The Pentagon Papers

Gravel Edition
Volume 1
Chapter I, "Background to the Crisis, 19!"#!," pp$ 1"#%$
&Boston' Beacon Press, 19(1)
"The contents of this volume are drawn from the official record of the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds. No copyright is claimed in the tet of
this official Government document."
Summary
I*+,C-I*. I* /$0$ 1.2TI3E P,4IC5, 191"19#
Significant misunderstanding has developed concerning U.S. policy towards !ndochina in
the decade of "orld "ar !! and its aftermath. # number of historians have held that anti$
colonialism governed U.S. policy and actions up until %&'() when containment of
communism supervened. *or eample) Bernard *all +e.g. in his %&,- postmortem boo.)
/ast 0eflections on a "ar1 categori2ed #merican policy toward !ndochina in si periods3
"+%1 #nti$4ichy) %&5($%&5'6 +71 Pro$4iet 8inh) %&5'$%&5,6 +91 Non$involvement) %&5,$
:une %&'(6 +51 Pro$*rench) %&'($:uly %&'56 +'1 Non$military involvement) %&'5$
November %&,%6 +,1 ;irect and full involvement) %&,%$ ." <ommenting that the first four
periods are those "least .nown even to the specialist)" *all developed the thesis that
President 0oosevelt was determined "to eliminate the *rench from !ndochina at all costs)"
and had pressured the #llies to establish an international trusteeship to administer
!ndochina until the nations there were ready to assume full independence. This obdurate
anti$colonialism) in *all=s view) led to cold refusal of #merican aid for *rench resistance
fighters) and to a policy of promoting >o <hi 8inh and the 4iet 8inh as the alternative
to restoring the *rench bonds. But) the argument goes) 0oosevelt died) and principle
faded6 by late %&5,) anti$colonialism mutated into neutrality. #ccording to *all3 ""hether
this was due to a deliberate policy in "ashington or) conversely) to an absence of policy)
is not ?uite clear. . . . The United States) preoccupied in @urope) ceased to be a diplomatic
factor in !ndochina until the outbrea. of the Aorean "ar." !n %&'() anti$communism
asserted itself) and in a remar.able volte$face) the United States threw its economic and
military resources behind *rance in its war against the 4iet 8inh. Bther commentators)
conversely$prominent among them) the historians of the 4iet 8inh$have described U.S.
policy as consistently condoning and assisting the reimposition of *rench colonial power
in !ndochina) with a concomitant disregard for the nationalist aspirations of the
4ietnamese.
Neither interpretation s?uares with the record6 the United States was less concerned over
!ndochina) and less purposeful than either assumes. #mbivalence characteri2ed U.S.
policy during "orld "ar %%) and was the root of much subse?uent misunderstanding. Bn
the one hand) the U.S. repeatedly reassured the *rench that its colonial possessions would
be returned to it after the war. Bn the other band) the U.S. broadly committed itself in the
#tlantic <harter to support national self$determination) and President 0oosevelt
personally and vehemently advocated independence for !ndochina. *.;.0. regarded
!ndochina as a flagrant eample of onerous colonialism which should be turned over to a
trusteeship rather than returned to *rance. The President discussed this proposal with the
#llies at the <airo) Teheran) and Calta <onferences and received the endorsement of
<hiang Aai$she. and Stalin6 Prime 8inister <hurchill demurred. #t one point) *all
reports) the President offered General de Gaulle *ilipino advisers to help *rance establish
a "more progressive policy in !ndochina"$$which offer the General received in "Pensive
Silence."
Ultimately) U.S. Policy was governed neither by the principle s of the #tlantic <harter)
nor by the President=s anti$colonialism but by the dictates of military strategy and by
British intransigence on the colonial issue. The United States) concentrating its forces
against :apan) accepted British military primacy in Southeast #sia) and divided !ndochina
at %,th parallel between the British and the <hinese for the purposes of occupation. . U.S.
commanders serving with the British and <hinese) while instructed to avoid ostensible
alignment with the *rench) were permitted to conduct operations in !ndochina which did
not detract from the campaign against :apan. <onsistent with *.;.0.=s guidance) U.S. did
provide modest aid to *rench$$and 4iet 8inh$$resistance forces in 4ietnam after 8arch)
%&5') but refused to provide shipping to move *ree *rench troops there. Pressed by both
the British and the *rench for clarification U.S. intentions regarding the political status of
!ndochina) *.;.0$ maintained that "it is a matter for postwar."
The President=s trusteeship concept foundered as early as 8arch %&59) when the U.S.
discovered that the British) concerned over possible preDudice to <ommonwealth policy)
proved to be unwilling to Doin in any declaration on trusteeships) and indeed any
statement endorsing national independence which went beyond the #tlantic <harter=s
vague "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which
they will live." So sensitive were the British on this point that the ;umbarton Ba.s
<onference of %&55) at which the blueprint for the postwar international system was
negotiated) s.irted the colonial issue) and avoided trusteeships altogether. #t each .ey
decisional point at which the President could have influenced the course of events toward
trusteeship$$in relations with the U.A.) in casting the United Nations <harter) in
instructions to allied commanders$$he declined to do so6 hence) despite his lip service to
trusteeship and anti$colonialism) *.;.0. in fact assigned to !ndochina a status correlative
to Burma) 8alaya) Singapore and !ndonesia3 free territory to be recon?uered and returned
to its former owners. Non$intervention by the U.S. on behalf of the 4ietnamese was
tantamount to acceptance of the *rench return. Bn #pril 9) %&5') with President
0oosevelt=s approval) Secretary of State Stettinius issued a statement that) as a result of
the Calta tal.s) the U.S. would loo. to trusteeship as a postwar arrangement only for
"territories ta.en from the enemy)" and for "territories as might voluntarily be placed
under trusteeship." By contet) and by the Secretary of State=s subse?uent interpretation)
!ndochina fell into the latter category. Trusteeship status for !ndochina became) then) a
matter for *rench determination.
Shortly following President Truman=s entry into office) the U.S. assured *rance that it had
never ?uestioned) "even by implication) *rench sovereignty over !ndo$<hina." The U.S.
policy was to press *rance for progressive measures in !ndochina) but to epect *rance to
decide when its peoples would be ready for independence6 "such decisions would
preclude the establishment of a trusteeship in !ndochina ecept with the consent of the
*rench Government." These guidelines) established by :une) %&5'$$before the end of the
warEremained fundamental to U.S. policy.
"ith British cooperation) *rench military forces were reestablished in South 4ietnam in
September) %&5'. The U.S. epressed dismay at the outbrea. of guerrilla warfare which
followed) and pointed out that while it had no intention of opposing the reestablishment
of *rench control) "it is not the policy of this government to assist the *rench to
reestablish their control over !ndochina by force) and the willingness of the U.S. to see
*rench control reestablished assumes that FtheG *rench claim to have the support of the
population in !ndochina is borne out by future events." Through the fall and winter of
%&5'$%&5,) the U.S. received a series of re?uests from >o <hi 8inh for intervention in
4ietnam6 these were) on the record) unanswered. >owever) the U.S. steadfastly refused to
assist the *rench military effort) e.g.) forbidding #merican flag vessels to carry troops or
war materiel to 4ietnam. Bn 8arch ,) %&5,) the *rench and >o signed an #ccord in
which >o acceded to *rench reentry into North 4ietnam in return for recognition of the
;04 as a "*ree State)" part of the *rench Union. #s of #pril %&5,) allied occupation of
!ndochina was officially terminated) and the U.S. ac.nowledged to *rance that all of
!ndochina had reverted to *rench control. Thereafter) the problems of U.S. policy toward
4ietnam were dealt with in the contet of the U.S. relationship with *rance.
/$0$ *E/T2.4IT5 I* T-E 62.*C,"VIET 3I*- 1.2, 197"199
!n late %&5,) the *ranco$4iet 8inh "ar began in earnest. # chart +pp. 9- ff1 summari2es
the principal events in the relations between *rance and 4ietnam) %&5,$%&5&) describing
the milestones along the route by which *rance) on the one hand) failed to reach any
lasting accommodation with >o <hi 8inh) and) on the other hand) erected the "Bao ;ai
solution" in its stead. The U.S. during these years continued to regard the conflict as
fundamentally a matter for *rench resolution. The U.S. in its representations to *rance
deplored the prospect of protracted war) and urged meaningful concessions to
4ietnamese nationalism. >owever) the U.S.) deterred by the history of >o=s communist
affiliation) always stopped short of endorsing >o <hi 8inh or the 4iet 8inh.
#ccordingly) U.S. policy gravitated with that of *rance toward the Bao ;ai solution. #t
no point was the U.S. prepared to adopt an openly interventionist course. To have done so
would have clashed with the epressed British view that !ndochina was an eclusively
*rench concern) and played into the hands of *rance=s etremist political parties of both
the 0ight and the /eft. The U.S. was particularly apprehensive lest by intervening it
strengthen the political position of *rench <ommunists. Beginning in %&5, and %&5-)
*rance and Britain were moving toward an anti$Soviet alliance in @urope and the U.S.
was reluctant to press a potentially divisive policy. The U.S. Fwords illegibleG 4ietnamese
nationalism relatively insignificant compared with @uropean economic recovery and
collective security from communist domination.
!t is not as though the U.S. was not prepared to act in circumstances such as these. *or
eample) in the %&5'$%&5, dispute over ;utch possessions in !ndonesia) the U.S. actively
intervened against its ;utch ally. !n this case) however) the intervention was in concert
with the U.A. +which steadfastly refused similar action in !ndochina1 and against the
Netherlands) a much less significant ally in @urope than *rance. !n wider company and at
proDected lower cost) the U.S. could and did show a determination to act against
colonialism.
The resultant U.S. policy has most often been termed "neutrality." !t was) however) also
consistent with the policy of deferring to *rench volition announced by President
0oosevelt=s Secretary of State on 9 #pril %&5'. !t was a policy characteri2ed by the same
indecision that had mar.ed U.S. wartime policy. 8oreover) at the time) !ndochina
appeared to many to be one region in the troubled postwar world in which the U.S. might
enDoy the luury of abstention.
!n *ebruary) %&5-) early in the war) the U.S. #mbassador in Paris was instructed to
reassure Premier 0amadier of the "very friendliest feelings" of the U.S. toward *rance
and its interest in supporting *rance in recovering its economic) political and military
strength3
!n spite any misunderstanding which might have arisen in minds *rench in regard to our
position concerning !ndochina they must appreciate that we have fully recogni2ed
*rance=s sovereign position in that area and we do not wish to have it appear that we are
in any way endeavoring undermine that position) and *rench should .now it is our desire
to be helpful and we stand ready assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for
!ndochinese problem. #t same time we cannot shut our eyes to fact that there are two
sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a lac. *rench understanding of other
side +more in Saigon than in Paris1 and continued eistence dangerously Butmoded
colonial outloo. and methods in area. *urthermore) there is no escape from fact that trend
of times is to effect that colonial empires in H!H <entury sense are rapidly becoming
thing of past. #ction Brit in !ndia and Burma and ;utch in !ndonesia are outstanding
eamples this trend) and *rench themselves too. cogni2ance of it both in new
<onstitution and in their agreements with 4ietnam. Bn other hand we do not lose sight
fact that >o <hi 8inh has direct <ommunist connections and it should be obvious that
we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by philosophy
and political organi2ations emanating from and controlled by Aremlin. . . .
*ran.ly we have no solution of problem to suggest. !t is basically matter for two parties
to wor. out themselves and from your reports and those from !ndochina we are led to feel
that both parties have endeavored to .eep door open to some sort of settlement. "e
appreciate fact that 4ietnam started present fighting in !ndochina on ;ecember %& and
that this action has made it more difficult for *rench to adopt a position of generosity and
conciliation. Nevertheless we hope that *rench will find it possible to be more than
generous in trying to find a solution.
The U.S. aniously followed the vacillations of *rance=s policy toward Bao ;ai)
ehorting the *rench to translate the successive "agreements" they contracted with him
into an effective nationalist alternative to >o <hi 8inh and the 4iet 8inh. !ncreasingly)
the U.S. sensed that *rench unwillingness to concede political power to 4ietnamese
heightened the possibility of the *ranco$4iet 8inh conflict being transformed into a
struggle with Soviet imperialism. U.S. diplomats were instructed to "apply such
persuasion andIor pressure as is best calculated FtoG produce desired result Fof *rance=sG
une?uivocally and promptly approving the principle of 4iet independence." *rance was
notified that the U.S. was willing to etend financial aid to a 4ietnamese government not
a *rench puppet) "but could not give consideration of altering its present policy in this
regard unless real progress FisG made in reaching non$<ommunist solution in !ndochina
based on cooperation of true nationalists of that country."
#s of %&5J) however) the U.S. remained uncertain that >o and the 4iet 8inh were in
league with the Aremlin. # State ;epartment appraisal of >o <hi 8inh in :uly %&5J)
indicated that3
%. ;epts info indicates that >o <hi 8inh is <ommunist. >is long and well$.nown record
in <omintern during twenties and thirties) continuous support by *rench <ommunist
newspaper >umanite since %&5') praise given him by 0adio 8oscow +which for past si
months has been devoting increasing attention to !ndochina1 and fact he has been called
"leading communist" by recent 0ussian publications as well as ;aily "or.er ma.es any
other conclusion appear to be wishful thin.ing.
7. ;ept has no evidence of direct lin. between >o and 8oscow but assumes it eists) nor
is it able evaluate amount pressure or guidance 8oscow eerting. "e have impression
>o must be given or is retaining large degree latitude. ;ept considers that USS0
accomplishing its immediate aims in !ndochina by +a1 pinning down large numbers of
*rench troops) +b1 causing steady drain upon *rench economy thereby tending retard
recovery and dissipate @<# assistance to *rance) and +c1 denying to world generally
surpluses which !ndochina normally has available thus perpetuating conditions of
disorder and shortages which favorable to growth cornmunism. *urthermore) >o seems
?uite capable of retaining and even strengthening his grip on !ndochina with no outside
assistance other than continuing procession of *rench puppet govts.
!n the fall of %&5J) the Bffice of !ntelligence 0esearch in the ;epartment of State
conducted a survey of communist influence in Southeast #sia. @vidence of Aremlin$
directed conspiracy was found in virtually all countries ecept 4ietnam3
Since ;ecember %&) %&5,) there have been continuous conflicts between *rench forces
and the nationalist government of 4ietnam. This government is a coalition in which
avowed communists hold influential positions. #lthough the *rench admit the influence
of this government) they have consistently refused to deal with its leader) >o <hi 8inh)
on the grounds that he is a communist.
To date the 4ietnam press and radio have not adopted an anti$#merican position. !t is
rather the *rench colonial press that has been strongly anti$#merican and has freely
accused the U.S. of imperialism in !ndochina to the point of approimating the official
8oscow position. #lthough the 4ietnam radio has been closely watched for a new
position toward the U.S.) no change has appeared so far. Nor does there seem to have
been any split within the coalition government of 4ietnam. . . .
@valuation. !f there is a 8oscow directed conspiracy in Southeast #sia) !ndochina is an
anomaly so far. Possible eplanations are3
%. No rigid directives have been issued by 8oscow
7. The 4ietnam government considers that it has no rightist elements that must be purged.
9. The 4ietnam <ommunists are not subservient to the foreign policies pursued by
8oscow.
5. # special dispensation for the 4ietnam government has been arranged in 8oscow.
Bf these possibilities) the first and fourth seem most li.ely.
,2IGI*0 ,6 /$0$ I*V,4VE3E*T I* VIET*.3
The collapse of the <hinese Nationalist government in %&5& sharpened #merican
apprehensions over communist epansion in the *ar @ast) and hastened U.S. measures to
counter the threat posed by 8ao=s <hina. The U.S. sought to create and employ policy
instruments similar to those it was bringing into play against the Soviets in @urope3
collective security organi2ations) economic aid) and military assistance. *or eample)
<ongress) in the opening paragraphs of the law it passed in %&5& to establish the first
comprehensive military assistance program) epressed itself "as favoring the creation by
the free countries and the free peoples of the *ar @ast of a Doint organi2ation) consistent
with the <harter of the United Nations) to establish a program of self$help and mutual
cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well$being) to safeguard basic
rights and liberties) and to protect their security and independence.." But) the negotiating
of such an organi2ation among the disparate powers and political entities of the *ar @ast
was inherently more comple a matter than the North #tlantic Treaty nations had
successfully faced. The U.S. decided that the impetus for collective security in #sia
should come from the #sians) but by late %&5&) it also recogni2ed that action was
necessary in !ndochina. Thus) in the closing months of %&5&) the course of U.S. policy
was set to bloc. further communist epansion in #sia3 by collective security if the #sians
were forthcoming6 by collaboration with maDor @uropean allies and commonwealth
nations) if possible6 but bilaterally if necessary. Bn that policy course lay the Aorean "ar
of %&'($%&'9) the forming of the Southeast #sia Treaty Brgani2ation of %&'5) and the
progressively deepening U.S. involvement in 4ietnam.
:anuary and *ebruary) %&'() were pivotal months. The *rench too. the first concrete
steps toward transferring public administration to Bao ;ai=s State of 4ietnam. >o <hi
8inh denied the legitimacy of the latter) proclaiming the ;04 as the "only legal
government of the 4ietnam people)" and was formally recogni2ed by Pe.ing and
8oscow. Bn 7& :anuary %&'() the *rench Nation) #ssembly approved legislation
granting autonomy to the State of 4ietnam. (n *ebruary %) %&'() Secretary of State
#cheson made the following public statement3
The recognition by the Aremlin of >o <hi 8inh=s communist movement in !ndochina
comes as a surprise. The Soviet ac.nowledgment of this movement should remove any
illusions as to the "nationalist" nature of >o <hi 8inh=s aims and reveals >o in his true
colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in !ndochina.
#lthough timed in an effort to cloud the transfer of sovereignty *rance to the legal
Governments of /aos) <ambodia and 4ietnam) we have every reason to believe that
those legal governments will proceed in their development toward stable governments
representing the true nationalist sentiments of more than 7( million peoples of !ndochina.
*rench action in transferring sovereignty to 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia has been in
process for some time. *ollowing *rench ratification) which is epected within a few
days) the way will be open for recognition of these local governments by the countries of
the world whose policies support the development of genuine national independence in
former colonial areas. . . .
*ormal *rench ratification of 4ietnamese independence was announced 5 *ebruary %&'(6
on the same date) President Truman approved U.S. recognition for Bao ;ai. *rench
re?uests for aid in !ndochina followed within a few wee.s. Bn 8ay J) %&'() the
Secretary of State announced that3
The United States Government convinced that neither national independence nor
democratic evolution eist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism) considers the
situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military e?uipment to
the #ssociated State of !ndochina and to *rance in order to assist them in restoring
stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.
The U.S. thereafter was deeply involved in the developing war. But it cannot be said that
the etension of aid was a volte$face of U.S. policy precipitated solely by the events of
%&'(. !t appears rather as the denouement of a cohesive progression of U.S. policy
decisions stemming from the %&5' determination that *rance should decide the political
future of 4ietnamese nationalism. Neither the modest B.S.S. aid to the 4iet 8inh in
%&5') nor the U.S. refusal to abet *rench recourse to arms the same year) signaled U.S.
bac.ing of >o <hi 8inh. To the contrary) the U.S. was very wary of >o) apprehensive
lest Paris= imperialism be succeeded by control from 8oscow. Uncertainty characteri2ed
the U.S. attitude toward >o through %&5J) but the U.S. incessantly pressured *rance to
accommodate "genuine" 4ietnamese nationalism and independence. !n early %&'() both
the apparent fruition of the Bao ;ai solution) and the patent alignment of the ;04 with
the USS0 and <ommunist <hina) impelled the U.S. to more direct intervention in
4ietnam.
(End of Summary)
1$ I*+,C-I*. I* /$0$ 1.2TI3E P,4IC5, 191"19#
!n the interval between the fall of *rance in %&5() and the Pearl >arbor attac. in
;ecember) %&5%) the United States watched with increasing apprehension the flu of
:apanese military power into !ndochina. #t first the United States urged 4ichy to refuse
:apanese re?uests for authori2ation to use bases there) but was unable to offer more than
vague assurances of assistance) such as a State ;epartment statement to the *rench
#mbassador on , #ugust %&5( that3
"e have been doing and are doing everything possible within the framewor. of our
established policies to .eep the situation in the *ar @ast stabili2ed6 that we have been
progressively ta.ing various steps) the effect of which has been to eert economic
pressure on :apan6 that our *leet is now based on >awaii) and that the course which we
have been following) as indicated above) gives a clear indication of our intentions and
activities for the future.
The *rench #mbassador replied that3
!n his opinion the phrase "within the framewor. of our established policies." when
associated with the apparent reluctance of the #merican Government to consider the use
of military force in the *ar @ast at this particular time) to mean that the United States
would not use military or naval force in support of any position which might be ta.en to
resist the :apanese attempted aggression on !ndochina. The #mbassador FfearedG that the
*rench Government would) under the indicated pressure of the :apanese Government) be
forced to accede . . .
The fears of the *rench #mbassador were reali2ed. !n %&5%) however) :apan went beyond
the use of bases to demands for a presence in !ndochina tantamount to occupation.
President 0oosevelt himself epressed the heightening U.S. alarm to the :apanese
#mbassador) in a conversation recorded by #cting Secretary of State "elles as follows3
The President then went on to say that this new move by :apan in !ndochina created an
eceedingly serious problem for the United States . . . the cost of any military occupation
is tremendous and the occupation itself is not conducive to the production by civilians in
occupied countries of food supplies and new materials of the character re?uired by :apan.
>ad :apan underta.en to obtain the supplies she re?uired from !ndochina in a peaceful
way) she not only would have obtained larger ?uantities of such supplies) but would have
obtained them with complete security and without the draining epense of a military
occupation. *urthermore) from the military standpoint) the President said) surely the
:apanese Government could not have in reality the slightest belief that <hina) Great
Britain) the Netherlands or the United States had any territorial designs on !ndochina nor
were in the slightest degree providing any real threats of aggression against :apan. This
Government) conse?uently) could only assume that the occupation of !ndochina was
being underta.en by :apan for the purpose of further offense and this created a situation
which necessarily must give the United States the most serious dis?uiet . . .
. . . The President stated that if the :apanese Government would refrain from occupying
!ndochina with its military and naval forces) or) had such steps actually been commenced)
if the :apanese Government would withdraw such forces) the President could assure the
:apanese Government that he would do everything within his power to obtain from the
Governments of <hina) Great Britain) the Netherlands) and of course the United States
itself a binding and solemn declaration) provided :apan would underta.e the same
commitment) to regard !ndochina as a neutrali2ed country in the same way in which
Swit2erland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutrali2ed country. >e
stated that this would imply that none of the powers concerned would underta.e any
military act of aggression against !ndochina and would remain in control of the territory
and would not be confronted with attempts to dislodge them on the part of de Gaullist or
*ree *rench agents or forces.
The same date) Secretary of State <ordell >ull instructed Sumner "elles to see the
:apanese #mbassador) and
8a.e clear the fact that the occupation of !ndochina by :apan possibly means one further
important step to sei2ing control of the South Sea area) including trade routes of supreme
importance to the United States controlling such products as rubber) tin and other
commodities. This was of vital concern to the United States. The Secretary said that if we
did not bring out this point our people will not understand the significance of this
movement into !ndochina. The Secretary mentioned another point to be stressed3 there is
no theory on which !ndochina could be flooded with armed forces) aircraft) et cetera) for
the defense of :apan. The only alternative is that this venture into !ndochina has a close
relation to the South Sea area and its value for offense against that area.
!n a press statement of 7 #ugust %&5%) #cting Secretary of State "elles deplored :apan=s
"epansionist aims" and impugned 4ichy3
Under these circumstances) this Government is impelled to ?uestion whether the *rench
Government at 4ichy in fact proposes to maintain its declared policy to preserve for the
*rench people the territories both at home and abroad which have long been under *rench
sovereignty.
This Government) mindful of its traditional friendship for *rance) has deeply
sympathi2ed with the desire of the *rench people to maintain their territories and to
preserve them intact. !n its relations with the *rench Government at 4ichy and with$the
local *rench authorities in *rench territories) the United States will be governed by the
manifest effectiveness with which those authorities endeavor to protect these territories
from domination and control by those powers which are see.ing to etend their rule by
force and con?uest) or by the threat thereof.
Bn the eve of Pearl >arbor) as part of the U.S. attempt to obtain :apanese consent to a
non$aggression pact) the U.S. again proposed neutrali2ation of !ndochina in return for
:apanese withdrawal. The events of - ;ecember %&5% put the ?uestion of the future of
!ndochina in the wholly different contet of U.S. strategy for fighting "orld "ar %%.
.$ 2,,0EVE4T80 T2/0TEE0-IP C,*CEPT
U.S. policy toward !ndochina during "orld "ar %% was ambivalent. Bn the one hand) the
U.S. appeared to support *ree *rench claims to all of *rance=s overseas dominions. The
U.S. early in the war repeatedly epressed or implied to the *rench an intention to restore
to *rance its overseas empire after the war. These U.S. commitments included the #ugust
7) %&5%) official statement on the *ranco$:apanese agreement6 a ;ecember) %&5%)
Presidential letter to P,tain6 a 8arch 7) %&57) statement on New <aledonia6 a note to the
*rench #mbassador of #pril %9) %&576 Presidential statements and messages at the time
of the North #frica invasion6 the <lar.$;arlan #greement of November 77) %&576 and a
letter of the same month from the President=s Personal 0epresentative to General >enri
Giraud) which included the following reassurance3
. . . The restoration of *rance to full independence) in all the greatness and vastness which
it possessed before the war in @urope as well as overseas) is one of the war aims of the
United Nations. !t is thoroughly understood that *rench sovereignty will be re$established
as soon as possible throughout all the territory) metropolitan or colonial) over which flew
the *rench flag in %&9&.
Bn the other hand) in the #tlantic <harter and other pronouncements the U.S. proclaimed
support for national self$determination and independence. 8oreover) the President of the
United States) especially distressed at the 4ichy "sell$out" to :apan in !ndochina) often
cited *rench rule there as a flagrant eample of onerous and eploitative colonialism) and
tal.ed of his determination to turn !ndochina over to an international trusteeship after the
war. !n early %&55) /ord >alifa) the British #mbassador in "ashin$ton) called on
Secretary of State >ull to in?uire whether the President=s "rather definite" statements
"that !ndochina should be ta.en away from the *rench and put under an international
trusteeship"$made to "Tur.s) @gyptians and perhaps others" during his trip to <airo and
Teheran$represented "final conclusions in view of the fact that they would soon get bac.
to the *rench +The *rench mar.ed well the President=s views$in fact as *rance withdrew
from 4ietnam in %&',) its *oreign 8inister recalled 0oosevelt=s assuring the Sultan of
8orocco that his sympathies lay with colonial peoples struggling for independence. /ord
>alifa later recorded that3
The President was one of the people who used conversation as others of us use a first
draft on paper . . . a method of trying out an idea. !f it does not go well) you can modify it
or drop it as you will. Nobody thin.s anything of it if you do this with a paper draft6 but if
you do it with conversation) people say that you have changed your mind) that "you never
.new where you have him)" and so on.
But in response to a memorandum from Secretary of State >ull putting the ?uestion of
!ndochina to *.;.0.) and reminding the President of the numerous U.S. commitments to
restoration of the *rench empire) 0oosevelt replied +on :anuary 75) %&551) that3
! saw >alifa last wee. and told him ?uite fran.ly that it was perfectly true that ! had) for
over a year) epressed the opinion that !ndo$<hina should not go bac. to *rance but that
it should be administered by an international trusteeship. *rance has had the country$
thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years) and the people are worse off than
they were at the beginning.
#s a matter of interest) ! am wholeheartedly supported in this view by Generalissimo
<hiang Aai$she. and by 8arshal Stalin. ! see no reason to play in with the British
*oreign Bffice in this matter. The only reason they seem to oppose it is that they fear the
effect it would have on their own possessions and those of the ;utch. They have never
li.ed the idea of trusteeship because it is) in some instances) aimed at future
independence. This is true in the case of !ndo$<hina.
@ach case must) of course) stand on its own feet) but the case of !ndo<hina is perfectly
clear. *rance has mil.ed it for one hundred years. The people of !ndo$<hina are entitled
to something better than that.
1. Military Strategy Pre-eminent
Throughout the year %&55) the President held to his views) and consistent with them)
proscribed U.S. aid to resistance groups$including *rench groups$in !ndochina. But the
war in the #sian theaters moved rapidly) and the center of gravity of the #merican effort
began to shift northward toward :apan. The ?uestion of U.S. strategy in Southeast #sia
then came to the fore. #t the Second Kuebec <onference +September) %&551) the U.S.
refused British offers of naval assistance against :apan because #dmiral Aing believed
"the best occupation for any available British forces would be to re$ta.e Singapore) and
to assist the ;utch in recovering the @ast !ndies)" and because he suspected that the offer
%% was perhaps not unconnected with a desire for United States help in clearing the
:apanese out of the 8alay States and Netherlands @ast !ndies." #dmiral Aing=s suspicions
were not well$founded) at least insofar as <hurchill=s strategic thought was concerned.
The Prime 8inister was evidently as unwilling to invite an active #merican role in the
liberation of Southeast #sia as the U.S. was to underta.e same6 as early as *ebruary)
%&55) <hurchill wrote that3
# decision to act as a subsidiary force under the #mericans in the Pacific raises difficult
political ?uestions about the future of our 8alayan possessions. !f the :apanese should
withdraw from them or ma.e peace as the result of the main #merican thrust) the United
States Government would after the victory feel greatly strengthened in its view that all
possessions in the @ast !ndian #rchipelago should be placed under some international
body upon which the United States would eercise a decisive concern.
The future of <ommonwealth territories in Southeast #sia stimulated intense British
interest in #merican intentions for *rench colonies there. !n November and ;ecember of
%&55) the British epressed to the United States) both in /ondon and in "ashington) their
concern "that the United States apparently has not yet determined upon its policy toward
!ndochina." The head of the *ar @astern ;epartment in the British *oreign Bffice told the
U.S. #mbassador that3
!t would be difficult to deny *rench participation in the liberation of !ndochina in light of
the increasing strength of the *rench Government in world affairs) and that) unless a
policy to be followed toward !ndochina is mutually agreed between our two
governments) circumstances may arise at any moment which will place our two
governments in a very aw.ward situation.
President 0oosevelt) however) refused to define his position further) notifying Secretary
of State Stettinius on :anuary %) %&5'3
! still do not want to get mied up in any !ndo$<hina decision. !t is a matter for postwar.$$
. . . ! do not want to get mied up in any military effort toward the liberation of !ndo$
<hina from the :apanese.$$Cou can tell >alifa that ! made this very clear to 8r.
<hurchill. *rom both the military and civil point of view) action at this time is premature.
>owever) the U.S. :oint <hiefs of Staff were concurrently planning the removal of
#merican armed forces from Southeast #sia. !n response to approaches from *rench and
;utch officials re?uesting aid in epelling :apan from their former colonial territories) the
U.S. informed them that3
#ll our available forces were committed to fighting the :apanese elsewhere in the Pacific)
and !ndochina and the @ast !ndies were therefore not included within the sphere of
interest of the #merican <hiefs of Staff.
#merican willingness to forego further operations in Southeast #sia led to a directive to
#dmiral /ord 8ountbatten) Supreme <ommander in that theater) to liberate 8alaya
without U.S. assistance. #fter the Calta <onference +*ebruary) %&5'1) U.S. commanders
in the Pacific were informed that the U.S. planned to turn over to the British
responsibility for operations in the Netherlands @ast !ndies and New Guinea. The
President) however) agreed to permit such U.S. military operations in !ndochina as
avoided "alignments with the *rench)" and detraction from the U.S. military campaign
against :apan. The latter stricture precluded) in the U.S. view) the U.S. cooperation with
the *rench at 8ountbatten=s head?uarters) or the furnishing of ships to carry *ree *rench
forces to !ndochina to underta.e its liberation. This U.S. position came under particularly
severe *rench criticism after %% 8arch %&5') when the :apanese overturned the 4ichy
regime in 4ietnam) and prompted the @mperor Bao ;ai to declare 4ietnam unified and
independent of *rance under :apanese protection. Bn %, 8arch %&5') a protest from
General de Gaulle led to the following echange between the Secretary of State and the
President3
;@P#0T8@NT B* ST#T@
"ashington
8arch %,) %&5'
8@8B0#N;U8 *B0 T>@ P0@S!;@NT
SubDect3 !ndo$<hina.
<ommunications have been received from the Provisional Government of the *rench
0epublic as.ing for3
+%1#ssistance for the resistance groups now fighting the :apanese in !ndo$<hina.
+71 <onclusion of a civil affairs agreement covering possible future operations in !ndo$
<hina.
These memoranda have been referred to the :oint <hiefs of Staff in order to obtain their
views concerning the military aspects of the problems) and ! shall communicate with you
further on the subDect upon receipt of the :oint <hiefs= reply.
#ttached herewith is the tet of a recent telegram from #mbassador <affery describing
his conversation with General de Gaulle on the subDect of !ndo$<hina. *rom this telegram
and de Gaulle=s speech of 8arch %5) it appears that this Government may be made to
appear responsible for the wea.ness of the resistance to :apan in !ndo$<hina. The British
may li.ewise be epected to encourage this view. !t seems to me that without preDudicing
in any way our position regarding the future of !ndo$<hina we can combat this trend by
ma.ing public Fmaterial illegibleG a suggested statement) subDect to your approval) by the
State ;epartment.
IsI @. 0. Stettinius) :r.
@nclosures3
%. Proposed Statement.
7. <opy of telegram from #mbassador <affery Fnot included hereG
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %
<hapter !) "Bac.ground to the <risis) %&5($'("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. %7$7&
F@nclosure %G
P0BPBS@; ST#T@8@NT
The action of the :apanese Government in tearing away the veil with which it for so long
attempted to cloa. its domination of !ndo$<hina is a direct conse?uence of the ever$
mounting pressure which our arms are applying to the :apanese @mpire. !t is a lin. in the
chain of events which began so disastrously in the summer of %&5% with the *ranco$
:apanese agreement for the "common defense" of !ndo$<hina. !t is clear that this latest
step in the :apanese program will in the long run prove to be of no avail.
The Provisional Government of the *rench 0epublic has re?uested armed assistance for
those who are resisting the :apanese forces in !ndo$<hina. !n accordance with its constant
desire to aid all those who are willing to ta.e up arms against our common enemies) this
Government will do all it can to be of assistance in the present situation) consistent with
plans to which it is already committed and with the operations now ta.ing place in the
Pacific. !t goes without saying that all this country=s available resources are being devoted
to the defeat of our enemies and they will continue to be employed in the manner best
calculated to hasten their downfall.
F0esponseG
T>@ ">!T@ >BUS@
"ashington
8arch %-) %&5'
8@8B0#N;U8 *B0
The Secretary of State
By direction of the President) there is returned herewith Secretary of State 8emorandum
of %, 8arch) subDect !ndo$<hina) which includes a proposed statement on the :apanese
action in !ndo$<hina.
The President is of the opinion that it is inadvisable at the present time to issue the
proposed statement
IsI "illiam ;. /eahy
The *rench were also actively pressuring the President and his .ey advisors through
military channels. #dmiral /eahy reported that) following Calta3
The *rench representatives in "ashington resumed their fre?uent calls to my office after
our return from the <rimea. They labeled most of their re?uests "urgent." They wanted to
participate in the combined intelligence group then studying German industrial and
scientific secrets6 to echange information between the #merican command in <hina and
the *rench forces in !ndo$<hina6 and to get agreement in principle to utili2ing the *rench
naval and military forces in the war against :apan +the latter would assist in returning
!ndo$<hina to *rench control and give *rance a right to participate in lend$lease
assistance after the defeat of Germany.1
8ost of the time ! could only tell them that ! had no useful information as to when and
where we might ma.e use of *rench assistance in the Pacific.
>owever) we did attempt to give a helping hand to the *rench resistance groups in !ndo$
<hina. 4ice #dmiral *enard called me on 8arch %J to say that planes from our %5th #ir
*orce in <hina were loaded with relief supplies for the undergrounders but could not start
without authority from "ashington. ! immediately contacted General >andy and told him
of the President=s agreement that #merican aid to the !ndo$<hina resistance groups might
be given provided it involved no interference with our operations against :apan.
7. Failure of the Trusteeship Proposal
!n the meantime) the President=s concept of postwar trusteeship status for dependent
territories as an intermediate step toward autonomy had undergone study by several
interdepartmental and international groups) but had fared poorly. !n deference to British
sensibilities) the United States had originally sought only a declaration from the colonial
powers setting forth their intention to liberate their dependencies and to provide tutelage
in self$government for subDect peoples. Such a declaration would have been consistent
with the #tlantic <harter of %&5% in which the U.S. and the U.A. Dointly agreed that)
among the "common principles . . . on which they base their hopes for a better future for
the world)" it was their policy that3
. . . they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which
they will live6 and they wish to see sovereign rights and self$government restored to those
who have been forcibly deprived of them. . . .
!n November) %&57) Secretary >ull submitted to the President a proposed draft US$UA
declaration entitled "The #tlantic <harter and National !ndependence)" which the
President approved. Before this draft could be broached to the British) however) they
submitted a counter$proposal) a statement emphasi2ing the responsibility of "parent"
powers for developing native self$government) and avoiding endorsement of trusteeships.
Subse?uent #nglo$#merican discussions in 8arch %&59 addressed both drafts) but
foundered on *oreign Secretary @den=s opposition. Secretary >ull reported in his
memoirs that @den could not believe that the word "independence" would be interpreted
to the satisfaction of all governments3
. . . the *oreign Secretary said that) to be perfectly fran.) he had to say that he did not li.e
our draft very much. >e said it was the word "independence" that troubled him) he had to
thin. of the British @mpire system) which was built on the basis of ;ominion and
colonial status.
>e pointed out that under the British @mpire system there were varying degrees of self$
government) running from the ;ominions through the colonial establishments which had
in some cases) li.e 8alta) completely self$government) to bac.ward areas that were never
li.ely to have their own government. >e added that #ustralia and New Lealand also had
colonial possessions that they would be unwilling to remove from their supervisory
Durisdiction.
U.S. inability to wor. out a common policy with the U.A. also precluded meaningful
discussion) let alone agreement) on the colonial issue at the ;umbarton Ba.s
<onversations in %&55. Through 8arch) %&5') the issue was further occluded by debates
within the U.S. Government over the postwar status of Pacific islands captured from the
:apanese3 in general) the "ar and Navy ;epartments advocated their retention under U.S.
control as military bases) while State and other departments advocated an international
trusteeship.
3. Deision on !ndohina "eft to Frane
Secretary of State Stettinius) with the approval of President 0oosevelt) issued a statement
on #pril 9) %&5') declaring that) as a result of international discussions at Calta on the
concept of trusteeship) the United States felt that the postwar trusteeship structure3
. . . . should be designed to permit the placing under it of the territories mandated after the
last war) and such territories ta.en from the enemy in thi war as might be agreed upon at
a later date) and also such other territories as might be voluntarily placed under
trusteeship.
!ndochina thus seemed relegated to *rench volition.
Nonetheless) as of President 0ooseveltMs death on. #pril %7) %&5') U.S. policy toward the
colonial possessions Bf its allies) and toward !ndochina in particular) was in disarray3
$$The British remained apprehensive that there might be a continued U.S. search for a
trusteeship formula which might impinge on the <ommonwealth.
$$ The *rench were restive over continued U.S. refusal to provide strategic transport for
their forces) resentful over the paucity of U.S. support for *rench forces in !ndochina) and
deeply suspicious that the United StatesEpossibly in concert with the <hineseEintended
to bloc. their regaining control of 4ietnam) /aos) and <ambodia.
B$ T2/3.* .*+ T-E ,CC/P.TI,* ,6 I*+,C-I*., 19#
"ithin a month of President Truman=s entry into office) the *rench raised the subDect of
!ndochina at the United Nations <onference at San *rancisco) Secretary of State
Stettinius reported the following conversation to "ashington3
...!ndo$<hina came up in a recent <onversation ! had with Bidault and Bonnet. The latter
remar.ed that the *rench Government interprets FUnder Secretary of StateG "elles)
statement of %&57 concerning the restoration of *rench sovereignty over the *rench
@mpire as including !ndo$<hina) the press continues to imply that a special status will be
reserved for this colonial area. !t was made ?uite clear to Bidault that the record is
entirely innocent of any official statement of this government ?uestioning) even by
implication) *rench sovereignty over !ndo$<hina. <ertain elements of #merican public
opinion) however) condemned *rench governmental policies and practices in !ndo$<hina.
Bidault seemed relieved and has no doubt cabled Paris that he received renewed
assurances of our recognition of *rench sovereignty over that area.
!n early :une %&5') the ;epartment of State instructed the United States #mbassador to
<hina on the deliberations in progress within the U.S. Government and its discussions
with allies on U.S. policy toward !ndochina. >e was informed that at San *rancisco3
...the #merican delegation has insisted upon the necessity of providing for a progressive
measure of self$government for all dependent peoples loo.ing toward their eventual
independence or incorporation in some form of federation according to circumstances
and the ability of the peoples to assume these responsibilities. Such decisions would
preclude the establishment of a trusteeship in !ndochina ecept with the consent of the
*rench Government. The latter seems unli.ely. Nevertheless) it is the PresidentMs
intention at some appropriate time to as. that the *rench Government give some positive
indication of its intention in regard to the establishment of civil liberties and increasing
measures of self$government in !ndochina before formulating further declarations of
policy in this respect.
The United Nations <harter +:une 7,) %&5'1 contained a ";eclaration 0egarding Non$
Self$Governing Territories"3
#rtile $3
8embers of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self$
government recogni2e the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories
are paramount) and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost)
within the system of international peace and security established by the present <harter)
the well$being of the inhabitants of these territories) and) to this end3
a. to ensure) with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned) their political)
economic) social) and educational advancement) their Dust treatment) and their protection
against abuses6
b. to develop self$government) to ta.e due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples) and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political
institutions) according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and
their varying stages of advancement6 . . .
#gain) however) military considerations governed U.S. policy in !ndochina. President
Truman replied to General de Gaulle=s repeated offers for aid in !ndochina with
statements to the effect that it was his policy to leave such matters to his military
commanders. #t the Potsdam <onference +:uly) %&5'1) the <ombined <hiefs of Staff
decided that !ndochina south of latitude %,= North was to be included in the Southeast
#sia <ommand under #dmiral 8ountbatten. Based on this decision) instructions were
issued that :apanese forces located north of that line would surrender to Generalissimo
<hiang Aai$she.) and those to the south to #dmiral /ord 8ountbatten6 pursuant to these
instructions) <hinese forces entered Ton.in in September) %&5') while a small British
tas. force landed at Saigon. Political difficulties materiali2ed almost immediately) for
while the <hinese were prepared to accept the 4ietnamese government they found in
power in >anoi) the British refused to do li.ewise in Saigon) and deferred to the *rench
there from the outset.
There is no evidence that serious concern developed in "ashington at the swiftly
unfolding events in !ndochina. !n mid$#ugust) 4ietnamese resistance forces of the 4iet
8inh) under >o <hi 8inh) had sei2ed power in >anoi and shortly thereafter demanded
and received the abdication of the :apanese puppet) @mperor Bao ;ai. Bn 4$: ;ay)
September 7nd) >o <hi 8inh had proclaimed in >anoi the establishment of the
;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam +;041. The ;04 ruled as the only civil government in
all of 4ietnam for a period of about 7( days. Bn 79 September %&5') with the .nowledge
of the British <ommander in Saigon) *rench forces overthrew the local ;04
government) and declared *rench authority restored in <ochinchina. Guerrilla war beoan
around Saigon. #lthough #merican BSS representatives were present in both >anoi and
Saigon and ostensibly supported the 4iet 8inh) the United States too. no official
position regarding either the ;04) or the *rench and British actions in South 4ietnam. !n
Bctober) %&5') the United States stated its policy in the following terms3
US has no thought of opposing the reestablishment of *rench control in !ndochina and no
official statement bv US GB4T has ?uestioned even by implication *rench sovereignty
over !ndochina. >owever) it is not the policy of this GB4T to assist the *rench to
reestablish their control over !ndochina by force and the willingness of the US to see
*rench control reestablished assumes that *rench claim to have the support of the
population of !ndochina is borne out by future events.
*rench statements to the U.S. loo.ed for an early end to the hostilities) and spo.e
reassuringly of reforms and liberality. !n November) :ean <hauvel) Secretary$General to
the *rench 8inister for *oreign #ffairs) told the U.S. #mbassador that3
"hen the trouble with the #nnamites bro.e out de Gaulle had been urged by the *rench
8ission in !ndia to ma.e some sort of policy statement announcing *rance=s intention to
adopt a far$reaching progressive policy designed to give the native population much
greater authority) responsibility and representation in govt. ;e Gaulle considered the idea
but reDected it because in the state of disorder prevailing in !ndochina he believed that no
such policy could be implemented pending restoration of *rench authority and would
therefore Dust be considered by everyone as "merely more fine words." *urthermore de
Gaulle and the *oreign 8inister believe that the present situation is still so confused and
they have so little information really reliable on the overall !ndochina picture that such
plans and thoughts as they held heretofore may have to be very thoroughly revised in the
light of recent developments.
;espite the fact that the *rench do not feel that they can as yet ma.e any general
statements outlining specific future plans for !ndochina) <hanvel says that they hope
"very soon" to put into operation in certain areas programs including local elections
which will be designed to grant much greater authority and greater voice in affairs to the
natives. This he said would be a much better indication of the sincerity of *rench
intentions than any policy statement. . . . The *rench hope soon to negotiate an agreement
with Fthe Aing of <ambodiaG which will result in the granting of much greater
responsibility and authority to the <ambodians. >e mentioned specifically that there
would be many more natives integrated into the local administrative services and it was
also hoped that local elections could soon be held. The *rench he said intend to follow
the same procedure in /aos when the situation permits and eventually also in #nnam and
Ton.in. "hen order is restored throughout !ndochina and agreements have been reached
with the individual states <hauvel said the *rench intend to embody the results of these
separate agreements into a general program for all of !ndochina.
*rom the autumn of %&5' through the autumn of %&5,) the United States received a series
of communications from >o <hi 8inh depicting calamitous conditions in 4ietnam)
invo.ing the principles proclaimed in the #tlantic <harter and in the <harter of the
United Nations) and pleading for U.S. recognition of the independence of the ;04) or$$
as a last resort$$trusteeship for 4ietnam under the United Nations. But while the U.S.
too. no action on >o=s re?uests) it was also unwilling to aid the *rench. Bn :anuary %')
%&5,) the Secretary of "ar was advised by the ;epartment of State that it was contrary to
U.S. policy to "employ #merican flag vessels or aircraft to transport troops of any
nationality to or from the Netherlands @ast !ndies or *rench !ndochina) nor to permit use
of such craft to carry arms) ammunition or military e?uipment to these areas." >owever)
the British arranged for the transport of additional *rench troops to !ndochina) bilaterally
agreed with the *rench for the latter to assume British occupation responsibilities) and
signed a pact on & Bctober) %&5') giving "full recognition to *rench rights" in !ndochina.
*rench troops began arriving in Saigon that month) and subse?uently the British turned
over to them some J(( U.S. /end$/ease Deeps and truc.s. President Truman approved the
latter transaction on the grounds that removing the e?uipment would be impracticable.
The fighting between the *rench and the 4ietnamese which began in South 4ietnam with
the 79 September) %&5') *rench oup d%etat& spread from Saigon throughout
<ochinchina) and to southern #nnam. By the end of :anuary) %&5,) it was wholly a
*rench affair) for by that time the British withdrawal was complete6 on 5 8arch) %&5,)
#dmiral /ord 8ountbatten deactivated !ndochina as territory under the #llied Southeast
#sia <ommand) thereby transferring all control to *rench authorities. *rom *rench
head?uarters) via 0adio Saigon) came announcements that a military "mopping$up"
campaign was in progress) but pacification was virtually complete6 but these reports of
success were typically interspersed with such items as the following3
7( 8arch %&5,3
0ebel bands are still +wrea.ing destruction1 in the areas south of Saigon. These bands are
?uite large) some numbering as many as %)((( men. <oncentrations of these bands are to
be found . . . in the villages. Some have turned north in an attempt to disrupt
+communications1 in the <amau Peninsula) northeast of Batri and in the general area
south of +Nha Trang1. !n the area south of <holon and in the north of the Plaine des :enes
region) several bands have ta.en refuge. . . .
7% 8arch %&5,3
The following communi?ue was issued by the >igh <ommissioner for !ndochina this
morning3 "0ebel activities have increased in the Bien >oa area) on both ban.s of the river
;ong Nai. # *rench convoy has been attac.ed on the road between Bien >oa and Tan
Uyen where a land mine had been laid by the rebels.
"!n the +Baclo1 area) northwest of Saigon) a number of pirates have been captured in the
course of a clean$up raid. #mong the captured men are five :apanese deserters. The dead
bodies of three :apanese) including an officer) have been found at the point where the
operation was carried out.
"# *rench detachment was ambushed at +San :ay1) south #nnam. The detachment)
nevertheless) succeeded in carrying out its mission. Several aggressions by rebel parties
are reported along the coastal road."
4iolence abated in South 4ietnam somewhat as *ranco$;04 negotiations proceeded in
spring) %&5,) but in the meantime) *rench forces moved into further confrontation with
4ietnamese "rebels" in Ton.in. !n *ebruary) %&5,) a *rench tas. force prepared to force
landings at >aiphong) but was forestalled by diplomatic maneuver. # *ranco$<hinese
agreement of 7J *ebruary %&5, provided that the <hinese would turn over their
responsibilities in northern !ndochina to the *rench on 9% 8arch %&5,.
Bn 8arch ,) %&5,) a *rench$;04 accord was reached in the following terms3
%. The *rench Government recogni2es the 4ietnamese 0epublic as a *ree State having its
own Government) its own Parliament) its own #rmy and its own *inances) forming part
of the !ndochinese *ederation and ofthe *rench Union. !n that which concerns the
reuniting of the three "#nnamite 0egions" F<ochinchina) #nnam) Ton.inG the *rench
Government pledges itself to ratify the decisions ta.en by the populations consulted by
referendum.
7. The 4ietnamese Government declares itself ready to welcome amicably the *rench
#rmy when) conforming to international agreements) it relieves the <hinese Troops. #
Supplementary #ccord) attached to the present Preliminary #greement) will establish the
means by which the relief operations will be carried out.
9. The stipulations formulated above will immediately enter into force. !mmediately after
the echange of signatures) each of the >igh <ontracting Parties will ta.e all measures
necessary to stop hostilities in the field) to maintain the troops in their respective
positions) and to create the favorable atmosphere necessary to the immediate opening of
friendly and sincere negotiations. These negotiations will deal particularly with3
a. diplomatic relations of 4iet$nam with *oreign States
b. the future law of !ndochina
c. *rench interests) economic and cultural) in 4iet$nam.
>anoi) Saigon or Paris may be chosen as the seat of the conference.
;BN@ #T >#NB!) the ,th of 8arch %&5,
Signed3 Sainteny
Signed3 >o <hi 8inh and 4u >ong Ahanh
*rench forces ?uic.ly eercise their prerogative) occupying >anoi on %J 8arch %&5,)
and negotiations opened in ;afat in #pril.
>ence) as of #pril %() %&5,) allied occupation in !ndochina was officially over) and
*rench forces were positioned in all of 4ietnam=s maDor cities6 the problems of U.S.
policv toward 4ietnam then shifted from the contet of wartime strategy to the arena of
the U.S. relationship with *rance.
II$ /$0$ *E/T2.4IT5 I* T-E 62.*C,"VIET 3I*- 1.2, 197"199
.$ 6.I4/2E0 ,6 *EG,TI.TE+ 0ETT4E3E*T
The return of the *rench to Ton.in in 8arch) %&5,) created an eplosive situation. North
4ietnam) a traditionally rice$deficit area) had eperienced an etraordinarily bad harvest
in %&5'. Severe famine was scarcely helped by the concentration of armies in the 0ed
0iver ;elta$4ietnamese irregular forces) the most numerous belonging to the 4iet 8inh6
some %'()((( <hinese6 and then the *rench @peditionary <orps. The people were not
only hungry) but politically restive6 the popular= appetite for national independence had
been thoroughly whetted by the 4iet 8inh and the formation of $the ;04. "hile feeling
against all foreign occupiers ran high) the *rench remained the primary target of enmity.
But the 8arch , #ccord deferred a rec.oning) serving to mollify etremists in Ton.in)
and to dampen guerrilla operations in South 4ietnam. The accord in any event
underwrote peaceful cooperation between *rance and the ;04 in North 4ietnam for
eight months.
Cet the 8arch , #ccord constituted an admission of defeat for >o <hi 8inh) because his
policy had been directed toward internationali2ing the !ndochina problem. >o made
repeated overtures to the United States) to the United Nations) and to <hina) the USS0)
and the U.A. >is letters presented elo?uent appeals for U.S. or U.N. intervention in
4ietnam on the grounds of the principles embodied in the #tlantic <harter) the U.N.
<harter) and on humanitarian grounds. The last such to be forwarded to the U.S. prior to
the #ccord of , 8arch %&5,) is summari2ed in the following telegram from an #merican
diplomat in >anoi) received in "ashington 7- *ebruary %&5,3
>o <hi 8inh handed me 7 letters addressed to President of US#) <hina) 0ussia) and
Britain identical copies of which were stated to have been forwarded to other
governments named. !n 7 letters to >o <hi 8inh re?uest FsicG US# as one of United
Nations to support idea of #nnamese independence according to Philippines FsicG
eample) to eamine the case of the #nnamese) and to ta.e steps necessary to
maintenance of world peace which is being endangered by *rench efforts to recon?uer
!ndochina. >e asserts that #nnamese will fi = ght until United Nations interfere in support
of #nnamese independence. The petition addressed to maDor United Nations contains3
#. 0eview of *rench relations with :apanese where *rench !ndochina allegedly aided
:aps3
B. Statement of establishment on 7 September %&5' of P@N" FsicG ;emocratic 0epublic
of 4iet 8inh3
<. Summary of *rench con?uest of <ochin <hina begun 79 Sept %&5' and still
incomplete3
;. Butline of accomplishments of #nnamese Government in Ton.in including popular
elections) abolition of undesirable taes) epansion of education and resumption as far as
possible of normal economic activities3
@. 0e?uest to 5 powers3 +%1 To intervene and stop the war in !ndochina in order to
mediate fair settlement and +71 to bring the !ndochinese issue before the United Nations
organi2ation. The petition ends with statement that #nnamese as. for full independence
in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNB decision the #nnamese will continue to
fight the reestablishment of *rench imperialism. /etters and petition will be transmitted
to ;epartment soonest.
There is no record that the U.S. encouraged >o <hi 8inh thus to submit his cause to the
U.S.) beyond the B.S.S. support he received during and immediately after "orld "ar !!6
nor does the record reflect that the U.S. responded affirmatively to >o=s petitions. 0ather)
the U.S. Government appears to have adhered uniformly to a policy of loo.ing to the
*rench rather than to 4ietnamese Nationalists for constructive steps toward 4ietnamese
independence. Bn ' ;ecember) %&5,) after the November incidents) but before the
fighting bro.e out in earnest) State instructed the U.S. diplomatic representative in >anoi
as follows3
#ssume you will see >o in >anoi and offer following summary our present thin.ing as
guide.
Aeep in mind >o=s clear record as agent international communism) absence evidence
recantation 8oscow affiliations) confused political situation *rance and support >o
receiving *rench <ommunist Party. /east desirable eventuality would be establishment
<ommunist$dominated 8oscow$oriented state !ndochina in view ;@PT) which most
interested !N*B strength non$communist elements 4ietnam. 0eport fully) repeating or
re?uesting ;@PT repeat Paris.
0ecent occurrences Ton.in cause deep concern. <onsider 8arch , accord and modus
vivendi as result peaceful negotiation provide basis settlement outstanding ?uestions
between *rance and 4ietnam and impose responsibility both sides not preDudice future)
particularly forthcoming *ontainebleau <onference) by resort force. Unsettled situation
such as pertains certain to offer provocations both sides) but for this reason conciliatory
patient attitude especially necessary. !ntransigence either side and disposition eploit
incidents can only retard economic rehabilitation !ndochina and cause indefinite
postponement conditions cooperation *rance and 4ietnam which both agree essential.
!f >o ta.es stand non$implementation promise by *rench of <ochinchina referendum
relieves 4ietnam responsibility compliance with agreements) you might if you consider
advisable raise ?uestion whether he believes referendum after such long disorder could
produce worthwhile result and whether he considers compromise on status <ochinchina
could possibly be reached through negotiation.
8ay say #merican people have welcomed attainments !ndochinese in efforts reali2e
praiseworthy aspirations greater autonomy in framewor. democratic institutions and it
would be regrettable should this interest and sympathy be imperilled by any tendency
4ietnam administration force issues by intransigence and violence.
8ay inform >o FU.S. #mbassador ParisG discussing situation *rench similar fran.ness.
*or your !N*B) F*oreign BfficeG in ;@< 9 conversation stated +%1 no ?uestion recon?uest
!ndochina as such would be counter *rench public opinion and probably beyond *rench
military resources) +71 *rench will continue base policy 8arch , accord and modus
vivendi and ma.e every effort apply them through negotiation) 4ietnam +91 *rench
would resort forceful measures only on restricted scale in case flagrant violation
agreements 4ietnam) +51 dM#rgenlieu=s usefulness impaired by outspo.en disli.e
4ietnam officials and replacement perhaps desirable) +'1 *rench <ommunists
embarrassed in pose as guardian *rench international interests by barrage telegraphic
appeals from 4ietnam. F#mbassadorG will epress gratification this statement *rench
policy with observation implementation such policy should go far obviate any danger that
+%1 4ietnamese irreconcilables and etremists might be in position ma.e capital of
situation +71 4ietnamese might be turned irrevocably against "est and toward ideologies
and affiliations hostile democracies which could result perpetual foment !ndochina with
conse?uences all Southeast #sia.
#void impression US Govt ma.ing formal intervention this Duncture. Publicity any .ind
would be unfortunate.
Paris be guided foregoing.
#cheson) #cting.
*or a while) the *rench seemed genuinely interested in pursuing a policy based on the
8arch , #ccord and the modus 'i'endi& and in avoiding a test of arms with the ;04. !f
there were contrary utterances from some) such as #dmiral d=#rgenlieu) the >igh
<ommissioner Bf !ndo$<hina)$$who recorded his "ama2ement that *rance has such a fine
epeditionary corps in !ndochina and yet its leaders prefer to negotiate rather than to
fight..."$$there were many such as General /eclerc) who had led *rench forces into >anoi
on %J 8arch %&5,) and promptly called on >o <hi 8inh) announcing every intention of
honoring the 8arch , #ccord. "#t the present time)" he said) "there is no ?uestion of
imposing ourselves by force on masses who desire evolution and innovation." The *rench
Socialist Party$$the dominant political party in *rance$$consistently advocated
conciliation during %&5,. !n ;ecember) %&5,) even after the armed incidents in
November between *rench and ;04 armed forces in North 4ietnam) /eon Blum$$who
had become Premier of *rance) at the head of an all$Socialist <abinet$$wrote that *rance
had no alternative save to grant the 4ietnamese independence3
There is one way and only one of preserving in !ndochina the prestige of our civili2ation)
our political and spiritual influence) and also those of our material interests which are
legitimate3 it is sincere agreement Fwith 4iet NamG on the basis of independence. . . . $
The <ommunists) the other maDor /eftist party in *rance) were also vocally conciliatory6
but) epectant of controlling the government) if not alone at least as part of a coalition)
they tended to be more careful than the Socialists of their ability to sway nationalist
sentiment. !n :uly of %&5,) "()umanit*& the <ommunist newspaper) had emphasi2ed that
the Party did not wish *rance to be reduced to "its own small metropolitan territory)" but
warned that such would be the conse?uence if the colonial peoples turned against *rance3
#re we) after having lost Syria and /ebanon yesterday) to lose !ndochina tomorrow)
North #frica the day afterN
!n the National #ssembly in September) %&5,) a <ommunist deputy had declared that3
The <ommunists are as much as the net person for the greatness of the country. But . . .
they have never ceased to affirm that the *rench Union . . . can only be founded on the
confident) fraternal) and above all) democratic collaboration of all the peoples and races
who compose it. . . .
>owever) >o <hi 8inh was unable to capitali2e upon this connection with the *rench
/eft +>o had been one of the founding members of the *rench <ommunist Party in the
early %&7(=s1 to turn the epressed convictions of either the Socialists or the <ommunists
to the advantage of the ;04. The <ommunists were not prepared to press the case for the
4ietnamese at the cost of votes in *rance. The Socialists in power paid only lip service to
conciliation) and allowed the more militant colonialists) especially those in 4ietnam) to
set *rance=s policy in !ndochina6 thus) #dmiral d=#rgenlieu) not General /eclerc) spo.e
for the *rench Government.
!n mid$;ecember) %&5,) as soon as Blum too. office) >o sent him a telegram with
proposals for easing tension in 4ietnam) but the message did not reach Paris until
;ecember 7,. By that time the flashpoint had been passed. !n >anoi) on %& ;ecember
%&5,) 4ietnamese troops) after several days of mounting animosity punctuated with
violence) cut off the city=s water and electricity) and attac.ed *rench posts using small
arms) mortar and artillery. The issue of who was the aggressor has never been resolved.
The fighting flared across North 4ietnam) and two days later) the guerrilla war in South
4ietnam ?uic.ened pace. The *rench responded to the initial attac.s with an occasional
savagery which rendered increasingly remote restoration of status +uo ante.
Bn 79 ;ecember %&5,) Premier /eon Blum addressed the National #ssembly on the
!ndochina crisis. >is speech was characteristically principled) and characteristically
ambiguous3 he tal.ed peace) but endorsed militant *rench officials in 4ietnam. #lthough
he declared that "the old colonial system founded on con?uest and maintained by
constraint) which tended toward eploitation of con?uered lands and peoples is finished
today)" he also stated that3
"e have been obliged to deal with violence. The men who are fighting out there) the
*rench soldiers and the friendly populations) may count unreservedly on the vigilance
and resolution of the government.
!t was our common tas. to try everything to spare the blood of our children$and also the
blood that is not ours) but which is blood all the same) that of a people whose right to
political liberty we recogni2ed ten months ago) and who should .eep their place in the
union of peoples federated around *rance. . . .
Before all) order must be reestablished) peaceful order which is necessarily the basis for
the eecution of contracts.
Premier Blum was succeeded within a wee. of his speech by the first government of the
*ourth 0epublic under Paul 0amadier. *rance sent three emissaries to 4ietnam at this
Duncture3 #dmiral d=#rgenlieu) General /eclerc) and the Socialist 8inister of Bverseas
*rance) 8arius 8outet. #dmiral d=#rgenlieu became the >igh <ommissioner of
!ndochina) and accused the 4ietnamese of brea.ing faith with *rance. >e stated
emphatically that *rance intended to preserve in !ndochina3
. . . the maintenance and development of its present influence and of its economic
interests) the protection of ethnic minorities with which it is entrusted) the care of
assuring the security of strategic bases within the framewor. of defense of the *ederation
and the *rench Union. . . .
*rance does not intend in the present state of evolution of the !ndochinese people to give
them unconditional and total independence) which would only be a fiction gravely
preDudicial to the interests of the two parties.
The other two representatives of *rance were dispatched on fact$finding missions. Their
reports contained diametrically opposing policy recommendations. General /eclerc
wrote3
!n %&5- *rance will no longer put down by force a grouping of 75)((()((( inhabitants
which is assuming unity and in which there eists a enophobic and perhaps a national
ideal. . . .
The capital problem from now on is political. !t is a ?uestion of coming to terms with an
awa.ening enophobic nationalism) channeling it in order to safeguard) at least in part)
the rights of *rance.
The General had been sent to eamine the military situation) and returned recommending
a political solution. The Socialist 8arius 8outet had been sent to in?uire into the
political prospects) and returned with the conclusion that only a military solution was
promising. /i.e #dmiral d=#rgenlieu) 8outet believed that there could be no negotiations
with >o <hi 8inh. >e wrote of the "cruel disillusionment of agreements that could not
be put into effect...)" and he declared that3
"e can no longer spea. of a free agreement between *rance and 4ietnam. . . .
Before any negotiations today) it is necessary to have a military decision. ! am sorry) but
one cannot commit such madness as the 4ietnamese have done with impunity.
!t was the politician=s ideas) rather than the general=s) which prevailed in Paris. Premier
0amadier$himself a Socialist$spo.e of peace in 4ietnam) and announced that his
government favored independence and unity for 4ietnam3
!ndependence within the *rench Union FandG union of the three #nnamese countries) if
the #nnamese people desire it.
#t the same time) however) his government permitted #dmiral d=#rgenlieli to launch a
military campaign of maDor proportions and punitive intent.
4ery early in the war) the *rench raised the spectre of <ommunist conspiracy in 4ietnam.
#dmiral d=#rgenlieu in Saigon called for an internationally concerted policy to array the
"estern powers against the epansion of communism in #sia) beginning with 4ietnam.
!n the National #ssembly debated in 8arch) %&5-) a 0ightist deputy introduced the
charge that the violence in 4ietnam had been directed from 8oscow3
Nationalism in !ndochina is a means) the end is Soviet imperialism.
Neither the government nor the people of *rance heeded General /eclerc=s statement of
:anuary) %&5-3
#nti$communism will be a useless tool as long as the problem of nationalism remains
unsolved.
>o <hi 8inh) for his part) issued repeated appeals to *rance for peace) even offering to
withdraw personally3
"hen *rance recogni2es the independence and unity of 4ietnam) we will retire to our
village) for we are not ambitious for power or honor.
!n *ebruary) %&5-) the *rench offered terms to >o tantamount to unconditional surrender.
>o flatly reDected these) as.ing the *rench representative) "!f you were in my place)
would you accept themN . . . !n the *rench Union there is no place for cowards. !f !
accepted their conditions ! should be one." Bn ! 8arch %&5-) >o appealed again to the
*rench government and the *rench people3
Bnce again) we declare solemnly that the 4ietnamese people desire only unity and
independence in the *rench Union) and we pledge ourselves to respect *rench economic
and cultural interests. . . . !f *rance would but say the word to cease hostility
immediately) so many lives and so much property would be saved and friendship and
confidence would be regained.
But the *rench displayed little interest in negotiations. Premier 0amadier stated in 8arch)
%&5-) that3
"e must protect the life and possessions of *renchmen) of foreigners) of our !ndochinese
friends who have confidence in *rench liberty. !t is necessary that we disengage our
garrisons) re$establish essential communications) assure the safety of populations which
have ta.en refuge with us. That we have done.
0amadier and his ministers spo.e repeatedly in the spring of %&5- of an imminent end to
the "military phase" of the crisis) and of the beginning of a "constructive phase)" in which
presumably economic and political assistance would supplant the military instrument6 but
in what was to become a pattern of epectation and frustration) the *ourth 0epublic
discovered that its military forces were incapable of controlling even the principal lines
of communication in 4ietnam) and that the military solution severely taed the full
resources of the *rench Union. !n 8arch) %&5- an additional division of troops for the
*rench @peditionary <orps) dispatched to 4ietnam per General /eclerc=s
recommendation) had to be diverted en route to ?uell an insurgency in 8adagascar.
By the summer of %&5-) the *rench Government was aware that the situation in
!ndochina was at an impasse. >aving failed in its attempt to force a military decision) it
turned to a political solution) as suggested by General /eclerc. But again the ideas of
#dmiral d=#rgenlieu weighed heavily. !n :anuary) %&5-) d=#rgenlieu wrote that3
!f we eamine the problem basically) we are led to in?uire whether the political form
un?uestionably capable of benefiting from the political prestige of legitimacy is not the
traditional monarchic institution) the very one that eisted before the :apanese
surrender. . . . The return of the @mperor FBao ;ail would probably reassure all those
who) having opposed the 4iet 8inh) fear they will be accused of treason.
!t was with Bao ;ai) not >o <hi 8inh) that the *rench elected to negotiate for a political
settlement with 4ietnamese Nationalists.
*rench emissaries approached Bao ;ai with terms not unli.e those >o <hi 8inh had
negotiated on , 8arch %&5,3 unity and independence within the *rench Union) provided
Bao ;ai formed a government which would furnish a clear alternative to >o <hi 8inh=s
;04. "ith *rench encouragement) a group of 4ietnamese Nationalists formed a political
party advocating the installation of Bao ;ai at the head of a non$4iet 8inh 4ietnamese
regime. Bao ;ai was at first evasive and s.eptical) but was eventually convinced that the
*rench situation in !ndochina was sufficiently desperate that they would have to honor
commitments they made to him. Bao ;ai also seems to have believed that he could attract
#merican support and material aid$a view which may have stemmed in part from a %&5-
/ife maga2ine article by "illiam <. Bullitt) the influential former U.S. #mbassador to
*rance) endorsing Bao ;ai as a solution to *rance=s dilemma.
*rance then proceeded to contract with Bao ;ai a series of agreements) each of which
ostensibly brought Bao ;ai closer to genuine autonomy for 4ietnam. !t was not)
however) until *ebruary) %&'() that the *rench National #ssembly acceded to political
independence and unification for 4ietnam. <hronicled below are the principal steps by
which *rance failed on the one hand to reach an accommodation with >o <hi 8inh) and
on the other hand erected the "Bao ;ai solution" in its stead.
B$ /$0$ P,4IC5 T,1.2+ T-E C,*64ICT, 19("199
The U.S. manifested increasing concern over the conflict in !ndochina) but through %&5&
#merican policy continued to regard the war as fundamentally a matter for *rench
resolution. !t is clear on the record that #merican policyma.ers of the day perceived the
vacuity of *rench policies in %&5, and %&5-. The U.S.) in its representations to *rance)
consistently deplored the prospect of protracted war in 4ietnam) and urged meaningful
concessions to 4ietnamese nationalism. >owever) the United States always stopped short
of endorsing >o <hi 8inh) deterred by >o=s history of communist affiliation.
#ccordinglv) U.S. policy gravitated with that of *rance toward the Bao ;ai solution. #t
no point was the U.S. prepared to adopt an openly interventionist course. To have done so
would have clashed with the epressed British view that !ndochina was an eclusively
*rench concern) and played into the hands of *rance=s etremist political parties of both
the 0ight and the /eft. The U.S. was particularly apprehensive lest by intervening it
strengthen the political position of *rench <ommunists. 8oreover) in %&5, and %&5-)
*rance and Britain were moving toward an anti$Soviet alliance in @urope) and the U.S.
was reluctant to press a potentially divisive policy. <ompared with @uropean recovery)
and escape from communist domination) the U.S. considered the fate of 4ietnamese
nationalism relatively insignificant. *urther) the dispute in %&5, and %&5' over the ;utch
possession in !ndonesia had furnished a precedent3 there the U.S. had moved cautiously)
and only after long delays) to internationali2e the conflict. @tensive #merican and
British investments in !ndonesia) moreover) afforded common ground for intervention.
No similar rationale or commonality eisted for intervention in !ndochina) since
!ndochina was almost eclusively a *rench economic preserve) and a political morass
which the U.A. was manifestly interested in avoiding.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %
<hapter !) "Bac.ground to the <risis) %&5($'("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 9) pp. 7&$57
The resultant U.S. policy has most often been termed "neutrality." !t was) however) also
consistent with the policy of deferring to *rench volition announced by President
0oosevelt=s Secretary of State on 9 #pril 1,-.. !t was a policy characteri2ed by the same
indecision that had mar.ed U.S. wartime policy. !t was) moreover) a policy formulated
with an undertone of indifference3 at the time) !ndochina appeared to be one region in
which the U.S. might enDoy the luury of abstention.
"hen open warfare bro.e out between the ;04 and *rance in ;ecember) %&5,) :ohn
<arter 4incent) ;irector of the Bffice of *ar @astern #ffairs) in a memorandum to Under
Secretary #cheson of 79 ;ecember %&5,) recommended that the latter call in the *rench
#mbassador to highlight inherent dangers. The memorandum included this acute
analysis3
#lthough the *rench in !ndochina have made far$reaching paper$concessions to the
4ietnamese desire for autonomy) *rench actions on the scene have been directed toward
whittling down the powers and the territorial etent of the 4ietnam "free state." This
process the 4ietnamese have continued to resist. #t the same time) the *rench themselves
admit that they lac. the military strength to recon?uer the country. !n brief) with
inade?uate forces) with public opinion sharply at odds) with a government rendered
largely ineffective through internal division) the *rench have tried to accomplish in
!ndochina what a strong and united Britain has found it unwise to attempt in Burma.
Given the present elements in the situation) guerrilla warfare may continue indefinitely.
Secretary #cheson acted on 8r. 4incent=s suggestion) and epressed to the #mbassador
views summari2ed as follows3
"e had anticipated such a situation developing in November and events have confirmed
our fears. "hile we have no wish to offer to mediate under present conditions we do
want the *rench GB4T to .now that we are ready and willing to do anything which it
might consider helpful in the circumstances. "e have been gratified to learn. of 8outet=s
mission and have confidence in his moderation and broad viewpoint. "e believe
however that the situation is highly inflammatory and if present unsettled conditions
continue) there is a possibility that other powers might attempt to bring the matter up
before the Security <ouncil. !f this happens) as in the case of !ndonesia) the ?uestion will
arise whether the matter is one of purely *rench internal concern or a situation li.ely to
disturb the peace. Bther powers might li.ewise attempt some form the <hinese press. "e
would be point of view it seems important possible. 8r. #cheson added that attempt to
recon?uer the country that the British had found unwise of intervention as has been
suggested in opposed to such steps) but from every that the ?uestion be settled as soon as
he wondered whether the *rench would through military force which was a step to
attempt in Burma.
Bn J :anuary) %&5-) the ;epartment of State instructed the #merican #mbassador in
Paris that the U.S. would approve sale of arms and armaments to *rance "ecept in cases
which appear to relate to !ndochina." Bn the same date) J :anuary %&5-) the *rench
conveyed to the ;epartment of State a message that3
. . . the *rench Government appreciated the understanding attitude that 8r. #cheson had
shown in discussing the problem of !ndochina6 that it had ta.en note of 8r. #cheson=s
offer of "good offices" and appreciated the spirit in which the offer was made6 and that
the *rench Government did not feel that it could avail itself of our offer but must
continue to handle the situation single$handedly along the lines stated by 8outet. FThe
emissaryG went on to say that the principal obDective of the *rench military was to restore
order and reopen communications. >e said that after this was done the *rench
Government would be prepared to discuss matters with the 4ietnamese. >e said that the
*rench Government had every intention of living up to the agreement of last 8arch , and
the modus 'i'endi of September %') once order was restored. F>e wasG as.ed . . . whether
he thought the *rench military could restore order within any foreseeable future time. >e
seemed to thin.) without much evidence of conviction) that they could.
There then ensued an interesting echange between the U.S. official and the *rench
representative in which the *renchman s.etched a claim of #merican culpability for the
war3
Spea.ing personally) ! told him that ! thought there was one flaw in the *rench approach
to the problem worth mentioning. ! had in mind an apparent assumption by the *rench
that there was an e?uality of responsibility as between the *rench and the 4ietnamese. !
said that this did not seem to me to be the case6 that the responsibility of *rance as a
world power to achieve a solution of the problem was far greater than that of the
4ietnamese6 and that the situation was not one which could be locali2ed as a purely
*rench$4ietnamese one but might affect adversely conditions throughout Southeast #sia.
FThe emissaryG ?uic.ly substituted the word "authority" for "responsibility" and said that
the *rench were now faced with the problem of reasserting their authority and that we
must share the responsibility for their delay in doing so because we had not acceded to
*rench re?uests in the autumn of %&5' for material assistance.
@arly in *ebruary) the U.S. #mbassador in Paris was instructed to reassure Premier
0amadier of the "very friendliest feelings" of the U.S. toward *rance and its interest in
supporting *rance=s recovering economic) political and military strength3
!n spite any misunderstanding which might have arisen in minds *rench in regard to our
position concerning !ndochina they must appreciate that we have fully recogni2ed
*rance=s sovereign position in that area and we do not wish to have it appear that we are
in any way endeavoring undermine that position) and *rench should .now it is our desire
to be helpful and we stand ready assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for
!ndochinese problem. #t same time we cannot shut our eyes to fact that there are two
sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a lac. *rench under$standing of
other side +more in Saigon than in Paris1 and continued eistence dangerously outmoded
colonial outloo. and methods in area. *urthermore) there is no escape from fact that trend
of times is to effect that colonial empires in H!H <entury sense are rapidly becoming
thing of past. #ction Brit in !ndia and Burma and ;utch. in !ndonesia are outstanding
eamples this trend) and *rench themselves too. cogni2ance of it both in new
<onstitution and in their agreements with 4ietnam. Bn other hand we do not lose sight
fact that >o <hi 8inh has direct <ommunist connections and it should be obvious that
we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted by philosophy
and political organi2ations emanating from and controlled by Aremlin.
*ran.ly we have no solution of problem to suggest. !t is basically matter for two parties
to wor. out themselves and from your reports and those from !ndochina we are led to feel
that both parties have endeavored to .eep door open to a settlement. "e appreciate fact
that 4ietnam started present fighting in !ndochina on ;ecember %& and that this action
has made it more difficult for *rench to adopt a position of generosity and conciliation.
Nevertheless we hope that *rench will find it possible to be more than generous in trying
to find a solution.
Thus) the U.S. chose to remain outside the conflict6 the announced U.S. position was) in
the words of Secretary of State George <. 8arshall) to hope that "a pacific basis of
adDustment of the difficulties could be found." @vents conspired against this hope)
however) and as the fighting continued) the prospect of a 8oscow$controlled state in
4ietnam continued to draw the U.S. nearer to involvement. Bn %9 8ay %&5-) the
;epartment of State furnished the following guidance to U.S. diplomats in Paris) Saigon)
and >anoi3
Aey our position is our awareness that in respect developments affecting position
"estern democratic powers in southern #sia) we essentially in same boat as *rench) also
as British and ;utch. "e cannot conceive setbac.s to long$range interests *rance which
would not also be setbac.s our own. <onversely we should regard close association
*rance and members *rench Union as not only to advantage peoples concerned) but
indirectly our own.
!n our view) southern #sia in critical phase its history with seven new nations in process
achieving or struggling independence or autonomy. These nations include ?uarter
inhabitants world and their future course) owing sheer weight populations) resources they
command) and strategic location) will be momentous factor world stability. *ollowing
relaation @uropean controls) internal racial) religious) and national differences could
plunge new nations into violent discord) or already apparent anti$"estern Pan$#siatic
tendencies could become dominant political force) or <ommunists could capture control.
"e consider as best safeguard against these eventualities a continued close association
between newly$autonomous peoples and powers which have long been responsible their
welfare. !n particular we recogni2e 4ietnamese will for indefinite period re?uire *rench
material and technical assistance and enlightened political guidance which can be
provided only by nation steeped li.e *rance in democratic tradition and confirmed in
respect human liberties and worth individual.
"e e?ually convinced) however) such association must be. voluntary to be lasting and
achieve results) and that protraction present situation !ndochina can only destroy basic
voluntary cooperation) leave legacy permanent bitterness) and irrevocably alienate
4ietnamese from *rance and those values represented by *rance and other "estern
democracies.
"hile fully appreciating difficulties *rench position this conflict) we feel there is danger
in any arrangement which might provide 4ietnamese opportunity compare unfavorably
their own position and that of other peoples southern #sia who have made tremendous.
strides toward autonomy since war.
"hile we are still ready and willing do anything we can which might be considered
helpful) *rench will understand we not attempting come forward with any solution our
own or intervene in situation. >owever) they will also understand we inescapably
concerned with situation *ar @ast generally) upon which developments !ndochina li.ely
have profound effect.
*or your !N*B) evidence that *rench <ommunists are being directed accelerate their
agitation *rench colonies even etent lose much popular support *rance +U0T@/ %-%&
#pr 7'1 may be indication Aremlin prepared sacrifice temporary gains with 5( million
*rench to long range colonial strategy with ,(( million dependent people) which lends
great urgency foregoing views ;@PT much concerned lest *rench efforts find KUBT@
true representatives 4ietnam UNKUBT@ with whom negotiate result creation impotent
puppet GB4T along lines <ochinchina regime) or that restoration Baodai FsicG may be
attempted) implying democracies reduced resort monarchy as weapon against
<ommunism. Cou may refer these further views if nature your conversations *rench
appears warrant.
The U.S. position may have influenced the *rench to revise the first >a /ong Bay
#greement +;ecember) %&5-1 and when the second agreement was signed in :une) %&5J)
the U.S. promptly instructed the U.S. #mbassador to "apply such persuasion andIor
pressure as is best calculated FtoG produce desired result" of *rance=s "une?uivocally and
promptly approving the principle of 4iet independence." #gain) however) the
#mbassador was instructed to avoid ostensible intervention while ma.ing it clear that the
U.S. foresaw *rance=s losing !ndochina if it persisted to ignore #merican advice. These
instructions were repeated at the end of #ugust) %&5J) with the assertion that the
;epartment of State "believes nothing should be left undone which will strengthen truly
nationalist groups in !ndochina and induce present supporters of the 4iet 8inh to come to
the side of that group."
The first suggestions that the U.S. became tangibly involved in 4ietnam appear in a
reported conversation of the U.S. #mbassador with the *rench *oreign Bffice in
September) %&5J. The U.S. #mbassador again urged on *rance legislation or other
definite action to move toward the unification of 4ietnam) and the immediate negotiation
of concrete steps toward autonomy as envisaged by the >a /ong Bay #greement. >e
then told the *rench representative that3
US is fully appreciative difficulties which face *rench Government in !ndochina at this
time and reminds him that US had already indicated its willingness) if *rench
Government so desired) to give public indication its approval of concrete steps by *rench
Government to come to grips with basic. political problem of !ndochina. ! informed him
that US also willing under similar circumstances to consider assisting *rench
Government with respect to matter of financial aid for !ndochina through @<# but could
not give consideration to altering its present policy in this regard unless real progress
made in reaching non$<ommunist solution in !ndochina based on cooperation of true
nationalists of that country.
#s negotiations proceeded with Bao ;ai preliminary to the @lysee #greement) the
;epartment of State instructed the #merican #mbassador in Paris) on %- :anuary %&5&)
that3
"hile the ;epartment is desirous of the *rench coming to terms with Bao ;ai or any
truly nationalist group which has a reasonable chance of winning over the preponderance
of 4ietnamese) we cannot at this time irretrievably commit the U.S. to support of a native
government which by failing to develop appeal among 4ietnamese might become
virtually a puppet government separated from the people and eisting only by the
presence of *rench military forces.
*ollowing the @lysee #greement) the U.S. was better disposed toward providing aid in
!ndochina. Bn %( 8ay %&5&) the #merican <onsul in Saigon was informed that the U.S.
desired the "Ba, ;ai eperiment" to succeed) since there appeared to be no other
alternative3
#t the proper time and under the proper circumstances) the ;epartment will be prepared
to do its part by etending recognition to the Bao ;ai government and by epressing the
possibility of complying with any re?uest by such a government for U.S. arms and
economic assistance. !t must be understood) however) that an aid program of this nature
would re?uire <ongressional approval. Since the U.S. could) however) scarcely afford
bac.ing a government which would have the color and be li.ely to suffer the fate of a
puppet regime) it m5st be clear that *rance will offer all necessary concessions to ma.e
the Bao ;ai solution attractive to the nationalists. This is a step of which the *rench
themselves must see the urgency and necessity in view of the possibly short time
remaining before <ommunist successes in <hina are felt in !ndochina. 8oreover) the Bao
;ai government must through its own efforts demonstrate the capacity to organi2e and
conduct affairs wisely so as to insure the maimum opportunity for obtaining re?uisite
popular support.
But "anti$communism" initially proved to be no better guideline for the formulation of
#merican policy in !ndochina than it had been for the *rench. !ndeed) early U.S. attempts
to discern the nature and etent of communist influence in 4ietnam devolved to the
seeming parado that if >o <hi 8inh were communist) he seemed to have no visible ties
with 8oscow. *or eample) a State ;epartment appraisal of >o <hi 8inh provided to the
U.S. #mbassador in <hina in :uly) %&5J) was admittedly speculative3
%. ;epts info indicates that >o <hi 8inh is <ommunist. >is long and well$.nown record
in <omintern during twenties and thirties) continuous support by *rench <ommunist
newspaper )umanite since %&5') praise given him by 0adio 8oscow +which for past si
months has been devoting increasing attention to !ndochina1 and fact he has been called
"leading communist= by recent 0ussian publications as well as Daily /or0er ma.es any
other conclusion appear to be wishful thin.ing.
7. ;ept has no evidence of direct lin. between >o and 8oscow but assumes it eists) nor
is it able evaluate amount pressure or guidance 8oscow eerting. "e have impression
>o must be given or is retaining large degree latitude. ;ept considers that USS0
accomplishing its immediate aims in !ndochina by +a1 pinning down large numbers of
*rench troops) +b1 causing steady drain upon *rench economy thereby tending retard
recovery and dissipate @<#. assistance to *rance) and +c1 denying to world generally
surpluses which !ndochina normally has available thus perpetuating conditions of
disorder and shortages which favorable to growth communism. *urthermore) >o seems
?uite capable of retaining and even strengthening his grip on !ndochina with no outside
assistance other than continuing procession of *rench puppet govts.
!n the fall of %&5J) the Bffice of !ntelligence 0esearch in the ;epartment of State
conducted a survey of communist influence in Southeast #sia. @vidence of Aremlin$
directed conspiracy was found in virtually all countries ecept 4ietnam3
Since ;ecember %&) %&5,) there have been continuous conflicts between *rench forces
and the nationalist government of 4ietnam. This government !s a coalition in which
avowed communists hold influential positions. #lthough the *rench admit the influence
of this government) they have consistently refused to deal with its leader) >o <hi 8inh)
on the grounds that he is a communist.
To date the 4ietnam press and radio have not adopted an anti$#merican position. !t is
rather the *rench colonial press that has been strongly anti$#merican and has freely
accused the U.S. of imperialism in !ndochina to the point of approimating the official
8oscow position. #lthough the 4ietnam radio has been closely watched for a new
position toward the U.S.) no change has appeared so far. Nor does there seem to have
been any split within the coalition government of 4ietnam.
E'aluation. !f there is a 8oscow$directed conspiracy in Southeast #sia) !ndochina is an
anomaly so far. Possible eplanations. are3
No rigid directives have been issued by 8oscow.
