicate and interact with one another.
The long-term social and health implication of ubiqui-
tous email and mobile device use raises a multitude
of important questions. Within the realm of civil
discovery and evidence preservation, this increased
connectivity presents a genuine opportunity to im-
prove the discovery of truth and the efficient en-
forcement of law. Written records now exist, in the
form of computer data, for a vast majority of commu-
nications at schools, workplaces, and social gather-
ings.
Zubulake has, for a decade, served as the most
cited framework concerning sanctions for e-discovery
violations. Nonetheless, Zubulake is not binding au-
thority outside of its circuit. Many courts, including
the First Circuit, remain confused or unaware of their
jurisdiction to remedy obstruction of due process
related to electronically stored information. This is an
unfortunate result in that a judicial system that
might be improved by technology thus far failed to
realize that potential.
This Petition seeks affirmation by the Supreme
Court of the United States that when relevant elec-
tronic evidence is intentionally destroyed, the Courts
have unambiguous jurisdiction to invoke specific
remedy, including injunctions. In the present case,
the Petitioner sought an injunction to return to his
41
medical residency, under the premise that ESI would
have demonstrated unjustifiable behavior by leaders
in medical academia at an Ivy League hospital. One
can imagine vast public policy benefits, reaching far
beyond the Petitioners unique circumstances, that
would result from a Supreme Court opinion on this
matter. The courts would have a powerful tool to
combat what seems to be an epidemic of tragedies
stemming from schoolyard bullying, workplace har-
assment, and other social ills that were more difficult
to discover prior to the advent of widespread elec-
tronic communications. An advocate for any such
victim should be able to send a reasonable Rule 34
letter to a school or workplace, as Petitioner did, and
expect readily available ESI to shed light, one way or
another, on the allegations.
Respectfully submitted on this 1st day of August,
2014.
Dr. Jeffrey D. Isaacs
Petitioner, pro se

App. 1
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 14-1085
J.D. ISAACS,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v.
DARTMOUTH HITCHCOCK
MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE TRUSTEES, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Before
Torruella, Howard and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
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JUDGMENT
Entered: March 31, 2014
Plaintiffs appeal from the district courts Novem-
ber 4, 2013 order is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.
By the Court:
/s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk.
App. 2
cc:
Jeffrey Isaacs
Edward Kaplan
Christopher Pyles
Pierre Chabot
Kathleen Peahl


App. 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

J. D. Isaacs
v.
Dartmouth Hitchcock Medical
Center, et al.
1

Civil No. 12-cv-40-JL

ORDER
(Filed Nov. 4, 2013)
Pending before the court are numerous motions
concerning discovery and other related matters (doc.
nos. 71, 72, 75-77, 79, 86, 89, 93, 98, and 100-102).
The district judge has referred all pending motions in
this case to this magistrate judge for ruling. I held a
hearing on October 31, 2013, concerning all pending
motions in this matter. I issued oral rulings from the
bench on all but one of the motions, plaintiff s motion
for a subpoena for PACER records (doc. no. 89). What
follows is a summary of my oral rulings and resolu-
tion of the motion for a subpoena for PACER records.




1
The defendants in this matter are the Dartmouth Hitch-
cock Medical Center and Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital
(collectively the Hitchcock defendants), and the Trustees of
Dartmouth College and Dr. Christine Finn (collectively the
College defendants).
App. 4
1. Joint Motion for Hearing for Emergency Sched-
uling Conference (Doc. No. 72) and Plaintiff s
Motion to Strike Motion for Hearing (Doc. No.
75)
The defendants motion (doc. no. 72) is DENIED
as moot, as a hearing was held On October 31, 2013.
The plaintiff s motion to strike (doc. no. 75) is also
DENIED.

2. College Defendants Motion for Protective Order
(Doc. No. 76) to prevent deposition of Dr. Jim
Yong Kim
The motion (doc. no. 76) is GRANTED. Once all
of the other depositions are complete in this matter,
plaintiff may renew his request for Dr. Kims deposi-
tion, if he can demonstrate that Dr. Kim possesses
discoverable information not obtained or obtainable
from any other source.