The 4ietnam government considers that it has no rightest elements that must be purged.
The 4ietnam <ommunists are not subservient to the foreign policies pursued by 8oscow
# special dispensation for the 4ietnam government has been arranged in 8oscow.
Bf these possibilities) the first and fourth seem most li.ely.
III$ ,2IGI*0 ,6 T-E /$0$ I*V,4VE3E*T I* VIET*.3
.$ T-E P,4IC5 C,*TE9T
@vents in <hina of %&5J and %&5& brought the United States to a new awareness of the
vigor of communism in #sia) and to a sense of urgency over its containment. U.S. policy
instruments developed to meet une?uivocal communist challenges in @urope were
applied to the problem of the *ar @ast. <oncurrent with the development of N#TB) a
U.S. search began for collective security in #sia6 economic and military assistance
programs were inaugurated6 and the Truman ;octrine ac?uired wholly new dimensions
by etension into regions where the @uropean empires were being dismantled. !n 8arch)
%&5-) President Truman had set forth the following policy guidelines3
! believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subDugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. ! believe we
must assist free peoples to wor. out their own destinies in their own way.
The President went on to underscore the U.S. determination to commit its resources to
contain communism. "hile he clearly subordinated military aid to economic and political
means) he did assert the U.S. intent to assist in maintaining security3
To insure the peaceful development of nations) free from coercion) the United States has
ta.en a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to
ma.e possible freedom and independence for all its members. "e shall not reali2e our
obDectives) however) unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free
institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that see. to impose
upon them totalitarian regimes.
!n the year %&5-) while U.S. military assistance began to flow into Greece to ward off
subversive aggression) the U.S. inaugurated the @uropean 0ecovery Plan +@0P1. @0P
was aimed at economic recovery in "estern @urope) especially in countries such as
*rance and !taly where post$war depression was fostering mar.ed leftward political
trends. !n one of the high level appraisals of the situation that the U.S. had to counter in
%&5-) the >arriman <ommittee on *oreign #id has concluded that3
The interest of the United States in @urope . . . cannot be measured simply in economic
terms. !t is also strategic and political. "e all .now that we are faced in the world today
with two conflicting ideologies. .
Bur position in the world has been based for at least a century on the eistence in @urope
of a number of strong states committed by tradition and inclination to the democratic
concept. .
The fall of the <2echoslova.ian Government in *ebruary %&5J brought about the
Brussels Pact) a "estern @uropean collective defense and economic collaboration
arrangement. The bloc.ade of Berlin) which began on % #pril %&5J) accelerated U.S.
movement toward membership in the alliance. Bn :une %%) %&5J the U.S. Senate adopted
a resolution advising the @ecutive to underta.e the3
Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and
collective self$defense in accordance with the purposes) principles) and provisions of the
<harter Fof the UNG) association of the United States) by constitutional process) with such
regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self$
help and mutual aid) and as affect its national security.
That same month) <ongress passed the @conomic <ooperation #ct) and in :uly) %&5J)
opened negotiations for a North #tlantic #lliance. The North #tlantic Treaty was signed
in #pril) %&5&) and entered into force in #ugust of that year.
!n the same omnibus foreign assistance legislation which had authori2ed @<# in :une)
%&5J) <ongress had provided for a <hina #id. Program. This measure met almost
immediate failure) for 8ao=s armies spread unchec.ed over the <hina mainland) and by
mid$%&5& the position of the nationalists there was untenable. The "failure" of U.S. aid$
which was termed such by <ongressional critics$no less than the urgent situation in
@urope and the eploding of the first Soviet nuclear device in September) %&5&) figured
in <ongressional action on military assistance legislation.
Bn Bctober ,) %&5&) <ongress passed the 8utual ;efense #ssistance Program +8;#P1
through which U.S. arms) military e?uipment and training assistance might be provided
world$wide for collective defense. !n the first appropriations under 8;#P) N#TB
countries received -,O of the total) and Greece. and Tur.ey +not yet N#TB members1)
%,O. But Aorea and the Philippines received modest aid) and the legislators clearly
intended the law to underwrite subse?uent appropriations for collective security in #sia.
The opening paragraph of the law not only supported N#TB) but foreshadowed the
Southeast #sia <ollective ;efense Treaty3
#n #ct to Promote the *oreign Policy and Provide for the ;efense and General "elfare
of the United States by *urnishing 8ilitary #ssistance to *oreign Nations) #pproved
Bctober ,) %&5&.
Be it enacted by the Senate and >ouse of 0epresentatives of the United States of #merica
in <ongress assembled) That this #ct may be cited as the "8utual ;efense #ssistance
#ct of %&5&."
*!N;!NGS #N; ;@</#0#T!BN B* PB/!<C
The <ongress of the United States reaffirms the policy of the United States to achieve
international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not
be used ecept in the common interest. The <ongress hereby finds that the efforts of the
United States and other countries to promote peace and security in furtherance of the
purposes of the <harter of the United Nations re?uire additional measures of support
based upon the principle of continuous and effective self$help and mutual aid. These
measures include the furnishing of military assistance essential to enable the United
States and other nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
<harter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self$
defense in support of those purposes and principles. !n furnishing such military
assistance) it remains the policy of the United States to continue to eert maimum
efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as
contemplated in the <harter and agreements to achieve universal control of weapons of
mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments) including armed
forces) under ade?uate safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and
evasion.
The <ongress hereby epresses itself as favoring the creation by the free countries and
the free peoples of the *ar @ast of a Doint organi2ation) consistent with the <harter of the
United Nations) to establish a program self$help and mutual cooperation designed to
develop their economic and social welt$being) to safeguard basic rights and liberties and
to protect their security and independence.
The <ongress recogni2es that economic recovery is essential to international peace and
security and must be given clear priority. The <ongress also recogni2es that the increased
confidence of free peoples in their ability to resist direct or indirect aggression and to
maintain internal security will advance such recovery and support political stability.
"hile <ongress was deliberating on 8;#P) the staff of the National Security <ouncil) at
the re?uest of the Secretary of ;efense) had been reeamining U.S. policy toward #sia.
!n :une) %&5&) the Secretary had noted that he was3
. . . increasingly concerned at the . . . advance of communism in large areas of the world
and particularly the successes of communism in <hina.
# maDor obDective of United States policy) as ! understand it) is to contain communism in
order to reduce its threat to our security. Bur actions in #sia should be part of a carefully
considered and comprehensive plan to further that obDective.
The NS< study responding to the Secretary=s re?uest is remar.able for the rarity of its
specific references to !ndochina. The staff study focused) rather) on generalities
concerning the conflict between the interests of @uropean metropoles and the aspirations
of subDect #sian peoples for independence. The following etract is from the section of
the study dealing with Southeast #sia3
The current conflict between colonialism and native independence is the most important
political factor in southeast #sia. This conflict results not only from the decay of
@uropean imperial power in the area but also from a widening political consciousness and
the rise of militant nationalism among the subDect peoples. "ith the eception of
Thailand and the Philippines) the southeast #sia countries do not possess leaders
practiced in the eercise of responsible power. The ?uestion of whether a colonial
country is fit to govern itself) however) is not always relevant in practical politics. The
real issue would seem to be whether the colonial country is able and determined to ma.e
continued foreign rule an overall losing proposition for the metropolitan power. !f it is)
independence for the colonial country is the only practical solution) even though
misgovernment eventuates. # solution of the conse?uent problem of instability) if it
arises) must be sought on a non$imperialist plane. !n any event) colonial$nationalist
conflict provides a fertile field for subversive communist activities) and it is now clear
that southeast #sia is the target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Aremlin. !n
see.ing to gain control of southeast #sia) the Aremlin is motivated in part by a desire to
ac?uire southeast #sia=s resources and communication lines) and to deny them to us. But
the political gains which would accrue to the USS0 from communist capture of southeast
#sia are e?ually significant. The etension of communist authority in <hina represents a
grievous political defeat for us6 if southeast #sia also is swept by communism we shall
have suffered a maDor political rout the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the
rest of the world) especially in the 8iddle @ast and in a then critically eposed #ustralia.
The United States should continue to use its influence loo.ing toward resolving the
colonial nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the
nationalist$colonial conflict) lay the basis for political stability and resistance to
communism) and avoid wea.ening the colonial powers who are our western allies.
>owever) it must be remembered that the long colonial tradition in #sia has left the
peoples of that area suspicious of "estern influence. "e must approach the problem
from the #siatic point of view in so far as possible and should refrain from ta.ing the
lead in movements which must of necessity be of #sian origin. !t will therefore be to our
interest wherever possible to encourage the peoples of !ndia) Pa.istan) the Philippines
and other #sian states to ta.e the leadership in meeting the common problems of the area.
!t would be to the interest of the United States to ma.e use of the s.ills) .nowledge and
long eperience of our @uropean friends and) to whatever etent may be possible) enlist
their cooperation in measures designed to chec. the spread of USS0 influence in #sia. !f
members of the British <ommonwealth) particularly !ndia) Pa.istan) #ustralia and New
Lealand) can be persuaded to Doin with the United Aingdom and the United States in
carrying out constructive measures of economic) political and cultural cooperation) the
results will certainly be in our interest. Not only will the United States be able thus to
relieve itself of part of the burden) but the cooperation of the white nations of the
<ommonwealth will arrest any potential dangers of the growth of a white$colored
polari2ation.
Bn ;ecember 9() %&5&) the National Security <ouncil met with President Truman
presiding) discussed the NS< staff study) and approved the following conclusions3
#s the basis for reali2ation of its obDectives) the United States should pursue a policy
toward #sia containing the following components3
a. The United States should ma.e .nown its sympathy with the efforts of #sian leaders to
form regional associations of non$<ommunist states of the various #sian areas) and if in
due course associations eventuate) the United States should be prepared) if invited) to
assist such associations to fulfill their purposes under conditions which would be to our
interest. The following principles should guide our actions in this respect3
#ny association formed must be the result of a genuine desire on the part of the
participating nations to cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political) economic)
social and cultural problems of the area.
The United States must not ta.e such an active part in the early stages of the formation of
such an association that it will be subDect to the charge of using the #siatic nations to
further United States ambitions.
The association) if it is to be a constructive force) must operate on the basis of mutual aid
and self$help in all fields so that a true partnership may eist based on e?ual rights and
e?ual obligations.
United States participation Fwords illegibleG association formed will be in accord with
<hapter 4!!! of the <harter of the United Nations dealing with regional arrangements.
b. The United States should act to develop and strengthen the security of the area from
<ommunist eternal aggression or internal subversion. These steps should ta.e into
account any benefits to the security of #sia which may flow from the development of one
or more regional groupings. The United States on its own initiative should now
!mprove the United States position with respect to :apan) the 0yu.yus and the
Philippines.
Scrutini2e closely the development of threats from <ommunist aggression) direct or
indirect) and be prepared to help within our means to meet such threats by providing
political) economic) and military assistance and advice where clearly needed to
supplement the resistance of the other governments in and out of the area which are more
directly concerned.
;evelop cooperative measures through multilateral or bilateral arrangements to combat
<ommunist internal subversion.
#ppraise the desirability and the means of developing in #sia some form of collective
security arrangements) bearing in mind the following considerations3
The reluctance of !ndia at this time to Doin in any anti$<ommunist security pact and the
influence this will have among the other nations of #sia.
The necessity of assuming that any collective security arrangements which might be
developed be based on the principle of mutual aid and on a demonstrated desire and
ability to share in the burden by all the participating states.
The necessity of assuring that any such security arrangements would be consonant with
the purposes of any regional association which may be formed in accordance with
paragraph 9$a above.
The necessity of assuring that any such security arrangement would be in conformity
with the provisions of #rticle '% of the <harter relating to individual and collective self$
defense.
c. The United States should encourage the creation of an atmosphere favorable to
economic recovery and development in non$<ommunist #sia) and to the revival of
Fwords illegibleG non$discriminatory lines. The policy of the United States should be
adapted to promote) where possible) economic conditions that will contribute to political
stability in friendly countries of #sia) but the United States should carefully avoid
assuming responsibility for the economic welfare and development of that continent. .
h. The United States should continue to use its influence in #sia toward resolving the
colonial$nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the
nationalist movement while at the same time minimi2ing the strain on the colonial
powers who are our "estern allies. Particular attention should be given to the problem of
*rench !ndo$<hina. and action should be ta.en to bring home to the *rench the urgency
of removing the barriers to the obtaining by Bao ;ai or other non$<ommunist nationalist
leaders of the support of a substantial proportion of the 4ietnamese. . .
i. #ctive consideration should be given to means by which all members of the British
<ommonwealth may be induced to play a more active role in collaboration with the
United States in #sia. Similar collaboration should be obtained to the etent possible
from other non$<ommunist nations having interests in #sia.
D. 0ecogni2ing that the non$<ommunist governments of South #sia already constitute a
bulwar. against <ommunist epansion in #sia) the United States should eploit every
opportunity to increase the present "estern orientation of the area and to assist) within
our capabilities) its governments in their efforts to meet the minimum aspirations of their
people and to maintain internal security.
Thus) in the closing months of %&5&) the course of U.S. policy was set to. bloc. further
communist epansion in #sia3 by collective security if the #sians were forthcoming) by
collaboration with maDor @uropean allies and commonwealth nations) if possible) but
bilaterally if necessary. Bn that policy course lay the Aorean "ar of %&'oP%&'9) the
forming of the Southeast #sia Treaty Brgani2ation of %&'5) and the progressively
deepening U.S. involvement in 4ietnam.
B$ T-E /$0$ E*TE20 T-E 1.2
Bn ;ecember 9() %&5&) the *rench signed over ten separate implementing agreements
relating to the transfer of internal administration in 4ietnam to Bao ;ai=s State of
4ietnam) in accordance with the @lysee #greement of 8arch J) %&5&. By :anuary) %&'()
8ao=s legions had reached 4ietnam=s northern frontier) and North 4ietnam was moving
into the Sino$Soviet orbit. # ;epartment of State statement enunciated U.S. policy as of
7( :anuary %&'(3
;@PT still hopeful Bao ;ai will succeed in gaining increasing popular support at >o=s
epense and our policy remains essentially the same6 to encourage him and to urge *0
toward further concessions.
The start made by Bao ;ai) the ?ualities ehibited by him) and his initial reception seem
to have been better than we might have anticipated) even discounting optimism of *0
sources. Transfer of power apparently well received. *0 success in disarming and
interning fleeing <>! Nationalists without serious intervention to the present by <8!
<B88!@S also encouraging.
>owever) more recently) mar.ed opposition has been encountered which demonstrates at
least that Bao ;ai=s popular support has not yet widened. !ncreased 4iet 8inh 8!/
activity is dis?uieting. This </; be special effort by >o) timed to coincide with transfer
of power and the arrival of <>! <B88!@S armies on frontier) and to precede Bang.o.
<onference) or </; be evidence of increasing strength reinforced by hopes of <0%
<B88!@ support) direct or indirect.
;@PT has as yet no .nowledge of negotiations between >o and 8ao groups although
radio intercept of New <hina News #gency release of :#N %- indicates that >o has
messaged the "GB4TS of the world" that "the GB4T of the ;emocratic 0epublic of
4ietnam is the only legal GB4T of the 4ietnam people" and is "ready to establish ;!P/
relations with any GB4T which "/; be willing to cooperate with her on the basis of
e?uality and mutual respect of national sovereignty and territory so as to defend world
peace and democracy." >o=s radio ma.ing similar professions. .
Nature and timing of recognition of Bao ;ai now under consideration here and with other
GB4TS. .
*irst the <hinese <ommunists) and then the Soviets recogni2ed the ;04. Bn 7& :anuary
1,.1& the *rench National #ssembly approved legislation granting autonomy to the State
of 4ietnam. Bn *ebruary %) %&'() Secretary of State #cheson made the following public
statement3
The recognition by the Aremlin of >o <hi 8inh=s communist movement in !ndochina
comes as a surprise. The Soviet ac.nowledgment of this movement should remove any
illusions as to the "nationalist" nature of >o <hi 8inhMs aims and reveals >o in his true
colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in !ndochina.
#lthough timed in an effort to cloud the transfer of sovereignty by *rance to the legal
Governments of /aos) <ambodia) and. 4ietnam) we have every reasonable Fwords
illegibleG governments will proceed in their development toward stable governments
representing the true nationalist sentiments of more than 7( million peoples of !ndochina.
*rench action in transferring sovereignty to 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia has been in
process for some time. *ollowing *rench ratification) which is epected within a few
days) the way will be open for recognition of these legal governments by the countries of
the world. whose policies support the development of genuine national independence in
former colonial areas. #mbassador :essup has already epressed to @mperor Bao ;ai our
best wishes for prosperity and stability in 4ietnam) and the hope that closer relationship
will be established between 4ietnam and the United States.
*ormal *rench ratification of 4ietnamese independence was announced on 7 *ebruary
%&'() President Truman approved U.S. recognition for Bao ;ai the same date) and on 5
*ebruary) the #merican <onsul General in Saigon was instructed to deliver the following
message to Bao ;ai3
Cour !mperial 8aDesty3
! have Cour 8aDesty=s letter in which ! am informed of the signing of the agreements of
8arch J) 1,-, between Cour 8aDesty) on behalf of 4ietnam) and the President of the
*rench 0epublic) on behalf of *rance. 8y Government has also been informed of the
ratification on *ebruary 7) %&'( by the *rench Government of the agreements of 8arch
J) %&5&6
Since these acts establish the 0epublic of 4ietnam as an independent State within the
*rench Union) ! ta.e this opportunity to congratulate Cour 8aDesty and the people of
4ietnam on this happy occasion.
The Government of the United States of #merica is pleased to welcome the 0epublic of
4ietnam into the community of peace$loving nations of the world and to etend
diplomatic recognition to the Government of the 0epublic of 4ietnam. ! loo. forward to
an early echange of diplomatic representatives between our two countries.
0ecognition of Bao ;ai was followed swiftly by *rench re?uests for U.S. aid. Bn 8ay J)
%&'() Secretary of State #cheson released the following statement in Paris3
The F*renchG *oreign 8inister and ! have Dust had an echange of views on the situation
in !ndochina and are in general agreement both as to the urgency of the situation in that
area and as to the necessity for remedial action. "e have noted the fact that the problem
of meeting the threat to the security of 4iet Nam) <ambodia) and /aos which now enDoy
independence within the *rench Union. is primarily the responsibility of *rance and the
Governments and peoples of !ndochina. The United States recogni2es that the solution of
the. !ndochina problem depends both upon the restoration of security and upon the
development of genuine nationalism and that United States assistance can and should
contribute to these maDor obDectives.
The United States Government) convinced that neither national independence nor
democratic evolution eist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism) considers the
situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military e?uipment to
the #ssociated States of !ndochina and to *rance in order to assist them in restoring
stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %
<hapter !) "Bac.ground to the <risis) %&5($'("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 5) pp. 57$'7
Bn 8ay %%) %&'() the #cting Secretary of State made the following statement3
# special survey mission) headed by 0. #llen Griffin) has Dust returned from Southeast
#sia and reported on economic and technical assistance needed in that area. !ts over$all
recommendations for the area are modest and total in the neighborhood of Q,( million.
The ;epartment is wor.ing on plans to implement that program at once.
Secretary #cheson on 8onday in Paris cited the urgency of the situation applying in the
associated states of 4iet Nam) /aos and <ambodia. The ;epartment is wor.ing Dointly
with @<# to implement the economic and technical assistance recommendations for
!ndochina as well as the other states of Southeast #sia and anticipates that this program
will get underway in the immediate future.
8ilitary assistance for Southeast #sia is being wor.ed out by the ;epartment of ;efense
in cooperation with the ;epartment of State) and the details will not be made public for
security reasons.
8ilitary assistance needs will be met from the President=s emergency fund of Q-' million
provided under 8;#P for the general area of <hina.
@conomic assistance needs will be met from the @<# <hina #id funds) part of which
both >ouses of <ongress have indicated will be made available for the general area of
<hina. *inal legislative action is still pending on this authori2ation but is epected to be
completed within the net wee..
The United States thereafter was directly involved in the developing tragedy in 4ietnam.
IV$ T-E C-.2.CTE2 .*+ P,1E2 ,6 T-E VIET 3I*- "" . 0/33.25
Bne of the recurrent themes of criticism of U.S. policy in 4ietnam has been that from the
end of "orld "ar !! on) there was a failure to recogni2e that the 4iet 8inh was the
principal vehicle for 4ietnamese nationalism and that it) !n fact) was in control of and
effectively governing all of 4ietnam. @vidence on issues li.e popularity and control is
always somewh5t suspect $$ especially when dealing with an eotic country li.e 4ietnam
at a time when what #mericans .new about it was largely dependent on *rench sources.
Nonetheless) some generali2ations can be made and supported.
*irst) the 4iet 8inh was the main repository of 4ietnamese nationalism and anti$*rench
colonialism. There were other such groups promoting 4iet independence but none were
competitive on a country$wide scale. !t is also true that the disciplined). well$organi2ed)
and well$led !ndochinese <ommunist Party was the controlling element in the 4iet 8inh.
The !<P was not) however) in the numerical maDority either in total membership or in
leadership posts held. This gap between control and numbers can be eplained by two
factors3 +a1 !<P strategy was to unify nationalist elements to achieve the immediate
obDective of independence6 and +b1 the other components of the 4iet 8inh were si2able
enough to fractionali2e the whole movement. !n other words) from "orld "ar !! on) the
!<P was strong enough td lead) but not to dominate 4ietnamese nationalism.
Second) the 4iet 8inh was sufficiently popular and effective to turn itself into a
4ietnam$wide government that could have etended its authority throughout the country
after "orld "ar !! $$ ecept for the obstacle of reasserted *rench power) and) to a lesser
degree) of indigenous political opp,sition in <ochinchina. The 4iet 8inh was always
more powerful in Ton.in and #nnam than in South 4ietnam. >owever) it seems li.ely
that in the absence of the *rench) the 4iet 8inh through its governmental creation) the
;04) would have overridden indigenous tribal) religious). and other opposition in short
order.
4ietnamese nationalism developed three types of political parties or movements3
2eform parties. Narrowly based among the small educated 4ietnamese elite) these parties
made little pretense at representing the masses of the peasantry ecept in the ancient
mandarinal sense of paternal leadership. !n general) they advocated reform of the
relationship between *rance and 4ietnam to establish an independent and united nati,n)
but would neither sever beneficial bonds with the metropole) nor alter drastically the
4ietnamese social structure. 8embers included many men of impeccable repute and
undoubted nationalist convictions $ among them Ngo6 ;inh ;iem$but also a number of
.nown opportunist and corrupt 4ietnamese. The reformist parties were further
discredited by collaboration with the :apanese during "orld "ar !!. These parties formed
the basis for the "Bao ;ai solution" to which *rance and the U.S. gravitated in the late
%&5(=s.
Theorati parties. !n <ochinchina and almost eclusively there during the %&9(=s there
emerged religious sects commanding firm loyalties of hundreds of thousands of peasants.
Two of these $$ the <ao ;ai and the >oa >ao R aspired to temporal as well as spiritual
power) fielded armed $ forces) and formed local governments. They opposed both *rench
political and cultural hegemony) and domination by other 4ietnamese parties. Some
elements collaborated openly with the :apanese during %&5($%&5'. Because these parties
were of local and religious character) any parallel with other 4iet political organi2ations
would be ineact. These movements account in
%
arge measure for the distinctive
character of South 4ietnamese nationalism as compared with that of #nnam or Ton.in.
2e'olutionary parties. The numerous remaining 4ietnamese political parties fall into the
revolutionary category3 they advocated 4ietnam=s independence from *rance and some
degree of radical reorgani2ation of the 4iet polity. Their political coloration ranged from
the deep red of the Saigon$centered Trots.yites +who advocated anti$imperialist $
revolution throughout the world) and within 4ietnam) epropriation for the wor.ers and
peasants1 through the less violent hues of communism and Auomintang$styled
nationalism) to the indistinct) .eclectic nationalism of the Binh Huyen criminal fraternity
+another Saigon phenomenon1.
Bnly two of these movements developed a 4ietnam$wide influence3 the !ndochinese
<ommunist Party +!<P1 and the 4ietnam Nationalist Party +4NK;;1. Both these parties
were troubled throughout their history by factionalism) and by repented +*rench police1
purges. Both aspired to politici2ing the peasants6 neither wholly succeeded.. Bf the two)
the !<P consistently demonstrated the greater resiliency and popularity) attributable to
superior conspiratorial doctrine and techni?ue) and to more coherent and astute
leadership. Both the !<P and the 4NK;; figured in peasant uprisings in %&9Bl&9l) and
l&5Bl&5l. @ach played a role in the 4ietnamese resistance against the 4ichy *rench and
the :apanese during "orld "ar !!3 the !<P as the nucleus of the 4iet 8inh) and the
4NK;; as the principal component of the <hinese Nationalist$sponsored ;ong 8inh
$>oi.
The 4iet 8inh $4iet 3am Do "ap Dong Minh )oi& /eague for the !ndependence of
4ietnam $ came into being in 8ay) %&5%) at the Jth Plenum of the !ndochinese
<ommunist Party) held in South <hina. !t was formed as a "united front" organi2ation
initially composed of the !<P) 0evolutionary Couth /eague) the New 4ietnam Party) and
factions of the 4ietnam Nationalist Party +4NK;;1. 8embership was held open to any
other individuals or groups willing to Doin in struggling for "national liberation." The
announced program of the 4iet 8inh called for a wide range of social and political
reforms designed mainly to appeal the 4iet patriotism. @mphasis was placed on an anti$
:apanese crusade and preparation .for "an insurrection by the organi2ation of the people
into self$defense corps)" not on communist cant.
Though a Auomintang general originally sponsored the 4iet 8inh) >o soon became
suspect) and in %&57 was Dailed by the <hinese. "hile he was in prison) probably. to
offset the 4iet 8ine=s growing appeal) and to assure tighter <hinese control of the
4ietnamese) the A8T fostered a rival 4iet "popular. front)" the 4ietnam 0evolutionary
/eague +;ong 8inh >oi1) which was based on the 4NK;;1) the Great 4ietnam
Nationalist Party +;ai 4iet1) and a number of smaller groups) but was supposed to
include the 4iet 8inh. !n fact) however) the ;ong 8inh >oi never ac?uired more than a
nominal control over the 4iet 8inh. !n %&59) >o was released from prison and put in
charge of the ;ong 8inh >oi$$a status apparently conditioned on his accepting overall
<hinese guidance and providing the allies with intelligence. But. as the war progressed)
>o and the 4iet 8inh drew apart from the ;ong 8inh >oi) and the latter never
succeeded in ac?uiring apparatus within 4ietnam comparable to the 4iet 8inh=s.
;uring the war) some 4ietnamese political parties collaborated with the :apanese or the
4ichy *rench. These were put at a disadvantage during and after the war in competition
with the !<P) the 4iet 8inh) or the ;ong 8inh >oi$$all of which developed an aura of
unwavering faith to resistance against all foreign domination But only the !<P and the
4iet 8inh established their reputations by etensive wartime operations among the
people of 4ietnam. !n <ochinchina) up until surfacing in #pril %&5') the !<P continued
to operate largely underground and without much regard for the 4iet 8inh mantle6 in
#nnam and Ton.in) however) all !<P underta.ings were given 4iet 8inh identity.
Throughout 4ietnam) the !<P initiated patient political action3 the dissemination of
propaganda) the training of cadres) the establishment of a networ. of cells down to
hamlet level. The !<P was during the war the hard core of the 4iet 8inh) but the bul. of
the 4iet 8inh membership were no doubt ?uite unaware of that fact3 they served the 4iet
8inh out of a patriotic fervor.
The #merican B.S.S. during "orld "ar !! dealt with the 4iet 8inh as the sole efficient
resistance apparatus within 4ietnam) depending upon it for reliable intelligence) and for
aid in assisting downed allied pilots. >owever) the 4iet 8inh itself assigned priority to
political tas.s ahead of these military missions. The first permanent 4iet 8inh bases
were established in %&57$59 in the mountains north of >anoi. Bnly after its political
networ. was well established did it field its first guerrilla forces) in September %&59. The
first units of the 4iet 8inh /iberation #rmy came into being on ;ecember 75 of that
year) but there is no evidence of large scale) concerted guerrilla operations until after
8arch %&5'.
#t the end of %&55) the 4iet 8inh claimed a total membership of '(()((() of which
7(()((( were in Ton.in) %'()((( in #nnam) and %'()((( in <ochinchina. The 4iet 8inh
political and military structure was significantly further developed in North 4ietnam. !n
8ay %&5'& a 4iet 8inh "liberated 2one" was established near the <hinese border. #s the
war drew to a close the 4iet 8inh determined to preempt allied occupation) and to form a
government prior to their arrival. The 4iet 8inh ability to do so proved better in the
north than in the south. !n #ugust %&5') >o <hi 8inh=s forces sei2ed over from the
:apanese and Bao ;ai in North 4ietnam) forced the emperor to abdicate) and to cede his
powers to >o=s ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam +;041. !n <ochinchina) however) the
4iet 8inh were able to gain only tenuous control of Saigon and its environs.
Nonetheless) when the allies arrived) the 4iet 8inh were the de fato government in both
North and South 4ietnam3 >o <hi 8inh and his ;04 in >anoi) and an !<P$dominated
"<ommittee of the South" in Saigon.
Bn %7 September %&5') the British landed a Gur.ha battalion and a company of *ree
*rench soldiers in Saigon. The British commander regarded the 4ietnamese government
with disdain because of its lac. of authority from the *rench and because of its inability
to ?uell civil disorder in South 4ietnam. Saigon police dashed with Trots.yites) and in
the rural areas) fighting bro.e out between 4iet 8inh troops and those of <ao ;ai and
>oa >oa. Spreading violence rendered futile further attempts to draw together the
4ietnamese factions) and prompted the *rench to importune the British commander to
permit them to step in to restore order. Bn the morning of 79 September) *rench troops
overthrew the 4ietnamese government after a tenure of only three wee.s. The official
British account termed the *rench method of eecuting the coup d=etat "unfortunate" in
that they "absolutely ensured that countermeasures would be ta.en by the F4ietnameseG
4ietnamese retaliation was ?uic. and violent3 over one hundred "esterners were slain in
the first few days) and others .idnapped6 on 7, September) the U.S. commander of the
B.S.S. in Saigon was .illed. Thus) the first !ndochina "ar began in <ochinchina in late
September) %&5'& and #merican blood was shed in its opening hours.
#t that Duncture) the !<P in <ochinchina was in a particularly vulnerable position. The
!<P had permitted the 4iet 8inh to pose as an arm of the #llies) and had supported
cooperation with the British and amnesty for the *rench. The Party had even underta.en)
through the <ommittee of the South) to repress the Trots.yites. But violence undermined
its advocacy of political moderation) of maintaining public order) and of negotiations
with the *rench. *urther) the !<P in Saigon was assured by *rench communists that they
would receive no assistance from Party brethren abroad. The *rench coup d=etat thrust
conflict upon the 4ietnamese of <ochinchina. The ?uestion before the communists was
how to respond6 the !<P leadership determined Fwords illegibleG and that to maintain
leadership of the nationalist movement in South 4ietnam they had to ma.e the 4iet 8inh
the most unbending foe of compromise with the *rench.
The situation in all of 4ietnam at the end of the war was confused $$ neither the *rench)
nor the 4iet 8inh) nor any other group eercised clear authority. "hile the 4iet 8inh
was far and away the single most powerful 4ietnamese organi2ation) and while it claimed
dominion over all 4ietnam) its authority was challenged in the North by the <hinese and
in the South by the British. The *rench position was patently more tenuous than that of
the 4iet 8inh until & Bctober %&5'. Bn that date) *rance and the UA concluded an
agreement whereby the British formally recogni2ed *rench civil administration in
!ndochina and ceded its occupation rights to *rance south of the %,th parallel. This
ceding of authority in the South did not) as a practical matter) ensure *rench rule. "ith
only 9')((( *rench soldiers in South 4ietnam) the 4iet 8inh and other parties were well
able to contest the *rench.
4iet 8inh authority in #nnam and Ton.in was less ambiguous) but by no means
unchallenged. !n the North) the salient political fact of life for the 4iet 8inh was the
presence of the <hinese Nationalist #rmy of Bccupation numbering '()((( men..
Through this presence) the <hinese were able to force the 4iet 8inh to accommodate
<hinese$4iet Nationalists within the ;04 and to defer to <hinese policy in other
respects.
The 4iet 8inh had to go further still in accommodating the wishes of the <hinese. !n
setting up the ;04 government of 7 September %&5') pro$<hinese) non$4iet 8inh
politicians were included) and the !<P too. only , of %, cabinet posts. Bn %% November
%&5') the 4iet 8inh leadership went even further) and formally dissolved the. !<P in the
interest of avoiding "misunderstandings." @ven this) however) was not sufficient.
<ompelled by opposition demands) >o agreed to schedule national elections for :anuary
of %&5, . The results of these elections were arranged beforehand with the maDor
opposition parties) and the #ssembly thus "elected" met on 7 8arch %&5,. This
#ssembly approved a new ;04 government) with the !<P holding only 7 of %7. cabinet
posts.
By then) *rance was ready to pose a stronger challenge. *rench reinforcements had
arrived in !ndochina) so that Paris could contemplate operations in North 4ietnam as well
as in <ochinchina. !n early %&5,) the <hinese turned over their occupation rights in the
North to *rance. *aced with increased *rench military power and <hinese withdrawal)
and denied succor from abroad) >o decided that he had no recourse save to negotiate with
the *rench. Bn , 8arch %&5,) >o signed an #ccord with the *rench providing for *rench
re$entry into 4ietnam for five years in return for recogni2ing the ;04 as a free state
within the *rench union.
This #ccord taed >oMs popularity to the utmost) and it too. all >o=s prestige to prevent
open rebellion. Bn 7- 8ay %&5,) >o countered these attac.s by merging the 4iet 8inh
into the /ien 4iet) a larger) more embracing "national front." #mity within the /ien 4iet)
however) lasted only as long as the <hinese remained in North 4ietnam. "hen they
withdrew a few wee.s later) in mid$:une) the 4iet 8inh) supported by *rench troops)
attac.ed the ;ong 8inh >oi and the 4NK;;) as "enemies of the peace)" effectively
suppressed organi2ed opposition) and asserted 4iet 8inh control throughout North
4ietnam.
But even this ascendancy proved transitory. >o <hi.8inh) though he tried hard) was
unable to negotiate any durable modus 'i'endi with the *rench in the summer and fall of
%&5,. !n the meantime) the ;04 and the 4iet 8inh were drawn more and more under the
control of the "8arists" of the former !<P. *or eample) during the sessions of the ;04
National #ssembly in November) nominal opposition members were whittled down to 7(
out of more than 9(( seats) and a few "8arists" dominated the proceedings.
Nonetheless) the ;04 government maintained at least a facade of coalition. Through
%&5&) !<P members remained in the minority) and nominally oppositionist 4NK;; and
;ong 8inh >oi politicians were consistently included.
#lthough the <ochinchina war continued throughout %&5,) with the 4iet 8inh assuming
a leading role in resistance) war in North 4ietnam did hot brea. out until ;ecember)
%&5,. # series of armed clashes in November were followed by a large scale fighting in
>anoi in late ;ecember. The ;04 government too. to the hills to assume the status of
shadow state. The 4iet 8inh transformed itself bac. into a semi$covert resistance
organi2ation and committed itself throughout the nation to the military defeat of the
*rench. ;uring the opening year of the war) %&5-) the 4iet 8inh too. steps to restore its
image as a popular) patriotic) anti$foreign movement) and again to play down the !<P role
in its leadership. The ;04 government was reorgani2ed and prominent communists
ecluded. #s the 4iet 8inh gathered strength over the years) however) these same leaders
reentered the ;04 government.
!n *ebruary %&'%) addressing the <ongress of the 4ietnamese <ommunist Party +/ao
;ong1) >o <hi 8inh stated that the <ommunist Party had formed and led the 4iet 8inh)
and founded and ruled the ;04. "hen the *rench colonialists reappeared in South
4ietnam and a Nationalist <hinese$sponsored government seemed in prospect in North
4ietnam) >o averred) the Party went underground) and entered into agreements with the
*rench3
/enin said that even if a compromise with bandits was advantageous to the revolution) he
would do it.
But >o=s eplanation notwithstanding) the 4iet 8inh was irrefutably nationalist) popular)
and patriotic. !t was also the most prominent and successful vehicle of 4iet nationalism
in the %&5(=s. To a degree it "as always non$communist. #vailable evidence indicates)
however) that from its inception) >o <hi 8inh and his lieutenants of the !ndochinese
<ommunist Party conceived its strategy) directed its operations) and channeled its
energies consistent with their own goals as they subse?uently claimed. "hether the non$
communist elements of the 4iet 8inh might have become dominant in different
circumstances must be relegated to speculation. !t seems clear that) as matters developed)
all of the non$communist nationalist movements$reformist) theocratic) or revolutionary$
were too locali2ed) too disunited) or too tainted with :apanese or Nationalist <hinese
associations to have competed successfully with the !<P for control of the 4iet 8inh.
#nd none could compete effectively with the 4iet 8inh in gaining a following among
4ietnam=s peasants.
FSupporting tet not availableG
V$ -, C-I 3I*-' .0I.* TIT,: . 0/33.25
#mong the more cogent criti?ues of U.S. policy toward 4ietnam is the contention that
the U.S. failed to recogni2e in >o <hi 8inh a potential #sian "Tito." This view holds that
>o has always been more concerned with 4ietnam=s independence and sovereign
viability than with following the interests and dictates of 8oscow and Pe.ing. "ith U.S.
support) the argument runs) >o would have adopted some form of neutrality in the @ast$
"est conflict and maintained the ;04 as a natural and durable bulwar. against <hinese
epansion southward. Thus) were it not for "U.S. communist blinders)" >o would have
served the larger purposes of #merican policy in #sia. Though the focus of in?uiry in
this study is the period immediately following "orld "ar !!) when it would have been
relatively easy to support an anti$:apanese) anti$colonial >o) it is often argued that the
U.S. neglected another opportunity after the Geneva <onference of %&'5$$and indeed)
that U.S. acceptance of >o) and a communist dominated 4ietnam) may be the only path
to peace in Southeast #sia today. The historical +%&5'$%&'51 argument has a persuasive
ring. !n the light of the present costs and repercussions of U.'. involvement in 4ietnam)
any prior way out can seem attractive !t is possible) however) that a dynamic and unified
communist 4ietnam under >o <hi 8inh could have been vigorously epansionist) thus
causing unanticipated difficult problems in some ways comparable to current ones.
8any authors have advanced one version or another of the "Tito" hypothesis. Some
develop the principal thesis that a different U.S. policy could have moved >o to non$
alignment and opposition to Pe.ing6 others stress the corollary that >o was forced into
dependence upon Pe.ing and 8oscow by #merican opposition or indifference. "hether
>o was a nationalist or a communist is not at issue6 all of the authors ?uoted seem to
accept that >o was a communist) and that a communist 4ietnam would probably have
eventuated under his leadership. 0ather) their arguments center on what they perceive to
be >o=s willingness to subordinate communist goals) forms) and international discipline
to attaining 4ietnam=s independence and unity. # few openly favor a communist 4ietnam
on the grounds that only a national communism led by >o would be sufficiently strong to
survive adDacent to <hina. They stress >o=s attempts in %&5' and %&5, to obtain "estern
bac.ing) and point out that antipathy to <hina is a pillar of 4iet nationalism. 8any
concede that the Tito analogy is not wholly appropriate. Unli.e Tito) >o came to power
after the war $ without the aid of another communist state. 8ore basically) there was no
analogy to be made until late %&5J) when the eperiment with Tito seemed li.e it would
wor.. Nonetheless) these authors point out that if the U.S. found it advantageous to set
aside its repugnance to Tito=s communism in the interest of stemming 0ussian epansion
in @urope) it should have been willing to accommodate >o <hi 8inh=s communism for
similar ends in #sia. This criti?ue generally ends with the accusation that the U.S.
purpose in Southeast #sia is simply and solely to stop communism.
#n eamination of >o <hi 8inh=s political development through %&'( may provide a
basis to narrow the range of speculation concerning >o and U.S. policy. *rom such a
review) it is evident that the man who in %&5' became President of the ;emocratic
0epublic of 4ietnam was a mature) etraordinarily dedicated revolutionary who had
undergone severe hardships serving the cause of 4ietnam=s freedom from *rance. *ifty$
five years of age in %&5') he had been a communist for twenty$five years) one of the
founding members of the *rench <ommunist Party) and a <omintern agent in #sia for
fifteen years before "orld "an !!. >e was originally of Nghe$#n) a province
traditionally a spawning ground of revolutionists6 of a father imprisoned by the *rench
for nationalist activism6 and of a >ue school .nown for radical nationalism among its
students. @iled from 4ietnam from %&%( to %&5() imprisoned in >ong Aong and in
<hina) deprived of home) family) fame) fortune and companionship outside the
<omintern=s conspiratorial circles) he apparently devoted himself selflessly all those years
to revolution in 4ietnam. 0uth *ischer) a well$.nown German former communist who
.new >o during this period) has written) "!t was >o <hi 8inh=s nationalism which
impressed us @uropean <ommunists born and bred in a rather grey .ind of abstract
internationalism."
*or >o) now bac. in #sia) "orld "ar !! opened new avenues to the attainment of his
lifelong goals. *rance discredited itself in 4ietnam through 4ichy=s collaboration with the
:apanese) and then in %&5' was toppled from power altogether by :apanese arms. !n the
meantime) >o had built the 4iet 8inh into the only 4ietnam$wide political organi2ation
capable of effective resistance to either the :apanese or the *rench. >o was the only
4ietnamese wartime leader with a national following) and he assured himself wider fealty
among the 4ietnamese people when in #ugust$September) %&5') he overthrew the
:apanese) obtained the abdication of Bao ;ai) established the ;04) and staged receptions
for in$coming allied occupation force in which the ;04 acted as the incumbent
4ietnamese government. *or a few wee.s in September %&5') 4ietnam was$$for the first
and only time in its modern history$$free of foreign domination) and united from north to
south under >o <hi 8inh.
>o became the focus of the nationalist fervor evo.ed by these and subse?uent events.
/eaders of the rival 4ietnamese Nationalist Party +4NK;;1 and the 0evolutionary
/eague +;ong 8inh >oi1) although admitted to the ;04 government) commanded no
grass$roots organi2ations) and since they were closely associated with the <hinese
Nationalists) shared in full measure in the anti$<hinese odium among the people of North
4ietnam. !n South 4ietnam) *rench intrigue) and 4ietnamese disunity precluded the
emergence of a competitor to >o. "hen *rance resorted to force to restore its control
over 4ietnam) >o again became the head of 4iet resistance) and the 4iet 8inh became
the primary nationalist protagonists. >ence) >o <hi 8inh) both on his own merits and out
of lac. of competition) became the personification of 4ietnamese nationalism.
>o) nonetheless) found himself) his movement) and his government under intense
pressure. *rom within the nation) the <hinese$bac.ed 4iet parties attac.ed communist
domination of his government. *or the sa.e of national unity) >o dissolved the
<ommunist Party) avoided communist cant) announced general elections) and assured the
contending factions representation in the government well out of proportion to their
popular support. @ternal pressures from *rance and from <hina proved more difficult.
The *rench capitali2ed on the relative wea.ness of the 4iet 8inh in South 4ietnam) and
the dissension among the 4ietnamese there to overthrow the ;04 government in Saigon)
and to force the 4iet 8inh to resort to guerrilla warfare. !n famine$wrac.ed North
4ietnam) <hinese hordes under booty$minded warlords descended on the ;04)
supplanting its local government with committees of their own sponsoring and
systematically looting. >o vainly sought aid abroad6 not even the Soviet Union proved
helpful. >o eventually +8arch) %&5,1 negotiated with the *rench) accepting a *rench
military presence in North 4ietnam for a period of five years in return for vague *rench
assurances to the ;04 as a "*ree State within the *rench Union." "hen >o was attac.ed
for this by the pro$<hinese elements within the ;04) he declared3
Cou foolsS ;on=t you reali2e what it means if the <hinese stayN ;on=t you remember your
historyN The last time the <hinese came) they stayed one thousand yearsS
The *rench are foreigners. They are wea.. <olonialism is dying out. Nothing will be able
to withstand world pressure for independence. They may stay for a while) but they will
have to go because the white man is finished in #sia. But if the <hinese stay now) they
will never leave.
#s for me) ! prefer to smell *rench shit for five years) rather than <hinese shit for the rest
of. my life.
The unresolved historic problem) of course) is to what etent >o=s nationalist goals over$
rode his communist convictions in these maneuvers. >o seemed to place the former
above the latter not solely as a matter of dissemblance) as he might have done in the
dissolution of the Party and the simultaneous formation of a "8arist #ssociation)" but
possibly as a result of doubts about communism as a political form suitable for 4ietnam.
Bao ;ai is reputed to have said that3 "! saw >o <hi 8inh suffer. >e was fighting a battle
within himself. >o had his own struggle. >e reali2ed communism was not best for his
country) but it was too late. Ultimately) he could not overcome his allegiance to
communism." ;uring negotiations for a modus 'i'endi with the *rench in Paris in
autumn) %&5,) >o appealed to the *rench to "save him from the etremists" within the
4iet 8inh by some meaningful concession to 4ietnamese independence) and he told the
U.S. #mbassador that he was not a communist. >e is reputed to have asserted at that time
that 4ietnam was not ready for communism) and described himself as a 8arist. !n reply
to a Dournalist=s in?uiry) >o claimed that he could remain neutral) "li.e Swit2erland" in
the developing world power struggle between communism and the "est. But these and
other such statements could have come either from a proper /eninist or a dedicated
nationalist. >o=s statements and actions after %&5&) and his eventual close alignment with
the Sino$Soviet Bloc) support the /eninist construction. But) then) U.S. insistence on >o=s
being a doctrinaire communist may have been a self$fulfilling prophesy.
There remains) however) the matter of >o=s direct appeals for U.S. intervention in
4ietnam) at which even a /eninist might have scrupled. These occurred +late %&5') early
%&5,1 Dust after *rance has reasserted itself militarily in South 4ietnam) while <hinese
Nationalist warlords were ensconced in >anoi) and before the , 8arch %&5, #ccord with
*rance. ;esperately) >o turned to the United States) among other powers) as.ing for
"immediate interference" in 4ietnam.
There were) at least) eight communications from >o to the President of the United States)
or to the Secretary of State) from Bctober) %&5') to *ebruary) %&5,. >o had conveyed
earlier) in #ugust and September) %&5') 'ia B.S.S. channels) proposals that 4ietnam be
accorded "the same status as the Philippines)" for an undetermined period of tutelage
preliminary to independence. "ith the outbrea. of hostilities in South 4ietnam)
September$Bctober %&5') he added formal re?uests for U.S. and U.N. intervention
against *rench aggression) citing the #tlantic <harter) the U.N. <harter) and a foreign
policy address of President Truman in Bctober) %&5') endorsing national self$
determination. >o=s last direct communication with the U.S. was in September6 %&5,)
when he visited the U.S. #mbassador in Paris to as. vaguely for U.S. assistance in
obtaining independence for 4ietnam within the *rench Union.
There is no record of U.S. reply to any of >o=s appeals for aid. @tant instructions to a
U.S. diplomat in contact with >o in ;ecember) %&5,) reveal U.S. preoccupation with his
.nown communist bac.ground) and apprehension that he might establish a "communist$
dominated) 8oscow$oriented state." Two months later) when the *ranco$4iet 8inh war
in North 4ietnam was underway) Secretary of State 8arshall emphasi2ed that "we do not
lose sight Fof theG fact that >o <hi 8inh has direct <ommunist connections and it should
be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial empire administrations supplanted
by philosophy and political organi2ations emanating from and controlled by the
Aremlin." !n 8ay) %&5&) Secretary of State #cheson admitted that as a "theoretical
possibility" the establishment of a "National <ommunist state on pattern Cugoslavia in
any area beyond reach Fof theG Soviet #rmy)" but pointed out that3
Kuestion whether >o as much nationalist as <ommie is irrelevant. #ll Stalinists in
colonial areas are nationalists. "ith achievement national aims +i.e.) independence1 their
obDective necessarily becomes subordination state to <ommie purposes and ruthless
etermination not only opposition groups but all elements suspected even. slightest
deviation.
"hen) in early %&'() >o=s ;04 lay within reach of 8ao=s <hinese #rmy) and >o had
openly embraced communism) Secretary #cheson declared that bloc recognition of the
;04 "should remove any illusion as to the nationalist character of >o <hi 8inh=s aims
and reveals >o in his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in
4ietnam."
But >o=s behavior in %&5&$%&'() however convincingly it endorsed U.S. policy at that
Duncture) does not necessarily eplain away his earlier eagerness for U.S. and U.N.
intervention $ in 4ietnam) nor otherwise gainsay the "Tito" hypothesis as applied to the
%&5'$%&5- period. Bf that period) it can be said that the U.S. offered >o only narrow
options. >e received no replies to his appeals. #fter %&5,) not only were >o=s direct
communications with the U.S. cut) but also the signals he received from the U.S. were
hardly encouraging. By the time the !ndochina war began in earnest in late %&5,) U.S.
military e?uipment had already been used by *rench forces against the 4ietnamese) and
the U.S. had arranged credit for *rance to purchase Q%,( million worth of vehicles and
miscellaneous industrial e?uipment for use in !ndochina. Secretary of State George <.
8arshall=s public comment on the outbrea. of war in :anuary) %&5-) was limited to a
hope that "a pacific basis for adDustment of the difficulties could be found)" and within
si months the 8arshall Plan threw even greater U.S. resources behind *rance.
The simple truth seems to be that the U.S. .new little of what was transpiring inside
4ietnam) and certainly cared less about 4ietnam than about *rance. Anowing little and
caring less meant that real problems and variety of choices were perceived but dimly. *or
eample) the U.S. could have as.ed itself$$";id we really have to support *rance in
Southeast #sia in order to support a non$communist *rance internally and in @uropeN"
#nother ?uestion we could have as.ed ourselves was$$"!f the U.S. choice in 4ietnam
really came down to either *rench colonialism or >o <hi 8inh) should >o automatically
be ecludedN" #gain) "!f the U.S. choice was to be *rance) did *rance have any real
chance of succeeding) and if so) at what costN"
@ven before "orld "ar !! was over) "ashington had placed the decision on >o=s fate in
the hands of *rance. !t can be argued) nonetheless) that the U.S. could have insisted that
Paris buy >o and provide !ndochinese independence without endangering the more basic
relationship between the U.S. and *rance in @urope. :ust as the U.S. came to recogni2e
the prime importance of @urope over any policy it pursued elsewhere) so the *rench
government would have soon reali2ed +if it had not already done so1 that nothing should
be done to impair seriously U.S. acceptance of common interests in @uropean recovery
and collective security. 8oreover) it was not as if there were not si2able segments of the
*rench community which would not have supported graceful U.S. attempts to etricate
*rance from !ndochina. !t may well be) however) that the "Tito hypothesis" assumes a
compliance from *rance of which *rance was demonstrably incapable. No *rench
government is li.ely to have survived a genuinely liberal policy toward >o in %&5' or
%&5,6 even *rench communists then favored redemption of control in !ndochina. *rom
=5, on) however) bloodshed hardened policy in *rance. #s before) the >o alternative was
never seriously contemplated.
*rench representations to the contrary notwithstanding) >o <hi 8inh possessed real
political strength among the people of 4ietnam6 "hile calling >o another George
"ashington may be stretching the point) there is no doubt about his being the only
popularly recogni2ed wartime leader of the 4ietnamese resistance) and the head of the
strongest and only 4ietnam$wide political movement. There can be no doubt either that
in a test by ballot only >o=s 4iet 8inh could have delivered votes at the hamlet level.
"ashington and Paris) however) did not focus on the fact of >o=s strength) only on the
conse?uences of his rule. Paris viewed >o as a threat to its regaining *rench economic)
cultural and political prerogatives in !ndochina. The U.S.) wary of >o=s .nown
communist bac.ground) was apprehensive that >o would lead 4ietnam into the Soviet)
and later <hinese) orbit. President @isenhower=s later remar. about >o=s winning a free
election in 4ietnam with an J(O vote shone through the dar.ness of our vision about
4ietnam6 but U.S. policy remained unillumined.
!n the last speculation) U.S. support for >o <hi 8inh would have involved perspicacity
and ris.. #s clear as national or independent or neutral communism may seem today) it
was a blurred vision in %&5'$%&5J. @ven with the benefit of seeing Tito successfully
assert his independence) it would have been hard for "ashington to ma.e the leap from
there to an analogy in #sia. 0ecourse to "national communism" in 4ietnam as an
eventual bulwar. against <hina) indeed) would have called for a perspicacity uni?ue in
U.S. history. The ris. was there) too. The reality of >o=s strength in 4ietnam could have
wor.ed seriously against U.S. interests as well as against <hinese <ommunist interests.
>o=s well$.nown leadership and drive) the iron discipline and effectiveness of the 4iet
8inh) the demonstrated fighting capability of his armies) a dynamic 4ietnamese people
under >o=s control) could have produced a dangerous period of 4ietnamese
epansionism. /aos and <ambodia would have been easy pic.ings for such a 4ietnam.
>o) in fact) always considered his leadership to etend to !ndochina as a whole) and his
party was originally called the !ndochinese <ommunist Party. Thailand) 8alaya)
Singapore) and even !ndonesia) could have been net. !t could have been the "domino
theory" with >o instead of 8ao. #nd) it could have been the dominoes with 8ao. This
may seem implausible) but it is only slightly less of a bad dream than what has happened
to 4ietnam since. The path of prudence rather than the path of ris. seemed the wiser
choice.
FSupporting tet not availableG
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
<hapter 7) "U.S. !nvolvement in the *ranco$4iet 8inh "ar) %&'($%&'5"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section %) pp. '9$-'
Fore4ord
This portion of the study treats U.S. policy towards the war in !ndochina from the U.S.
decision to recogni2e the 4ietnamese Nationalist regime of the @mperor Bao ;ai in
*ebruary) %&'() through the U.S. deliberations on military intervention in late %&'9 and
early %&'5.
Summary
!t has been argued that even as the U.S. began supporting the *rench in !ndochina) the
U.S. missed opportunities to bring peace) stability and independence to 4ietnam. The
issues arise from the belief on the part of some critics that +a1 the U.S. made no attempt to
see. out and support a democratic$nationalist alternative in 4ietnam6 and +b1 the U.S.
commanded) but did not use) leverage to move the *rench toward granting genuine
4ietnamese independence.
U.S. PB/!<C #N; T>@ B#B ;#! 0@G!8@
The record shows that through %&'9) the *rench pursued a policy which was based on
military victory and ecluded meaningful negotiations with >o <hi 8inh. The *rench
did) however) recogni2e the re?uirement for an alternative focus for 4ietnamese
nationalist aspirations) and from %&5- forward) advanced the TBao ;ai solution.U The
record shows that the U.S. was hesitant through %&5& to endorse the TBao ;ai solutionU
until 4ietnam was in fact unified and granted autonomy and did consistently support the
creation of a genuinely independent) noncommunist 4ietnamese government to supplant
*rench rule. Nonetheless) the fall of <hina and the deteriorating *rench military position
in !ndochina caused both *rance and the U.S. to press the TBao ;ai solution.U !n early
%&'() after *rench ratification of the @lysee #greement granting T4ietnamMs
independence)U the U.S. recogni2ed Bao ;ai and initiated military and economic aid)
even before transfer of governmental power actually occurred. Thereafter) the *rench
yielded control only pro forma) while the @mperor Bao ;ai adopted a retiring) passive
role) and turned his government over to discreditable politicians. The Bao ;ai regime
was neither popular nor efficient) and its army) dependent on *rench leadership) was
powerless. The impotence of the Bao ;ai regime) the lac. of any perceptible alternatives
+ecept for the communists1) the fact of continued *rench authority and control over the
G4N) the fact that the *rench alone seemed able to contain communism in !ndochinaE
all these constrained U.S. promptings for a democratic$nationalist government in
4ietnam.
/@4@0#G@3 *0#N<@ >#; 8B0@ T>#N T>@ UN!T@; ST#T@S
The U.S.$*rench ties in @urope +N#TB) 8arshall Plan) 8utual ;efense #ssistance
Program1 only marginally strengthened U.S. urgings that *rance ma.e concessions to
4ietnamese nationalism. #ny leverage from these sources was severely limited by the
broader considerations of U.S. policy for the containment of communism in @urope and
#sia. N#TB and the 8arshall Plan were of themselves Dudged to be essential to our
@uropean interests. To threaten *rance with economic and military sanctions in @urope in
order to have it alter its policy in !ndochina was) therefore) not plausible. Similarly) to
reduce the level of military assistance to the *rench effort in !ndochina would have been
counter$productive) since it would have led to a further deterioration in the *rench
military position there. !n other words) there was a basic incompatibility in the two
strands of U.S. policy3 +%1 "ashington wanted *rance to fight the anti$communist war
and win) preferably with U.S. guidance and advice6 and +71 "ashington epected the
*rench) when battlefield victory was assured) to magnanimously withdraw from
!ndochina. *or *rance) which was probably fighting more a colonial than an anti$
communist war) and which had to consider the effects of withdrawal on colonial holdings
in #lgeria) Tunisia and 8orocco) magnanimous withdrawal was not too li.ely.
*rance) having no such policy incompatibilities) could and did pursue a consistent course
with the stronger bargaining hand. Thus) the *rench were able to resist pressures from
"ashington and through the 8##G in Saigon to create a truly 4ietnamese army) to
grant the 4ietnamese more local autonomy and to wage the war more effectively. 8##G
was relegated to a supply function and its occasional admonitions to the *rench were
interpreted by them as interference in their internal affairs. @ven though by %&'5) the U.S.
was financing -JO of the costs of the war) the *rench retained full control of the
dispensation of military assistance and of the intelligence and planning aspects of the
military struggle. The epectation of *rench victory over the 4iet 8inh encouraged the
U.S. to "go along" with Paris until the conclusion of the war. 8oreover) the U.S. was
reluctant to antagoni2e the *rench because of the high priority given in "ashington=s
planning to *rench participation in the @uropean ;efense <ommunity. *rance) therefore)
had considerable leverage and) unless the U.S. supported Paris on its own terms) the
*rench could) and indeed did) threaten not to Doin the @;< and to stop fighting in
!ndochina.
P@0<@PT!BNS B* T>@ <B88UN!ST T>0@#T TB SBUT>@#ST #S!# #N; TB
B#S!< U.S. !NT@0@STS
#merican thin.ing and policy$ma.ing was dominated by the tendency to view
communism in monolithic terms. The 4iet 8inh was) therefore) seen as part of the
Southeast #sia manifestation of the world$wide communist epansionary movement.
*rench resistance to >o <hi 8inh) in turn) was thought to be a crucial lin. in the
containment of communism. This strategic perception of the communist threat was
supported by the espousal of the domino principle3 the loss of a single nation in Southeast
#sia to communism would ineorably lead to the other nations of the area falling under
communist control. The domino principle) which probably had its origin at the time of the
Nationalist withdrawal from mainland <hina) was at the root of U.S. policy. #lthough
elements of a domino$li.e theory could be found in NS< papers before the start of the
Aorean "ar) the <hinese intervention in Aorea was thought to be an ominous
confirmation of its validity. The possibility of a large$scale <hinese intervention in
!ndochina) similar to that in Aorea) was feared) especially after the armistice in Aorea.
The @isenhower #dministration followed the basic policy of its predecessor) but also
deepened the #merican commitment to containment in #sia. Secretary ;ulles pursued a
forthright) anti$communist policy and made it clear that he would not permit the "loss" of
!ndochina) in the manner the ;emocrats had allegedly allowed the "loss" of <hina. ;ulles
warned <hina not to intervene) and urged the *rench to drive toward a military victory.
;ulles was opposed to a cease$fire and tried to dissuade the *rench from negotiations
with the 4iet 8inh until they had mar.edly improved their bargaining position through
action on the battlefield. The NS< in early %&'5 was persuaded that a non$communist
coalition regime would eventually turn the country over to the 4iet 8inh. !n conse?uence
of this more militant policy) the U.S. Government tended to focus on the military rather
than the political aspects of the *rench$4iet 8inh struggle.
#mong the more fre?uently cited misapprehensions concerning U.S. policy in 4ietnam is
the view that the @isenhower #dministration flatly reDected intervention in the *irst
!ndochina "ar. The record shows plainly that the U.S. did seriously consider
intervention) and advocated it to the U.A. and other allies. "ith the intensification of the
*rench$4iet 8inh war and the deterioration of the *rench military position) the United
States was forced to ta.e a position on3 first) a possible U.S. military intervention in order
to avert a 4iet 8inh victory6 second) the increasingly li.ely contingency of negotiations
between Paris and >o <hi 8inh to end the war through a political settlement. !n order to
avoid a *rench sell$out) and as an alternative to unilateral U.S. intervention) the U.S.
proposed in %&'5 to broaden the war by involving a number of allies in a collective
defense effort through "united action."
T>@ !NT@0#G@N<C ;@B#T@ B4@0 U.S. !NT@04@NT!BN !N !N;B<>!N#
The U.S. Government internal debate on the ?uestion of intervention centered essentially
on the desirability and feasibility of U.S. military action. !ndochina=s importance to U.S.
security interests in the *ar @ast was ta.en for granted. The @isenhower #dministration
followed in general terms the rationale for #merican interest in !ndochina that was
epressed by the Truman #dministration. "ith respect to intervention) the Truman
#dministration=s NS< %75 of *ebruary %&'7 recogni2ed that the U.S. might be forced to
ta.e some military action in order to prevent the subversion of Southeast #sia. !n late
%&'9$early %&'5) as the fall of !ndochina seemed imminent) the ?uestion of intervention
came to the fore. The ;efense ;epartment pressed for a determination by highest
authority of the si2e and nature of the forces the U.S. was willing to commit in !ndochina.
Some in ;B; ?uestioned the then operating assumption that U.S. air and naval forces
would suffice as aid for the *rench. The #rmy was particularly concerned about
contingency planning that assumed that U.S. air and naval action alone could bring
military victory) and argued for realistic estimates of re?uisite land forces) including the
degree of mobili2ation that would be necessary. The State ;epartment thought that
!ndochina was so critical from a foreign policy viewpoint that intervention might be
necessary. But ;B; and the :<S) estimating that air$naval action alone could not stem
the surging 4iet 8inh) recommended that rather than intervening directly) the U.S.
should concentrate on urging Paris to train an epanded indigenous army) and should
eert all possible pressures$in @urope as well as in #sia$to motivate the *rench to fight
hard for a military victory. 8any in the U.S. Government +the 0idgway 0eport stands out
in this group1 were wary that U.S. intervention might provo.e <hinese <ommunist
intervention. !n the latter case) even a considerable U.S. deployment of ground forces
would not be able to stem the tide in !ndochina. # number of special high$level studies
were unable to bridge the evident disparity between those who held that vital U.S.
interests were at sta.e in !ndochina) and those who were unwilling to ma.e a firm
decision to intervene with U.S. ground forces to assure those interests. <onse?uently)
when the *rench began pressing for U.S. intervention at ;ien Bien Phu) the @isenhower
#dministration too. the position that the U.S. would not intervene unilaterally) but only
in concert with a number of @uropean and *ar @astern allies as part of a combined force.
T>@ #TT@8PT TB B0G#N!L@ "UN!T@; #<T!BN"
This "united action" proposal) announced publicly by Secretary ;ulles on 8arch 7&)
%&'5) was also designed to offer the *rench an alternative to surrender at the negotiating
table. Negotiations for a political settlement of the *ranco$4iet 8inh war) however) were
assured when the Big *our *oreign 8inisters meeting in *ebruary at Berlin placed
!ndochina on the agenda of the impending Geneva <onference. *oreign 8inister Bidault
insisted upon this) over U.S. obDections) because of the mounting pressure in *rance for
an end to the seemingly interminable and costly war. The "peace faction" in Paris became
stronger in proportion to the "peace feelers" let out by >o <hi 8inh) and the lac. of
*rench success on the battlefield. U.S. policy was to steer the *rench away from
negotiations because of the fear that !ndochina would thereby be handed over to the
communist "empire."
Secretary ;ulles envisaged a ten$nation collective defense force to ta.e "united action" to
prevent a *rench defeat$if necessary before the Geneva <onference. ;ulles and #dmiral
0adford were) at first) inclined towards an early unilateral intervention at ;ien Bien Phu)
as re?uested by the *rench +the so$called "Bperation 4ulture"1. But <ongressional
leaders indicated they would not support U.S. military action without active allied
participation) and President @isenhower decided that he would not intervene without
<ongressional approval. !n addition to allied participation) <ongressional approval was
deemed dependent upon a public declaration by *rance that it was speeding up the
timetable for independence for the #ssociated States.
The U.S. was unable to gather much support for "united action" ecept in Thailand and
the Philippines. The British response was one of hesitation in general) and flat opposition
to underta.ing military action before the Geneva <onference. @den feared that it would
lead to an epansion of the war with a high ris. of <hinese intervention. 8oreover) the
British ?uestioned both the U.S. domino principle) and the belief that !ndochina would be
totally lost at ;ien Bien Phu and through negotiations at Geneva. #s for the *rench) they
were less interested in "united action" than in immediate U.S. military assistance at ;ien
Bien Phu. Paris feared that united action would lead to the internationali2ation of the war)
and ta.e control out of its hands. !n addition) it would impede or delay the very
negotiations leading towards a settlement which the *rench increasingly desired. But
repeated *rench re?uests for direct U.S. intervention during the final agony of ;ien Bien
Phu failed to alter President @isenhower=s conviction that it would be an error for the U.S.
to act alone.
*ollowing the fall of ;ien Bien Phu during the Geneva <onference) the "domino theory"
underwent a reappraisal. Bn a 8ay %% press conference) Secretary ;ulles observed that
"Southeast #sia could be secured even without) perhaps) 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia."
!n a further remar. that was deleted from the official transcript) ;ulles said that /aos and
<ambodia were "important but by no means essential" because they were poor countries
with meager populations.
(End of Summary)
!. U.S. PB/!<C #N; T>@ B#B ;#! 0@G!8@
#. T)E 5#6 D#! S6"7T!63
1. The Frenh Prediament
*rench perceptions of the conflict which bro.e out in ;ecember) %&5,) between their
forces in !ndochina and the 4iet 8inh forces of the ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam
+;041 began to alternate between boundless optimism and unbridled gloom. !n 8ay)
%&5-) 8inister of "ar <oste$*loret announced in Paris that3 "There is no military
problem any longer in !ndochina . . . the success of *rench arms is complete." "ithin si
months) though ambitious armored) amphibious) and airborne drives had plunged into the
northern mountains and along the #nnam coast) 4iet 8inh sabotage and raids along lines
of communication had mounted steadily) and Paris had come to reali2e that *rance had
lost the military initiative. !n the meantime) the *rench launched political forays similarly
ambitious and e?ually unproductive. /eon Pignon) political adviser to the *rench
<ommander in !ndochina) and later >igh <ommissioner) wrote in :anuary) %&5-) that3
Bur obDective is clear3 to transpose to the field of 4ietnamese domestic politics the
?uarrel we have with the 4iet 8inh) and to involve ourselves as little as possible in the
campaigns and reprisals which ought to be the wor. of the native adversaries of that
party.
"ithin a month) an emissary Dourneyed into the Dungle to deliver to >o <hi 8inh=s
government demands tantamount to unconditional surrender. #bout the same time)
*rench representatives approached Bao ;ai) the former @mperor of #nnam) with
proposals that he underta.e to form a 4ietnamese government as an alternate to >o <hi
8inh=s. Being unable to force a military resolution) and having foreclosed meaningful
negotiations with >o) the *rench turned to Bao ;ai as their sole prospect for etrication
from the growing dilemma in 4ietnam.
8. The )a "ong 5ay #greement& 1,-9
Bao ;ai=s mandarinal court in >ue) #nnam) had been little more than an instrument of
*rench colonial policy) and$after the occupation by :apan$Bf :apanese policy. Bao ;ai
had become @mperor at the age of %7) in %&7') but did not actually ascend the throne
until %&97) after education in *rance. !n #ugust) %&5') when the 4iet 8inh arrived in
>ue) he abdicated in favor of >o=s ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam) and accepted the
post of "Supreme #dviser" to the new state. !n %&5,) he left 4ietnam) and went to >ong
Aong. There) he found himself solicited not only by *rench representatives) but by the
;04) who sought him to act on their behalf with the *rench.
Bao ;ai attempted at first to maintain a central position between the two protagonists) but
was soon persuaded to decline the 4iet 8inh overtures by non$<ommunist nationalists.
# group of these) including members of the <ao ;ai) >oa >ao) ;ong 8inh >oi) ;ai 4et)
and the 4NK;; formed a National Union) and declared support for Bao ;ai. Bne
authority termed the National Union "a fragile coalition of discredited collaborators)
ambitious masters of intrigue) incompetent sectarians) and a smattering of honest leaders
without a following." #mong the latter were Ngo ;inh ;iem) who "for the first and only
time) Doined a. party of which he was not the founder)" and pledged to bac. the @mperor
so long as he pursued independence for 4ietnam. Now) having eliminated the 4iet 8inh
support option) Bao ;ai became more compliant in his discussions with the *rench) and
the *rench became correspondingly stiffer in their attitude toward the 4iet 8inh. Cet)
little came of the tal.s. Bn ;ecember -) %&5-) aboard a *rench warship in >a /ong Bay)
Bao ;ai signed an accord with the *rench) committing the *rench to 4ietnamese political
independence so minimally that it was promptly condemned not only by ;iem) but also
by more opportunistic colleagues in the National Union. Bao ;ai) in what might have
been a political withdrawal) removed himself from the developing intrigue) and fled to
@uropean pleasure centers for a four month Daunt which earned him the sobri?uet "night
club emperor."
The *rench) despite lac. of cooperation from their elusive 4ietnamese principal) sent
diplomats to pursue Bao ;ai and publici2ed their resolve "to carry on) outside the >o <hi
8inh Government) all activities and negotiations necessary for the restoration of peace
and freedom in the 4ietnamese countries"$$in effect) committing themselves to military
victory and Bao ;ai. *rench persistence eventually persuaded Bao ;ai to return to >ong
Aong) to endorse the formation of a 4ietnamese national government prior to
independence) and finally) to return to 4ietnam as the >ead of State. *rench negotiating
pressures on him and the National Union included both spurious "lea.s" of *ranco$4iet
8inh settlement tal.s) and further assurances of intentions to grant 4ietnamese
autonomy. Bn :une ') %&5J) Bao ;ai witnessed the signing of another Bay of >a /ong
#greement. Thereby) *rance publicly and "solemnly" recogni2ed the independence of
4ietnam$but specifically retained control over foreign relations and the #rmy) and
deferred transfer of other governmental functions to future negotiations6 no authority was
in fact transferred to the 4ietnamese. #gain Bao ;ai retired to @urope) while in >anoi
the *rench assembled a transparently impotent semblance of native government. #
second summer of war passed in %&5J without dispelling the military miasma over
!ndochina) and without ma.ing the "Bao ;ai solution" any less repugnant among
4ietnamese patriots. Bpposition to it began to mount among *rench /eftists. This
disenchantment) combined with a spreading acceptance of the strategic view that the
*ranco$4iet 8inh war was a .ey anti$<ommunist struggle) influenced *rench leaders to
liberali2e their approach to the "Bao ;ai solution."
3. Elysee #greement& 1,-,
Bn 8arch J) %&5&) after months of negotiations) *rench President #uriol) in an echange
of letters with Bao ;ai) reconfirmed independence for 4ietnam as an #ssociated State of
the *rench Union and detailed procedures for unifying 4ietnam and placing it under
4ietnamese administration. Nonetheless) in the @lysee #greement) *rance yielded control
of neither 4ietnam=s army nor its foreign relations) and again postponed arrangements for
virtually all other aspects of autonomy. >owever) Bao ;ai) apparently convinced that
*rance was now sufficiently desperate in !ndochina that it would have to honor the
#greements) declared that3
...#n era of reconstruction and renovation will open in 4ietnam. The country will be
given democratic institutions that will be called on primarily to approve the present
agreement. . . . Profound economic and social reforms will be instituted to raise the
general standard of living and to promote social Dustice) which is the condition and
guarantee of order . . . F! loo. forG the union of all 4ietnamese regardless of their political
and religious tendencies) and the generous support of *rance on which ! can count
>is public stance notwithstanding) Bao ;ai delayed his return to 4ietnam until a
<ochinchinese #ssembly had been elected +albeit in a farce of an election1) and did not
proceed to Saigon until the *rench #ssembly had approved <ochinchina=s Doining the rest
of 4ietnam. !n late :une) %&5&) 4ietnam was legally united under Bao ;ai) but the related
alteration of administrative functions was slow) and usually only pro forma6 no genuine
power or authority was turned over to the 4ietnamese. The State of 4ietnam became a
camouflage for continued *rench rule in !ndochina. #s Bao ;ai himself characteri2ed the
situation in %&'() ""hat they call a Bao ;ai solution turned out to be Dust a *rench
solution. . . . The situation in !ndochina is getting worse every day..."
-. 5ao Dai(s :o'ernments
The unsavory elements of the coalition supporting Bao ;ai dominated his regime. Ngo
;inh ;iem and a few other upright nationalists refused high government posts) and
withdrew their support from Bao ;ai when their epectations of autonomy were
disappointed. ;iem=s public statement critici2ed the probity of those who did accept
office3
The national aspirations of the 4ietnamese people will be satisfied only on the day when
our nation obtains the same political regime which !ndia and Pa.istan enDoy . . . ! believe
it is only Dust to reserve the best posts in the new 4ietnam for those who have deserved
best of the country6 ! spea. of those who resist .
>owever) far from loo.ing to the "resistance)" Bao ;ai chose his leaders from among
men with strong identification with *rance) often men of great and dubious wealth) or
with ties with the sub$worlds of *rench neo$mercantilism and 4iet vice. None
commanded a popular following. General Georges 0evers) <hief of Staff of the *rench
#rmy) who was sent to 4ietnam to appraise the situation in 8ay and :une) %&5&) wrote
that3
!f >o <hi 8inh has been able to hold off *rench intervention for so long) it is because the
4iet 8inh leader has surrounded himself with a group of men of incontestable worth . . .
FBao ;ai) by contrast) hadG a government composed of twenty representatives of phantom
parties) the best organi2ed of which would have difficulty in rallying twenty$five
adherents .
Bao ;ai himself did net to nothing to ma.e his government either more representative
or more efficient. >e divided his time among the pleasures of the resort towns of ;alat)
Nha Trang) and Banmethuout) and for all practical purposes) remained outside the
process of government.
#n #merican diplomat serving in 4ietnam at the time who .new Bao ;ai well)
characteri2ed him in these terms3
Bao ;ai) above all) was an intelligent man. !ntellectually) he could discuss the comple
details of the various agreements and of the whole involved
relationship with *rance as well as or better than anyone ! .new. But he was a man who
was crippled by his *rench upbringing. >is manner was too impassive. >e allowed
himself to be sold by the *rench on an erroneous instead of a valid evolutionary concept)
and this suited his own termperament. >e was too congenial) and he was almost
pathologically shy) which was one reason he always li.ed to wear dar. glasses. >e would
go through depressive cycles) and when he was depressed) he would dress himself in
4ietnamese clothes instead of @uropean ones) and would mince no words about the
*rench. >is policy) he said to me on one of these dour occasions) was one of
"grignotage)" or "nibbling)" and he was painfully aware of it. The *rench) of course) were
never happy that we #mericans had good relations with Bao ;ai) and they told him so.
Unfortunately) they also had some blac.mail on him) about his relationship with
gambling enterprises in Saigon and his love of the fleshpots.
"hatever his virtues) Bao ;ai was not a man who could earn the fealty of the
4ietnamese peasants. >e could not even hold the loyalty of honest nationalists) one of
whom) for eample) was ;r. Phan Kuang ;an$$a prominent and able non$<ommunist
leader and early supporter of the "solution)" and a personal friend of Bao ;ai$+;r. ;an
later was the opposition leader of the ;iem era1. ;r. ;an reported a touching
conversation with Bao ;ai=s mother in which she described her son at a loss to .now
whom to trust) and heartsic. at the atmosphere of hostility which surrounded him. Cet
;r. ;an resigned as Bao ;ai=s 8inister of !nformation over the @lysee #greement) and)
though he remained close to the @mperor) would not reassume public office for him. Bao
;ai himself furnished an apt description of his political philosophy which may eplain
why he failed to capture the hearts of either beleaguered farmers or serious political
leaders$$neither of whom could stomach "nibbling" when revolution was re?uired. Said
Bao ;ai3
To practice politics is li.e playing a game) and ! have always considered life a game.
.. The Pau 3egotiations& 1,.1
Cet Bao ;ai did wor. at pressing the *rench. *rench officials in fact complained to an
#merican writer that Bao ;ai spent too much of his time on such pursuits3
>e has concentrated too much on getting what he can from us instead of building up his
support among the people of the country . . . >istory will Dudge if he did right in putting
so much stress on that
*rom late :une) %&'() until the end of November) Bao ;ai stayed close to the series of
conferences in Pau) *rance) designed to arrange the transfer to the 4ietnamese of the
services of immigration) communications) foreign trade) customs) and finances. The issue
of the finance service was a particularly thorny one) involving as it did lucrative foreign
echange controls. "hile the *rench did eventually grant significant concessions to the
4ietnamese) /aotians) and <ambodians in each area discussed) they preserved "rights of
observation" and "intervention" in matters that "concerned the *rench Union as a whole."
!ndeed) the *rench assured themselves full access to government information) license to
participate in all government decisions) and little reduction in economic benefits.
Some *rench commentators viewed Pau as an unmitigated disaster and the assurance of
an early *rench demise in !ndochina. #s one writer put it3
By accepting the eventual restriction of trade within the *rench Union) by losing all
effective authority over the issuance of money) by renouncing control over foreign trade)
by permitting a system of controlled prices for eports and imports) we have given the
#ssociated States all the power they need if they wish to assure the ruin of our enterprises
and compel their withdrawal without in any way molesting our compatriots.
But a contemporary 4ietnamese critic too. a ?uite different view3
#ll these conventions conserve in !ndochina a privileged position for *rench capital)
supported by the presence of a powerful fleet and army. @ven if no one tal.s any more of
an !ndochinese *ederation) it is still a federalism both administrative and economic
+8onetary Union) <ustoms Union) <ommunications Union) etc.1 which co$ordinates the
various activities of the three #ssociated States. *rance always eercises control through
the representatives she has in all the organs of planning or of federal surveillance) and
through what is in effect the right of veto) because the president or the secretary general
of these committees is always elected by Doint decision of the four governments and)
further) because most of the decisions of the committees are made by unanimous
agreement.
Bao ;ai=s delegates were) however) generally pleased with the outcome of Pau. >is
Prime 8inister) Tran 4an >uu declared as he signed the conventions that
"our independence is now perfect." But to the ordinary 4ietnamese) to honest *renchmen)
and to the #mericans) Tran 4an >uu was proved dramatically
wrong.
5. 7.S. P6"!;< T6/#2DS 5#6 D#!
1. =ualified #ppro'al& 1,-$-1,.1
The "Bao ;ai solution" depended on #merican support. ;uring the %&'( negotiations in
Pau) *rance) Bao ;ai=s Prime 8inister Tran 4an >uu was called bac. to !ndochina by a
series of *rench military reverses in Ton.in. Tran 4an >uu sei2ed the occasion to appeal
to the United States "as the leading democratic nation)" and hoped that the U.S. would3
...bring pressure to bear on *rance in order to achieve democratic freedom. "e want the
right to decide our own affairs for ourselves.
Tran demanded the @lysee #greement be superseded by genuine autonomy for 4ietnam3
!t is not necessary for young men to die so that a *rench engineer can be director of the
port of Saigon. 8any people are dying every day because 4iet Nam is not given
independence. !f we had independence the people would have no more reason to fight.
Tran=s addressing the U.S. thus was realistic) if not Dudicious) for the U.S. had already
become involved in !ndochina as one part of a troubled triangle with *rance and Bao
;ai=s regime. !ndeed) there had been an #merican role in the "Bao ;ai solution" from its
inception. :ust before the >a /ong Bay #greements) the *rench initiative had received
some support from a ;ecember) %&5-) /ife maga2ine article by "illiam <. Bullitt)
former U.S. #mbassador to *rance. Bullitt argued for a policy aimed at ending "the
saddest war" by winning the maDority of 4ietnamese nationalists away from >o <hi 8inh
and from the <ommunists through a movement built around Bao ;ai. Bullitt=s views
were widely accepted in *rance as a statement of U.S. policy) and a direct endorsement)
and promise of U.S. aid) for Bao ;ai. Bao ;ai) whether he accepted the Bullitt canard or
not) seemed to sense that the U.S. would inevitably be drawn into Southeast #sia) and
apparently epected #merican involvement to be accompanied by U.S. pressure on
*rance on behalf of 4ietnamese nationalism. But the U.S.) though it appreciated *rance=s
dilemma) was reluctant initially to endorse the Bao ;ai solution until it became a reality.
The following State ;epartment messages indicate the U.S. position3
:uly %() %&5J +Paris 9,7% to State13
...*rance is faced with alternatives of une?uivocally and promptly approving principle
FofG 4iet independence within *rench union and FtheG union Fof theG three parts of
4ietnam or losing !ndochina.
:uly %5) %&5J +State 7,9- to Paris13
...Bnce FBay of >a /ongG #greement together with change in status FofG <ochinchina FisG
approved) ;epartment would be disposed FtoG consider lending its support to etent of
publicly approving *rench Government=s action as forward loo.ing step toward
settlement of troubled situation FinG !ndochina and toward reali2ation of aspirations
4ietnamese people. !t appears to ;epartment that above stated U.S. approval would
materially assist in strengthening hands of nationalists as opposed to communists in
!ndochina
#ugust 9() %&5J +State 99,J to Paris13
;epartment appreciates difficulties facing any *rench Government ta.ing decisive action
vis$a$vis !ndochina) but can only see steadily deteriorating situation unless Fthere isG more
positive approval FBay of >a /ongG #greement) enactment legislation or action
permitting change <ochinchina status) and immediate commencement formal
negotiations envisaged that #greement. ;epartment believes FthatG nothing should be left
undone which will strengthen truly nationalist groups FinG !ndochina and induce present
supporters Fof theG 4iet 8inh FtoG come to FtheG side FofG that group. No such inducement
possible unless that group can show concrete evidence FthatG *rench FareG prepared FtoG
implement promptly creation 4ietnamese free state Fwhich isG associated Fwith theG
*rench Union and with all attributes free state...
:anuary %-) %&5& +State %5' to Paris13
"hile ;epartment desirous *rench coming to terms with Bao ;ai or any truly nationalist
group which has reasonable chance winning over preponderance of 4ietnamese) we
cannot at this time irretrevably FsicG commit U.S. to support of native government which
by failing develop appeal among 4ietnamese might become virtually puppet government)
separated from people) and eisting only by presence *rench military forces...
The @lysee #greement too. place in 8arch) %&5&. #t this Duncture) the fall of <hina
obtruded) and the U.S. began to view the "Bao ;ai solution" with a greater sense of
urgency3
8ay %() %&5& +State -- to Saigon13
#ssumption . . . ;epartment desires FtheG success Bao ;ai eperiment entirely correct.
Since FthereG appears FtoG be no other alternative to FestablishedG <ommie pattern FinG
4ietnam) ;epartment considers no effort should be spared by *rance) other "estern
powers) and non$<ommie #sian nations to assure eperiment best chance succeeding.
#t proper time and under proper circumstances ;epartment will be prepared FtoG do its
part by etending recognition Fto theG Bao ;ai Government and by eploring FtheG
possibility of complying with any re?uest by such a Government for U.S. arms and
economic assistance. F!tG must be understood) however) FthatG aid program this nature
would re?uire <ongressional approval. Since U.S. could scarcely afford bac.ing FaG
government which would have color FofG) and be li.ely Fto suffer theG fate of) FaG puppet
regime) it must first be clear that *rance will offer all necessary concessions to ma.e Bao
;ai solution attractive to nationalists.
This is FaG step of which *rench themselves must see urgency FandG necessity FinG view
possibly short time remaining before <ommie successes FinG <hina are felt FinG
!ndochina. 8oreover) Bao ;ai Government must through own efforts demonstrate
capacity FtoG organi2e and conduct affairs wisely so as to ensure maimum opportunity of
obtaining re?uisite popular support) inasmuch as FanyG government created in !ndochina
analogous Fto theG Auomintang would be foredoomed failure.
#ssuming essential *rench concessions are forthcoming) best chance FofG success FforG
Bao ;ai would appear to be in persuading 4ietnamese nationalists3
+%1 their patriotic aims may be reali2ed promptly through *rench$ Bao ;ai agreement
+71 Bao ;ai government will be truly representative even to the etent of including
outstanding non$<ommie leaders now supporting >o) and
+91 Bao ;ai solution Fis theG only means FofG safeguarding 4ietnam from aggressive
designs Fof theG <ommie <hinese.
Through %&5&) the southward march of 8ao=s legions continued) and the 4iet 8inh were
obviously preparing to establish relations with them.
8. 2eognition& 1,.1
The @lysee #greements were eleven months old before the U.S. considered that *rance
had ta.en the concrete steps toward 4ietnamese autonomy which the U.S. had set as
conditions for recogni2ing Bao ;ai. !n late :anuary) %&'() events moved swiftly. >o <hi
8inh announced that his was the "only legal government of the 4ietnam people" and
indicated ;04 willingness to cooperate with any nation willing to recogni2e it on the
basis of "e?uality and mutual respect of national sovereignty and territory." 8ao
responded promptly with recognition) followed by Stalin. !n *rance there was an
acrimonious debate in the National #ssembly between leftist advocates of immediate
truce with the 4iet 8inh and government supporters of the @lysee #greement to proceed
with the Bao ;ai solution. 0enV Pleven) 8inister of National ;efense) declared that3
!t is necessary that the *rench people .now that at the present time the only true enemy of
peace in 4iet Nam is the <ommunist Party. Because members of the <ommunist Party
.now that peace in !ndochina will be established by the policy of independence that we
are following.
+"Peace with 4iet NamS Peace with 4iet NamS" shouted the <ommunists.1
:ean /etourneau arose to assert that3
!t is not at all a ?uestion of approving or disapproving a government6 we are very far
beyond the transitory life of a government in an affair of this gravity. !t is necessary that)
on the international level) the vote that ta.es place tonight reveals truly the maDor
importance that this event should have in the eyes of the entire world.
*rVdVric ;upont said3
The !ndochina war has always been a test of the *rench Union before international
<ommunism. But since the arrival of the <hinese <ommunists on the frontier of Ton.in)
!ndochina has become the frontier of "estern civili2ation and the war in !ndochina is
integrated into the cold war.
Premier Georges Bidault was the last spea.er3
The choice is simple. 8oreover there is no choice.
The National #ssembly vote on :anuary 7&) %&'() was 9&, to %&9. *rom the etreme left
there were cries of ";own with the warS" and Paul <oste$*loret replied3 "/ong live
peace." Bn *ebruary 7) %&'() *rance=s formal ratification of the independence of 4ietnam
was announced.
The U.S. assessment of the situation) and its action) is indicated in the following3
;@P#0T8@NT B* ST#T@
"ashington
*ebruary 7) %&'(
8@8B0#N;U8 *B0 T>@ P0@S!;@NT
SubDect3 U.S. 0ecognition of 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia
%. The *rench #ssembly +/ower >ouse1 ratified on 7& :anuary by a large maDority +9&, $
%&91 the bill which) in effect) established 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia as autonomous
states within the *rench Union. The opposition consisted of %J% <ommunist votes with
only %7 Doining in from other parties. The <ouncil of the 0epublic +Senate1 is epected to
pass the bills by the same approimate maDority on or about *ebruary 9. President
#uriol=s signature is epected to follow shortly thereafter.
7. The *rench legislative and political steps thus ta.en will transform areas which were
formerly governed as Protectorates or <olonies into states within the *rench Union) with
considerably more freedom than they enDoyed under their prior status. The *rench
Government has indicated that it hopes to grant greater degrees of independence to the
three states as the security position in !ndochina allows) and as the newly formed
governments become more able to administer the areas following withdrawal of the
*rench.
9. "ithin /aos and <ambodia there are no powerful movements directed against the
governments which are relatively stable. >owever) 4ietnam has been the battleground
since the end of "orld "ar !! of conflicting political parties and military forces. >o <hi
8inh) who under various aliases) has been a communist agent in various parts of the
world since %&7' and was able to ta.e over the anti$*rench nationalist movement in
%&5'. #fter failing to reach agreement with the *rench regarding the establishment of an
autonomous state of 4ietnam) he withdrew his forces to the Dungle and hill areas of
4ietnam and has harassed the *rench ever since. >is followers who are estimated at
approimately -')((( armed men) with probably the same number unarmed. >is
head?uarters are un.nown.
The *rench counter efforts have included) on the military side) the deployment of
approimately %9()((( troops) of whom the approimately '()((( are local natives
serving voluntarily) #frican colonials) and a hard core made up of *rench troops and
*oreign /egion units. >o <hi 8inh=s guerrilla tactics have been aimed at denying the
*rench control of 4ietnam. Bn 8arch J) %&5& the *rench President signed an agreement
with Bao ;ai as the >ead of State) granting independence within the *rench Union to the
Government of 4ietnam. Similar agreements were signed with the Aing of /aos and the
Aing of <ambodia.
0ecent developments have included <hinese <ommunist victories bringing those troops
to the !ndochina border6 recognition of >o <hi 8inh as the head of the legal Government
of 4ietnam by <ommunist <hina +%J :anuary1 and by Soviet 0ussia +9( :anuary1.
5. 0ecognition by the United States of the three legally constituted governments of
4ietnam) /aos= and <ambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States
foreign policy for several reasons. #mong them are3 encouragement to national
aspirations under non$<ommunist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast
#sia6 the establishment of stable non$<ommunist governments in areas adDacent to
<ommunist <hina6 support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North
#tlantic Treaty6 and as a demonstration of displeasure with <ommunist tactics which are
obviously aimed at eventual domination of #sia) wor.ing under the guise of indigenous
nationalism.
SubDect to your approval) the ;epartment of State recommends that the United States of
#merica etend recognition to 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia) following ratification by
the *rench Government.
+signed1 ;@#N #<>@SBN
#pproved
+signed1
>arry S. Truman
*ebruary 9) %&'(
3. 7.S. #id to !ndohina
Bn *ebruary %,) %&'() *rance re?uested U.S. military and economic assistance in
prosecuting the !ndochina "ar. The Secretary of ;efense in a 8emorandum for the
President on 8arch , stated that3
The choice confronting the United States is to support the legal governments in !ndochina
or to face the etension of <ommunism over the remainder of the continental area of
Southeast #sia and possibly westward...
The same month) the State ;epartment dispatched an aid survey mission under 0. #llen
Griffin to !ndochina +and to Burma) !ndonesia) Thailand) and 8alaya1. The Griffin
8ission proposed +inter alia1 aid for the Bao ;ai government) since the State of 4ietnam
was considered3
...not secure against internal subversion) political infiltration) or military aggression.
The obDective of each program is to assist as much as possible in building strength) and in
so doing . . . to assure the several peoples that support of their governments and
resistance to communist subversion will bring them direct and tangible benefits and well$
founded hope for an increase in living standards. #ccordingly) the programs are of two
main types3 +%1 technical and material aid to essential services and +71 economic
rehabilitation and development) focused primarily on the provision of technical assistance
and material aid in developing agricultural and industrial output. . . . These activities are
to be carried on in a way best calculated to demonstrate that the local national
governments are able to bring benefits to their own people and thereby build political
support) especially among the rural population...
The aims of economic assistance to Southeast #sia . . . are to reinforce the non$
<ommunist national governments in that region by ?uic.ly strengthening and epanding
the economic life of the area) improve the conditions under which its people live) and
demonstrate concretely the genuine interest of the United States in the welfare of the
people of Southeast #sia.
!n a strategic assessment of Southeast #sia in #pril) %&'() the :<S recommended military
assistance for !ndochina) provided3
...that United States military aid not be granted unconditionally6 rather that it be carefully
controlled and that the aid program be integrated with political and economic programs . .
. F;oc. 9G
Bn 8ay %) %&'() President Truman approved Q%( million for urgently needed military
assistance items for !ndochina. The President=s decision was ta.en in the contet of the
successful amphibious invasion of Nationalist$defended >ainan by a <ommunist <hinese
army under General /in Piao$with obvious implications for !ndochina) and for Taiwan.
Bne wee. later) on 8ay J) the Secretary of State announced U.S. aid for "the #ssociated
States of !ndochina and to *rance in order to assist them in restoring stability and
permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development." Siteen
days later) Bao ;ai=s government and *rance were notified on 8ay 75 of the U.S.
intention to establish an economic aid mission to the #ssociated States. F;oc. ,G #s the
North Aorean #rmy moved southward on :une 7-) %&'() President Truman announced
that he had directed "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of
*rance and the #ssociated States in !ndochina . . ." F;oc. JG
The crucial issue presented by the #merican decision to provide aid to !ndochina was
who should be the recipient$BWo ;ai or *rance$and) hence) whose policies would U.S.
aid supportN
-. Frenh !ntransigene
"hile the U.S. was deliberating over whether to provide economic and military
assistance to !ndochina in early %&'() negotiations opened at Pau) *rance) among *rance
and the #ssociated States to set the timing and etent of granting autonomy. >ad these
tal.s led to genuine independence for Bao ;ai=s regime) the subse?uent U.S.$*rench
relationship would probably have been much less comple and significantly less acerbic.
#s it was) however) the Pau accords led to little more independence than had the >a /ong
Bay or @lysee #greements. 8oreover) *rance=s reluctance to yield political or economic
authority to Bao ;ai was reinforced by its proclivity to field strong$willed commanders)
suspicious of the U.S.) determined on a military victory) and scornful of the Bao ;ai
solution. General 8arcel <arpentier) <ommander in <hief when the *rench applied for
aid) was ?uoted in the 3e4 <or0 Times on 8arch &) %&'() as follows3
! will never agree to e?uipment being given directly to the 4ietnamese. !f this should be
done ! would resign within twenty$four hours. The 4ietnamese have no generals) no
colonels) no military organi2ation that could effectively utili2e the e?uipment. !t would be
wasted) and in <hina) the United States has had enough of that.
a. 1,.1-1,.1> De "attre and ?Dynamisme?
<arpentier=s successor) >igh <ommissioner$<ommander in <hief General :ean de /attre
de Tassigny) arrived in ;ecember) %&'() following the severe setbac. of the autumn. ;e
/attre electrified the discouraged *rench forces li.e General 0idgway later enheartened
U.S. forces in Aorea. ;e /attre saw himself as leading an anti$communist crusade. >e
calculated that he could win a decisive victory within fifteen months in 4ietnam) and
"save it from Pe.ing and 8oscow." >e deprecated the idea that the *rench were still
motivated by colonialism) and even told one U.S. newsman that *rance fought for the
"est alone3
"e have no more interest here . . . "e have abandoned all our colonial positions
completely. There is little rubber or coal or rice we can any longer obtain. #nd what does
it amount to compared to the blood of our sons we are losing and the three hundred and
fifty million francs we spend a day in !ndochinaN The wor. we are doing is for the
salvation of the 4ietnamese people. #nd the propaganda you #mericans ma.e that we
are still colonialists is doing us tremendous harm) all of us$the 4ietnamese) yourselves)
and us.
8oreover) ;e /attre was convinced that the 4ietnamese had to be brought into the fight.
!n a speech$$"# <all to 4ietnamese Couth"$$he declared3
This war) whether you li.e it or not) is the war of 4ietnam for 4ietnam. #nd *rance will
carry it on for you only if you carry it on with her...
<ertain people pretend that 4ietnam cannot be independent because it is part of the
*rench Union. Not trueS !n our universe) and especially in our world of today) there can
be no nations absolutely independent. There are only fruitful interdependencies and
harmful dependencies. . . . Coung men of 4ietnam) to whom ! feel as close as ! do to the
youth of my native land) the moment has come for you to defend your country.
Cet) General ;e /attre regarded U.S. policy vis$a$vis Bao ;ai with grave misgivings.
#mericans) he held) afflicted with "missionary 2eal)" were "fanning the fires of etreme
nationalism . . . *rench traditionalism is vital here. Cou cannot) you must not destroy it.
No one can simply ma.e a new nation overnight by giving out economic aid and arms
alone." #s adamantly as <arpentier) ;e /attre opposed direct U.S. aid for 4ietnamese
forces) and allowed the 4ietnamese military little real independence.
@dmund #. Gullion) U.S. 8inister <ounselor in Saigon from %&'( on) faulted ;e /attre
on his inability to stimulate in the 4ietnamese National #rmy either the elan vital or
dynamisme he communicated to the rest of the *rench @peditionary <orps3
...!t remained difficult to inculcate nationalist ardor in a native army whose officers and
non$corns were primarily white *renchmen . . . The 4ietnamese units that went into
action were rarely unsupported by the *rench. #merican contact with them was mainly
through the *rench) who retained eclusive responsibility for their training. "e felt we
needed much more documentation than we had to assess the army=s true potential. "e
needed battalion$by$battalion reports on the performance of the 4ietnamese in training as
well as in battle and a close contact with intelligence and command echelons) and we
never got this. Perhaps the most significant and saddest manifestation of the *rench
failure to create a really independent 4ietnamese #rmy that would fight in the way de
/attre meant was the absence) at ;ienbienphu) of any 4ietnamese fighting elements. !t
was a *rench show.
Gullion is not altogether correct with respect to ;ien Bien Phu6 nonetheless) statistics on
the ethnic composition of the defending garrison do reveal the nature of the problem. The
'th 4ietnamese Parachute Battalion was dropped to reinforce the garrison so that as of
8ay ,) %&'5) the troops at ;ien Bien Phu included3
:#22!S63 6F D!E3 5!E3 P)7
6ffiers 3;6(s EM(s Totals
4ietnamese %% 7-( ')%%& ')5J(
Total 9&9 %),,, %9)(7, %')%('
4iet O of
Total
7.J %,.7 9&.7 9,.7

Thus) the 4ietnamese comprised more than a third of the fighting forces +and nearly 5(O
of the enlisted troops16 but among the leaders) they provided one$sith of the non$
commissioned officers and less than 9O of the officers.
The paucity of 4iet officers at ;ien Bien Phu reflected the general condition of the
National #rmy3 as of %&'9) there were 7),(( native officers) of whom only a handful held
ran. above maDor) compared to -)((( *rench officers in a force of %'()((( 4ietnamese
troops.
@. 1,.1-1,.3> "etourneau and ?Ditatorship?
;e /attre=s successor as >igh <ommissioner) :ean /etourneau) was also the *rench
<abinet 8inister for the #ssociated States. /etourneau was sent to !ndochina to assume
the same power and privilege in the "independent" State of 4ietnam that any of *rance=s
Governor Generals had ever eercised from Saigon=s Norodom Palace. !n 8ay) %&'9) a
*rench Parliamentary 8ission of !n?uiry accused the 8inister$>igh <ommissioner of
"veritable dictatorship) without limitation or control"3
The artificial life of Saigon) the temptations of power without control) the security of a
Dudgment which disdains realities) have isolated the 8inister and his entourage and have
made them insensible to the daily tragedy of the war...
!t is no longer up to us to govern) but to advise. The big thing was not to draw up plans
irresponsibly) but to carry on daily a subtle diplomacy. !n Saigon our representatives have
allowed themselves to be inveigled into the tempting game of power and intrigue.
!nstead of seeing the most important things and acting on them) instead of ma.ing on the
spot investigations) of loo.ing for inspiration in the village and in the ricefield) instead of
informing themselves and winning the confidence of the most humble people) in order to
deprive the rebels of their best weapon) the Norodom Palace cli?ue has allowed itself the
luury of administering a la francaise and of reigning over a country where revolution is
smouldering...
The press has not the right of criticism. To tell the truth) it has become official) and the
principal newspaper in Saigon is at the disposition of the >igh <ommissariat. /etters are
censored. Propaganda seems to be issued Dust to defend the >igh <ommissariat. Such a
regime cannot last) unless we are to appear as people who are determined not to .eep
their promises.
The Parliamentary 8ission described Saigon3 "where gambling) depravity) love of money
and of power finish by corrupting the morale and destroying willpower . . ."6 and the
4ietnamese government3 "The 8inisters Fof the Bao ;ai regimeG appear in the eyes of
their compatriots to be *rench officials . . ." The report did not hesitate to blame the
*rench for 4ietnamese corruption3
!t is grave that after eight years of laisser-aller and of anarchy) the presence in !ndochina
of a resident 8inister has not been able to put an end to these daily scandals in the life in
regard to the granting of licenses) the transfer of piastres) war damages) or commercial
transactions. @ven if our administration is not entirely responsible for these abuses) it is
deplorable that one can affirm that it either ignores them or tolerates them.
<ommenting on this report) an influential *rench editor blamed the "natural tendency of
the military proconsulate to perpetuate itself" and "certain *rench political groups who
have found in the war a principal source of their revenues...through echange operations)
supplies to the epeditionary corps and war damages . . . >e concluded that3
The generally accepted theory is that the prolongation of the war in !ndochina is a fatality
imposed by events) one of those dramas in history which has no solution. The theory of
the s.eptics is that the impotence or the errors of the men responsible for our policy in
!ndochina have prevented us from finding a way out of this catastrophic enterprise. The
truth is that the facts now .nown seem to add up to a lucid plan wor.ed out step by step
to eliminate any possibility of negotiation in !ndochina in order to assure the prolongation
without limit of the hostilities and of the military occupation.
.. 5ao Dai& #ttentiste
;espite U.S. recognition of the grave imperfections of the *rench administration in
4ietnam) the U.S. was constrained to deal with the !ndochina situation through *rance
both by the overriding importance of its @uropean policy and by the impotence and
ineptitude of the Bao ;ai regime. The U.S. attempted to persuade Bao ;ai to eercise
more vigorous leadership) but the @mperor chose differently. *or eample) immediately
after the Pau negotiations) the ;epartment of State sent these instructions to @dmund
Gullion3
BUTGB!NG T@/@G0#8
;@P#0T8@NT B* ST#T@
B<T %J %&'(
P2!62!T<
#8/@G#T!BN
S#!GBN
9J5
;@PT wishes to have *B/ 8SG delivered to Bao ;ai personally by 8!N !88@; after
<hief of State=s arrival in Saigon. !t S>/; be delivered informally
without submission written tet with sufficient emphasis to leave no doubt in @mperor=s
mind that it represents ;@PTS studied opinion in matter now receiving
#TTN highest auths US GB4T. Begin 8SG3
Bao ;ai will arrive in Saigon at moment when 4ietnam is facing grave crisis outcome of
which may decide whether country will be permitted develop independence status or pass
in near future to one of Sino$Soviet dominated satellite) a new form of colony
immeasurably worse than the old from which 4ietnam has so recently separated herself.
The US GB4T is at present moment ta.ing steps to increase the #8T of aid to *0 Union
and #SSB< States in their effort to defend the territorial integrity of !< and prevent the
incorporation of the #SSB< States within the <B88!@$dominated bloc of slave states
but even the resources of US are strained by our present UN commitments in Aorea) the
need for aid in the defense of "estern @urope and our own rearmament program. "e
sometimes find it impossible to furnish aid as we "/; wish in a given #8T at a given
time and in a given place.
/eadership of 4ietnam GB4T during this crucial period is a factor of preponderant
importance in deciding ultimate outcome. GB4T must display unusually aggressive
leadership and courage before a discouraged people) distraught and floundering in the
wa.e of years of civil war. /esser considerations concern$
ing the modalities of relations between the States of the *0 Union and the 0@P of *0
must) for instance) be at least temporarily laid aside in face of serious threat to very
eistence of 4ietnam as autonomous state) within *0 Union or otherwise.
"e are aware +as in Bao ;ai1 that present 4ietnamese GB4T is so lin.ed with person of
<hief of State that leadership and eample provided by latter ta.es on etraordinary
importance in determining degree of efficiency in functioning of GB4T. Through
circumstances of absence in *0 of Bao ;ai and other 4ietnamese leaders for prolonged
period) opportunity for progress in assumption of responsibilities from *0 and etension
authority and influence of GB4T with people was neglected. 8any people) including
great number #8@0S) have been unable understand reasons for @mperor=s GT@
prolonged holiday UNKT@ on 0iviera and have misinterpreted it as an indication of lac.
of patriotic attachment to his role of <hief of State. ;@PT is at least of opinion that his
absence did not enhance the authority and prestige of his GB4T at home.
Therefore) ;@PT considers it imperative Bao ;ai give 4ietnamese people evidence his
determination personally ta.e up reins of state and lead his country into !88@; and
energetic opposition <B88!@ menace. Specifically he S>/; embar. upon !88@;
program of visits to all parts 4ietnam ma.ing numerous speeches and public appearances
in the process. <hief of State S>/; declare his determination plunge into Dob of rallying
people to support of GB4T and opposition to 48 !88@; upon arrival Saigon. >e
S>/; announce US) *0 support for formation N#T/ armies and his own intention
assume role <ommander in <hief. >e S>/; ta.e full advantage of *0 official
declaration of intention to form N#T/ armies +confirmed yesterday by 8!N #SS< States
/etourneau1 and set up precise plan for such formation !88@;.
*inally) it S>/; be tactfully suggested that any further display procrastination in facing
realities in the form prolonged periods of seclusion at ;alat or otherwise "/; confirm
impressions of those not as convinced of @mperor=s seriousness of purpose as ;@PT and
/@G are and raise ?uestions of the wisdom of continuing to support a 4ietnamese GB4T
which proves itself incapable of eercising the autonomy ac?uired by it at such a high
price. @nd of 8SG.
@ndeavor obtain private interview soonest possible after arrival for ;@PT regards timing
as of prime importance. Simultaneously or !88@; *B/ inform /etourneau and Pignon
of action. Saigon advise Paris in advance to synchroni2e informing *BNB**
#<>@SBN
"hatever Bao ;ai=s response$$probably polite and obscure$$he did not act on the U.S.
advice. >e subse?uently told ;r. Phan Kuang ;an) aboard his imperial yacht) that his
successive governments had been of little use) and added that it would be dangerous to
epand the 4ietnamese #rmy because it might defect en masse and go to the 4iet 8inh3
! could not inspire the troops with the necessary enthusiasm and fighting spirit) nor could
Prime 8inister >uu . . . @ven if we had an able man) the present political conditions
would ma.e it impossible for him to convince the people and the troops that they have
something worth while to fight for...
;r. ;an agreed that the effectiveness of the National #rmy was a central issue6 he
pointed out that there were but three 4iet generals) non of whom had ever held
operational command) and neither they nor the 7( colonels or lieutenant colonels could
eercise initiative of any sort. ;r. ;an held that3 "The 4ietnamese #rmy is without
responsible 4ietnamese leaders) without ideology) without obDective) without enthusiasm)
without fighting spirit) and without popular bac.ing." But it was very clear that Bao ;ai
did not propose to alter the conditions of his army ecept by the long) slow process of
"nibbling" at *rench military prerogative. Bn other vital issues Bao ;ai was no more
aggressive. *or all practical purposes) the @mperor) in his own fashion) li.e ;r. ;an and
Ngo ;inh ;iem) assumed the posture of the attentiste$$a spectator as the *rench and
#mericans tested their strength against each other) and against the 4iet 8inh.
A. The #merian Prediament
#mong the #merican leaders who understood the vacuity of the Bao ;ai solution) and
recogni2ed the pitfalls in *rench intransigence on genuine independence was the then
Senator :ohn *. Aennedy. Aennedy visited 4ietnam in %&'% and evidently weighed
Gullion=s views heavily. !n November) %&'%) Aennedy declared that3
!n !ndochina we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of the *rench regime to hang
on to the remnants of an empire. There is no broad general support of the native 4ietnam
Government among the people of that area.
!n a speech to the U.S. Senate in :une) %&'9) he pointed out that3
Genuine independence as we understand it is lac.ing in !ndochina local government is
circumscribed in its functions . . . the government of 4ietnam) the state which is of the
greatest importance in this area) lac.s popular support) that the degree of military) civil)
political) and economic control maintained by the *rench goes well beyond what is
necessary to fight a war . . . !t is because we want the war to be brought to a successful
conclusion that we should insist on genuine independence . . . 0egardless of our united
effort) it is a truism that the war can never be successful unless large numbers of the
people of 4ietnam are won over from their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and
fully support its successful conclusion
...! strongly believe that the *rench cannot succeed in !ndochina without giving
concessions necessary to ma.e the native army a reliable and crusading force.
/ater) Aennedy critici2ed the *rench3
@very year we are given three sets of assurances3 first) that the independence of the
#ssociated States is now complete6 second) that the independence of the #ssociated
States will soon be completed under steps "now" being ta.en6 and third) that military
victory for the *rench Union forces is assured) or is Dust around the corner.
#nother #merican .nowledgeable concerning the U.S.$*rench difficulties and with the
Bao ;ai solution was 0obert Blum) who headed the economic aid program etended to
the Bao ;ai regime in %&'(. General ;e /attre viewed U.S. economic aid as especially
pernicious) and told Blum that3 "8r. Blum) you are the most dangerous man in
!ndochina." ;e /attre resented the #merican intrusion. "#s a student of history) ! can
understand it) but as a *renchman ! don=t li.e it." !n %&'7) Blum analy2ed the Bao ;ai$
*rench$#merican triangle as follows3
The attitude of the *rench is difficult to define. Bn the one hand are the repeated official
affirmations that *rance has no selfish interests in !ndochina and desires only to promote
the independence of the #ssociated States and be relieved of the terrible drain of *rance=s
resources. Bn the other hand are the numerous eamples of the deliberate continuation of
*rench controls) the interference in maDor policy matters) the profiteering and the constant
bic.ering and ill$feeling over the transfer of powers and the issues of independence . . .
There is un?uestionably a contradiction in *rench actions between the natural desire to be
rid of this unpopular) costly and apparently fruitless war and the determination to see it
through with honor while satisfying *rench pride and defending interests in the process.
This distinction is typified by the sharp difference between the attitude toward General de
/attre in !ndochina) where he is heralded as the political genius and military savior . . .
and in *rance) where he is suspected as a person who for personal glory is drawing off
*rance=s resources on a perilous adventure...
!t is difficult to measure what have been the results of almost two years of active
#merican participation in the affairs of !ndochina. #lthough we embar.ed upon a course
of uneasy association with the "colonialist"$tainted but indispensable *rench) on the one
hand) and the indigenous) wea. and divided 4ietnamese) on the other hand) we have not
been able fully to reconcile these two allies in the interest of a single$minded fight against
<ommunism. Bf the purposes which we hoped to serve by our actions in !ndochina) the
one that has been most successful has been the strengthening of the *rench military
position. Bn the other hand) the 4ietnamese) many of whom thought that magical
solutions to their advantage would result from our appearance on the scene) are chastened
but disappointed at the evidence that #merica is not omnipotent and not prepared to ma.e
an undiluted effort to support their point of view . . . Bur direct influence on political and
economic matters has not been great. "e have been reluctant to become directly
embroiled and) though the degree of our contribution has been steadily increasing) we
have been content) if not eager) to have the *rench continue to have primary
responsibility) and to give little) if any) advice.
Blum concluded that3
The situation in !ndochina is not satisfactory and shows no substantial prospect of
improving) that no decisive military victory can be achieved) that the Bao ;ai
government gives little promise of developing competence and winning the loyalty of the
population . . . and that the attainment of #merican obDectives is remote.
Shortly before his death in %&,') Blum held that a clash of *rench and U.S. interests was
inevitable3
"e wanted to strengthen the ability of the *rench to protect the area against <ommunist
infiltration and invasion) and we wanted to capture the nationalist movement from the
<ommunists by encouraging the national aspirations of the local populations and
increasing popular support of their governments. "e .new that the *rench were
unpopular) that the war that had been going on since %&5, was not only a nationalist
revolt against them but was an eample of the awa.ening self$consciousness of the
peoples of #sia who were trying to brea. loose from domination by the "estern world.
"e recogni2ed right away that two$pronged policy was beset with great difficulties.
Because of the prevailing anti$*rench feeling) we .new that any bolstering by us of the
*rench position would be resented by the local people. #nd because of the traditional
*rench position) and *rench sensitivity at seeing any increase of #merican influence) we
.now they would loo. with suspicion upon the development of direct #merican relations
with local administrations and peoples. Nevertheless) we were determined that our aid
program would not be used as a means of forcing co$ordination upon unwilling
governments) and we were e?ually determined that our emphasis would be on types of
aid that would appeal to the masses of the population and not on aid that) while
economically more sophisticated) would be less readily understood. Burs was a political
program that wor.ed with the people and it would obviously have lost most of its
effectiveness if it had been reduced to a role of *rench$protected anonymity . . . FThe
program wasG greatly handicapped and its beneficial psychological results were largely
negated because the United States at the same time was pursuing a program of FmilitaryG
support to the *rench . . . on balance) we came to be loo.ed upon more as a supporter of
colonialism than as a friend of the new nation.
!n %&,') @dmund Gullion) who was also very close to the Bao ;ai problem) too. this
retrospect3
"e really should have pushed the *rench right after the @lysee agreements of 8arch)
%&5&. "e did not consider the echange of letters carefully enough at the time. !t was
understandable. "e obviously felt it was going to be a continuing process) and we hoped
to be able to have some influence over it. But then we got involved in Aorea) and since
the *rench were in trouble in !ndochina) we pulled our punches . . . The *rench could
have said une?uivocally) as we did with regard to the Philippines) that in such$and$such a
number of years 4ietnam would be totally free) and that it could thereupon Doin the
*rench Union or stay out) as it desired . . . #n evolutionary solution was the obvious one)
and it should have been confronted openly and honestly without all the impossible)
protracted preliminary negotiations involving efforts to bring the three #ssociated States
together) to get them to agree among each other) and with *rance) separately and
collectively. The *rench) in arguing against any .ind of bilateral agreements) claimed that
their attempt at federation in !ndochina was li.e our effort to build some sort of federated
system in @urope. But their involvement and interest in !ndochina was obviously
different) and they used the formula they devised to avoid any real agreement on
4ietnam. The problem grew more comple as the military and political aspects of the
situation became unavoidably tied together) and the Aorean "ar) of course) complicated
it further. *rom the outset) the *rench sought to regard the war in Aorea and the war in
!ndochina as related parts of one big fight against <ommunism) but it wasn=t that simple.
#ctually) what the Aorean "ar did do was ma.e it more difficult for us to urge an
evolutionary settlement in 4ietnam. By %&'%) it may have been too late for us to do
anything about this) but we could still have tried much harder than we did. The trouble
was the world by then had begun to close in on us. The @.;.<. formula in @urope was
being reDected by the *rench) Dust as in %&,' they were reDecting the North #tlantic Treaty
Brgani2ation concept. Bur degree of leverage was being drastically reduced.
>ad Bao ;ai been willing or capable of more effective leadership) the U.S. role in the
war might not have fallen into what @dmund Gullion called the "pattern of prediction and
disappointment"3
!t can be timed almost to the month to coincide with the rainy season and the campaign
season. Thus) in 8ay or :une) we usually get *rench estimates of success in the coming
campaign season) based partly on an assessment of losses the 4ietminh are supposed to
have suffered in the preceding fall) which are typically claimed as the bright spot in an
otherwise gloomy fighting season. The new set of estimates soon proves e?ually
disappointing6 by Bctober) *rench Union troops are found bottled up in mountain defiles
far from their bases . . . There are rumblings about late or lac.ing #merican aid and lac.
of #merican understanding. Some time around the first of the new year) special high$
level United States$*rench conferences are called. "e as. some ?uestions about the
military situation but only a few about the political situation. There is widespread
speculation that the *rench may pull out of !ndochina if we press them for eplanations
of their political and economic program. "e promise the *rench more aid. The *rench
ma.e a stand3 they claim great casualties inflicted on the enemy. They give us new
estimates for the following campaign season$and the round begins once more.
!n that blea. pattern) Bao ;ai played only a passive role6 the "Bao ;ai solution"
ultimately solved nothing. The outcome rested rather on *rance=s military struggle with
the 4iet 8inh) and its contest of leverage with the United States.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 7) "U.S. !nvolvement in the *ranco$4iet 8inh "ar) %&'($%&'5"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. -'$%(-
!!. /@4@0#G@3 *0#N<@ >#; 8B0@ T>#N T>@ UN!T@; ST#T@S
!t is sometimes asserted that *rance could not have continued the war in !ndochina
without #merican aid) but that the United States failed to use its considerable leverage on
the *rench to force them to ta.e more positive steps towards granting complete
independence to the #ssociated States. #n eamination of *ranco$#merican relations
between %&'($%&'5 suggests) however) that #merican leverage was severely limited and
that) given the primacy accorded in U.S. policy to the containment of communism in
Southeast #sia) *rench leverage on the United States was the stronger of the two.
#. #8@0!<#N /@4@0#G@ BN *0#N<@
%. N#TB and 8arshall Plan
!n the first postwar decade) *rance was relatively wea. and depended upon the United
States through N#TB and the 8arshall Plan for its military security
and economic revival. But neither N#TB nor the 8arshall Plan offered usable fulcrums
for influencing *rench policy on !ndochina. Both were Dudged by the U.S. Government
and public to be strongly in the #merican national interest at a time when the Soviet
threat to "estern @urope) either through overt aggression or internal subversion) was
clearly recogni2able. # communist ta.e$over in *rance was a real possibility. +The
*rench <ommunist Party was the largest political party in the nation) and) at the time)
?uite militant in character.1 Thus) an #merican threat to withdraw military and economic
support to metropolitan *rance if it did not alter its policies in !ndochina was not
plausible. To threaten *rance with sanctions in N#TB or through the 8arshall Plan
would have Deopardi2ed a U.S. interest in @urope more important than any in !ndochina.
7. 8ilitary #ssistance Program
The chief remaining source of influence was the military assistance program to the
*rench in !ndochina. #nnounced by President Truman on 8ay J) %&'() in response to an
urgent *rench re?uest of *ebruary %,) %&'() for military and economic assistance) the
purpose of the aid was to help the *rench in the prosecution of the war against the 4iet
8inh. The #merican #mbassador in Paris was called to the Kuay d=Brsay) following a
determination by the *rench Government that "it should set forth to the United States
Government fully and fran.ly the etreme gravity of the situation in !ndochina from
*rench point of view as a result of recent developments and the epectation that at least
increased military aid will be furnished to >o <hi 8inh from <ommunist <hina." >e was
told3
...that the effort in !ndochina was such a drain on *rance that a long$term program of
assistance was necessary and it was only from the United States that it could come.
Btherwise . . . it was very li.ely that *rance might be forced to reconsider her entire
policy with the possible view to cutting her losses and withdrawing from !ndochina . . .
loo.ing into the future it was obvious . . . that *rance could not continue indefinitely to
bear this burden alone if the epected developments in regard to increased assistance to
>o <hi 8inh came about...
#lthough the decision to etend aid to the *rench military effort in !ndochina was ta.en
before the outbrea. of the Aorean "ar) it clearly was heavily influenced by the fall of
Nationalist <hina and the arrival of <ommunist <hinese troops on the !ndochina border
in ;ecember) %&5&. The >o <hi 8inh regime was recogni2ed as the legal government of
4ietnam by the <hinese <ommunists on :anuary %J) %&'() and twelve days later the
Soviet Government similarly announced its recognition. The NS< was thereupon as.ed
"to underta.e a determination of all practicable United States measures to protect its
security in !ndochina and to prevent the epansion of communist aggression. in that
area." !n NS< ,5 +*ebruary 7-) %&'(1 it concluded that3
!t is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be ta.en to
prevent further communist epansion in Southeast #sia. !ndochina is a .ey area of
Southeast #sia and is under immediate threat.
The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be epected to fall under
<ommunist domination if !ndochina were controlled by a
<ommunist$dominated government. The balance of Southeast #sia would then be in
grave ha2ard. F;oc. %G
The :oint <hiefs of Staff) referring on #pril ') %&'() to intelligence estimates indicating
that the situation in Southeast #sia had deteriorated) noted that "without United States
assistance) this deterioration will be accelerated." Therefore) the rationale for the decision
to aid the *rench was to avert !ndochina=s sliding into the communist camp) rather than
aid for *rance as a colonial power or a fellow N#TB ally.
U.S. assistance) which began modestly with Q%( million in %&'() reached Q%)(,9 million
in fiscal year %&'5) at which time it accounted for -JO of the cost of the *rench war
burden. The maDor portion of the increase came in the last year of the war) following the
presentation in %&'9 of the Navarre Plan) which called for the enlargement of *ranco$
4ietnamese forces and a dynamic strategy to recapture the initiative and pave the way for
victory by %&''. The optimistic endorsement of the Navarre Plan by /t. General :ohn ".
B=;aniel) head of the 8##G in !ndochina) as being capable of turning the tide and
leading to a decisive victory over the 4iet 8inh contributed to "ashington=s agreement
to substantially raise the level of assistance. But e?ually important) the Navarre Plan) by
being a concrete proposal which held out the promise of ending the long war) put *rance
in a position to pressure the United States for more funds to underwrite the training and
e?uipping of nine additional *rench battalions and a number of new 4ietnamese units.
9. U.S. Supports !ndependence for #ssociated States
Throughout the period of assistance to the *rench military effort) #merican policy
ma.ers .ept in mind the necessity of encouraging the *rench to grant the #ssociated
States full independence and to ta.e practical measures in this direction) such as the
training of 4ietnamese officers and civil servants. Such active persuasion was delicate
and difficult because of the high sensitivity of the *rench to any "interference" in their
"internal" affairs.
# reading of the NS< memorandum and the *rance$#merican diplomatic dialogue of the
time indicates that "ashington .ept its eyes on the ultimate goal of the de$coloniali2ation
of !ndochina. !ndeed) it was uncomfortable in finding itself$forced by the greater
necessity of resisting 4iet 8inh communism$in the same bed as the *rench. #merican
pressure may well have helped account for the public declaration of Premier :oseph
/aniel of :uly 9) %&'9) that the independence and sovereignty of the #ssociated States
would be "perfected" by transferring to them various functions which had remained under
*rench control) even though no final date was set for complete independence. #t an NS<
meeting on #ugust ,) %&'9 President @isenhower stated that assistance to the *rench
would be determined by three conditions3
+%1 # public *rench commitment to "a program which will insure the support and
cooperation of the native !ndochina"6
+71 # *rench invitation for "close FU.S.G military advice"6
+91 0enewed assurances on the passage of the @;<.
<onsistent with these) "ashington=s decision of September &) %&'9) to grant Q9J' million
towards implementation of the Navarre Plan was made dependent upon a number of
conditions. The #merican #mbassador was instructed to inform Prime 8inister /aniel
and *oreign 8inister Bidault that the United States Government would epect *rance to3
. . continue pursue policy of perfecting independence of #ssociated States in conformity
with :uly 9 declaration6
facilitate echange information with #merican military authorities and ta.e into account
their views in developing and carrying out *rench military plans !ndochina6
assure that no basic or permanent alteration of plans and programs for N#TB forces will
be made as result of additional effort !ndochina...
-. "imitation on #merian "e'erage
The United States attempted to use its military assistance program to gain leverage over
*rench policies) but was severely constrained in what it could do. The U.S. military
mission +8##G1 in Saigon was small and limited by the *rench in its functions to a
supply$support group. #llocation of all U.S. aid to the #ssociated States had to be made)
by agreement) solely through the *rench. Thus) 8##G was not allowed to control the
dispensing of supplies once they arrived in 4ietnam. 8##G officers were not given the
necessary freedom to develop intelligence information on the course of the war6
information supplied by the *rench was limited) and often unreliable or deliberately
misleading. The *rench resisted repeated U.S. admonitions that the native armies of the
#ssociated States be built up and conse?uently they did not create a true national
4ietnamese army. "ith some minor eceptions) the *rench ecluded #merican advisors
from participating in the training for the use of the materials being furnished by the U.S.
General Navarre viewed any function of 8##G in Saigon beyond boo..eeping to be an
intrusion upon internal *rench affairs. @ven though it would have been difficult beyond
%&'7 to continue the war without #merican aid) the *rench never permitted participation
by U.S. officials in strategic planning or policy ma.ing. 8oreover) the *rench suspected
the economic aid mission of being over$sympathetic to 4ienamese nationalism. The
director of the economic aid program) 0obert Blum) and the ;<8 of the #merican
@mbassy) @dmund Gullion) were subDected to *rench criticisms of their pro$4ietnamese
views) although the #merican #mbassador) ;onald >eath) remained staunchly pro$
*rench. Thus) *rench officials insisted that #merican assistance be furnished with "no
strings attached" and with virtually no control over its use. Underlying this attitude was a
deep$seated suspicion that the United States desired to totally supplant the *rench)
economically as well as politically) in !ndochina.
5. F2E3;) "EBE2#:E 63 T)E 73!TED ST#TES
*rench leverage over the United States was made possible by the conviction) apparently
firmly held in "ashington) that the maintenance of a non$<ommunist !ndochina was vital
to "estern$and specifically #merican$interests.
1. Primarily !t /as Frane(s /ar
The most fundamental fact was that the *rench were carrying on a war which the United
States considered) rightly or wrongly) to be essential. Thus) the *rench were always able
to threaten simply to end the war by pulling out of !ndochina. By the early %&'(=s) with
the *rench nation tired of the "!a sale guerre)" this would not have been an unpopular
decision within *rance. Paris was thereby able to hint$which it did$that if U.S. assistance
was not forthcoming) it would simply withdraw from !ndochina) leaving to the United
States alone the tas. of the containment of communism in Southeast #sia. "hen the
/aniel Government re?uested in the fall of %&'9 a massive increase in #merican
assistance) the State ;epartment representative at an NS< meeting asserted that "if this
*rench Government) which proposes reinforcing !ndochina with our aid) is not supported
by us at this time) it may be the last such government prepared to ma.e a real effort to
win in !ndochina." !n effect) then) because of the overriding importance given by
"ashington to holding the communist line in !ndochina) the *rench in being able to
threaten to withdraw possessed an important instrument of blac.mail.
The upshot of this was that U.S. leverage was ?uite minimal. Since the *rench were) in a
way) fighting a U.S. battle as well as their own to prevent communist control of
!ndochina) any ham$fisted U.S. pressure was bound to wea.en the *rench resolve and
capability. <onse?uently) the leverage which the U.S. attained through its aid could be
used for little more than to urge greater efficiency and determination on *rance. !n other
words) "ashington could move Paris to formulate a Navarre type plan) but could not
influence the way *rance conducted the war) nor could it move *rance on political issues
in dispute.
8. ECpetation of Frenh Suess
The temptation to "go along" with the *rench until the 4iet 8inh was defeated was all
the more attractive because of the epectation of victory which pervaded official
"ashington. Before ;ien Bien Phu) General B=;aniel consistently reported that victory
was within reach if the United States continued its support. !n November) %&'9) General
B=;aniel submitted a progress report on the Navarre Plan which summari2ed what the
*rench had been doing and what remained to be accomplished. The report said that
*rench Union forces held the initiative and would begin offensives in mid$:anuary) %&'5
in the 8e.ong ;elta and in the region between <ape 4arella and ;a Nang. 8eanwhile) a
relatively small force would attempt to .eep the 4iet 8inh off balance in the Ton.in
;elta until Bctober) %&'5) when the *rench would begin a maDor offensive North of the
%&th parallel. The report concluded by assessing that the Navarre Plan was basically
sound and should be supported since it would bring a decisive victory.
B=;aniel=s optimism was not duplicated by other observers. <!N<P#<) for one)
considered the report over$optimistic) stating that political and psychological factors were
of such crucial importance that no victory would be possible until the 4ietnamese were
able to capture villages and until psychological warfare operations could be underta.en to
win over the people. The #rmy attachV in Saigon was even less sanguine. >e flatly stated
that the *rench) after si months of the Navarre Plan) were still on the defensive and
showed no sign of being able to win the war in the future. The attachV=s views were)
moreover) concurred in by the #ssistant <hief of Staff for !ntelligence) who observed that
other high U.S. military officers in !ndochina agreed with the attachV and found
B=;aniel=s report unwarrantedly optimistic.
3. #merian Poliy in Europe> The ED;
#n important source of *rench leverage was to be found outside of *ar @astern affairs. #
primary obDective of #merican foreign policy in %&'9$%&'5 was the creation of a
@uropean ;efense <ommunity +@.;.<.1. The purpose of the @;< was to "envelope" a
new "est German #rmy into an integrated si nation army which would go a long way
towards providing for the defense of "estern @urope. "ashington officials epected that
the @;< would permit a reduction +but not complete elimination1 of #merican ground
forces in @urope. The membership of *rance in the @;<$as a counter$weight to the
proposed re$arming of Germany$was essential to its adoption by the five other @uropean
nations. Because of the high priority given to @;< in #merican planning) there was a
strong reluctance to antagoni2e the *rench in !ndochina. This was reinforced by
.nowledge that the *rench placed a far lower priority on @;<) in part because of the
traditional *rench fear of an armed Germany) in part because the *rench estimate of
Soviet intentions in "estern @urope differed from that of the United States in that it
placed a low probability on a direct Soviet intervention.
#pparently unnoticed at the time was an implicit contradiction in the #merican policy of
pushing the *rench simultaneously on both adopting the @;< and on ma.ing a greater
effort in !ndochina. The latter re?uired increased *rench forces in the *ar @ast. But the
*rench National #ssembly would not adopt the @;< unless) at a minimum) it was
assured that *rench forces in @urope would be on parity with those of Germany. Thus)
the *rench argued that the possible coming into effect of the @;< prevented them from
putting larger forces into !ndochina. #fter the loss of North 4ietnam and the *rench
reDection of @;<) the <hairman of an !nterdepartmental "or.ing Group set up to
formulate a new #merican policy on !ndochina for the post$Geneva period observed that
"our policies thus far have failed because we tried to hit two birds with one stone and
missed both."
-. Frenh Desire for 3egotiations
*rench leverage was also demonstrated by their ability to have the !ndochina problem
placed on the agenda for the Geneva <onference at the time of the Kuadripartite *oreign
8inister=s meeting in *ebruary %&'5 in Berlin. The Geneva <onference had been called
to wor. out a political settlement for the Aorean "ar. ;ulles did not wish to negotiate on
!ndochina until there was a mar.ed improvement in the military situation of the *rench
and they could negotiate from a position of far greater strength. But the /aniel
Government was under mounting pressure from *rench public opinion to end the
!ndochinese war. #t Berlin the *rench delegation insisted) despite #merican obDections)
that !ndochina be inscribed on the Geneva agenda. *oreign 8inister Bidault reportedly
warned that if the United States did not ac?uiesce on this point) @;< would doubtlessly
be scuttled.
;ulles did succeed in opposing Soviet efforts to gain for <ommunist <hina the status of a
sponsoring power at Geneva and forced the acceptance in the Berlin communi?uV of a
statement that no diplomatic recognition would be implied in the <hinese invitation to the
conference. !n return for this concession) however) the *rench were able to give highly
visible evidence of their interest in ending the war soon through negotiations. !ronically)
this had a double$edged effect3 in Paris the "peace faction" was mollified6 but in >anoi
plans were made to step up the intensity of the war so as to ma.e a show of strength prior
to the beginning of the Geneva <onference. Thus) the coming battle Kf ;ien Bien Phu
came to have a crucial significance in large measure because of the very inclusion of the
!ndochina item for the Geneva <onference. #s @llen >ammer has written3
This was the last opportunity before the Geneva <onference for the 4iet 8inh to show its
military strength) its determination to fight until victory. #nd there were those who
thought that General Giap was resolved on victory) no matter the cost) not only to
impress the enemy but also to convince his <ommunist allies that the 4iet 8inh by its
own efforts had earned a seat at the conference table and the right to a voice in its own
future. *or the *rench . . . upon the outcome of the battle depended much of the spirit in
which they would send their representatives to Geneva.
'. <onclusion3 !ncompatibility of #merican and *rench BbDectives
!n summary) one must ta.e notice of the parado of U.S. policy vis$X$vis the *rench with
respect to !ndochina) %&'($%&'5. #merican interests and obDectives were basically
different from those of the *rench. The United States was concerned with the
containment of communism and restricting the spread of <hinese influence in Southeast
#sia. The immediate U.S. obDective was supporting a domino. *rance) on the other hand)
was fighting primarily a colonial war designed to maintain the *rench presence in
Southeast #sia and avoid the crumbling of the *rench Union. ;espite occasional pledges
to the "perfectionment" of independence for the #ssociated States$$pledges which were
usually given under circumstances which were forcing *rance to "Dustify" the war) in part
to receive further #merican assistance$$*rance was not fighting a long and costly war in
order to thereafter completely pull out.
The fact that the #merican and *rench means$pushing for military victory$$converged in
%&'($%&'5 obscured the fact that the ends of the two nations were inherently
incompatible. This further led to a basic incompatibility in the two strands of #merican
policy3 +%1 "ashington wanted *rance to fight the war and win) preferably .with
#merican guidance and advice6 and +71 having achieved success at great cost in what the
*rench viewed at least initially as more a "colonial" than "anti$communist" war)
"ashington epected the *rench to withdraw magnanimously. +# *renchman might have
as.ed how *rance) even if it wished to) could have left !ndochina without creating similar
pressures for withdrawal from #lgeria) Tunisia) and 8orocco) where over one million
*renchmen lived.1 !n this inherent inconsistency can be found much of the eplanation
for the lac. of #merican leverage over *rance during the pre$Geneva years.
!!!. P@0<@PT!BNS B* T>@ <B88UN!ST T>0@#T TB SBUT>@#ST #S!# #N;
TB B#S!< U.S. !NT@0@STS
Three maDor perceptions dominated U.S. thin.ing and policy$ma.ing on !ndochina during
the years %&'($%&'5. The first was the growing importance of #sia in world politics. The
process of devotion from colonial empires to independent states) it was thought) would
create power vacuums and conditions of instability which would ma.e #sia susceptible
to becoming a battleground in the growing @ast$"est cold war conflict. Second) there
was an undeniable tendency to view the worldwide "communist threat" in monolithic
terms. This was perhaps understandable given the relatively etensive influence then
eerted by the Soviet Union over other communist nations) and the communist parties in
non$communist states. 8oreover) the "est) and especially the U.S.) was challenged by
the epansionist policies openly proclaimed by leaders of virtually all the communist
movements. Third) the attempt of the patently <ommunist >o <hi 8inh regime to evict
the *rench from !ndochina was seen as part of the Southeast #sian manifestation of the
communist world$wide aggressive intent. The resistance of *rance to >o) therefore) was
seen as a crucial stand on the line along which the "est would contain communism.
#. ?D6M!36 P2!3;!P"E? 5EF62E D62E#
These three perceptions help eplain the widely held assumption in official "ashington
that if !ndochina was "lost" to communism) the remaining nations of Southeast #sia
would ineorably succumb to communist infiltration and be ta.en over in a chain
reaction. This strategic conception of the communist threat to Southeast #sia pre$dated
the outbrea. in :une %&'( of the Aorean "ar. !t probably had its period of gestation at
the time of the Nationalist withdrawal from mainland <hina. NS< 5JI% was the .ey
document in framing this conception. ;rawn up in :une %&5&) after Secretary of ;efense
/ouis :ohnson had epressed concern at the course of events in #sia and had suggested a
widening of the previous country$by$country memorandum approach to a regional plan)
NS< 5JI% included the statements that "the etension of communist authority in <hina
represents a grievous political defeat for us . . . !f Southeast #sia is also swept by
communism) we shall have suffered a maDor political rout the repercussions of which will
be felt throughout the rest of the world) especially in the 8iddle @ast and in a then
critically eposed #ustralia."
!t was 0ussia rather than <hina that was seen in %&5& as being the principal source of the
communist threat in #sia. #lthough it was conceded that in the course of time <hina +or
:apan or !ndia1 may attempt to dominate #sia3
now and for the foreseeable future it is the USS0 which threatens to dominate #sia
through the complementary instruments of communist conspiracy and diplomatic
pressure supported by military strength. *or the foreseeable future) therefore) our
immediate obDective must be to contain and where feasible to reduce the power and
influence of the USS0 in #sia to such a degree that the Soviet Union is not capable of
threatening the security of the United States from that area and that the Soviet Union
would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace) national
independence or stability of the #siatic nations.
NS< 5JI% also recogni2ed that "the colonial$nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for
subversive communist movements) and it is now clear that Southeast #sia is the target for
a coordinated offensive directed by the Aremlin."
#t this time) the NS< believed that the United States) as a "estern power in any area
where the bul. of the population had long been suspicious of "estern influence) should
insofar as possible refrain from ta.ing any lead in Southeast #sia. The United States
should instead "encourage the peoples of !ndia) Pa.istan) the Philippines and other #sian
states to ta.e the leadership in meeting the common problems of the area)" recogni2ing
"that the non$communist governments of South #sia already constitute a bulwar. against
communist epansion in #sia." NS< 5JI7 pointed out that particular attention should be
given to the problem of !ndochina where "action should be ta.en to bring home to the
*rench the urgency of removing the barriers to the obtaining by Bao ;ai or other non$
communist nationalist leaders of the support of a substantial proportion of the
4ietnamese."
5. !MP62T#3;E 6F !3D6;)!3#
!ndochina was of special importance because it was the only area adDacent to <hina
which contained a large @uropean army which was in armed conflict with communist
forces. The <hinese <ommunists were believed to be furnishing the 4iet 8inh with
substantial material assistance. Bfficial *rench sources reported that there were some
<hinese troops in Ton.in) as well as large numbers ready for action against the *rench on
the <hinese side of the border. The first NS< memorandum dealing solely with !ndochina
+NS< ,51 F;oc. %G was adopted as policy on *ebruary 7-) %&'(. This paper too. note of
<hinese assistance to the 4iet 8inh and estimated that it was doubtful that the *rench
@peditionary forces) combined with !ndochinese troops) could successfully contain >o
<hi 8inh=s forces should they be strengthened by either <hinese troops crossing the
border) or by communist$supplied arms and material in ?uantity.
NS< ,5$written) it should be noted) by the Truman #dministration and before the
outbrea. of the Aorean "ar$observed that "the threat of <ommunist aggression against
!ndochina is only one phase of anticipated communist plans to sei2e all of Southeast
#sia." !t concluded with a statement of what came to be .nown as the "domino
principle"3
!t is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be ta.en to
prevent further communist epansion in Southeast #sia. !ndochina is a .ey area of
Southeast #sia and is under immediate threat.
The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be epected to fall under
<ommunist domination if !ndochina were controlled by a <ommunist$dominated
government. The balance of Southeast #sia would then be in grave ha2ard.
;. !MP#;T 6F ST#2T 6F D62E#3 /#2
The outbrea. of the Aorean "ar) and the #merican decision to resist North Aorean
aggression) sharpened overnight our thoughts and actions with respect to Southeast #sia.
The #merican military response symboli2ed in the most concrete manner possible the
basic belief that holding the line in Southeast #sia was essential to #merican security
interests. The *rench struggle in !ndochina came far more than before to be seen as an
integral part of the containment of communism in that region of the world. #ccordingly)
the United States intensified and enlarged its programs of aid in !ndochina. 8ilitary aid
shipments to !ndochina ac?uired in %&'% the second highest priority) Dust behind the
Aorean war program.
# conse?uence of the Aorean "ar) and particularly the <hinese intervention) was that
<hina replaced the Soviet Union as the principal source of the perceived communist
threat in Southeast #sia. This was made eplicit in NS< %75I7 +:une %&'71 F;oc. %9G
which stated that "the danger of an overt military attac. against Southeast #sia is
inherent in the eistence of a hostile and aggressive <ommunist <hina."
The "domino principle" in its purest form was written into the "General <onsiderations"
section of NS< %75I7. !t lin.ed the loss of any single state of Southeast #sia to the
stability of @urope and the security of the United States3
7. <ommunist domination) by whatever means) of all Southeast #sia would seriously
endanger in the short term) and critically endanger in the longer term) United States
security interests.
a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast #sia to communist control as a
conse?uence of overt or covert <hinese <ommunist aggression would have critical
psychological) political and economic conse?uences. !n the absence of effective and
timely counteraction) the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively
swift submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this
group. *urthermore) an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast #sia and
!ndia) and in the longer term) of the 8iddle @ast +with the probable eceptions of at least
Pa.istan and Tur.ey1 would in all probability progressively follow. Such widespread
alignment would endanger the stability and security of @urope.
b. <ommunist control of all of Southeast #sia would render the U.S. position in the
Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously Deopardi2e fundamental U.S.
security interests in the *ar @ast.
c. Southeast #sia) especially 8alaya and !ndonesia) is the principal world source of
natural rubber and tin) and a producer of petroleum and other strategically important
commodities. The rice eports of Burma and Thailand are critically important to 8alaya)
<eylon and >ong Aong and are of considerable significance to :apan and !ndia) all
important areas of free #sia.
d. The loss of Southeast #sia) especially of 8alaya and !ndonesia) could result in such
economic and political pressures in :apan as to ma.e it etremely difficult to prevent
:apan=s eventual accommodation to communism.
The possibility of a large$scale <hinese intervention in !ndochina) similar to the <hinese
intervention in Aorea) came to dominate the thin.ing of #merican policy$ma.ers after
the start of the Aorean "ar. Such an intervention would not have been surprising given
the larger numbers of <hinese troops massed along the Ton.in border and the material
assistance being given to the 4iet 8inh. The N!@ of ;ecember %&'( considered direct
<hinese intervention to be "impending." The following year it was estimated that after an
armistice in Aorea the <hinese would be capable of intervention in considerable strength)
but would be inhibited from acting overtly by a number of factors) including the ris. of
#merican retaliation and the disadvantages attendant upon involvement in another
protracted campaign. By early %&'7) as the *rench position showed signs of deterioration)
intelligence authorities believed that the <hinese would be content to continue aiding the
4iet 8inh without underta.ing direct involvement +ecept for material aid1 unless
provo.ed into it. Thus) the intelligence community) after estimating a high ris. of
<hinese intervention at the start of the Aorean "ar) gradually reduced its estimate of
!ndochina being broadened into a wider war as the 4iet 8inh showed signs of doing well
enough on their own.
Nevertheless) the NS< undertoo. in %&'7 to list a course of action for the "resolute
defense" of !ndochina in case of a large$scale <hinese intervention. !t included the
provision of air and naval forces6 the interdiction of <hinese communication lines)
including those in <hina proper6 and a naval bloc.ade of the <hina coast. !f these
"minimum courses of action" did not prove to be sufficient) the U.S. should ta.e air and
naval action "against all suitable military targets in <hina)" when possible in conDunction
with British and *rench forces.
!n prescribing these recommended actions) the NS< focused on the less li.ely
contingency of a <hinese intervention rather than the more li.ely contingency of the
continued deterioration of the *rench position in !ndochina itself. !t did so despite the fact
that NS< %75I7 conceded that the "primary threat" was the situation in !ndochina itself
+increasing subversive efforts by indigenous communist forces) increased guerrilla
activity) and increased 4iet 8inh civil control over population and territory1. #pparently)
the NS< wanted to ma.e clear that direct U.S. involvement in !ndochina was to be
limited to dealing with direct <hinese involvement. !n the absence of this contingency)
however) and to meet the eisting situation in :ndochina) the NS< recommended that the
United States increase its level of aid to *rench Union forces but "without relieving the
*rench authorities of their basic military responsibility for the defense of the #ssociated
States."
D. 2EP75"!;#3 #DM!3!ST2#T!63 #3D F#2 E#ST
Two events in %&'9 served to deepen the #merican commitment in !ndochina. The first
was the arrival of a 0epublican #dministration following a long period in which the
G.B.P. had persistently accused the Truman #dministration of being responsible for the
"loss" of <hina to communism. The writings and speeches of :ohn *oster ;ulles before
the election left no doubt that he regarded Southeast #sia as a .ey region in the conflict
with communist "imperialism)" and that it was important to draw the line of containment
north of the 0ice Bowl of #sia$$the !ndochina peninsula. !n his first State of the Union
8essage on *ebruary 9) %&'9) President @isenhower promised a "new) positive foreign
policy." >e went on to lin. the communist aggression in Aorea and 8alaya with
!ndochina. ;ulles subse?uently spo.e of Aorea and !ndochina as two flan.s) with the
principal enemy$$0ed <hina$$in the center. # special study mission headed by
0epresentative "alter :udd) a recogni2ed 0epublican spo.esman on #sia) surveyed the
*ar @ast and reported on its view of the high sta.es involved3
The area of !ndochina is immensely wealthy in rice) rubber) coal) and iron ore. !ts
position ma.es it a strategic .ey to the rest of Southeast #sia. !f !ndochina should fall)
Thailand and Burma would be in etreme danger) 8alaya) Singapore and even !ndonesia
would become more vulnerable to the <ommunist power drive. . . . <ommunism would
then be in an eceptional position to complete its perversion of the political and social
revolution that is spreading through #sia. . . . The <ommunists must be prevented from
achieving their obDectives in !ndochina.
The 0epublican #dministration clearly intended to prevent the loss of !ndochina by
ta.ing a more forthright) anti$communist stand.
E. !MP#;T 6F D62E#3 #2M!ST!;E
Second) the armistice in Aorea created apprehension that the <hinese <ommunists would
now turn their attention to !ndochina. President @isenhower warned in a speech on #pril
%,) %&'9) that any armistice in Aorea that merely released armed forces to pursue an
attac. elsewhere would be a fraud. Secretary ;ulles continued this theme afer the Aorean
armistice in a speech on September 7) %&'9) on the war in !ndochina. #fter noting that "a
single <ommunist aggressive front etends from Aorea on the north to !ndochina in the
south" he said3
<ommunist <hina has been and now is training) e?uipping and supplying the <ommunist
forces in !ndochina. There is the ris. that) as in Aorea) 0ed <hina might send its own
#rmy into !ndochina. The <hinese <ommunist regime should reali2e that such a second
aggression could not
occur without grave conse?uences which might not be confined to !ndochina. ! say this
soberly . . . in the hope of preventing another aggressor miscalculation.
Underlying these warnings to <hina was the belief that the difference between success or
failure in avoiding a ta.eover of all 4ietnam by >o <hi 8inh probably depended upon
the etent of <hinese assistance or direct participation. Signaling a warning to <hina was
probably designed to deter further <hinese involvement. !mplicit in the signals was the
threat that if <hina came into the war) the United States would be forced to follow suit)
preferably with allies but) if necessary) alone. *urthermore) the @isenhower
#dministration implied that in .eeping with its policy of massive retaliation the United
States would administer a punishing nuclear blow to <hina without necessarily involving
its land forces in an #sian war.
F. DEEPE3!3: 6F 7.S. ;6MM!TME3T T6 ;63T#!3ME3T
!n addition to the new mood in "ashington created by the strategic perceptions of a new
#dministration and the Aorean armistice) the 4iet 8inh invasion of /aos in the spring of
%&'9 and the deepening war weariness in *rance served to strengthen those who favored
a more assertive policy in !ndochina. The United States rushed supplies to /aos and
Thailand in 8ay %&'9 and provided si <$i %&=s with civilian crews for the airlift into
/aos. !t increased substantially the volume and tempo of #merican military assistance to
*rench Union forces. *or fiscal year %&'5) Q5,( million in military assistance was
planned. <ongress only appropriated Q5(( million) but following the presentation by the
*rench of the Navarre Plan an additional Q9J' million was decided upon by the NS<. No
obDection was raised when *rance as.ed our views in #ugust) %&'9) on the transfer of its
battalion in Aorea to !ndochina and subse?uently too. this action. The Navarre Plan) by
offering a format for victory which promised success without the direct involvement of
#merican military forces) tended) because of its very attractiveness) to have the effect of
enlarging our commitment to assist the *rench towards achieving a military solution.
!n the last NS< paper approved before the !ndochina situation was totally transformed by
the *rench defeat at ;ien Bien Phu and the Geneva <onference) the "successful defense
of Ton.in" was said to be the ".eystone of the defense of mainland Southeast #sia ecept
possibly 8alaya." NS< '5(' F;oc. 7(G too. some) but probably not sufficient) account of
the deterioration in the *rench position which had occurred since NS< %75I7 was
approved eighteen months earlier. !t) nevertheless) repeated the domino principle in
detail) including the admonition that "such is the interrelation of the countries of the area
that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any
single country from leading to submission to) or an alignment with) communism by the
remaining countries of Southeast #sia and !ndonesia." The document also noted that3
!n the conflict in !ndochina) the <ommunists and non$<ommunists worlds clearly
confront one another in the field of battle3 The loss of the struggle in !ndochina) in
addition to its impact in Southeast #sia and South #sia) would therefore have the most
serious repercussions on U.S. and free world interests in @urope and elsewhere.
The subDect of possible negotiations was broached in NS< '5(') following the
observation that political pressures in *rance may impel the *rench Government to see. a
negotiated rather than a military settlement. !t was noted +before ;ien Bien Phu1 that if
the Navarre Plan failed or appeared doomed to failure) the *rench might see. to negotiate
simply for the best possible terms) irrespective of whether these offered any assurance of
preserving a non$communist !ndochina.
!n this regard the NS< decided the U.S. should employ every feasible means to influence
the *rench Government against concluding the struggle on terms "inconsistent" with the
basic U.S. obDectives. The *rench should be told that3 +%1 in the absence of a mar.ed
improvement in the military situation) there was no basis for negotiation on acceptable
terms6 +71 the U.S. would "flatly oppose any idea" of a cease$fire as a preliminary to
negotiations) because such a cease$fire would result in an irretrievable deterioration of the
*ranco$4ietnamese military position in !ndochina6 +91 a nominally non-ommunist
oalition regime 4ould e'entually turn the ountry o'er to )o ;hi Minh 4ith no
opportunity for the replaement of the Frenh @y the 7nited States or the 7nited
Dingdom. F@mphasis #ddedG
:. ;63;"7S!63
!n conclusion) two comments can be made3
a. "ith the growing perception of a <hinese threat to !ndochina) and) therefore) to all of
Southeast #sia) the U.S. Government tended to concentrate on the military rather than the
political aspects of the *rench$4iet 8inh struggle. !n conse?uence) #merican attention
focused on +%1 deterring eternal intervention from <hina) and +71 assisting the *rench in
successfully prosecuting the war through the implementation of the Navarre Plan. The
result of this was that the encouragement and support of the non$communist nationalist
governments in the #ssociated States was almost inadvertently given lower priority. The
United States was reluctant to press the *rench too strongly on ta.ing measures to foster
4ietnam nationalism because of its overriding interest in halting the potential sweep of
communism through Southeast #sia. 8oreover) it was easier to develop a policy for
dealing with the eternal threat of intervention than to meet the internal threat of
subversion) or the even more difficult process of finding and sustaining a genuine
nationalist alternative to the 4iet 8inh.
b. The "domino theory" and the assumptions behind it were never ?uestioned. The
homogeneity of the nations of Southeast #sia was ta.en as a given) as was the lin.age in
their ability to remain democratic) or at an acceptable minimum) non$communist) nations.
Undoubtedly) in the first decade of the cold war thcre eisted an unfortunate stereotype of
a monolithic communist epansionary bloc. !t was reinforced by a somewhat emotional
approach on the part of many #mericans to communism in <hina and #sia. This
"syndrome" was) in part) the result of the "fall" of <hina) which some felt could have
been averted) and a few hoped would still be reversed.
#ccordingly) not sufficient cogni2ance was ta.en of the individuality of the states of
Southeast #sia and the separateness of their societies. Probably there was some lac. of
.nowledge in depth on the part of "ashington policy$ma.ers about the area. No one
before "orld "ar !! had epected that the United States would be called upon to ta.e a
position of leadership in these remote colonial territories of our @uropean allies. !n
hindsight) these shortcomings may have led to the fallacious belief that a neutralist or
communist !ndochina would inevitably draw the other states of #sia into the communist
bloc or into neutralism. But the "fallacy" was neither evident then) nor is it demonstrable
now in retrospect.
!4. T>@ !NT@0#G@N<C ;@B#T@ B4@0 U.S. !NT@04@NT!BN !N !N;B<>!N#
#. T)E :E3E2#" P6"!;< ;63TEET
The debate over the wisdom and manner of #merican intervention in !ndochina was
based primarily on the desirability of military involvement) not on ?uestions concerning
!ndochina=s value to United States security interests in the *ar @ast. The @isenhower
#dministration was in general agreement with the rationale for #merican interest in
!ndochina epressed by the Truman #dministration. The United States Government first
came to full grips with the ?uestion of intervention in late %&'9$early %&'5 as the fall of
!ndochina seemed to become imminent.
1. The Final Truman Program (3S; 18-)
NS< %75 +*ebruary) %&'71 considered imperative the prevention of a <ommunist ta.e$
over in !ndochina. !t recogni2ed that even in the absence of "identifiable aggression" by
<ommunist <hina) the U.S. might be forced to ta.e some action in order to prevent the
subversion of Southeast #sia. !n case of overt <hinese intervention) NS< %75
recommended3 +%1 naval) air and logistical support of *rench Union forces6 +71 naval
bloc.ade of <ommunist <hina6 +91 attac.s by land and carrier$based aircraft on military
targets in 8ainland <hina. !t stopped short of recommending the commitment of U.S.
ground forces in !ndochina.
8. Eisenho4er #dministration(s ?5asi 3ational Seurity Poliy?
NS< %,7I7 F;oc. %JG) adopted in Bctober) %&'9) ten months after the 0epublican
#dministration too. office) was the basic document of the "New /oo.." #fter
commenting on U.S. and Soviet defense capabilities) the prospect of nuclear parity and
the need to balance domestic economic policy with military ependitures) it urged a
military posture based on the ability "to inflict massive retaliatory damage" on the enemy.
!ndochina was listed as an area of "strategic importance" to the U.S. #n attac. on such
important areas "probably would compel the United States to react with military force
either locally at the point of attac. or generally against the military power of the
aggressor." The use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional war situations was
recommended) but they were not specifically suggested for use in !ndochina.
5. T)E =7EST!63 6F !3TE2BE3T!63 /!T) :2673D F62;ES
1. The Pro@lem !s Presented
!n late %&'9) the #rmy ?uestioned prevalent assumptions that ground forces would not be
re?uired in !ndochina if the area was as important to U.S. security interests as the NS<
papers stated. The #rmy urged that the issue be faced s?uarely in order to provide the
best possible preparation for whatever courses
of action might be underta.en. The Plans ;ivision of the #rmy General Staff pointed out
that under current programs the #rmy did not have the capability of providing divisional
forces for operations in !ndochina while maintaining its eisting commitments in @urope
and the *ar @ast. #rmy also suggested a "reevaluation of the importance of !ndochina and
Southeast #sia in relation to the possible cost of saving it."
"ith the deterioration of the *rench military situation in !ndochina) the first serious
attention came to be given to the manner and si2e of a U.S. intervention. The ?uestion to
be faced was3 how far was the U.S. prepared to go in terms of force commitments to
ensure that !ndochina stayed out of <ommunist handsN The ;efense ;epartment) though
not of a single mind on this ?uestion) pressed for an early determination of the forces the
U.S. would be willing to dispatch in an emergency situation. The <hief of Naval
Bperations) #dmiral 0obert #nderson) proposed to Secretary of ;efense "ilson on
:anuary ,) %&'5) that the U.S. decide immediately to employ combat forces in !ndochina
on the "reasonable assurance of strong indigenous support of our forces)" whether or not
the *rench Government approved. But 4ice #dmiral #. <. ;avis) ;irector of the Bffice
of *oreign 8ilitary #ffairs in BS;) wrote3
...!nvolvement of U.S. forces in the !ndochina war should be avoided at all practical
costs. !f) then) National Policy determines no other alternative) the U.S. should not be
self$duped into believing the possibility of partial involvement$$such as "Naval and #ir
units only." Bne cannot go over Niagara *alls in a barrel only slightly.
#dmiral ;avis then went on3
<omment3 !f it is determined desirable to introduce air and naval forces in combat in
!ndochina it is difficult to understand how involvement of ground forces could be
avoided. #ir strength sufficient to be of worth in such an effort would re?uire bases in
!ndochina of considerable magnitude. Protection of those bases and port facilities would
certainly re?uire U.S. ground force personnel) and the force once committed would need
ground combat units to support any threatened evacuation. !t must be understood that
there is no cheap way to fight a war) once committed.
8. 3S;> State and Defense Bie4s
The evident disparity between) on the one hand) our high strategic valuation of !ndochina)
and on the other) our unwillingness to reach a firm decision on the forces re?uired to
defend the area became the subDect of the NS<=s %-&th meeting on :anuary J) %&'5. #t
this meeting the <ouncil discussed NS< %-- on Southeast #sia) but it decided not to ta.e
up the Special #nne to NS< %-- which laid out a series of choices which might face the
United States if the *rench military position in !ndochina continued to deteriorate.
Nevertheless) the NS< at that time did ma.e some headway on the problem it had posed
for itself.
#ccording to summary notes ta.en of the meeting) State and ;efense were at
considerable variance on what should be done in either of two contingencies3
first) *rench abandonment of the struggle6 second) a *rench demand for substantial U.S.
forces +ground) sea) and air1. The State view considered the *rench position so critical
already as +in the rapporteur=s words1 to "force the U.S. to decide now to utili2e U.S.
forces in the fighting in Southeast #sia." The ;efense
representative refused to underwrite U.S. involvement. >e reportedly stated that the
*rench could win by the spring of %&'' given U.S. aid and given "improved *rench
political relations with the 4ietnamese . . . The commitment of U.S. forces in a =civil war=
in !ndochina will be an admission of the ban.ruptcy of our political policies re Southeast
#sia and *rance and should be resorted to only in etremity." >e urged that every step be
ta.en to avoid a direct #merican commitment.
The <ouncil meeting reached two important conclusions) both fully in .eeping with the
;efense position. *irst) it decided that a discussion of contingencies for U.S. involvement
missed the essential point that the *rench were capable of winning provided they gained
native political and military cooperation. Second) NS< %-- was) as ;efense suggested)
inade?uate in that the study failed to come to grips with the fact that eventual success in
!ndochina depended upon *rench ability to solve the problem of how to obtain
4ietnamese support for the war effort.
3. The F;S Bie4
The NS< meeting of :anuary J still left open the ?uestion of U.S. action in the event
troops were indisputably necessary to prevent the "loss" of !ndochina. !n this regard) the
:oint <hiefs of Staff .ept their options open. The <hiefs thought that the Navarre Plan
was fundamentally sound) but was being steadily undercut by the gulf separating the
*rench from the 4ietnamese) by General Navarre=s failure to implement U.S.
recommendations) and by hesitancy in Paris over the necessary political concessions to
the Bao ;ai government. Cet :<S refused either to rule out the use of U.S. combat forces
or to bac. une?uivocally their employment.
-. Formation of Speial /or0ing :roup on !ndohina
;issatisfaction with NS< %-- and the NS<=s subse?uent failure in NS< '5(' to resolve
the ground force commitment issue led to the formation of a wor.ing group to evaluate
the *rench military effort) to ma.e recommendations concerning future U.S.
contributions to it) and to devote attention to the various contingencies under which the
U.S. might be called upon to intervene directly in the war. The wor.ing group) under the
chairmanship of General G. B. @rs.ine +US8<) 0et.1) was composed of representatives
from the ;epartments of State and ;efense) the :oint <hiefs) and <!#. The group was
responsible to NS< through General ". Bedell Smith) Under Secretary of State) who had
been appointed by the <ouncil to head the Special <ommittee on the U.S. and !ndochina.
.. The Ers0ine 2eport& Part !> Moti'ate the Frenh
The first section of @rs.ine=s two$part report) dated *ebruary ,) %&'5) was based on the
assumption that U.S. policy toward !ndochina would not re?uire resort to overt combat
operations by U.S. forces. "ithin that framewor.) the report adhered closely to the
;efense ;epartment position that the *rench) if properly motivated) could win in
!ndochina) but that their failure to carry through on needed reforms would re?uire U.S.
consideration of active involvement. The report noted that3
There is in !ndo$<hina) or programmed for !ndo$<hina . . . ) a sufficient amount of
e?uipment and supplies and a potential manpower pooi sufficient eventually to defeat the
<ommunists decisively if properly utili2ed and maintained and if the situation continues
to permit this manpower to be converted into military effectiveness. Success will
ultimately be dependent upon the inspiration of the local population to fight for their own
freedom from <ommunist domination and the willingness of the *rench both to ta.e the
measures to stimulate that inspiration and to more fully utili2e the native potential.
The @rs.ine 0eport +Part !1 recommended3 +%1 augmentation of the *rench air force) but
not using #merican personnel6 +71 additional U.S. military assistance support of Q%75
million +supplementing *C %&'5 commitments of Q%.%%' billion16 +91 elevation of
8##G=s status to that of 8ilitary 8ission) with epanded personnel and advisory
authority over training and planning6 +51 assignment of additional U.S. personnel with the
mission of acting as instructors and performing other .ey duties within the *rench forces6
+'1 Presidential letters to the >eads of State of the #ssociated States reaffirming our
support of their independence and eplaining our motivations in assisting them through
the *rench6 +,1 an effort be underta.en to persuade Bao ;ai to ta.e a more active part in
the anti$4iet 8inh struggle. The report concluded that the program of recommended
changes could bring about victory over the 4iet 8inh if it received full *rench approval
and barring <hinese intervention.
A. The Ers0ine 2eport& Part !!> !nter'ention 6nly #fter :ene'aG
The second part of the @rs.ine 0eport F;oc. 75G did not appear until 8arch %-) %&'5) and
unli.e the first) was the responsibility only of the ;efense ;epartment and the :oint
<hiefs) with the State ;epartment position "reserved." The report confirmed previous
determinations that the loss of !ndochina would be a maDor military and political setbac.
for the United States. !t recommended that prior to the start of the Geneva <onference)
the U.S. should inform Britain and *rance that it was interested only in military victory in
!ndochina and would not associate ourselves with any settlement which falls short of that
obDective. !t further recommended that in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome at
Geneva) the U.S. should pursue ways of continuing the struggle in concert with the
#ssociated States) the United Aingdom) and other allies. The National Security <ouncil
was therefore re?uested to determine the etent of #merican willingness to commit
combat forces to the region with or without *rench cooperation. But with the ;ien Bien
Phu siege Dust beginning) and the Geneva <onference si wee.s away) the @rs.ine 0eport
suggested that the United States influence and observe developments at the Geneva
<onference before deciding on active involvement.
$. 3S; 1$$ #nneC 2aises !nter'ention =uestion #ne4
*ollowing the second part of the @rs.ine 0eport) the President evidently decided that the
Special #nne to NS< %--) which had been withdrawn in :anuary %&'5) should be
redistributed for consideration by the <ouncil=s Planning Board. The #nne to NS< %--
posed the fundamental choice between +a1 acceptance of the loss of !ndochina) which
would be followed by U.S. efforts to prevent further deterioration of our security position
in Southeast #sia) or +b1 direct military action to save !ndochina before the *rench and
4ietnamese became committed to an unacceptable political settlement at Geneva.
#mong the alternative courses of action outlined in the #nne) two in particular$both
geared to direct U.S. action prior to a Geneva settlement$were discussed. Under the first)
based on *rench consent to continue fighting) the U.S. was urged to +%1 see. a *ranco$
4ietnamese settlement of the independence issue) +71 insist upon a build$up of indigenous
forces with U.S. advisory and material support) +91 demand the maintenance of *rench
forces in the field at their then present level) and +51 prepare to provide sufficient U.S.
forces to ma.e possible the success of a Doint effort. *ull internationali2ation of the war
would be discussed with the *rench later) thereby discounting immediate action in
concert with the British or #sian nations.
The second alternative assumed a *rench pull$out. !n such a case the United States could
either accept the loss of !ndochina) or adopt an active policy while *rance gradually
withdrew its troops. Should we accept the latter course) our "most positive" step offering
"the greatest assurance of success" would be) NS< estimated) to Doin with indigenous
forces in combatting the 4iet 8inh until they were reduced "to the status of scattered
guerrilla bands." U.S. land) sea) and air forces would be involved.
The #nne was based upon assumptions that U.S. involvement against the 4iet 8inh
would not provo.e massive <hinese intervention) would not lead to direct Soviet
involvement) and that there would be no resumption of hostilities in Aorea. !t
ac.nowledged that any change in these assumptions would seriously Deopardi2e the
success of the alternatives proposed. !n particular) it noted that U.S. participation
heightened the ris. of <hinese intervention) and <hinese entry would alter radically both
the immediate military situation and U.S. force re?uirements.
9. #rmy =uestions Feasi@ility of #ir-3a'al inter'ention and 6utlines :round Fores
2e+uirements
The principal result of the discussions on the NS< %-- Special #nne was to bring into
the open the issue of the costs in manpower and materiel of a U.S. involvement. The
#rmy was critical of contingency planning that was based on the assumption that U.S. air
and naval forces could be used in !ndochina without the commitment of ground combat
forces. General 8atthew B. 0idgway) #rmy <hief of Staff) later wrote in his 8emoirs
that he was ?uite disturbed at tal. in high government circles about employing air$naval
power alone in !ndochina. #n #rmy position paper F;oc. 9%G submitted to the NS< in the
first wee. of #pril) %&'5) argued as follows3
%. U.S. intervention with combat forces in !ndochina is not militarily desirable...
7. # victory in !ndochina cannot be assured by U.S. intervention with air and naval forces
alone.
9. The use of atomic weapons in !ndochina would not reduce the number of ground
forces re?uired to achieve a victory in !ndochina.
5. Seven U.S. divisions or their e?uivalent) with appropriate naval and air support) would
be re?uired to win a victory in !ndochina if the *rench withdraw and the <hinese
<ommunists do not intervene. >owever) U.S. intervention plans cannot be based on the
assumption that the <hinese <ommunists will not intervene.
'. The e?uivalent of %7 U.S. divisions would be re?uired to win a victory in !ndochina) if
the *rench withdraw and the <hinese <ommunists intervene.
,. The e?uivalent of - U.S. divisions would be re?uired to win a victory in !ndochina if
the *rench remain and the <hinese <ommunists intervene.
-. 0e?uirements for air and naval support for ground force operations are3
a. *ive hundred fighter$bomber sorties per day eclusive of interdiction and counter$air
operations.
b. #n airlift capability of a one division drop.
c. # division amphibious lift.
J. Two U.S. divisions can be placed in !ndochina in 9( days) and an additional '
divisions in the following %7( days. This could be accomplished without reducing U.S.
ground strength in the *ar @ast to an unacceptable degree) but the U.S. ability to meet its
N#TB commitment would be seriously affected for a considerable period. The amount of
time re?uired to place %7 divisions in !ndochina would depend upon the industrial and
personnel mobili2ation measures ta.en by the government .
,. Defense-F;S ?Solution?> 2etify Frenh Defiienies
*aced with estimates that U.S. air$naval action could not turn the tide) and that U.S.
ground forces of appropriate si2e would impinge upon other commitments) ;o; and the
:<S too. the position that an alternative military solution eisted within the reach of the
*rench which re?uired no U.S. intervention. ;o; argued that the three reasons for
*rance=s deteriorating position were +%1 lac. of the will to win6 +71 reluctance to meet
!ndochinese demands for true independence6 +91 refusal to train indigenous personnel for
military leadership. ;efense believed that premature U.S. involvement would therefore
beg the basic ?uestion of whether the U.S. was prepared to apply the strongest pressure
on *rance) primarily in the @uropean contet) to attempt to force the *rench in Paris and
in !ndochina to ta.e appropriate measures to rectify these deficiencies. Bnly if these
measures were forthcoming) ;o; held) should the U.S. seriously consider committing
ground forces in defense of the interests of *rance and the #ssociated States. The net
effect of the ;efense$:<S position was to challenge the notion that a ?uic. U.S. military
action in !ndochina would be either feasible or necessary.
;. T)E 3E/ #PP26#;)> ?73!TED #;T!63?
#t this Duncture the @isenhower #dministration began giving serious consideration to
broadening any #merican military intervention in !ndochina by ma.ing it part of a
collective venture along with its @uropean and #sian allies. Secretary of State ;ulles in a
speech on 8arch 7& warned the public of the alarming situation in !ndochina and called
for "united action"$$without defining it further$$in these words3
Under the conditions of today) the imposition on Southeast #sia of the political system of
<ommunist 0ussia and its <hinese <ommunist ally) by whatever means) would be a
grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that the possibility
should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve
serious ris.s. But these ris.s are far less than those that will face us a few years from now
if we dare not be resolute today.
Under Secretary of State ". Bedell Smith=s Special <ommittee on the U.S. and
!ndochina) to which the @rs.ine wor.ing group had reported) issued a study on #pril 7.
This report went beyond the ?uestion of holding !ndochina and agreed that whatever that
area=s fate) the U.S. should begin developing a system of mutual defense for Southeast
#sia. *or the short term) the Smith <ommittee favored #merican sponsorship of a mutual
defense treaty directed against <ommunist aggression in !ndochina and Thailand. !n the
long run) it recommended promotion of a "regional and #sian mutual defense
arrangement subscribed and underwritten by the maDor @uropean powers with interests in
the Pacific."
The State ;epartment=s thin.ing in early #pril %&'5 was not greatly at variance from that
of ;efense and the Smith <ommittee. Perhaps more so than ;efense) State was
concerned about the <hinese reaction to a U.S. military intervention. !t urged caution and
suggested that in any type of "united action" the U.S. ma.e clear to both the <hinese and
the allies that the intervention would not be aimed at the overthrow or destruction of the
Pe.ing regime. State recommended3 +%1 no U.S. military intervention for the moment) nor
should it be promised to the *rench6 +71 planning for military intervention continue6 +91
discussions with potential allies on possibility of forming a regional grouping in the event
of an unacceptable settlement at Geneva.
1. Presidential Deision to Support 6nly ?7nited #tion?
8eanwhile) the President decided) following a meeting of Secretary ;uiles and #dmiral
0adford) <hairman of the :oint <hiefs) with <ongressional leaders on #pril 9) that the
U.S. would not underta.e a unilateral intervention. #ny U.S. military involvement in
!ndochina would be contingent upon +%1 formation of a coalition force with U.S. allies to
pursue "united action"6 +71 declaration of *rench intent to accelerate independence of
#ssociated States6 +91 <ongressional approval of U.S. involvement +which was throught
to be dependent upon +%1 and +711.
These policy guidelines undoubtedly influenced the NS< which) at a meeting on #pril ,)
developed the somewhat incompatible obDectives that the U.S. +a1 "intervene if necessary
to avoid the loss of !ndochina) but advocate that no steps be left unta.en to get the *rench
to achieve a successful conclusion of the war on their own" and +b1 support as the best
alternative to U.S. intervention a regional grouping with maimum #sian participation.
The President accepted the NS< recommendations but decided that henceforth the
#dministration=s primary efforts would be devoted toward3 +%1 organi2ing regional
collective defense against <ommunist epansion6 +71 gaining British support for U.S.
obDectives in Southeast #sia6 +91 pressing *rance to accelerate its timetable for
!ndochinese independence. The President would see. <ongressional approval for U.S.
participation in a regional arrangement) if it could be put together) and meanwhile
contingency planning for mobili2ation would commence.
8. 2eHetion of 7nilateral !nter'ention
Thus) as the curtain began to fall on the *rench effort at ;ien Bien Phu) and the ?uestion
of what the U.S. would do became critical) the U.S. Government bac.ed away from
unilateral intervention. The ;efense ;epartment was reluctant to intervene following the
#rmy=s presentation of the view that air$naval action alone would not do the Dob and
ground forces would be needed. The very recent eperience of the Aorean "ar mitigated
strongly against another #merican involvement in an #sian land war. *urthermore) the
President was not willing to enter into such a venture unless it was cloa.ed with
<ongressional approval. Such approval) in turn) depended upon the participation of the
allies. >ence) Secretary ;ulles undertoo. the tas. of persuading Britain) *rance and the
#sian allies to participate in a coalition for "united action" in !ndochina.
4. T>@ #TT@8PT TB B0G#N!L@ "UN!T@; #<T!BN"
#. T)E 5E2"!3 ;63FE2E3;E 6F 1,.-
Negotiations for a political settlement of the *rench$4iet 8inh war were practically
assured when it was decided at the Big *our meeting in Berlin in *ebruary %&'5 that the
!ndochina ?uestion would be added to the agenda of an upcoming international
conference at Geneva which was to discuss primarily a settlement of the Aorean "ar.
The period between the Berlin and Geneva conferences +i.e.) between *ebruary and 8ay
%&'51 unepectedly witnessed a denouement of the !ndochina drama with the siege and
fall of ;ien Bien Phu) the U.S. decision not to intervene) and the unsuccessful U.S.
attempt to rally its allies together in order to form a collective force in pursuance of
"united action."