3. Hitchcock Defendants Motion for Protective
Order (Doc. No. 79) and College Defendants
Motion to Quash Subpoena (Doc. No. 98) to
change the location of depositions of Drs.
Riblet, Friedman, and Green
The motions (doc. nos. 79 and 98) are GRANTED.
Depositions will be held at a neutral location in
Lebanon with an off-duty law enforcement officer
present. As agreed to by defendants, the costs associ-
ated with obtaining a neutral location and hiring the
officer will be borne by defendants.
App. 5
4. Plaintiff s Motion for a Protective Order (Doc. No.
86) concerning the deposition of the plaintiff
The motion (doc. no. 86) is DENIED as unneces-
sary because defendants have agreed that the deposi-
tion of the plaintiff can be held on one day and will
last less than six hours. The deposition will be con-
ducted in two three-hour sessions, to take place on
the same day, with at least one hour in between the
sessions.

5. Defendants Motion for Protective Order (Doc.
No. 102) Concerning Depositions of New Jersey
and California Witnesses (Drs. Guez and Simon)
The motion (doc. no. 102) is DENIED as unneces-
sary because plaintiff has agreed that the depositions
of witnesses Guez and Simon will be conducted in the
city or town where the witnesses live or work, or as
otherwise agreed by the parties.

6. Plaintiff s Motion for Subpoena (Doc. No. 89) for
PACER Service
The motion (doc. no. 89) is DENIED without
prejudice to plaintiff renewing his motion if he is
unable to obtain the information he seeks in discov-
ery.


App. 6
7. Plaintiff s Motion for Sanctions and Injunctive
Order (Doc. No. 71) and Addendum (Doc. No. 77)
The plaintiff s motion (doc. no. 71) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part, as specified herein:

A. Sanctions
All of plaintiff s requests for sanctions are DE-
NIED. The defendants have not violated any court
order to compel discovery. Sanctions are inappropri-
ate at this time.

B. Admissions
Plaintiff s request to have any fact deemed
admitted by any defendant is DENIED, as it is moot-
ed by the scheduling order issued today.

C. Email
i. Keyword Searches
Plaintiff s request for Keyword Searches of the
email systems of the Hitchcock and College defen-
dants for the term Isaacs is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. As discussed at the hearing, the
defendants will provide to plaintiff the results of
Keyword Searches for certain individuals email
accounts for the period beginning January 1, 2011,
and ending March 19, 2012.
The College defendants have agreed to produce to
plaintiff, on or before November 14, 2013, search
App. 7
results for the keyword Isaacs for the email ac-
counts of: Attorney OLeary, Dr. Jim Yong Kim, and
Dr. Alan Green. The Hitchcock defendants have
agreed to produce to plaintiff, on or before November
14, 2013, search results for the keyword Isaacs for
the email accounts of: Dr. Christine Finn, Dr. Marc
Bertrand, and Dr. Harley Friedman. To the extent
that defendants assert a privilege as a reason not to
disclose any results of these searches, a privilege log
will also be provided to plaintiff by November 14,
2013.

ii. Forensics Expert
Plaintiff s request for a forensics expert to at-
tempt to recover plaintiff s Outlook email account is
DENIED at this time, without prejudice to renewal
should the information he seeks not be produced
during the Keyword Searches to be conducted by
defendants pursuant to this order.
The court notes that plaintiff made clear during
the hearing that he was less concerned with the
production of his Outlook account than he is with the
Keyword Search (for Isaacs) of certain employees of
defendants. As plaintiff candidly admitted, plaintiff is
generally aware of what was in his Outlook account,
as he previously saw the ingoing and outgoing emails
of that account. Plaintiff stated that he cannot recall
any smoking gun email evidence in his Outlook
account.

App. 8
D. Patient Records
Plaintiff, in the addendum to his motion for
sanctions and an injunction order (doc. no. 77), asks
the court to compel defendants to produce medical
records of certain patients he treated during his
internal medicine rotation. The request is DENIED
as plaintiff has not demonstrated the materiality of
those records to any issue in this matter.

8. Plaintiff s Motion to Quash Subpoenas (Doc.
No. 93) for USC and American University of the
Caribbean records
The motion to quash (doc. no. 93) is DENIED.
The relevance of educational records has been
demonstrated by defendants. Plaintiff s argument
that the confidential settlement concerning the USC
records precludes discovery is not accurate. The
settlement agreement exempts from its purview any
court-ordered disclosure.