1. Biet Minh Strategy and Frenh #ttitudes
The half$year before the Berlin *oreign 8inisters conference of *ebruary %&'5 saw both
a mar.ed step up of 4iet 8inh military activity and the presentation of a peace feeler
from >o <hi 8inh. The 4ietnam Peoples #rmy +4P#1 began to change its strategy
against the *rench from guerrilla activities to conventional battle deployments. This was
accompanied by an increase in the amount of <hinese military assistance) no doubt
facilitated by the end of armed conflict in Aorea. Thus) the 4iet 8inh appeared to be
showing a newly found strength and confidence) although at the time the *rench refused
to recogni2e this either publicly or to themselves.
8eanwhile) >o <hi 8inh put out a peace feeler in late November %&'9 in reply to a
?uestionnaire submitted by a correspondent for the Swedish newspaper ECpressen. The
one pre$condition set by >o for negotiations was *rench recognition of 4ietnamese
independence. !n subse?uent wee.s) the peace feeler was repeated on several occasions)
but each time it failed to indicate the place at which tal.s might be held) nor did it
propose a scope for the tal.s.
Nothing resulted directly from these peace feelers) but indirectly they added to the
mounting public and political sentiment in *rance for an end to the seemmgly
interminable and costly war. The armistice agreement negotiated at PanmunDom in :uly
%&'9 served as an eample which many *renchmen hoped could be followed in the
negotiation of a cease$fire with the ;0y. # widespread disenchantment with the
!ndochina war pervaded *rance. This was reflected in public statements by Prime
8inister /aniel that Paris would be satisfied with an "honorable solution" to the war.
The *rench then adopted a policy toward the war of ".eep fighting$see. tal.ing." There
was an increase in *rench military activity and confidence stimulated by the Navarre
Plan) but this was offset by a growth in the si2e and influence of the peace faction in
*rance) as indicated by the "dovish" votes of the National #ssembly favoring an early
settlement of the protracted war. Premier /aniel and *rench officials told the U.S.
@mbassy that they considered the >o <hi 8inh offer pure propaganda) but said also that
>o=s move had produced the intended impact on public and military circles in *rance and
!ndochina. /aniel mentioned that President 4incent #uriol had become so ecited by
>o=s proposal that he told /aniel "to consult representatives of three #ssociated States
immediately with view to see.ing earliest possible opening of negotiations with
representatives of >o <hi 8inh. /aniel had flatly refused . . ." But #merican officials
were s.eptical. The U.S. @mbassy reported that a /aniel speech of November 75) %&'9)
"left considerable latitude for negotiations)" and that >o=s offers had increased the
pressure for a settlement.
8. Early 7.S. 6pposition to 3egotiations
The consistent U.S. policy was to attempt to steer the *rench clear of the negotiating
table pending substantial military gains on the battlefield. !n bilateral U.S.$*rench tal.s in
:uly) %&'9) while the Aorean armistice was being discussed at PanmunDom) *oreign
8inister Bidault told Secretary ;ulles that parallel tal.s should be pursued on !ndochina.
Bidault eplained that the *rench public would never understand why negotiations were
fit and honorable for Aorea but were not for !ndochina. # cease$fire in Aorea) with
nothing similar in prospect for !ndochina) would ma.e his government=s position
"absolutely impossible."
Secretary ;ulles in reply stressed that "negotiations with no other alternative usually end
in capitulation." !n the Aorean case) ;ulles said) the alternative was the U.S. threat of
"other and unpleasant measures" which the <ommunists reali2ed we possessed. >e urged
the *rench to adopt the Navarre Plan) not only for military reasons) but because it would
improve the *rench negotiating position. ;ulles made it clear that the U.S. felt it was
inadvisable to have the !ndochina war inscribed on the agenda of a post$armistice
political conference on Aorea. The U.S. position at this time foreclosed negotiating on
!ndochina until after a <hinese decision to eliminate or cut down aid to the 4iet 8inh. !n
general) the U.S. sought to convince the *rench that military victory was the only
guarantee of diplomatic success.
;ulles wished the *rench to continue the war because of his deep conviction that
!ndochina was a principal lin. in the line of the containment of <ommunism. !n addition)
"ashington was undoubtedly influenced by optimistic reports on the progress of the war.
General B=;aniel reported from Saigon that a *rench victory was li.ely if U.S. material
support was forthcoming. Bn *ebruary ,) %&'5) it was announced that forty B$7,
bombers and 7(( U.S. technicians to service them would be sent to !ndochina. #dmiral
0adford told a >ouse *oreign 0elations Subcommittee) a month before the siege of ;ien
Bien Phu began +8arch) %&'51) that the Navarre Plan was "a broad strategic concept
which within a few months should insure a favorable turn in the course of the war."
#t the Berlin Kuadripartite *oreign 8inisters meeting in *ebruary) however) Secretary
;ulles was forced to give in on the *rench demand that !ndochina be placed on the
Geneva agenda. Bidault pressured the U.S. by threatening to scuttle the proDect for the
@uropean ;efense <ommunity which then was at the top ofo U.S. priorities. ;ulles could
not bloc. Paris= determination to discuss !ndochina at Geneva for it was) in the last
analysis) *rance=s war. >e must have reali2ed that the /aniel Government could not
completely avoid negotiations without alienating itself from popular opinion and bringing
about its downfall at the hands of the anti$war opposition parties.
The United States successfully opposed Soviet efforts at Berlin to gain for <ommunist
<hina the status of a sponsoring power) and successfully held out) furthermore) for the
inclusion in the Berlin communi?uV of a statement that no diplomatic recognition) not
already accorded) would be implied either in the invitation to) or the holding of) the
Geneva <onference.
5. T)E E"< M!SS!63 (M#2;) 81-8-)
1. Dien 5ien Phu 5egins
Bn 8arch %9) %&'5) the 4P#) under the direct command of General Giap) began its
assault upon ;ien Bien Phu. This fortress in Northern 4ietnam was to ta.e on a political
and psychological importance far out of proportion to its actual strategic value because of
the upcoming Geneva <onference. The 4iet 8inh correctly foresaw that a show of
decisive force) not to mention a victory) would mar.edly strengthen their hand at the
conference. *urther) a defeat of the *rench Union forces would sap the will of the *rench
nation to continue the struggle. The 4iet 8inh were greatly helped by a substantial
increase in the level of <hinese military aid including artillery and radar. #s the battle
developed) the optimism which had pervaded "ashington statements) public and private)
on the war was replaced with the conviction that unless new steps were ta.en to deal with
<hinese aid) the *rench were bound to go under.
General Paul @ly) *rench <hief of Staff) arrived in "ashington on 8arch 7( to confer
with U.S. officials on the war situation. @ly=s principal aims were to obtain #merican
assurance of air intervention in the event of <hinese aerial attac.) and to obtain further
U.S. material assistance) especially B$7, bombers. ;ulles told @ly that he could not then
answer regarding U.S. response to <hinese air intervention. @ly subse?uently contended
in his 8Vmoires that he received a promise from #dmiral 0adford) <hairman of the :oint
<hiefs of Staff) to push for prompt #merican approval of interdiction should the
contingency arise. #s to the supply of bombers) twenty$five additional B$7,=s were
promised.
8. 6peration Bulture (Bautour)
#ccording to subse?uent *rench reports) General @ly was as.ed to stay 75 hours longer
than planned in "ashington) during which time #dmiral 0adford made an informal but
maDor proposal to him. 0adford is said to have suggested a nighttime raid against the
perimeter of ;ien Bien Phu by aircraft of the U.S. #ir *orce and U.S. Navy. The plan)
named Bperation 4ulture) called for about sity B$7&=s to ta.e off from <lar. *ield near
8anila) under escort of %'( fighters of the U.S. Seventh *leet) to conduct a massive
stri.e against 4P# positions on the perimeter of ;ien Bien Phu.
Bperation 4ulture) according to *rench sources) was conceived by a Doint #merican$
*rench military staff in Saigon. !t is admitted to have been an informal proposal which
had not as yet received full U.S. Government bac.ing as policy. No record of Bperation
4ulture has been found in files eamined. !n an interview in %&,') #dmiral 0adford
stated that no plans for "Bperation 4ulture" eisted) since planning to aid ;ien Bien Phu
by an air stri.e never proceeded beyond the conceptual stage. Nevertheless) such an
operation probably was the subDect of informal discussions both in 4ietnam) and between
0adford and @ly.
;. ?73!TED #;T!63? #S #3 #"TE23#T!BE T6 E!T)E2 3E:6T!#T!63S 62 T6
73!"#TE2#" 7.S. !3TE2BE3T!63
1. Formulation of 7.S. Poliy
By late 8arch the internal debate within the @isenhower #dministration had reached the
point where it was recogni2ed that3 +a1 unilateral U.S. intervention in the !ndochina "ar
would not be effective without ground forces6 +b1 the involvement of U.S. ground forces
was logistically and politically undesirable6 +c1 preferably) "free world" intervention in
!ndochina to save the area from communism would ta.e the form of a collective
operation by allied forces. This was the import of the NS< deliberations) the 0idgway
0eport) the 0eport of Under Secretary of State ". Bedell Smith=s Special <ommittee on
the U.S. and !ndochina) and President @isenhower=s general train of thought.
#ccordingly) Secretary ;ulles in his discussions with General @ly went beyond the
?uestion of immediate assistance to the *rench garrison at ;ien Bien Phu and broached
the possible establishment of a regional defense arrangement for Southeast #sia.
This proposal was given public eposure in Secretary ;ulles= speech of 8arch 7& before
the Bverseas Press <lub. ;ulles described the importance of resisting communist
aggression in !ndochina in these words3
!f the <ommunist forces were to win uncontested control over !ndo$<hina or any
substantial part thereof) they would surely resume the same pattern of aggression against
the other free peoples in that area.
The propagandists of 0ed <hina and of Soviet 0ussia ma.e it perfectly apparent that the
purpose is to dominate all of Southeast #sia.
Now Southeast #sia is an important part of the world. !t is the so$called "rice bowl" . . . !t
is an area that is rich in many raw materials...
#nd in addition to these tremendous economic values) the area has great strategic value . .
. <ommunist control of Southeast #sia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines)
#ustralia and New Lealand . . . The entire western Pacific area) including the so$called
"offshore island chain)" would be strategically endangered.
>e then went on call for "united action)" and after noting <hinese assistance to the 4iet
8inh) prophesied that aggression would "lead to action in places by means of the free
world=s choosing) so that the aggression would surely cost more than it would gain."
!n the following wee.s the aim of U.S. diplomacy was to escure allied agreement to a
collective defense pact consisting of ten nations3 the U.S.) *rance) Britain) #ustralia) New
Lealand) Philippines) Thailand) and the three #ssociated States. Secretary ;ulles
presented his proposal in discussions with British #mbassador Sir 0oger 8a.ins and
*rench #mbassador >enri Bonnet. President @isenhower addressed a personal message
to Prime 8inister <hurchill eplaining the proposed coalition. The President noted that3
Geneva is less than four wee.s away. There the possibility of the <ommunists driving a
wedge between us will) given the state of mind in *rance)
be infinitely greater than at Berlin. ! can understand the very natural desire of the *rench
to see. an end to this war which has been bleeding them for eight years. But our
painsta.ing search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the
conclusion that there is no negotiated solution of the !ndochina problem which in its
essence would not be either a face$saving device to cover a *rench surrender or a face$
saving device to cover a <ommunist retirement. The first alternative is too serious in its
broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable...
Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative.
President @isenhower went on to outline the need for a coalition willing to fight the
<ommunists) if this proved necessary. >e concluded with a historical ?uestion certain to
appeal to <hurchill3
!f ! may refer again to history6 we failed to halt >irohito) 8ussolini and >itler by not
acting in unit and in time. That mar.ed the beginning of many years of star. tragedy and
desperate peril. 8ay it not be that our nations have learned something from that lessonN .
!n these discussions the United States sought generally to stiffen the will of the free
nations in the !ndochina crisis. !t emphasi2ed both the avowed intention of *rance to
grant real independence to the #ssociated States) and the condition accepted by the
*rench at Berlin for the United States= agreeing to discuss !ndochina at Geneva. That
condition was that *rance would not agree to any arrangement which would directly or
indirectly result in the turnover of !ndochina to the <ommunists. The United States
sought solid support for this position) especially from the United Aingdom) #ustralia) and
New Lealand. #lthough the possibility was held out of future involvement of the United
Nations in the !ndochina problem) there was no thought of immediate UN
action.
8. !nitial #llied 2eation to ?7nited #tion?
Thailand and the Philippines gave a favorable response to the call for united action. The
British response was one of caution and hesitancy. <hurchill accepted @isenhower=s
suggestion that Secretary ;ulles go to /ondon for further tal.s) but the British saw
dangers in pressing for a defensive coalition before the Geneva conference. @den was
determined not to be "hustled into inDudicious military decisions." #s @den later wrote3
! welcomed the #merican proposal for the organi2ation of collective defence in South$
@ast #sia) since this would contribute to the security of 8alaya and >ong Aong and
would remove the anomaly of our eclusion from the #.N.L.U.S. Pact) to which the
United States) #ustralia and New Lealand were party. But ! felt that to form and proclaim
a defensive coalition) before we went to the conference table) would be unli.ely to help
us militarily and would harm us politically) by frightening off important potential allies.
By the beginning of 8ay) the rains would be starting in !ndo$<hina and etensive
campaigning by either side would be impossible for several months. Since the complete
collapse of the *rench military effort before then was improbable) ! did not thin. that
concern for the immediate military situation should be the guiding factor in our policy.
3. Frenh ;all for 7.S. !nter'ention at Dien 5ien Phu (#pril --.)
The *rench response to the proposal for united action was overta.en by military events at
;ien Bien Phu. *oreign 8inister Bidault contended on #pril ' that the time for a
coalition approach had passed and that the fate of ;ien Bien Phu would be decided in the
net ten days. The previous day #mbassador ;ouglas ;illon was called to an emergency
Sunday cabinet meeting and was informed by Bidault) in the company of /aniel) that
"immediate armed intervention of U.S. carrier aircraft at ;ien Bien Phu is now necessary
to save the situation." Bidault) reporting Navarre=s desperate state in the field and the
etent of <hinese intervention in support of General Giap=s forces) as.ed the #mbassador
point$blan. for U.S. action) saying that "the fate of Southeast #sia now rested on ;ien
Bien Phu)" and that "Geneva would be won or lost depending on outcome" of the battle.
The United States was now being called upon to act ?uic.ly and unilaterally to save a
local situation) rather than) as ;ulles desired) in concert with #sian and "estern #llies.
-. 7.S. Deision 3ot to !nter'ene 7nilaterally
!n the first wee. of #pril it became clear that the ?uestion of U.S. intervention was now
crucial. *ighting at ;ien Bien Phu reached maDor proportions as <hinese$supplied
artillery pounded the *rench and drove them bac.wards. "ithout an early intervention by
an eternal power) or group of powers) the *rench position at ;ien Bien Phu was li.ely to
be overrun. !n anticipation of the *rench re?uest for intervention) the @isenhower
#dministration decided to consult with <ongressional leaders. The President appears to
have thought that <ongressional support was vital for whatever active role the U.S. might
now ta.e in !ndochina.
#vailable Government documents do not provide details of the two meetings to be
described below. >owever) on the basis of seemingly reliable published sources) it
appears that on #pril 9 Secretary ;ulles and #dmiral 0adford met with eight
<ongressmen +three 0epublicans and five ;emocrats1 at the State ;epartment. 0adford
apparently outlined a plan for an air stri.e on the 4ietnam People=s #rmy +4P#1 at ;ien
Bien Phu using 7(( planes from the aircraft carriers @sse and Boer) stationed on
maneuvers in the South <hina Sea. #n unsuccessful air stri.e might need to be followed
by a second air stri.e) but ground forces were not envisaged at this stage. !t has been
averred that there were atomic bombs on the aircraft carriers which could be delivered by
the planes) but there is no indication that there was any serious consideration given to
using nuclear weapons at ;ien Bien Phu or elsewhere in !ndochina. !n the event of a
massive <hinese troop intervention) however) it is ?uite possible that the U.S. would have
retaliated with strategic nuclear weapons against targets in <hina.
The <ongressional leaders raised ?uestions about the amount of allied support for such an
action) about the position of the other :oint <hiefs) about the need for ground forces if a
second air stri.e also failed) and about the danger of a mammoth <hinese intervention
which could transform !ndochina into another Aorean$type war. 0adford apparently was
forced to admit that he was the only one of the :oint <hiefs who favored the intervention
plan. ;ulles conceded that the allies had not as yet been consulted. !n conse?uence)
;ulles) who had been thin.ing of a Doint <ongressional resolution authori2ing
Presidential use of U.S. air$naval power in !ndochina +which it is alleged he had ready in
his poc.et1 left the meeting without the vital support he needed. The <ongressional
leaders laid down three conditions necessary for their support3 +a1 formation of an allied
"coalition"$type force6 +b1 a *rench declaration indicating an intent to accelerate
independence for the #ssociated States6 +c1 *rench agreement to continue their
@peditionary <orps in !ndochina. Thus <ongressional opposition put the bra.e on a
possible unilateral U.S. intervention. #ccording to a subse?uent State ;epartment
Summary3
!t was the sense of the meeting that the U.S. should not intervene alone but should
attempt to secure the cooperation of other free nations concerned in Southeast #sia) and
that if such cooperation could be assured) it was probable that the U.S. <ongress would
authori2e U.S. participation in such "United #ction."
The following day) #pril 5) ;ulles and 0adford met with the President at the "hite
>ouse. The President reached the decision to intervene only upon the satisfaction of the
three conditions necessary for the U.S. "to commit belligerent acts" in !ndochina. There
would have to be a coalition "with active British <ommonwealth participation"6 a "full
political understanding with *rance and other countries)" and <ongressional approval.
President @isenhower clearly did not want the U.S. to intervene alone. >e also was very
concerned with having broad <ongressional support for any step which might involve the
U.S. in a war. #s Sherman #dams later observed3
>aving avoided one total war with 0ed <hina the year before in Aorea when he had
United Nations support) he F@isenhowerG was in no mood to provo.e another one in !ndo$
<hina by going it alone in a military action without the British and other "estern #llies.
>e was also determined not to become involved militarily in any foreign conflict without
the approval of <ongress. >e had had trouble enough convincing some Senators that it
was even necessary to send small groups of noncombatant #ir *orce technicians to !ndo$
<hina.
.. 5ritish 6ppose ?7nited #tion?
*rom #pril %% to %5) Secretary ;ulles visited /ondon and Paris to attempt to obtain
British and *rench commitments to support his proposal for "United #ction." #ccording
to President @isenhower) ;ulles felt that he had been given assurance of <ongressional
support for "United #ction" if the allies approved his plan.
;ulles found the British opposed to any type of collective military action prior to the
Geneva <onference. ;ulles eplained) according to @den=s account) that the U.S. had
concluded that the *rench could no longer deal with the situation in !ndochina) militarily
or politically) alone. !f the *rench position in !ndochina collapsed) the conse?uences in
the rest of Southeast #sia would be grave. U.S. air and naval forces were ready to
intervene and some aircraft carriers had already been moved from 8anila to the
!ndochina coast. Bn reflection) said ;ulles) he had thought that the U.S. should not act
alone in this matter and that an ad hoc coalition might be formed which might develop
later into a Southeast #sia defense organi2ation. This in itself would deter <hina from
further interference in !ndochina and would strengthen the western position at Geneva by
giving evidence of solidarity.
@den was not convinced. >e drew a distinction between the long term issue of collective
security in Southeast #sia$$which might well be guaranteed by treaty after Geneva$$and
the more immediate ?uestion of "united action" in !ndochina. >e was opposed to any
military action or warning announcement before Geneva. The British were willing to
provide the *rench with full diplomatic support at Geneva) either as a guarantor of the
final settlement or as a participant in multilateral tal.s if a settlement failed to
materiali2e. !n the latter case) the British were prepared to discuss a collective defense
formula that would comprehend any non$<ommunist portion of !ndochina formed as the
result of the Geneva deliberations. But they would not) prior to Geneva) commit
themselves to united action.
Britain=s distinction between the appropriateness of a united approach after) as opposed to
before) the <onference was founded on serious doubts about the true import of united
action. #s ;ulles correctly Dudged) behind Britain=s push for a settlement was the "fear
that if fighting continues) we will in one way or another become involved) thereby
enhancing ris. of <hinese intervention and possibility further epansion of war." @den
charged that action prior to the <onference would not only destroy chances for a peaceful
settlement) but would critically raise the ris. of a wider war. #merican planning admitted
the strong possibility of direct <hinese intervention) and his own intelligence staff had
concluded that "estern involvement would bring on the <hinese by land and air once the
4iet 8inh effort became "seriously endangered."
Thus) while ;ulles was angered at the way he felt the British were writing off !ndochina)
@den was highly pessimistic about ;ulles= militancy in an area of uncertain value for
which the United States had ambiguous) high$ris. plans. There was considerable
difference) in @den=s mind) between warnings to <ommunist <hina against direct
intervention before the fact +which the British went along with in mid$%&'91 and united
action) which would) despite any allied assurances to Pe.ing) be interpreted by the
<hinese as provocatory.
British suspicions) furthermore) were an etension of the belief that !ndochina need not
be entirely lost at Geneva in the absence of united action. /ondon was apparently pu22led
by #merican tal. of the "loss" of !ndochina) for to %( ;owning Street) "*rench cannot
lose the war between now F#pril %&'5G and the coming of the rainy season however
badly they may conduct it." F;oc. 9'G "hile ;ulles .ept telling the British that only
united action through the formation of a coalition could ensure against a complete
<ommunist diplomatic triumph at Geneva) @den was e?ually convinced that the best way
to assure continuation of the war would be united action) and that the *rench) even after
;ien Bien Phu) were still strong enough to prevent the <ommunists from gaining all
!ndochina.
@ven before ;ulles= #pril flight to /ondon to sound out the British on united action) the
<hurchill government was closely ?uestioning #merican evaluations of !ndochina. !n an
#pril % cable) for instance) ;ulles vented his disturbance at Britain=s refusal to accept the
view that the loss of !ndochina would ultimately affect their security interests in 8alaya)
#ustralia) and New Lealand. This was indeed the case) as ;ulles discovered for himself
once he tal.ed to @den in /ondon and later at Geneva. @den steadfastly refused to buy
;ulles= analogy between !ndochina and 8alaya) retorting that the situation in 8alaya was
"well in hand" while that in !ndochina was clearly not. #dmiral 0adford concluded in late
#pril from tal.s with the British chiefs of staff that the U.A. policy seemed "to be on a
very narrow basis strictly in terms of local U.A. interest without regard to other areas of
the *ar @ast such as :apan."
The British simply could not accept the domino principle even as they admitted Southeast
#sia=s security value to the free world. By the opening of the Geneva <onference) the
U.S.$U.A. relations had reached a low point3 ;ulles was insisting that the British were the
maDor roadbloc. to implementation of united action) while @den was clinging to the
notion that a negotiated settlement leading to partition would be the best outcome of an
impossibly comple politico$military situation in !ndochina.
A. Frenh 6ppose ?7nited #tion?
Secretary ;ulles fared little better in selling "united action" in Paris than he did in
/ondon) but for somewhat different reasons. The *rench were see.ing a ?uic. action to
avoid an imminent military defeat at ;ien Bien Phu. ;ulles) however) refused to be torn
from a collective allied approach to the !ndochina "ar. The *rench feared that a coalition
arrangement would lead to an internationali2ation of the war and ta.e control of it out of
their hands. They) therefore) only desired local assistance at ;ien Bien Phu along the
lines of Bperation 4ulture.
*urthermore) another obDection to "united action" from the *rench viewpoint was that it
would only delay or impede the very negotiations leading towards a settlement which the
*rench increasingly desired. The U.S. obDective was to .eep alive the *rench
determination to continue the war. ;uties feared that the *rench would use Geneva to
find a face$saving formula for a *rench surrender. Premier /aniel reaffirmed to ;ulles in
Paris that his government would ta.e no action which directly or indirectly turned
!ndochina over to the <ommunists. But he also called attention to the increasing desire on
the part of many in *rance to get out of !ndochina at any cost. The *rench stressed that it
was necessary to await the results of the Geneva <onference and that they could not give
the impression in advance that they believed Geneva would fail.
$. #@orted /or0ing :roup on ;olleti'e Defense in Southeast #sia (#pril 81)
!mmediately upon returning to "ashington on #pril %' Secretary ;ulles invited
representatives of the United Aingdom) *rance) the #ssociated States) #ustralia) New
Lealand) the Philippines) and Thailand to attend a meeting on the 7(th to set up an ad hoc
defense group for the Southeast #sia region. The delegates were to wor. on a draft for a
future organi2ation. The Secretary had been under the impression from his tal. in /ondon
with @den that the U.A.) while reDecting immediate "united action" in !ndochina) would
have no obDection to such a preliminary meeting.
Bn #pril %J) Dust two days before the scheduled meeting) the British #mbassador
informed ;ulles that there would be no British participation. The reasons3
no understanding on the part of the British *oreign Secretary that the wor.ing group
would go forward at once) and no agreement concerning membership. The ;epartment
epressed ama2ement) but in view of the British attitude the #pril 7( meeting was
transformed into a general briefing for the nations comprising the allied side at the
Geneva <onference. !n a later eplanation of the shift in British attitude) *oreign
Secretary @den said that in agreeing to informal wor.ing group tal.s he had overloo.ed
the pending <olombo <onference and that he felt that it would have been most
undesirable to give any public indication of membership in a program for united action
before the end of the <olombo discussions. !t is now clear that the British were restrained
by !ndia and by a fear that British attendance at the meeting would be construed as assent
to "united action." 8oreover) /ondon could not have been reassured by a "trial balloon"
speech of 4ice President Nion on #pril %- in which he suggested that the U.S. might
have to "ta.e the ris. by putting our boys in" in order to avoid "further <ommunist
epansion in #sia and !ndochina."
9. ;ontinued Frenh Prodding for 7.S. !nter'ention (#pril 81-8.)
!n preparation for the !ndochina phase of the Geneva <onference) tripartite discussions
+U.S.) U.A.) *rance1 too. place in Paris in mid$#pril. !n these discussions) the *rench
contended that a successful Geneva settlement was dependent on a favorable outcome of
the battle at ;ien Bien Phu and that their participation in a Southeast #sian coalition
might not be possible if ;ien Bien Phu fell. There could be no guarantee what position
*rance would ta.e in the event of a collapse at ;ien Bien Phu. The *rench argued that
only large$scale United States air and naval intervention could retrieve the situation in
!ndochina. They made no formal re?uest for intervention in the tripartite discussions) but
on several occasions suggested or implied to the #mericans that such action was
necessary.
Bn #pril 7%) 8arc :ac?uet) *rench Secretary of State for the #ssociated States) told the
#merican #mbassador to !ndochina) ;onald >eath) then in Paris) that no *rench military
authority still believed a victory was possible in !ndochina without United States air and
naval intervention) and that such action should be indicated after the impending failure of
the !ndochina phase of the Geneva <onference.
Bn #pril 77) *oreign 8inister Bidault) with General @ly) suggested to Secretary ;ulles
that there should be emergency consultation between General Navarre and #merican
military commanders in !ndochina. The *oreign 8inister indicated that) although he had
been opposed to internationali2ing the war) he would now favor it with United States
participation if that would save ;ien Bien Phu.
Bn #pril 79 the *rench Under Secretary of State) #ndrV Bougenot) in the presence of
Premier /aniel) suggested to ;ouglas 8ac#rthur !!) <ounselor of the ;epartment of
State) that the United States could commit its naval aircraft to the battle at ;ien Bien Phu
without ris.ing #merican prestige or committing an act of belligerency by placing such
aircraft) painted with *rench insignia and construed as part of the *rench *oreign /egion)
under nominal *rench command for an isolated action consisting of air stri.es lasting two
or three days.
Bn the same day *oreign 8inister Bidault showed the Secretary a message from General
Navarre in which the *rench commander said that the situation at ;ien Bien Phu was
desperate and that he believed that the only alternatives were +%1 Bperation 4#UTBU0)
massive B$7& bombing +which Secretary ;ulles understood would be a United States
operation from bases outside !ndochina1) or +71 a *rench Union re?uest for a cease$fire
+which the Secretary assumed would be at ;ien Bien Phu only) but which General
Navarre) as it turned out) meant should apply to all of !ndochina1.
D. F!3#" 7.S. P6S!T!63 5EF62E :E3EB#
1. EChanges 4ith the Frenh
The #merican response to these various suggestions was to reiterate to the *rench the
necessary preconditions for #merican intervention3 +%1 complete independence for the
#ssociated States6 +71 <ongressional authori2ation6 +91 a coalition that would include the
United Aingdom. !n relation to the need for a coalition) Secretary ;ulles in Paris and
Under Secretary ". Bedell Smith in "ashington suggested to *rench officials that
*rance) in the same way as it had as.ed for #merican air intervention in !ndochina)
should appeal for British intervention there.
Before leaving Paris for Geneva) Secretary ;ulles gave *oreign 8inister Bidault a letter
replying to General Navarre=s suggestion that United States air intervention at ;ien Bien
Phu was the sole alternative to a cease$fire. !n this letter) the Secretary stated again the
necessary preconditions for United States intervention) and contended that if ;ien Bien
Phu fell there was no reason that this should ma.e it necessary to plead for a cease$fire.
The *rench *oreign 8inister) in a letter limited to the military conse?uences of United
States intervention) replied that in the opinion of *rench military eperts "a massive
intervention of #merican aviation would still be able to save the garrison."
8. EChanges 4ith the 7.D.
!n the discussions with the British) meanwhile) the United States had tried both to induce
the United Aingdom to participate in a Doint #nglo$#merican air and naval intervention
at ;ien Bien Phu and to persuade the United Aingdom that the prompt organi2ation of a
collective defense in Southeast #sia was necessary to bolster the *rench in !ndochina.
But the British indicated that they would ma.e no commitment to intervene militarily in
!ndochina and wished to postpone conversations on collective defense arrangements until
after the Geneva <onference. *oreign Secretary @den told Secretary ;ulles on #pril 75
that the British did not want at this Duncture to intervene in the !ndochina "ar.
!mmediately afterward @den returned to /ondon for a special <abinet meeting on the
!ndochina crisis which was held on #pril 7'. Prime 8inister <hurchill reported to the
>ouse of <ommons two days later that the British Government was "not prepared to give
any underta.ings about United Aingdom military action in !ndochina in advance of the
results of Geneva)" and had "not entered into any new political or military commitments."
Before addressing the <ommons) <hurchill had reDected a plea from *rench #mbassador
0enV 8assigli) made on behalf of Premier /aniel) for a statement that Great Britain
would Doin the United States and *rance in defense of ;ien Bien Phu.
The United Aingdom was willing) however) to participate in early military discussions to
consider measures which might be ta.en in Southeast #sia if !ndochina were lost. #long
these lines) *oreign Secretary @den and Secretary ;ulles had discussed tentatively on
#pril 77 the possibility of a secret military appraisal$$by the United States) the United
Aingdom) #ustralia) New Lealand) and Thailand$$of what could be done to bolster
Thailand in the event of a *rench collapse in !ndochina. The *oreign Secretary had
returned to this proposition in another conversation with Secretary ;ulles the net day.
Bn #pril 9() indicating that the British were prepared to defend the area outside
!ndochina) and possibly the free part of a partitioned !ndochina) @den proposed to
Secretary ;ulles "an immediate and secret Doint eamination of the political and military
problems in creating a collective defense for Southeast #sia) namely3 +a1 nature and
purpose6 +b1 membership6 +c1 commitments." >e added that this eamination should also
cover immediate measures to strengthen Thailand.
Secretary ;ulles raised the ?uestion of early military tal.s that might strengthen the
*rench position at the Geneva <onference at a meeting in Geneva on 8ay 7 with the
*oreign 8inisters of #ustralia and New Lealand) partners of the United States in the
#NLUS organi2ation. The three agreed at this meeting that there should be five$power
military tal.s in "ashington among the #NLUS powers) the United Aingdom) and
*rance) with the possible participation of Thailand.
3. The /ashington Bie4point
!n "ashington in the meantime) the President on #pril 7,) the opening date of the
Geneva <onference) told a group of 0epublican leaders that it would be a "tragic error"
for the United States to intervene unilaterally as a partner of *rance in the !ndochina
struggle. Two days later) in a discussion with Under Secretary ". Bedell Smith)
Presidential #ssistant 0obert <utler) and #dmiral 0adford +who had Dust been to /ondon
and had tal.ed with the British <hiefs of Staff and Prime 8inister <hurchill1) the
President epressed disappointment over the British attitude of refraining from active
participation in discussions on a Southeast #sian collective security arrangement before
the end of the Geneva <onference. President @isenhower) in this discussion) reiterated his
firm decision that there would be no United States military intervention in !ndochina by
eecutive action. >e urged his aides to provide help to the *rench in repairing three
airfields in !ndochina but to avoid any undue ris. of involving the United States in
combat operations.
The feasibility of #merican intervention at ;ien Bien Phu was finally removed with the
fall of that fortress on 8ay -. President @isenhower sent messages to the President of
*rance) 0enV <oty) and to the <hief of State of 4ietnam) Bao ;ai) praising the defenders
of ;ien Bien Phu and stressing the determination of the free world to remain "faithful to
the causes for which they fought."
E. 2E#PP2#!S#" 6F D6M!36 T)E62< #FTE2 D!E3 5!E3 P)7
The fall of ;ien Bien Phu) and the failure to organi2e an intervention through "united
action" prior to the opening of the Geneva <onference in late #pril) %&'5) led to a
reappraisal of the "domino theory" which had been at the center of U.S. policy in
Southeast #sia since the late %&5(=s. The loss of Ton.in) or 4ietnam) or perhaps even all
of !ndochina) was no longer considered to lead ineorably to the loss to <ommunism of
all of Southeast #sia.
#ccordingly) Secretary ;ulles in a press conference on 8ay %% +four days after the
*rench surrender at ;ien Bien Phu1 observed that "Southeast #sia could be secured even
without perhaps 4ietnam) /aos and <ambodia." >e went on to note that although he
would not want to underestimate the importance of these countries he would not want
either to give the impression that "if events that we could not control) and which we do
not anticipate) should lead to their being lost that we would consider the whole situation
hopeless and we would give up in despair . . ." !n a remar. at the press conference that
was later deleted from the official transcript) ;ulles said that /aos and <ambodia were
"important but by no means essential" because they were poor countries with meager
populations.
/ater) as the U.S. became reconciled to a political settlement at Geneva which would
yield northern 4ietnam to the >o <hi 8inh regime) the concept of "united action" was
given a new twist. !t now was transformed into an attempt to organi2e a long$range
collective defense alliance which would offset the setbac. in !ndochina and prevent
further losses. That long$feared setbac. was now perceived to be less serious than had
once been envisaged. The loss of Ton.in was no longer seen as leading necessarily to a
<ommunist ta.e$over of other territory between <hina and the #merican shore.
@ventually) in S@#TB) the U.S. sought to create an alliance which would be strong
enough to withstand the fall of one such domino.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 9) "The Geneva <onference) 8ay$:uly) %&'5"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section %) pp. %(J$%5,
!. B#<AG0BUN; TB T>@ <BN*@0@N<@
Bn *ebruary %J) %&'5) a Doint communi?uV from Berlin issued by the United States)
Great Britain) the Soviet Union) and *rance announced that in late #pril the Big *our and
other parties concerned would meet at Geneva to see. a peaceful solution of the eight$
year$old war in !ndochina. Between those dates) the "estern allies engaged in a series of
discussions centered around #merican proposals for direct intervention) while the
<ommunist side$the USS0) <ommunist <hina +<P01) and the 4iet 8inh$wor.ed to
ensure that they would enter the forthcoming Geneva <onference ftom a position of
strength.
The @isenhower #dministration found as much difficulty in persuading *rance and Great
Britain that fundamental changes in the war were necessary before the start of the
conference as in accepting the notion of a negotiated solution in !ndochina. The troubles
with *rance had begun in mid$%&'9 when the U.S. Government gave its conditional
approval to the Navarre Plan) which provided for radically new *rench field tactics and a
buildup of the 4ietnamese National #rmy +4N#1. #merican hopes that assistance in
money and war materiel would elicit a *rench commitment to a program to attract native
!ndochinese into close military and political collaboration with the colonial governments)
especially in 4ietnam) were not fulfilled. Nor was *rance hospitable to #merican
suggestions for greater involvement of the 8ilitary #dvisory #ssistance Group +8##G1
in *rench planning. #s was to be the case almost throughout the !ndochina crisis) *rance
capitali2ed on #merican fears of National #ssembly reDection of the @uropean ;efense
<ommunity +@;<1 treaty and of a *rench pull$out from !ndochina to gain U.S. aid
without having to ma.e commensurate concessions on 4ietnamese independence or
tactical planning. #merican attempts to tie aid to such concessions were never followed
through) and whatever leverage on *rench policy$ma.ing in !ndochina the United States
possessed was left largely uneploited.
*or the most part) *rance=s reDection of #merican conditions and suggestions was based
on the /aniel government=s conviction) implemented 2ealously by *rench civil and
military authorities in !ndochina) that the United States would be intruding in *rance=s
domain. # policy of systematic restrictions on #merican officials in the field prevented
the United States from ma.ing independent evaluations of the war=s progress) with the
result that the Government was for many months badly informed and unwarrantedly
optimistic about the *rench Union army=s chances against the 4iet 8inh. !n late 8arch
and #pril %&'5) when it became clear to "ashington that the Navarre Plan had failed and
that +in Secretary of State ;ulles= words1 "united action" was necessary to prevent
!ndochina from falling to the <ommunists) the *rench revealed that their distrust of
#merican "interference" etended to any plans for overt #merican air$naval involvement.
The /aniel government was perfectly amenable to locali2ed #merican intervention at
;ienbienphu to save the besieged *rench army from disaster6 but it stood firmly opposed
to ;ulles= concept of collective +"estern$#sian1 defense in a security organi2ation that
would) if necessary) intervene to prevent the "loss" of !ndochina. *rance=s re?uests for
assistance at ;ienbienphu were entirely consistent with long$standing policy in Paris that
loo.ed to a negotiated settlement of the war on "honorable" terms at the same time as it
hoped to be in the best possible military position at the time negotiations began.
Bpposition to "united action" was no less stubborn in /ondon. The British) li.e the
*rench) were suspicious of #merican intentions in calling for that alternative) though for
different reasons. To the <hurchill government) the United States) even while
proclaiming a strong desire to avoid open conflict with <ommunist <hina) was tending
precisely in that direction by insisting on the formation of a collective security pact prior
to the start of the Geneva <onference. @isenhower=s letter to <hurchill on #pril 5) %&'5)
could only have reinforced those suspicions) for the President described united action as
an attempt to ma.e <hina stop supporting the 4iet 8inh rather than face the prospect of
large$scale allied involvement in 4ietnam. #lthough the British were not as.ed to ma.e
substantial ground troop commitments to a united action) they felt that their approval
would ultimately condone a widening of the war that would ris. bringing in the <hinese
who) the British argued) could not possibly be epected to cease assistance they had been
providing since %&'(. /ondon therefore told ;ulles it would not approve united action
and preferred to await the outcome of the negotiations before deciding whether the
!ndochina situation warranted resort to military alternatives. The British were perfectly
willing to tal. about regional defense in the *ar @ast) but only after the results were in on
the negotiations. Until then) they said) they would limit themselves to providing full
diplomatic support to the *rench in search of a peaceful solution.
;ifferences among the allies were therefore acute as the conference opened. The *rench
had cleverly eploited the #merican assistance program without having brought in the
#mericans in full force) yet had also been unable to save ;ienbienphu from being
overrun on 8ay -. The British were felt in "ashington to have been the primary obstacle
to united action6 they were accused of having been so blinded by their own self$interest in
other areas of Southeast #sia that they failed to appreciate the vast strategic importance
to the *ree "orld of saving !ndochina.
<ontrasting <ommunist unity on the eve of the conference was more a matter of Sino$
Soviet agreement on the desirability of negotiations than of complete accord among the
three parties. !n the aftermath of Stalin=s death) Soviet foreign policy under 8alen.ov had
altered considerably. ;omestic priorities no doubt influenced the regime=s proclaimed
hopes for a reduction in international tension. Pe.ing) more intimately involved in the
4iet 8inh cause) stepped up its assistance to General Giap=s forces between *ebruary and
#pril %&'5) but also agreed with 8oscow on the desirability of convening an
international conference) which <hina would attend) to end the fighting. The limited
available evidence suggests that the ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam +;041 alone
among the three <ommunist parties considered the call for negotiations premature and
urged that they be preceded by intensified military efforts. >o=s much$publici2ed offer in
late November %&'9 to tal. with the *rench was intended more to influence *rench
domestic and official opinion and to demorali2e *ranco$4ietnamese troops than to evince
sincere interest in arriving at an e?uitable settlement. !n ensuing months) ;04 broadcasts
showed a far greater interest in first achieving a clear$cut military victory in the Ton.in
;elta and parts of /aos than in engaging in discussions while *rench forces remained
scattered throughout !ndochina.
These developments) in very broad outline) provided the bac.drop to the Geneva
<onference. Strength and wea.ness seemed to be the respective characteristics of the
<ommunist and "estern positions. Cet these terms are) as we shall see) not entirely
accurate) for the interaction between and within the two sides was to ma.e clear that the
Geneva <onference would not be the setting for a victor=s peace.
!!. T>@ <BN;U<T #N; ST0U<TU0@ B* ;!P/B8#<C
Bne of the first agreements reached at the Geneva <onference occurred in the course of a
conversation between 4. 8. 8olotov and #nthony @den on 8ay ') when the Soviet
foreign minister endorsed the foreign secretary=s assertion that this negotiation was the
most difficult he had ever encountered.Y !ndeed) it seems at first glance somewhat
paradoical that the !ndochina phase of the Geneva <onference +8ay J$:uly 7%1 should
have resulted in a settlement within less than a do2en wee.s) given the unusual
difficulties facing the negotiators on both sides. +See Table %1 Aey issues were postponed
until the eleventh hour while debate wore endlessly on over relatively insignificant
matters6 contact among the delegations was limited by ideological proDudices and
political antagonisms) forcing some delegates to act as mediators no less than as
representatives of national interests6 and maDor agreements were reached outside the
special framewor. for discussions that the conferees had ta.en a month to build.
Y # valuable source is #nthony @den) 8emoirs3 *ull <ircle) >oughton$8ifflin) Boston)
%&,(.
T#B/@ %
<>!@* N@GBT!#TB0S #T T>@ G@N@4# <BN*@0@N<@ BN !N;B<>!N#
United Aingdom
#nthony @den
United States
General "alter Bedell Smith
U. #leis :ohnson
<hinese People=s 0epublic
<hou @n$lai
<hang "en$t=ien
/i A=e$nung
4iet 8inh
Pham 4an ;ong
/aos
Phoui Sanani.one
USS0
4yacheslav 8olotov
*rance
Georges Bidault
:ean <hauvel
Pierre 8endZs$*rance
4ietnam
;ac Ahe
Tran 4an ;o
<ambodia
Tep Phan
Sam Sary
#. T>@ 0@P0@S@NT#T!BN KU@ST!BN
The first maDor roadbloc. in the negotiations was the <ommunist claims concerning the
representation of parties not present at the conference. Since the conference had already
begun when these claims were forwarded) the chances of epanding the list of invited
parties were very limited. Nevertheless) through fourteen restricted and seven plenary
sessions)Y bitter controversy raged over <ommunist insistence that the 4iet 8inh$led
*ree <ambodian +Ahmer !ssara.1 and *ree /aotian +Pathet /ao1 forces were entitled to
be seated beside representatives of the 0oyal Governments of <ambodia and /aos. Not
until :une %,) when Premier <hou @n$lai) <hina=s foreign minister and chief delegate)
indicated to @den that 4iet 8inh forces would be withdrawn from <ambodia and /aos)
was the debate resolved and the way opened for serious efforts to bring about cease$fires
throughout !ndochina.
The time$consuming echanges over the authenticity of <ommunist "resistance forces" in
/aos and <ambodia were) interestingly enough) not duplicated when it came to
determining the status of the ;04. The Berlin <onference final communi?uV had
specified that the !ndochina deliberations would be attended by the United States) Great
Britain) <ommunist <hina) the Soviet Union) *rance) "and other states concerned."
!nvitations to the participants would) it was further agreed) be issued only by the Berlin
conferees) i.e.) by the Big *our but not by Pe.ing. Cet) as 8olotov admitted at the first
plenary session +8ay J1) Pe.ing as well as 8oscow invited the ;0y) a move vigorously
assailed by *rance and the United States. F;oc. 5'G No attempt was made) however) to
bloc. the ;04=s participation. ;espite the antagonism of the 4ietnamese government
nominally headed by Bao ;ai) +Bao ;ai=s consistent position) supported by Ngo ;inh
;iem when he too. over the premiership on :une %J) was that his was the only legitimate
government in 4ietnam) while the 4iet 8inh were not political competitors but merely
armed rebels.1 the ;04 was generally considered one of the principal combatants whose
consent to a cease$fire) being indispensable) re?uired its participation. 8oreover) the
Soviet Union indicated to the *rench that it would not accept the presence of delegates
from the #ssociated States of !ndochina +4ietnam) <ambodia) and /aos1 unless the ;04
was admitted to the conference. By the time of ;ienbienphu=s fall +8ay -1) all parties
were agreed that there would be nine delegations +though not States1 discussing
!ndochina6 and on 8ay J the first session got underway.
Y !n all) the Geneva <onference comprised eight plenary and twenty$two restricted
sessions. These were ?uite apart from the *ranco$4iet 8inh military command
conferences held after :une 7) as well as from 4iet 8inh military staff tal.s with /aotian
and <ambodian representatives that begain in late :une. *inally) during the latter half of
the conference) *rench and 4iet 8inh delegation heads met secretly in so$called
"underground" negotiations) the results of which were closely held) at least by the *rench.
B. T>@ <B88UN!<#T!BN G#PS
Nine delegations seated at a roundtable to echange views) about every second day)
obscured the fact that true bargaining was not ta.ing place. Proposals were) of course)
tabled and debated6 but actual give$and$ta.e was reserved for private discussions) usually
in the absence of the pro$"estern !ndochinese parties. @ven then) the Geneva tal.s on
!ndochina were hardly dominated by Big Power cabais6 political and ideological
differences were so intense) particularly between the #merican and <hinese
representatives) that diplomacy had to be conducted circuitously) with @den and 8olotov
fre?uently acting as mediators and messengers for delegates unwilling to be found
together. +#s one eample of the #merican attitude) ;uties told reporters Dust prior to the
first session that the only way he could possibly meet with <hou @n$lai was if their cars
collided.1
#nthony @den) whose persistence in the face of adverse developments throughout the
conference was rewarded in the end) has provided this description of personal tribulation3
! was conscious that time was not on our side. Since neither the #mericans nor the
*rench had established any contacts with the <ommunist representatives Fin mid$:uneG) !
had been compelled to adopt the rote of intermediary between the "estern powers and
the <ommunists. 8y activities in this respect were open to every .ind of
misrepresentation. ! was concerned about their effect on #nglo$#merican relations. Bn
the other hand) ! was encouraged by the close accord maintained throughout the
conference between ourselves and the other members of the <ommonwealth) including
those) li.e 8r. Nehru) who were not represented at Geneva. They sent me messages of
than.s and encouragement. ! needed them) for ! began to feet that we should never ma.e
effective headway. ! had never .nown a conference of this .ind. The parties would not
ma.e direct contact and we were in constant danger of one or another bac.ing out of the
door.
Not until the latter half of :une did high$ran.ing *rench and 4iet 8inh delegates meet
face$to$face) did 4iet 8inh military officials confer with <ambodian and /aotian
representatives) and did *rench and <hinese heads$of$delegation privately echange
views. <ommunist and non$<ommunist 4ietnamese) meanwhile) refused to tal. to one
another until :uly) when finally Tran 4an ;o and Pham 4an ;ong were persuaded to
have private discussions. 8ost importantly) the #merican delegation +US;@/1) under
strict instructions to avoid contact with the <hinese) had to rely on second$hand
information provided by the British) *rench) and Soviet representatives) a procedure that
was repeated with respect to the 4iet 8inh.
The problem of contact was no more acutely felt than by the delegation of the State of
4ietnam. #lthough finally granted complete independence by *rance under treaties
initialed in Paris #pril 7J and approved by both governments :une 5) 4ietnam did not
gain the concurrent power to negotiate its own fate. The *rench) clearly anious lest the
4ietnamese upset the delicate state of private tal.s with the 4iet 8inh) avoided Bao ;ai=s
representatives whenever possible and sought to eploit close 4ietnamese$#merican
relations in informing the 4ietnamese only after agreements had been reached. ;uring
:une) for instance) :ean <hauvel) head of the *rench delegation) on several occasions
approached the #mericans with information on the "underground" negotiations with the
4iet 8inh and with the hope that) once partition had been fied) the United States would
"sell" that solution to Saigon. F;oc. ,(G !n the same month) <hauvel) evincing complete
understanding of #merican determination to avoid approving or ac?uiescing in a partition
settlement) nevertheless as.ed if the United States would soften 4ietnamese opposition to
it by indicating it was the best solution obtainable. <hauvel described ;iem and his
predecessor) Buu /oc) as difficult) unrealistic) and unreasonable on the subDect. F;oc. ,,G
!n an aide$memoire delivered to ;uties and @den on :une 7, by >enri Bonnet) the *rench
ambassador to "ashington) Paris urged "ashington not to encourage an adverse
4ietnamese reaction to partition. The United States was also as.ed "to intervene with the
4ietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self$control and to dissuade them from
refusing an agreement which) if it is reached) is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning
them) but on the contrary by the desire to save in !ndochina all that can possibly be saved)
and to give the 4ietnamese state) under peaceful conditions) opportunities which have not
always been possible heretofore because of the war." To these approaches) the United
States consistently reacted negatively in the undoubtedly correct belief that the *rench
were merely attempting to identify the United States in 4ietnamese eyes with the
partition concept. By refusing to act as intermediaries for the *rench) the #merican
delegation .ept free of association with a "*rench solution" to the 4ietnam problem.
*rench aloofness from the 4ietnamese continued into :uly. ;espite #merican re?uests of
the *rench delegation that the 4ietnamese be .ept informed of developments) the *rench
demurred. <hauvel informed U. #leis :ohnson) chief deputy to the head of the US;@/)
General "aiter Bedell Smith) that "he was handling this Fliaison with the 4ietnameseG
through members of his staff and was avoiding direct contact with 4ietnamese in order
not to have to answer their ?uestions." "hen Bffroy) another member of the *rench
delegation) suggested that the United States placate the 4ietnamese with assurance of
*ree "orld political) economic) and military support after the settlement) :ohnson replied
that this was a matter for the *rench to handle. Not until late in the <onference did the
4ietnamese government become aware of the strong possibility that partition would
become part of the settlement6 on this and other developments) as we shall see) the
4ietnamese were .ept in the dar.) a circumstance that was to solidify 4ietnamese
hostility to and dissociation from the final terms.
But the 4ietnamese loyal to Bao ;ai were not alone in being denied important
information) although they suffered worst from it. The United States delegation itself
several times suspected that it was not receiving all the news the *rench were in a
position to provide. The fault) however) lay as much with the ambiguous status under
which the delegation operated as with the *rench who were to act as messengers. Bn the
one hand) the #mericans wanted to use their influence to ensure that the *rench not sell
out "estern interests for the sa.e of a ?uic. settlement6 on the other) they were
determined not to become so involved in the bargaining process as to lin. the
#dministration to the final terms. The resolution of these apparently conflicting aims was
offered by ;uties on the eve of the conference in a bac.ground briefing to newsmen at
Geneva. >e said that primary responsibility for decisions ta.en at the conference
belonged to the *rench and 4ietnamese on one side) and to the 4iet 8inh on the other.
The United States "would be inclined not to try to interpose FitsG veto in any sense as
against what they might want to do." #s to whether this attitude applied e?ually to
substantive provisions of any settlement) the Secretary indicated that the United States
would) if necessary) refuse to ac.nowledge results contrary to #merican "interests"3
! would thin. that Fnonapplication of a vetoG would be true up to the point at least where
we felt that the issues involved had a pretty demonstrable interest to the United States
itself. The United States does have pretty considerable interests in the "estern Pacific)
and there are some solutions there which we would regard as so disadvantageous that we
would see. to prevent them. #nd if we failed in that respect) we would probably want to
disassociate ourselves from it Fthe final settlementG.
Thus) the United States would apply the tactic of "disassociation" should its influence not
be sufficient to ma.e the final terms compatible with #merican "interests." Cet the
*rench) against whom the tactic was primarily directed) were probably +and ?uite
naturally1 averse to .eeping their #merican colleagues so well informed of developments
in the tal.s with the 4iet 8inh that the United States would have occasion to resort to
"disassociation." Throughout the conference) in fact) the *rench aimed at eploiting the
#merican presence for the strength they believed it provided their negotiators) and this
policy meant pressuring "ashington to retain a high$ran.ing delegation at the conference
right up to the moment of the settlement.
"hatever the rationale for *rench behavior) the US;@/ complained to "ashington that
it was not being .ept fully informed of developments in the "underground" *ranco$4iet
8inh tal.s. The change in government in Paris during :une from /aniel to Pierre
8endZs$*rance helped matters somewhat. But though it was conceded that 8endZs$
*rance=s representatives had done better than their predecessors in .eeping the United
States apprised) the United States still felt) as ;ulles put it) that while Paris was not
willfully concealing information) there remained a "certain lac. of any intimacy..." F;oc.
,'G
The British also felt loc.ed out of news that vitally affected them. Particularly during
8ay) when "ashington and Paris were fre?uently in touch about possible military
intervention) the British were highly disturbed to find newspapers their best source of
information on the intentions of their foremost allies. Since /ondon was no longer
considered essential to "united action" +see Section !41) the #mericans and the *rench
had evidently agreed that their negotiations should be .ept under wraps until such time as
a decision was made. Bnly after @den confronted Under Secretary Smith with the
newspaper stories +which may have been deliberate "lea.s" to influence the Geneva
deliberations1 did ;ulles direct that the British) #ustralian) and New Lealand
ambassadors be informed "in general terms" regarding U.S.$*rench tal.s. ;iplomay
among the "estern Big Three clearly reflected the rifts that had developed in the alliance
over intervention before the ;ienbienphu disaster6 as a result) secrecy and bilateral
discussions tended to be the rule) thereby complicating the already mammoth tas. of
presenting a united "estern front against the <ommunist negotiators.
Thus far we have been dealing with diplomacy as it was conducted by the non$
<ommunist delegations. "hat of the <ommunistsN The available documentation limits
the comments we may ma.e) but still permits some remar.s) both definite and
speculative. *irst) the <hinese) Soviet) and 4iet 8inh delegations were in constant touch)
as reported by their news agencies. 8oreover) <hou @n$lai was able to ma.e three
stopovers in 8oscow during the conference that very li.ely heightened Sino$Soviet
coordination. *inally) during a recess for heads of delegation) <hou and >o <hi 8inh
held a three$day meeting in early :uly that may have provided the turning point in the
4iet 8inh=s more conciliatory attitude thereafter. !n brief) the <ommunists apparently
were not plagued by the .inds of communication problems that hampered the #mericans)
British) and 4ietnamese.
#s will be argued in greater detail subse?uently) the fre?uent meetings of the <ommunist
delegations did not result in a uniformity of views. The <hinese and Soviets evidently
wor.ed independent of the 4iet 8inh whenever their separate interests dictated the need
for advancement of progress in the negotiations. #t times when the 4iet 8inh were
intransigent) <hou and 8olotov fre?uently too. the initiative to brea. log Dams that
threatened to plunge the conference into irresolvable deadloc.. 8uch li.e @den) <hou
and 8olotov sometimes found themselves playing the role of mediator) a role which
they) and particularly <hou) relished for what *red !.lV has called the "side$effects" of
negotiations$benefits deriving from) but incidental to) negotiations) such as enhanced
prestige. !n the end) the 4iet 8inh advantage of close rapport with 8oscow and Pe.ing
did not prevent the 4iet 8inh from sharing with their non$<ommunist compatriots the
ignominious distinction of having been undercut by allies.
!!!. T>@ ;@4@/BP8@NT B* B#0G#!N!NG PBS!T!BNS
#. T)E 73!TED ST#TES #3D T)E 3E:6T!#T!63S
!n underwriting the Navarre Plan and proceeding with utmost caution in urging *rance to
improve its relationship with the non$<ommunist 4ietnamese nationalists) the United
States hoped to influence Paris to postpone a commitment to negotiations until *rench
forces were at least on the threshold of military victory. "hile aware of the strong
pressures on the /aniel government from the National #ssembly and the *rench public
for a peaceful settlement) the United States) clearly influenced by the eperience at
PanmunDom) sought to persuade the premier not to let the clamor for peace drive him to
the bargaining table. #s late as ;ecember %&'9 /aniel agreed that "ashington=s aversion
to premature negotiations was well$advised6 but two months later) at Berlin) his
government Doined with the Soviet Union in calling for an international conference to end
the !ndochina conflict. The *rench government found it could no longer ignore anti$war
sentiment at home without Deopardi2ing its survival) while the #mericans) however
strongly opposed to bringing the war to the conference table with victory nowhere in
sight and with <ommunist <hina as a negotiating opponent) felt compelled to approve the
Berlin decision if only to blunt the *rench threat of scuttling @;<.
*orced to go along with *rench preference for negotiating with the <ommunists) the
United States remained unalterably pessimistic about the probable results. This attitude
was first set out fully by the :oint <hiefs of Staff in 8arch %&'5. F;oc. 79G The <hiefs
eamined the alternatives to military victory and found them all infeasible or
unacceptable to the United States. # ceasefire prior to a political settlement) the :<S
paper states) "would) in all probability) lead to a political stalemate attended by a
concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the *ranco$4ietnamese military position." #
coalition government would lead to <ommunist control by .eeping any outside assistance
from preventing a sei2ure of power from within. Partition) on the other hand) would mean
recogni2ing <ommunist success by force of arms) ceding the .ey Ton.in ;elta to the
communists) and) even if confined to only one of the three !ndochinese states)
undercutting our containment policy in #sia.
The <hiefs also commented at some length on the difficult ?uestion of elections in
4ietnam. They too. the position that even if elections could be held along democratic
lines +which they doubted1) a <ommunist victory would almost certainly result because
of <ommunist territorial control) popular support) and superior tactics3
Such factors as the prevalence of illiteracy) the lac. of suitable educational media) and
the absence of ade?uate communications in the outlying areas would render the holding
of a truly representative plebiscite of doubtful feasibility. The <ommunists) by virtue of
their superior capability in the field of propaganda) could readily pervert the issue as
being a choice between national independence and *rench <olonial rule. *urthermore) it
would be militarily infeasible to prevent widespread intimidation of voters by <ommunist
partisans. "hile it is obviously impossible to ma.e a dependable forecast as to the
outcome of a free election) current intelligence leads the :oint <hiefs to the belief that a
settlement based upon free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the
#ssociated States to <ommunist control.
The :<S views) together with the recommendation that the United States not associate
itself with any settlement that "would fail to provide reasonably ade?uate assurance of the
future political and territorial integrity of !ndochina . . .)" were approved by the Secretary
of ;efense on 8arch 79.
The :<S position reflected Government policy) for in the remaining months before the
<onference the United States privately stood opposed to any course of action other than
full prosecution of the war. ;ulles) spea.ing with *rench #mbassador >enri Bonnet on
#pril 9) reasoned thaf a negotiated settlement would lead only to face$saving formulae
for either a *rench or a 4iet 8inh surrender. The Secretary termed a division of
!ndochina "impractical" and a coalition government the "beginning of disaster"6 neither
arrangement could prevent a *rench surrender. F;oc. 7-G The President himself echoed
this either$or approach. "riting to <hurchill #pril 5) @isenhower proposed3 "There is no
negotiated solution of the !ndochina problem which in essence would not be either a face$
saving device to cover a *rench surrender or a face$saving device to cover a <ommunist
retirement." #nd) as already observed) it was precisely to bring about the latter$<hina=s
"discreet disengagement" from support of the 4iet 8inh$that the President wanted British
cooperation in united action.
<oncomitantly) the United States was concerned that a disaster at ;ienbienphu would
propel the *rench into acceptance of an immediate) unsupervised cease$fire even before
the conference was to begin. ;ulles obtained assurances from Bidault that the *rench
would not agree to such a cease$fire. But the Secretary found the British less infleible)
with @den doubting the #merican view that a sudden cease$fire would lead either to a
massacre of the *rench by the native people or to large$scale infiltration of *rench$held
terrain by 4iet 8inh forces. F;oc. 9-G
Thus assured by the *rench but mindful of both *rench and British preference for trying
to bargain with the <ommunists. before resorting to further military steps) "ashington) in
late #pril and early 8ay) sought to develop guidelines for the #merican delegation. The
National Security <ouncil) less than a wee. before the opening conference session)
carefully eamined #merican alternatives. ;isturbed by what it regarded as peace$at$any$
price thin.ing in Paris) the NS< urged the President to decide not to Doin the Geneva
deliberations without assurance from *rance that it was not preparing to negotiate the
surrender of !ndochina. #gain) the Aorean eample was foremost3 <ommunist tactics at
Geneva) the NS< forecast) would li.ely resemble those at PanmunDom6 a cease$fire might
be announced that the <ommunists would not comply with for lac. of effective
supervision6 the *rench would wilt before the <ommunists= predictable dilatory tactics
and end by accepting almost any terms.
The NS< therefore decided that the *rench had to be pressured into adopting a strong
posture in the face of probable <ommunist intransigence. The President was urged to
inform Paris that *rench ac?uiescence in a <ommunist ta.eover of !ndochina would bear
not only on *rance=s future position in the *ar @ast) but also on its status as one of the Big
Three6 that abandonment of !ndochina would grievously affect both *rance=s position in
North #frica and *ranco$U.S. relations in that region6 that U.S. aid to *rance would
automatically cease upon Paris= conclusion of an unsatisfactory settlement6 and) finally)
that <ommunist domination of !ndochina would be of such serious strategic harm to U.S.
interests as to produce "conse?uences in @urope as well as elsewhere FwithoutG apparent
limitation." !n addition) the NS< recomended that the United States determine
immediately whether the #ssociated States should be approached with a view to
continuing the anti$4iet 8inh struggle in some other form) including unilateral #merican
involvement "if necessary." The NS< clearly viewed the !ndochina situation with
etreme aniety) and its action program amounted to unprecedented proposals to threaten
*rance with the serious repercussions of a sell$out in Southeast #sia.
Pessimism over the prospects for any meaningful progress in tal.s with the <ommunists
was shared by Secretary ;ulles. !n a bac.ground briefing for newsmen at Geneva) ;ulles
gave the first official indication for public consumption that the United States would
dissociate itself from any settlement rather than be party to unacceptable terms. #s to the
acceptability of partition) the Secretary) in views that would change later) said he did not
see how partition could be arranged with the fighting not confined to any single area. >e
as much as ruled out a territorial division when he commented that the United States
would only agree to an arrangement in which all the 4iet 8inh troops would be placed in
a small regroupment area out of harm=s way. But that arrangement "might not be
acceptable to them)" ;ulles said coyly.
#merican opinions on the li.ely ramifications of a settlement were also made .nown) and
with greater precision) in private. Bn 8ay -) for instance) /ivingston 8erchant of the
State ;epartment presented the #merican view to the 8inisters of New Lealand and
#ustralia. Predicting that the *rench would finally settle for part of 4ietnam and manage
to salvage <ambodia and /aos) 8erchant said the United States could not accept such a
surrender of territory. "hile we could not prevent the *rench from ma.ing concessions)
neither did we have to associate ourselves with the results. Thus) both publicly and
privately) #dministration leaders indicated at the outset of the conference that the United
States would divorce itself from any settlement that resulted in less than a complete
*rench$4ietnamese victory.
The first test of U.S. policy came 8ay ' when the *rench informed "ashington of the
proposals they intended to ma.e in the opening round of the Geneva tal.s on 8ay J. The
proposals included a separation of the "civil war" in 4ietnam from the <ommunist
aggressions in <ambodia and /aos6 a cease$fire) supervised by a well$staffed
international authority +but not the UN1 and followed by political discussions leading to
free elections6 the regrouping of regular forces of the belligerents into defined 2ones +as
/aniel had proposed in a speech on 8arch '1 upon signature of a cease$fire agreement6
the disarming of all irregular forces +i.e.) the 4iet 8inh guerrillas16 and a guarantee of the
agreements by "the States participating in the Geneva <onference."
The :<S were first to react to the *rench plan. The <hiefs strongly felt that even if the
<ommunists unepectedly agreed to it) the li.ely outcomes would still be either rapid
*rench capitulation in the wa.e of the cease$fire or virtual *rench surrender in the course
of protracted political discussions. Bnce more) the <hiefs fell bac. on the Aorean
eperience) which they said demonstrated the certainty that the <ommunists would
violate any armistice controls) including those supervised by an international body. #n
agreement to refrain from new military activities during armistice negotiations would be
a strong obstacle to <ommunist violations6 but the <ommunists) the :<S concluded)
would never agree to such an arrangement. Bn the contrary) they were far more li.ely to
intensify military operations so as to enhance their bargaining position) precisely at the
time the *rench would see. to reduce operations to avoid ta.ing casualties. The <hiefs
therefore urged that the United States not get trapped into bac.ing a *rench armistice
proposal that the <ommunists) by voicing approval) could use to bind us to a cease$fire
while they themselves ignored it. The only way to get satisfactory results was through
military success) and since the Navarre Plan was no longer tenable) the net best
alternative was not to associate the United States with any cease$fire in advance of a
satisfactory political settlement. The first step) the <hiefs believed) should be the
conclusion of a settlement that would "reasonably assure the political and territorial
integrity of the #ssociated States . . . "6 only thereafter should a cease$fire be entertained.
#s previously) the :oint <hiefs= position became U.S. policy with only minor
emendations. The President) reviewing the <hiefs= paper) agreed that the Government
could not bac. the *rench proposal with its call for a supervised cease$fire that the
<ommunists would never respect. @isenhower further concurred with the <hiefs=
insistence on priority to a political settlement) with the stipulation that *rench forces
continue fighting while negotiations were in progress. >e added that the United States
would continue aiding the *rench during that period and would) in addition) wor. toward
a coalition "for the purpose of preventing further epansion of <ommunist power in
Southeast #sia."
These statements of position paved the way for a National Security <ouncil meeting on
8ay J) which set forth the guidelines of U.S. policy on negotiations for the delegation at
Geneva. The decision ta.en at the meeting simply underscored what the President and the
<hiefs had already stated3
The United States will not associate itself with any proposal from any source directed
toward a cease$fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement) including
international controls. The United States could concur in the initiation of negotiations for
such an armistice agreement. ;uring the course of such negotiations) the *rench and the
#ssociated States should continue to oppose the forces of the 4iet 8inh with all the
means at their disposal. !n the meantime) as a means of strengthening the hands of the
*rench and the #ssociated States during the course of such negotiations) the United
States will continue its program of aid and its efforts to organi2e and promptly activate a
Southeast #sian regional grouping for the purpose of preventing further epansion of
<ommunist power in Southeast #sia.
5. T)E ;6MM73!ST P26P6S#"S
Bfficial #merican perspectives on the li.ely pattern of the Geneva negotiations were
confirmed when the 4iet 8inh forwarded their first proposal "pac.age" at the second
plenary session on 8ay %(. Pham 4an ;ong) then the ;04=s vice$minister for foreign
affairs and already a seasoned negotiator with the *rench) introduced his case with the
argument that the 4iet 8inh were the "stronger" force in "more than three$fourths of the
country." >e went on to describe the successful administration of this territory by his
government) which he said "represents the will of the entire 4ietnamese nation The
opposition) the Bao ;ai regime) characteri2ed as "the government of the temporarily
occupied 2one)" did not enDoy popular support and was merely the tool of the *rench.
Pham 4an ;ong did not) however) demand that *rance concede control of all 4ietnam to
the ;0C. !nstead) ;ong urged that *rance recogni2e "the sovereignty and independence
of 4ietnam throughout the territory of 4ietnam)" a statement which amounted to a
reDection of the *ranco$4ietnamese treaties approved #pril 7J in Paris by /aniel and
Premier Nguyen Trung 4inh. The main points of ;ong=s proposal for a cease$fire and
political settlement in 4ietnam were as follows3
+%1 <onclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of all "foreign" +i.e.) *rench1 troops
from the #ssociated States) to be preceded by the relocation of those troops to
regroupment areas
+71 <onvening of advisory conferences) to be composed of representatives of the
"governments of both sides)" in each country of !ndochina) with the obDective of holding
general elections leading to the establishment of unified governments
+91 Supervision of elections by local commissions
+51 Prior to the establishment of unified governments) the carrying out by the opposing
parties of "the administrative functions in the districts which will be FtemporarilyG under
their administration . .
+'1 <ease$fire in all !ndochina supervised by mied commissions composed of the
belligerents) the ease-fire to ta0e effet upon implementation of all other measures. No
new forces or military e?uipment to be introduced into !ndochina during the armistice
To placate the *rench) ;ong asserted the ;04=s readiness "to eamine the ?uestion of the
entry of the ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam into the *rench Union..."
The meaning of ;ong=s proposal was clear. # political settlement would precede a
military agreement to a cease$fire rather than the reverse) which the *rench preferred.
Somewhat ironically) the 4iet 8inh position was in line with the #merican preference
for giving priority to a political settlement6 but the 4iet 8inh in effect proposed to stop
fighting only when *rench troops had left 4ietnam and a political process favorable to
the <ommunists had been set up. By first getting rid of the *rench) and then substituting
all$4ietnamese consultations for strict control and supervision of the cease$fire) the
regroupment) and the general elections) the 4iet 8inh could legitimately epect a ?uic.
ta.eover of power from the relatively wea. 4ietnamese National #rmy) by then bereft of
its *rench command structure. #s ;ong well .new) the relocation of *rench forces in the
Ton.in ;elta to a tighter perimeter was having) and would continue to have) maDor
repercussions on 4N# morale. Bnce the *rench could be persuaded to withdraw) the
4N# would undoubtedly collapse under 4iet 8inh military pressure. 8oreover)
inasmuch as ;ong=s plan made no allowance for the disarming) much less the regrouping)
of indigenous forces on either side) the 4iet 8inh would be militarily in a virtually
unassailable position to control any general election that might be held. ;ong=s proposal)
then) amounted to a re?uest that the *rench abandon 4ietnam to a certain fate.
!n the same speech) ;ong made clear that the ;04=s concern etended beyond 4ietnam
to <ambodia and /aos. By %&'5) 4iet 8inh coordination with the Pathet /ao and *ree
Ahmer "resistance forces" had been going on for at least three years) or since the formal
announcement on 8arch %%) %&'%) of formation of a 4iet 8inh$*ree Ahmer$Pathet /ao
"National United *ront." 4iet 8inh soldiers and cadres were active participants in the
fighting there) where they provided the hard core of the "resistance." !n addition) forces
under General 4o Nguyen Giap had invaded /aos in #pril and ;ecember %&'9) and
<ambodia in #pril %&'5 +a move which prompted a formal protest by the 0oyal Ahmer
Government to the Secretary General of the UN on #pril 791. 4iet 8inh battalions were
still active in both countries during 8ay and :une) with greater priority given operations
in /aos. Thus) ;ong=s proposals on a settlement in /aos and <ambodia reflected not
simply the ;04=s assumption of the role of spo.esman for the unrepresented *ree Ahmer
and Pathet /ao movements) but also direct 4iet 8inh interests in those neighboring
.ingdoms.
;ong argued that the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer forces enDoyed widespread popular
support and controlled most of the territory of their respective countries. "ith
considerable distortion of history +subse?uently corrected by the /aotian and <ambodian
delegates1) ;ong sought to demonstrate that the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer were de
facto governments carrying out "democratic reforms" in the areas their armies had
"liberated." *rance was therefore advised to recogni2e the "sovereignty and
independence" of those movements no less than of the ;0C. *rench forces alone were to
withdraw from <ambodia and /aos6 the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer were not "foreign"
troops. The same election procedure offered for 4ietnam) without neutral or international
supervision) would) ;ong proposed) ta.e place in <ambodia and /aos) thereby granting
the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer a status e?ual to that of the lawful governments. #nd
during the electoral process) ;ong insisted on "conditions securing freedom of activity
for patriotic parties) groups) and social organi2ations..." agreement to which would have
permitted various <ommunist fronts to function with impunity. The inclusion of the
Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer in the ;04=s settlement plan$in particular) the demand that
they merited political and territorial recognition$very ?uic.ly brought the conference to a
standstill and) much later) compelled the Soviets and <hinese to wor. against 4iet 8inh
ambitions.
;. T)E #ME2!;#3 2E#;T!63
Pham 4an ;ong=s opening gambit was clearly anathema to the "estern delegations.
<ertainly) from the #merican standpoint) his proposals met none of the criteria for
acceptability outlined by the National Security <ouncil on 8ay J. Smith said as much at
Geneva when he spo.e on 8ay %( and again at the third plenary session 8ay %7.
#ccordingly) Smith did not wholeheartedly embrace Bidault=s proposals) for despite
giving a general endorsement of the *rench plan) he departed from it at two important
Dunctures. *irst) he declined to commit the United States in advance to a guarantee of the
settlement despite Bidault=s call for all the participants to ma.e such a guarantee6 second)
he proposed that national elections in 4ietnam be supervised specifically by an
international commission "under United Nations auspices." #s his speeches made clear)
the United States believed the UN should have two separate functions$overseeing not
only the cease$fire but the elections as well. Both these points in Smith=s remar.s were to
remain cardinal elements of #merican policy throughout the negotiations despite *rench
+and <ommunist1 efforts to induce their alteration.
@ntirely in .eeping with Smith=s position at the conference) as well as with the tenor of
the 4iet 8inh proposals) Secretary ;ulles) on 8ay %7) sent Smith instructions intended
to ma.e the United States an influential) but unentangled and unobligated) participant. #s
;ulles phrased it) the United States was to be "an interested nation which) however) is
neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation." !ts primary aim would be to3
help the nations of that area F!ndochinaG peacefully to enDoy territorial integrity and
politial independene under sta@le and free go'ernments with the opportunity to epand
their economies) to reali2e their legitimate national aspirations) and to develop security
through individual and collective defense against aggression) from within and without.
This implies that these people should not @e amalgamated into the <ommunist bloc of
imperialistic dictatorship.
#ccordingly) Smith was told) the United States should not give its approval to any
settlement or cease$fire "which would have the effect of su@'erting the eisting lawful
governments of the three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their
territorial integrity or of placing in Deopardy the forces of the *rench Union of !ndochina)
or which otherwise contravened the principles stated . . . above." F;oc. 5-G
The NS< decision of 8ay J) Smith=s comments at the second and third plenary sessions)
and ;ulles= instructions on 8ay %7 reveal the rigidity of the #merican position on a
Geneva settlement. The United States would not associate itself with any arrangement
that failed to provide ade?uately for an internationally supervised cease$fire and national
elections) that resulted in the partitioning of any of the #ssociated States) or that
compromised the independence and territorial integrity of those States in any way. !t
would not interfere with *rench efforts to reach an agreement) but neither would it
guarantee or other wise be placed in the position of seeming to support it if contrary to
policy. Bedell Smith was left free) in fact) to withdraw from the conference or to restrict
the #merican role to that of observer. F;oc. 5-G The rationale for this approach was clear
enough3 the United States) foreseeing inevitable protraction of negotiations by the
<ommunists in the manner of Aorea) would not be party to a *rench cession of territory
that would be the end result of the <ommunists= waiting game already begun by Pham
4an ;ong. 0ather than passively accept that result) the United States would withdraw
from active involvement in the proceedings) thereby leaving it with at least the freedom
to ta.e steps to recapture the initiative +as by rolling bac. the 4iet 8inh at some future
date1 and the moral purity of having refused to condone the enslavement of more people
behind the !ron <urtain. #merican policy toward negotiations at Geneva was therefore in
perfect harmony with the @isenhower$;ulles global approach to dealing with the
<ommunist bloc.
Gloomy #merican conclusions about the conference) and no doubt the etravagant
opening <ommunist demands) were intimately connected with events on the battlefield.
#fter the debacle at ;ienbienphu on 8ay -) the *rench gradually shifted their forces
from /aos and <ambodia into the Ton.in ;elta) leaving behind wea. /aotian and
<ambodian national armies to cope with veteran 4iet 8inh battalions. #s the *rench
sought to consolidate in northern 4ietnam) the 4iet 8inh pressed the attac.) moving
several battalions eastward from ;ienbienphu. U.S. #rmy intelligence reported in late
8ay) on the basis of *rench evaluations) that the 4iet 8inh were redeploying much faster
than anticipated) to the point where of 9')((( troops originally in northwestern Ton.in
only 7)((( remained. #t the same time) two 4iet 8inh battalions stayed behind in
<ambodia and another ten in /aos6 and in both those countries) #merican intelligence
concluded that the 4iet 8inh position was so strong as to Deopardi2e the political no less
than the military stability of the royal governments.
To thwart the <ommunist military threat in 4ietnam) the *rench chief of staff) General
Paul @ly) told General :. >. Trapnell) the 8##G chief +on 8ay 9(1) that *rench forces
were forming a new defensive perimeter along the >anoi>aiphong ais6 but @ly made no
effort to hide the touch$and$go nature of *rench defensive capabilities during the rainy
season already underway. This precarious situation was confirmed by General 4alluy of
the *rench command staff. !n a report in early :une to U.S.) British) #ustralian) and New
Lealand chiefs of staff assembled in "ashington) 4alluy held that the ;elta was in
danger of falling to the <ommunists) that neither *renchmen nor 4ietnamese would fight
on in the south in that eventuality) and that only prompt allied intervention could save the
situation. F;oc. '9G #merican assessments merely echoed those provided by the *rench.
# National !ntelligence @stimate published :une %' determined that *rench Union forces)
despite a numerical advantage) faced defections on a mounting scale that could become
very large if the 4iet 8inh scored maDor victories or if the *rench were believed +and
4ietnamese suspicions were rife on this score in >anoi and Saigon1 about to abandon
>anoi and portions of the ;elta. !n sum) the tenor of intelligence reports by *rench and
#merican sources during this period +from early 8ay through mid$:une1 was that the
4iet 8inh armies were solidly entrenched in portions of <ambodia and /aos) were
preparing for further advances in the Ton.in ;elta) and) if the war were to continue
beyond the rainy season) had the capability to destroy positions then being fortified by
*rench Union forces throughout northern 4ietnam.
The upshot of this military deterioration throughout much of !ndochina was to reinforce
the #merican conviction that the <ommunists) while ma.ing proposals at Geneva they
.new would be unacceptable to the "est) would drive hard for important battlefield gains
that would thoroughly demorali2e *rench Union troops and set the stage for their
withdrawal southward) perhaps precipitating a general crisis of confidence in !ndochina
and a 4iet 8inh ta.eover by default. 8ore clearly than earlier in the year) #merican
officials now saw Dust how desperate the *rench really were) in part because *rench field
commanders were being far more sincere about and open with information on the actual
military situation. But the thic.ening gloom in !ndochina no less than at Geneva did not
give way to counsels of despair in "ashington. The Government concluded not that the
goals it had set for a settlement were unrealistic) but rather that the only way to attain
them) as the President and the :<S had been saying) was through decisive military victory
in conformity with the original united action proposal of 8arch 7&. "hile therefore
maintaining its delegation at Geneva throughout the indecisive sessions of 8ay and :une)
the United States once again alerted *rance to the possibility of a military alternative to
defeat under the pressure of <ommunist tal.$fight tactics.

!4. T>@ UN!T@; ST#T@S #T G@N@4#3 T>@ ST#G@ B* *B0<@ #N;
;!P/B8#<C) 8#C TB 8!;$:UN@
!n .eeping open the option of united action) the #dministration) no less during 8ay and
the first half of :une than in #pril) carefully made direct involvement conditional on a
range of *rench concessions and promises. This second go$=round on united action was
not designed to ma.e further negotiations at Geneva impossible6 rather) it was intended to
provide an alternative to which the *rench might turn once they) and hopefully the British
as well) conceded that negotiations were a wasteful eercise.
The issue of united action arose again in early 8ay when Premier /aniel) in a tal. with
#mbassador ;illon) epressed the view that the <hinese were the real masters of the
negotiations at Geneva. This being the case) /aniel reasoned) the <hinese would probably
see. to drag out the tal.s over any number of peripheral issues while the 4iet 8inh
pushed on for a military decision. The *rench position in the field) with a maDor
redeployment on the order of %' battalions to the Ton.in ;elta probably very soon)
would be desperate) /aniel said) unless the United States decided to give its active
military cooperation. !n the interim) the premier re?uested that an #merican general be
dispatched to Paris to assist in military planning.
/aniel=s views failed to ma.e an impression in "ashington. #lthough the #dministration
agreed to dispatch a general +Trapnell1) ;ulles proposed) and @isenhower accepted) a
series of "indispensable" conditions to #merican involvement that would have to be met
by Paris. @ven after those conditions were met) #merican intervention would not follow
automatically6 /aniel would have to re?uest further U.S.$*rench consultations. The
conditions were3 +!n forwarding these conditions to the @mbassy for transmittal to the
*rench) ;ulles noted that a prompt) favorable decision would be premature inasmuch as
it might internationali2e the war in a way offensive to the British) leaving the *rench with
the difficult choice of internationali2ation or capitulation.1
+%1 *ormal re?uests for U.S. involvement from *rance and the #ssociated States
+71 #n immediate) favorable response to those invitations from Thailand) the Philippines)
#ustralia) and New Lealand) as well as the assurance that Britain "would either
participate or be ac?uiescent"
+91 Presentation of "some aspect of matter" to the UN by one of the involved #sian states
+51 # *rench guarantee of complete independence to the #ssociated States) "including
un?ualified option to withdraw from *rench Union at any time
+'1 # *rench underta.ing not to withdraw the @peditionary <orps from !ndochina
during the period of united action in order to ensure that the United States would be
providing air and sea) but not combat$troop) support
+,1 *ranco$#merican agreement on the training of native forces and a new command
structure during united action +#dmiral 0adford was reported to be thin.ing in terms of a
*rench supreme command with a U.S. air command1
+-1 *ull endorsement by the *rench cabinet and #ssembly of these conditions to ensure a
firm *rench commitment even in the event of a change in government in Paris
!t was further agreed that in the ourse of united action) the United States would pursue
efforts to broaden the coalition and to formali2e it as a regional defense pact.
;uring the same conference in which the conditions were drawn up) top #merican
officials went deeper into them. @isenhower was insistent on collective action) but
recogni2ed that the British might not commit themselves initially and that the
#ustralians) facing a general election later in 8ay) could only give "evidence" of their
willingness to participate. # second maDor problem was !ndochinese independence.
;ulles posed the #merican dilemma on this score3 on the one hand) the United States had
to avoid giving #sians reason to believe we were intervening on behalf of colonialism6 on
the other) the #ssociated States lac.ed the administrative personnel and leadership
necessary to carrying on alone. "!n a sense)" said ;ulles) "if the #ssociated States were
turned loose) it would be li.e putting a baby in a cage of hungry lions. The baby would
rapidly be devoured." >is solution was that the #ssociated States be granted +evidently)
orally1 the right to withdraw from the *rench Union after passage of a suitable time
period) perhaps five or ten years.
# final point concerned @ecutive$<ongressional relations once a *rench re?uest) bac.ed
by Parliamentary assent) reached "ashington. The President felt he should appear before
a Doint session of <ongress and see. a <ongressional resolution to use the armed forces in
!ndo$<hina Fwords missingG act on the formal invitation of *rance and the #ssociated
States) and with the cooperation of friends and allies in the region. #t @isenhower=s
re?uest) ;ulles directed that the State ;epartment begin wor.ing up a first draft of a
Presidential message.
The #merican response to /aniel=s re?uests set the stage for an etended series of
discussions over the ensuing five wee.s. !n Paris) ;illon communicated the #merican
conditions to /aniel and 8aurice Schumann) the ;eputy 8inister for *oreign #ffairs6 in
a tal. with the #mbassador 8ay %5) they accepted the conditions) but with important
reservations. *irst) /aniel indicated his dismay at the #merican insistence on the right of
the #ssociated States to withdraw from the *rench Union. The premier predicted that the
*rench public would never accept this condition inasmuch as the #ssociated States had
themselves never made it and since even the 4iet 8inh envisioned Doining the Union.
The obvious #merican reluctance to go beyond air and naval forces also disturbed the
premier. >e re?uested that the United States additionally provide artillery forces and a
to.en contingent of ground troops. But he indicated pleasure that UA participation was
no longer a prere?uisite to #merican involvement.
/aniel=s ?ualified approval of the preconditions was accompanied by a re?uest for a
response to two other ?uestions3 could the United States in some way guarantee the
borders and independence of /aos and <ambodia following a *rench withdrawal from
those countriesN <ould the United States provide written assurance of prompt air
intervention to meet a possible <hinese <ommunist air attac. on *rench forces in the
Ton.in ;eltaN
The #merican response to /aniel=s demurrers and re?uests was for the most part
negative. Bn the *rench$#ssociated States relationship) which #mbassador ;illon had
said was the chief barrier to a *rench re?uest for intervention)Y ;ulles replied +through
;illon1 that the United States might have some fleibility on the matter)
Y ;illon commented3 "! am certain that unless we can find some way to get around this
re?uirement Fthat the 4ietnamese have the option of leaving the *rench UnionG) *rench
will never as. for outside assistance."
;illon proposed that the real obDection among #sians to the position of the #ssociated
States rested not on the "purely Duridical" problem of the right to leave the Union) but on
!ndochina=s lac. of powerful national armies. The #mbassador recommended that
#merican training and e?uipping of the 4N#) coupled with a *rench statement of
intention to withdraw the @peditionary <orps after the establishment of peace and a
national army) would significantly dampen #sian antagonism to the Bao ;ai regime. !t is
difficult to understand why ;illon assumed #sians would significantly change their
attitude toward *rench !ndochina when) even with an #merican ta.eover of the training
and e?uipping of the 4N#) *rench forces would still be on 4ietnamese territory for a
lengthy period.
but had to remain adamant on complete independence if it ever hoped to gain Thai and
*ilipino support. Net) on the ?uestion of the etent of #merican involvement) the
Government was more fleible3 !t would not eclude antiaircraft "and limited U.S.
ground forces for protection of bases which might be used by U.S. naval and air forces."
#s to /aniel=s ?uestions) "ashington answered that it saw no way) in view of the military
and legal impracticalities) to guarantee the security of /aos and <ambodia6 the alternative
was that /aos and <ambodia Doin with Thailand in re?uesting the stationing of a UN
Peace Bbservation <ommission +PB<1 on their territories. The possibility of <hinese
8!G intervention) considered etremely remote by the ;efense ;epartment) ruled out the
need for a written commitment. The *rench were to be assured) however) that a collective
defense arrangement would include protection against that contingency) and that prior to
the formation of the organi2ation) <hinese air involvement would prompt a Presidential
re?uest for <ongressional authori2ation to respond with U.S. aircraft.
#lthough the setting up of several preconditions to involvement and the ?ualifications of
the *rench reply by no means made intervention an immediate possibility) the
#dministration moved ahead on contingency planning. The State ;epartment=s Bureau of
*ar @astern #ffairs too. the lead by producing a hypothetical timetable based on the
assumption of U.S.$*rench agreement in principle to the proposed conditions by 8ay 7%.
*@# also outlined a full slate of urgent priority studies) including U.S. strategy under
differing circumstances of <hinese involvement in the war. By 8ay 75) *@# had
forwarded a contingency study from the Bperations Planning Board that proposed)
among other things) public and private communications to Pe.ing to prevent) or at least
reduce the effectiveness of) direct <hinese intervention.
The initiation of planning for intervention etended to more far$ranging discussions of
the purposes) re?uirements) and ma.e$up of a Southeast #sia collective defense
organi2ation. The framewor. of the discussions evidenced the Government=s intention
that united action be underta.en only after the Geneva <onference had reached a
stalemate or) far less li.ely) a settlement. Three regional formulations were envisaged3 the
first would be designed for direct action) probably +it was felt1 without British
participation) either to defeat the 4iet 8inh or to prevent them from gaining control of
!ndochina6 the second) formed after a settlement) would comprise the present S@#TB
members and functions) in particular active assistance to the participating #sian states
resisting eternal attac. or "<ommunist insurrection"6 the third would have have a broad
#sian membership) but would be functionally limited to social and economic
cooperation.
#n important input to contingency planning on intervention came from the :oint <hiefs
of Staff. Bn 8ay 7() the :<S sent a memorandum to the Secretary of ;efense entitled
"U.S. 8ilitary Participation in !ndochina." !n the paper) the <hiefs re?uested formulation
of a ;efense ;epartment position on the si2e of any #merican contributions and the
nature of the command structure once united action began. They noted the "limited
availability of U.S. forces for military action in !ndochina" and the "current numerical
advantage of the *rench Union forces over the enemy) i.e.) approimately ' to 9."
Pointing out the disadvantages of either stationing large numbers of U.S. troops in
!ndochina or of basing U.S. aircraft on !ndochina=s limited facilities) the <hiefs
considered "the current greatest need" to be an epanded) intensified training program for
indigenous troops. They observed) moreover) that they were guided in their comments by
the li.ely reaction of the <P0 to U.S. involvement) as well as by the prescription3
"#tomic weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage."
!n view of these problems and prospects) the :<S urged the limitation of United States
involvement to strategic planning and the training of indigenous forces through an
increase in 8##G from less than %'( to 77'( men. !ts force commitment should be
restricted) they advised) primarily to air$naval support directed from outside !ndochina6
even here) the <hiefs cautioned against ma.ing a "substantial" air force commitment. The
<hiefs were also mindful of the <hinese. Since 4iet 8inh supplies came mainly from
<hina) "the destruction or neutrali2ation of those outside sources supporting the 4iet
8inh would materially reduce the *rench military problems in !ndochina."
The <hiefs were simply ta.ing their traditional position that any maDor U.S. force
commitment in the *ar @ast should be reserved for a war against <hina in the event the
President decided that such a conflict was necessary for the preservation of vital
#merican interests. 0ecogni2ing the limitations of the "New /oo." defense establishment
for large$scale involvement in "brushfire" wars) the <hiefs were etremely hesitant) as
had consistently been the case during the !ndochina crisis) to favor action along the
periphery of <hina when the strategic advantages of #merican power lay in decisive
direct blows against the maDor enemy. Thus) the :<S closed their memorandum with the
admonition that air$naval commitments beyond those specified3
will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to meet probable <hinese
<ommunist reaction elsewhere in the *ar @ast. *rom the point of view of the United
States) with reference to the *ar @ast as a whole) !ndochina is devoid of decisive military
obDectives and the allocation of more than to.en U.S. armed forces to that area would be
a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities.Y
Y These conclusions were su@se+uently confirmed when) at the direction of General
8atthew B. 0idgway) #rmy <hief of Staff) a technical team of seven officers
representing the @ngineer) Transportation) and Signal <orps went to !ndochina on a
covert mission to determine military and military$related resources available there in the
event U.S. intervention were implemented. The team spent the period 8ay 9%$:une 77 in
the field. Their conclusions were) in brief) that !ndochina was devoid of the logistical)
geographic) and related resources necessary to a substantial #merican ground effort. The
group=s findings are in a report from <ol. ;avid ". >eiman) its leader) to 0idgway) :uly
%7) %&'5.
The <hiefs= conclusions were disputed) however) by @verett ;rumright of State +*@#1 +in
a memorandum to 8ac#rthur) 8ay 75) %&'51. >e argued that if) as everyone agreed)
!ndochina was vital to #merican security) the United States should not consider more
than a to.en group troop commitment to be a serious diversion of our capabilities. "hile
not arguing for a substantial troop commitment) ;rumright suggested that the United
States plan for that eventuality rather than count on defense with atomic weapons or non$
nuclear stri.es on <hinese territory. Somehow) however) ;rumright=s concern about the
<hinese did not etend to the consideration that a massive troop commitment) which he
stated elsewhere in the memorandum might prove necessary should to.en forces fail to
do the Dob) also ris.ed bringing in the <hinese.
The :<S evidently also decided to call a meeting of military representatives from the
United States) *rance) the UA) #ustralia) and New Lealand. #t first) the <hiefs suggested
the downgrading of the representatives to below chief$of$staff level6 but apparently on the
strong protest of Under Secretary Smith at Geneva) and of the British too) the <hiefs
ac?uiesced in a meeting at chief$of$staff level. But prior to the meeting) which began the
first wee. of :une) important developments occurred in the U.S.$*rance discussions of
intervention.
The tic.lish problem of bringing *rance to concede the critical importance of granting
full independence to the #ssociated States occupied center stage once more. Bn 8ay 7-)
the State ;epartment) ac.nowledging *rance=s hesitancy to go too far on this score) still
insisted on certain "minimum measures)" the most important of which was that *rance)
during or immediately after formal approval of the #pril 7J draft treaties) announce its
willingness to withdraw all its forces from !ndochina unless invited by the governments
of the #ssociated States to maintain them or to establish bases. +The United States) the
;epartment added) would be prepared to ma.e a similar declaration if it committed
forces.1 Beyond that step) the *rench were also as.ed to permit !ndochinese participation
in the programming of economic aid and their direct receipt of all military aid) to find
ways to broaden participation of the 4ietnamese defense ministry and armed forces in
national defense) and to push for the establishment of "representative and authentic
nationalist governments" at the earliest possible date.
Transmitting these new proposals to the *rench) ;illon +incorrectly as it turned out1
found them so well received that he reported on 8ay 7&) following a conversation with
/aniel) that the two partners "had now reached accord in principle on political side."
/aniel) he cabled ;ulles) urged immediate military tal.s to complete arrangements on
training of the 4ietnamese) a new command structure) and war plans. !nasmuch as @ly
and General :ohn ". B=;aniel in !ndochina had reached general agreement on #merican
assumption of responsibility for training the 4N#) F;oc. '7G the way was apparently
cleared for bilateral military tal.s in "ashington to ta.e place simultaneously with) and
therefore disguised by) the five$power staff negotiations.
;illon=s optimistic assessment proved premature) however) on several grounds. "hen he
reported 8ay 7J on tal.s with Schumann) he had added Schumann=s and ;efense
8inister 0enV Pleven=s concern about <hinese air intervention) which they felt would be
so damaging as to warrant a deterrent action in the form of a Presidential re?uest to the
<ongress for discretionary authority to defend the ;elta in case of <<#* attac.. The
*rench wanted a virtually instantaneous U.S. response) one that would be assured by a
Presidential re?uest before rather than after overt <hinese aerial intervention. The State
;epartment=s retort was that the *rench first had to satisfy the previously reported
conditions before any such move by the President could be considered.
;illon was no less disappointed by "ashington=s reply than the *rench. >e cabled bac.
that there apparantly was an "etremely serious misunderstanding between U.S. and
*rench"3
*rench draw sharp distinction between +%1 U.S. intervention in present circumstances
with 4iet 8inh bolstered by <hinese <ommunist materiel) technicians and possibly
scattered troops and +71 U.S. reaction against full$scale air attac. mounted from
<ommunist <hinese bases.
;illon said that) for the *rench) "ashington=s preconditions applied in the first ase @ut
not the seond) wherein only <ongressional authori2ation was understood to stand in the
way of direct #merican action. @ly) the #mbassador reported) had all along believed he
had 0adford=s personal assurance of an #merican countermove against <hinese air attac.
in the ;elta. Now) the *rench wanted to .now if they could count on instant U.S.
interdiction of a <<#* stri.e. The #mbassador closed by reminding the ;epartment of
the incalculable harm to N#TB) to the whole U.S. role in "estern @urope) and to the
U.S. position against the <ommunists= world strategy if a <hinese attac. was not met.
;espite ;illon=s protestations the ;epartment stuc. by its initial position of 8ay %')
namely) that <hinese air attac. was unli.ely and that the United States would meet that
problem when it arose. <learly) the #dministration was unwilling to ma.e any advance
commitments which the *rench could sei2e upon for political advantage at Geneva
without having to give a +uid pro +uo in their !ndochina policy. @isenhower affirmed this
view and went beyond it3 The onditions for united ation& he said& applied e+ually to
;hinese diret and indiret in'ol'ement in !ndohina. The 7nited States 4ould ma0e no
unilateral ommitment against any ontingeny& inluding o'ert& unpro'o0ed ;hinese
aggression& 4ithout firm& @road allied support. Y
Y @isenhower=s unwavering attitude toward action in #sia only in concert with allies put
him at odds with ;ulles) who was prepared to act unilaterally in cases of overt
aggression. "hen the issue of possible <P0 air intervention came before the President)
he is reported to have reacted sharply. @vidently supposing that conflict in the air would
mean a Sino$#merican war) the President
said the United States would not intervene in <hina on any basis ecept united action. >e
would not be responsible for going into <hina alone unless a Doint <ongressional
resolution ordered him to do so. The United States should in no event underta.e alone to
support *rench colonialism. Unilateral action by the United States in cases of this .ind
would destroy us. !f we intervened alone in this case we would be epected to intervene
alone in other parts of the world. >e made very plain that the need for united action as a
condition of U.S. intervention was not related merely to the regional grouping for the
defense of Southeast #sia but was also a necessity for U.S. intervention in response to
<hinese communist overt aggression.
See memorandum of conversation between @isenhower and 0obert <utler) the President=s
special assistant) :une %) %&'5.
The rationale for the President=s difference of view with his Secretary was laid out more
fully the net day. @isenhower said that since direct <hinese aggression would force him
to go all the way with naval and air power +including "new weapons"1 in reply. he would
need to have much more than <ongressional authori2ation. Thai) *ilipino) *rench) and
!ndochinese support would be important but not sufficient6 other nations) such as
#ustralia) would have to give their approval) for otherwise he could not be certain the
public would bac. a war against <hina. +8emorandum of conversation in the President=s
office) :une 7) %&'5) involving also ;ulles) #nderson) 0adford) 8ac#rthur) and <utler.1
#t its 7((th meeting on :une 9) the NS< received) considered) and agreed upon the
President=s views.
There were other obstacles to U.S$*rench agreement) as brought into the open with a
memorandum to the President from *oreign 8inister Georges Bidault on :une %. Bne
was the ?uestion of timing involved in #merican insistence on *rench #ssembly
approval of a government re?uest for U.S. intervention. The *rench cabinet considered
that to present a program of allied involvement to the #ssembly ecept under the
circumstance of "a complete failure of the Geneva <onference" attributable to the
<ommunists "would be literally to wish to overthrow the t*renchG Government." #
second area of continuing disagreement concerned the maintenance of *rench forces in
the field and the nature of a U.S. commitment. The *rench held that the United States
could bypass <ongress by committing perhaps one division of 8arines without a
declaration of war. #lthough assured by "ashington that the 8arines would not be
ecluded from a U.S. air$naval commitment) the *rench were not satisfied. !n his
memorandum) Bidault as.ed that the United States ta.e account of *rance=s defense
obligations elsewhere) an indirect way of as.ing that "ashington go beyond a to.en
ground$troop commitment. <onfronted by a war$weary Parliament on one side and
opponents of @;< on the other) Bidault doubtless believed that the retention of *rench
soldiers in !ndochina without relief from #merican G!s was neither militarily nor
politically acceptable.
# final but by no means negligible *rench obDection to the #merican proposals
concerned the independence issue. *ar from having been settled) as ;illon supposed) the
*rench were still unhappy about #merican pressure for concessions even after the State
;epartment=s 8ay 7- revisions. The *rench were particularly disturbed +as Bidault
implied1 at the notion that the #ssociated States could leave the Union at any time) even
while *rench fighting men were in the field on !ndochina=s behalf. "Such a formula)"
Bidault wrote) "is unacceptable to the *rench Government) first because it is
incompatible with the *rench <onstitution) and also because it would be etremely
difficult to eplain to *rench opinion that the forces of the *rench Union were continuing
the war in !ndochina for the benefit of States that might at any moment leave the Union."
*rance was perfectly willing) Bidault remar.ed) to sign new treaties of association with
the three !ndochinese States) to allow them a larger voice in defense matters) and to wor.
with them toward formation of truly national governments6 but) to Dudge from his
commentary) Paris would not go the whole route by committing itself in advance to
!ndochina=s full freedom of action in the *rench Union. #nd while this and other issues
remained unresolved) as ;ulles observed :une 5) /aniel=s reported belief that the United
States and *rance were politically agreed was a "serious overstatement."
By early :une the unsettled issues separating the United States from *rance began to lose
their relevance to the war. @ven if they could be resolved) it was ?uestionable whether
#merican involvement could any longer be useful) much less decisive. Bn the matter of
training the 4N#) for instance) the United States was no longer certain that time would
permit its training methods to ta.e effect even if the *rench promptly removed
themselves from responsibility in that area. The State ;epartment now held that the
4ietnam situation had deteriorated "to point where any commitment at this time to send
over U.S. instructors in near future might epose us to being faced with situation in
which it would be contrary to our interests to have to fulfill such commitment. Bur
position accordingly is that we do not wish to consider U.S. training mission or program
separately from over$all operational plan on assumption conditions fulfilled for U.S.
participation war !ndochina." 8orale of the *ranco$4ietnamese forces) moreover) had
dropped sharply) the whole Ton.in ;elta was endangered) and the political situation in
Saigon was reported to be dangerously unstable. *aced with this uniformly blac. picture)
the #dministration determined that the grave but still retrievable military situation
prevailing at the time united action was proposed and pursued had) in :une) altered
radically) to the point where united action might have to be withdrawn from consideration
by the *rench.
By mid$:une #merican diplomacy was therefore in an unenviable position. #t Geneva)
very little progress had been made of a .ind that could lead any of the #llies to epect a
satisfactory outcome. Cet the alternative which the United States had reopened no longer
seemed viable either. #s ;ulles told Smith) any "final agreement" with the *rench would
be "?uite impossible)" for Paris was moving farther than ever from a determination that
united action was necessary. "They want) and in effect have) an option on our
intervention)" ;ulles wrote) "but they do not want to eercise it and the date of epiry of
our option is fast running out." F;oc. '-G *rom Paris) in fact) #mbassador ;illon urged
the Secretary that "the time limit be now" on U.S. intervention. F;oc. ',G #nd ;ulles was
fast concluding that ;illon was correct.
!n view of *rance=s feeling that) because of strong #ssembly pressure for a settlement) no
re?uest could be made of the United States until every effort to reach agreement at
Geneva had been ehausted) ;ulles in effect decided) on :une %') that united action was
no longer tenable. !n a conversation with Bonnet) in which the *rench #mbassador read a
message from Bidault which indicated that the *rench no longer considered the United
States bound to intervene on satisfaction of the seven conditions) the Secretary put forth
the difficulty of the #merican position. >e stated that the United States stood willing to
respond to a *rench re?uest under the conditions of 8ay %%) but that time and
circumstance might ma.e future intervention "impracticable or so burdensome as to be
out of proportion to the results obtainable." "hile this offer would be unsatisfactory to
Bidault) especially in his dealings with the <ommunists at Geneva) ;ulles "could not
conceive that it would be epected that the United States would give a third power the
option to put it into war at times and under conditions wholly of the other=s choosing."
"ith this) united action was shelved) and it never appeared again in the form and with the
purpose originally proposed.
#s a brea. with *rance on united action became li.ely) #merican interest focused on a
collective defense arrangement after a Geneva settlement with British participation. The
*rench and British roles in U.S. planning were in effect reversed6 Paris) it was felt) could
no longer be counted on as an active participant in regional security. #s their delegate to
Geneva) :ean <hauvel) told Smith) Bidault was still hopeful of getting "something" from
the conference. F;oc. '5G Bn the other hand) @den told Smith on :une & of his etreme
pessimism over the course of the negotiations. @den believed a recess in the tal.s was
li.ely within a few days +it came) in fact) ten days later1) and proposed that the
<ambodian and /aotian cases be brought before the United Nations immediately after the
end of the conference) even if *rance opposed the move. Smith drew from the
conversation the strong impression that @den believed negotiations to have failed and
would now follow the #merican lead on a coalition to guarantee <ambodia and /aos
"under umbrella of some UN action" +Smith=s words1. F;oc. '5G ;ays later) ;ulles
li.ewise anticipated a British shift when he observed sardonically that events at Geneva
had probably "been such as to satisfy the British insistence that they did riot want to
discuss collective action until either Geneva was over or at least the results of Geneva
were .nown. ! would assume)" ;ulles went on) "that the departure of @den Ffrom
GenevaG would be evidence that there was no ade?uate reason for further delaying
collective tal.s on Southeast #sia defense." But whether the United States and Great
Britain would see eye$to$eye on their post$settlement security obligations in the region)
and whether Doint diplomatic initiatives to influence the nature of the settlement could be
decided upon) remained outstanding ?uestions.
The rebirth and demise of united action was a rare case of history repeated almost
immediately after it had been made. The United States) having failed to interest Britain
and *rance in united action prior to the start of the Geneva <onference) refused to be
relegated to an uninfluential role and determined instead to plunge ahead without British
participation. But the conditions for intervention which had been given the *rench before
the fall of ;ienbienphu were now stiffened) most importantly by a greater detailing of the
process the *rench government would have to go through before the United States would
consider direct involvement.
@ven while the *rench pondered the conditions) urged their refinement and redefinition to
suit *rench policies) and insisted in the end that they saw no political obstacles separating
the United States and *rance) "ashington anticipated that the *rench were very unli.ely
to forward a re?uest for U.S. involvement. >aving learned something of *rench
government priorities from the futile diplomatic bargaining in #pril) ;epartment of State
representatives in Paris and "ashington saw that what the *rench wanted above all was
not the military advantages of active U.S. intervention but the political benefits that might
be derived from bringing into the open the fact that the two allies were negotiating
#merican participation in the fighting. Thus) ;illon correctly assessed in mid$8ay that
*rench in?uiries about #merican conditions for intervention represented a "wish to use
possibility of our intervention primarily to strengthen their hand at Geneva." The *rench
hoped they would not have to call on the United States for direct support6 they did hope
the <ommunists would sense the dangers of proposing unacceptable terms for a
settlement. ;illon=s sensitivity to the *rench position was proven accurate by Bidault=s
memorandum to the President3 *rance would) in reality) only call on the United States if
an "honorable" settlement could clearly not be obtained at Geneva) for only under that
circumstance could the National #ssembly be persuaded that the /aniel government had
done everything possible to achieve peace.
0ecognition of the game the *rench were playing did not .eep the United States from
posing intervention as an alternative for them6 but by adhering tenaciously to the seven
conditions) it ruled out either precipitous #merican action or an open$ended commitment
to be accepted or reDected by Paris. The State ;epartment) guided on the military side by
strong :<S obDections to promising the *rench #merican combat troops in advance of a
new and satisfactory command structure and strategic plan) became increasingly
distraught with and suspicious of *rench motivations. ""e cannot grant *rench an
indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration" of the military
situation) ;ulles wrote on :une J. #s much as the #dministration wanted to avoid a sell$
out at Geneva) it was aware that events in !ndochina might preclude effective U.S. action
even if the *rench suddenly decided they wanted #merican support. Put another way) one
of the primary differences between #merican diplomacy before and after the fall of
;ienbienphu was its ability to proDect ahead$to weigh the factors of time and
circumstance against the distasteful possibility that 4ietnam) by *rench default at the
negotiating table or defeat on the battlefield) might be lost. #s the scales tipped against
united action) #merican security planning began to focus on the future possibilities of
collective defense in Southeast #sia) while the pattern of diplomacy shifted from
disenchantment with the Geneva <onference to attempts to bring about the best possible
settlement terms.
4. T>@ 8#:B0 !SSU@S #T T>@ <BN*@0@N<@) 8#C$:UN@
"ashington=s sense that the conference had essentially gotten nowhere$a view which
Smith and ;ulles believed was shared by @den) as already noted$was not entirely
accurate6 nor was it precisely the thin.ing of other delegations. *ollowing the initial
*rench and 4iet 8inh proposals of 8ay J and %() respectively) some progress had in fact
been made) although certainly not of an order that could have led any of the chief
negotiators to epect a ?uic. settlement. #s the conference moved ahead) three maDor
areas of contention emerged3 the separation of belligerent forces) the establishment of a
framewor. for political settlements in the three !ndochinese states) and provision for
effective control and supervision of the cease$fire.
#. S@P#0#T!BN B* T>@ B@//!G@0@NTS
The ?uestion how best to disentangle the opposing armies was most acute in 4ietnam)
but was also hotly debated as it applied to <ambodia and /aos. !n 4ietnam) 4iet 8inh
forces were concentrated in the Ton.in ;elta) though large numbers had long been active
in #nnam +central 4ietnam1 and <ochinchina +the south1. The original *rench and 4iet
8inh proposals sought to ta.e account of this situation by dismissing +although for
separate reasons1 the concept of single regroupment areas and forwarding instead the idea
of perhaps several concentration points to facilitate a cease$fire. To this point) the
4ietnamese delegation was in agreement3 regroupment of the belligerents should in no
way have the effect of dividing the country into ma.eshift military 2ones that could have
lasting political implications.
!t was an entirely different matter where the regroupment areas should be located6
whether "foreign" +i.e.) *rench1 troops should be withdrawn) and if so) from what areas
and during what period6 whether irregular troops +i.e.) 4iet 8inh guerrillas1 should be
disarmed and disbanded) and if so) whether they and their comrades in the regular forces
should be integrated +as the Bao ;ai delegation proposed1 into the 4N#6 and) of crucial
importance) whether a cease$fire should be dependent upon success in the regroupment
process or) as Pham 4an ;ong proposed) upon an overall political settlement.
This last ?uestion was tac.led first by the negotiators. Bn @den=s initiative) the
conference had moved in mid$8ay from plenary to restricted sessions) where fewer
delegates were present) no verbatim record was systematically .ept) and the press was
barred. @den=s epectation that the opportunities for greater intimacy among the delegates
would enhance the possibility of ma.ing some headway was partially fulfilled. #t the
first restricted session on 8ay %-) 8olotov responded to Bidault=s implication that one
cause of continuing irresolution in the negotiations was the 4iet 8inh=s insistence on
coupling a military with a political settlement) whereas the *rench proposal had been
geared to dealing only with the military portion before going on to discuss the political
side. The Soviet delegate argued that while military and political matters were obviously
closely lin.ed) the conference might do best to address the military settlement first) since
it was a point common to the *rench and 4iet 8inh proposals. ;ong obDected that
military and political matters were so closely .nit that they could not be separated6
however) he agreed +although) we may surmise) with some reluctance1 that the two
problems could be dealt with in that order.
"ith a basic procedural obstacle removed) it was finally agreed that a cease$fire should
have priority in the conference=s order of business.Y Toward that goal) the
Y Bn 8ay 7() <hou @n$lai told @den that military and political matters should indeed be
dealt with separately) and that priority should be given to the attainment of a cease$fire.
+Smith tel. S@<TB 7,- from Geneva) 8ay 7() %&'5.1 The <ommunists were ?uic. to
point out thereafter) though) that a political settlement should not be dropped from
consideration. !n fact) at the fifth restricted session) 8olotov returned to the issue of
military versus political settlements by proposing that they be considered at alternate
meetings. The "estern side held fast to concentrating on the cease$fire and turning to
political matters only when agreement had been reached on the military side6 this position
was tacitly adopted.
problem of regroupment and disarmament of certain forces was ta.en up. #t the fifth
restricted session on 8ay 75) *oreign 8inister Bidault proposed) among other things)
that a distinction be admitted between "regular" and "irregular" forces. 0egular troops) he
said) included all permanently organi2ed forces) which for the 4iet 8inh meant regional
as well as regular units. These) he suggested) should be regrouped into demilitari2ed
2ones) whereas loosely organi2ed irregulars should be disarmed under some form of
control. Pham 4an ;ong) in his reply) agreed on the urgency of a cease$fire and on the
importance of disarming irregulars6 but) in contrast to Bidault=s proposal) ;ong asserted
that inasmuch as each side would have responsibility for all forces in areas under its
control after the cease$fire) disarmament would ta.e place naturally. ;ong implicitly
reDected the idea of controlled disarmament) therefore) by placing the problem in the post$
rather than pre$cease$fire period.
The issues of regroupment and disarmament might have brought the conference to a
standstill had not Pham 4an ;ong) at the sith restricted session +8ay 7'1) suddenly
reversed his position on regroupment and proposed what amounted to the partitioning of
!ndochina. *ollowing only moments after the 4ietnamese delegate) Nguyen Kuoc ;inh)
had offered a plan based on the maintenance of his country=s territorial integrity)Y ;ong
suggested that in the course of the regroupment) specific
Y The G4N=s position called for the disbandment and disarming of 4iet 8inh forces and
their later integration into a national army under international control6 international
supervision of elections to be conducted by the Bao ;ai government at an unspecified
future date6 and recognition of the integrity of the 4ietnamese state. The G4N also
insisted that the withdrawal of foreign forces come after all other issues had been
resolved.
territorial Durisdictions be established such that each side would have complete economic
and administrative) no less than military) control. So as not to be misunderstood) ;ong
further urged that a temporary line of demarcation be drawn that would be
topographically suitable and appropriate for transportation and communication within
each 2one thus created. The #merican delegate) General Smith) immediately dismissed
;ong=s proposal and advised that the conferees return to discussion of the original cease$
fire issues. But) as was to become clear very soon) ;ong=s new move struc. a responsive
chord among the *rench even as it confirmed to the Bao ;ai delegation its worst fears.
"hat had prompted ;ong to introduce a partition arrangement when) at previous
sessions) the 4iet 8inh had pushed repeatedly for a settlement procedure that would
facilitate their consolidation of control over the entire countryN "hat evidence we have is
circumstantial) but it suggests that the 4iet 8inh delegation may have come under Sino$
Soviet pressure to produce an alternative to cease$fire proposals that were consistently
being reDected by the "est. The partition alternative) specifically at the %,th parallel) had
been intimated to #merican officials as early as 8arch 5 by a member of the Soviet
@mbassy in /ondon) apparently out of awareness of *ranco$#merican obDections to a
coalition arrangement for 4ietnam. Bn the opening day of the conference) moreover)
Soviet officials had again approached #merican officials on the subDect) this time at
Geneva) averring that the establishment of a buffer state to <hina=s south would be
sufficient satisfaction of <hina=s security needs. "hile these events do not demonstrate
that ;ong=s partition proposal Y was the direct outgrowth of Sino$Soviet disposition
toward a territorial division) they do reveal that
Y The ;04) it should be added) refused to call its proposal one for partition. #s the
official newspaper) Nhan ;an +The People1 put it) the proposal amounted merely to
"2onal readDustment" necessary to achieving a cease$fire. The readDustment "is only a
stage in preparation for free general elections with a view toward the reali2ation of
national unity." 4ietnam News #gency +4N#1 broadcast in @nglish to Southeast #sia)
:une -) %&'5.
partition was a solution) albeit temporary) which 8oscow) at least) early found agreeable.
"hatever lay behind ;ong=s gambit) the *rench were put in the position of being
challenged on their prior commitments to the 4ietnamese. #t the time the conference
began) Bao ;ai=s government) perhaps mindful of past instances of partition$type
solutions in Aorea and Germany) and almost certainly suspicious of ultimate *rench
intentions in the face of 4iet 8inh territorial demands) urged Paris to provide written
assurance it would neither see. nor accept a division of 4ietnam at Geneva. To ma.e his
own position perfectly clear) Bao ;ai) through his representatives in the *rench capital)
issued a communi?ue +in the name of the G4N cabinet1 which too. note of various plans
in the air for partition. The communi?ue stated that partition "would be in defiance of
4ietnamese national sentiment which has asserted itself with so much strength for the
unity as well as for the independence of the country. Neither the <hief of State nor the
national government of 4ietnam admits that the unity of the country can be severed
legally...." The cabinet warned that an agreement compromising that unity would never
receive 4ietnam=s approval3
...neither the <hief of State) nor the 4ietnamese Government will consider themselves
FsicG as bound by decisions running counter to the interests) i.e.) independence and unity)
of their country that would) at the same time) violate the rights of the peoples and offer a
reward to aggression in opposition to the principles of the <harter of the United Nations
and democratic ideals.
!n response to this clear$cut statement) the *rench came forward with both oral and
written promises. Bn 8ay 9) 8aurice ;eDean) the <ommissioner General for !ndochina)
said in Saigon3
The *rench Government does not intend to see. a settlement of the !ndochina problem on
the basis of a partition of 4ietnamese territory. .
*ormal assurances were given on this subDect last #pril 7' by the *rench minister for
foreign affairs to the minister for foreign affairs of 4ietnam) and they were confirmed to
him on 8ay %.
"ritten assurance came from Bidault on 8ay , when he wrote Bao ;ai that the tas. of
the *rench government was to establish peace in !ndochina) not "to see. here Fat GenevaG
a definitive political solution." Therefore) the *rench goal would be) said Bidault) to
obtain a cease$fire with guarantees for the #ssociated States) hopefully with general
elections in the future. Bidault continued3
#s of now) ! am however in a position to confirm to Cour 8aDesty that nothing would be
more contrary to the intentions of the *rench government than to prepare for the
establishment) at the epense of the unity of 4ietnam) two States having each an
international calling +vocation1.
Bidault=s support of 4ietnam=s opposition to partition) which he repeated privately before
@den and Smith at Geneva) collapsed once the new government of Pierre 8endZs$*rance
too. over in mid$:une. 8endZs$*rance) .eenly aware of the tenor of *rench public
opinion) was far more disposed than the /aniel$Bidault administration to ma.ing every
effort toward achieving a reasonable settlement. "hile by no means prepared for a sell$
out) 8endZs$*rance ?uic.ly foresaw that agreement with the 4iet 8inh was unli.ely
unless he accepted the concept of partition. >is delegate at Geneva) who remained
<hauvel) and the new <ommissioner General for !ndochina) General @ly) reached the
same conclusion. #t a high$level meeting in Paris on :une 75) the new government
thoroughly revised the *rench negotiating position. The obDectives for subse?uent tal.s) it
was decided) would be3 +%1 the regroupment of forces of both sides) and their separation
by a line about at the %Jth parallel6Y +71 the establishment of enclaves under neutral
control in the two 2ones) one for the *rench in the area of the <atholic bishoprics at Phat
;iem and
Y *rench insistence on the %Jth parallel originated in the recommendation of General
Navarre) who was as.ed several ?uestions by the *rench delegation at Geneva regarding
the li.ely impact of the then$eisting military situation on the *rench negotiatory
position. Navarre=s responses were sent #pril 7%. Bn the demarcation line) Navarre said
that the %Jth parallel would leave "us" the ancient political capital of >ue as well as
Tourane +;a Nang1) and permit the retention of militarily valuable terrain. +See General
@ly=s 8Vmoires3 l(!ndohine dans la Tourmente FParis3 Plon) %&,5%) p. %%7) and
/acouture and ;evillers) "a fin d(une guerre& p. %7,.1 Thus) the choice of the %Jth
parallel was based on military considerations) and apparently assumed a continuing
*rench role in southern 4ietnam after partition.
Bui <hu) one for the 4iet 8inh at an area to be determined6 +91 the maintenance of
>aiphong in *rench hands in order to assist in the regroupment. The meeting also
decided that) for the purpose of psychological pressure on the 4iet 8inh if not military
preparedness for future contingencies) *rance should brea. with past practice and
announce plans to send a contingent of conscripts +later determined as two divisions1 to
!ndochina. Thus) by late :une) the *rench had come around to acceptance of the need to
eplore a territorial settlement without) as we have already observed) informing the
4ietnamese that Bidault=s and ;eDean=s assurances had been superseded. Bn :une 7,)
Paris formally notified "ashington and /ondon that <hauvel would soon begin direct
tal.s with Pham 4an ;ong on a partition arrangement that would provide the G4N with
the firmest possible territorial base. F;oc. ,,G
"hile ground had been bro.en on the cease$fire for 4ietnam) debate continued on /aos
and <ambodia. Prior to and after ;ong=s proposal of 8ay 7') the delegates argued bac.
and forth without progress over the relationship between the conflict in 4ietnam and that
in <ambodia and /aos. The Ahmer and /aotian delegates insisted they represented free
and independent governments which were being challenged by a handful of indigenous
renegades assisted by the invading 4iet 8inh. Thus) the delegates reasoned) their
situations were ?uite different from the "civil war" in 4ietnam) and therefore cease$fires
could readily be established in /aos and <ambodia by the simple epedient of removing
the aggressors. These delegates saw no reason$$and they received solid support from the
#merican) *rench and British representatives$$for acceding to the 4iet 8inh demand that
cease$fires in their two countries be contingent upon) and hence forced to occur
simultaneously with) one in 4ietnam.
The <ommunists= retorts left little room for compromise. Pham 4an ;ong held) as
before) that he spo.e for "governments" which were being refused admission to the
conference. The Pathet /ao and the *ree Ahmer were separate) genuine "national
liberation movements" whose sta.e in their respective countries) ;ong implied) would
have to be ac.nowledged before a cease$fire could be arranged anywhere in !ndochina.
8olotov buttressed this argument with the claim that /aos and <ambodia were no more
"independent" than 4ietnam. Using a common negotiating tactic) he ecerpted from a
public statement by ;ulles to point out how *rance was still being urged by the United
States in 8ay to grant real independence to all three !ndochinese states) not Dust 4ietnam.
8olotov=s only retreat was on the etent of Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer terntonal control.
>e admitted that while the 4iet 8inh were dominant in 4ietnam) the Ahmer$/aotian
resistance movements controlled some lesser amount of territory.
*or a while it seemed that the conference would become inetricably bogged down on the
?uestion whether the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer were creatures of the 4iet 8inh or
genuine nationalist forces. <ertainly the 4iet 8inh delegation remained steadfast. #t the
fourth restricted session +8ay 7%1) Pham 4an ;ong made his implication of the previous
sessions clearer when he said he had always understood the *rench cease$fire proposal to
have applied to all !ndochina +an outright fabrication1 inasmuch as the problems in the
three states were different only in degree) not in nature. !f <ambodia and /aos were
detached from 4ietnam in the discussions) ;ong said) the cease$fire issue would be
attac.ed in the wrong way and a satisfactory solution would not be reached. The warning
of no cease$fire settlement for <ambodia and /aos without one for 4ietnam was clear.
These last remar.s by ;ong) however) were no longer wholly in accord with what the
<hinese were privately indicating. <hou @n$lai) in the same conversation with @den on
8ay 7( in which <hou had agreed to separate military from political matters) also
admitted that political settlements might be different for the three !ndochinese states.
<hou thus moved one step closer to the "estern position) which held that the /aotian and
<ambodian cases were substantially different from that in 4ietnam and hence should be
decided separately. The concession) however small) paved the way for agreement to
@den=s proposal on 8ay 7' that the problem of a cease$fire in 4ietnam be dealt with
separately and directly by having the 4iet 8inh and *rench military commands meet in
Geneva and on the spot in 4ietnam +later determined as Trung Gia1 to discuss technical
aspects of the regroupment. The military staffs would report their findings to the
conferees. Bn :une 7 formal agreement was reached between the commands to begin
wor.6 but it was not until :une %() apparently) that the 4iet 8inh actually consented that
their secret tal.s with the *rench) li.e the discussions of the military commands) should
be concerned only with 4ietnam to the eclusion of /aotian and <ambodian problems.
Thus) it would seem that the 4iet 8inh position on the indivisibility of the three
!ndochinese states for purposes of a settlement was undercut by the <hinese +doubtless
with Soviet support16 yet for about three wee.s following <hou=s tal. with @den) the 4iet
8inh had privately refused to deal with the *rench on 4ietnam alone.
5. P6"!T!;#" SETT"EME3TS
<ommunist agreement to treat /aos and <ambodia separately as well as to consider a
territorial division did not) however) signal imminent progress on the substance of
military or political settlements for those countries any more than for 4ietnam. Several
additional plenary and restricted sessions made no headway at all during late 8ay and the
first wee.s of :une. @den=s disappointment led him to state to his fellow delegates3
!n respect . . . to the arrangements for supervision and to the future of /aos and
<ambodia) the divergencies are at present wide and deep. Unless we can narrow them
now without further delay) we shall have failed in our tas.. "e have ehausted every
epedient procedure which we could devise to assist us in our wor.. "e all .now now
what the differences are. "e have no choice but to resolve them or to admit our failure.
*or our part) the United Aingdom ;elegation is still willing to attempt to resolve them
here or in restricted session or by any other method which our colleagues may prefer.
But) gentlemen) if the positions remain as they are today) ! thin. it is our clear$cut duty to
say so to the world and to admit that we have failed.
;ays later) his pessimism ran even deeper as the conference indeed seemed close to a
brea.down. The #mericans did not help matters) either3 "Bedell Smith)" @den has since
divulged) "showed me a telegram from President @isenhower advising him to do
everything in his power to bring the conference to an end as rapidly as possible) on the
grounds that the <ommunists were only spinning things out to suit their own military
purposes."
*or reasons which will be speculated on subse?uently) the Soviets and <hinese were not
prepared to admit that the conference had failed and were willing to forestall that
prospect by ma.ing concessions sufficient to Dustify its continuation. "hile the
#mericans may have wished to see a brea.down) @den was not yet convinced that was
inevitable. #gain) his patience was rewarded. Bn :une %,) <hou told the foreign secretary
that the <ambodian resistance forces were small) ma.ing a political settlement with the
0oyal Government "easily" obtainable. !n /aos) where those forces were larger)
regroupment areas along the border with 4ietnam +in Sam Neua and Phong Saly
provinces1 would be re?uired) <hou thought. #s.ed by @den whether there might not be
difficulty in gaining 4iet 8inh agreement to the withdrawal of their troops from the two
countries) <hou replied it would "not be difficult" in the contet of a withdrawal of all
foreign forces. The <P0 would even be willing to consider the royal governments as
heading independent states that could maintain their ties to the *rench Union) provided
no #merican bases were established in their territories. <hina=s preeminent concern) @den
deduced) was that the United States might use /aos and <ambodia as Dump$off points for
an attac. on the mainland.
*rom the conversation) @den "received a strong impression that he F<houl wanted a
settlement and ! accordingly urged Georges Bidault to have a tal. with him and to discuss
this new offer." Bn the net day +:une %-1) Bidault met with <hou for the first time) as
well as with 8olotov) and reported the <ommunists= great concern over a brea.$up of the
conference. Two days later a *rench redraft of a <hinese proposal to broaden the military
staff conferences to include separate tal.s on /aos and <ambodia was accepted.
This first maDor brea.through in the negotiations) with the <hinese ma.ing an overture
that evidently had full Soviet bac.ing)Y seems not to have had 4iet 8inh
Y "hen 8olotov met with Smith on :une %&) the Soviet representative said he saw the
possibility of agreement on /aos and <ambodia so long as neither side +i.e.) the *rench
and 4iet 8inh1 "adopted one$sided views or put forward etreme pretensions." 8olotov
said about '( percent of /aotian territory was not controlled by the royal government
+putting the Pathet /ao case in the negative1) with a much smaller movement in
<ambodia. The tone of Smith=s report on this conversation suggests that 8olotov saw no
obstacles to 4iet 8inh withdrawal of its "volunteers." Smith tel. ;U/T@ 7(7 from
Geneva) :une %&) %&'5.
approval. #t the same time as the <hinese were saying) for eample in a New <hina
News #gency +N<N#1 broadcast of :une %-) that all three <ommunist delegations had
"all along maintained that the conditions in each of the three !ndochinese countries are
not eactly ali.e)" and hence that "conditions peculiar to each of these countries should
be ta.en into consideration)" the 4iet 8inh were claiming that "the indivisibility of the
three ?uestions of 4ietnam) Ahmer) and Pathet /ao" was one of several "fundamental
?uestions" which the conference had failed to resolve. !n fact) of course) that ?uestion had
been resolved6 yet the 4iet 8inh continued to proclaim the close unity of the 4iet 8inh)
Pathet /ao) and *ree Ahmer under the banner of their tri$national united front alliance
formed in %&'%. No doubt the 4iet 8inh were see.ing to assure their cadres and soldiers
in <ambodia and /aos that Pham 4an ;ong would not bargain away their fate at the
conference table) but it may also be that the broadcasts were meant to imply 4iet 8inh
eceptions to obDectionable Sino$Soviet concessions.
Those concessions) first on the separability of /aos and <ambodia from 4ietnam and
subse?uently on 4iet 8inh involvement there) compelled the ;04 delegation to ta.e a
new tac.. Bn the former ?uestions 4iet 8inh representatives indicated on :une %, during
"underground" discussions with the *rench that insofar as 4ietnam was concerned) their
minimum terms were absolute control of the Ton.in ;elta) including >anoi and
>aiphong. "hile the *rench were reluctant to yield both cities) which they still
controlled) a bargaining point had been established inasmuch as the 4iet 8inh were now
willing to discuss specific geographic obDectives. Bn the second ?uestion) the 4iet 8inh)
apparently responding to <hou @n$lai=s "offer" of their withdrawal from <ambodia and
/aos) indicated fleibility at least toward the latter country. # /aotian delegate reported
:une 79) following a meeting with Pham 4an ;ong in the garden of the <hinese
delegation=s villa) that the 4iet 8inh were in apparent accord on the withdrawal of their
"volunteers" and even on /aos= retention of *rench treaty bases. The 4iet 8inh=s
principal demand was that *rench military personel in /aos be reduced to a minimum.
/ess clearly) ;ong alluded to the creation in /aos of a government of "national union)"
Pathet /ao participation in %&'' elections for the national assembly) and a "temporary
arrangement" governing areas dominated by Pathet /ao military forces. But these latter
points were interpreted as being suggestive6 ;ong had come around to the "estern view
shared +now by the Soviets and <hinese1 that the Pathet /ao not be accorded either
military or political weight e?ual to that of the royal government. /ater in the conference)
;ong would ma.e a similar retreat on <ambodia.
<. <BNT0B/ #N; SUP@04!S!BN
Painsta.ingly slow progress toward cease$fires and political settlements for the
!ndochinese states also characteri2ed the wor. of devising supervisory organs to oversee
the implementation and preservation of the cease$fire. Cet here again) the <ommunist
side was not so intransigent as to ma.e agreement impossible.
Three separate but interrelated issues dominated the discussions of control and
supervision at this stage of the conference and afterward. *irst) there was sharp
disagreement over the structure of the supervisory organ3 Should it consist solely of Doint
commissions composed of the belligerents) or should it have superimposed above an
international authority possessing decisionma.ing powerN Second) the composition of
any supervisory organ other than the Doint commissions was also hotly disputed3 Given
agreement to have "neutral" nations observe the truce) which nations might be considered
"neutral"N *inally) if it were agreed that there should be a neutral control body) how
would it discharge its dutiesN
!n the original 4iet 8inh proposals) implementation of the cease$fire was left to Doint
indigenous commissions) with no provision for higher) international supervision.
4ehement *rench obDections led to a second line of defense from the <ommunist side. #t
the fourth plenary session +8ay %51) 8olotov suggested the setting up of a Neutral
Nations Supervisory <ommission +NNS<1 such as eisted in Aorea) and said he did not
foresee any insurmountable problem in reaching agreement on its membership. But
8olotov=s revision left much to be determined and) from the "estern standpoint) much to
be desired too. Serious debate on the control and supervision problem did not get
underway until early :une. #t that time) 8olotov epressly reDected the #merican plan)
supported by the !ndochinese delegations and Great Britain) to have the United Nations
supervise a cease$fire. >e argued that the UN had nothing to do with the Geneva
<onference) especially as most of the conferees were not UN members. 0eturning to his
plan for an NNS<) 8olotov reiterated his view that <ommunist countries could be as
neutral as capitalist countries6 hence) he said) the problem was simply one of choosing
which countries should comprise the supervisory organ) and suggested that the yardstic.
be those having diplomatic and political relations with both *rance and the 4iet 8inh. #s
to that body=s relationship to the Doint commissions) 8olotov shied away from the
"estern proposal to ma.e them subordinate to the neutral commission. "!t would be in
the interest of our wor. to recogni2e)" 8olotov said) "that these commissions should act
in coordination and in agreement between each other) but should not be subordinate to
each other." No such hierarchical relationship had eisted in Aorea) so why one in
!ndochinaN *inally) the foreign minister saw no reason why an NNS< could not reach
decisions by unanimous vote on "important" ?uestions. ;isputes among or within the
commissions) 8olotov concluded) would be referred to the states guaranteeing the
settlement) which would) if necessary) ta.e "collective measures" to resolve them.
The "estern position was stated succinctly by Bidault. #gain insisting on having "an
authority remote from the heat of the fighting and which would have a final word to say
in disputes)" Bidault said the neutral control commission should have absolute
responsibility for the armistice. !t would have such functions as regrouping the regular
forces) supervising any demilitari2ed 2ones) conducting the echange of prisoners) and
implementing measures for the non$introduction of war materiel into !ndochina. "hile
the Doint commission would have an important role to play in these control processes)
such as in wor.ing out agreement for the safe passage of opposing armies from one 2one
to another or for PB" echange) its functions would have to be subordinate to the
undisputed authority of a neutral mechanism. Bidault did not specify which nations fitted
his definition of "neutrality" and whether they would decide by maDority or unanimous
vote. These omissions were corrected by @den a few days later when he suggested the
<olombo Powers +!ndia) Pa.istan) <eylon) Burma) and !ndonesia1) which he argued were
all #sian) had all been actively discussing !ndochina outside the conference) were five in
number and hence impervious to obstruction by a two$to$two vote +as on the NNS<1 or
re?uirement for unanimity) and were truly impartial.
The basis for agreement on the vital ?uestion of supervising a cease$fire seemed at this
stage noneistent. The <ommunists had revised their position by admitting the feasibility
of a neutral nations= control organ in addition to Doint commissions of the belligerents.
But they clearly hoped to duplicate in !ndochina the ineffective machinery they had
foisted on the United Nations command at PanmunDom) one in which effective
peace.eeping action was basically proscribed by the built$in veto of a four$power
authority evenly divided among <ommunist and non$<ommunist representatives. The
"est) on the other hand) absolutely refused to eperiment again with an NNS<6 a neutral
organ was vital) but it could not include <ommunist representatives) who did not .now
the meaning of neutrality. !f the United Nations was not acceptable to the <ommunists)
the <olombo Powers should be.
>owever remote these positions) various .inds of trade$offs must have been apparent to
the negotiators. ;espite differing standards of "neutrality" and "impartiality)" for
instance) compromise on the membership problem seemed possible. The real dilemma
was the authority of a neutral body. Unless superior to the Doint commissions) it would
never be able to resolve disputes) and unless it had the power to enforce its own
decisions) it would never be more than an advisory organ. "hether some new formula
could be found somewhere between the <ommunists= insistence on parallel authority and
the "est=s preference for a hierarchical arrangement remained to be seen.
Bn :une %& the Aorea phase of the conference ended without reaching a political
settlement. The conferees at that point agreed to a prolonged recess by the delegation
leaders on the understanding that the military committees would continue to meet at
Geneva and in the field. @den wrote to the #sian <ornmonwealth prime ministers that "if
the wor. of the committees is sufficiently advanced) the >eads of ;elegations will come
bac.." Until that time) the wor. of the conference would go on in restricted session.
<hauvel and Pham 4an ;ong remained at their posts6 8olotov returned to 8oscow6
<hou @n$lai) en route to Pe.ing) made important stopovers in New ;elhi) 0angoon) and
Nanning that were to have important bearing on the conference. Smith remained in
Geneva) but turned the delegation over to :ohnson. !t was ?uestionable whether the
Under Secretary would ta.e over again6 gloom was so thic. in "ashington over the
perceived lac. of progress in the tal.s and the conviction = that the new 8endZs$*rance
government would reach a settlement as soon as the conference reconvened) that ;ulles
cabled Smith3 "Bur thin.ing at present is that our role at Geneva should soon be restricted
to that of observer. . . ." F;oc. ,'G #s for @den) he prepared to accompany <hurchill on a
trip to "ashington for tal.s relating to the conference and prospects for a Southeast #sia
defense pact.
4!. T>@ #NG/B$#8@0!<#N 0#PP0B<>@8@NT
"ith its preconceptions of <ommunist negotiating strategy confirmed by the harshness of
the first 4iet 8inh proposals) which "ashington did not regard as significantly watered
down by subse?uent Sino$Soviet alterations) and with its military alternatives no longer
considered relevant to the war) the United States began to move in the direction of
becoming an influential actor at the negotiations. This move was not dictated by a sudden
conviction that "estern capacity for inducing concessions from the <ommunist side had
increased6 nor was the shift premised on the hope that we might be able to drive a wedge
between the 4iet 8inh and their Soviet and <hinese friends. 0ather) "ashington
believed that inasmuch as a settlement was certain to come about) and even though there
was near$e?ual certainty it could not support the final terms) basic #merican and "estern
interests in Southeast #sia might still be preserved if *rance could be persuaded to
toughen its stand. "ere concessions still not forthcoming$$were the <ommunists) in other
words) to stiffen in response to *rench firmness$$the #llies would be able to consult on
their net moves with the confidence every reasonable effort to reestablish peace had
been attempted.
#s already observed) the #merican decision to play a more decisive role at the
conference depended on gaining British support. The changing war situation now made
alignment with the British necessary for future regional defense) especially as
"ashington was informed of the probability that a partition settlement +which /ondon
had foreseen months before1 would place all !ndochina in or within reach of <ommunist
hands. The ?uestions remained how much territory the <ommunists could be granted
without compromising non$<ommunist !ndochina=s security) what measures were needed
to guarantee that security) and what other military and political principles were vital to
any settlement which the *rench would also be willing to adopt in the negotiations. "hen
the chief ministers of the United States and Great Britain met in "ashington in late :une)
these were the issues they had to confront.
The British and #merican representatives$@den) <hurchill) ;ulles) and @isenhower$
brought to the tal.s positions on partition and regional security that) for all the
differences) left considerable room for a harmoni2ation of viewpoints. The UA) as the
#mericans well .new) was never convinced either that !ndochina=s security was
inetricably lin.ed to the security of all #sia) or that the *ranco$4iet 8inh war would
ever bring into ?uestion the surrender of all !ndochina to the <ommunists. /ondon
considered partition a feasible solution) but was already loo.ing beyond that to some
more basic @ast$"est understanding that would have the effect of producing a laisse2$
faire coeistence between the <ommunist and "estern powers in the region. #s @den
recalled his thin.ing at the time) the best way of .eeping <ommunism out of Southeast
#sia while still providing the necessary security within which free societies might evolve
was to build a belt of neutral states assisted by the "est. The <ommunists might not see
any advantage to this arrangement) he admitted. But3
!f we could bring about a situation where the <ommunists believed that there was a
balance of advantage to them in arranging a girdle of neutral states) we might have the
ingredients of a settlement.
Bnce the settlement was achieved) a system for guaranteeing the security of the neutral
states thus formed would be re?uired) @den held. <ollective defense) of the .ind that
would ensure action without unanimity among the contracting parties$$a system "of the
/ocarno type"$$seemed most reasonable to him. These points) in broad outline) were
those presented by him and <hurchill.
The United States had from the beginning dismissed the viability of a partition solution.
;ulles= public position in his maDor speech of 8arch 7& that <ommunist control even of
part of !ndochina would merely be the prelude to total domination was fully supported in
private by both State and ;efense. Nevertheiess) the Government early recogni2ed the
possibility that partition) however distasteful) might be agreed to among the *rench and
<ommunist negotiators. #s a result) on 8ay ') the ;efense ;epartment drew up a
settlement plan that included provision for a territorial division. #s little of 4ietnam as
possible should be yielded) ;efense argued) with the demarcation line fied in the north
and "defined by some defensible geographic boundary +i.e.) the 0ed or Blac. 0ivers) or
the #nnamite 8ountains1 !n accord with the *rench position that evolved from the
meeting of 8endZs$*rance=s cabinet on :une 75) ;efense urged provision for a
4ietnamese enclave in the >anoi$>aiphong area
or) alternatively) internationali2ation of the port facilities there. *airly well convinced)
however) that partition would be fragile) ;efense also called for "sanctions" against any
form of <ommunist aggression in /aos) <ambodia) or Thailand) and for allied agreement
to united action in the event the <ommunists violated a cease$fire by conducting
subversive activities in the non$<ommunist area of 4ietnam.
The ;efense proposal amounted to containing the <ommunist forces above the 7(th
parallel while denying them sovereign access to the sea. This position went much further
than that of the *rench) who also favored a demarcation line geared to military
re?uirements but were willing to settle on roughly the %Jth parallel. 8oreover) when the
five$power military staff conference met in "ashington in early :une) it reported +on the
&th1 that a line midway between the %-th and %Jth parallels +from Tha.he. in /aos
westward to ;ong >oi on the north 4ietnam seacoast1 would be defensible in the event
partition came about. F;oc. ,%G Undercutting the ;efense plan still further was the
*rench disposition to yield on an enclave in the >anoi$>aiphong area were the 4iet 8inh
to press for their own enclave in southern 4ietnam. #s <hauvel told U. #leis :ohnson)
should the choice come to a trade$off of enclaves or a straight territorial division) the
*rench preferred the latter. F;oc. ,7G Thus) by mid$:une) a combination of circumstances
made it evident to the #dministration that some more fleible position on the location of
the partition line would have to be) and could be) adopted.
#merican acceptance of partition as a wor.able arrangement put "ashington and /ondon
on even terms. Similarly) on the matter of an overall security "umbrella" for Southeast
#sia) the two allies also found common ground. "hile the United States found "/ocarno"
an unfortunate term) the Government did not dispute the need to establish a vigorous
defense mechanism capable of acting despite obDections by one or more members. !t will
be recalled that the NS< Planning Board) on 8ay %&) had outlined three possible regional
groupings dependent upon the nature and timing of a settlement at Geneva. Now) in late
:une) circumstances dictated the advisability of concentrating on the "Group 7" formula)
in which the UA) the United States) Pa.istan) Thailand) the Philippines) #ustralia) and
New Lealand would participate but not *rance +unless it was decided that the pact would
apply to !ndochina1. The concerned states would echange information) act as a united
front against <ommunism) provide actual assistance to #sian members against eternal
attac. or "<ommunist insurrection)" and ma.e use of #sian facilities andIor forces in
their defense assistance program.
#merican planning for what was to become S@#TB evinced concern) however) about the
commitment of #merican forces in cases of <ommunist infiltration and subversion. #s
the Planning Board=s paper notes) the role of the United States and other countries should
be limited to support of the country re?uesting assistance6 #sian member nations would
be epected to "contribute facilities and) if possible) at least to.en military contingents."
The Board=s paper did not represent a final policy statement6 but it did reflect #merican
reluctance) particularly on the part of the President and the :oint <hiefs) to have
#merican forces drawn into the .ind of local conflict the #dministration had steered
clear of in 4ietnam. Bn this ?uestion of limiting the "estern commitment) the British) to
Dudge from their hostility toward involvement against the 4iet 8inh) were also in general
agreement.
#side from partition and regional security) a basis also eisted for agreement to assisting
the *rench in their diplomatic wor. by the device of some carefully worded warning to
the <ommunists. The British) before as well as after ;ienbienphu) were firmly against
issuing threats to the <ommunists that involved military conse?uences. "hen united
action had first been broached) /ondon reDected raising the threat of a naval bloc.ade and
carrying it out if the <hinese continued to assist the 4iet 8inh. #gain) when united
action came up in private U.S.$*rench discussions during 8ay) the British saw no useful
purpose in see.ing to influence discussions at Geneva by ma.ing it .nown to the
<ommunists that united action would follow a brea.down in negotiations. The situation
was different now. !nstead of threatening direct military action) /ondon and "ashington
apparently agreed) the "est could profit from an open$ended warning tied to a lac. of
progress at Geneva. "hen @den addressed the >ouse of <ommons on :une 79 prior to
emplaning for "ashington) he said3 "!t should be clear to all that the hopes of agreement
Fat GenevaG would be Deopardi2ed if active military operations in !ndochina were to be
intensified while negotiations for an armistice are proceeding at Geneva. !f this reminder
is needed) ! hope that it may be heeded." @den was specifically thin.ing of a renewed
4iet 8inh offensive in the ;elta) but was not saying what might happen once
negotiations were placed in Deopardy.
This type of warning was sounded again at the conclusion of the #nglo$#merican tal.s)
and encouragement for it came from Paris. !n the same aidememoire of :une 7, in which
the *rench Government had re?uested that the United States counsel Saigon against a
violent reaction to partition) "ashington was also urged to Doin with /ondon in a
declaration. The declaration would "state in some fashion or other that) if it is not
possible to reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva <onference) a serious aggravation
of international relations would result F;oc. ,,G The *rench suggestion was acted upon.
@isenhower and <hurchill issued a statement on :une 7& that "if at Geneva the *rench
Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement
regarding !ndochina) the international situation will be seriously aggravated." !n
retrospect) the statement may have had an important bearing on the <ommunists=
negotiating position$$a point to which we shall return subse?uently.
The Doint statement referred to "an acceptable agreement)" and indeed the ramifications of
that phrase constituted the main subDect of the U.S.$UA tal.s. !n an unpublici2ed
agreement) the two governments concurred on a common set of principles which) if
wor.ed into the settlement terms) would enable both to "respect" the armistice. These
principles) .nown subse?uently as the Seven Points) were communicated to the *rench.
#s reported by @den) they were3
+%1 Preservation of the integrity and independence of /aos and <ambodia) and assurance
of 4iet 8inh withdrawal from those countries
+71 Preservation of at least the southern half of 4ietnam) and if possible an enclave in the
;elta) with the line of demarcation no further south than one running generally west from
;ong >oi
+91 No restrictions on /aos) <ambodia) or retained 4ietnam "materially impairing their
capacity to maintain stable non$<ommunist regimes6 and especially restrictions impairing
their right to maintain ade?uate forces for internal security) to import arms and to employ
foreign advisers"
+51 No "political provisions which would ris. loss of the retained area to <ommunist
control"
+'1 No provision that would "eclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification of
4ietnam by peaceful means"
+,1 Provision for "the peaceful and humane transfer) under international supervision) of
those people desiring to be moved from one 2one to another of 4ietnam"
+-1 Provision for "effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."
The Seven Points represented something of an #merican diplomatic victory when viewed
in the contet of the changed #dministration position on partition. "hile any loss of
territory to the <ommunists predetermined the official #merican attitude toward the
settlement$$@den was told the United States would almost certainly be unable to
guarantee it$$the terms agreed upon with the British were sufficiently hard that) if pushed
through by the *rench) they would bring about a tolerable arrangement for !ndochina.
The stic.ing point for "ashington lay not in the terms but in the unli.elihood that the
British) any more than the *rench) would actually stand by them against the <ommunists.
Thus) ;ulles wrote3 ". . . we have the distinct impression that the British loo. upon this
Fmemorandum of the Seven PointsG merely as an optimum solution and that they would
not encourage the *rench to hold out for a solution as good as this." The Secretary
observed that the British) during the tal.s) were unhappy about finding "ashington ready
only to "respect" the final terms reached at Geneva. They had preferred a stronger word)
yet they "wanted to epress these - points merely as a =hope= without any indication of
firmuess on our part." The United States) ?uite aside from what was said in the Seven
Points) "would not want to be associated in any way with a settlement which fell
materially short of the - point memorandum." F;oc. -(G Thus) the seven points) while
having finally bound the United States and Great Britain to a common position on the
conference) did not allay "ashington=s aniety over British and *rench readiness to
conclude a less$than$satisfactory settlement. The possibility of a unilateral #merican
withdrawal from the conference was still being "given consideration)" ;ulles reported)
even as the Seven Points were agreed upon.
;espite reservations about our #llies= adherence to the Seven Points) the United States
still hoped to get *rench approval of them. Bn :uly ,) ;illon telegraphed the *rench
reaction as given him by Parodi) the secretary$general of the cabinet. "ith the eception
of Point ') denoting national elections) the *rench were in agreement. They were
confused about an apparent conflict between the elections provision and Point 5) under
which political provisions) which would include elections) were not to ris. loss of
retained 4ietnam. !n addition) they) too) felt #merican agreement merely to "respect" any
agreement was too wea. a term) and re?uested clarification of its meaning.
;ulles responded the net day +:uly -1 to both matters. Points 5 and ' were not in
conflict) he said. !t was ?uite possible that an agreement in line with the Seven Points
might still not prevent !ndochina from going <ommunist. The important thing) therefore)
was to arrange for national elections in a way that would give the South 4ietnamese a
liberal breathing spell3
since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually mean unification 4ietnam under
>o <hi 8inh this ma.es it all more important they should be only held as long after
cease$fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give
democratic elements Fin South 4ietnamG best chance. "e believe important that no date
should be set now and especially that no conditions should be accepted by *rench which
would have direct or indirect effect of preventing effective international supervision of
agreement ensuring political as well as military guarantees.
#nd so far as "respect" of that agreement was concerned) the United States and Britain
meant they "would not oppose a settlement which conformed to Seven Points. . . . !t does
not of course mean we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily
support it publicly. "e consider =respect= as strong a word as we can possibly employ in
the circumstances. . . . =0espect= would also mean that we would not see. directly or
indirectly to upset settlement by force." Y
Y ;ulles to #merican @mbassy) Paris) tel. No. --) :uly -. %&'5 +Secret1. F;oc. ,5G
0egarding the U.S. view of a >o <hi 8inh electoral victory) we not only have the well$
.nown comment of @isenhower that >o) at least in early %&'5) would have garnered J(
percent of the vote. +See Mandate for ;hange FGarden <ity) New Cor.3 ;oubledayG) pp.
99-$9J.1 !n addition) there is a ;epartment of State memorandum of conversation of 8ay
9%) %&'5) in which /ivingston 8erchant reportedly "recogni2ed the possibility that in
4iet Nam >o might win a plebiscite) if held today."
;ulles= clarification of the #merican position on elections in 4ietnam) together with his
delimitation of the nation=s obligation towards a settlement) did not satisfy the *rench
completely but served the important purpose of enlightening them as to #merican
intentions. Placed beside the discussions with @den and <hurchill) the thrust of #merican
diplomacy at this time clearly was to leave no ?uestion in the minds of our allies as to
what we considered the elements in a reasonable !ndochina settlement and what we
would li.ely do once a settlement were achieved.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 9) "The Geneva <onference) 8ay$:uly) %&'5"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. %5,$%-J
4!!. TB"#0; # S@TT/@8@NT3 T>@ /#ST T>!0TC ;#CS
#. T)E 5#2:#!3!3: ;63T!37ES
"hile the *rench and British pondered the implications of the Seven Points) bargaining
continued behind the scenes against a bac.ground of further military advance by the 4iet
8inh. #t about the same time the 4iet 8inh made their first specific partition proposal)
their forces in the field completed their deployment from the ;ienbienphu area. By mid$
:une) according to #merican intelligence) the 4iet 8inh were believed prepared for a
massive attac. in the ;elta. #nother report spo.e of their renewed attention to southern
#nnam and of an apparent buildup of military strength there. Not surprisingly in light of
these developments) the 4iet 8inh) in late :une) responded to the *rench proposal of a
division at the %Jth parallel with a plan for a line in southern #nnam running northwest
from the %9th to the %5th parallel) i.e.) from Tuy >oa on the coast through Plei.u to the
<ambodian border. 8oreover) in secret tal.s with the *rench) the 4iet 8inh=s vice$
minister for national defense) Ta Kuang Buu) also insisted on *rench withdrawal from the
;elta within two months of a cease$fire) in contrast to *rench demands for a four$month
interval. F;oc. ,&G #s suggested by /acouture and ;evillers) the 4iet 8inh may have
been see.ing to capitali2e not only on their improved military position in the ;elta)
where *rench Union forces were still in retreat) but also on 8endZs$*rance=s reputation
as a man of peace obviously desirous of a settlement.
This resurgence of 4iet 8inh toughness on terms for a cessation of hostilities applied
also to /aos and <ambodia. !n the military staff conferences that had begun separately on
those two countries in late :une) no progress was made. The 4iet 8inh indicated) in the
/aotian case) that they had already withdrawn6 if forces opposing the royal government
remained +as in fact some %')((( did1) negotiations with the resistance groups would
have to be underta.en. Thus) despite <hou @n$lai=s claim that 4iet 8inh withdrawal from
/aos and <ambodia could easily be accomplished) the 4iet 8inh were hardly ready to
move out unless they received substantial guarantees +such as a permanent regroupment
area1) which the royal governments refused to give.
"hether because of or in spite of 4iet 8inh intransigence) the <hinese forcefully made
.nown their earnest desire to .eep the conference moving. !n an important encounter at
Bern on :une 79) <hou @n$lai several times emphasi2ed to 8endZs$*rance that the main
thing was a cease$fire) on which he hoped progress could be made before all the heads of
delegation returned to Geneva. 0egarding /aos and <ambodia) <hou thought
regroupment areas for the insurgents would be necessary) but reiterated that national
unity was the affair of the royal governments6 he hoped the resistance elements might
find a place in the national life of their respective countries. <hou told the *rench
premier) as he had told @den previously) that no #merican bases could be permitted in
those countries6 yet <hou spo.e sympathetically of the *rench Union. Turning finally to
the 4iet 8inh) <hou urged that direct contact be established between them and the
4ietnamese. >e promised that for his part) he would see that the 4iet 8inh were
thoroughly prepared for serious discussions on a military settlement. <learly) the <hinese
were far more interested in moving forward toward a cease$fire than were their 4iet 8inh
counterparts.
@ven though the 4iet 8inh were ma.ing demands that the *rench) <ambodians) and
/aotians could not accept) the debate was narrowing to specifics. The ?uestion when
national elections in 4ietnam should be held is illustrative. The 4iet 8inh did not budge
from their insistence that elections occur si months after the cease$fire. But the *rench)
attempting to ma.e some headway in the tal.s) retreated from insistence on setting no
date +a position the 4ietnamese had supported1 and offered to hold elections %J months
after completion of the regroupment process) or between 77 and 79 months after the
cessation of hostilities. F;oc. ,&G The *rench now admitted that while they still loo.ed
forward to retaining >aiphong and the <atholic bishoprics as long as possible) perhaps in
some neutral environment) total withdrawal from the north would probably be necessary
to avoid cutting up 4ietnam into enclaves. F;oc. ,,G But partition in any manner faced
the *rench with hostile 4ietnamese) and it was for this reason that <hauvel not only
suggested #merican intervention to induce 4ietnamese self$control) but also received
Pham 4an ;ong=s approval) in a conversation :uly ,) to having the military commands
rather than governments sign the final armistice so as to avoid having to win 4ietnamese
consent. #s Ngo ;inh ;iem) who became prime minister :une %J) suspected) the *rench
were prepared to pull out of Ton.in as part of the cease$fire arrangements.
Bn the matter of control and supervision) the debate also became more focused even as
the gulf between opposing views remained wide. The chief points of contention were) as
before) the composition and authority of the neutral supervisory body6 but the outlines of
an acceptable arrangement were beginning to form. Thus) on composition) the
<ommunist delegations) in early :uly) began spea.ing in terms of an odd$numbered
+three or five1 neutral commission chaired by !ndia) with pro$<ommunist and pro$
"estern governments e?ually sharing the remaining two or four places. Second) on the
powers of that body) dispute persisted as to whether it would have separate but parallel
authority with the Doint commissions or supreme authority6 whether and on what
?uestions it would ma.e Dudgments by unanimous vote6 and whether it would +as the
*rench proposed1 be empowered to issue maDority and minority reports in case of
disagreement. These were all fundamental issues) but the important point is that the
<ommunist side refused to consider them irremovable obstacles to agreement. #s
8olotov=s understudy) Au2netsov +the deputy foreign minister1) put it) the Soviet and
*rench proposals on control and supervision revealed "rapprochement in the points of
view on certain ?uestions. !t is true with respect to the relationships between the mied
commission and the international supervisory commission. This rapprochement eists
also in regard to the ?uestion of the eamination of the functions and duties of the
commission..." !n fact) a "rapprochement" did not eist6 but the Soviets) interestingly)
persisted in their optimism that a solution could be found.
5. ;)!3ESE DiP"6M#;<
"hile the negotiations went on among the second$string diplomats) a different .ind of
diplomacy was being carried on elsewhere. <hou @n$lai) en route to Pe.ing) advanced
<ommunist <hina=s effort) actually begun in late %&'7) to woo its #sian neighbors with
tal. of peaceful coeistence. This diplomatic offensive) which was to have an important
bearing on the outcome at Geneva) had borne its first fruit in #pril %&'5) when <hou
reached agreement with Nehru over Tibet. #t that time) the <hinese first introduced the
"five principles" they vowed to follow in their relations with other nations. The five
principles are3 mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty) nonaggression)
noninterference in internal affairs) e?uality and mutual benefit) and peaceful coeistence.
<hou=s first stopover was in New ;elhi) the scene of his initial success. Bn :une 7J he
and Nehru reaffirmed the five principles and epressed the hope that a peaceful
settlement in !ndochina would be concluded in conformity with them. Similar sentiments
appeared in a Doint statement from 0angoon) scene of tal.s with Prime 8inister U Nu.
Promises were echanged) moreover) for the maintenance of close contact between <hina
and Burma) and support was voiced for the right of countries having different social
systems to coeist without interference from outside. "0evolution cannot be eported)"
the Doint statement proclaimed6 "at the same time outside interference with the common
will epressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted."
Pe.ing made full use of these diplomatic achievements by contrasting them with the
#merican policy of ruthless epansionism) which Pe.ing said was carried out by
"ashington under the label of opposing <ommunism. Pe.ing proclaimed that the era of
colonialism which the United States was see.ing to perpetuate in !ndochina had come to
an end. "# new era has dawned in which #sian countries can coeist peacefully and
establish friendly relations on the basis of respect for each other=s territorial integrity and
sovereignty and mutual nonaggression)" said Fen-min Hih-pao. #nother newspaper)
Duang-ming Hih-pao) offered similar testimony to the inspirational effect of the Sino$
!ndian and Sino$Burmese agreements) considering them to conform to the interests of all
#sian peoples. The daily castigated the #merican "policy of strength" as being totally
incompatible with the five principles. <learly) <hina was eploiting its gains through
diplomacy not simply to ac?uire #sian support +and thus detract from pro$"esternism in
the region1) but more broadly to muster recognition for <hina as the leading #sian power
in the fight against "imperialism" and "colonialism."
<hou=s diplomatic efforts too. a different turn) it seems) when he met with >o <hi 8inh
at Nanning) on the Sino$4ietnamese frontier) from :uly 9$'. #lthough the final
communi?ue merely stated that the two leaders "had a full echange of views on the
Geneva <onference with respect to the ?uestion of the restoration of peace in !ndochina
and related ?uestions)" it subse?uently appeared that much more may have ta.en place.
#ccording to observers in >ong Aong) <hou pressed for the meeting out of fear that the
4iet 8inh might engage in intensified military action that would destroy chances for an
armistice and upset <hina=s budding role as an #sian peacema.er. <onceivably) <hou
sought to persuade >o that his territorial gains were about as much as he could epect at
that Duncture without ris.ing an end to negotiations and renewed #merican attempts to
forge a military alliance for intervention. To Dudge from the 4iet 8inh reaction to the
tal.s) >o was not completely satisfied with <hou=s proposed tactics.
8omentarily leaving aside <hou=s motivations) it is vital to note the impact of the tal.s
on the Geneva negotiations. Bn :uly &) <hauvel dined with /i A=enung and <hang "en$
t=ien) a vice$minister for foreign affairs and <P0 ambassador to the Soviet Union.
<hauvel opened the conversation$$as he later recounted to :ohnson$$by complaining that
discussions with the 4iet 8inh were not going well) that 4iet 8inh demands were
eorbitant and well beyond <hou @n$lai=s stated position. The <hinese delegates evinced
surprise but said nothing in direct reply. >owever) <hang did report that <hou had had a
"very good meeting" with >o <hi 8inh) the results of which "would be helpful to
*rench." <hauvel received the impression$$one which seems) in retrospect) to have been
accurate$$that the 4iet 8inh had been given a free hand by the Soviets and <hinese up to
the point where their demands were unacceptable to the *rench) at which time the Soviets
andIor <hinese felt compelled to intervene. F;oc. ,,G !f such was the case) <hou=s tal.
with >o) coming after 8endZs$*rance and his negotiators showed no sign of being more
compromising than their predecessors) /aniel and Bidault) may have been intended to
inform the 4iet 8inh that the "point" had been reached and that they had to soften their
demands if a settlement were ever to be attained.
;. T)E F2#3;6-#ME2!;#3 73DE2ST#3D!3:
Precisely how <hou=s stopover in Nanning would be "helpful" to the *rench did not
become apparent until four days after <hauvel=s conversation with /i and <hang. By that
time) the *rench had been engaged in intensive conversations with the #mericans) the
aim of which was to convince "ashington that the United States) to be truly influential at
the conference$to reali2e) in other words) a settlement in line with the Seven Points$had to
bac. the *rench with a high$level representative in Geneva. Unless the United States did
more than offer its views from afar on an acceptable settlement) 8endZs$*rance argued)
*rance could not be epected to present a strong front when 8olotov and <hou resumed
their places. #s though to prove his determination to stand fast against <ommunist
demands) 8endZs$*rance told #mbassador ;illon in Paris that if a cease$fire was not
agreed to by :uly 7() the premier would approve the dispatch of conscripts to !ndochina
and would introduce a law into Parliament to that effect on :uly 7%. >is government
would not resign until that law passed6 the ships would be prepared to transport the
conscripts to !ndochina beginning :uly 7'. [;oc. ,7G
;espite 8endZs$*rance=s willingness to establish a deadline and) for the first time in the
history of *rench involvement in !ndochina) to conscript soldiers for service there)
"ashington remained opposed to upgrading its Geneva delegation. Sensitive as much to
any proposal that might implicate the United States in the final settlement terms as to
8endZs$*rance=s difficulties at the conference table) ;ulles believed the *rench would
end by accepting a settlement unsatisfactory to the United States whether or not the
US;@/ were upgraded. #s he eplained to ;illon) were he +the Secretary1 or Smith to
return to Geneva only to find the *rench compelled to negotiate an unacceptable
agreement anyway) the United States would be re?uired to dissociate itself in a manner
"which would be deeply resented by the *rench as an effort on our part to bloc. at the
last minute a peace which they ardently desire)" with possible "irreparable inDury to
*ranco$#merican relations The least embarrassing alternative) ;ulles felt) was to avoid
the probability of having to ma.e a "spectacular disassociation" by staying away from the
conference altogether. F;oc. ,'G
"hen ;ulles= position was reported to 8endZs$*rance) the premier said he understood
the #mericans= reluctance but considered it misplaced. The #merican fear of in some way
becoming committed to the settlement) he said) was precisely his dilemma) for he had no
idea what the <ommunists would propose in the crucial days ahead. The *rench
negotiating position was the Seven Points) he went on) and would not deviate
substantially from them. "ith great feeling) 8endZs$*rance told a member of the
#merican @mbassy that the presence of ;ulles or Smith was "absolutely essential and
necessary"6 without either of them) the <ommunists would sense and see. to capitali2e
on a lac. of unity in the allied camp. "8endZs indicated that our high$level presence at
Geneva had di rect bearing on where <ommunists would insist on placing line of
demarcation or partition in 4ietnam."
These arguments did not prove convincing to "ashington. Bn :uly %() ;ulles wrote
8endZs$*rance a personal message reiterating that his or General Smith=s presence would
serve no useful purpose. #nd ;ulles again raised doubts that *rance) Britain) and the
United States were really agreed on a single negotiating position3
"hat now concerns us is that we are very doubtful as to whether there is a united front in
relation to !ndochina) and we do not believe that the mere fact that the high
representatives of the three nations physically reappear together at Geneva will serve as a
substitute for a clear agreement on a Doint position which includes agreement as to what
will happen if that position is not accepted by the <ommunists. "e fear that unless there
is the reality of such a united front) the events at Geneva will epose differences under
conditions which will only serve to accentuate them with conse?uent strain upon the
relations between our two countries greater than if the US does not reappear at Geneva) in
the person of General Smith or myself. F;oc. ,-G
The Secretary ?uestioned whether the Seven Points truly represented a common
"minimum acceptable solution" which the three #llies were willing to fight for in the
event the <ommunists reDected them. <harging that the Seven Points were actually
"merely an optimum solution" for Paris no less than for /ondon) ;ulles sought to
demonstrate that the *rench were already moving away from the Seven Points. >e cited
apparent *rench willingness to permit <ommunist forces to remain in northern /aos) to
accept a demarcation line "considerably south of ;onghoi)" to neutrali2e and demilitari2e
/aos and <ambodia) and to permit "elections so early and so ill$prepared and ill$
supervised as to ris. the loss of the entire area to <ommunism" as evidences of a
"whittling$away process" which) cumulatively) could destroy the intent of the Seven
Points. F;oc. ,-G Un?uestionably) the Secretary=s firm opposition to restoring to the
#merican delegation its high ran. was grounded in intense suspicion of an ultimate
*rench sell$out) yet suspicion based on apparent misinformation concerning both the
actual *rench position and the degree of *rench willingness to stand firm.
Thus believing that the *rench had already gone far toward deflating some of the maDor
provisions of the U.S.$UA memorandum) ;ulles reiterated the #dministration=s position
that it had the right "not to endorse a solution which would seem to us to impair seriously
certain principles which the US believes must) as far as it is concerned) be .ept
unimpaired) if our own struggle against <ommunism is to be successfully pursued."
Perhaps see.ing to rationali2e the impact of his reDection) ;ulles wrote in closing that the
#merican decision might actually assist the *rench3 "!f our conduct creates a certain
uncertainty in the minds of the <ommunists) this might strengthen your hand more than
our presence at Geneva F;oc. ,-G 8endZs$*raiice had been rebuffed) however) and while
;ulles left the door slightly aDar for his or Smith=s return if "circumstances" should
change) it seemed more probable that *rance would have to wor. for a settlement with
only the British along side.
The ;ulles$8endZs$*rance echanges were essentially an eercise in credibility) with the
*rench premier desperately see.ing to persuade the Secretary that Paris really did support
and really would abide by the Seven Points. "hen 8endes$*rance read ;ulles= letter) he
protested that *rance would accept nothing unacceptable to the United States) and went
so far as to say that ;ulles= presence at the conference would give him a veto power) in
effect) on the decisions ta.en. Beyond that) 8endZs$*rance warned of the catastrophic
impact of an #merican withdrawal on the #merican position in @urope no less than in the
*ar @ast6 withdrawal) he said) was sure to be interpreted as a step toward isolationism.
#s.ed what alternative his government had in mind if the conference failed even with an
#merican high$level presence) 8endZs$*rance replied there would have to be full
internationali2ation of the war.Y
Y ;illon from Paris priority tel. No. %95) :uly %%) %&'5. F;oc. ,JG The same day)
8endZs$*rance had told ;illon again of *rance=s intention to send conscripts) with
parliamentary approval) by :uly 7') with two divisions ready for action by about
September %'. The premier said that while he could not predict how the #ssembly would
react) he personally saw the need for direct #merican involvement in the war once
negotiations bro.e down and the conscripts were sent. ;illon from Paris priority tel. No.
%99) :uly %%) %&'5.
8endZs$*rance=s persistence was sufficiently persuasive to move ;ulles) on :uly %9) to
fly to Paris to document the premier=s support of the Seven Points. Bn the %5th) the
Secretary and the premier signed a memorandum which duplicated that agreed to by the
United States and Great Britain. !n addition) a position paper was drawn up the same day
reiterating that the United States was at the conference as "a friendly nation" whose role
was subordinate to that of the primary non$<ommunist parties) the #ssociated States and
*rance. The Seven Points were described) as they had been some two wee.s earlier) as
those acceptable to the "primarily interested nations" and which the United States could
"respect." >owever) should terms ultimately be concluded which differed mar.edly from
the Seven Points) *rance agreed that the United States would neither be as.ed nor
epected to accept them) and "may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms"
by a unilateral or multilateral statement.
Bne of ;ulles= obDections had been that a true united front did not eist so long as
agreement was lac.ing on allied action in the event of no settlement. Bn this point) too)
the *rench were persuaded to adopt the #merican position. !n the event of a settlement) it
was agreed in the position paper that the United States would "see.) with other interested
nations) a collective defense association designed to preserve) against direct and indirect
aggression) the integrity of the non$<ommunist areas of Southeast #sia Should no
settlement be forthcoming) U.S.$*rance consultations would ta.e place6 but these would
not preclude the United States from bringing "the matter" before the UN as a threat to the
peace. Previous obstacles to *rench obDections to UN involvement were noneistent) for
*rance reaffirmed in the position paper its commitment under the :une 5 treaty of
independence with 4ietnam that Saigon) as well as 4ientiane and Phnom Penh) was an
"e?ual and voluntary" partner in the *rench Union) and hence no longer subDect in its
foreign policy to *rench di0tat.
Bn all but one matter) now) the United States and *rance were in complete accord on a
negotiating strategy. That matter was) of course) the #merican delegation. 8endZs$
*rance had formally subscribed to the Seven Points and had agreed to #merican plans for
dealing with the aftermath of the conference6 yet he had gained nothing for the *rench
delegation. "riting to the Secretary) the premier pointed out again3
!n effect) ! have every reason to thin. that your absence would be precisely interpreted as
demonstrating) before the fact) that you disapproved of the conference and of everything
which might be accomplished. Not only would those who are against us find therein the
confirmation of the ill will which they attribute to your government concerning the
reestablishment of peace in !ndochina6 but many others would read in it a sure sign of a
division of the western powers. F;oc. -(G
Bnce more) 8endZs$*rance was putting forth the view that a high$level #merican
representation at the conference would do more to ensure a settlement in conformity with
the Seven Points than private U.S.$*rench agreement to them.
*or reasons not entirely clear) but perhaps the conse?uence of @isenhower=s personal
intervention) 8endZs$*rance=s appeal was now favorably received in "ashington. ;ulles
was able to inform the premier on :uly %53 "!n the light of what you say and after
consultation with President @isenhower) ! am glad to be able to inform you that the
President and ! are as.ing the Under Secretary of State) General "alter Bedell Smith) to
prepare to return at his earliest convenience to Geneva to share in the wor. of the
conference on the basis of the understanding which we have arrived at." F;oc. -(G *or the
first time since late %&'9) the United States and *rance were solidly Doined in a common
front on !ndochina policy.
!n accordance with the understandings reached with *rance) Smith was sent new
instructions on :uly %, based upon the Seven Points. #fter reiterating the passive formal
role the United States was to play at the conference) ;ulles informed his Under Secretary
he was to issue a unilateral +or) if possible) multilateral1 statement should a settlement be
reached that "conforms substantially" to the Seven Points. "The United States will not)
however) become cosignatory with the <ommunists in any ;eclaration)" ;ulles wrote
with reference to the procedure then being discussed at Geneva of drafting military
accords and a final declaration on a political settlement. Nor should the United States)
Smith=s instructions went on) be put in a position where it could be held responsible for
guaranteeing the results of the conference. Smith=s efforts should be directed) ;ulles
summed up) toward forwarding ideas to the "active negotiators)" *rance) <ambodia)
/aos) and 4ietnam.
This last point of guidance referred to the possibility of a brea.down in the negotiations.
Should no settlement be reached) the United States delegation was
to avoid permitting the *rench to believe that outcome was the result of #merican advice
or pressure) and that in some way the United States was morally obligated to intervene
militarily in !ndochina. The United States) ;ulles wrote) was "not prepared at the present
time to give any commitment that it will intervene in the war if the Geneva <onference
fails..." "hile this stricture almost certainly reflected the President=s and the :oint <hiefs=
etreme reluctance to become committed) in advance) to a war already past the point of
return) it was also doubtless a reaction to 8endZs$*rance=s intimations to ;illon of
*rench willingness to reconsider active #merican involvement if the conference failed.
"ith *rench and British adherence to the Seven Points promised by written agreement)
the United States had gone about as far as it could toward ensuring an acceptable
settlement without becoming tied to it. The #dministration still apparently believed that
the final terms would violate the Seven Points in several significant respects6Y but by
ma.ing clear in advance that any settlement would be met with a unilateral #merican
declaration rather than Bedell Smith=s signature) the United
Y Thus) on :uly %' +one day after the *ranco$#merican agreements1) the National
Security <ouncil) after being briefed on the Geneva situation) decided that the li.ely
settlement would go against the Seven Points. The NS< was told the <ommunists would3
+%1 see. partition of 4ietnam somewhere between the %5th and %Jth parallels6 +71 demand
control of some part of /aos) neutrali2ation of the remainder) and agreement on the
formation of a coalition government6 +91 as. neutrali2ation of <ambodia and some form
of recognition for the *ree Ahmer movement. "ere the <ommunists to accept the ;ong
>oi line for 4ietnam) they would then demand an enclave in southern 4ietnam plus part
of /aos) or simply etend the ;ong >oi line through /aos.
States had at least guaranteed its retention of a moral advantage) useful particularly in
placating domestic public opinion. !n the event of an unsatisfactory settlement)
"ashington would be in a position to say that it had stood steadfastly by principle only to
be undercut by "soft" #llies and <ommunist territorial ambitions.