9. Defendants Motion to Compel (Doc. No. 100)
Answers to Interrogatories 11, 17, 18 and 21
The motion (doc. no. 100) is GRANTED. The
defendants have demonstrated the relevance of the
requested information. Plaintiff is directed to respond
to interrogatories numbered 11, 17, 18 and 21 on or
before November 14, 2013.


App. 9
10. Defendants Motion for a Protective Order (Doc.
No. 101)
Because the parties have extreme difficulty
agreeing on simple matters of discovery, and because
so much of the discovery in this case concerns confi-
dential matters (such as medical records; audit trails;
quality assurance information; personnel records,
including evaluations and testing; educational rec-
ords; and employment records), the court believes a
broad confidentiality order is appropriate. The motion
for a protective order (doc. no. 101) is therefore
GRANTED. The court has issued this date, a protec-
tive order in this matter substantially similar to the
proposed order (doc. no. 101-1) submitted by the
Hitchcock defendants. The court notes that the pro-
tective order applies to all of the parties in this case.

11. Scheduling
A. Each party will have until December 2, 2013,
to submit a request to any other party to produce any
interrogatory response, document, or other item in
discovery, or to notice any depositions yet to be taken.
B. The parties will then have until January 2,
2014, to either produce the discovery requested,
produce privilege logs, or submit to the requesting
party any objection, in writing, to providing the
requested item.
C. Any motions to compel, or other motions to
resolve any outstanding discovery dispute, must be
filed by January 16, 2014. These motions must be in
App. 10
compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and this courts Local Rules.
The court reminds plaintiff that pro se parties
must follow the rules of court and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. As just one example, with any
motion to compel, our local rules require the movant
to attach an exact copy of the request and the re-
sponse. Failure to abide by the rules of court may
result in sanctions, such as the court denying a
motion that fails to so comply.
D. Discovery will close on February 3, 2014.
E. The deposition of the plaintiff will take place
on or before December 19, 2013.
F. All experts will be disclosed in compliance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The plaintiff must
disclose expert witnesses by December 13, 2013.
Defendants must disclose expert witnesses by Janu-
ary 10, 2013. Plaintiff s supplementations under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(e) are due December 27, 2013, and
defendants supplementations are due January 24,
2014. Challenges to expert testimony must be made
by February 28, 2014.
G. Motions for summary judgment are due
February 17, 2014.
H. A final pretrial conference will be held June
27, 2014, at 2:00 p.m.
I. Trial is continued to the two-week trial period
beginning July 8, 2014.
App. 11
SO ORDERED.
/s/ [Illegible]
Landya McCafferty
United States
Magistrate Judge

November 4, 2013
cc: Christopher James Pyles, Esq.
Edward M. Kaplan, Esq.
Kathleen C. Peahl, Esq.
Pierre A. Chabot, Esq.
Jeffrey D. Isaacs, M.D., pro se


App. 12
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
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No. 14-1085
J.D. ISAACS,
Plaintiff, Appellant
v.
DARTMOUTH HITCHCOCK
MEDICAL CENTER, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees,
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DARTMOUTH COLLEGE TRUSTEES, ET AL.,
Defendants.
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Before
Lynch, Chief Judge.
Torruella, Howard and Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
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ORDER OF COURT
Entered: May 5, 2014
Petitioner J.D. Isaacs has filed an untimely
petition for rehearing en banc, and a motion to extend
time. Petitioners motion to extend time is granted.
Pursuant to this Courts Internal Operating
Procedure X.C., we treat a petition for rehearing en
App. 13
banc also as a petition for rehearing before the origi-
nal panel. The petition for rehearing having been
denied by the panel of judges who decided this case,
and the petition for rehearing en banc having been
submitted to the active judges of this court, and a
majority of the judges not having voted that the case
be heard en banc, it is ordered that the petition for
rehearing and petition for rehearing en banc be
denied.
By the Court:
/s/ Margaret Carter, Clerk.
cc:
Pierre A. Chabot
Jeffrey David Isaacs
Edward M. Kaplan
Kathleen C. Peahl
Christopher James Pyles