;. T>@ *!N#/ "@@A B* B#0G#!N!NG
Prior to Smith=s return) positions had tended to harden rather than change at Geneva)
although the 4iet 8inh had yielded a trifle on partition. <hang "en$t=ien=s encouraging
remar. to <hauvel of :uly & had been fulfilled four days later) as already indicated. The
final signal was <hou=s comment to 8endZs*rance on the %9th that both sides) *rench
and 4iet 8inh) had to ma.e concessions on the demarcation problem) but that this "does
not signify that each must ta.e the same number of steps." That same day) Pham 4an
;ong told the *rench premier the 4iet 8inh were willing to settle on the %,th parallel.
;ong=s territorial concession meant little to the *rench) however) and) as the negotiations
continued) it became plain that the 4iet 8inh were not concerned about 8endZs$*rance=s
:uly 7( deadline. Cet the <hinese remained optimistic) at least publicly. :en$min Dih$pao=s
Geneva reporter) for instance) wrote :uly %7 that while no solution had yet been wor.ed
out on the control and supervision problem) "there seems no reason why agreement
cannot be reached." #s for defining the regroupment areas) the correspondent asserted
that "speedy agreement would seem probable after the return of the *oreign 8inisters of
the Big Powers..." So long as all parties were "sincere)" he wrote) agreement would
indeed come about.
The minuscule progress made on settling the 4ietnam problem loomed large in
comparison with the seemingly unbrea.able log Dam that had developed over /aos and
<ambodia. Since the maDor <ommunist concessions of mid$:une) which had at least
paved the way for separating /aos and <ambodia from 4ietnam for discussion purposes)
virtually nothing had been accomplished toward cease$fires. ;ebate on /aos and
<ambodia occupied the spotlight again on :uly & when) from the remar.s of the <hinese
delegate +/i A=e$nung1) it ?uic.ly became apparent that for all their willingness to discuss
the withdrawal of 4iet 8inh troops) the <hinese remained greatly concerned about
possible /aotian and <ambodian rearmament and alignment. Simply put) the <hinese
were negotiating for their own security) not for 4iet 8inh territorial advantage.
#s <hou had pointed out to @den in :une) the <P0=s maDor concern was that <ambodia
and /aos might) after a settlement) be left free to negotiate for a permanent #merican
military presence. !n his presentation) therefore) /i A=e$nung insisted that the two
countries not be permitted to ac?uire fresh troops) military personnel) arms) and
ammunition ecept as might be strictly re?uired for self$defense6 nor should they) he
held) allow foreign military bases to be established. /i formali2ed <hou=s passing remar.
to @den that <hina was not much disturbed by *rench Union +as opposed to #merican1
technicians. /i allowed that *rench military personnel to assist the training of the /aotian
and <ambodian armies was a matter that "can be studied."
The <ambodian case) presented by *oreign 8inister Sam Sary) revealed a stubborn
independence that was to assist the country greatly in the closing days of the conference.
Sam Sary said that foreign bases would indeed not be authori2ed on Ahmer soil "only as
far as there is no menace against <ambodia. . . . !f our security is imperiled) <ambodia
will .eep its legitimate right to defend itself by all means." #s for foreign instructors and
technicians) his government wished to retain those *renchmen then in <ambodia6 he was
pleased to note /i A=e$nung=s apparent acceptance of this arrangement. *inally) with
regard to the importation of arms) Sam Sary differentiated between a limitation on
?uantity +which his government accepted1 and on ?uality +which his government wished
to have a free hand in determining1.
"hile the <hinese publicly castigated the <ambodians for wor.ing with the #mericans to
threaten "the security of <ambodia=s neighboring countries under the pretet of self$
defense)" the #mericans gave the <ambodians encouragement. !n "ashington) Phnom
Penh=s ambassador) Nong Aimny) met with ;ulles on :uly %(. Nong Aimny said his
Government would oppose the neutrali2ation and demilitari2ation of the country6 ;ulles
replied that hopefully <ambodia would become a member of the collective security
arrangement envisaged in #merican$British plans. <ambodia) the Secretary said)
possessed a .ind of independence superior to that in 4ietnam and /aos) and as such
should indeed oppose <ommunist plans to neutrali2e and demilitari2e her. #s an
independent state) <ambodia was entitled to see. outside military and economic
assistance.
The /aotian delegation was also eperiencing difficulties) though with the 4iet 8inh
rather than the <hinese. The 4iet 8inh negotiators) in the military command
conferences) insisted on ma.ing etraneous demands concerning the Pathet /ao. The
/aotians were concerned not so much with the demands as with the possibility of a
private *rench deal with the 4iet 8inh that would subvert the /aotian position. #
member of the royal government=s delegation went to :ohnson to be assured that a
behind$the$scenes deal would not occur. The delegate said /aos hoped to be covered by
and to participate in a Southeast #sia collective security pact. :ohnson did not guarantee
that this arrangement could be wor.ed out6 but as the conference drew to a close) as we
shall see) the United States made it clear to the <ambodians and /aotians that their
security would in some fashion be ta.en care of under the S@#TB treaty.
!rresolution over <ambodia and /aos) a continuing wide gap between *rench and 4iet
8inh positions on the partition line) and no progress on the control and supervision
dilemma were the highlights of the generally dismal scene that greeted General Smith on
his return :uly %, to the negotiating wars. Smith apparently too. heart) however) in the
steadfastness of 8endZs$*rance) although the Under Secretary also observed that the
<ommunists had reacted to this by themselves becoming unmoving. Smith attributed
<ommunist intransigence to the probability that "8endZs$*rance has been a great
disappointment to the <ommunists both as regards the relatively firm position he has
ta.en on !ndochina and his attitude toward @;<. They may therefore wish to force him
out of the government by ma.ing settlement here impossible."
#ctually) what had disturbed the <ommunists most was not so much 8endZs*rance=s
firmness as Smith=s return. That became clear following a private meeting re?uested by a
member of the <P0 delegation) >uang >ua) with Seymour Topping) the 3e4 <or0 Times
correspondent at Geneva. Topping) as the <hinese must have epected) reported the
conversation to the #merican delegation. >e said >uang >ua) spea.ing in deadly earnest
and without propagandistic overtones) had interpreted Smith=s return as an #merican
attempt to prevent a settlement. !ndeed) according to >uang >ua) the Paris tal.s between
;ulles and 8endZs$*rance on :uly %9 and %5 had been primarily responsible for 8endZs$
*rance=s stubbornness6 the *rench premier had obviously concluded a deal with the
United States in which he agreed to raise the price for a settlement. F;oc. -JG
Bvert <hinese statements in this period lent credence to Topping=s report. *irst) Pe.ing
was far from convinced that continued discussions on the restoration of peace in
!ndochina removed the possibility of dramatic new military moves by the United States.
"ashington was accused) as before the conference) of desiring to intervene in !ndochina
so as to etend the war there into "a new military venture on <hina=s southern borders. !n
support of this contention) Pe.ing cited such provocative moves as trips during #pril and
:une by General :ames #. 4an *leet +"the notorious butcher of the Aorean "ar"1 to
Aorea) :apan) and Taiwan) for the purpose of establishing a North Pacific military
alliance6 #merican intentions of concluding a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as the
first step in <hiang Aai$she.=s invasion plans6 #merican efforts) through the five$power
and later @isenhower$<hurchill tal.s) to create a Southeast #sia alliance for a military
thrust into !ndochina6 and stepped$up U.S. military assistance) including training) for the
Thai armed forces.
Second) Pe.ing was clearly disturbed that the *rench were still heeding #merican advice
when the path to a settlement lay before them. !n a People=s ;aily editorial of :uly %5) for
instance) the *rench people and National #ssembly were said to be strongly desirous of
peace. Thus3 "# policy running counter to *rench interests cannot wor.. *rance is a
maDor world power. She should have her own independent and honorable path. This
means following an independent foreign policy consistent with *rench national interests
and the interests of world peace." The #merican alternative$$a Southeast #sia coalition
with *rench participation$$should be reDected) the editorial intoned) and a settlement
conforming to the five principles achieved instead. !n .eeping with its line of previous
months) Pe.ing was attempting to demonstrate$$for #sian no less than for *rench ears$$
that it had a .een interest in resolving the !ndochina problem rather than seeing the
conference give way to new #merican military pressures and a possibly wider war.
*inally) Pe.ing paid considerable attention to ;ut!es= stay in Paris and to his dispatch of
Smith to Geneva. ;uties= sudden trip to the *rench capital was said to reveal #merican
determination to obstruct progress in the negotiations by pressuring 8endZs$*rance not
to grasp the settlement that lay Dust around the corner. ;uties originally had no intention
of upgrading the #merican delegation) according to Pe.ing. "But Bedell Smith had to be
sent bac. to Geneva because of strong criticism in the "estern press) and "ashington
was fearful lest agreement could be reached ?uic.ly despite #merican boycotting of the
conference." Cet <hina=s optimism over a settlement did not diminish3 "<hinese
delegation circles)" N<N# reported) "see no reason whatsoever why the Geneva
<onference should play up to the U.S. policy and ma.e no efforts towards achieving an
agreement which is acceptable and satisfactory to all parties concerned and which is
honorable for the two belligerent sides." !f Smith=s return) then) was viewed from Pe.ing
as a challenge to its diplomatic ingenuity) the <hinese +and) we may surmise) the Soviets1
were prepared to accept it.
!n doing so) however) the <hinese evidently were not about to sacrifice in those areas of
dispute where they had a special interest) namely) /aos and <ambodia. Bn :uly %5) <hou
called on Nong Aimny to state <hina=s position. The premier said first that) in accord
with his recent tal.s with Nehru) U Nu) and >o <hi 8inh) he could report a unanimous
desire for peace in !ndochina) for the unity of each of the three #ssociated States) and for
their futBre cordial relationship with the <olombo Powers. <hou then as.ed about the
status of <ambodian tal.s with the 4iet 8inh. "hen Nong Aimny replied that Pham 4an
;ong) in two recent get$togethers) had insisted on interDecting political problems into
discussions of a military settlement$$as by re?uesting <ambodia=s retention of certain
provincial officials appointed by the *ree Ahmers) and by suggesting the royal
government=s preservation of a *ree Ahmer youth movement$$<hou is said to have
laughed off these claims and to have replied that these were indeed matters for <ambodia
to handle by herself.
<hou had his own views on what <ambodia should and should not do6 however) Ahmer
sovereignty should not mean discrimination against the resistance elements) the
establishment of foreign military bases in <ambodia) /aos) and 4ietnam) or the
conclusion of military alliances with other states. <hou was less adamant only on the
subDect of <ambodia=s importation of arms and military personnel6 when Nong Aimny
flatly stated that Phnom Penh would absolutely reDect any limitations inasmuch as these
would be incompatible with <ambodian sovereignty) <hou did not contradict him.
!nstead) he promised to study the matter further and as.ed to .now precisely what
?uantities of arms and personnel the royal government had in mind. /ater on) he became
a bit more fleible by saying that a prohibition on arms and personnel should apply only
to the armistice period) not permanently. Bnly in 4ietnam) <hou said) would there be a
flat proscription against military e?uipment and troops.
<hou and Nong Aimny met again three days later) on :uly %-. Bn this occasion) <hou
was obviously less conciliatory +as Nong Aimny reported1) stating <hina=s position more
in terms of demands than suggestions. >e urged the <ambodian government to
incorporate resistance elements into the army) police) and civil service. But he reserved
his emphasis for <ambodia=s future security position. !n a thinly$veiled warning) <hou
said that should <ambodia Doin the pact) permit foreign bases on its territory) or accept
#merican military instructors) "the conse?uences would be very serious and would
aggravate the situation with unfortunate conse?uences for <ambodian independence and
territorial integrity" +Smith=s paraphrase1. <ambodia could have *rench or British
instructors) <hou said. But his three$fold limitation) obviously directed at assuring against
future <ambodia$U.S. defense ties) remained$and) he added) it applied to /aos and
4ietnam as well.
The <hinese were clearly out to get from the conference what they could) without
0ussian assistance) before a settlement was concluded. <hou did not stop at warning
Nong Aimny) either. Bn :uly %- he too. his case to @den) telling the foreign secretary
that while the <P0 stood ready to Doin in guaranteeing the freedom and independence of
all three !ndochinese states) membership in a Southeast #sia pact would change
everything. @vidently intent on removing what he may have sensed was a possible last$
minute obstacle) @den implied that he .new of no proposal for including the United
States in the pact) although he did not deny #merican interest in forming a defense
organi2ation for Southeast #sia. <hou said he had no obDections to #NLUS +it was
directed against :apan) he thought1) but he went into a lengthy discourse on the danger to
<hina of having foreign bases in !ndochina.
@den=s assurances evidently did not Fwords illegibleG <hou deeply. Bn :uly %J <hou met
with the /aotian foreign minister and presented "unofficial" but etravagant demands
which the latter found totally unacceptable. /aos was willing to provide the resistance
elements with Fwords illegibleG 2ones in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam
Neua6 <hou proposed) additionally) portions of /uang Prabang and Hien Ahouang
provinces. The royal government was further willing to concede the insurgents freedom
of movement in those 2ones) but <hou demanded administration by Doint royal$insurgent
committees and a supervisory Doint committee in 4ientiane until the general elections of
#ugust %&''. *inally) where the /aotians thought the issue of *rench Union bases had
been resolved in their favor) <hou now said the bases should be completely eliminated
even though established by *ranco$/aotian treaty.
<hou=s obsession with foreign military bases and related issues led to an effort to ma.e a
settlement contingent upon "estern acceptance of <hinese neutrali2ation plans. #
<hinese informant +probably >uang >ua1 told Seymour Topping that "estern
willingness to bar foreign military bases from !ndochina and to deny the #ssociated
States admission to any military blocs would assure agreement by :uly 7(. 8ore than
that) the informant said) the United States had also to subscribe to and guarantee the final
settlement) evidently in the belief that #merica=s signature would ma.e !ndochinese
participation in S@#TB illegal. F;oc. -5G # more direct statement was made by N<N#=s
"special correspondent" in Geneva) who drew a harsh characteri2ation of a cease$fire
agreement that left the door open to !ndochinese involvement in a military alliance3
!f efforts are made at the same time negotiations for peace are ta.ing place to drag the
three !ndochinese countries into an aggressive military bloc whose purpose is to unleash
war) then the cease$fire would mean nothing other than a respite for adDusting battle lines
and dispositions of strength in order to start the fighting again on an even larger scale. !n
such circumstances) the armistice agreement would become no more than a scrap of
paper.
"hether the <hinese seriously believed that the United States would sign the accords in
order to achieve a settlement) or that /aos and <ambodia Fwords missingG But of the
Southeast #sia collective defense is at best debatable. There seems little doubt) however)
that Pe.ing sincerely considered a written prohibition on
o the accords against !ndochinese alliances or foreign bases as a maDor step toward the
neutrali2ation of Southeast #sia and the area=s eventual dissociation from the #merican
defense system.
General Smith felt that Topping=s report dovetailed with growing <ommunist
intransigence in the past few days) particularly on the part of 8olotov. >e believed that
8olotov) who had urgently re?uested a restricted session for the %Jth) would li.ewise
raise the ?uestion of eplicit #merican ac?uiescence in a final settlement. F;oc. -5G
"hen the meeting came) however) 8olotov did not reiterate >uang >ua=s implication
that #merican failure to sign the accords might scuttle the conference. Perhaps aware that
a warning of that .ind would not wor.) 8olotov instead limited himself to tal.ing of the
conference=s achievements to date. >e complimented those who had been engaged in
private negotiations) and went so far as to voice confidence that a settlement of
outstanding problems relating to /aos and <ambodia could be achieved. >e closed by
pointing out that two drafts were before the conference relating to the cessation of
hostilities in 4ietnam and /aos) two on <ambodia) and two on a final declaration dealing
with political matters. That ended 8olotov=s contribution) leaving the #mericans) and
probably others) wondering why the Soviet foreign minister had hastily summoned the
meeting. F;oc. -,G
E. #:2EEME3T
!f 8olotov=s refusal at the :uly %J restricted session to warn the conference of failure
signaled renewed <ommunist efforts toward agreement) his subse?uent actions proved
the point. Between :uly %J and 7%) the conferees were able to iron out their differences
sufficiently to produce agreements now commonly referred to as the Geneva "accords."
!n fact) the accords consist of military agreements for 4ietnam) <ambodia) and /aos to
fulfill the conference=s primary tas. of restoring peace to !ndochina) and a *inal
;eclaration designed to establish the conditions for future political settlements
throughout !ndochina. The nature of the eleventh$hour compromises reached) and a broad
outline of the settlement) are treated below.
Bietnam
The Geneva accords temporarily established two 2ones of 4ietnam separated by a line
running roughly along the %-th parallel and further divided by a demilitari2ed 2one.
#greement to the demarcation line was apparently the wor. of 8olotov) who gained
*rench acceptance of the %-th parallel when he found the *rench flatly opposed to the
%,th) a late 4iet 8inh compromise perhaps prompted by 8olotov himself. F;oc. -7G
Precisely what motivated 8olotov to ma.e his proposal is not clear. Speculatively) he
may simply have traded considerable territorial advantage which the 4iet 8inh enDoyed
for a specific election date he) <hou) and Pham 4an ;ong wanted from the outset. The
"estern negotiators certainly recogni2ed the trade$off possibility3 @den considered a line
between the %-th and %Jth parallels worth echanging for a mutually acceptable position
on elections6 and 8endZs$*rance observed in a conversation with 8ob$toy that the
election and demarcation ?uestions might be lin.ed in the sense that each side could yield
on one of the ?uestions. [;oc. -7G
"hether or not a trade$off actually too. place) the fact remains that the *rench came off
much better in the matter of partition than on elections) which they had
insisted not be given a specific date. Bn :uly %,) 8olotov had proposed holding elections
in %&'') with the eact date to be decided between 4ietnamese and 4iet 8inh authorities.
F;oc. -7G The <hinese were more fleible. !n a tal. with a member of the British
delegation) /i A=e$nung argued for a specific date) but said his government was willing to
set it within two or three years of the ceasefire. F;oc. -,G The compromise formula was
reportedly wor.ed out by 8olotov) who) at a meeting :uly %& attended also by @den)
8endZs$*rance) <hou) and ;ong) drew the line at two years. !t was agreed in the *inal
;eclaration that the 4ietnamese of the two 2ones would consult together in :uly %&'' and
reunify 4ietnam by national plebiscite one year later. !mportantly for the 4iet 8inh) the
demarcation line was said to be "provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as
constituting a political or territorial boundary." 0epresentatives of the member states on
the !<< would act as a commission to supervise the national elections) which were to be
freely conducted by secret ballot. #s shall be pointed out later) however) the evident
intention of all the conferees +including the United States and the Government of South
4ietnam1 to see 4ietnam reunified was to a large etent undercut by the nature of the
military and political settlements.
The military accords on 4ietnam also stipulated that the :oint <ommission) which was to
ta.e over the wor. of the military commission that had met at Trung Gia) would have
general responsibility for wor.ing out the disengagement of forces and implementation of
the cease$fire. *rench Union soldiers were to be removed from North 4ietnam in stages
within 9(( days +article %'1) a lengthy period in .eeping with *rench demands.
Thereafter) the introduction into the two 2ones of fresh arms) e?uipment) and personnel
was prohibited with the eception of normal troop rotation and replacement of damaged
or destroyed materiel +articles %, and %-1. The establishment of new military bases in
4ietnam) and the adherence of either 2one to military alliances) were also proscribed
under articles %J and %&.
The membership and powers of the !nternational <ontrol <ommission were finally
resolved +<hapter 4! of the accords1. #pparently through <hou @n$lai=s efforts)
agreement was reached that !ndia) Poland) and <anada should be the member states of the
!<<. The !<< was empowered to form fied and mobile inspection teams and to have
full freedom of movement in both 2ones of 4ietnam. !n the performance of these tas.s)
the !<< was to epect complete cooperation from local civil and military officials. !ts
functions etended to control of the movement of armed forces and the release of
prisoners of war) and to supervision of the demarcation line) frontiers) ports) and airfields.
/ess clearly decided was the delicate ?uestion of the !<<=s relationship to the :oint
<ommission. Generally) the plan adopted was close to that originally submitted by the
*rench in early :uly) wherein the !<<=s supremacy was tacitly admitted. The !<< was to
be informed by the :oint <ommission of disputes arising out of differences of
interpretation) either of a provision or of fact) that the :oint <ommission could not
resolve. The !<< would then +article 5(1 have the power of recommendation6 but) ?uite
aside from the limited effectiveness of a recommendation) there remained the problem of
maDority or unanimous voting by the !<< in reaching agreement to recommend. Under
article 57) the rule of unanimity was to apply to "?uestions concerning violations) or
threats of violations) which might lead to a resumption of hostilities)" namely) a refusal to
regroup is provided in the accords) or an armed violation by one party of the territory of
the other. The "est) which had pushed hard for maDority rule) had to settle for its
application to those less volatile ?uestions that would not be considered threats to the
peace. *urthermore) under article 59) recognition was ta.en of possible splits among the
three members by providing for maDority and minority reports6 but these) li.e !<<
decisions) could be no more than suggestive) and as such wholly dependent upon the
cooperativeness of the conference members who had created it.
;am@odia and "aos
!n conflict with the wishes of the <ambodian and /aotian delegations) cease$fires in their
countries occurred simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities in 4ietnam.
Nevertheless) in most other respects) their persistence was largely responsible for
settlements highly favorable to their respective interests.
!n the first place) the #greement on the <essation of >ostilities in <ambodia called for
the removal of nonnative *ree Ahmer troops) whether <ommunist 4ietnamese or
<ambodians) ninety days from the cease$fire date +:uly 7(1. +*rench Union units) but not
instructors) were also scheduled for departure.1 #s the <ambodian delegation had
promised) those insurgents still in the country would be guaranteed the right to reDoin the
national community and to participate) as electors or candidates) in elections scheduled
under the constitution for %&''6 but the agreement assured their demobili2ation within
one month of the cease$fire. Separate Doint and international supervisory commissions for
<ambodia were established) as Phnom Penh had demanded. *inally) a declaration issued
:uly 7% by the <ambodian delegation was incorporated into the accord proclaiming) in
effect) Phnom Penh=s inherent right of self$defense. The royal government vowed not to
enter into military alliances "not in conformity with the principles of the <harter of the
United Nations"6 nor) so long as its security was not threatened) would <ambodia permit
the establishment of foreign military bases. #s for war materiel and military personnel)
the delegation made clear that these would not be solicited during the period :uly 7()
%&'5) to the election date in %&'' "ecept for the purpose of the effective defence of the
territory." Thus) after the elections) <ambodia proclaimed itself free to ta.e any steps it
considered necessary for its security) whether or not such steps were absolutely necessary
for self$defense.
<ambodia=s ac?uisition of considerable latitude was entirely in .eeping with the royal
government=s epressed insistence on not being either neutrali2ed or demilitari2ed. Bn
this point) the <ambodians received indirect assurance from the United States that their
security would in some way be covered by the Southeast #sian pact despite their
unilateral declaration. Toward the end of the conference) Philip Bonsal of the State
;epartment and the #merican delegation) told Sam Sary that he +Bonsal1 "was confident
U.S. and other interested countries loo.ed forward to discussing with <ambodian
government" the security problem upon implementation of a cease$fire. "hen Sam Sary
called a few days later on Smith in the company of Nong Aimny) the Under Secretary
recommended that Phnom Penh) at the conference) state its intention not to have foreign
bases on its territory and not to enter into military alliances. #t the same time) though)
<ambodia would be free to import arms and to employ *rench military instructors and
technicians. <ambodia might not be able to Doin S@#TB under this arrangement) Smith
said) but it could still benefit from it. Smith3
assured the <ambodian *oreign 8inister that) in our view) any aggression overt or covert
against <ambodian territory would bring pact into operation even though <ambodia not a
member. ! too. position that *rench Union membership afforded <ambodia ade?uate
desirable means of securing through *rance necessary arms some of which would be
#merican as well as necessary instructors and technicians some of which might well be
#merican trained.
Nong Aimny replied that <ambodia relied heavily on the United States for protection
against future aggression. The way was thus cleared for the subse?uent inclusion of
<ambodia in the Protocol to the S@#TB treaty.
The cease$fire agreement on /aos followed lines similar to those drawn for <ambodia. #
separate Doint commission was set up to supervise the withdrawal of Pathet /ao units)
although provision was made for their prior regroupment in the provinces of Phong Saly
and Sam Neua.Y #lthough /aos was prohibited from see.ing to
Y The /aotian delegation also issued a declaration averring the government=s willingness
to integrate former insurgents into the national community without reprisal. @lections in
/aos were scheduled for September %&'') and former Pathet /ao were promised the right
to participate in the balloting as electors or candidates.
augment its military establishment) the royal government was specifically permitted a
maimum of %)'(( *rench training instructors. 8oreover) the prohibition against the
establishment of foreign military bases on /aotian territory did not apply to two *rench
bases in operation under a %&5& treaty) and employing 9)'(( *renchmen. /aos) li.e
<ambodia) was allowed to import arms and other military e?uipment essential for self$
defense6 but 4ientiane also issued a unilateral declaration on :uly 7% ma.ing clear) in
terms that nearly duplicated those used in <ambodia=s declaration) that its refrainment
from alliances and foreign military bases was limited to situations in which /aotian
security was not threatened. !n view of 4ientiane=s epressed hope for #merican
protection) its delegates had succeeded admirably in getting a settlement containing terms
that restricted) but did not eliminate) /aotian control over their security re?uirements.
F. D!SSE3T!3: B!E/S> T)E #ME2!;#3 #3D B!ET3#MESE P6S!T!63S
No delegate at the final plenary session on !ndochina :uly 7% should have been surprised
when Under Secretary Smith issued a unilateral statement of the #merican position. The
United States had fre?uently indicated) publicly and privately) directly and indirectly) that
it would not be cosignatory with the <ommunist powers to any agreement and that) at
best) it would agree only to "respect" the final settlement. #t the restricted session of :uly
%J) Smith had) moreover) indicated the points which were to become basic features of his
final statement. ;espite the fact that the accords were in line with the Seven Points in
nearly every particular) it would have been presumptuous of any delegation to believe
that the United States) given the implacable hostility of #dministration leaders to
<ommunist <hina and to any agreement that would imply #merican approval of a
territorial cession to the <ommunists) would formally sign the Geneva accords.
Bedell Smith) revealing a considerably more pliant approach to dealing with the
<ommunist world) was able to eact from "ashington agreement to partial #merican
acceptance of the *inal ;eclaration. Bn :uly %& he had been approached by 8endZs$
*rance) who from the beginning had sought to identify the United States as closely as
possible with the final terms) with the proposal that "ashington not simply respect any
military agreements reached) but in addition ta.e note of them and the political
statements that comprised the first nine paragraphs of the proposed conference
declaration. 8endZs$*rance indicated the *rench would be sharply disappointed if the
United States could not at least ta.e note of those portions of the declaration. Smith)
apparently swayed by the premier=s views) recommended to "ashington that his
instructions be amended to provide for ta.ing note in the event the *inal ;eclaration was
substantially as the *rench had indicated. F;oc. J(G ;ulles gave his approval) demurring
only on the second part of paragraph & +in the final version) paragraph %91) which the
Secretary said "seems to imply a multilateral engagement with <ommunists which would
be inconsistent with our basic approach and which subse?uently might enable
<ommunist <hina to charge us with alleged violations of agreement to which it might
claim both governments became parties." F;oc. J%G "hen Smith) therefore) issued his
unilateral statement) note was ta.en only of the first twelve paragraphs of the *inal
;eclaration6 but this was much more than had been called for in his revised instructions
of :uly %,.
!n line with his instructions) Smith declared on behalf of the Government that the United
States would "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the accords.
8oreover) the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of
the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international
peace and security." *inally) Smith reiterated a U.S. policy declaration of :une 7&) made
during the visit of @den and <hurchill) that registered "ashington=s support of UN
supervision of free elections to reunify countries "now divided against their will Smith
mentioned on this point that the United States could not associate itself with any
arrangement that would hinder "its traditional position that peoples are entitled to
determine their own future..."
Smith=s caution against "any renewal of aggression" deserves additional comment
inasmuch as it was cited by President Aennedy +in a letter to President Ngo ;inh ;iem
on ;ecember %5) %&,%1 as the basis for the #merican commitment to South 4ietnam=s
defense. 4iewed in the contet of the conference) the statement does not seem to have
been intended as an open$ended #merican commitment to South 4ietnam against
possible aggression from the North. 0ather) the #dministration apparently intended the
statement as a warning to the 4iet 8inh that should they) within the two$year interval
before general elections) "renew" what "ashington and Saigon regarded as their
"aggression" since %&5,) the United States would be gravely concerned. Smith=s
statement) in short) seems to have been limited to the period :uly %&'5 to :uly %&',.
That part of Smith=s unilateral statement dealing with United Nations supervision of
elections is also noteworthy. <oming in the wa.e of ;ulles= epressed concern over
provision in the accords for !<< supervision) F;oc. J%G Smith=s reference to the UN may
have forecast #merican unwillingness to bac. an electoral process not supervised by the
Brgani2ation. !nasmuch as the United States delegation had consistently pushed at
Geneva for United Nations rather than any other form of international machinery) Smith
may have meant to give an advance signal of #merican displeasure with free 4ietnamese
elections that the UN would be prevented from overseeing.
#merican ?ualifications to the Geneva accords paled beside those made by the South
4ietnam delegation. >owever naively) the "South" 4ietnamese refused to accept a
divided country and believed) to the end of the conference) that the *rench had bra2enly
and illegally sold out 4ietnamese interests. 4ietnam=s anger at *rench manipulation of its
political future was reflected in a note handed to the *rench delegation on :uly %- by
Nguyen >uu <hau. F;oc. -9G The note maintained that not until the day before +an
eaggeration by about three wee.s) it would appear1 did 4ietnam learn that at the very
time the *rench >igh <ommand had ordered the evacuation of troops from important
areas in the Ton.in ;elta) the *rench had also "accepted abandoning to the 4iet 8inh all
of that part situated north of the eighteenth parallel and that the delegation of the 4iet
8inh might claim an even more advantageous demarcation line." The 4ietnamese
delegation protested against having been left "in complete ignorance" of *rench
proposals) which were said not to "ta.e any account of the unanimous will for national
unity of the 4ietnamese people."
"hile it may have been absurd for the 4ietnamese to believe that partition was avoidable
given 4iet 8inh strength) their rationale for .eeping the country united was) as matters
developed) eminently clear$sighted. !n speeches during :une and :uly) their leaders had
warned that partition would be merely a temporary interlude before the renewal of
fighting. "hen the 4iet 8inh first proposed a temporary division of territory) the
;efense 8inister) Phan >uy Kuat) said in Saigon on :une 7 that partition would "ris.
reviving the drama of the struggle between the North and the South." ;iem) in his
investiture speech of early :uly) warned against a cease$fire that would mean partition)
for that arrangement "can only be the preparation for another more deadly war..." #nd
General Nguyen 4an >inh) head of the 4ietnamese National #rmy) declared3
To reali2e a cease$fire by partition of 4ietnamese territory can be only a temporary
measure to stop the bloodshed but not to end the war. #nd it is possible that we shall
have to face a cold war as in Aorea where both sides= troops have their fingers on the
triggers of their guns all the time) and people are thin.ing only of recovering what has
been given up under the pressure of the circumstances.
#lthough their struggle against partition) which reached a clima in the aftermath of the
signing of the accords with huge rallies in the maDor cities) proved futile) the 4ietnamese
early gave notice that they would accept neither partition nor a fied date for national
elections. "e need only recall the statements by Bao ;ai=s cabinet in Paris on the eve of
the conference to find evidence of 4ietnam=s early determination that it would not be
party to a sell$out of its own territory. "hen partition became certain in :uly with the
circulation of draft final declarations) the 4ietnamese delegation became more vocal. #t
the final plenary session) Tran 4an ;o said3 ". . . the Government of the State of
4ietNam wishes the <onference to ta.e note of the fact that it reserves its full freedom of
action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the 4ietnamese people to its territorial
unity) national independence) and freedom." "hen as.ed to consent to the military
accords and the *inal ;eclaration) ;o re?uested insertion of the following tet into the
;eclaration3
The conference ta.es note of the ;eclaration of the Government of the State of 4iet$Nam
underta.ing3
to ma.e and support every effort to reestablish a real and lasting peace in 4iet$Nam6
not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the ceasefire into effect) in spite of
the obDections and reservations that the State of 4iet$Nam has epressed) especially in its
final statement.
The re?uest was denied.
#s for elections) the 4ietnamese believed that the war situation compelled the
postponement of elections until the country had achieved a measure of internal stability.
#s early as 8ay) ;iem indicated his opposition to elections for a National #ssembly)
much less to national elections for the presidency. !n its note to the *rench delegation)
moreover) the 4ietnamese asserted that a cease$fire without disarmament was
incompatible with elections6 the regroupment of the armed forces of the belligerents into
separate 2ones was said to compromise their freedom in advance. !n 4ietnam=s view)
elections could only be considered after security and peace had been established) thereby
ecluding a set time interval of two years. F;oc. -9G
>aving ta.en these positions) the 4ietnamese could hardly adhere to the *inal
;eclaration. #t the same time) they protested against the "hasty conclusion of the
#rmistice #greement by the *rench and 4ietminh >igh <ommanders only . . ." +as Tran
4an ;o put it at the :uly 7% session1. !nasmuch as the military accords) by
prearrangement) were signed by *rench and 4iet 8inh commanders precisely to avoid
see.ing 4ietnamese consent) there was nothing Saigon could do but protest.
Nevertheless) by having protested) they were asserting that the treaties with *rance of
:une 5 had indeed made 4ietnam a sovereign state) that the interests of non$<ommunist
4ietnamese were deeply involved in the settlement) and that *rance=s by$passing of the
Bao ;ai government only made the settlement possible) not legal. ;espite article 7- of
the agreement on 4ietnam) which bound "successors" +such as 4ietnam1 to the
signatories to respect and enforce the agreement) 4ietnam was in a legally persuasive
position to argue that *rance could not assume liabilities in its behalf) least of all to the
political provisions contained in the *inal ;eclaration) which was an unsigned document.
Y
Y #rticle 7-) which is fre?uently cited to demonstrate that 4ietnam was bound to abide
by the accords) and particularly the elections provision) refers to "signatories of the
present FmilitaryG #greement..." >ence) the article would seem not to obligate *rance=s
"successor" with respect to any provisions of the *inal ;eclaration) a document to which
South 4ietnam did not adhere.
:. S7MM#2<
Throughout the rapid series of compromises in the last thirty days of the Geneva
<onference) #merican diplomacy revealed a constancy of purpose fully in line with the
@isenhower #dministration=s global foreign policy. Based largely on the unfortunate
eperiences at PanmunDom) the #dministration could not reconcile itself to the notion
that Sino$Soviet negotiating tactics in the post$Stalin period of peaceful coeistence had
changed. <onse?uently) even as the reali2ation dawned that the <ommunists could not be
epelled from !ndochina and that some compromise with them by *rance was inevitable)
the #dministration stuc. fast to the position that the United States delegation to the
conference would only assist) but not ta.e an active part) in bringing about an acceptable
settlement. *rom :une on) the delegation was under instructions to remain clear of any
involvement in the negotiations such as might implicate or commit the United States to
the final terms reached) yet simultaneously was to maintain an influential role in ma.ing
the best of difficult circumstances. British and *rench agreement to the Seven Points
proved a diplomatic victory) not because their acceptance of them assured a reasonable
settlement but because) ?uite contrary to #merican epectations) they returned to Geneva
prepared to hold the line against eorbitant <ommunist demands. #llied agreement to
future discussions of a regional defense system for Southeast #sia was really a hedge
against a *rench sell$out at Geneva6 in the event 4ietnam) and parts of <ambodia and
/aos) were ceded to the <ommunist insurgents) the United States would at least have
#nglo$*rench consent to protect the security of what remained of !ndochina and its
neighbors.
The Seven Points represented principles) not #merican obDectives. They constituted not a
statement of goals to be achieved by the United States) but of principles to be adopted by
the British and *rench negotiators toward concluding a satisfactory settlement. !n this
manner) the #dministration could preserve its dignity before anticipated 4ietnamese
outrage at partition and domestic displeasure at further <ommunist inroads in the *ar
@ast without losing its ability to influence the terms. Under Secretary Smith=s final
statement ta.ing note of the agreements and vowing not to disturb them thus culminated a
careful policy that reDected an #merican commitment to the accords such as might
identify the #dministration with a cession of territory and people to the <ommunist bloc.
The Geneva <onference left much wor. undone) especially on a political settlement for
4ietnam. The State of 4ietnam) li.e the United States) had refused to adhere to the *inal
;eclaration and was not signatory to the military accord that partitioned the country. !n
the net section) the focus is therefore on the practical effect of the Geneva accords) the
epectations of the conferees concerning them) and the etent to which the maDor powers)
in reaching a settlement) achieved the obDectives they had set for themselves.
4!!!. T>@ 8@#N!NG B* G@N@4#
8uch of the controversy surrounding the #merican involvement in 4ietnam relates to the
post$Geneva period) in particular to the two$year interval before national elections were
to bring about 4ietnam=s reunification. To address the ?uestion whether the United States
instigated or colluded with the Government of 4ietnam to defy the *inal ;eclaration=s
stipulation for national elections would broaden this paper beyond its intended scope.
"hat is relevant) however) are the documented or presumed epectations and obDectives
of the maDor participants concerning 4ietnam) as well as <ambodia and /aos) at the time
the conference closed. >ow had the accords met the aims of the participants) and to what
etent were obDectives intertwined with) or perhaps divorced from) epectationsN To
anticipate) the present argument over the failure to hold elections in :uly %&', overloo.s
the relative unimportance of them) for a variety of reasons) to the five maDor powers at the
Geneva <onference6 their obDectives only secondarily too. into account the epectations
of the 4ietnamese) north and south.
#n assessment of the hopes and goals of the Geneva conferees in the immediate
aftermath of the conference should) in the first place) be differentiated from the practical
effect of the accords they drew up. The distinction not often made) yet highly important
to an understanding of the conference and its achievements) is between the intent of the
parties regarding 4ietnam and the seemingly contradictory conse?uences of their
agreement.
#. T)E P2#;T!;#" 3#T72E 6F T)E #;;62DS
"ith the eception of South 4ietnam) every nation represented at the conference came to
believe that partition was the only way to separate the combatants) settle the widely
disparate military and political demands of the *rench and 4iet 8inh) and conclude an
armistice. !t might further be argued +although the evidence available does not actually
permit a definitive statement one way or the other1 that these eight delegations intended
the partition line to be temporary inasmuch as they all desired 4ietnamese elections in
%&',. But what needs to be pointed out is that the accords themselves did not further that
intent. By creating two regimes responsible for "civil administration" +article %5$a of the
4ietnam armistice agreement1) by providing for the regroupment of forces to two 2ones
and for the movement of persons to the 2one of their choice) and by putting off national
elections for two years) the conferees had actually made a future political settlement for
4ietnam etremely unli.ely. <ertainly) the separation of 4ietnam at the %-th parallel was
designed to facilitate the armistice) not to create political subdivisions6 but its unintended
effect was to allow time for the development of two go'ernments) headed by totally
divergent personalities and committed to antithetical political philosophies) foreign
policies) and socio$economic systems. Thus) the call for elections in the *inal ;eclaration
had as little chance of implementation in 4ietnam as previously in Aorea and Germany) a
point brought home by 4ietnamese officials and reinforced by the failure of the same
Geneva conferees to agree on a political settlement in Aorea. "@lections)" 4ictor Bator
has commented "can) indeed) decide secondary problems of coeistence in circumstances
where some measurable minimum basis for political agreement eists. But they are
incapable of acceptance by two opposing states) or parts of a state) when diametrically
opposite philosophies are involved." !f the intent of the Geneva accords was subverted)
the subverters were the conferees themselves) who aspired to an ideal political settlement
incompatible with the physical and psychological dismemberment of 4ietnam on :uly 7%)
%&'5.
5. 65FE;T!BES 6F T)E P#2T!;!P#3TS> T)E ;6MM73!ST S!DE
"hether or not one accepts the view offered here that the central political provision of
the *inal ;eclaration was decisively undercut by provisions of the military accords and
the ;eclaration itself) an eamination of the obDectives of the Soviet Union and
<ommunist <hina can go far toward determining) albeit by surmisal) the importance they)
as distinct from the ;04) attached to 4ietnamese unity. *or it is the conclusion here that
4ietnamese unity) whether achieved by free elections or the disintegration of South
4ietnam) was not a priority obDective of 8oscow or Pe.ing even though both powers
may well have anticipated an all$<ommunist 4ietnam by :uly %&',. !f this is so) we may
as.) what were the primary aims of 8oscow and Pe.ing in supporting a settlementN "hy
did the <ommunists apparently strive for a settlement) and why did 8olotov in particular)
who was not personally identified in "estern eyes at the time as a vigorous proponent of
dVtente) play such a .ey role in .eeping the conference from the brin. of failureN
#lthough it would appear that) on the maDor issues at least) the Soviet Union coordinated
its actions with <ommunist <hina) the two <ommunist powers were clearly pursuing
separate national interests in wor.ing toward a settlement of the war. The reconciliation
of those interests seems to have been achieved not so much through Soviet ability +which
did eist1 to compel <hinese ac?uiescence as through a common desire for a settlement.
So'iet 6@Heti'es at the ;onferene
!n retrospect) the Soviet Union seems to have had four maDor obDectives at the
conference3 +%1 to avert a maDor war crisis over !ndochina that would stimulate "estern
unity) enable the United States to gain support it previously lac.ed for "united action)"
and conceivably force 8oscow into a commitment to defend the <hinese6 +71 to reduce
the prospects for successful passage of @;< in the *rench National #ssembly6 +91 to
heighten the prestige of the Soviet Union as a world peacema.er6 +51 to bolster the
prestige of <ommunist <hina) probably more as an adDunct to the Soviet drive for
leadership of the "peaceful coeistence" movement than as a means of supporting any
<hinese claim to unrivaled leadership in #sia.
Bn the first point) the Soviets were surely aware that the United States) under certain
conditions) was prepared to consider active involvement in the war. "hile united action
was a dead issue in "ashington by mid$:une) the Soviets +and the <hinese as well1 could
not have .nown this. 8oreover) newspaper reports of the time added both credence and
uncertainty to #merican military plans. !n the course of private discussions at Geneva)
8olotov indicated his concern that a brea.down of the conference might lead to
continued fighting right up to the point of "orld "ar !!!. The *rench and British did
nothing to dispel those fears. <hauvel) for instance) told the 0ussian delegate) Au2netsov)
that *rance=s proposed division of 4ietnam at the %Jth parallel would be more acceptable
to the other conferees than the unreasonable 4iet 8inh demand for the %9th parallel) and
that a settlement along the *rench line would thereby avert the ris. of an
internationali2ation of the conflict. #nd 8endZs$*rance vowed to bac. his call for
conscripts by informing 8olotov he "did not intend Geneva would turn into a
PanmunDom."
The possibility of renewed fighting leading to a wider war was particularly influential on
the Soviets) it would seem) as a conse?uence of 8oscow=s inner debate during %&'9 and
%&'5 over #merican strategic intentions and their meaning for the Soviet defense system.
The views of the so$called Ahrushchev wing apparently won out in the spring of %&'53
The United States was considered fully capable of initiating a nuclear echange and a
new world war. *ree$wheeling discussion in the "estern press on the foreign policy
implications of @isenhower=s "New /oo." and ;ulles= "massive retaliation" speech of
:anuary %7) %&'5) was closely followed by the Soviets) who may have been persuaded in
their pessimistic assumptions regarding #merican strategy by the very ambiguity of
#merican "reliance" on nuclear weapons to combat <ommunist aggression. !n fact) it can
be argued that even though the United States and its allies went to the conference table
from a position of diplomatic wea.ness) their hands were considerably strengthened
because of Soviet uncertainty over what the "est might do in the event the conference
failed. !nasmuch as Soviet analyses by no means ecluded #merican rec.lessness with
nuclear weapons) 8oscow might have been highly reluctant to press too vigorously for
the "est=s acceptance of eorbitant 4iet 8inh demands. Soviet awareness that the United
States had seriously considered active involvement in !ndochina prior to the fall of
;ienbienphu may therefore have been a significant lever for the "est in the Geneva
negotiations. >ad the opposite perception been true$had the Soviets) that is) been
confident that the #merican #dministration would be highly sober) conservative) and
cautious in responding to war situations$8olotov might have been instructed to play a far
more audacious game while the 4iet 8inh intensified their military operations. ;ulles=
reputation as a militant anti$<ommunist with tremendous influence on @isenhower
probably served the "estern cause well at Geneva.
#s a result) to conclude on this point) one of the Soviets= principal aims at the conference
was to diminish the possibility of #merican unilateral or multilateral intervention in the
li.ely belief that intervention would have built up tremendous pressure on 8oscow to
ma.e new commitments in Southeast #sia. "hile this
outloo. did not prevent the Soviets from at first see.ing to capitali2e on the change in
government in Paris from /aniel to 8endZs$*rance) it did wor. in the general direction
of a reasonable settlement that would be honorable for the *rench and still valuable to the
4iet 8inh. The 0ussians evidently believed that so long as the *rench +and the British1
were .ept interested in a settlement) the #mericans would be hard$pressed to disregard
their allies and intervene.
That 8oscow may have been anious about a wider war does not) however) address the
inenti'es it may have had in concluding the cease$fire. >ere) the @uropean ;efense
<ommunity treaty must have been uppermost in 8olotov=s mind. No evidence has been
found to support the contention that 8olotov eplicitly baited 8endZs$*rance with a
lenient !ndochina settlement in return for #ssembly reDection of @;<. But 8olotov need
not have been that obtrusive. Throughout %&'9 and into %&'5) Soviet propaganda was
dominated by comments on @;< and the danger of a rearmed Germany. !t was certainly
in Soviet interests to pressure the 4iet 8inh for concessions to the *rench) since removal
of the *rench command from !ndochina would restore *rench force levels on the
<ontinent and thereby probably offset their need for an @;<. Soviet interests thus
dictated the sacrifice of 4iet 8inh goals if necessary to prevent German remilitari2ation.
Given 8oscow=s belated attention to the !ndochina war) it appears that the consolidation
of 4iet 8inh gains short of complete reunification of 4ietnam was more than sufficient
to Dustify termination of the struggle in Soviet eyes$$and this perception) it might be
added) dovetailed with what seems to have been the <hinese outloo..
Thirdly) the worldwide Soviet peace offensive which gained priority in the aftermath of
Stalin=s death could be given added impetus through vigorous Soviet support of an
!ndochina settlement. This point) in fact) was the theme of 8olotov=s closing remar.s to
the conference on :uly 7%. >e called the accords "a maDor victory for the forces of peace
and a maDor step towards a reduction of international tensions." <onsidering that the
conference had demonstrated the value of international negotiations to settle dangerous
disputes) 8olotov said3 "The results of the Geneva <onference have confirmed the
rightness of the principle which is fundamental to the whole foreign policy of the Soviet
Union) namely) that there are no issues in the contemporary international situation which
cannot be solved and settled through negotiations and by agreements designed to
consolidate peace." #t a time when the United States was alleged to be Deopardi2ing
world peace with its "policy of strength)" the Soviet Union could lay claim to sparing no
effort in the struggle for ways to avoid a nuclear holocaust.
!n this light) <ommunist <hina was important to the USS0 as a partner in the peace
offensive. "hile 8oscow could not have wished to see <hina so gain in prestige as to
rival the Soviet Union in #sia or elsewhere) the 0ussians do seem) in %&'5) to have
considered a gain in <hinese influence highly desirable if only because the United States
would be bound to suffer a corresponding loss. #s 8olotov phrased it on :uly 7%3
...the Geneva <onference indicated the great positive importance that the participation of
the People=s 0epublic of <hina has in the settlement of urgent international problems.
The course of wor. at this <onference has shown that any artificial obstacles on the road
to <hina=s participation in the settlement of international affairs) which are still being put
up by aggressive circles of some countries) are being swept away by life itself.
Noteworthy is 8olotov=s omission of the additional claim made at the time by Pe.ing
that <hina=s participation was absolutely essential to the solution of #sian
problems. "hile the Soviet foreign minister was perhaps thin.ing in terms of <P0
admission to the United Nations) the <hinese apparently were loo.ing beyond the UN to
the .ind of full$scale diplomatic effort that would earn them #sia=s respect as founders of
what was later termed the "Bandung spirit." Nor did 8olotov assert that <hina=s wor. at
the conference had earned it a status e?uivalent to one of the maDor powers. The Soviets
were willing to admit that Pe.ing had gained a new importance as a result of the
conference) but they refused to go as far as the <hinese in asserting <hina=s first$ran.
status either in #sia or worldwide.
The Soviets) then) had much to gain from an honorable settlement of the !ndochina war
and much to ris. in permitting the tal.s to drag on inconclusively. The 4iet 8inh had
proven their strength as a national liberation movement and had been amply rewarded
with a firm territorial base assured by international agreement. "ith overriding interests
in "estern @urope) 8oscow no doubt found great appeal in giving the *rench a face$
saving "out" from !ndochina. That @;< was eventually defeated in the National
#ssembly +in #ugust1 was testimony not to the cleverness of any Soviet "deal" with
8endZs$*rance) but simply to a low$cost Soviet diplomatic gamble that paid off
handsomely.
;hinese 6@Heti'es
*or Pe.ing) a negotiated settlement of the !ndochina war represented an important
opportunity to propel <hina forward as a maDor #sian power whose voice in #sian
councils could not be ignored. "hen the Berlin <onference decided in *ebruary %&'5 to
hold an international conference on !ndochina) the <hinese applauded the move and
prophesied then that the People=s 0epublic) as an invitee) would thereby gain recognition
of its maDor role in #sian affairs. "ith the Geneva <onference coming at a time of
vigorous <hinese diplomatic activity in !ndia and Burma) Pe.ing probably considered a
settlement short of a complete 4iet 8inh victory acceptable) since it would prove <hina=s
sincere commitment to peace. >ad the <P0 spurred the 4iet 8inh on) it not only would
have been in conflict with the Soviets) whose aid was vital to <hina=s economic recovery
plans) but would also have lost considerable ground in the support <hou @n$lai=s travels
had earned. The war in !ndochina had become) for <hina) a demonstration test of its
sincerity in promoting peaceful coeistence. *rom the tactical standpoint) devotion to
peaceful coeistence may also have been seen as reducing the prospects of widespread
#sian support of) or participation in) the #merican plan for a regional alliance. "ith the
conference ended) <hina was in a position to offer #sian nations an alternative to alliance
with the United States$the concept of "collective peace and security)" sustained by mutual
agreement to foster the five principles.
The motive force behind <hina=s drive for #sian leadership during the period of the
Geneva <onference was the theme that negotiated solutions were possible for all
outstanding world problems. By the time of Geneva) Pe.ing had already been party to the
armistice in Aorea) to agreement with !ndia over Tibet) and to statements of mutual
respect issued bilaterally with !ndia and Burma. 8oreover) <hina had Doined with
8oscow in supporting negotiations of the !ndochina war as early as September %&'9)
while the Sino$!ndian and Sino$Burmese statements also contained calls for an early
settlement. The maDor role played by <hou @n$/ai at Geneva therefore not simply
affirmed <hina=s interest in peace) but as importantly established <hina=s reputation as a
fleible bargainer willing to negotiate disputes and ma.e concessions to resolve them.
!ndeed) once the conference ended) Pe.ing declared that the conference had proved that
negotiations could resolve such other @ast$"est problems as a final Aorea settlement)
arms control) nuclear weapons proliferation) German unification) and @uropean security.
0elatedly) <hina urged that the Geneva <onference was a benchmar. in the rise of the
People=s 0epublic to new prominence on the international scene. "The great significance
of the convening of the Geneva <onference)" the People(s Daily proclaimed before its
close) "lies in the fact that the <hinese People=s 0epublic is participating in the settlement
of #sian ?uestions as one of the Great Powers) thus putting an end to the era when the
#sian peoples were denied their say in their own problems." <hina stood not only for a
resurgent) decoloniali2ed #sia) but also as a Great Power. #s stated by the authoritative
/orld ;ulture>
The contributions of the <P0 at the Geneva <onference to the search for peace) and its
efforts to establish collective security in #sia) have received the universal recognition and
trust of the world=s peace$loving peoples and nations. Because of this) the position of the
<P0 as one of the world=s great nations has been even more affirmed and its international
prestige greatly elevated. The <hinese people feel etraordinary glory because of this.
The fact that <hina had) in !ndochina and as was not the case in Aorea) been invited to
Doin with the Big *our in discussing measures for the restoration of peace was considered
by Pe.ing to have given the <P0 still more international authority.
#ugmentation of <hinese prestige in #sia and throughout the world was a benefit due to
the conference6 but it does not fully eplain why <hina apparently pressed for a
settlement when she did rather than prolong the tal.s until better terms were available.
>aving negotiated at PanmunDom for two years) why did she ta.e less than three months
to conclude a cease$fire in !ndochinaN There seem to have been three reasons for <hina=s
reluctance to engage in etended discussions3 +%1 agreement with the Soviets that the
United States could intervene to spar. a wider war6 +71 consideration that /aos and
<ambodia had been effectively neutrali2ed6 +91 satisfaction that a communist state had
been established on <hina=s southern flan..
!n the first place) Pe.ing was convinced) to Dudge from its published comments on the
war) that influential men in "ashington) including Secretary ;ulles and the :oint <hiefs
of Staff) were ?uite prepared to move directly against <hina if circumstances permitted.
"ashington=s warnings to Pe.ing in %&'9 left room for the continuation of <hinese aid to
the 4iet 8inh) but Pe.ing could never be certain when that aid might become the pretet
for active #merican intervention. By %&'5) moreover) the <hinese had evinced greater
concern than before over the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons. >aving been
through a costly war in Aorea) and having decided as early as the fall of %&'7 to give
priority to "socialist reconstruction" at home) Pe.ing had nothing to gain from provo.ing
the United States. "ere the 4iet 8inh encouraged to strive for the maimum territorial
advantage) the United States$Pe.ing may have calculated$might withdraw from the
conference and change the nature of the war. Bnce those events occurred) the <hinese
advocacy of peace through diplomacy would have been irreparably undercut.
Pe.ing) moreover) was made clearly aware of the dangers inherent in continued fighting.
#t the conference) @den used the implied threat of #merican involvement against <hou
in much the same way as <hauvel had used it against Au2netsov. ;uring late 8ay) for
eample) @den warned <hou "again" of the dangers in the !ndochina situation6
unpredictable and serious results could come about. "hen <hou said he was counting on
Britain to prevent these from happening) the foreign secretary replied <hou was
mista.en) since Britain would stand by the United States in a showdown. *urthermore)
with the @isenhower$<hurchill warning of :une 7J that unacceptable demands made
against *rance would "seriously aggravate" the international situation) with ;ulles=
perceived pressure on 8endZs$*rance at the Paris meeting of mid$:uly) and with the
return of Smith to the conference table) the <hinese were given unmista.able signs that
"estern unity had finally been achieved and some .ind of coordination wor.ed out on
the settlement. #t that Duncture) the outstanding issue for Pe.ing was not how much
territory the ;04 would ultimately obtain) but how far <ambodia and /aos could be
pressed before the :uly 7( deadline passed.
By the deadline) as we have seen) <hou @n$lai=s hardened attitude in conversations with
the <ambodian and /aotian delegates had not swayed them from their hope of eventual
security coverage by the United States. *rom <hina=s standpoint) however) the vital
agreement had been secured3 None of the !ndochinese states was permitted to Doin a
military alliance or to allow the establishment of foreign military bases on their soil.
"hether the <hinese recogni2ed the alternative for the three states of obtaining protection
through a device such as the S@#TB Protocol is not .nown. "hen the accords were
signed) Pe.ing greeted them with the remar. that the restrictions upon !ndochina=s
military ties to the "est had dealt a severe blow to #merican regional security ambitions.
So long as the United States was not permitted to establish bases in the three countries
and to introduce military personnel there) <hina=s security re?uirements were fulfilled
even though) in their internal political ma.e$up) the three states might ta.e a strong anti$
<ommunist line. !t was perhaps because the <P0 had emerged with these advantages that
a <hinese Dournalist confided on :uly 793 ""e have won the first campaign for the
neutrali2ation of all Southeast #sia."
The supposed "neutrali2ation" of <ambodia and /aos was coupled with the securance of
a solid territory for the ;04 along <hina=s southern frontier. *urther territorial gains by
the 4iet 8inh would augment ;04 resources) but would not significantly enhance
<hina=s security. "ith agreement by the conference to stabili2e the military assets of both
2ones of 4ietnam and to forbid their military alignment with other nations) <hina could
feel some confidence that a divided 4ietnam would not present an immediate threat.
Thus) the agreements on <ambodia and /aos complemented the 4ietnam accord in
bolstering <hina=s security from the south even as it also meant a sacrifice of the 4iet
8inh=s capability for overrunning all 4ietnam.
The argument here is) in summary) that the Soviet Union and <ommunist <hina were less
concerned with the specific terms of the settlement than with attaining it once their basic
obDectives had been achieved. # settlement along lines that would satisfy the 4iet 8inh
need for territory) give *rance the satisfaction that it had not sold out) go far toward
fulfilling <hinese security re?uirements and political ambitions in Southeast #sia) and
reduce the possibility of a precipitate #merican withdrawal from the conference was) to
8oscow and Pe.ing) acceptable and even desirable. They saw advantages to themselves
in an early e?uitable agreement that clearly conflicted with 4iet 8inh terms) but not with
their own obDectives.
Precisely how <hou and 8olotov reasoned with >o <hi 8inh$by threat) persuasion) or a
combination of the two$will li.ely never be .nown6 but it seems reasonable to suppose
that) given the precarious political situation in South 4ietnam) the multitude of armed
sects and other groups hostile to the Saigon government) the continued eacerbating
presence of the *rench) and the economic and social vulnerabilities of a society wrac.ed
by war) Pe.ing and 8oscow could argue convincingly that South 4ietnam would never
cohere sufficiently to pose a viable alternative to the ;04. !t may thus have been the
<ommunists= epectation that the ;04 would as li.ely assume control of the entire
country by default as by an election victory in %&',. The <hinese) to be sure) accepted
the notion that the Geneva accords had) temporarily at least) created two 4ietnamese
governments rather than simply divided the country administratively. F;oc. ,5G But it is
improbable that either they or the Soviets anticipated that even an #merican$supported
South 4ietnam could survive. Put another way) the possibility of a prospering) anti$
<ommunist South 4ietnam may simply not have been a serious) and certainly was not an
immediate) concern for either <ommunist power. The Geneva <onference had created
*rench goodwill for 8oscow and added security for Pe.ing6 what might happen in South
4ietnam may) in %&'5) have seemed inconse?uential.
Biet Minh 6@Heti'es
The 4iet 8inh did not emerge as "losers" in the negotiations. They received the territorial
benefits of the settlement without having to cede the *rench or any neutral body control
of enclaves in northern 4ietnam. =!n addition) the ;04 was promised an opportunity
within two years to gain full control of the country through a ballot bo victory) although
it appears that 4iet 8inh leaders put more stoc. in a collapse of the southern regime
before the election date as the path to complete control of the country. !n /aos) the Pathet
/ao had not been disarmed immediately6 instead) they were permitted to regroup over a
wide epanse of terrain that would ma.e disarmament difficult to accomplish. #nd in
both /aos and <ambodia) the resistance elements were to be accorded full political rights
to participate) as individuals) in the %&'' elections.
!n their public commentaries on the Geneva accords) 4iet 8inh leaders displayed full
satisfaction. 8ilitary victories had gained political recognition) they said) than.s to the
support rendered by the Soviet and <hinese delegations. 4ietnam=s independence and
territorial integrity were admitted by Paris) >o <hi 8inh proclaimed. 8oreover) the
regroupment to two 2ones in 4ietnam was) as he put it) "a temporary action) a transitional
step in the reali2ation of a cease$fire) toward restoring peace and attaining the unification
of our country by means of general elections." No "administrative partition" was
intended6 nor would the "2onal arrangements" be permitted to interfere with 4ietnam=s
future unification3
North) <entral and South 4iet Nam are territories of ours. Bur country will certainly be
unified) our entire people will surely be liberated. Bur compatriots in the South were the
first to wage the war of 0esistance. They possess a high political consciousness. ! am
confident that they will place national interests above local interests) permanent interests
above temporary interests) and Doin their efforts with the entire people in strengthening
peace) achieving unity) independence and democracy all over the country . . . . our
people) armymen and cadres from North to South must unite closely. They must be at one
in thought and deed.
#nd Ton ;uc Thang vowed3 "The 4ietnam State will undoubtedly be unified through
general elections."
;espite these protestations of satisfaction and confidence) Tillman ;urdin=s report from
Geneva that members of the 4iet 8inh delegation were sharply disappointed by the
results and veed at pressure applied by their <hinese and 0ussian comrades seems on
the mar.. The 4iet 8inh command evidently believed$$and no *rench authority on the
spot doubted this$$that they could eliminate the *rench from Ton.in with one maDor
offensive and proceed from there against a wea.ened) demorali2ed *ranco$4ietnamese
army in #nnam. Surely >o <hi 8inh must have considered the possibility of #merican
intervention$$although this concern does not emerge as clearly from 4iet 8inh public
commentaries as it does from the official 8oscow and Pe.ing organs. But the 4iet 8inh
loo.ed to the Aorea eperience as having demonstrated that fighting and tal.ing
simultaneously was) as put by a mid$8ay 4N# broadcast) a tactic they could pursue for
two years +li.e the <hinese during the PanmunDom tal.s1 in order to maimi2e territorial
gains. "hether the 4iet 8inh ultimately envisaged the con?uest of all 4ietnam before
reaching agreement with the *rench to cease fire is debatable6 at the least) they) li.e the
*rench) probably regarded maimum control of population and territory as insurance
against future elections. Thus) to the 4iet 8inh) a settlement at the %-th parallel could
only have been regarded as a tactical blunder in violation of the guerrilla war theory and
practice they had mastered.
*orfeiture of considerable territory in 4ietnam was undoubtedly not the only ground for
the 4iet 8inh=s displeasure. Their fre?uent pronouncements on the "indivisibility" of the
4iet 8inh) *ree Ahmer) and Pathet /ao were largely ignored by <hou and 8olotov)
whose agreement on /aos and <ambodia seems to have given priority to <hinese
interests. #ccount had been ta.en) as <hou insisted) of the desirability of integrating the
resistance forces into the national Ahmer and /aotian communities) but those forces were
eventually to be disarmed and disbanded) or withdrawn. <onceivably) the 4iet 8inh
leaders never intended to leave /aos) or were assured by the <hinese and Soviets that the
agreements reached regarding the Pathet /ao were not meant to eclude future North
4ietnamese support. Nevertheless) any future 4iet 8inh contacts with the rebels would
be a clear violation of the Geneva accords and provide the occasion for intensified
/aotian ties to the "est.
The 4iet 8inh also yielded ground on national elections. Their hopes for an all$
4ietnamese political settlement soon after the cease$fire were ?uashed by the Soviets and
<hinese) who were disposed to accept a longer waiting period. *urthermore) the political
settlement itself was not given the priority the 4iet 8inh had originally demanded6 it
would be achieved) as phrased in the *inal ;eclaration) "in the near future)" as the result
of rather than as the precondition to) a military +cease$fire1 settlement. *inally) when the
time for a political settlement was at hand) the ;eclaration specified that an international
body would supervise it rather than the 4iet 8inh and "South" 4ietnamese alone. The
overriding interests of the Soviets and <hinese had ta.en the heart out of the initial 4iet
8inh proposals of 8ay %( and) in addition) had considerably undercut their "fallbac."
positions epressed in late 8ay and :une. :ean <hauvel was apparently correct when he
perceived) after private tal.s with the <hinese) that the 4iet 8inh were really on the end
of a string being manipulated from 8oscow and Pe.ing. "hen they moved forward too
?uic.ly) <hou and 8olotov were always at hand to pull them bac. to a more
accommodating position. Briefly put) the 4iet 8inh very li.ely felt they had been
compelled to give away much of what they had earned even as they ac?uired the
attributes of sovereignty for which they had fought.
;. 65FE;T!BES 6F T)E P#2T!;!P#3TS> T)E /ESTE23 5!: T)2EE
The 5ritish
*or Great Britain) the accords signalled the end of a war that more than once threatened
to involve the United States and ris. a regional conflagration. >ad the point of direct
#merican intervention been reached) the <hurchill government would have been faced
with an etraordinarily difficult decision3 whether to Doin with an old ally in a war
venture that Britain considered politically wrong and militarily foolish) or to brea. with
"ashington and thereby throw into ?uestion the #nglo$#merican alliance. Britain=s
consistent advice to delay irreversible military steps) including formation of a Southeast
#sia defense organi2ation) until the <ommunists had been given an opportunity to ma.e
good on their proclaimed devotion to a peaceful solution over !ndochina had been
grudgingly accepted by the United States6 the choice of following or ignoring #merican
leadership was averted.
# diplomatic untangling of the !ndochina problem) as Britain=s first hope) also became in
large measure its responsibility. !f the allies were not to be pressed into a military
response) it was as much up to @den as to Bidault +and) later) 8endZs$*rance1) to
establish the grounds for a settlement. #lthough final agreement at the conference
re?uired Soviet and <hinese preparedness to offer e?uitable terms) @den=s own
contributions cannot be eaggerated. "or.ing closely with 8olotov and <hou) @den
apparently earned their respect as a forthright) fleible) but firm negotiator. That the
accords were drawn up testified to @den=s persistence. They were a triumph of British
diplomacy to the etent that the <hinese and Soviets) in press commentaries immediately
following the close of the <onference) accorded the UA delegation the unusual accolade
of having) along with their delegations) rendered the most important services in the
agoni2ing process of reaching agreement.
#t the same time as the British successfully pushed through a settlement by diplomatic
rather than military means) they also reserved the right to Doin with the United States in a
regional security arrangement immediately after the conference. #s @den had told <hou)
the formation of a S@#TB would not be put off) even though the #ssociated States would
not become members. British membership in S@#TB represented another significant
diplomatic victory. They had on several occasions informed the United States that a
Southeast #sia pact formed in advance of or during the Geneva deliberations might be
interpreted as provocatory by the <hinese and reduce) if not eliminate) chances for a
settlement. The British never opposed the concept of S@#TB) but they cautioned against
poor timing. S@#TB=s establishment in September %&'5 was thus doubly welcomed by
/ondon3 !t satisfied Britain=s conviction that a much$needed regional organi2ation should
be formed to preserve what remained of !ndochina) not to ta.e action to recover it all
from the 4iet 8inh.
Britain=s opposition to forming S@#TB before or during the conference so as) in part) not
to provo.e the <hinese fitted with /ondon=s aspirations for better Sino$British relations.
Kuite unli.e the dominant voices in "ashington) <hurchill and @den were amenable to
attempting to achieve some .ind of wor.ing relationship with Pe.ing) particularly in
view of the ongoing guerrilla war in 8alaya. The conference) as @den noted in his :une
79 speech to the <ommons) had resulted in an improvement of Sino$British relations)
demonstrated by Pe.ing=s agreement on :une %-) after four years of silence) to echange
charges d=affaires. !n the remaining month of the conference) moreover) British youth
delegations traveled to <hina) and there were hopeful comments from both countries on
the possibilities for stepped up trade and the echange of cultural delegations. Thus) in
sharp contrast to the United States) Great Britain fully eploited this period of harmony
through diplomacy to change) rather than preserve) its pattern of contact with Pe.ing.
The Frenh
*rance probably had as much cause for satisfaction with the outcome at Geneva as any
other party to the conference. Paris had etricated itself from la sale guerre with honor)
yet had also retained a foothold in South 4ietnam and a close relationship with <ambodia
and /aos. The *rench Union lost much of its strength) but not all of its appeal) in
!ndochina. #t least in mid$%&'5) it appeared that *rench cultural and economic interests
in all three former colonies would be substantially preserved6 and even the ;04 had
indicated) at the close as well as at the beginning of the negotiations) that it aspired to
membership in the Union. *rench military power would have to be surrendered) of
course6Y but *rench influence could +and did1 remain in all three countries.
Y @ven as most *rench troops were withdrawn) a *rench military presence remained for
some time. The last troops did not leave 4ietnam until *ebruary %&', while) under the
military accords) *rench instructors remained in /aos and <ambodia and two bases
continued to function in /aos.
"hile the British were ready to Doin with the United States and other interested nations in
S@#TB) the *rench clearly intended) as evidenced by their concern over the location of
the demarcation line) that South 4ietnam have a defensible territory within which to
establish a stable regime competitive with the ;04. Y Y #s already
YY *rench interest was not confined to South 4ietnam after :uly 7%) %&'5. Soon
thereafter) Paris dispatched :ean Sainteny) its former chief negotiator with the 4iet 8inh
at *ontainebleau and ;alat in %&5,) to >anoi to represent *rench interests without
conferring recognition on the ;0C. *rance recogni2ed only one 4ietnam but in fact dealt
with two.
observed) Paris was not motivated by altruism alone6 a substantial territorial base was as
much for the preservation of *rench economic holdings in the South as for the future
security of the Saigon government. To Dudge from the *rench attitude) the Paris
government) no less than the #merican administration) loo.ed forward to participating
fully in the consolidation and rehabilitation of the G4N at least in the two years before
nationwide elections.
The #merians
The United States viewed the conference results with mied emotions. Bn the one hand)
the terms of the settlement conformed surprisingly well to those the #dministration had
agreed with the *rench and British would be acceptable. @ven as the #dministration
could not do more than agree to "respect" and "ta.e note" of the Geneva accords) it had to
concede that they represented a reasonable outcome given the chaotic state of #llied
relations before the conference) the reDection by *rance of a possible military alternative)
and the undeniable military superiority of the 4iet 8inh beyond as well as within
4ietnam. Bn the other hand) the settlement) viewed through the special lenses of the
@isenhower$;ulles #dministration) also contained the elements of defeat. Part of the *ree
"orld=s "assets" in the *ar @ast had been "lost" to the Sino$Soviet bloc +much as <hina
had been "lost" to 8ao Tse$tung=s forces16 our allies had begged off when offered a
chance to deal with the <ommunists by force of arms and) later) by an #sian$"estern
anti$<ommunist alliance ready for action6 and the United States had been compelled to
attend an international conference which not only confirmed to the <ommunists by
diplomacy what they had gained by force) but also enhanced their image elsewhere in
#sia and worldwide as standard$bearers of peace.
The view that Geneva had come out better than could have been epected was the one
offered publicly. The President) at a :uly 7% news conference) declined to critici2e the
accords. >e said they contained "features which we do not li.e) but a great deal depends
on how they wor. in practice." >e announced the Government=s intention to establish
permanent missions in /aos and <ambodia) and said the United States was actively
"pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organi2ation of a
collective defense in Southeast #sia in order to prevent further direct or indirect
<ommunist aggression in that general area."
Under Secretary Smith li.ewise was very guarded in remar.s two days later. ;enying
that Geneva was another "8unich)" Smith said3 "! am . . . convinced that the results are
the best that we could possibly have obtained in the circumstances)" adding that
"diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or
held on the battlefield." "hen ;ulles spo.e +also on :uly 791) he was much less
interested in the past than in the future. 0eferring to "the loss in Northern 4ietnam)" the
Secretary epressed the hope that much would be learned from the eperience toward
preventing further <ommunist inroads in #sia. Two lessons could be culled) he observed.
*irst) popular support was essential against <ommunist subversion6 "the people should
feel that they are defending their own national institutions." Second) collective defense
should precede rather than come during the aggression$a pointed criticism of British
policy during the crisis. # collective security system now in Southeast #sia) he
concluded) would chec. both outright aggression and subversion.
# point$by$point comparison of the Seven Points with the provisions of the accords
indicates that ?uite apart from what had happened to #merican interests in Southeast
#sia as a conse?uence of the conference) #merican diplomacy had) on balance)
succeeded3
+%1 The integrity and independence of /aos and <ambodia were preserved) and 4iet
8inh forces were to be withdrawn or disarmed and disbanded.
+71 Southern 4ietnam was retained) although without an enclave in the North and with
the partition line somewhat south of ;ong >oi.
+91 /aos) <ambodia) and "retained" 4ietnam were not prevented from forming "non$
<ommunist regimes" +in the case of 4ietnam) within the two$year preelection period16
nor were they epressly forbidden "to maintain ade?uate forces for internal security."
4ietnam=s right to import arms and other war materiel was) however) restricted to piece$
by$piece replacement) and its employment of foreign advisers to the number in the
country at the war=s close.
+5$'1 0ecalling ;ulles= interpretation of :uly - that elections should "be only held as long
after cease$fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give
democratic elements best chance)" the accords did not "contain political provisions which
would ris. loss of the retained area to <ommunist control"6 nor did they "eclude the
possibility of the ultimate reunification of 4ietnam by peaceful means." #lthough ;ulles
and 8endZs$*rance preferred that no date be set for the elections) the compromise two$
year hiatus gave the #mericans) the *rench) and the South 4ietnamese a considerable
breathing spell. The first priority) therefore) was to "give democratic elements best
chance"6 as was subse?uently determined by "ashington) this meant providing South
4ietnam with economic assistance and political support. @lections) as ;ulles indicated
then) and as the B<B concurred in #ugust) were agreeable to the United States6 but they
were two years away) and the immediate& primary tas0 was "to maintain a friendly non$
<ommunist South 4ietnam..." Thus) the corollary obDective +stated by the NS< in #ugust
and approved by the President1 "to prevent a <ommunist victory through all$4ietnam
elections" did not connote #merican intention to subvert the accords6 read in contet) the
phrase meant that #merican influence would aim at assuring that the <ommunists not
gain an electoral victory through deceitful) undemocratic methods in violation of the
*inal ;eclaration=s stipulation that they be "free."
+,1 The accords epressly provided for the transfer of individuals desiring to move from
one 2one to another.
+-1 The accords did seem) at the time) to have basically fulfilled the precondition of
providing "effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement." #lthough
the machinery would be the !<<=s rather than the UN=s) Under Secretary Smith noted that
the !<< would have a veto power on important ?uestions +referring) evidently) to the
unanimity rule16 would be composed of one genuine neutral +!ndia1 and one pro$"estern
government +<anada16 and would be permitted full freedom of movement into
demilitari2ed 2ones and frontier and coastal areas. Smith gave this assessment3
Ta.ing everything into consideration) ! strongly feel this Fthe control and supervision
arrangementG is satisfactory and much better than we were able to obtain in Aorea.
*rench feel) and @den and ! agree) that with such composition built$in veto will wor. to
our advantage. This setup is best *rench or anybody else could get) and ! feel it is within
spirit of point -. F;oc. -&G
;espite the overall concordance of maDor provisions of the accords with the Seven Points)
the fact that another piece of territory had been formally ceded to the <ommunists
obviously weighed heavily on the #dministration. "hen) in #ugust) papers were drawn
up for the National Security <ouncil) the Geneva <onference was evaluated as a maDor
defeat for United States diplomacy and a potential disaster for United States security
interests in the *ar @ast. The Bperations <ontrol Board) in its progress report on the then$
current NS< paper '5(') stated that the *inal ;eclaration of the conference "completed a
maDor forward stride of communism which may lead to the loss of Southeast #sia. !t
therefore recorded a drastic defeat of .ey policies in NS< '5(' and a serious loss for the
free world) the psychological and political effects of which will be felt throughout the *ar
@ast and around the globe." !n a separate report) the NS< was somewhat more specific
concerning the etent of the damage) but no less restrained. The <ommunists had
ac?uired "an advance salient" in 4ietnam for use in military and nonmilitary ways6 the
United States had lost prestige as a leader in #sia capable of stemming <ommunist
epansion6 the <ommunist peace line had gained at #merica=s epense6 and <ommunist
military and political prestige had been enhanced as the result of their proven ability to
eploit unstable situations in Southeast #sian countries without resort to armed attac..
The conclusion that emerges from the obvious contrast between the public and private
comments of #dministration officials and organs is that where #merican diplomacy fell
down was not at the conference but during the !ndochina crisis as a whole. Nearly al: the
revised #merican negotiatory priniples had emerged unscathed6 but #merican
o@Heti'es in !ndochina$$the elimination of the 4iet 8inh threat) preservation of the
strategically vital Ton.in ;elta) and obstruction of <ommunist political and military
epansionist policies in the region +all of which were enumerated in NS< '5('$$had still
been defeated. The United States had admirably maneuvered at Geneva in its self$limited
role of interested party6 but the #dministration) convinced that any attrition of what had
been regarded as "*ree "orld" territory and resources was inimical to #merican global
interests) could only view the settlement as the acceptance of terms from the <ommunist
victors. The tas. in 4ietpam in the two years ahead was therefore to wor. with what had
been "retained" in the hope) by no means great) that the ;iem government could pull the
country up by its bootstraps in time to present a meaningful alternative to >o <hi 8inh=s
;04.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 9) "The Geneva <onference) 8ay$:uly) %&'5"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section %) pp. %(J$%5,
!. B#<AG0BUN; TB T>@ <BN*@0@N<@
Bn *ebruary %J) %&'5) a Doint communi?uV from Berlin issued by the United States)
Great Britain) the Soviet Union) and *rance announced that in late #pril the Big *our and
other parties concerned would meet at Geneva to see. a peaceful solution of the eight$
year$old war in !ndochina. Between those dates) the "estern allies engaged in a series of
discussions centered around #merican proposals for direct intervention) while the
<ommunist side$the USS0) <ommunist <hina +<P01) and the 4iet 8inh$wor.ed to
ensure that they would enter the forthcoming Geneva <onference ftom a position of
strength.
The @isenhower #dministration found as much difficulty in persuading *rance and Great
Britain that fundamental changes in the war were necessary before the start of the
conference as in accepting the notion of a negotiated solution in !ndochina. The troubles
with *rance had begun in mid$%&'9 when the U.S. Government gave its conditional
approval to the Navarre Plan) which provided for radically new *rench field tactics and a
buildup of the 4ietnamese National #rmy +4N#1. #merican hopes that assistance in
money and war materiel would elicit a *rench commitment to a program to attract native
!ndochinese into close military and political collaboration with the colonial governments)
especially in 4ietnam) were not fulfilled. Nor was *rance hospitable to #merican
suggestions for greater involvement of the 8ilitary #dvisory #ssistance Group +8##G1
in *rench planning. #s was to be the case almost throughout the !ndochina crisis) *rance
capitali2ed on #merican fears of National #ssembly reDection of the @uropean ;efense
<ommunity +@;<1 treaty and of a *rench pull$out from !ndochina to gain U.S. aid
without having to ma.e commensurate concessions on 4ietnamese independence or
tactical planning. #merican attempts to tie aid to such concessions were never followed
through) and whatever leverage on *rench policy$ma.ing in !ndochina the United States
possessed was left largely uneploited.
*or the most part) *rance=s reDection of #merican conditions and suggestions was based
on the /aniel government=s conviction) implemented 2ealously by *rench civil and
military authorities in !ndochina) that the United States would be intruding in *rance=s
domain. # policy of systematic restrictions on #merican officials in the field prevented
the United States from ma.ing independent evaluations of the war=s progress) with the
result that the Government was for many months badly informed and unwarrantedly
optimistic about the *rench Union army=s chances against the 4iet 8inh. !n late 8arch
and #pril %&'5) when it became clear to "ashington that the Navarre Plan had failed and
that +in Secretary of State ;ulles= words1 "united action" was necessary to prevent
!ndochina from falling to the <ommunists) the *rench revealed that their distrust of
#merican "interference" etended to any plans for overt #merican air$naval involvement.
The /aniel government was perfectly amenable to locali2ed #merican intervention at
;ienbienphu to save the besieged *rench army from disaster6 but it stood firmly opposed
to ;ulles= concept of collective +"estern$#sian1 defense in a security organi2ation that
would) if necessary) intervene to prevent the "loss" of !ndochina. *rance=s re?uests for
assistance at ;ienbienphu were entirely consistent with long$standing policy in Paris that
loo.ed to a negotiated settlement of the war on "honorable" terms at the same time as it
hoped to be in the best possible military position at the time negotiations began.
Bpposition to "united action" was no less stubborn in /ondon. The British) li.e the
*rench) were suspicious of #merican intentions in calling for that alternative) though for
different reasons. To the <hurchill government) the United States) even while
proclaiming a strong desire to avoid open conflict with <ommunist <hina) was tending
precisely in that direction by insisting on the formation of a collective security pact prior
to the start of the Geneva <onference. @isenhower=s letter to <hurchill on #pril 5) %&'5)
could only have reinforced those suspicions) for the President described united action as
an attempt to ma.e <hina stop supporting the 4iet 8inh rather than face the prospect of
large$scale allied involvement in 4ietnam. #lthough the British were not as.ed to ma.e
substantial ground troop commitments to a united action) they felt that their approval
would ultimately condone a widening of the war that would ris. bringing in the <hinese
who) the British argued) could not possibly be epected to cease assistance they had been
providing since %&'(. /ondon therefore told ;ulles it would not approve united action
and preferred to await the outcome of the negotiations before deciding whether the
!ndochina situation warranted resort to military alternatives. The British were perfectly
willing to tal. about regional defense in the *ar @ast) but only after the results were in on
the negotiations. Until then) they said) they would limit themselves to providing full
diplomatic support to the *rench in search of a peaceful solution.
;ifferences among the allies were therefore acute as the conference opened. The *rench
had cleverly eploited the #merican assistance program without having brought in the
#mericans in full force) yet had also been unable to save ;ienbienphu from being
overrun on 8ay -. The British were felt in "ashington to have been the primary obstacle
to united action6 they were accused of having been so blinded by their own self$interest in
other areas of Southeast #sia that they failed to appreciate the vast strategic importance
to the *ree "orld of saving !ndochina.
<ontrasting <ommunist unity on the eve of the conference was more a matter of Sino$
Soviet agreement on the desirability of negotiations than of complete accord among the
three parties. !n the aftermath of Stalin=s death) Soviet foreign policy under 8alen.ov had
altered considerably. ;omestic priorities no doubt influenced the regime=s proclaimed
hopes for a reduction in international tension. Pe.ing) more intimately involved in the
4iet 8inh cause) stepped up its assistance to General Giap=s forces between *ebruary and
#pril %&'5) but also agreed with 8oscow on the desirability of convening an
international conference) which <hina would attend) to end the fighting. The limited
available evidence suggests that the ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam +;041 alone
among the three <ommunist parties considered the call for negotiations premature and
urged that they be preceded by intensified military efforts. >o=s much$publici2ed offer in
late November %&'9 to tal. with the *rench was intended more to influence *rench
domestic and official opinion and to demorali2e *ranco$4ietnamese troops than to evince
sincere interest in arriving at an e?uitable settlement. !n ensuing months) ;04 broadcasts
showed a far greater interest in first achieving a clear$cut military victory in the Ton.in
;elta and parts of /aos than in engaging in discussions while *rench forces remained
scattered throughout !ndochina.
These developments) in very broad outline) provided the bac.drop to the Geneva
<onference. Strength and wea.ness seemed to be the respective characteristics of the
<ommunist and "estern positions. Cet these terms are) as we shall see) not entirely
accurate) for the interaction between and within the two sides was to ma.e clear that the
Geneva <onference would not be the setting for a victor=s peace.
!!. T>@ <BN;U<T #N; ST0U<TU0@ B* ;!P/B8#<C
Bne of the first agreements reached at the Geneva <onference occurred in the course of a
conversation between 4. 8. 8olotov and #nthony @den on 8ay ') when the Soviet
foreign minister endorsed the foreign secretary=s assertion that this negotiation was the
most difficult he had ever encountered.Y !ndeed) it seems at first glance somewhat
paradoical that the !ndochina phase of the Geneva <onference +8ay J$:uly 7%1 should
have resulted in a settlement within less than a do2en wee.s) given the unusual
difficulties facing the negotiators on both sides. +See Table %1 Aey issues were postponed
until the eleventh hour while debate wore endlessly on over relatively insignificant
matters6 contact among the delegations was limited by ideological proDudices and
political antagonisms) forcing some delegates to act as mediators no less than as
representatives of national interests6 and maDor agreements were reached outside the
special framewor. for discussions that the conferees had ta.en a month to build.
Y # valuable source is #nthony @den) 8emoirs3 *ull <ircle) >oughton$8ifflin) Boston)
%&,(.
T#B/@ %
<>!@* N@GBT!#TB0S #T T>@ G@N@4# <BN*@0@N<@ BN !N;B<>!N#
United Aingdom
#nthony @den
United States
General "alter Bedell Smith
U. #leis :ohnson
<hinese People=s 0epublic
<hou @n$lai
<hang "en$t=ien
/i A=e$nung
4iet 8inh
Pham 4an ;ong
/aos
Phoui Sanani.one
USS0
4yacheslav 8olotov
*rance
Georges Bidault
:ean <hauvel
Pierre 8endZs$*rance
4ietnam
;ac Ahe
Tran 4an ;o
<ambodia
Tep Phan
Sam Sary
#. T>@ 0@P0@S@NT#T!BN KU@ST!BN
The first maDor roadbloc. in the negotiations was the <ommunist claims concerning the
representation of parties not present at the conference. Since the conference had already
begun when these claims were forwarded) the chances of epanding the list of invited
parties were very limited. Nevertheless) through fourteen restricted and seven plenary
sessions)Y bitter controversy raged over <ommunist insistence that the 4iet 8inh$led
*ree <ambodian +Ahmer !ssara.1 and *ree /aotian +Pathet /ao1 forces were entitled to
be seated beside representatives of the 0oyal Governments of <ambodia and /aos. Not
until :une %,) when Premier <hou @n$lai) <hina=s foreign minister and chief delegate)
indicated to @den that 4iet 8inh forces would be withdrawn from <ambodia and /aos)
was the debate resolved and the way opened for serious efforts to bring about cease$fires
throughout !ndochina.
The time$consuming echanges over the authenticity of <ommunist "resistance forces" in
/aos and <ambodia were) interestingly enough) not duplicated when it came to
determining the status of the ;04. The Berlin <onference final communi?uV had
specified that the !ndochina deliberations would be attended by the United States) Great
Britain) <ommunist <hina) the Soviet Union) *rance) "and other states concerned."
!nvitations to the participants would) it was further agreed) be issued only by the Berlin
conferees) i.e.) by the Big *our but not by Pe.ing. Cet) as 8olotov admitted at the first
plenary session +8ay J1) Pe.ing as well as 8oscow invited the ;0y) a move vigorously
assailed by *rance and the United States. F;oc. 5'G No attempt was made) however) to
bloc. the ;04=s participation. ;espite the antagonism of the 4ietnamese government
nominally headed by Bao ;ai) +Bao ;ai=s consistent position) supported by Ngo ;inh
;iem when he too. over the premiership on :une %J) was that his was the only legitimate
government in 4ietnam) while the 4iet 8inh were not political competitors but merely
armed rebels.1 the ;04 was generally considered one of the principal combatants whose
consent to a cease$fire) being indispensable) re?uired its participation. 8oreover) the
Soviet Union indicated to the *rench that it would not accept the presence of delegates
from the #ssociated States of !ndochina +4ietnam) <ambodia) and /aos1 unless the ;04
was admitted to the conference. By the time of ;ienbienphu=s fall +8ay -1) all parties
were agreed that there would be nine delegations +though not States1 discussing
!ndochina6 and on 8ay J the first session got underway.
Y !n all) the Geneva <onference comprised eight plenary and twenty$two restricted
sessions. These were ?uite apart from the *ranco$4iet 8inh military command
conferences held after :une 7) as well as from 4iet 8inh military staff tal.s with /aotian
and <ambodian representatives that begain in late :une. *inally) during the latter half of
the conference) *rench and 4iet 8inh delegation heads met secretly in so$called
"underground" negotiations) the results of which were closely held) at least by the *rench.
B. T>@ <B88UN!<#T!BN G#PS
Nine delegations seated at a roundtable to echange views) about every second day)
obscured the fact that true bargaining was not ta.ing place. Proposals were) of course)
tabled and debated6 but actual give$and$ta.e was reserved for private discussions) usually
in the absence of the pro$"estern !ndochinese parties. @ven then) the Geneva tal.s on
!ndochina were hardly dominated by Big Power cabais6 political and ideological
differences were so intense) particularly between the #merican and <hinese
representatives) that diplomacy had to be conducted circuitously) with @den and 8olotov
fre?uently acting as mediators and messengers for delegates unwilling to be found
together. +#s one eample of the #merican attitude) ;uties told reporters Dust prior to the
first session that the only way he could possibly meet with <hou @n$lai was if their cars
collided.1
#nthony @den) whose persistence in the face of adverse developments throughout the
conference was rewarded in the end) has provided this description of personal tribulation3
! was conscious that time was not on our side. Since neither the #mericans nor the
*rench had established any contacts with the <ommunist representatives Fin mid$:uneG) !
had been compelled to adopt the rote of intermediary between the "estern powers and
the <ommunists. 8y activities in this respect were open to every .ind of
misrepresentation. ! was concerned about their effect on #nglo$#merican relations. Bn
the other hand) ! was encouraged by the close accord maintained throughout the
conference between ourselves and the other members of the <ommonwealth) including
those) li.e 8r. Nehru) who were not represented at Geneva. They sent me messages of
than.s and encouragement. ! needed them) for ! began to feet that we should never ma.e
effective headway. ! had never .nown a conference of this .ind. The parties would not
ma.e direct contact and we were in constant danger of one or another bac.ing out of the
door.
Not until the latter half of :une did high$ran.ing *rench and 4iet 8inh delegates meet
face$to$face) did 4iet 8inh military officials confer with <ambodian and /aotian
representatives) and did *rench and <hinese heads$of$delegation privately echange
views. <ommunist and non$<ommunist 4ietnamese) meanwhile) refused to tal. to one
another until :uly) when finally Tran 4an ;o and Pham 4an ;ong were persuaded to
have private discussions. 8ost importantly) the #merican delegation +US;@/1) under
strict instructions to avoid contact with the <hinese) had to rely on second$hand
information provided by the British) *rench) and Soviet representatives) a procedure that
was repeated with respect to the 4iet 8inh.
The problem of contact was no more acutely felt than by the delegation of the State of
4ietnam. #lthough finally granted complete independence by *rance under treaties
initialed in Paris #pril 7J and approved by both governments :une 5) 4ietnam did not
gain the concurrent power to negotiate its own fate. The *rench) clearly anious lest the
4ietnamese upset the delicate state of private tal.s with the 4iet 8inh) avoided Bao ;ai=s
representatives whenever possible and sought to eploit close 4ietnamese$#merican
relations in informing the 4ietnamese only after agreements had been reached. ;uring
:une) for instance) :ean <hauvel) head of the *rench delegation) on several occasions
approached the #mericans with information on the "underground" negotiations with the
4iet 8inh and with the hope that) once partition had been fied) the United States would
"sell" that solution to Saigon. F;oc. ,(G !n the same month) <hauvel) evincing complete
understanding of #merican determination to avoid approving or ac?uiescing in a partition
settlement) nevertheless as.ed if the United States would soften 4ietnamese opposition to
it by indicating it was the best solution obtainable. <hauvel described ;iem and his
predecessor) Buu /oc) as difficult) unrealistic) and unreasonable on the subDect. F;oc. ,,G
!n an aide$memoire delivered to ;uties and @den on :une 7, by >enri Bonnet) the *rench
ambassador to "ashington) Paris urged "ashington not to encourage an adverse
4ietnamese reaction to partition. The United States was also as.ed "to intervene with the
4ietnamese to counsel upon them wisdom and self$control and to dissuade them from
refusing an agreement which) if it is reached) is dictated not by the spirit of abandoning
them) but on the contrary by the desire to save in !ndochina all that can possibly be saved)
and to give the 4ietnamese state) under peaceful conditions) opportunities which have not
always been possible heretofore because of the war." To these approaches) the United
States consistently reacted negatively in the undoubtedly correct belief that the *rench
were merely attempting to identify the United States in 4ietnamese eyes with the
partition concept. By refusing to act as intermediaries for the *rench) the #merican
delegation .ept free of association with a "*rench solution" to the 4ietnam problem.
*rench aloofness from the 4ietnamese continued into :uly. ;espite #merican re?uests of
the *rench delegation that the 4ietnamese be .ept informed of developments) the *rench
demurred. <hauvel informed U. #leis :ohnson) chief deputy to the head of the US;@/)
General "aiter Bedell Smith) that "he was handling this Fliaison with the 4ietnameseG
through members of his staff and was avoiding direct contact with 4ietnamese in order
not to have to answer their ?uestions." "hen Bffroy) another member of the *rench
delegation) suggested that the United States placate the 4ietnamese with assurance of
*ree "orld political) economic) and military support after the settlement) :ohnson replied
that this was a matter for the *rench to handle. Not until late in the <onference did the
4ietnamese government become aware of the strong possibility that partition would
become part of the settlement6 on this and other developments) as we shall see) the
4ietnamese were .ept in the dar.) a circumstance that was to solidify 4ietnamese
hostility to and dissociation from the final terms.
But the 4ietnamese loyal to Bao ;ai were not alone in being denied important
information) although they suffered worst from it. The United States delegation itself
several times suspected that it was not receiving all the news the *rench were in a
position to provide. The fault) however) lay as much with the ambiguous status under
which the delegation operated as with the *rench who were to act as messengers. Bn the
one hand) the #mericans wanted to use their influence to ensure that the *rench not sell
out "estern interests for the sa.e of a ?uic. settlement6 on the other) they were
determined not to become so involved in the bargaining process as to lin. the
#dministration to the final terms. The resolution of these apparently conflicting aims was
offered by ;uties on the eve of the conference in a bac.ground briefing to newsmen at
Geneva. >e said that primary responsibility for decisions ta.en at the conference
belonged to the *rench and 4ietnamese on one side) and to the 4iet 8inh on the other.
The United States "would be inclined not to try to interpose FitsG veto in any sense as
against what they might want to do." #s to whether this attitude applied e?ually to
substantive provisions of any settlement) the Secretary indicated that the United States
would) if necessary) refuse to ac.nowledge results contrary to #merican "interests"3
! would thin. that Fnonapplication of a vetoG would be true up to the point at least where
we felt that the issues involved had a pretty demonstrable interest to the United States
itself. The United States does have pretty considerable interests in the "estern Pacific)
and there are some solutions there which we would regard as so disadvantageous that we
would see. to prevent them. #nd if we failed in that respect) we would probably want to
disassociate ourselves from it Fthe final settlementG.
Thus) the United States would apply the tactic of "disassociation" should its influence not
be sufficient to ma.e the final terms compatible with #merican "interests." Cet the
*rench) against whom the tactic was primarily directed) were probably +and ?uite
naturally1 averse to .eeping their #merican colleagues so well informed of developments
in the tal.s with the 4iet 8inh that the United States would have occasion to resort to
"disassociation." Throughout the conference) in fact) the *rench aimed at eploiting the
#merican presence for the strength they believed it provided their negotiators) and this
policy meant pressuring "ashington to retain a high$ran.ing delegation at the conference
right up to the moment of the settlement.
"hatever the rationale for *rench behavior) the US;@/ complained to "ashington that
it was not being .ept fully informed of developments in the "underground" *ranco$4iet
8inh tal.s. The change in government in Paris during :une from /aniel to Pierre
8endZs$*rance helped matters somewhat. But though it was conceded that 8endZs$
*rance=s representatives had done better than their predecessors in .eeping the United
States apprised) the United States still felt) as ;ulles put it) that while Paris was not
willfully concealing information) there remained a "certain lac. of any intimacy..." F;oc.
,'G
The British also felt loc.ed out of news that vitally affected them. Particularly during
8ay) when "ashington and Paris were fre?uently in touch about possible military
intervention) the British were highly disturbed to find newspapers their best source of
information on the intentions of their foremost allies. Since /ondon was no longer
considered essential to "united action" +see Section !41) the #mericans and the *rench
had evidently agreed that their negotiations should be .ept under wraps until such time as
a decision was made. Bnly after @den confronted Under Secretary Smith with the
newspaper stories +which may have been deliberate "lea.s" to influence the Geneva
deliberations1 did ;ulles direct that the British) #ustralian) and New Lealand
ambassadors be informed "in general terms" regarding U.S.$*rench tal.s. ;iplomay
among the "estern Big Three clearly reflected the rifts that had developed in the alliance
over intervention before the ;ienbienphu disaster6 as a result) secrecy and bilateral
discussions tended to be the rule) thereby complicating the already mammoth tas. of
presenting a united "estern front against the <ommunist negotiators.
Thus far we have been dealing with diplomacy as it was conducted by the non$
<ommunist delegations. "hat of the <ommunistsN The available documentation limits
the comments we may ma.e) but still permits some remar.s) both definite and
speculative. *irst) the <hinese) Soviet) and 4iet 8inh delegations were in constant touch)
as reported by their news agencies. 8oreover) <hou @n$lai was able to ma.e three
stopovers in 8oscow during the conference that very li.ely heightened Sino$Soviet
coordination. *inally) during a recess for heads of delegation) <hou and >o <hi 8inh
held a three$day meeting in early :uly that may have provided the turning point in the
4iet 8inh=s more conciliatory attitude thereafter. !n brief) the <ommunists apparently
were not plagued by the .inds of communication problems that hampered the #mericans)
British) and 4ietnamese.
#s will be argued in greater detail subse?uently) the fre?uent meetings of the <ommunist
delegations did not result in a uniformity of views. The <hinese and Soviets evidently
wor.ed independent of the 4iet 8inh whenever their separate interests dictated the need
for advancement of progress in the negotiations. #t times when the 4iet 8inh were
intransigent) <hou and 8olotov fre?uently too. the initiative to brea. log Dams that
threatened to plunge the conference into irresolvable deadloc.. 8uch li.e @den) <hou
and 8olotov sometimes found themselves playing the role of mediator) a role which
they) and particularly <hou) relished for what *red !.lV has called the "side$effects" of
negotiations$benefits deriving from) but incidental to) negotiations) such as enhanced
prestige. !n the end) the 4iet 8inh advantage of close rapport with 8oscow and Pe.ing
did not prevent the 4iet 8inh from sharing with their non$<ommunist compatriots the
ignominious distinction of having been undercut by allies.
!!!. T>@ ;@4@/BP8@NT B* B#0G#!N!NG PBS!T!BNS
#. T)E 73!TED ST#TES #3D T)E 3E:6T!#T!63S
!n underwriting the Navarre Plan and proceeding with utmost caution in urging *rance to
improve its relationship with the non$<ommunist 4ietnamese nationalists) the United
States hoped to influence Paris to postpone a commitment to negotiations until *rench
forces were at least on the threshold of military victory. "hile aware of the strong
pressures on the /aniel government from the National #ssembly and the *rench public
for a peaceful settlement) the United States) clearly influenced by the eperience at
PanmunDom) sought to persuade the premier not to let the clamor for peace drive him to
the bargaining table. #s late as ;ecember %&'9 /aniel agreed that "ashington=s aversion
to premature negotiations was well$advised6 but two months later) at Berlin) his
government Doined with the Soviet Union in calling for an international conference to end
the !ndochina conflict. The *rench government found it could no longer ignore anti$war
sentiment at home without Deopardi2ing its survival) while the #mericans) however
strongly opposed to bringing the war to the conference table with victory nowhere in
sight and with <ommunist <hina as a negotiating opponent) felt compelled to approve the
Berlin decision if only to blunt the *rench threat of scuttling @;<.
*orced to go along with *rench preference for negotiating with the <ommunists) the
United States remained unalterably pessimistic about the probable results. This attitude
was first set out fully by the :oint <hiefs of Staff in 8arch %&'5. F;oc. 79G The <hiefs
eamined the alternatives to military victory and found them all infeasible or
unacceptable to the United States. # ceasefire prior to a political settlement) the :<S
paper states) "would) in all probability) lead to a political stalemate attended by a
concurrent and irretrievable deterioration of the *ranco$4ietnamese military position." #
coalition government would lead to <ommunist control by .eeping any outside assistance
from preventing a sei2ure of power from within. Partition) on the other hand) would mean
recogni2ing <ommunist success by force of arms) ceding the .ey Ton.in ;elta to the
communists) and) even if confined to only one of the three !ndochinese states)
undercutting our containment policy in #sia.
The <hiefs also commented at some length on the difficult ?uestion of elections in
4ietnam. They too. the position that even if elections could be held along democratic
lines +which they doubted1) a <ommunist victory would almost certainly result because
of <ommunist territorial control) popular support) and superior tactics3
Such factors as the prevalence of illiteracy) the lac. of suitable educational media) and
the absence of ade?uate communications in the outlying areas would render the holding
of a truly representative plebiscite of doubtful feasibility. The <ommunists) by virtue of
their superior capability in the field of propaganda) could readily pervert the issue as
being a choice between national independence and *rench <olonial rule. *urthermore) it
would be militarily infeasible to prevent widespread intimidation of voters by <ommunist
partisans. "hile it is obviously impossible to ma.e a dependable forecast as to the
outcome of a free election) current intelligence leads the :oint <hiefs to the belief that a
settlement based upon free elections would be attended by almost certain loss of the
#ssociated States to <ommunist control.
The :<S views) together with the recommendation that the United States not associate
itself with any settlement that "would fail to provide reasonably ade?uate assurance of the
future political and territorial integrity of !ndochina . . .)" were approved by the Secretary
of ;efense on 8arch 79.
The :<S position reflected Government policy) for in the remaining months before the
<onference the United States privately stood opposed to any course of action other than
full prosecution of the war. ;ulles) spea.ing with *rench #mbassador >enri Bonnet on
#pril 9) reasoned thaf a negotiated settlement would lead only to face$saving formulae
for either a *rench or a 4iet 8inh surrender. The Secretary termed a division of
!ndochina "impractical" and a coalition government the "beginning of disaster"6 neither
arrangement could prevent a *rench surrender. F;oc. 7-G The President himself echoed
this either$or approach. "riting to <hurchill #pril 5) @isenhower proposed3 "There is no
negotiated solution of the !ndochina problem which in essence would not be either a face$
saving device to cover a *rench surrender or a face$saving device to cover a <ommunist
retirement." #nd) as already observed) it was precisely to bring about the latter$<hina=s
"discreet disengagement" from support of the 4iet 8inh$that the President wanted British
cooperation in united action.
<oncomitantly) the United States was concerned that a disaster at ;ienbienphu would
propel the *rench into acceptance of an immediate) unsupervised cease$fire even before
the conference was to begin. ;ulles obtained assurances from Bidault that the *rench
would not agree to such a cease$fire. But the Secretary found the British less infleible)
with @den doubting the #merican view that a sudden cease$fire would lead either to a
massacre of the *rench by the native people or to large$scale infiltration of *rench$held
terrain by 4iet 8inh forces. F;oc. 9-G
Thus assured by the *rench but mindful of both *rench and British preference for trying
to bargain with the <ommunists. before resorting to further military steps) "ashington) in
late #pril and early 8ay) sought to develop guidelines for the #merican delegation. The
National Security <ouncil) less than a wee. before the opening conference session)
carefully eamined #merican alternatives. ;isturbed by what it regarded as peace$at$any$
price thin.ing in Paris) the NS< urged the President to decide not to Doin the Geneva
deliberations without assurance from *rance that it was not preparing to negotiate the
surrender of !ndochina. #gain) the Aorean eample was foremost3 <ommunist tactics at
Geneva) the NS< forecast) would li.ely resemble those at PanmunDom6 a cease$fire might
be announced that the <ommunists would not comply with for lac. of effective
supervision6 the *rench would wilt before the <ommunists= predictable dilatory tactics
and end by accepting almost any terms.
The NS< therefore decided that the *rench had to be pressured into adopting a strong
posture in the face of probable <ommunist intransigence. The President was urged to
inform Paris that *rench ac?uiescence in a <ommunist ta.eover of !ndochina would bear
not only on *rance=s future position in the *ar @ast) but also on its status as one of the Big
Three6 that abandonment of !ndochina would grievously affect both *rance=s position in
North #frica and *ranco$U.S. relations in that region6 that U.S. aid to *rance would
automatically cease upon Paris= conclusion of an unsatisfactory settlement6 and) finally)
that <ommunist domination of !ndochina would be of such serious strategic harm to U.S.
interests as to produce "conse?uences in @urope as well as elsewhere FwithoutG apparent
limitation." !n addition) the NS< recomended that the United States determine
immediately whether the #ssociated States should be approached with a view to
continuing the anti$4iet 8inh struggle in some other form) including unilateral #merican
involvement "if necessary." The NS< clearly viewed the !ndochina situation with
etreme aniety) and its action program amounted to unprecedented proposals to threaten
*rance with the serious repercussions of a sell$out in Southeast #sia.
Pessimism over the prospects for any meaningful progress in tal.s with the <ommunists
was shared by Secretary ;ulles. !n a bac.ground briefing for newsmen at Geneva) ;ulles
gave the first official indication for public consumption that the United States would
dissociate itself from any settlement rather than be party to unacceptable terms. #s to the
acceptability of partition) the Secretary) in views that would change later) said he did not
see how partition could be arranged with the fighting not confined to any single area. >e
as much as ruled out a territorial division when he commented that the United States
would only agree to an arrangement in which all the 4iet 8inh troops would be placed in
a small regroupment area out of harm=s way. But that arrangement "might not be
acceptable to them)" ;ulles said coyly.
#merican opinions on the li.ely ramifications of a settlement were also made .nown) and
with greater precision) in private. Bn 8ay -) for instance) /ivingston 8erchant of the
State ;epartment presented the #merican view to the 8inisters of New Lealand and
#ustralia. Predicting that the *rench would finally settle for part of 4ietnam and manage
to salvage <ambodia and /aos) 8erchant said the United States could not accept such a
surrender of territory. "hile we could not prevent the *rench from ma.ing concessions)
neither did we have to associate ourselves with the results. Thus) both publicly and
privately) #dministration leaders indicated at the outset of the conference that the United
States would divorce itself from any settlement that resulted in less than a complete
*rench$4ietnamese victory.
The first test of U.S. policy came 8ay ' when the *rench informed "ashington of the
proposals they intended to ma.e in the opening round of the Geneva tal.s on 8ay J. The
proposals included a separation of the "civil war" in 4ietnam from the <ommunist
aggressions in <ambodia and /aos6 a cease$fire) supervised by a well$staffed
international authority +but not the UN1 and followed by political discussions leading to
free elections6 the regrouping of regular forces of the belligerents into defined 2ones +as
/aniel had proposed in a speech on 8arch '1 upon signature of a cease$fire agreement6
the disarming of all irregular forces +i.e.) the 4iet 8inh guerrillas16 and a guarantee of the
agreements by "the States participating in the Geneva <onference."
The :<S were first to react to the *rench plan. The <hiefs strongly felt that even if the
<ommunists unepectedly agreed to it) the li.ely outcomes would still be either rapid
*rench capitulation in the wa.e of the cease$fire or virtual *rench surrender in the course
of protracted political discussions. Bnce more) the <hiefs fell bac. on the Aorean
eperience) which they said demonstrated the certainty that the <ommunists would
violate any armistice controls) including those supervised by an international body. #n
agreement to refrain from new military activities during armistice negotiations would be
a strong obstacle to <ommunist violations6 but the <ommunists) the :<S concluded)
would never agree to such an arrangement. Bn the contrary) they were far more li.ely to
intensify military operations so as to enhance their bargaining position) precisely at the
time the *rench would see. to reduce operations to avoid ta.ing casualties. The <hiefs
therefore urged that the United States not get trapped into bac.ing a *rench armistice
proposal that the <ommunists) by voicing approval) could use to bind us to a cease$fire
while they themselves ignored it. The only way to get satisfactory results was through
military success) and since the Navarre Plan was no longer tenable) the net best
alternative was not to associate the United States with any cease$fire in advance of a
satisfactory political settlement. The first step) the <hiefs believed) should be the
conclusion of a settlement that would "reasonably assure the political and territorial
integrity of the #ssociated States . . . "6 only thereafter should a cease$fire be entertained.
#s previously) the :oint <hiefs= position became U.S. policy with only minor
emendations. The President) reviewing the <hiefs= paper) agreed that the Government
could not bac. the *rench proposal with its call for a supervised cease$fire that the
<ommunists would never respect. @isenhower further concurred with the <hiefs=
insistence on priority to a political settlement) with the stipulation that *rench forces
continue fighting while negotiations were in progress. >e added that the United States
would continue aiding the *rench during that period and would) in addition) wor. toward
a coalition "for the purpose of preventing further epansion of <ommunist power in
Southeast #sia."
These statements of position paved the way for a National Security <ouncil meeting on
8ay J) which set forth the guidelines of U.S. policy on negotiations for the delegation at
Geneva. The decision ta.en at the meeting simply underscored what the President and the
<hiefs had already stated3
The United States will not associate itself with any proposal from any source directed
toward a cease$fire in advance of an acceptable armistice agreement) including
international controls. The United States could concur in the initiation of negotiations for
such an armistice agreement. ;uring the course of such negotiations) the *rench and the
#ssociated States should continue to oppose the forces of the 4iet 8inh with all the
means at their disposal. !n the meantime) as a means of strengthening the hands of the
*rench and the #ssociated States during the course of such negotiations) the United
States will continue its program of aid and its efforts to organi2e and promptly activate a
Southeast #sian regional grouping for the purpose of preventing further epansion of
<ommunist power in Southeast #sia.
5. T)E ;6MM73!ST P26P6S#"S
Bfficial #merican perspectives on the li.ely pattern of the Geneva negotiations were
confirmed when the 4iet 8inh forwarded their first proposal "pac.age" at the second
plenary session on 8ay %(. Pham 4an ;ong) then the ;04=s vice$minister for foreign
affairs and already a seasoned negotiator with the *rench) introduced his case with the
argument that the 4iet 8inh were the "stronger" force in "more than three$fourths of the
country." >e went on to describe the successful administration of this territory by his
government) which he said "represents the will of the entire 4ietnamese nation The
opposition) the Bao ;ai regime) characteri2ed as "the government of the temporarily
occupied 2one)" did not enDoy popular support and was merely the tool of the *rench.
Pham 4an ;ong did not) however) demand that *rance concede control of all 4ietnam to
the ;0C. !nstead) ;ong urged that *rance recogni2e "the sovereignty and independence
of 4ietnam throughout the territory of 4ietnam)" a statement which amounted to a
reDection of the *ranco$4ietnamese treaties approved #pril 7J in Paris by /aniel and
Premier Nguyen Trung 4inh. The main points of ;ong=s proposal for a cease$fire and
political settlement in 4ietnam were as follows3
+%1 <onclusion of an agreement on the withdrawal of all "foreign" +i.e.) *rench1 troops
from the #ssociated States) to be preceded by the relocation of those troops to
regroupment areas
+71 <onvening of advisory conferences) to be composed of representatives of the
"governments of both sides)" in each country of !ndochina) with the obDective of holding
general elections leading to the establishment of unified governments
+91 Supervision of elections by local commissions
+51 Prior to the establishment of unified governments) the carrying out by the opposing
parties of "the administrative functions in the districts which will be FtemporarilyG under
their administration . .
+'1 <ease$fire in all !ndochina supervised by mied commissions composed of the
belligerents) the ease-fire to ta0e effet upon implementation of all other measures. No
new forces or military e?uipment to be introduced into !ndochina during the armistice
To placate the *rench) ;ong asserted the ;04=s readiness "to eamine the ?uestion of the
entry of the ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam into the *rench Union..."
The meaning of ;ong=s proposal was clear. # political settlement would precede a
military agreement to a cease$fire rather than the reverse) which the *rench preferred.
Somewhat ironically) the 4iet 8inh position was in line with the #merican preference
for giving priority to a political settlement6 but the 4iet 8inh in effect proposed to stop
fighting only when *rench troops had left 4ietnam and a political process favorable to
the <ommunists had been set up. By first getting rid of the *rench) and then substituting
all$4ietnamese consultations for strict control and supervision of the cease$fire) the
regroupment) and the general elections) the 4iet 8inh could legitimately epect a ?uic.
ta.eover of power from the relatively wea. 4ietnamese National #rmy) by then bereft of
its *rench command structure. #s ;ong well .new) the relocation of *rench forces in the
Ton.in ;elta to a tighter perimeter was having) and would continue to have) maDor
repercussions on 4N# morale. Bnce the *rench could be persuaded to withdraw) the
4N# would undoubtedly collapse under 4iet 8inh military pressure. 8oreover)
inasmuch as ;ong=s plan made no allowance for the disarming) much less the regrouping)
of indigenous forces on either side) the 4iet 8inh would be militarily in a virtually
unassailable position to control any general election that might be held. ;ong=s proposal)
then) amounted to a re?uest that the *rench abandon 4ietnam to a certain fate.
!n the same speech) ;ong made clear that the ;04=s concern etended beyond 4ietnam
to <ambodia and /aos. By %&'5) 4iet 8inh coordination with the Pathet /ao and *ree
Ahmer "resistance forces" had been going on for at least three years) or since the formal
announcement on 8arch %%) %&'%) of formation of a 4iet 8inh$*ree Ahmer$Pathet /ao
"National United *ront." 4iet 8inh soldiers and cadres were active participants in the
fighting there) where they provided the hard core of the "resistance." !n addition) forces
under General 4o Nguyen Giap had invaded /aos in #pril and ;ecember %&'9) and
<ambodia in #pril %&'5 +a move which prompted a formal protest by the 0oyal Ahmer
Government to the Secretary General of the UN on #pril 791. 4iet 8inh battalions were
still active in both countries during 8ay and :une) with greater priority given operations
in /aos. Thus) ;ong=s proposals on a settlement in /aos and <ambodia reflected not
simply the ;04=s assumption of the role of spo.esman for the unrepresented *ree Ahmer
and Pathet /ao movements) but also direct 4iet 8inh interests in those neighboring
.ingdoms.
;ong argued that the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer forces enDoyed widespread popular
support and controlled most of the territory of their respective countries. "ith
considerable distortion of history +subse?uently corrected by the /aotian and <ambodian
delegates1) ;ong sought to demonstrate that the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer were de
facto governments carrying out "democratic reforms" in the areas their armies had
"liberated." *rance was therefore advised to recogni2e the "sovereignty and
independence" of those movements no less than of the ;0C. *rench forces alone were to
withdraw from <ambodia and /aos6 the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer were not "foreign"
troops. The same election procedure offered for 4ietnam) without neutral or international
supervision) would) ;ong proposed) ta.e place in <ambodia and /aos) thereby granting
the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer a status e?ual to that of the lawful governments. #nd
during the electoral process) ;ong insisted on "conditions securing freedom of activity
for patriotic parties) groups) and social organi2ations..." agreement to which would have
permitted various <ommunist fronts to function with impunity. The inclusion of the
Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer in the ;04=s settlement plan$in particular) the demand that
they merited political and territorial recognition$very ?uic.ly brought the conference to a
standstill and) much later) compelled the Soviets and <hinese to wor. against 4iet 8inh
ambitions.
;. T)E #ME2!;#3 2E#;T!63
Pham 4an ;ong=s opening gambit was clearly anathema to the "estern delegations.
<ertainly) from the #merican standpoint) his proposals met none of the criteria for
acceptability outlined by the National Security <ouncil on 8ay J. Smith said as much at
Geneva when he spo.e on 8ay %( and again at the third plenary session 8ay %7.
#ccordingly) Smith did not wholeheartedly embrace Bidault=s proposals) for despite
giving a general endorsement of the *rench plan) he departed from it at two important
Dunctures. *irst) he declined to commit the United States in advance to a guarantee of the
settlement despite Bidault=s call for all the participants to ma.e such a guarantee6 second)
he proposed that national elections in 4ietnam be supervised specifically by an
international commission "under United Nations auspices." #s his speeches made clear)
the United States believed the UN should have two separate functions$overseeing not
only the cease$fire but the elections as well. Both these points in Smith=s remar.s were to
remain cardinal elements of #merican policy throughout the negotiations despite *rench
+and <ommunist1 efforts to induce their alteration.
@ntirely in .eeping with Smith=s position at the conference) as well as with the tenor of
the 4iet 8inh proposals) Secretary ;ulles) on 8ay %7) sent Smith instructions intended
to ma.e the United States an influential) but unentangled and unobligated) participant. #s
;ulles phrased it) the United States was to be "an interested nation which) however) is
neither a belligerent nor a principal in the negotiation." !ts primary aim would be to3
help the nations of that area F!ndochinaG peacefully to enDoy territorial integrity and
politial independene under sta@le and free go'ernments with the opportunity to epand
their economies) to reali2e their legitimate national aspirations) and to develop security
through individual and collective defense against aggression) from within and without.
This implies that these people should not @e amalgamated into the <ommunist bloc of
imperialistic dictatorship.
#ccordingly) Smith was told) the United States should not give its approval to any
settlement or cease$fire "which would have the effect of su@'erting the eisting lawful
governments of the three aforementioned states or of permanently impairing their
territorial integrity or of placing in Deopardy the forces of the *rench Union of !ndochina)
or which otherwise contravened the principles stated . . . above." F;oc. 5-G
The NS< decision of 8ay J) Smith=s comments at the second and third plenary sessions)
and ;ulles= instructions on 8ay %7 reveal the rigidity of the #merican position on a
Geneva settlement. The United States would not associate itself with any arrangement
that failed to provide ade?uately for an internationally supervised cease$fire and national
elections) that resulted in the partitioning of any of the #ssociated States) or that
compromised the independence and territorial integrity of those States in any way. !t
would not interfere with *rench efforts to reach an agreement) but neither would it
guarantee or other wise be placed in the position of seeming to support it if contrary to
policy. Bedell Smith was left free) in fact) to withdraw from the conference or to restrict
the #merican role to that of observer. F;oc. 5-G The rationale for this approach was clear
enough3 the United States) foreseeing inevitable protraction of negotiations by the
<ommunists in the manner of Aorea) would not be party to a *rench cession of territory
that would be the end result of the <ommunists= waiting game already begun by Pham
4an ;ong. 0ather than passively accept that result) the United States would withdraw
from active involvement in the proceedings) thereby leaving it with at least the freedom
to ta.e steps to recapture the initiative +as by rolling bac. the 4iet 8inh at some future
date1 and the moral purity of having refused to condone the enslavement of more people
behind the !ron <urtain. #merican policy toward negotiations at Geneva was therefore in
perfect harmony with the @isenhower$;ulles global approach to dealing with the
<ommunist bloc.
Gloomy #merican conclusions about the conference) and no doubt the etravagant
opening <ommunist demands) were intimately connected with events on the battlefield.
#fter the debacle at ;ienbienphu on 8ay -) the *rench gradually shifted their forces
from /aos and <ambodia into the Ton.in ;elta) leaving behind wea. /aotian and
<ambodian national armies to cope with veteran 4iet 8inh battalions. #s the *rench
sought to consolidate in northern 4ietnam) the 4iet 8inh pressed the attac.) moving
several battalions eastward from ;ienbienphu. U.S. #rmy intelligence reported in late
8ay) on the basis of *rench evaluations) that the 4iet 8inh were redeploying much faster
than anticipated) to the point where of 9')((( troops originally in northwestern Ton.in
only 7)((( remained. #t the same time) two 4iet 8inh battalions stayed behind in
<ambodia and another ten in /aos6 and in both those countries) #merican intelligence
concluded that the 4iet 8inh position was so strong as to Deopardi2e the political no less
than the military stability of the royal governments.
To thwart the <ommunist military threat in 4ietnam) the *rench chief of staff) General
Paul @ly) told General :. >. Trapnell) the 8##G chief +on 8ay 9(1) that *rench forces
were forming a new defensive perimeter along the >anoi>aiphong ais6 but @ly made no
effort to hide the touch$and$go nature of *rench defensive capabilities during the rainy
season already underway. This precarious situation was confirmed by General 4alluy of
the *rench command staff. !n a report in early :une to U.S.) British) #ustralian) and New
Lealand chiefs of staff assembled in "ashington) 4alluy held that the ;elta was in
danger of falling to the <ommunists) that neither *renchmen nor 4ietnamese would fight
on in the south in that eventuality) and that only prompt allied intervention could save the
situation. F;oc. '9G #merican assessments merely echoed those provided by the *rench.
# National !ntelligence @stimate published :une %' determined that *rench Union forces)
despite a numerical advantage) faced defections on a mounting scale that could become
very large if the 4iet 8inh scored maDor victories or if the *rench were believed +and
4ietnamese suspicions were rife on this score in >anoi and Saigon1 about to abandon
>anoi and portions of the ;elta. !n sum) the tenor of intelligence reports by *rench and
#merican sources during this period +from early 8ay through mid$:une1 was that the
4iet 8inh armies were solidly entrenched in portions of <ambodia and /aos) were
preparing for further advances in the Ton.in ;elta) and) if the war were to continue
beyond the rainy season) had the capability to destroy positions then being fortified by
*rench Union forces throughout northern 4ietnam.
The upshot of this military deterioration throughout much of !ndochina was to reinforce
the #merican conviction that the <ommunists) while ma.ing proposals at Geneva they
.new would be unacceptable to the "est) would drive hard for important battlefield gains
that would thoroughly demorali2e *rench Union troops and set the stage for their
withdrawal southward) perhaps precipitating a general crisis of confidence in !ndochina
and a 4iet 8inh ta.eover by default. 8ore clearly than earlier in the year) #merican
officials now saw Dust how desperate the *rench really were) in part because *rench field
commanders were being far more sincere about and open with information on the actual
military situation. But the thic.ening gloom in !ndochina no less than at Geneva did not
give way to counsels of despair in "ashington. The Government concluded not that the
goals it had set for a settlement were unrealistic) but rather that the only way to attain
them) as the President and the :<S had been saying) was through decisive military victory
in conformity with the original united action proposal of 8arch 7&. "hile therefore
maintaining its delegation at Geneva throughout the indecisive sessions of 8ay and :une)
the United States once again alerted *rance to the possibility of a military alternative to
defeat under the pressure of <ommunist tal.$fight tactics.

!4. T>@ UN!T@; ST#T@S #T G@N@4#3 T>@ ST#G@ B* *B0<@ #N;
;!P/B8#<C) 8#C TB 8!;$:UN@
!n .eeping open the option of united action) the #dministration) no less during 8ay and
the first half of :une than in #pril) carefully made direct involvement conditional on a
range of *rench concessions and promises. This second go$=round on united action was
not designed to ma.e further negotiations at Geneva impossible6 rather) it was intended to
provide an alternative to which the *rench might turn once they) and hopefully the British
as well) conceded that negotiations were a wasteful eercise.
The issue of united action arose again in early 8ay when Premier /aniel) in a tal. with
#mbassador ;illon) epressed the view that the <hinese were the real masters of the
negotiations at Geneva. This being the case) /aniel reasoned) the <hinese would probably
see. to drag out the tal.s over any number of peripheral issues while the 4iet 8inh
pushed on for a military decision. The *rench position in the field) with a maDor
redeployment on the order of %' battalions to the Ton.in ;elta probably very soon)
would be desperate) /aniel said) unless the United States decided to give its active
military cooperation. !n the interim) the premier re?uested that an #merican general be
dispatched to Paris to assist in military planning.
/aniel=s views failed to ma.e an impression in "ashington. #lthough the #dministration
agreed to dispatch a general +Trapnell1) ;ulles proposed) and @isenhower accepted) a
series of "indispensable" conditions to #merican involvement that would have to be met
by Paris. @ven after those conditions were met) #merican intervention would not follow
automatically6 /aniel would have to re?uest further U.S.$*rench consultations. The
conditions were3 +!n forwarding these conditions to the @mbassy for transmittal to the
*rench) ;ulles noted that a prompt) favorable decision would be premature inasmuch as
it might internationali2e the war in a way offensive to the British) leaving the *rench with
the difficult choice of internationali2ation or capitulation.1
+%1 *ormal re?uests for U.S. involvement from *rance and the #ssociated States
+71 #n immediate) favorable response to those invitations from Thailand) the Philippines)
#ustralia) and New Lealand) as well as the assurance that Britain "would either
participate or be ac?uiescent"
+91 Presentation of "some aspect of matter" to the UN by one of the involved #sian states
+51 # *rench guarantee of complete independence to the #ssociated States) "including
un?ualified option to withdraw from *rench Union at any time
+'1 # *rench underta.ing not to withdraw the @peditionary <orps from !ndochina
during the period of united action in order to ensure that the United States would be
providing air and sea) but not combat$troop) support
+,1 *ranco$#merican agreement on the training of native forces and a new command
structure during united action +#dmiral 0adford was reported to be thin.ing in terms of a
*rench supreme command with a U.S. air command1
+-1 *ull endorsement by the *rench cabinet and #ssembly of these conditions to ensure a
firm *rench commitment even in the event of a change in government in Paris
!t was further agreed that in the ourse of united action) the United States would pursue
efforts to broaden the coalition and to formali2e it as a regional defense pact.
;uring the same conference in which the conditions were drawn up) top #merican
officials went deeper into them. @isenhower was insistent on collective action) but
recogni2ed that the British might not commit themselves initially and that the
#ustralians) facing a general election later in 8ay) could only give "evidence" of their
willingness to participate. # second maDor problem was !ndochinese independence.
;ulles posed the #merican dilemma on this score3 on the one hand) the United States had
to avoid giving #sians reason to believe we were intervening on behalf of colonialism6 on
the other) the #ssociated States lac.ed the administrative personnel and leadership
necessary to carrying on alone. "!n a sense)" said ;ulles) "if the #ssociated States were
turned loose) it would be li.e putting a baby in a cage of hungry lions. The baby would
rapidly be devoured." >is solution was that the #ssociated States be granted +evidently)
orally1 the right to withdraw from the *rench Union after passage of a suitable time
period) perhaps five or ten years.
# final point concerned @ecutive$<ongressional relations once a *rench re?uest) bac.ed
by Parliamentary assent) reached "ashington. The President felt he should appear before
a Doint session of <ongress and see. a <ongressional resolution to use the armed forces in
!ndo$<hina Fwords missingG act on the formal invitation of *rance and the #ssociated
States) and with the cooperation of friends and allies in the region. #t @isenhower=s
re?uest) ;ulles directed that the State ;epartment begin wor.ing up a first draft of a
Presidential message.
The #merican response to /aniel=s re?uests set the stage for an etended series of
discussions over the ensuing five wee.s. !n Paris) ;illon communicated the #merican
conditions to /aniel and 8aurice Schumann) the ;eputy 8inister for *oreign #ffairs6 in
a tal. with the #mbassador 8ay %5) they accepted the conditions) but with important
reservations. *irst) /aniel indicated his dismay at the #merican insistence on the right of
the #ssociated States to withdraw from the *rench Union. The premier predicted that the
*rench public would never accept this condition inasmuch as the #ssociated States had
themselves never made it and since even the 4iet 8inh envisioned Doining the Union.
The obvious #merican reluctance to go beyond air and naval forces also disturbed the
premier. >e re?uested that the United States additionally provide artillery forces and a
to.en contingent of ground troops. But he indicated pleasure that UA participation was
no longer a prere?uisite to #merican involvement.
/aniel=s ?ualified approval of the preconditions was accompanied by a re?uest for a
response to two other ?uestions3 could the United States in some way guarantee the
borders and independence of /aos and <ambodia following a *rench withdrawal from
those countriesN <ould the United States provide written assurance of prompt air
intervention to meet a possible <hinese <ommunist air attac. on *rench forces in the
Ton.in ;eltaN
The #merican response to /aniel=s demurrers and re?uests was for the most part
negative. Bn the *rench$#ssociated States relationship) which #mbassador ;illon had
said was the chief barrier to a *rench re?uest for intervention)Y ;ulles replied +through
;illon1 that the United States might have some fleibility on the matter)
Y ;illon commented3 "! am certain that unless we can find some way to get around this
re?uirement Fthat the 4ietnamese have the option of leaving the *rench UnionG) *rench
will never as. for outside assistance."
;illon proposed that the real obDection among #sians to the position of the #ssociated
States rested not on the "purely Duridical" problem of the right to leave the Union) but on
!ndochina=s lac. of powerful national armies. The #mbassador recommended that
#merican training and e?uipping of the 4N#) coupled with a *rench statement of
intention to withdraw the @peditionary <orps after the establishment of peace and a
national army) would significantly dampen #sian antagonism to the Bao ;ai regime. !t is
difficult to understand why ;illon assumed #sians would significantly change their
attitude toward *rench !ndochina when) even with an #merican ta.eover of the training
and e?uipping of the 4N#) *rench forces would still be on 4ietnamese territory for a
lengthy period.
but had to remain adamant on complete independence if it ever hoped to gain Thai and
*ilipino support. Net) on the ?uestion of the etent of #merican involvement) the
Government was more fleible3 !t would not eclude antiaircraft "and limited U.S.
ground forces for protection of bases which might be used by U.S. naval and air forces."
#s to /aniel=s ?uestions) "ashington answered that it saw no way) in view of the military
and legal impracticalities) to guarantee the security of /aos and <ambodia6 the alternative
was that /aos and <ambodia Doin with Thailand in re?uesting the stationing of a UN
Peace Bbservation <ommission +PB<1 on their territories. The possibility of <hinese
8!G intervention) considered etremely remote by the ;efense ;epartment) ruled out the
need for a written commitment. The *rench were to be assured) however) that a collective
defense arrangement would include protection against that contingency) and that prior to
the formation of the organi2ation) <hinese air involvement would prompt a Presidential
re?uest for <ongressional authori2ation to respond with U.S. aircraft.
#lthough the setting up of several preconditions to involvement and the ?ualifications of
the *rench reply by no means made intervention an immediate possibility) the
#dministration moved ahead on contingency planning. The State ;epartment=s Bureau of
*ar @astern #ffairs too. the lead by producing a hypothetical timetable based on the
assumption of U.S.$*rench agreement in principle to the proposed conditions by 8ay 7%.
*@# also outlined a full slate of urgent priority studies) including U.S. strategy under
differing circumstances of <hinese involvement in the war. By 8ay 75) *@# had
forwarded a contingency study from the Bperations Planning Board that proposed)
among other things) public and private communications to Pe.ing to prevent) or at least
reduce the effectiveness of) direct <hinese intervention.
The initiation of planning for intervention etended to more far$ranging discussions of
the purposes) re?uirements) and ma.e$up of a Southeast #sia collective defense
organi2ation. The framewor. of the discussions evidenced the Government=s intention
that united action be underta.en only after the Geneva <onference had reached a
stalemate or) far less li.ely) a settlement. Three regional formulations were envisaged3 the
first would be designed for direct action) probably +it was felt1 without British
participation) either to defeat the 4iet 8inh or to prevent them from gaining control of
!ndochina6 the second) formed after a settlement) would comprise the present S@#TB
members and functions) in particular active assistance to the participating #sian states
resisting eternal attac. or "<ommunist insurrection"6 the third would have have a broad
#sian membership) but would be functionally limited to social and economic
cooperation.
#n important input to contingency planning on intervention came from the :oint <hiefs
of Staff. Bn 8ay 7() the :<S sent a memorandum to the Secretary of ;efense entitled
"U.S. 8ilitary Participation in !ndochina." !n the paper) the <hiefs re?uested formulation
of a ;efense ;epartment position on the si2e of any #merican contributions and the
nature of the command structure once united action began. They noted the "limited
availability of U.S. forces for military action in !ndochina" and the "current numerical
advantage of the *rench Union forces over the enemy) i.e.) approimately ' to 9."
Pointing out the disadvantages of either stationing large numbers of U.S. troops in
!ndochina or of basing U.S. aircraft on !ndochina=s limited facilities) the <hiefs
considered "the current greatest need" to be an epanded) intensified training program for
indigenous troops. They observed) moreover) that they were guided in their comments by
the li.ely reaction of the <P0 to U.S. involvement) as well as by the prescription3
"#tomic weapons will be used whenever it is to our military advantage."
!n view of these problems and prospects) the :<S urged the limitation of United States
involvement to strategic planning and the training of indigenous forces through an
increase in 8##G from less than %'( to 77'( men. !ts force commitment should be
restricted) they advised) primarily to air$naval support directed from outside !ndochina6
even here) the <hiefs cautioned against ma.ing a "substantial" air force commitment. The
<hiefs were also mindful of the <hinese. Since 4iet 8inh supplies came mainly from
<hina) "the destruction or neutrali2ation of those outside sources supporting the 4iet
8inh would materially reduce the *rench military problems in !ndochina."
The <hiefs were simply ta.ing their traditional position that any maDor U.S. force
commitment in the *ar @ast should be reserved for a war against <hina in the event the
President decided that such a conflict was necessary for the preservation of vital
#merican interests. 0ecogni2ing the limitations of the "New /oo." defense establishment
for large$scale involvement in "brushfire" wars) the <hiefs were etremely hesitant) as
had consistently been the case during the !ndochina crisis) to favor action along the
periphery of <hina when the strategic advantages of #merican power lay in decisive
direct blows against the maDor enemy. Thus) the :<S closed their memorandum with the
admonition that air$naval commitments beyond those specified3
will involve maldeployment of forces and reduce readiness to meet probable <hinese
<ommunist reaction elsewhere in the *ar @ast. *rom the point of view of the United
States) with reference to the *ar @ast as a whole) !ndochina is devoid of decisive military
obDectives and the allocation of more than to.en U.S. armed forces to that area would be
a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities.Y
Y These conclusions were su@se+uently confirmed when) at the direction of General
8atthew B. 0idgway) #rmy <hief of Staff) a technical team of seven officers
representing the @ngineer) Transportation) and Signal <orps went to !ndochina on a
covert mission to determine military and military$related resources available there in the
event U.S. intervention were implemented. The team spent the period 8ay 9%$:une 77 in
the field. Their conclusions were) in brief) that !ndochina was devoid of the logistical)
geographic) and related resources necessary to a substantial #merican ground effort. The
group=s findings are in a report from <ol. ;avid ". >eiman) its leader) to 0idgway) :uly
%7) %&'5.
The <hiefs= conclusions were disputed) however) by @verett ;rumright of State +*@#1 +in
a memorandum to 8ac#rthur) 8ay 75) %&'51. >e argued that if) as everyone agreed)
!ndochina was vital to #merican security) the United States should not consider more
than a to.en group troop commitment to be a serious diversion of our capabilities. "hile
not arguing for a substantial troop commitment) ;rumright suggested that the United
States plan for that eventuality rather than count on defense with atomic weapons or non$
nuclear stri.es on <hinese territory. Somehow) however) ;rumright=s concern about the
<hinese did not etend to the consideration that a massive troop commitment) which he
stated elsewhere in the memorandum might prove necessary should to.en forces fail to
do the Dob) also ris.ed bringing in the <hinese.
The :<S evidently also decided to call a meeting of military representatives from the
United States) *rance) the UA) #ustralia) and New Lealand. #t first) the <hiefs suggested
the downgrading of the representatives to below chief$of$staff level6 but apparently on the
strong protest of Under Secretary Smith at Geneva) and of the British too) the <hiefs
ac?uiesced in a meeting at chief$of$staff level. But prior to the meeting) which began the
first wee. of :une) important developments occurred in the U.S.$*rance discussions of
intervention.
The tic.lish problem of bringing *rance to concede the critical importance of granting
full independence to the #ssociated States occupied center stage once more. Bn 8ay 7-)
the State ;epartment) ac.nowledging *rance=s hesitancy to go too far on this score) still
insisted on certain "minimum measures)" the most important of which was that *rance)
during or immediately after formal approval of the #pril 7J draft treaties) announce its
willingness to withdraw all its forces from !ndochina unless invited by the governments
of the #ssociated States to maintain them or to establish bases. +The United States) the
;epartment added) would be prepared to ma.e a similar declaration if it committed
forces.1 Beyond that step) the *rench were also as.ed to permit !ndochinese participation
in the programming of economic aid and their direct receipt of all military aid) to find
ways to broaden participation of the 4ietnamese defense ministry and armed forces in
national defense) and to push for the establishment of "representative and authentic
nationalist governments" at the earliest possible date.
Transmitting these new proposals to the *rench) ;illon +incorrectly as it turned out1
found them so well received that he reported on 8ay 7&) following a conversation with
/aniel) that the two partners "had now reached accord in principle on political side."
/aniel) he cabled ;ulles) urged immediate military tal.s to complete arrangements on
training of the 4ietnamese) a new command structure) and war plans. !nasmuch as @ly
and General :ohn ". B=;aniel in !ndochina had reached general agreement on #merican
assumption of responsibility for training the 4N#) F;oc. '7G the way was apparently
cleared for bilateral military tal.s in "ashington to ta.e place simultaneously with) and
therefore disguised by) the five$power staff negotiations.
;illon=s optimistic assessment proved premature) however) on several grounds. "hen he
reported 8ay 7J on tal.s with Schumann) he had added Schumann=s and ;efense
8inister 0enV Pleven=s concern about <hinese air intervention) which they felt would be
so damaging as to warrant a deterrent action in the form of a Presidential re?uest to the
<ongress for discretionary authority to defend the ;elta in case of <<#* attac.. The
*rench wanted a virtually instantaneous U.S. response) one that would be assured by a
Presidential re?uest before rather than after overt <hinese aerial intervention. The State
;epartment=s retort was that the *rench first had to satisfy the previously reported
conditions before any such move by the President could be considered.
;illon was no less disappointed by "ashington=s reply than the *rench. >e cabled bac.
that there apparantly was an "etremely serious misunderstanding between U.S. and
*rench"3
*rench draw sharp distinction between +%1 U.S. intervention in present circumstances
with 4iet 8inh bolstered by <hinese <ommunist materiel) technicians and possibly
scattered troops and +71 U.S. reaction against full$scale air attac. mounted from
<ommunist <hinese bases.
;illon said that) for the *rench) "ashington=s preconditions applied in the first ase @ut
not the seond) wherein only <ongressional authori2ation was understood to stand in the
way of direct #merican action. @ly) the #mbassador reported) had all along believed he
had 0adford=s personal assurance of an #merican countermove against <hinese air attac.
in the ;elta. Now) the *rench wanted to .now if they could count on instant U.S.
interdiction of a <<#* stri.e. The #mbassador closed by reminding the ;epartment of
the incalculable harm to N#TB) to the whole U.S. role in "estern @urope) and to the
U.S. position against the <ommunists= world strategy if a <hinese attac. was not met.
;espite ;illon=s protestations the ;epartment stuc. by its initial position of 8ay %')
namely) that <hinese air attac. was unli.ely and that the United States would meet that
problem when it arose. <learly) the #dministration was unwilling to ma.e any advance
commitments which the *rench could sei2e upon for political advantage at Geneva
without having to give a +uid pro +uo in their !ndochina policy. @isenhower affirmed this
view and went beyond it3 The onditions for united ation& he said& applied e+ually to
;hinese diret and indiret in'ol'ement in !ndohina. The 7nited States 4ould ma0e no
unilateral ommitment against any ontingeny& inluding o'ert& unpro'o0ed ;hinese
aggression& 4ithout firm& @road allied support. Y
Y @isenhower=s unwavering attitude toward action in #sia only in concert with allies put
him at odds with ;ulles) who was prepared to act unilaterally in cases of overt
aggression. "hen the issue of possible <P0 air intervention came before the President)
he is reported to have reacted sharply. @vidently supposing that conflict in the air would
mean a Sino$#merican war) the President
said the United States would not intervene in <hina on any basis ecept united action. >e
would not be responsible for going into <hina alone unless a Doint <ongressional
resolution ordered him to do so. The United States should in no event underta.e alone to
support *rench colonialism. Unilateral action by the United States in cases of this .ind
would destroy us. !f we intervened alone in this case we would be epected to intervene
alone in other parts of the world. >e made very plain that the need for united action as a
condition of U.S. intervention was not related merely to the regional grouping for the
defense of Southeast #sia but was also a necessity for U.S. intervention in response to
<hinese communist overt aggression.
See memorandum of conversation between @isenhower and 0obert <utler) the President=s
special assistant) :une %) %&'5.
The rationale for the President=s difference of view with his Secretary was laid out more
fully the net day. @isenhower said that since direct <hinese aggression would force him
to go all the way with naval and air power +including "new weapons"1 in reply. he would
need to have much more than <ongressional authori2ation. Thai) *ilipino) *rench) and
!ndochinese support would be important but not sufficient6 other nations) such as
#ustralia) would have to give their approval) for otherwise he could not be certain the
public would bac. a war against <hina. +8emorandum of conversation in the President=s
office) :une 7) %&'5) involving also ;ulles) #nderson) 0adford) 8ac#rthur) and <utler.1
#t its 7((th meeting on :une 9) the NS< received) considered) and agreed upon the
President=s views.
There were other obstacles to U.S$*rench agreement) as brought into the open with a
memorandum to the President from *oreign 8inister Georges Bidault on :une %. Bne
was the ?uestion of timing involved in #merican insistence on *rench #ssembly
approval of a government re?uest for U.S. intervention. The *rench cabinet considered
that to present a program of allied involvement to the #ssembly ecept under the
circumstance of "a complete failure of the Geneva <onference" attributable to the
<ommunists "would be literally to wish to overthrow the t*renchG Government." #
second area of continuing disagreement concerned the maintenance of *rench forces in
the field and the nature of a U.S. commitment. The *rench held that the United States
could bypass <ongress by committing perhaps one division of 8arines without a
declaration of war. #lthough assured by "ashington that the 8arines would not be
ecluded from a U.S. air$naval commitment) the *rench were not satisfied. !n his
memorandum) Bidault as.ed that the United States ta.e account of *rance=s defense
obligations elsewhere) an indirect way of as.ing that "ashington go beyond a to.en
ground$troop commitment. <onfronted by a war$weary Parliament on one side and
opponents of @;< on the other) Bidault doubtless believed that the retention of *rench
soldiers in !ndochina without relief from #merican G!s was neither militarily nor
politically acceptable.
# final but by no means negligible *rench obDection to the #merican proposals
concerned the independence issue. *ar from having been settled) as ;illon supposed) the
*rench were still unhappy about #merican pressure for concessions even after the State
;epartment=s 8ay 7- revisions. The *rench were particularly disturbed +as Bidault
implied1 at the notion that the #ssociated States could leave the Union at any time) even
while *rench fighting men were in the field on !ndochina=s behalf. "Such a formula)"
Bidault wrote) "is unacceptable to the *rench Government) first because it is
incompatible with the *rench <onstitution) and also because it would be etremely
difficult to eplain to *rench opinion that the forces of the *rench Union were continuing
the war in !ndochina for the benefit of States that might at any moment leave the Union."
*rance was perfectly willing) Bidault remar.ed) to sign new treaties of association with
the three !ndochinese States) to allow them a larger voice in defense matters) and to wor.
with them toward formation of truly national governments6 but) to Dudge from his
commentary) Paris would not go the whole route by committing itself in advance to
!ndochina=s full freedom of action in the *rench Union. #nd while this and other issues
remained unresolved) as ;ulles observed :une 5) /aniel=s reported belief that the United
States and *rance were politically agreed was a "serious overstatement."
By early :une the unsettled issues separating the United States from *rance began to lose
their relevance to the war. @ven if they could be resolved) it was ?uestionable whether
#merican involvement could any longer be useful) much less decisive. Bn the matter of
training the 4N#) for instance) the United States was no longer certain that time would
permit its training methods to ta.e effect even if the *rench promptly removed
themselves from responsibility in that area. The State ;epartment now held that the
4ietnam situation had deteriorated "to point where any commitment at this time to send
over U.S. instructors in near future might epose us to being faced with situation in
which it would be contrary to our interests to have to fulfill such commitment. Bur
position accordingly is that we do not wish to consider U.S. training mission or program
separately from over$all operational plan on assumption conditions fulfilled for U.S.
participation war !ndochina." 8orale of the *ranco$4ietnamese forces) moreover) had
dropped sharply) the whole Ton.in ;elta was endangered) and the political situation in
Saigon was reported to be dangerously unstable. *aced with this uniformly blac. picture)
the #dministration determined that the grave but still retrievable military situation
prevailing at the time united action was proposed and pursued had) in :une) altered
radically) to the point where united action might have to be withdrawn from consideration
by the *rench.
By mid$:une #merican diplomacy was therefore in an unenviable position. #t Geneva)
very little progress had been made of a .ind that could lead any of the #llies to epect a
satisfactory outcome. Cet the alternative which the United States had reopened no longer
seemed viable either. #s ;ulles told Smith) any "final agreement" with the *rench would
be "?uite impossible)" for Paris was moving farther than ever from a determination that
united action was necessary. "They want) and in effect have) an option on our
intervention)" ;ulles wrote) "but they do not want to eercise it and the date of epiry of
our option is fast running out." F;oc. '-G *rom Paris) in fact) #mbassador ;illon urged
the Secretary that "the time limit be now" on U.S. intervention. F;oc. ',G #nd ;ulles was
fast concluding that ;illon was correct.
!n view of *rance=s feeling that) because of strong #ssembly pressure for a settlement) no
re?uest could be made of the United States until every effort to reach agreement at
Geneva had been ehausted) ;ulles in effect decided) on :une %') that united action was
no longer tenable. !n a conversation with Bonnet) in which the *rench #mbassador read a
message from Bidault which indicated that the *rench no longer considered the United
States bound to intervene on satisfaction of the seven conditions) the Secretary put forth
the difficulty of the #merican position. >e stated that the United States stood willing to
respond to a *rench re?uest under the conditions of 8ay %%) but that time and
circumstance might ma.e future intervention "impracticable or so burdensome as to be
out of proportion to the results obtainable." "hile this offer would be unsatisfactory to
Bidault) especially in his dealings with the <ommunists at Geneva) ;ulles "could not
conceive that it would be epected that the United States would give a third power the
option to put it into war at times and under conditions wholly of the other=s choosing."
"ith this) united action was shelved) and it never appeared again in the form and with the
purpose originally proposed.
#s a brea. with *rance on united action became li.ely) #merican interest focused on a
collective defense arrangement after a Geneva settlement with British participation. The
*rench and British roles in U.S. planning were in effect reversed6 Paris) it was felt) could
no longer be counted on as an active participant in regional security. #s their delegate to
Geneva) :ean <hauvel) told Smith) Bidault was still hopeful of getting "something" from
the conference. F;oc. '5G Bn the other hand) @den told Smith on :une & of his etreme
pessimism over the course of the negotiations. @den believed a recess in the tal.s was
li.ely within a few days +it came) in fact) ten days later1) and proposed that the
<ambodian and /aotian cases be brought before the United Nations immediately after the
end of the conference) even if *rance opposed the move. Smith drew from the
conversation the strong impression that @den believed negotiations to have failed and
would now follow the #merican lead on a coalition to guarantee <ambodia and /aos
"under umbrella of some UN action" +Smith=s words1. F;oc. '5G ;ays later) ;ulles
li.ewise anticipated a British shift when he observed sardonically that events at Geneva
had probably "been such as to satisfy the British insistence that they did riot want to
discuss collective action until either Geneva was over or at least the results of Geneva
were .nown. ! would assume)" ;ulles went on) "that the departure of @den Ffrom
GenevaG would be evidence that there was no ade?uate reason for further delaying
collective tal.s on Southeast #sia defense." But whether the United States and Great
Britain would see eye$to$eye on their post$settlement security obligations in the region)
and whether Doint diplomatic initiatives to influence the nature of the settlement could be
decided upon) remained outstanding ?uestions.
The rebirth and demise of united action was a rare case of history repeated almost
immediately after it had been made. The United States) having failed to interest Britain
and *rance in united action prior to the start of the Geneva <onference) refused to be
relegated to an uninfluential role and determined instead to plunge ahead without British
participation. But the conditions for intervention which had been given the *rench before
the fall of ;ienbienphu were now stiffened) most importantly by a greater detailing of the
process the *rench government would have to go through before the United States would
consider direct involvement.
@ven while the *rench pondered the conditions) urged their refinement and redefinition to
suit *rench policies) and insisted in the end that they saw no political obstacles separating
the United States and *rance) "ashington anticipated that the *rench were very unli.ely
to forward a re?uest for U.S. involvement. >aving learned something of *rench
government priorities from the futile diplomatic bargaining in #pril) ;epartment of State
representatives in Paris and "ashington saw that what the *rench wanted above all was
not the military advantages of active U.S. intervention but the political benefits that might
be derived from bringing into the open the fact that the two allies were negotiating
#merican participation in the fighting. Thus) ;illon correctly assessed in mid$8ay that
*rench in?uiries about #merican conditions for intervention represented a "wish to use
possibility of our intervention primarily to strengthen their hand at Geneva." The *rench
hoped they would not have to call on the United States for direct support6 they did hope
the <ommunists would sense the dangers of proposing unacceptable terms for a
settlement. ;illon=s sensitivity to the *rench position was proven accurate by Bidault=s
memorandum to the President3 *rance would) in reality) only call on the United States if
an "honorable" settlement could clearly not be obtained at Geneva) for only under that
circumstance could the National #ssembly be persuaded that the /aniel government had
done everything possible to achieve peace.
0ecognition of the game the *rench were playing did not .eep the United States from
posing intervention as an alternative for them6 but by adhering tenaciously to the seven
conditions) it ruled out either precipitous #merican action or an open$ended commitment
to be accepted or reDected by Paris. The State ;epartment) guided on the military side by
strong :<S obDections to promising the *rench #merican combat troops in advance of a
new and satisfactory command structure and strategic plan) became increasingly
distraught with and suspicious of *rench motivations. ""e cannot grant *rench an
indefinite option on us without regard to intervening deterioration" of the military
situation) ;ulles wrote on :une J. #s much as the #dministration wanted to avoid a sell$
out at Geneva) it was aware that events in !ndochina might preclude effective U.S. action
even if the *rench suddenly decided they wanted #merican support. Put another way) one
of the primary differences between #merican diplomacy before and after the fall of
;ienbienphu was its ability to proDect ahead$to weigh the factors of time and
circumstance against the distasteful possibility that 4ietnam) by *rench default at the
negotiating table or defeat on the battlefield) might be lost. #s the scales tipped against
united action) #merican security planning began to focus on the future possibilities of
collective defense in Southeast #sia) while the pattern of diplomacy shifted from
disenchantment with the Geneva <onference to attempts to bring about the best possible
settlement terms.
4. T>@ 8#:B0 !SSU@S #T T>@ <BN*@0@N<@) 8#C$:UN@
"ashington=s sense that the conference had essentially gotten nowhere$a view which
Smith and ;ulles believed was shared by @den) as already noted$was not entirely
accurate6 nor was it precisely the thin.ing of other delegations. *ollowing the initial
*rench and 4iet 8inh proposals of 8ay J and %() respectively) some progress had in fact
been made) although certainly not of an order that could have led any of the chief
negotiators to epect a ?uic. settlement. #s the conference moved ahead) three maDor
areas of contention emerged3 the separation of belligerent forces) the establishment of a
framewor. for political settlements in the three !ndochinese states) and provision for
effective control and supervision of the cease$fire.
#. S@P#0#T!BN B* T>@ B@//!G@0@NTS
The ?uestion how best to disentangle the opposing armies was most acute in 4ietnam)
but was also hotly debated as it applied to <ambodia and /aos. !n 4ietnam) 4iet 8inh
forces were concentrated in the Ton.in ;elta) though large numbers had long been active
in #nnam +central 4ietnam1 and <ochinchina +the south1. The original *rench and 4iet
8inh proposals sought to ta.e account of this situation by dismissing +although for
separate reasons1 the concept of single regroupment areas and forwarding instead the idea
of perhaps several concentration points to facilitate a cease$fire. To this point) the
4ietnamese delegation was in agreement3 regroupment of the belligerents should in no
way have the effect of dividing the country into ma.eshift military 2ones that could have
lasting political implications.
!t was an entirely different matter where the regroupment areas should be located6
whether "foreign" +i.e.) *rench1 troops should be withdrawn) and if so) from what areas
and during what period6 whether irregular troops +i.e.) 4iet 8inh guerrillas1 should be
disarmed and disbanded) and if so) whether they and their comrades in the regular forces
should be integrated +as the Bao ;ai delegation proposed1 into the 4N#6 and) of crucial
importance) whether a cease$fire should be dependent upon success in the regroupment
process or) as Pham 4an ;ong proposed) upon an overall political settlement.
This last ?uestion was tac.led first by the negotiators. Bn @den=s initiative) the
conference had moved in mid$8ay from plenary to restricted sessions) where fewer
delegates were present) no verbatim record was systematically .ept) and the press was
barred. @den=s epectation that the opportunities for greater intimacy among the delegates
would enhance the possibility of ma.ing some headway was partially fulfilled. #t the
first restricted session on 8ay %-) 8olotov responded to Bidault=s implication that one
cause of continuing irresolution in the negotiations was the 4iet 8inh=s insistence on
coupling a military with a political settlement) whereas the *rench proposal had been
geared to dealing only with the military portion before going on to discuss the political
side. The Soviet delegate argued that while military and political matters were obviously
closely lin.ed) the conference might do best to address the military settlement first) since
it was a point common to the *rench and 4iet 8inh proposals. ;ong obDected that
military and political matters were so closely .nit that they could not be separated6
however) he agreed +although) we may surmise) with some reluctance1 that the two
problems could be dealt with in that order.
"ith a basic procedural obstacle removed) it was finally agreed that a cease$fire should
have priority in the conference=s order of business.Y Toward that goal) the
Y Bn 8ay 7() <hou @n$lai told @den that military and political matters should indeed be
dealt with separately) and that priority should be given to the attainment of a cease$fire.
+Smith tel. S@<TB 7,- from Geneva) 8ay 7() %&'5.1 The <ommunists were ?uic. to
point out thereafter) though) that a political settlement should not be dropped from
consideration. !n fact) at the fifth restricted session) 8olotov returned to the issue of
military versus political settlements by proposing that they be considered at alternate
meetings. The "estern side held fast to concentrating on the cease$fire and turning to
political matters only when agreement had been reached on the military side6 this position
was tacitly adopted.
problem of regroupment and disarmament of certain forces was ta.en up. #t the fifth
restricted session on 8ay 75) *oreign 8inister Bidault proposed) among other things)
that a distinction be admitted between "regular" and "irregular" forces. 0egular troops) he
said) included all permanently organi2ed forces) which for the 4iet 8inh meant regional
as well as regular units. These) he suggested) should be regrouped into demilitari2ed
2ones) whereas loosely organi2ed irregulars should be disarmed under some form of
control. Pham 4an ;ong) in his reply) agreed on the urgency of a cease$fire and on the
importance of disarming irregulars6 but) in contrast to Bidault=s proposal) ;ong asserted
that inasmuch as each side would have responsibility for all forces in areas under its
control after the cease$fire) disarmament would ta.e place naturally. ;ong implicitly
reDected the idea of controlled disarmament) therefore) by placing the problem in the post$
rather than pre$cease$fire period.
The issues of regroupment and disarmament might have brought the conference to a
standstill had not Pham 4an ;ong) at the sith restricted session +8ay 7'1) suddenly
reversed his position on regroupment and proposed what amounted to the partitioning of
!ndochina. *ollowing only moments after the 4ietnamese delegate) Nguyen Kuoc ;inh)
had offered a plan based on the maintenance of his country=s territorial integrity)Y ;ong
suggested that in the course of the regroupment) specific
Y The G4N=s position called for the disbandment and disarming of 4iet 8inh forces and
their later integration into a national army under international control6 international
supervision of elections to be conducted by the Bao ;ai government at an unspecified
future date6 and recognition of the integrity of the 4ietnamese state. The G4N also
insisted that the withdrawal of foreign forces come after all other issues had been
resolved.
territorial Durisdictions be established such that each side would have complete economic
and administrative) no less than military) control. So as not to be misunderstood) ;ong
further urged that a temporary line of demarcation be drawn that would be
topographically suitable and appropriate for transportation and communication within
each 2one thus created. The #merican delegate) General Smith) immediately dismissed
;ong=s proposal and advised that the conferees return to discussion of the original cease$
fire issues. But) as was to become clear very soon) ;ong=s new move struc. a responsive
chord among the *rench even as it confirmed to the Bao ;ai delegation its worst fears.
"hat had prompted ;ong to introduce a partition arrangement when) at previous
sessions) the 4iet 8inh had pushed repeatedly for a settlement procedure that would
facilitate their consolidation of control over the entire countryN "hat evidence we have is
circumstantial) but it suggests that the 4iet 8inh delegation may have come under Sino$
Soviet pressure to produce an alternative to cease$fire proposals that were consistently
being reDected by the "est. The partition alternative) specifically at the %,th parallel) had
been intimated to #merican officials as early as 8arch 5 by a member of the Soviet
@mbassy in /ondon) apparently out of awareness of *ranco$#merican obDections to a
coalition arrangement for 4ietnam. Bn the opening day of the conference) moreover)
Soviet officials had again approached #merican officials on the subDect) this time at
Geneva) averring that the establishment of a buffer state to <hina=s south would be
sufficient satisfaction of <hina=s security needs. "hile these events do not demonstrate
that ;ong=s partition proposal Y was the direct outgrowth of Sino$Soviet disposition
toward a territorial division) they do reveal that
Y The ;04) it should be added) refused to call its proposal one for partition. #s the
official newspaper) Nhan ;an +The People1 put it) the proposal amounted merely to
"2onal readDustment" necessary to achieving a cease$fire. The readDustment "is only a
stage in preparation for free general elections with a view toward the reali2ation of
national unity." 4ietnam News #gency +4N#1 broadcast in @nglish to Southeast #sia)
:une -) %&'5.
partition was a solution) albeit temporary) which 8oscow) at least) early found agreeable.
"hatever lay behind ;ong=s gambit) the *rench were put in the position of being
challenged on their prior commitments to the 4ietnamese. #t the time the conference
began) Bao ;ai=s government) perhaps mindful of past instances of partition$type
solutions in Aorea and Germany) and almost certainly suspicious of ultimate *rench
intentions in the face of 4iet 8inh territorial demands) urged Paris to provide written
assurance it would neither see. nor accept a division of 4ietnam at Geneva. To ma.e his
own position perfectly clear) Bao ;ai) through his representatives in the *rench capital)
issued a communi?ue +in the name of the G4N cabinet1 which too. note of various plans
in the air for partition. The communi?ue stated that partition "would be in defiance of
4ietnamese national sentiment which has asserted itself with so much strength for the
unity as well as for the independence of the country. Neither the <hief of State nor the
national government of 4ietnam admits that the unity of the country can be severed
legally...." The cabinet warned that an agreement compromising that unity would never
receive 4ietnam=s approval3
...neither the <hief of State) nor the 4ietnamese Government will consider themselves
FsicG as bound by decisions running counter to the interests) i.e.) independence and unity)
of their country that would) at the same time) violate the rights of the peoples and offer a
reward to aggression in opposition to the principles of the <harter of the United Nations
and democratic ideals.
!n response to this clear$cut statement) the *rench came forward with both oral and
written promises. Bn 8ay 9) 8aurice ;eDean) the <ommissioner General for !ndochina)
said in Saigon3
The *rench Government does not intend to see. a settlement of the !ndochina problem on
the basis of a partition of 4ietnamese territory. .
*ormal assurances were given on this subDect last #pril 7' by the *rench minister for
foreign affairs to the minister for foreign affairs of 4ietnam) and they were confirmed to
him on 8ay %.
"ritten assurance came from Bidault on 8ay , when he wrote Bao ;ai that the tas. of
the *rench government was to establish peace in !ndochina) not "to see. here Fat GenevaG
a definitive political solution." Therefore) the *rench goal would be) said Bidault) to
obtain a cease$fire with guarantees for the #ssociated States) hopefully with general
elections in the future. Bidault continued3
#s of now) ! am however in a position to confirm to Cour 8aDesty that nothing would be
more contrary to the intentions of the *rench government than to prepare for the
establishment) at the epense of the unity of 4ietnam) two States having each an
international calling +vocation1.
Bidault=s support of 4ietnam=s opposition to partition) which he repeated privately before
@den and Smith at Geneva) collapsed once the new government of Pierre 8endZs$*rance
too. over in mid$:une. 8endZs$*rance) .eenly aware of the tenor of *rench public
opinion) was far more disposed than the /aniel$Bidault administration to ma.ing every
effort toward achieving a reasonable settlement. "hile by no means prepared for a sell$
out) 8endZs$*rance ?uic.ly foresaw that agreement with the 4iet 8inh was unli.ely
unless he accepted the concept of partition. >is delegate at Geneva) who remained
<hauvel) and the new <ommissioner General for !ndochina) General @ly) reached the
same conclusion. #t a high$level meeting in Paris on :une 75) the new government
thoroughly revised the *rench negotiating position. The obDectives for subse?uent tal.s) it
was decided) would be3 +%1 the regroupment of forces of both sides) and their separation
by a line about at the %Jth parallel6Y +71 the establishment of enclaves under neutral
control in the two 2ones) one for the *rench in the area of the <atholic bishoprics at Phat
;iem and
Y *rench insistence on the %Jth parallel originated in the recommendation of General
Navarre) who was as.ed several ?uestions by the *rench delegation at Geneva regarding
the li.ely impact of the then$eisting military situation on the *rench negotiatory
position. Navarre=s responses were sent #pril 7%. Bn the demarcation line) Navarre said
that the %Jth parallel would leave "us" the ancient political capital of >ue as well as
Tourane +;a Nang1) and permit the retention of militarily valuable terrain. +See General
@ly=s 8Vmoires3 l(!ndohine dans la Tourmente FParis3 Plon) %&,5%) p. %%7) and
/acouture and ;evillers) "a fin d(une guerre& p. %7,.1 Thus) the choice of the %Jth
parallel was based on military considerations) and apparently assumed a continuing
*rench role in southern 4ietnam after partition.
Bui <hu) one for the 4iet 8inh at an area to be determined6 +91 the maintenance of
>aiphong in *rench hands in order to assist in the regroupment. The meeting also
decided that) for the purpose of psychological pressure on the 4iet 8inh if not military
preparedness for future contingencies) *rance should brea. with past practice and
announce plans to send a contingent of conscripts +later determined as two divisions1 to
!ndochina. Thus) by late :une) the *rench had come around to acceptance of the need to
eplore a territorial settlement without) as we have already observed) informing the
4ietnamese that Bidault=s and ;eDean=s assurances had been superseded. Bn :une 7,)
Paris formally notified "ashington and /ondon that <hauvel would soon begin direct
tal.s with Pham 4an ;ong on a partition arrangement that would provide the G4N with
the firmest possible territorial base. F;oc. ,,G
"hile ground had been bro.en on the cease$fire for 4ietnam) debate continued on /aos
and <ambodia. Prior to and after ;ong=s proposal of 8ay 7') the delegates argued bac.
and forth without progress over the relationship between the conflict in 4ietnam and that
in <ambodia and /aos. The Ahmer and /aotian delegates insisted they represented free
and independent governments which were being challenged by a handful of indigenous
renegades assisted by the invading 4iet 8inh. Thus) the delegates reasoned) their
situations were ?uite different from the "civil war" in 4ietnam) and therefore cease$fires
could readily be established in /aos and <ambodia by the simple epedient of removing
the aggressors. These delegates saw no reason$$and they received solid support from the
#merican) *rench and British representatives$$for acceding to the 4iet 8inh demand that
cease$fires in their two countries be contingent upon) and hence forced to occur
simultaneously with) one in 4ietnam.
The <ommunists= retorts left little room for compromise. Pham 4an ;ong held) as
before) that he spo.e for "governments" which were being refused admission to the
conference. The Pathet /ao and the *ree Ahmer were separate) genuine "national
liberation movements" whose sta.e in their respective countries) ;ong implied) would
have to be ac.nowledged before a cease$fire could be arranged anywhere in !ndochina.
8olotov buttressed this argument with the claim that /aos and <ambodia were no more
"independent" than 4ietnam. Using a common negotiating tactic) he ecerpted from a
public statement by ;ulles to point out how *rance was still being urged by the United
States in 8ay to grant real independence to all three !ndochinese states) not Dust 4ietnam.
8olotov=s only retreat was on the etent of Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer terntonal control.
>e admitted that while the 4iet 8inh were dominant in 4ietnam) the Ahmer$/aotian
resistance movements controlled some lesser amount of territory.
*or a while it seemed that the conference would become inetricably bogged down on the
?uestion whether the Pathet /ao and *ree Ahmer were creatures of the 4iet 8inh or
genuine nationalist forces. <ertainly the 4iet 8inh delegation remained steadfast. #t the
fourth restricted session +8ay 7%1) Pham 4an ;ong made his implication of the previous
sessions clearer when he said he had always understood the *rench cease$fire proposal to
have applied to all !ndochina +an outright fabrication1 inasmuch as the problems in the
three states were different only in degree) not in nature. !f <ambodia and /aos were
detached from 4ietnam in the discussions) ;ong said) the cease$fire issue would be
attac.ed in the wrong way and a satisfactory solution would not be reached. The warning
of no cease$fire settlement for <ambodia and /aos without one for 4ietnam was clear.
These last remar.s by ;ong) however) were no longer wholly in accord with what the
<hinese were privately indicating. <hou @n$lai) in the same conversation with @den on
8ay 7( in which <hou had agreed to separate military from political matters) also
admitted that political settlements might be different for the three !ndochinese states.
<hou thus moved one step closer to the "estern position) which held that the /aotian and
<ambodian cases were substantially different from that in 4ietnam and hence should be
decided separately. The concession) however small) paved the way for agreement to
@den=s proposal on 8ay 7' that the problem of a cease$fire in 4ietnam be dealt with
separately and directly by having the 4iet 8inh and *rench military commands meet in
Geneva and on the spot in 4ietnam +later determined as Trung Gia1 to discuss technical
aspects of the regroupment. The military staffs would report their findings to the
conferees. Bn :une 7 formal agreement was reached between the commands to begin
wor.6 but it was not until :une %() apparently) that the 4iet 8inh actually consented that
their secret tal.s with the *rench) li.e the discussions of the military commands) should
be concerned only with 4ietnam to the eclusion of /aotian and <ambodian problems.
Thus) it would seem that the 4iet 8inh position on the indivisibility of the three
!ndochinese states for purposes of a settlement was undercut by the <hinese +doubtless
with Soviet support16 yet for about three wee.s following <hou=s tal. with @den) the 4iet
8inh had privately refused to deal with the *rench on 4ietnam alone.
5. P6"!T!;#" SETT"EME3TS
<ommunist agreement to treat /aos and <ambodia separately as well as to consider a
territorial division did not) however) signal imminent progress on the substance of
military or political settlements for those countries any more than for 4ietnam. Several
additional plenary and restricted sessions made no headway at all during late 8ay and the
first wee.s of :une. @den=s disappointment led him to state to his fellow delegates3
!n respect . . . to the arrangements for supervision and to the future of /aos and
<ambodia) the divergencies are at present wide and deep. Unless we can narrow them
now without further delay) we shall have failed in our tas.. "e have ehausted every
epedient procedure which we could devise to assist us in our wor.. "e all .now now
what the differences are. "e have no choice but to resolve them or to admit our failure.
*or our part) the United Aingdom ;elegation is still willing to attempt to resolve them
here or in restricted session or by any other method which our colleagues may prefer.
But) gentlemen) if the positions remain as they are today) ! thin. it is our clear$cut duty to
say so to the world and to admit that we have failed.
;ays later) his pessimism ran even deeper as the conference indeed seemed close to a
brea.down. The #mericans did not help matters) either3 "Bedell Smith)" @den has since
divulged) "showed me a telegram from President @isenhower advising him to do
everything in his power to bring the conference to an end as rapidly as possible) on the
grounds that the <ommunists were only spinning things out to suit their own military
purposes."
*or reasons which will be speculated on subse?uently) the Soviets and <hinese were not
prepared to admit that the conference had failed and were willing to forestall that
prospect by ma.ing concessions sufficient to Dustify its continuation. "hile the
#mericans may have wished to see a brea.down) @den was not yet convinced that was
inevitable. #gain) his patience was rewarded. Bn :une %,) <hou told the foreign secretary
that the <ambodian resistance forces were small) ma.ing a political settlement with the
0oyal Government "easily" obtainable. !n /aos) where those forces were larger)
regroupment areas along the border with 4ietnam +in Sam Neua and Phong Saly
provinces1 would be re?uired) <hou thought. #s.ed by @den whether there might not be
difficulty in gaining 4iet 8inh agreement to the withdrawal of their troops from the two
countries) <hou replied it would "not be difficult" in the contet of a withdrawal of all
foreign forces. The <P0 would even be willing to consider the royal governments as
heading independent states that could maintain their ties to the *rench Union) provided
no #merican bases were established in their territories. <hina=s preeminent concern) @den
deduced) was that the United States might use /aos and <ambodia as Dump$off points for
an attac. on the mainland.
*rom the conversation) @den "received a strong impression that he F<houl wanted a
settlement and ! accordingly urged Georges Bidault to have a tal. with him and to discuss
this new offer." Bn the net day +:une %-1) Bidault met with <hou for the first time) as
well as with 8olotov) and reported the <ommunists= great concern over a brea.$up of the
conference. Two days later a *rench redraft of a <hinese proposal to broaden the military
staff conferences to include separate tal.s on /aos and <ambodia was accepted.
This first maDor brea.through in the negotiations) with the <hinese ma.ing an overture
that evidently had full Soviet bac.ing)Y seems not to have had 4iet 8inh
Y "hen 8olotov met with Smith on :une %&) the Soviet representative said he saw the
possibility of agreement on /aos and <ambodia so long as neither side +i.e.) the *rench
and 4iet 8inh1 "adopted one$sided views or put forward etreme pretensions." 8olotov
said about '( percent of /aotian territory was not controlled by the royal government
+putting the Pathet /ao case in the negative1) with a much smaller movement in
<ambodia. The tone of Smith=s report on this conversation suggests that 8olotov saw no
obstacles to 4iet 8inh withdrawal of its "volunteers." Smith tel. ;U/T@ 7(7 from
Geneva) :une %&) %&'5.
approval. #t the same time as the <hinese were saying) for eample in a New <hina
News #gency +N<N#1 broadcast of :une %-) that all three <ommunist delegations had
"all along maintained that the conditions in each of the three !ndochinese countries are
not eactly ali.e)" and hence that "conditions peculiar to each of these countries should
be ta.en into consideration)" the 4iet 8inh were claiming that "the indivisibility of the
three ?uestions of 4ietnam) Ahmer) and Pathet /ao" was one of several "fundamental
?uestions" which the conference had failed to resolve. !n fact) of course) that ?uestion had
been resolved6 yet the 4iet 8inh continued to proclaim the close unity of the 4iet 8inh)
Pathet /ao) and *ree Ahmer under the banner of their tri$national united front alliance
formed in %&'%. No doubt the 4iet 8inh were see.ing to assure their cadres and soldiers
in <ambodia and /aos that Pham 4an ;ong would not bargain away their fate at the
conference table) but it may also be that the broadcasts were meant to imply 4iet 8inh
eceptions to obDectionable Sino$Soviet concessions.
Those concessions) first on the separability of /aos and <ambodia from 4ietnam and
subse?uently on 4iet 8inh involvement there) compelled the ;04 delegation to ta.e a
new tac.. Bn the former ?uestions 4iet 8inh representatives indicated on :une %, during
"underground" discussions with the *rench that insofar as 4ietnam was concerned) their
minimum terms were absolute control of the Ton.in ;elta) including >anoi and
>aiphong. "hile the *rench were reluctant to yield both cities) which they still
controlled) a bargaining point had been established inasmuch as the 4iet 8inh were now
willing to discuss specific geographic obDectives. Bn the second ?uestion) the 4iet 8inh)
apparently responding to <hou @n$lai=s "offer" of their withdrawal from <ambodia and
/aos) indicated fleibility at least toward the latter country. # /aotian delegate reported
:une 79) following a meeting with Pham 4an ;ong in the garden of the <hinese
delegation=s villa) that the 4iet 8inh were in apparent accord on the withdrawal of their
"volunteers" and even on /aos= retention of *rench treaty bases. The 4iet 8inh=s
principal demand was that *rench military personel in /aos be reduced to a minimum.
/ess clearly) ;ong alluded to the creation in /aos of a government of "national union)"
Pathet /ao participation in %&'' elections for the national assembly) and a "temporary
arrangement" governing areas dominated by Pathet /ao military forces. But these latter
points were interpreted as being suggestive6 ;ong had come around to the "estern view
shared +now by the Soviets and <hinese1 that the Pathet /ao not be accorded either
military or political weight e?ual to that of the royal government. /ater in the conference)
;ong would ma.e a similar retreat on <ambodia.
<. <BNT0B/ #N; SUP@04!S!BN
Painsta.ingly slow progress toward cease$fires and political settlements for the
!ndochinese states also characteri2ed the wor. of devising supervisory organs to oversee
the implementation and preservation of the cease$fire. Cet here again) the <ommunist
side was not so intransigent as to ma.e agreement impossible.
Three separate but interrelated issues dominated the discussions of control and
supervision at this stage of the conference and afterward. *irst) there was sharp
disagreement over the structure of the supervisory organ3 Should it consist solely of Doint
commissions composed of the belligerents) or should it have superimposed above an
international authority possessing decisionma.ing powerN Second) the composition of
any supervisory organ other than the Doint commissions was also hotly disputed3 Given
agreement to have "neutral" nations observe the truce) which nations might be considered
"neutral"N *inally) if it were agreed that there should be a neutral control body) how
would it discharge its dutiesN
!n the original 4iet 8inh proposals) implementation of the cease$fire was left to Doint
indigenous commissions) with no provision for higher) international supervision.
4ehement *rench obDections led to a second line of defense from the <ommunist side. #t
the fourth plenary session +8ay %51) 8olotov suggested the setting up of a Neutral
Nations Supervisory <ommission +NNS<1 such as eisted in Aorea) and said he did not
foresee any insurmountable problem in reaching agreement on its membership. But
8olotov=s revision left much to be determined and) from the "estern standpoint) much to
be desired too. Serious debate on the control and supervision problem did not get
underway until early :une. #t that time) 8olotov epressly reDected the #merican plan)
supported by the !ndochinese delegations and Great Britain) to have the United Nations
supervise a cease$fire. >e argued that the UN had nothing to do with the Geneva
<onference) especially as most of the conferees were not UN members. 0eturning to his
plan for an NNS<) 8olotov reiterated his view that <ommunist countries could be as
neutral as capitalist countries6 hence) he said) the problem was simply one of choosing
which countries should comprise the supervisory organ) and suggested that the yardstic.
be those having diplomatic and political relations with both *rance and the 4iet 8inh. #s
to that body=s relationship to the Doint commissions) 8olotov shied away from the
"estern proposal to ma.e them subordinate to the neutral commission. "!t would be in
the interest of our wor. to recogni2e)" 8olotov said) "that these commissions should act
in coordination and in agreement between each other) but should not be subordinate to
each other." No such hierarchical relationship had eisted in Aorea) so why one in
!ndochinaN *inally) the foreign minister saw no reason why an NNS< could not reach
decisions by unanimous vote on "important" ?uestions. ;isputes among or within the
commissions) 8olotov concluded) would be referred to the states guaranteeing the
settlement) which would) if necessary) ta.e "collective measures" to resolve them.
The "estern position was stated succinctly by Bidault. #gain insisting on having "an
authority remote from the heat of the fighting and which would have a final word to say
in disputes)" Bidault said the neutral control commission should have absolute
responsibility for the armistice. !t would have such functions as regrouping the regular
forces) supervising any demilitari2ed 2ones) conducting the echange of prisoners) and
implementing measures for the non$introduction of war materiel into !ndochina. "hile
the Doint commission would have an important role to play in these control processes)
such as in wor.ing out agreement for the safe passage of opposing armies from one 2one
to another or for PB" echange) its functions would have to be subordinate to the
undisputed authority of a neutral mechanism. Bidault did not specify which nations fitted
his definition of "neutrality" and whether they would decide by maDority or unanimous
vote. These omissions were corrected by @den a few days later when he suggested the
<olombo Powers +!ndia) Pa.istan) <eylon) Burma) and !ndonesia1) which he argued were
all #sian) had all been actively discussing !ndochina outside the conference) were five in
number and hence impervious to obstruction by a two$to$two vote +as on the NNS<1 or
re?uirement for unanimity) and were truly impartial.
The basis for agreement on the vital ?uestion of supervising a cease$fire seemed at this
stage noneistent. The <ommunists had revised their position by admitting the feasibility
of a neutral nations= control organ in addition to Doint commissions of the belligerents.
But they clearly hoped to duplicate in !ndochina the ineffective machinery they had
foisted on the United Nations command at PanmunDom) one in which effective
peace.eeping action was basically proscribed by the built$in veto of a four$power
authority evenly divided among <ommunist and non$<ommunist representatives. The
"est) on the other hand) absolutely refused to eperiment again with an NNS<6 a neutral
organ was vital) but it could not include <ommunist representatives) who did not .now
the meaning of neutrality. !f the United Nations was not acceptable to the <ommunists)
the <olombo Powers should be.
>owever remote these positions) various .inds of trade$offs must have been apparent to
the negotiators. ;espite differing standards of "neutrality" and "impartiality)" for
instance) compromise on the membership problem seemed possible. The real dilemma
was the authority of a neutral body. Unless superior to the Doint commissions) it would
never be able to resolve disputes) and unless it had the power to enforce its own
decisions) it would never be more than an advisory organ. "hether some new formula
could be found somewhere between the <ommunists= insistence on parallel authority and
the "est=s preference for a hierarchical arrangement remained to be seen.
Bn :une %& the Aorea phase of the conference ended without reaching a political
settlement. The conferees at that point agreed to a prolonged recess by the delegation
leaders on the understanding that the military committees would continue to meet at
Geneva and in the field. @den wrote to the #sian <ornmonwealth prime ministers that "if
the wor. of the committees is sufficiently advanced) the >eads of ;elegations will come
bac.." Until that time) the wor. of the conference would go on in restricted session.
<hauvel and Pham 4an ;ong remained at their posts6 8olotov returned to 8oscow6
<hou @n$lai) en route to Pe.ing) made important stopovers in New ;elhi) 0angoon) and
Nanning that were to have important bearing on the conference. Smith remained in
Geneva) but turned the delegation over to :ohnson. !t was ?uestionable whether the
Under Secretary would ta.e over again6 gloom was so thic. in "ashington over the
perceived lac. of progress in the tal.s and the conviction = that the new 8endZs$*rance
government would reach a settlement as soon as the conference reconvened) that ;ulles
cabled Smith3 "Bur thin.ing at present is that our role at Geneva should soon be restricted
to that of observer. . . ." F;oc. ,'G #s for @den) he prepared to accompany <hurchill on a
trip to "ashington for tal.s relating to the conference and prospects for a Southeast #sia
defense pact.
4!. T>@ #NG/B$#8@0!<#N 0#PP0B<>@8@NT
"ith its preconceptions of <ommunist negotiating strategy confirmed by the harshness of
the first 4iet 8inh proposals) which "ashington did not regard as significantly watered
down by subse?uent Sino$Soviet alterations) and with its military alternatives no longer
considered relevant to the war) the United States began to move in the direction of
becoming an influential actor at the negotiations. This move was not dictated by a sudden
conviction that "estern capacity for inducing concessions from the <ommunist side had
increased6 nor was the shift premised on the hope that we might be able to drive a wedge
between the 4iet 8inh and their Soviet and <hinese friends. 0ather) "ashington
believed that inasmuch as a settlement was certain to come about) and even though there
was near$e?ual certainty it could not support the final terms) basic #merican and "estern
interests in Southeast #sia might still be preserved if *rance could be persuaded to
toughen its stand. "ere concessions still not forthcoming$$were the <ommunists) in other
words) to stiffen in response to *rench firmness$$the #llies would be able to consult on
their net moves with the confidence every reasonable effort to reestablish peace had
been attempted.
#s already observed) the #merican decision to play a more decisive role at the
conference depended on gaining British support. The changing war situation now made
alignment with the British necessary for future regional defense) especially as
"ashington was informed of the probability that a partition settlement +which /ondon
had foreseen months before1 would place all !ndochina in or within reach of <ommunist
hands. The ?uestions remained how much territory the <ommunists could be granted
without compromising non$<ommunist !ndochina=s security) what measures were needed
to guarantee that security) and what other military and political principles were vital to
any settlement which the *rench would also be willing to adopt in the negotiations. "hen
the chief ministers of the United States and Great Britain met in "ashington in late :une)
these were the issues they had to confront.
The British and #merican representatives$@den) <hurchill) ;ulles) and @isenhower$
brought to the tal.s positions on partition and regional security that) for all the
differences) left considerable room for a harmoni2ation of viewpoints. The UA) as the
#mericans well .new) was never convinced either that !ndochina=s security was
inetricably lin.ed to the security of all #sia) or that the *ranco$4iet 8inh war would
ever bring into ?uestion the surrender of all !ndochina to the <ommunists. /ondon
considered partition a feasible solution) but was already loo.ing beyond that to some
more basic @ast$"est understanding that would have the effect of producing a laisse2$
faire coeistence between the <ommunist and "estern powers in the region. #s @den
recalled his thin.ing at the time) the best way of .eeping <ommunism out of Southeast
#sia while still providing the necessary security within which free societies might evolve
was to build a belt of neutral states assisted by the "est. The <ommunists might not see
any advantage to this arrangement) he admitted. But3
!f we could bring about a situation where the <ommunists believed that there was a
balance of advantage to them in arranging a girdle of neutral states) we might have the
ingredients of a settlement.
Bnce the settlement was achieved) a system for guaranteeing the security of the neutral
states thus formed would be re?uired) @den held. <ollective defense) of the .ind that
would ensure action without unanimity among the contracting parties$$a system "of the
/ocarno type"$$seemed most reasonable to him. These points) in broad outline) were
those presented by him and <hurchill.
The United States had from the beginning dismissed the viability of a partition solution.
;ulles= public position in his maDor speech of 8arch 7& that <ommunist control even of
part of !ndochina would merely be the prelude to total domination was fully supported in
private by both State and ;efense. Nevertheiess) the Government early recogni2ed the
possibility that partition) however distasteful) might be agreed to among the *rench and
<ommunist negotiators. #s a result) on 8ay ') the ;efense ;epartment drew up a
settlement plan that included provision for a territorial division. #s little of 4ietnam as
possible should be yielded) ;efense argued) with the demarcation line fied in the north
and "defined by some defensible geographic boundary +i.e.) the 0ed or Blac. 0ivers) or
the #nnamite 8ountains1 !n accord with the *rench position that evolved from the
meeting of 8endZs$*rance=s cabinet on :une 75) ;efense urged provision for a
4ietnamese enclave in the >anoi$>aiphong area
or) alternatively) internationali2ation of the port facilities there. *airly well convinced)
however) that partition would be fragile) ;efense also called for "sanctions" against any
form of <ommunist aggression in /aos) <ambodia) or Thailand) and for allied agreement
to united action in the event the <ommunists violated a cease$fire by conducting
subversive activities in the non$<ommunist area of 4ietnam.
The ;efense proposal amounted to containing the <ommunist forces above the 7(th
parallel while denying them sovereign access to the sea. This position went much further
than that of the *rench) who also favored a demarcation line geared to military
re?uirements but were willing to settle on roughly the %Jth parallel. 8oreover) when the
five$power military staff conference met in "ashington in early :une) it reported +on the
&th1 that a line midway between the %-th and %Jth parallels +from Tha.he. in /aos
westward to ;ong >oi on the north 4ietnam seacoast1 would be defensible in the event
partition came about. F;oc. ,%G Undercutting the ;efense plan still further was the
*rench disposition to yield on an enclave in the >anoi$>aiphong area were the 4iet 8inh
to press for their own enclave in southern 4ietnam. #s <hauvel told U. #leis :ohnson)
should the choice come to a trade$off of enclaves or a straight territorial division) the
*rench preferred the latter. F;oc. ,7G Thus) by mid$:une) a combination of circumstances
made it evident to the #dministration that some more fleible position on the location of
the partition line would have to be) and could be) adopted.
#merican acceptance of partition as a wor.able arrangement put "ashington and /ondon
on even terms. Similarly) on the matter of an overall security "umbrella" for Southeast
#sia) the two allies also found common ground. "hile the United States found "/ocarno"
an unfortunate term) the Government did not dispute the need to establish a vigorous
defense mechanism capable of acting despite obDections by one or more members. !t will
be recalled that the NS< Planning Board) on 8ay %&) had outlined three possible regional
groupings dependent upon the nature and timing of a settlement at Geneva. Now) in late
:une) circumstances dictated the advisability of concentrating on the "Group 7" formula)
in which the UA) the United States) Pa.istan) Thailand) the Philippines) #ustralia) and
New Lealand would participate but not *rance +unless it was decided that the pact would
apply to !ndochina1. The concerned states would echange information) act as a united
front against <ommunism) provide actual assistance to #sian members against eternal
attac. or "<ommunist insurrection)" and ma.e use of #sian facilities andIor forces in
their defense assistance program.
#merican planning for what was to become S@#TB evinced concern) however) about the
commitment of #merican forces in cases of <ommunist infiltration and subversion. #s
the Planning Board=s paper notes) the role of the United States and other countries should
be limited to support of the country re?uesting assistance6 #sian member nations would
be epected to "contribute facilities and) if possible) at least to.en military contingents."
The Board=s paper did not represent a final policy statement6 but it did reflect #merican
reluctance) particularly on the part of the President and the :oint <hiefs) to have
#merican forces drawn into the .ind of local conflict the #dministration had steered
clear of in 4ietnam. Bn this ?uestion of limiting the "estern commitment) the British) to
Dudge from their hostility toward involvement against the 4iet 8inh) were also in general
agreement.
#side from partition and regional security) a basis also eisted for agreement to assisting
the *rench in their diplomatic wor. by the device of some carefully worded warning to
the <ommunists. The British) before as well as after ;ienbienphu) were firmly against
issuing threats to the <ommunists that involved military conse?uences. "hen united
action had first been broached) /ondon reDected raising the threat of a naval bloc.ade and
carrying it out if the <hinese continued to assist the 4iet 8inh. #gain) when united
action came up in private U.S.$*rench discussions during 8ay) the British saw no useful
purpose in see.ing to influence discussions at Geneva by ma.ing it .nown to the
<ommunists that united action would follow a brea.down in negotiations. The situation
was different now. !nstead of threatening direct military action) /ondon and "ashington
apparently agreed) the "est could profit from an open$ended warning tied to a lac. of
progress at Geneva. "hen @den addressed the >ouse of <ommons on :une 79 prior to
emplaning for "ashington) he said3 "!t should be clear to all that the hopes of agreement
Fat GenevaG would be Deopardi2ed if active military operations in !ndochina were to be
intensified while negotiations for an armistice are proceeding at Geneva. !f this reminder
is needed) ! hope that it may be heeded." @den was specifically thin.ing of a renewed
4iet 8inh offensive in the ;elta) but was not saying what might happen once
negotiations were placed in Deopardy.
This type of warning was sounded again at the conclusion of the #nglo$#merican tal.s)
and encouragement for it came from Paris. !n the same aidememoire of :une 7, in which
the *rench Government had re?uested that the United States counsel Saigon against a
violent reaction to partition) "ashington was also urged to Doin with /ondon in a
declaration. The declaration would "state in some fashion or other that) if it is not
possible to reach a reasonable settlement at the Geneva <onference) a serious aggravation
of international relations would result F;oc. ,,G The *rench suggestion was acted upon.
@isenhower and <hurchill issued a statement on :une 7& that "if at Geneva the *rench
Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement
regarding !ndochina) the international situation will be seriously aggravated." !n
retrospect) the statement may have had an important bearing on the <ommunists=
negotiating position$$a point to which we shall return subse?uently.
The Doint statement referred to "an acceptable agreement)" and indeed the ramifications of
that phrase constituted the main subDect of the U.S.$UA tal.s. !n an unpublici2ed
agreement) the two governments concurred on a common set of principles which) if
wor.ed into the settlement terms) would enable both to "respect" the armistice. These
principles) .nown subse?uently as the Seven Points) were communicated to the *rench.
#s reported by @den) they were3
+%1 Preservation of the integrity and independence of /aos and <ambodia) and assurance
of 4iet 8inh withdrawal from those countries
+71 Preservation of at least the southern half of 4ietnam) and if possible an enclave in the
;elta) with the line of demarcation no further south than one running generally west from
;ong >oi
+91 No restrictions on /aos) <ambodia) or retained 4ietnam "materially impairing their
capacity to maintain stable non$<ommunist regimes6 and especially restrictions impairing
their right to maintain ade?uate forces for internal security) to import arms and to employ
foreign advisers"
+51 No "political provisions which would ris. loss of the retained area to <ommunist
control"
+'1 No provision that would "eclude the possibility of the ultimate reunification of
4ietnam by peaceful means"
+,1 Provision for "the peaceful and humane transfer) under international supervision) of
those people desiring to be moved from one 2one to another of 4ietnam"
+-1 Provision for "effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement."
The Seven Points represented something of an #merican diplomatic victory when viewed
in the contet of the changed #dministration position on partition. "hile any loss of
territory to the <ommunists predetermined the official #merican attitude toward the
settlement$$@den was told the United States would almost certainly be unable to
guarantee it$$the terms agreed upon with the British were sufficiently hard that) if pushed
through by the *rench) they would bring about a tolerable arrangement for !ndochina.
The stic.ing point for "ashington lay not in the terms but in the unli.elihood that the
British) any more than the *rench) would actually stand by them against the <ommunists.
Thus) ;ulles wrote3 ". . . we have the distinct impression that the British loo. upon this
Fmemorandum of the Seven PointsG merely as an optimum solution and that they would
not encourage the *rench to hold out for a solution as good as this." The Secretary
observed that the British) during the tal.s) were unhappy about finding "ashington ready
only to "respect" the final terms reached at Geneva. They had preferred a stronger word)
yet they "wanted to epress these - points merely as a =hope= without any indication of
firmuess on our part." The United States) ?uite aside from what was said in the Seven
Points) "would not want to be associated in any way with a settlement which fell
materially short of the - point memorandum." F;oc. -(G Thus) the seven points) while
having finally bound the United States and Great Britain to a common position on the
conference) did not allay "ashington=s aniety over British and *rench readiness to
conclude a less$than$satisfactory settlement. The possibility of a unilateral #merican
withdrawal from the conference was still being "given consideration)" ;ulles reported)
even as the Seven Points were agreed upon.
;espite reservations about our #llies= adherence to the Seven Points) the United States
still hoped to get *rench approval of them. Bn :uly ,) ;illon telegraphed the *rench
reaction as given him by Parodi) the secretary$general of the cabinet. "ith the eception
of Point ') denoting national elections) the *rench were in agreement. They were
confused about an apparent conflict between the elections provision and Point 5) under
which political provisions) which would include elections) were not to ris. loss of
retained 4ietnam. !n addition) they) too) felt #merican agreement merely to "respect" any
agreement was too wea. a term) and re?uested clarification of its meaning.
;ulles responded the net day +:uly -1 to both matters. Points 5 and ' were not in
conflict) he said. !t was ?uite possible that an agreement in line with the Seven Points
might still not prevent !ndochina from going <ommunist. The important thing) therefore)
was to arrange for national elections in a way that would give the South 4ietnamese a
liberal breathing spell3
since undoubtedly true that elections might eventually mean unification 4ietnam under
>o <hi 8inh this ma.es it all more important they should be only held as long after
cease$fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give
democratic elements Fin South 4ietnamG best chance. "e believe important that no date
should be set now and especially that no conditions should be accepted by *rench which
would have direct or indirect effect of preventing effective international supervision of
agreement ensuring political as well as military guarantees.
#nd so far as "respect" of that agreement was concerned) the United States and Britain
meant they "would not oppose a settlement which conformed to Seven Points. . . . !t does
not of course mean we would guarantee such settlement or that we would necessarily
support it publicly. "e consider =respect= as strong a word as we can possibly employ in
the circumstances. . . . =0espect= would also mean that we would not see. directly or
indirectly to upset settlement by force." Y
Y ;ulles to #merican @mbassy) Paris) tel. No. --) :uly -. %&'5 +Secret1. F;oc. ,5G
0egarding the U.S. view of a >o <hi 8inh electoral victory) we not only have the well$
.nown comment of @isenhower that >o) at least in early %&'5) would have garnered J(
percent of the vote. +See Mandate for ;hange FGarden <ity) New Cor.3 ;oubledayG) pp.
99-$9J.1 !n addition) there is a ;epartment of State memorandum of conversation of 8ay
9%) %&'5) in which /ivingston 8erchant reportedly "recogni2ed the possibility that in
4iet Nam >o might win a plebiscite) if held today."
;ulles= clarification of the #merican position on elections in 4ietnam) together with his
delimitation of the nation=s obligation towards a settlement) did not satisfy the *rench
completely but served the important purpose of enlightening them as to #merican
intentions. Placed beside the discussions with @den and <hurchill) the thrust of #merican
diplomacy at this time clearly was to leave no ?uestion in the minds of our allies as to
what we considered the elements in a reasonable !ndochina settlement and what we
would li.ely do once a settlement were achieved.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 9) "The Geneva <onference) 8ay$:uly) %&'5"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. %5,$%-J
4!!. TB"#0; # S@TT/@8@NT3 T>@ /#ST T>!0TC ;#CS
#. T)E 5#2:#!3!3: ;63T!37ES
"hile the *rench and British pondered the implications of the Seven Points) bargaining
continued behind the scenes against a bac.ground of further military advance by the 4iet
8inh. #t about the same time the 4iet 8inh made their first specific partition proposal)
their forces in the field completed their deployment from the ;ienbienphu area. By mid$
:une) according to #merican intelligence) the 4iet 8inh were believed prepared for a
massive attac. in the ;elta. #nother report spo.e of their renewed attention to southern
#nnam and of an apparent buildup of military strength there. Not surprisingly in light of
these developments) the 4iet 8inh) in late :une) responded to the *rench proposal of a
division at the %Jth parallel with a plan for a line in southern #nnam running northwest
from the %9th to the %5th parallel) i.e.) from Tuy >oa on the coast through Plei.u to the
<ambodian border. 8oreover) in secret tal.s with the *rench) the 4iet 8inh=s vice$
minister for national defense) Ta Kuang Buu) also insisted on *rench withdrawal from the
;elta within two months of a cease$fire) in contrast to *rench demands for a four$month
interval. F;oc. ,&G #s suggested by /acouture and ;evillers) the 4iet 8inh may have
been see.ing to capitali2e not only on their improved military position in the ;elta)
where *rench Union forces were still in retreat) but also on 8endZs$*rance=s reputation
as a man of peace obviously desirous of a settlement.
This resurgence of 4iet 8inh toughness on terms for a cessation of hostilities applied
also to /aos and <ambodia. !n the military staff conferences that had begun separately on
those two countries in late :une) no progress was made. The 4iet 8inh indicated) in the
/aotian case) that they had already withdrawn6 if forces opposing the royal government
remained +as in fact some %')((( did1) negotiations with the resistance groups would
have to be underta.en. Thus) despite <hou @n$lai=s claim that 4iet 8inh withdrawal from
/aos and <ambodia could easily be accomplished) the 4iet 8inh were hardly ready to
move out unless they received substantial guarantees +such as a permanent regroupment
area1) which the royal governments refused to give.
"hether because of or in spite of 4iet 8inh intransigence) the <hinese forcefully made
.nown their earnest desire to .eep the conference moving. !n an important encounter at
Bern on :une 79) <hou @n$lai several times emphasi2ed to 8endZs$*rance that the main
thing was a cease$fire) on which he hoped progress could be made before all the heads of
delegation returned to Geneva. 0egarding /aos and <ambodia) <hou thought
regroupment areas for the insurgents would be necessary) but reiterated that national
unity was the affair of the royal governments6 he hoped the resistance elements might
find a place in the national life of their respective countries. <hou told the *rench
premier) as he had told @den previously) that no #merican bases could be permitted in
those countries6 yet <hou spo.e sympathetically of the *rench Union. Turning finally to
the 4iet 8inh) <hou urged that direct contact be established between them and the
4ietnamese. >e promised that for his part) he would see that the 4iet 8inh were
thoroughly prepared for serious discussions on a military settlement. <learly) the <hinese
were far more interested in moving forward toward a cease$fire than were their 4iet 8inh
counterparts.
@ven though the 4iet 8inh were ma.ing demands that the *rench) <ambodians) and
/aotians could not accept) the debate was narrowing to specifics. The ?uestion when
national elections in 4ietnam should be held is illustrative. The 4iet 8inh did not budge
from their insistence that elections occur si months after the cease$fire. But the *rench)
attempting to ma.e some headway in the tal.s) retreated from insistence on setting no
date +a position the 4ietnamese had supported1 and offered to hold elections %J months
after completion of the regroupment process) or between 77 and 79 months after the
cessation of hostilities. F;oc. ,&G The *rench now admitted that while they still loo.ed
forward to retaining >aiphong and the <atholic bishoprics as long as possible) perhaps in
some neutral environment) total withdrawal from the north would probably be necessary
to avoid cutting up 4ietnam into enclaves. F;oc. ,,G But partition in any manner faced
the *rench with hostile 4ietnamese) and it was for this reason that <hauvel not only
suggested #merican intervention to induce 4ietnamese self$control) but also received
Pham 4an ;ong=s approval) in a conversation :uly ,) to having the military commands
rather than governments sign the final armistice so as to avoid having to win 4ietnamese
consent. #s Ngo ;inh ;iem) who became prime minister :une %J) suspected) the *rench
were prepared to pull out of Ton.in as part of the cease$fire arrangements.
Bn the matter of control and supervision) the debate also became more focused even as
the gulf between opposing views remained wide. The chief points of contention were) as
before) the composition and authority of the neutral supervisory body6 but the outlines of
an acceptable arrangement were beginning to form. Thus) on composition) the
<ommunist delegations) in early :uly) began spea.ing in terms of an odd$numbered
+three or five1 neutral commission chaired by !ndia) with pro$<ommunist and pro$
"estern governments e?ually sharing the remaining two or four places. Second) on the
powers of that body) dispute persisted as to whether it would have separate but parallel
authority with the Doint commissions or supreme authority6 whether and on what
?uestions it would ma.e Dudgments by unanimous vote6 and whether it would +as the
*rench proposed1 be empowered to issue maDority and minority reports in case of
disagreement. These were all fundamental issues) but the important point is that the
<ommunist side refused to consider them irremovable obstacles to agreement. #s
8olotov=s understudy) Au2netsov +the deputy foreign minister1) put it) the Soviet and
*rench proposals on control and supervision revealed "rapprochement in the points of
view on certain ?uestions. !t is true with respect to the relationships between the mied
commission and the international supervisory commission. This rapprochement eists
also in regard to the ?uestion of the eamination of the functions and duties of the
commission..." !n fact) a "rapprochement" did not eist6 but the Soviets) interestingly)
persisted in their optimism that a solution could be found.
5. ;)!3ESE DiP"6M#;<
"hile the negotiations went on among the second$string diplomats) a different .ind of
diplomacy was being carried on elsewhere. <hou @n$lai) en route to Pe.ing) advanced
<ommunist <hina=s effort) actually begun in late %&'7) to woo its #sian neighbors with
tal. of peaceful coeistence. This diplomatic offensive) which was to have an important
bearing on the outcome at Geneva) had borne its first fruit in #pril %&'5) when <hou
reached agreement with Nehru over Tibet. #t that time) the <hinese first introduced the
"five principles" they vowed to follow in their relations with other nations. The five
principles are3 mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty) nonaggression)
noninterference in internal affairs) e?uality and mutual benefit) and peaceful coeistence.
<hou=s first stopover was in New ;elhi) the scene of his initial success. Bn :une 7J he
and Nehru reaffirmed the five principles and epressed the hope that a peaceful
settlement in !ndochina would be concluded in conformity with them. Similar sentiments
appeared in a Doint statement from 0angoon) scene of tal.s with Prime 8inister U Nu.
Promises were echanged) moreover) for the maintenance of close contact between <hina
and Burma) and support was voiced for the right of countries having different social
systems to coeist without interference from outside. "0evolution cannot be eported)"
the Doint statement proclaimed6 "at the same time outside interference with the common
will epressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted."
Pe.ing made full use of these diplomatic achievements by contrasting them with the
#merican policy of ruthless epansionism) which Pe.ing said was carried out by
"ashington under the label of opposing <ommunism. Pe.ing proclaimed that the era of
colonialism which the United States was see.ing to perpetuate in !ndochina had come to
an end. "# new era has dawned in which #sian countries can coeist peacefully and
establish friendly relations on the basis of respect for each other=s territorial integrity and
sovereignty and mutual nonaggression)" said Fen-min Hih-pao. #nother newspaper)
Duang-ming Hih-pao) offered similar testimony to the inspirational effect of the Sino$
!ndian and Sino$Burmese agreements) considering them to conform to the interests of all
#sian peoples. The daily castigated the #merican "policy of strength" as being totally
incompatible with the five principles. <learly) <hina was eploiting its gains through
diplomacy not simply to ac?uire #sian support +and thus detract from pro$"esternism in
the region1) but more broadly to muster recognition for <hina as the leading #sian power
in the fight against "imperialism" and "colonialism."
<hou=s diplomatic efforts too. a different turn) it seems) when he met with >o <hi 8inh
at Nanning) on the Sino$4ietnamese frontier) from :uly 9$'. #lthough the final
communi?ue merely stated that the two leaders "had a full echange of views on the
Geneva <onference with respect to the ?uestion of the restoration of peace in !ndochina
and related ?uestions)" it subse?uently appeared that much more may have ta.en place.
#ccording to observers in >ong Aong) <hou pressed for the meeting out of fear that the
4iet 8inh might engage in intensified military action that would destroy chances for an
armistice and upset <hina=s budding role as an #sian peacema.er. <onceivably) <hou
sought to persuade >o that his territorial gains were about as much as he could epect at
that Duncture without ris.ing an end to negotiations and renewed #merican attempts to
forge a military alliance for intervention. To Dudge from the 4iet 8inh reaction to the
tal.s) >o was not completely satisfied with <hou=s proposed tactics.
8omentarily leaving aside <hou=s motivations) it is vital to note the impact of the tal.s
on the Geneva negotiations. Bn :uly &) <hauvel dined with /i A=enung and <hang "en$
t=ien) a vice$minister for foreign affairs and <P0 ambassador to the Soviet Union.
<hauvel opened the conversation$$as he later recounted to :ohnson$$by complaining that
discussions with the 4iet 8inh were not going well) that 4iet 8inh demands were
eorbitant and well beyond <hou @n$lai=s stated position. The <hinese delegates evinced
surprise but said nothing in direct reply. >owever) <hang did report that <hou had had a
"very good meeting" with >o <hi 8inh) the results of which "would be helpful to
*rench." <hauvel received the impression$$one which seems) in retrospect) to have been
accurate$$that the 4iet 8inh had been given a free hand by the Soviets and <hinese up to
the point where their demands were unacceptable to the *rench) at which time the Soviets
andIor <hinese felt compelled to intervene. F;oc. ,,G !f such was the case) <hou=s tal.
with >o) coming after 8endZs$*rance and his negotiators showed no sign of being more
compromising than their predecessors) /aniel and Bidault) may have been intended to
inform the 4iet 8inh that the "point" had been reached and that they had to soften their
demands if a settlement were ever to be attained.
;. T)E F2#3;6-#ME2!;#3 73DE2ST#3D!3:
Precisely how <hou=s stopover in Nanning would be "helpful" to the *rench did not
become apparent until four days after <hauvel=s conversation with /i and <hang. By that
time) the *rench had been engaged in intensive conversations with the #mericans) the
aim of which was to convince "ashington that the United States) to be truly influential at
the conference$to reali2e) in other words) a settlement in line with the Seven Points$had to
bac. the *rench with a high$level representative in Geneva. Unless the United States did
more than offer its views from afar on an acceptable settlement) 8endZs$*rance argued)
*rance could not be epected to present a strong front when 8olotov and <hou resumed
their places. #s though to prove his determination to stand fast against <ommunist
demands) 8endZs$*rance told #mbassador ;illon in Paris that if a cease$fire was not
agreed to by :uly 7() the premier would approve the dispatch of conscripts to !ndochina
and would introduce a law into Parliament to that effect on :uly 7%. >is government
would not resign until that law passed6 the ships would be prepared to transport the
conscripts to !ndochina beginning :uly 7'. [;oc. ,7G
;espite 8endZs$*rance=s willingness to establish a deadline and) for the first time in the
history of *rench involvement in !ndochina) to conscript soldiers for service there)
"ashington remained opposed to upgrading its Geneva delegation. Sensitive as much to
any proposal that might implicate the United States in the final settlement terms as to
8endZs$*rance=s difficulties at the conference table) ;ulles believed the *rench would
end by accepting a settlement unsatisfactory to the United States whether or not the
US;@/ were upgraded. #s he eplained to ;illon) were he +the Secretary1 or Smith to
return to Geneva only to find the *rench compelled to negotiate an unacceptable
agreement anyway) the United States would be re?uired to dissociate itself in a manner
"which would be deeply resented by the *rench as an effort on our part to bloc. at the
last minute a peace which they ardently desire)" with possible "irreparable inDury to
*ranco$#merican relations The least embarrassing alternative) ;ulles felt) was to avoid
the probability of having to ma.e a "spectacular disassociation" by staying away from the
conference altogether. F;oc. ,'G
"hen ;ulles= position was reported to 8endZs$*rance) the premier said he understood
the #mericans= reluctance but considered it misplaced. The #merican fear of in some way
becoming committed to the settlement) he said) was precisely his dilemma) for he had no
idea what the <ommunists would propose in the crucial days ahead. The *rench
negotiating position was the Seven Points) he went on) and would not deviate
substantially from them. "ith great feeling) 8endZs$*rance told a member of the
#merican @mbassy that the presence of ;ulles or Smith was "absolutely essential and
necessary"6 without either of them) the <ommunists would sense and see. to capitali2e
on a lac. of unity in the allied camp. "8endZs indicated that our high$level presence at
Geneva had di rect bearing on where <ommunists would insist on placing line of
demarcation or partition in 4ietnam."
These arguments did not prove convincing to "ashington. Bn :uly %() ;ulles wrote
8endZs$*rance a personal message reiterating that his or General Smith=s presence would
serve no useful purpose. #nd ;ulles again raised doubts that *rance) Britain) and the
United States were really agreed on a single negotiating position3
"hat now concerns us is that we are very doubtful as to whether there is a united front in
relation to !ndochina) and we do not believe that the mere fact that the high
representatives of the three nations physically reappear together at Geneva will serve as a
substitute for a clear agreement on a Doint position which includes agreement as to what
will happen if that position is not accepted by the <ommunists. "e fear that unless there
is the reality of such a united front) the events at Geneva will epose differences under
conditions which will only serve to accentuate them with conse?uent strain upon the
relations between our two countries greater than if the US does not reappear at Geneva) in
the person of General Smith or myself. F;oc. ,-G
The Secretary ?uestioned whether the Seven Points truly represented a common
"minimum acceptable solution" which the three #llies were willing to fight for in the
event the <ommunists reDected them. <harging that the Seven Points were actually
"merely an optimum solution" for Paris no less than for /ondon) ;ulles sought to
demonstrate that the *rench were already moving away from the Seven Points. >e cited
apparent *rench willingness to permit <ommunist forces to remain in northern /aos) to
accept a demarcation line "considerably south of ;onghoi)" to neutrali2e and demilitari2e
/aos and <ambodia) and to permit "elections so early and so ill$prepared and ill$
supervised as to ris. the loss of the entire area to <ommunism" as evidences of a
"whittling$away process" which) cumulatively) could destroy the intent of the Seven
Points. F;oc. ,-G Un?uestionably) the Secretary=s firm opposition to restoring to the
#merican delegation its high ran. was grounded in intense suspicion of an ultimate
*rench sell$out) yet suspicion based on apparent misinformation concerning both the
actual *rench position and the degree of *rench willingness to stand firm.
Thus believing that the *rench had already gone far toward deflating some of the maDor
provisions of the U.S.$UA memorandum) ;ulles reiterated the #dministration=s position
that it had the right "not to endorse a solution which would seem to us to impair seriously
certain principles which the US believes must) as far as it is concerned) be .ept
unimpaired) if our own struggle against <ommunism is to be successfully pursued."
Perhaps see.ing to rationali2e the impact of his reDection) ;ulles wrote in closing that the
#merican decision might actually assist the *rench3 "!f our conduct creates a certain
uncertainty in the minds of the <ommunists) this might strengthen your hand more than
our presence at Geneva F;oc. ,-G 8endZs$*raiice had been rebuffed) however) and while
;ulles left the door slightly aDar for his or Smith=s return if "circumstances" should
change) it seemed more probable that *rance would have to wor. for a settlement with
only the British along side.
The ;ulles$8endZs$*rance echanges were essentially an eercise in credibility) with the
*rench premier desperately see.ing to persuade the Secretary that Paris really did support
and really would abide by the Seven Points. "hen 8endes$*rance read ;ulles= letter) he
protested that *rance would accept nothing unacceptable to the United States) and went
so far as to say that ;ulles= presence at the conference would give him a veto power) in
effect) on the decisions ta.en. Beyond that) 8endZs$*rance warned of the catastrophic
impact of an #merican withdrawal on the #merican position in @urope no less than in the
*ar @ast6 withdrawal) he said) was sure to be interpreted as a step toward isolationism.
#s.ed what alternative his government had in mind if the conference failed even with an
#merican high$level presence) 8endZs$*rance replied there would have to be full
internationali2ation of the war.Y
Y ;illon from Paris priority tel. No. %95) :uly %%) %&'5. F;oc. ,JG The same day)
8endZs$*rance had told ;illon again of *rance=s intention to send conscripts) with
parliamentary approval) by :uly 7') with two divisions ready for action by about
September %'. The premier said that while he could not predict how the #ssembly would
react) he personally saw the need for direct #merican involvement in the war once
negotiations bro.e down and the conscripts were sent. ;illon from Paris priority tel. No.
%99) :uly %%) %&'5.
8endZs$*rance=s persistence was sufficiently persuasive to move ;ulles) on :uly %9) to
fly to Paris to document the premier=s support of the Seven Points. Bn the %5th) the
Secretary and the premier signed a memorandum which duplicated that agreed to by the
United States and Great Britain. !n addition) a position paper was drawn up the same day
reiterating that the United States was at the conference as "a friendly nation" whose role
was subordinate to that of the primary non$<ommunist parties) the #ssociated States and
*rance. The Seven Points were described) as they had been some two wee.s earlier) as
those acceptable to the "primarily interested nations" and which the United States could
"respect." >owever) should terms ultimately be concluded which differed mar.edly from
the Seven Points) *rance agreed that the United States would neither be as.ed nor
epected to accept them) and "may publicly disassociate itself from such differing terms"
by a unilateral or multilateral statement.
Bne of ;ulles= obDections had been that a true united front did not eist so long as
agreement was lac.ing on allied action in the event of no settlement. Bn this point) too)
the *rench were persuaded to adopt the #merican position. !n the event of a settlement) it
was agreed in the position paper that the United States would "see.) with other interested
nations) a collective defense association designed to preserve) against direct and indirect
aggression) the integrity of the non$<ommunist areas of Southeast #sia Should no
settlement be forthcoming) U.S.$*rance consultations would ta.e place6 but these would
not preclude the United States from bringing "the matter" before the UN as a threat to the
peace. Previous obstacles to *rench obDections to UN involvement were noneistent) for
*rance reaffirmed in the position paper its commitment under the :une 5 treaty of
independence with 4ietnam that Saigon) as well as 4ientiane and Phnom Penh) was an
"e?ual and voluntary" partner in the *rench Union) and hence no longer subDect in its
foreign policy to *rench di0tat.
Bn all but one matter) now) the United States and *rance were in complete accord on a
negotiating strategy. That matter was) of course) the #merican delegation. 8endZs$
*rance had formally subscribed to the Seven Points and had agreed to #merican plans for
dealing with the aftermath of the conference6 yet he had gained nothing for the *rench
delegation. "riting to the Secretary) the premier pointed out again3
!n effect) ! have every reason to thin. that your absence would be precisely interpreted as
demonstrating) before the fact) that you disapproved of the conference and of everything
which might be accomplished. Not only would those who are against us find therein the
confirmation of the ill will which they attribute to your government concerning the
reestablishment of peace in !ndochina6 but many others would read in it a sure sign of a
division of the western powers. F;oc. -(G
Bnce more) 8endZs$*rance was putting forth the view that a high$level #merican
representation at the conference would do more to ensure a settlement in conformity with
the Seven Points than private U.S.$*rench agreement to them.
*or reasons not entirely clear) but perhaps the conse?uence of @isenhower=s personal
intervention) 8endZs$*rance=s appeal was now favorably received in "ashington. ;ulles
was able to inform the premier on :uly %53 "!n the light of what you say and after
consultation with President @isenhower) ! am glad to be able to inform you that the
President and ! are as.ing the Under Secretary of State) General "alter Bedell Smith) to
prepare to return at his earliest convenience to Geneva to share in the wor. of the
conference on the basis of the understanding which we have arrived at." F;oc. -(G *or the
first time since late %&'9) the United States and *rance were solidly Doined in a common
front on !ndochina policy.
!n accordance with the understandings reached with *rance) Smith was sent new
instructions on :uly %, based upon the Seven Points. #fter reiterating the passive formal
role the United States was to play at the conference) ;ulles informed his Under Secretary
he was to issue a unilateral +or) if possible) multilateral1 statement should a settlement be
reached that "conforms substantially" to the Seven Points. "The United States will not)
however) become cosignatory with the <ommunists in any ;eclaration)" ;ulles wrote
with reference to the procedure then being discussed at Geneva of drafting military
accords and a final declaration on a political settlement. Nor should the United States)
Smith=s instructions went on) be put in a position where it could be held responsible for
guaranteeing the results of the conference. Smith=s efforts should be directed) ;ulles
summed up) toward forwarding ideas to the "active negotiators)" *rance) <ambodia)
/aos) and 4ietnam.
This last point of guidance referred to the possibility of a brea.down in the negotiations.
Should no settlement be reached) the United States delegation was
to avoid permitting the *rench to believe that outcome was the result of #merican advice
or pressure) and that in some way the United States was morally obligated to intervene
militarily in !ndochina. The United States) ;ulles wrote) was "not prepared at the present
time to give any commitment that it will intervene in the war if the Geneva <onference
fails..." "hile this stricture almost certainly reflected the President=s and the :oint <hiefs=
etreme reluctance to become committed) in advance) to a war already past the point of
return) it was also doubtless a reaction to 8endZs$*rance=s intimations to ;illon of
*rench willingness to reconsider active #merican involvement if the conference failed.
"ith *rench and British adherence to the Seven Points promised by written agreement)
the United States had gone about as far as it could toward ensuring an acceptable
settlement without becoming tied to it. The #dministration still apparently believed that
the final terms would violate the Seven Points in several significant respects6Y but by
ma.ing clear in advance that any settlement would be met with a unilateral #merican
declaration rather than Bedell Smith=s signature) the United
Y Thus) on :uly %' +one day after the *ranco$#merican agreements1) the National
Security <ouncil) after being briefed on the Geneva situation) decided that the li.ely
settlement would go against the Seven Points. The NS< was told the <ommunists would3
+%1 see. partition of 4ietnam somewhere between the %5th and %Jth parallels6 +71 demand
control of some part of /aos) neutrali2ation of the remainder) and agreement on the
formation of a coalition government6 +91 as. neutrali2ation of <ambodia and some form
of recognition for the *ree Ahmer movement. "ere the <ommunists to accept the ;ong
>oi line for 4ietnam) they would then demand an enclave in southern 4ietnam plus part
of /aos) or simply etend the ;ong >oi line through /aos.
States had at least guaranteed its retention of a moral advantage) useful particularly in
placating domestic public opinion. !n the event of an unsatisfactory settlement)
"ashington would be in a position to say that it had stood steadfastly by principle only to
be undercut by "soft" #llies and <ommunist territorial ambitions.
;. T>@ *!N#/ "@@A B* B#0G#!N!NG
Prior to Smith=s return) positions had tended to harden rather than change at Geneva)
although the 4iet 8inh had yielded a trifle on partition. <hang "en$t=ien=s encouraging
remar. to <hauvel of :uly & had been fulfilled four days later) as already indicated. The
final signal was <hou=s comment to 8endZs*rance on the %9th that both sides) *rench
and 4iet 8inh) had to ma.e concessions on the demarcation problem) but that this "does
not signify that each must ta.e the same number of steps." That same day) Pham 4an
;ong told the *rench premier the 4iet 8inh were willing to settle on the %,th parallel.
;ong=s territorial concession meant little to the *rench) however) and) as the negotiations
continued) it became plain that the 4iet 8inh were not concerned about 8endZs$*rance=s
:uly 7( deadline. Cet the <hinese remained optimistic) at least publicly. :en$min Dih$pao=s
Geneva reporter) for instance) wrote :uly %7 that while no solution had yet been wor.ed
out on the control and supervision problem) "there seems no reason why agreement
cannot be reached." #s for defining the regroupment areas) the correspondent asserted
that "speedy agreement would seem probable after the return of the *oreign 8inisters of
the Big Powers..." So long as all parties were "sincere)" he wrote) agreement would
indeed come about.
The minuscule progress made on settling the 4ietnam problem loomed large in
comparison with the seemingly unbrea.able log Dam that had developed over /aos and
<ambodia. Since the maDor <ommunist concessions of mid$:une) which had at least
paved the way for separating /aos and <ambodia from 4ietnam for discussion purposes)
virtually nothing had been accomplished toward cease$fires. ;ebate on /aos and
<ambodia occupied the spotlight again on :uly & when) from the remar.s of the <hinese
delegate +/i A=e$nung1) it ?uic.ly became apparent that for all their willingness to discuss
the withdrawal of 4iet 8inh troops) the <hinese remained greatly concerned about
possible /aotian and <ambodian rearmament and alignment. Simply put) the <hinese
were negotiating for their own security) not for 4iet 8inh territorial advantage.
#s <hou had pointed out to @den in :une) the <P0=s maDor concern was that <ambodia
and /aos might) after a settlement) be left free to negotiate for a permanent #merican
military presence. !n his presentation) therefore) /i A=e$nung insisted that the two
countries not be permitted to ac?uire fresh troops) military personnel) arms) and
ammunition ecept as might be strictly re?uired for self$defense6 nor should they) he
held) allow foreign military bases to be established. /i formali2ed <hou=s passing remar.
to @den that <hina was not much disturbed by *rench Union +as opposed to #merican1
technicians. /i allowed that *rench military personnel to assist the training of the /aotian
and <ambodian armies was a matter that "can be studied."
The <ambodian case) presented by *oreign 8inister Sam Sary) revealed a stubborn
independence that was to assist the country greatly in the closing days of the conference.
Sam Sary said that foreign bases would indeed not be authori2ed on Ahmer soil "only as
far as there is no menace against <ambodia. . . . !f our security is imperiled) <ambodia
will .eep its legitimate right to defend itself by all means." #s for foreign instructors and
technicians) his government wished to retain those *renchmen then in <ambodia6 he was
pleased to note /i A=e$nung=s apparent acceptance of this arrangement. *inally) with
regard to the importation of arms) Sam Sary differentiated between a limitation on
?uantity +which his government accepted1 and on ?uality +which his government wished
to have a free hand in determining1.
"hile the <hinese publicly castigated the <ambodians for wor.ing with the #mericans to
threaten "the security of <ambodia=s neighboring countries under the pretet of self$
defense)" the #mericans gave the <ambodians encouragement. !n "ashington) Phnom
Penh=s ambassador) Nong Aimny) met with ;ulles on :uly %(. Nong Aimny said his
Government would oppose the neutrali2ation and demilitari2ation of the country6 ;ulles
replied that hopefully <ambodia would become a member of the collective security
arrangement envisaged in #merican$British plans. <ambodia) the Secretary said)
possessed a .ind of independence superior to that in 4ietnam and /aos) and as such
should indeed oppose <ommunist plans to neutrali2e and demilitari2e her. #s an
independent state) <ambodia was entitled to see. outside military and economic
assistance.
The /aotian delegation was also eperiencing difficulties) though with the 4iet 8inh
rather than the <hinese. The 4iet 8inh negotiators) in the military command
conferences) insisted on ma.ing etraneous demands concerning the Pathet /ao. The
/aotians were concerned not so much with the demands as with the possibility of a
private *rench deal with the 4iet 8inh that would subvert the /aotian position. #
member of the royal government=s delegation went to :ohnson to be assured that a
behind$the$scenes deal would not occur. The delegate said /aos hoped to be covered by
and to participate in a Southeast #sia collective security pact. :ohnson did not guarantee
that this arrangement could be wor.ed out6 but as the conference drew to a close) as we
shall see) the United States made it clear to the <ambodians and /aotians that their
security would in some fashion be ta.en care of under the S@#TB treaty.
!rresolution over <ambodia and /aos) a continuing wide gap between *rench and 4iet
8inh positions on the partition line) and no progress on the control and supervision
dilemma were the highlights of the generally dismal scene that greeted General Smith on
his return :uly %, to the negotiating wars. Smith apparently too. heart) however) in the
steadfastness of 8endZs$*rance) although the Under Secretary also observed that the
<ommunists had reacted to this by themselves becoming unmoving. Smith attributed
<ommunist intransigence to the probability that "8endZs$*rance has been a great
disappointment to the <ommunists both as regards the relatively firm position he has
ta.en on !ndochina and his attitude toward @;<. They may therefore wish to force him
out of the government by ma.ing settlement here impossible."
#ctually) what had disturbed the <ommunists most was not so much 8endZs*rance=s
firmness as Smith=s return. That became clear following a private meeting re?uested by a
member of the <P0 delegation) >uang >ua) with Seymour Topping) the 3e4 <or0 Times
correspondent at Geneva. Topping) as the <hinese must have epected) reported the
conversation to the #merican delegation. >e said >uang >ua) spea.ing in deadly earnest
and without propagandistic overtones) had interpreted Smith=s return as an #merican
attempt to prevent a settlement. !ndeed) according to >uang >ua) the Paris tal.s between
;ulles and 8endZs$*rance on :uly %9 and %5 had been primarily responsible for 8endZs$
*rance=s stubbornness6 the *rench premier had obviously concluded a deal with the
United States in which he agreed to raise the price for a settlement. F;oc. -JG
Bvert <hinese statements in this period lent credence to Topping=s report. *irst) Pe.ing
was far from convinced that continued discussions on the restoration of peace in
!ndochina removed the possibility of dramatic new military moves by the United States.
"ashington was accused) as before the conference) of desiring to intervene in !ndochina
so as to etend the war there into "a new military venture on <hina=s southern borders. !n
support of this contention) Pe.ing cited such provocative moves as trips during #pril and
:une by General :ames #. 4an *leet +"the notorious butcher of the Aorean "ar"1 to
Aorea) :apan) and Taiwan) for the purpose of establishing a North Pacific military
alliance6 #merican intentions of concluding a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan as the
first step in <hiang Aai$she.=s invasion plans6 #merican efforts) through the five$power
and later @isenhower$<hurchill tal.s) to create a Southeast #sia alliance for a military
thrust into !ndochina6 and stepped$up U.S. military assistance) including training) for the
Thai armed forces.
Second) Pe.ing was clearly disturbed that the *rench were still heeding #merican advice
when the path to a settlement lay before them. !n a People=s ;aily editorial of :uly %5) for
instance) the *rench people and National #ssembly were said to be strongly desirous of
peace. Thus3 "# policy running counter to *rench interests cannot wor.. *rance is a
maDor world power. She should have her own independent and honorable path. This
means following an independent foreign policy consistent with *rench national interests
and the interests of world peace." The #merican alternative$$a Southeast #sia coalition
with *rench participation$$should be reDected) the editorial intoned) and a settlement
conforming to the five principles achieved instead. !n .eeping with its line of previous
months) Pe.ing was attempting to demonstrate$$for #sian no less than for *rench ears$$
that it had a .een interest in resolving the !ndochina problem rather than seeing the
conference give way to new #merican military pressures and a possibly wider war.
*inally) Pe.ing paid considerable attention to ;ut!es= stay in Paris and to his dispatch of
Smith to Geneva. ;uties= sudden trip to the *rench capital was said to reveal #merican
determination to obstruct progress in the negotiations by pressuring 8endZs$*rance not
to grasp the settlement that lay Dust around the corner. ;uties originally had no intention
of upgrading the #merican delegation) according to Pe.ing. "But Bedell Smith had to be
sent bac. to Geneva because of strong criticism in the "estern press) and "ashington
was fearful lest agreement could be reached ?uic.ly despite #merican boycotting of the
conference." Cet <hina=s optimism over a settlement did not diminish3 "<hinese
delegation circles)" N<N# reported) "see no reason whatsoever why the Geneva
<onference should play up to the U.S. policy and ma.e no efforts towards achieving an
agreement which is acceptable and satisfactory to all parties concerned and which is
honorable for the two belligerent sides." !f Smith=s return) then) was viewed from Pe.ing
as a challenge to its diplomatic ingenuity) the <hinese +and) we may surmise) the Soviets1
were prepared to accept it.
!n doing so) however) the <hinese evidently were not about to sacrifice in those areas of
dispute where they had a special interest) namely) /aos and <ambodia. Bn :uly %5) <hou
called on Nong Aimny to state <hina=s position. The premier said first that) in accord
with his recent tal.s with Nehru) U Nu) and >o <hi 8inh) he could report a unanimous
desire for peace in !ndochina) for the unity of each of the three #ssociated States) and for
their futBre cordial relationship with the <olombo Powers. <hou then as.ed about the
status of <ambodian tal.s with the 4iet 8inh. "hen Nong Aimny replied that Pham 4an
;ong) in two recent get$togethers) had insisted on interDecting political problems into
discussions of a military settlement$$as by re?uesting <ambodia=s retention of certain
provincial officials appointed by the *ree Ahmers) and by suggesting the royal
government=s preservation of a *ree Ahmer youth movement$$<hou is said to have
laughed off these claims and to have replied that these were indeed matters for <ambodia
to handle by herself.
<hou had his own views on what <ambodia should and should not do6 however) Ahmer
sovereignty should not mean discrimination against the resistance elements) the
establishment of foreign military bases in <ambodia) /aos) and 4ietnam) or the
conclusion of military alliances with other states. <hou was less adamant only on the
subDect of <ambodia=s importation of arms and military personnel6 when Nong Aimny
flatly stated that Phnom Penh would absolutely reDect any limitations inasmuch as these
would be incompatible with <ambodian sovereignty) <hou did not contradict him.
!nstead) he promised to study the matter further and as.ed to .now precisely what
?uantities of arms and personnel the royal government had in mind. /ater on) he became
a bit more fleible by saying that a prohibition on arms and personnel should apply only
to the armistice period) not permanently. Bnly in 4ietnam) <hou said) would there be a
flat proscription against military e?uipment and troops.
<hou and Nong Aimny met again three days later) on :uly %-. Bn this occasion) <hou
was obviously less conciliatory +as Nong Aimny reported1) stating <hina=s position more
in terms of demands than suggestions. >e urged the <ambodian government to
incorporate resistance elements into the army) police) and civil service. But he reserved
his emphasis for <ambodia=s future security position. !n a thinly$veiled warning) <hou
said that should <ambodia Doin the pact) permit foreign bases on its territory) or accept
#merican military instructors) "the conse?uences would be very serious and would
aggravate the situation with unfortunate conse?uences for <ambodian independence and
territorial integrity" +Smith=s paraphrase1. <ambodia could have *rench or British
instructors) <hou said. But his three$fold limitation) obviously directed at assuring against
future <ambodia$U.S. defense ties) remained$and) he added) it applied to /aos and
4ietnam as well.
The <hinese were clearly out to get from the conference what they could) without
0ussian assistance) before a settlement was concluded. <hou did not stop at warning
Nong Aimny) either. Bn :uly %- he too. his case to @den) telling the foreign secretary
that while the <P0 stood ready to Doin in guaranteeing the freedom and independence of
all three !ndochinese states) membership in a Southeast #sia pact would change
everything. @vidently intent on removing what he may have sensed was a possible last$
minute obstacle) @den implied that he .new of no proposal for including the United
States in the pact) although he did not deny #merican interest in forming a defense
organi2ation for Southeast #sia. <hou said he had no obDections to #NLUS +it was
directed against :apan) he thought1) but he went into a lengthy discourse on the danger to
<hina of having foreign bases in !ndochina.
@den=s assurances evidently did not Fwords illegibleG <hou deeply. Bn :uly %J <hou met
with the /aotian foreign minister and presented "unofficial" but etravagant demands
which the latter found totally unacceptable. /aos was willing to provide the resistance
elements with Fwords illegibleG 2ones in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam
Neua6 <hou proposed) additionally) portions of /uang Prabang and Hien Ahouang
provinces. The royal government was further willing to concede the insurgents freedom
of movement in those 2ones) but <hou demanded administration by Doint royal$insurgent
committees and a supervisory Doint committee in 4ientiane until the general elections of
#ugust %&''. *inally) where the /aotians thought the issue of *rench Union bases had
been resolved in their favor) <hou now said the bases should be completely eliminated
even though established by *ranco$/aotian treaty.
<hou=s obsession with foreign military bases and related issues led to an effort to ma.e a
settlement contingent upon "estern acceptance of <hinese neutrali2ation plans. #
<hinese informant +probably >uang >ua1 told Seymour Topping that "estern
willingness to bar foreign military bases from !ndochina and to deny the #ssociated
States admission to any military blocs would assure agreement by :uly 7(. 8ore than
that) the informant said) the United States had also to subscribe to and guarantee the final
settlement) evidently in the belief that #merica=s signature would ma.e !ndochinese
participation in S@#TB illegal. F;oc. -5G # more direct statement was made by N<N#=s
"special correspondent" in Geneva) who drew a harsh characteri2ation of a cease$fire
agreement that left the door open to !ndochinese involvement in a military alliance3
!f efforts are made at the same time negotiations for peace are ta.ing place to drag the
three !ndochinese countries into an aggressive military bloc whose purpose is to unleash
war) then the cease$fire would mean nothing other than a respite for adDusting battle lines
and dispositions of strength in order to start the fighting again on an even larger scale. !n
such circumstances) the armistice agreement would become no more than a scrap of
paper.
"hether the <hinese seriously believed that the United States would sign the accords in
order to achieve a settlement) or that /aos and <ambodia Fwords missingG But of the
Southeast #sia collective defense is at best debatable. There seems little doubt) however)
that Pe.ing sincerely considered a written prohibition on
o the accords against !ndochinese alliances or foreign bases as a maDor step toward the
neutrali2ation of Southeast #sia and the area=s eventual dissociation from the #merican
defense system.
General Smith felt that Topping=s report dovetailed with growing <ommunist
intransigence in the past few days) particularly on the part of 8olotov. >e believed that
8olotov) who had urgently re?uested a restricted session for the %Jth) would li.ewise
raise the ?uestion of eplicit #merican ac?uiescence in a final settlement. F;oc. -5G
"hen the meeting came) however) 8olotov did not reiterate >uang >ua=s implication
that #merican failure to sign the accords might scuttle the conference. Perhaps aware that
a warning of that .ind would not wor.) 8olotov instead limited himself to tal.ing of the
conference=s achievements to date. >e complimented those who had been engaged in
private negotiations) and went so far as to voice confidence that a settlement of
outstanding problems relating to /aos and <ambodia could be achieved. >e closed by
pointing out that two drafts were before the conference relating to the cessation of
hostilities in 4ietnam and /aos) two on <ambodia) and two on a final declaration dealing
with political matters. That ended 8olotov=s contribution) leaving the #mericans) and
probably others) wondering why the Soviet foreign minister had hastily summoned the
meeting. F;oc. -,G
E. #:2EEME3T
!f 8olotov=s refusal at the :uly %J restricted session to warn the conference of failure
signaled renewed <ommunist efforts toward agreement) his subse?uent actions proved
the point. Between :uly %J and 7%) the conferees were able to iron out their differences
sufficiently to produce agreements now commonly referred to as the Geneva "accords."
!n fact) the accords consist of military agreements for 4ietnam) <ambodia) and /aos to
fulfill the conference=s primary tas. of restoring peace to !ndochina) and a *inal
;eclaration designed to establish the conditions for future political settlements
throughout !ndochina. The nature of the eleventh$hour compromises reached) and a broad
outline of the settlement) are treated below.
Bietnam
The Geneva accords temporarily established two 2ones of 4ietnam separated by a line
running roughly along the %-th parallel and further divided by a demilitari2ed 2one.
#greement to the demarcation line was apparently the wor. of 8olotov) who gained
*rench acceptance of the %-th parallel when he found the *rench flatly opposed to the
%,th) a late 4iet 8inh compromise perhaps prompted by 8olotov himself. F;oc. -7G
Precisely what motivated 8olotov to ma.e his proposal is not clear. Speculatively) he
may simply have traded considerable territorial advantage which the 4iet 8inh enDoyed
for a specific election date he) <hou) and Pham 4an ;ong wanted from the outset. The
"estern negotiators certainly recogni2ed the trade$off possibility3 @den considered a line
between the %-th and %Jth parallels worth echanging for a mutually acceptable position
on elections6 and 8endZs$*rance observed in a conversation with 8ob$toy that the
election and demarcation ?uestions might be lin.ed in the sense that each side could yield
on one of the ?uestions. [;oc. -7G
"hether or not a trade$off actually too. place) the fact remains that the *rench came off
much better in the matter of partition than on elections) which they had
insisted not be given a specific date. Bn :uly %,) 8olotov had proposed holding elections
in %&'') with the eact date to be decided between 4ietnamese and 4iet 8inh authorities.
F;oc. -7G The <hinese were more fleible. !n a tal. with a member of the British
delegation) /i A=e$nung argued for a specific date) but said his government was willing to
set it within two or three years of the ceasefire. F;oc. -,G The compromise formula was
reportedly wor.ed out by 8olotov) who) at a meeting :uly %& attended also by @den)
8endZs$*rance) <hou) and ;ong) drew the line at two years. !t was agreed in the *inal
;eclaration that the 4ietnamese of the two 2ones would consult together in :uly %&'' and
reunify 4ietnam by national plebiscite one year later. !mportantly for the 4iet 8inh) the
demarcation line was said to be "provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as
constituting a political or territorial boundary." 0epresentatives of the member states on
the !<< would act as a commission to supervise the national elections) which were to be
freely conducted by secret ballot. #s shall be pointed out later) however) the evident
intention of all the conferees +including the United States and the Government of South
4ietnam1 to see 4ietnam reunified was to a large etent undercut by the nature of the
military and political settlements.
The military accords on 4ietnam also stipulated that the :oint <ommission) which was to
ta.e over the wor. of the military commission that had met at Trung Gia) would have
general responsibility for wor.ing out the disengagement of forces and implementation of
the cease$fire. *rench Union soldiers were to be removed from North 4ietnam in stages
within 9(( days +article %'1) a lengthy period in .eeping with *rench demands.
Thereafter) the introduction into the two 2ones of fresh arms) e?uipment) and personnel
was prohibited with the eception of normal troop rotation and replacement of damaged
or destroyed materiel +articles %, and %-1. The establishment of new military bases in
4ietnam) and the adherence of either 2one to military alliances) were also proscribed
under articles %J and %&.
The membership and powers of the !nternational <ontrol <ommission were finally
resolved +<hapter 4! of the accords1. #pparently through <hou @n$lai=s efforts)
agreement was reached that !ndia) Poland) and <anada should be the member states of the
!<<. The !<< was empowered to form fied and mobile inspection teams and to have
full freedom of movement in both 2ones of 4ietnam. !n the performance of these tas.s)
the !<< was to epect complete cooperation from local civil and military officials. !ts
functions etended to control of the movement of armed forces and the release of
prisoners of war) and to supervision of the demarcation line) frontiers) ports) and airfields.
/ess clearly decided was the delicate ?uestion of the !<<=s relationship to the :oint
<ommission. Generally) the plan adopted was close to that originally submitted by the
*rench in early :uly) wherein the !<<=s supremacy was tacitly admitted. The !<< was to
be informed by the :oint <ommission of disputes arising out of differences of
interpretation) either of a provision or of fact) that the :oint <ommission could not
resolve. The !<< would then +article 5(1 have the power of recommendation6 but) ?uite
aside from the limited effectiveness of a recommendation) there remained the problem of
maDority or unanimous voting by the !<< in reaching agreement to recommend. Under
article 57) the rule of unanimity was to apply to "?uestions concerning violations) or
threats of violations) which might lead to a resumption of hostilities)" namely) a refusal to
regroup is provided in the accords) or an armed violation by one party of the territory of
the other. The "est) which had pushed hard for maDority rule) had to settle for its
application to those less volatile ?uestions that would not be considered threats to the
peace. *urthermore) under article 59) recognition was ta.en of possible splits among the
three members by providing for maDority and minority reports6 but these) li.e !<<
decisions) could be no more than suggestive) and as such wholly dependent upon the
cooperativeness of the conference members who had created it.
;am@odia and "aos
!n conflict with the wishes of the <ambodian and /aotian delegations) cease$fires in their
countries occurred simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities in 4ietnam.
Nevertheless) in most other respects) their persistence was largely responsible for
settlements highly favorable to their respective interests.
!n the first place) the #greement on the <essation of >ostilities in <ambodia called for
the removal of nonnative *ree Ahmer troops) whether <ommunist 4ietnamese or
<ambodians) ninety days from the cease$fire date +:uly 7(1. +*rench Union units) but not
instructors) were also scheduled for departure.1 #s the <ambodian delegation had
promised) those insurgents still in the country would be guaranteed the right to reDoin the
national community and to participate) as electors or candidates) in elections scheduled
under the constitution for %&''6 but the agreement assured their demobili2ation within
one month of the cease$fire. Separate Doint and international supervisory commissions for
<ambodia were established) as Phnom Penh had demanded. *inally) a declaration issued
:uly 7% by the <ambodian delegation was incorporated into the accord proclaiming) in
effect) Phnom Penh=s inherent right of self$defense. The royal government vowed not to
enter into military alliances "not in conformity with the principles of the <harter of the
United Nations"6 nor) so long as its security was not threatened) would <ambodia permit
the establishment of foreign military bases. #s for war materiel and military personnel)
the delegation made clear that these would not be solicited during the period :uly 7()
%&'5) to the election date in %&'' "ecept for the purpose of the effective defence of the
territory." Thus) after the elections) <ambodia proclaimed itself free to ta.e any steps it
considered necessary for its security) whether or not such steps were absolutely necessary
for self$defense.
<ambodia=s ac?uisition of considerable latitude was entirely in .eeping with the royal
government=s epressed insistence on not being either neutrali2ed or demilitari2ed. Bn
this point) the <ambodians received indirect assurance from the United States that their
security would in some way be covered by the Southeast #sian pact despite their
unilateral declaration. Toward the end of the conference) Philip Bonsal of the State
;epartment and the #merican delegation) told Sam Sary that he +Bonsal1 "was confident
U.S. and other interested countries loo.ed forward to discussing with <ambodian
government" the security problem upon implementation of a cease$fire. "hen Sam Sary
called a few days later on Smith in the company of Nong Aimny) the Under Secretary
recommended that Phnom Penh) at the conference) state its intention not to have foreign
bases on its territory and not to enter into military alliances. #t the same time) though)
<ambodia would be free to import arms and to employ *rench military instructors and
technicians. <ambodia might not be able to Doin S@#TB under this arrangement) Smith
said) but it could still benefit from it. Smith3
assured the <ambodian *oreign 8inister that) in our view) any aggression overt or covert
against <ambodian territory would bring pact into operation even though <ambodia not a
member. ! too. position that *rench Union membership afforded <ambodia ade?uate
desirable means of securing through *rance necessary arms some of which would be
#merican as well as necessary instructors and technicians some of which might well be
#merican trained.
Nong Aimny replied that <ambodia relied heavily on the United States for protection
against future aggression. The way was thus cleared for the subse?uent inclusion of
<ambodia in the Protocol to the S@#TB treaty.
The cease$fire agreement on /aos followed lines similar to those drawn for <ambodia. #
separate Doint commission was set up to supervise the withdrawal of Pathet /ao units)
although provision was made for their prior regroupment in the provinces of Phong Saly
and Sam Neua.Y #lthough /aos was prohibited from see.ing to
Y The /aotian delegation also issued a declaration averring the government=s willingness
to integrate former insurgents into the national community without reprisal. @lections in
/aos were scheduled for September %&'') and former Pathet /ao were promised the right
to participate in the balloting as electors or candidates.
augment its military establishment) the royal government was specifically permitted a
maimum of %)'(( *rench training instructors. 8oreover) the prohibition against the
establishment of foreign military bases on /aotian territory did not apply to two *rench
bases in operation under a %&5& treaty) and employing 9)'(( *renchmen. /aos) li.e
<ambodia) was allowed to import arms and other military e?uipment essential for self$
defense6 but 4ientiane also issued a unilateral declaration on :uly 7% ma.ing clear) in
terms that nearly duplicated those used in <ambodia=s declaration) that its refrainment
from alliances and foreign military bases was limited to situations in which /aotian
security was not threatened. !n view of 4ientiane=s epressed hope for #merican
protection) its delegates had succeeded admirably in getting a settlement containing terms
that restricted) but did not eliminate) /aotian control over their security re?uirements.
F. D!SSE3T!3: B!E/S> T)E #ME2!;#3 #3D B!ET3#MESE P6S!T!63S
No delegate at the final plenary session on !ndochina :uly 7% should have been surprised
when Under Secretary Smith issued a unilateral statement of the #merican position. The
United States had fre?uently indicated) publicly and privately) directly and indirectly) that
it would not be cosignatory with the <ommunist powers to any agreement and that) at
best) it would agree only to "respect" the final settlement. #t the restricted session of :uly
%J) Smith had) moreover) indicated the points which were to become basic features of his
final statement. ;espite the fact that the accords were in line with the Seven Points in
nearly every particular) it would have been presumptuous of any delegation to believe
that the United States) given the implacable hostility of #dministration leaders to
<ommunist <hina and to any agreement that would imply #merican approval of a
territorial cession to the <ommunists) would formally sign the Geneva accords.
Bedell Smith) revealing a considerably more pliant approach to dealing with the
<ommunist world) was able to eact from "ashington agreement to partial #merican
acceptance of the *inal ;eclaration. Bn :uly %& he had been approached by 8endZs$
*rance) who from the beginning had sought to identify the United States as closely as
possible with the final terms) with the proposal that "ashington not simply respect any
military agreements reached) but in addition ta.e note of them and the political
statements that comprised the first nine paragraphs of the proposed conference
declaration. 8endZs$*rance indicated the *rench would be sharply disappointed if the
United States could not at least ta.e note of those portions of the declaration. Smith)
apparently swayed by the premier=s views) recommended to "ashington that his
instructions be amended to provide for ta.ing note in the event the *inal ;eclaration was
substantially as the *rench had indicated. F;oc. J(G ;ulles gave his approval) demurring
only on the second part of paragraph & +in the final version) paragraph %91) which the
Secretary said "seems to imply a multilateral engagement with <ommunists which would
be inconsistent with our basic approach and which subse?uently might enable
<ommunist <hina to charge us with alleged violations of agreement to which it might
claim both governments became parties." F;oc. J%G "hen Smith) therefore) issued his
unilateral statement) note was ta.en only of the first twelve paragraphs of the *inal
;eclaration6 but this was much more than had been called for in his revised instructions
of :uly %,.
!n line with his instructions) Smith declared on behalf of the Government that the United
States would "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the accords.
8oreover) the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of
the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international
peace and security." *inally) Smith reiterated a U.S. policy declaration of :une 7&) made
during the visit of @den and <hurchill) that registered "ashington=s support of UN
supervision of free elections to reunify countries "now divided against their will Smith
mentioned on this point that the United States could not associate itself with any
arrangement that would hinder "its traditional position that peoples are entitled to
determine their own future..."
Smith=s caution against "any renewal of aggression" deserves additional comment
inasmuch as it was cited by President Aennedy +in a letter to President Ngo ;inh ;iem
on ;ecember %5) %&,%1 as the basis for the #merican commitment to South 4ietnam=s
defense. 4iewed in the contet of the conference) the statement does not seem to have
been intended as an open$ended #merican commitment to South 4ietnam against
possible aggression from the North. 0ather) the #dministration apparently intended the
statement as a warning to the 4iet 8inh that should they) within the two$year interval
before general elections) "renew" what "ashington and Saigon regarded as their
"aggression" since %&5,) the United States would be gravely concerned. Smith=s
statement) in short) seems to have been limited to the period :uly %&'5 to :uly %&',.
That part of Smith=s unilateral statement dealing with United Nations supervision of
elections is also noteworthy. <oming in the wa.e of ;ulles= epressed concern over
provision in the accords for !<< supervision) F;oc. J%G Smith=s reference to the UN may
have forecast #merican unwillingness to bac. an electoral process not supervised by the
Brgani2ation. !nasmuch as the United States delegation had consistently pushed at
Geneva for United Nations rather than any other form of international machinery) Smith
may have meant to give an advance signal of #merican displeasure with free 4ietnamese
elections that the UN would be prevented from overseeing.
#merican ?ualifications to the Geneva accords paled beside those made by the South
4ietnam delegation. >owever naively) the "South" 4ietnamese refused to accept a
divided country and believed) to the end of the conference) that the *rench had bra2enly
and illegally sold out 4ietnamese interests. 4ietnam=s anger at *rench manipulation of its
political future was reflected in a note handed to the *rench delegation on :uly %- by
Nguyen >uu <hau. F;oc. -9G The note maintained that not until the day before +an
eaggeration by about three wee.s) it would appear1 did 4ietnam learn that at the very
time the *rench >igh <ommand had ordered the evacuation of troops from important
areas in the Ton.in ;elta) the *rench had also "accepted abandoning to the 4iet 8inh all
of that part situated north of the eighteenth parallel and that the delegation of the 4iet
8inh might claim an even more advantageous demarcation line." The 4ietnamese
delegation protested against having been left "in complete ignorance" of *rench
proposals) which were said not to "ta.e any account of the unanimous will for national
unity of the 4ietnamese people."
"hile it may have been absurd for the 4ietnamese to believe that partition was avoidable
given 4iet 8inh strength) their rationale for .eeping the country united was) as matters
developed) eminently clear$sighted. !n speeches during :une and :uly) their leaders had
warned that partition would be merely a temporary interlude before the renewal of
fighting. "hen the 4iet 8inh first proposed a temporary division of territory) the
;efense 8inister) Phan >uy Kuat) said in Saigon on :une 7 that partition would "ris.
reviving the drama of the struggle between the North and the South." ;iem) in his
investiture speech of early :uly) warned against a cease$fire that would mean partition)
for that arrangement "can only be the preparation for another more deadly war..." #nd
General Nguyen 4an >inh) head of the 4ietnamese National #rmy) declared3
To reali2e a cease$fire by partition of 4ietnamese territory can be only a temporary
measure to stop the bloodshed but not to end the war. #nd it is possible that we shall
have to face a cold war as in Aorea where both sides= troops have their fingers on the
triggers of their guns all the time) and people are thin.ing only of recovering what has
been given up under the pressure of the circumstances.
#lthough their struggle against partition) which reached a clima in the aftermath of the
signing of the accords with huge rallies in the maDor cities) proved futile) the 4ietnamese
early gave notice that they would accept neither partition nor a fied date for national
elections. "e need only recall the statements by Bao ;ai=s cabinet in Paris on the eve of
the conference to find evidence of 4ietnam=s early determination that it would not be
party to a sell$out of its own territory. "hen partition became certain in :uly with the
circulation of draft final declarations) the 4ietnamese delegation became more vocal. #t
the final plenary session) Tran 4an ;o said3 ". . . the Government of the State of
4ietNam wishes the <onference to ta.e note of the fact that it reserves its full freedom of
action in order to safeguard the sacred right of the 4ietnamese people to its territorial
unity) national independence) and freedom." "hen as.ed to consent to the military
accords and the *inal ;eclaration) ;o re?uested insertion of the following tet into the
;eclaration3
The conference ta.es note of the ;eclaration of the Government of the State of 4iet$Nam
underta.ing3
to ma.e and support every effort to reestablish a real and lasting peace in 4iet$Nam6
not to use force to resist the procedures for carrying the ceasefire into effect) in spite of
the obDections and reservations that the State of 4iet$Nam has epressed) especially in its
final statement.
The re?uest was denied.
#s for elections) the 4ietnamese believed that the war situation compelled the
postponement of elections until the country had achieved a measure of internal stability.
#s early as 8ay) ;iem indicated his opposition to elections for a National #ssembly)
much less to national elections for the presidency. !n its note to the *rench delegation)
moreover) the 4ietnamese asserted that a cease$fire without disarmament was
incompatible with elections6 the regroupment of the armed forces of the belligerents into
separate 2ones was said to compromise their freedom in advance. !n 4ietnam=s view)
elections could only be considered after security and peace had been established) thereby
ecluding a set time interval of two years. F;oc. -9G
>aving ta.en these positions) the 4ietnamese could hardly adhere to the *inal
;eclaration. #t the same time) they protested against the "hasty conclusion of the
#rmistice #greement by the *rench and 4ietminh >igh <ommanders only . . ." +as Tran
4an ;o put it at the :uly 7% session1. !nasmuch as the military accords) by
prearrangement) were signed by *rench and 4iet 8inh commanders precisely to avoid
see.ing 4ietnamese consent) there was nothing Saigon could do but protest.
Nevertheless) by having protested) they were asserting that the treaties with *rance of
:une 5 had indeed made 4ietnam a sovereign state) that the interests of non$<ommunist
4ietnamese were deeply involved in the settlement) and that *rance=s by$passing of the
Bao ;ai government only made the settlement possible) not legal. ;espite article 7- of
the agreement on 4ietnam) which bound "successors" +such as 4ietnam1 to the
signatories to respect and enforce the agreement) 4ietnam was in a legally persuasive
position to argue that *rance could not assume liabilities in its behalf) least of all to the
political provisions contained in the *inal ;eclaration) which was an unsigned document.
Y
Y #rticle 7-) which is fre?uently cited to demonstrate that 4ietnam was bound to abide
by the accords) and particularly the elections provision) refers to "signatories of the
present FmilitaryG #greement..." >ence) the article would seem not to obligate *rance=s
"successor" with respect to any provisions of the *inal ;eclaration) a document to which
South 4ietnam did not adhere.
:. S7MM#2<
Throughout the rapid series of compromises in the last thirty days of the Geneva
<onference) #merican diplomacy revealed a constancy of purpose fully in line with the
@isenhower #dministration=s global foreign policy. Based largely on the unfortunate
eperiences at PanmunDom) the #dministration could not reconcile itself to the notion
that Sino$Soviet negotiating tactics in the post$Stalin period of peaceful coeistence had
changed. <onse?uently) even as the reali2ation dawned that the <ommunists could not be
epelled from !ndochina and that some compromise with them by *rance was inevitable)
the #dministration stuc. fast to the position that the United States delegation to the
conference would only assist) but not ta.e an active part) in bringing about an acceptable
settlement. *rom :une on) the delegation was under instructions to remain clear of any
involvement in the negotiations such as might implicate or commit the United States to
the final terms reached) yet simultaneously was to maintain an influential role in ma.ing
the best of difficult circumstances. British and *rench agreement to the Seven Points
proved a diplomatic victory) not because their acceptance of them assured a reasonable
settlement but because) ?uite contrary to #merican epectations) they returned to Geneva
prepared to hold the line against eorbitant <ommunist demands. #llied agreement to
future discussions of a regional defense system for Southeast #sia was really a hedge
against a *rench sell$out at Geneva6 in the event 4ietnam) and parts of <ambodia and
/aos) were ceded to the <ommunist insurgents) the United States would at least have
#nglo$*rench consent to protect the security of what remained of !ndochina and its
neighbors.
The Seven Points represented principles) not #merican obDectives. They constituted not a
statement of goals to be achieved by the United States) but of principles to be adopted by
the British and *rench negotiators toward concluding a satisfactory settlement. !n this
manner) the #dministration could preserve its dignity before anticipated 4ietnamese
outrage at partition and domestic displeasure at further <ommunist inroads in the *ar
@ast without losing its ability to influence the terms. Under Secretary Smith=s final
statement ta.ing note of the agreements and vowing not to disturb them thus culminated a
careful policy that reDected an #merican commitment to the accords such as might
identify the #dministration with a cession of territory and people to the <ommunist bloc.
The Geneva <onference left much wor. undone) especially on a political settlement for
4ietnam. The State of 4ietnam) li.e the United States) had refused to adhere to the *inal
;eclaration and was not signatory to the military accord that partitioned the country. !n
the net section) the focus is therefore on the practical effect of the Geneva accords) the
epectations of the conferees concerning them) and the etent to which the maDor powers)
in reaching a settlement) achieved the obDectives they had set for themselves.
4!!!. T>@ 8@#N!NG B* G@N@4#
8uch of the controversy surrounding the #merican involvement in 4ietnam relates to the
post$Geneva period) in particular to the two$year interval before national elections were
to bring about 4ietnam=s reunification. To address the ?uestion whether the United States
instigated or colluded with the Government of 4ietnam to defy the *inal ;eclaration=s
stipulation for national elections would broaden this paper beyond its intended scope.
"hat is relevant) however) are the documented or presumed epectations and obDectives
of the maDor participants concerning 4ietnam) as well as <ambodia and /aos) at the time
the conference closed. >ow had the accords met the aims of the participants) and to what
etent were obDectives intertwined with) or perhaps divorced from) epectationsN To
anticipate) the present argument over the failure to hold elections in :uly %&', overloo.s
the relative unimportance of them) for a variety of reasons) to the five maDor powers at the
Geneva <onference6 their obDectives only secondarily too. into account the epectations
of the 4ietnamese) north and south.
#n assessment of the hopes and goals of the Geneva conferees in the immediate
aftermath of the conference should) in the first place) be differentiated from the practical
effect of the accords they drew up. The distinction not often made) yet highly important
to an understanding of the conference and its achievements) is between the intent of the
parties regarding 4ietnam and the seemingly contradictory conse?uences of their
agreement.
#. T)E P2#;T!;#" 3#T72E 6F T)E #;;62DS
"ith the eception of South 4ietnam) every nation represented at the conference came to
believe that partition was the only way to separate the combatants) settle the widely
disparate military and political demands of the *rench and 4iet 8inh) and conclude an
armistice. !t might further be argued +although the evidence available does not actually
permit a definitive statement one way or the other1 that these eight delegations intended
the partition line to be temporary inasmuch as they all desired 4ietnamese elections in
%&',. But what needs to be pointed out is that the accords themselves did not further that
intent. By creating two regimes responsible for "civil administration" +article %5$a of the
4ietnam armistice agreement1) by providing for the regroupment of forces to two 2ones
and for the movement of persons to the 2one of their choice) and by putting off national
elections for two years) the conferees had actually made a future political settlement for
4ietnam etremely unli.ely. <ertainly) the separation of 4ietnam at the %-th parallel was
designed to facilitate the armistice) not to create political subdivisions6 but its unintended
effect was to allow time for the development of two go'ernments) headed by totally
divergent personalities and committed to antithetical political philosophies) foreign
policies) and socio$economic systems. Thus) the call for elections in the *inal ;eclaration
had as little chance of implementation in 4ietnam as previously in Aorea and Germany) a
point brought home by 4ietnamese officials and reinforced by the failure of the same
Geneva conferees to agree on a political settlement in Aorea. "@lections)" 4ictor Bator
has commented "can) indeed) decide secondary problems of coeistence in circumstances
where some measurable minimum basis for political agreement eists. But they are
incapable of acceptance by two opposing states) or parts of a state) when diametrically
opposite philosophies are involved." !f the intent of the Geneva accords was subverted)
the subverters were the conferees themselves) who aspired to an ideal political settlement
incompatible with the physical and psychological dismemberment of 4ietnam on :uly 7%)
%&'5.
5. 65FE;T!BES 6F T)E P#2T!;!P#3TS> T)E ;6MM73!ST S!DE
"hether or not one accepts the view offered here that the central political provision of
the *inal ;eclaration was decisively undercut by provisions of the military accords and
the ;eclaration itself) an eamination of the obDectives of the Soviet Union and
<ommunist <hina can go far toward determining) albeit by surmisal) the importance they)
as distinct from the ;04) attached to 4ietnamese unity. *or it is the conclusion here that
4ietnamese unity) whether achieved by free elections or the disintegration of South
4ietnam) was not a priority obDective of 8oscow or Pe.ing even though both powers
may well have anticipated an all$<ommunist 4ietnam by :uly %&',. !f this is so) we may
as.) what were the primary aims of 8oscow and Pe.ing in supporting a settlementN "hy
did the <ommunists apparently strive for a settlement) and why did 8olotov in particular)
who was not personally identified in "estern eyes at the time as a vigorous proponent of
dVtente) play such a .ey role in .eeping the conference from the brin. of failureN
#lthough it would appear that) on the maDor issues at least) the Soviet Union coordinated
its actions with <ommunist <hina) the two <ommunist powers were clearly pursuing
separate national interests in wor.ing toward a settlement of the war. The reconciliation
of those interests seems to have been achieved not so much through Soviet ability +which
did eist1 to compel <hinese ac?uiescence as through a common desire for a settlement.
So'iet 6@Heti'es at the ;onferene
!n retrospect) the Soviet Union seems to have had four maDor obDectives at the
conference3 +%1 to avert a maDor war crisis over !ndochina that would stimulate "estern
unity) enable the United States to gain support it previously lac.ed for "united action)"
and conceivably force 8oscow into a commitment to defend the <hinese6 +71 to reduce
the prospects for successful passage of @;< in the *rench National #ssembly6 +91 to
heighten the prestige of the Soviet Union as a world peacema.er6 +51 to bolster the
prestige of <ommunist <hina) probably more as an adDunct to the Soviet drive for
leadership of the "peaceful coeistence" movement than as a means of supporting any
<hinese claim to unrivaled leadership in #sia.
Bn the first point) the Soviets were surely aware that the United States) under certain
conditions) was prepared to consider active involvement in the war. "hile united action
was a dead issue in "ashington by mid$:une) the Soviets +and the <hinese as well1 could
not have .nown this. 8oreover) newspaper reports of the time added both credence and
uncertainty to #merican military plans. !n the course of private discussions at Geneva)
8olotov indicated his concern that a brea.down of the conference might lead to
continued fighting right up to the point of "orld "ar !!!. The *rench and British did
nothing to dispel those fears. <hauvel) for instance) told the 0ussian delegate) Au2netsov)
that *rance=s proposed division of 4ietnam at the %Jth parallel would be more acceptable
to the other conferees than the unreasonable 4iet 8inh demand for the %9th parallel) and
that a settlement along the *rench line would thereby avert the ris. of an
internationali2ation of the conflict. #nd 8endZs$*rance vowed to bac. his call for
conscripts by informing 8olotov he "did not intend Geneva would turn into a
PanmunDom."
The possibility of renewed fighting leading to a wider war was particularly influential on
the Soviets) it would seem) as a conse?uence of 8oscow=s inner debate during %&'9 and
%&'5 over #merican strategic intentions and their meaning for the Soviet defense system.
The views of the so$called Ahrushchev wing apparently won out in the spring of %&'53
The United States was considered fully capable of initiating a nuclear echange and a
new world war. *ree$wheeling discussion in the "estern press on the foreign policy
implications of @isenhower=s "New /oo." and ;ulles= "massive retaliation" speech of
:anuary %7) %&'5) was closely followed by the Soviets) who may have been persuaded in
their pessimistic assumptions regarding #merican strategy by the very ambiguity of
#merican "reliance" on nuclear weapons to combat <ommunist aggression. !n fact) it can
be argued that even though the United States and its allies went to the conference table
from a position of diplomatic wea.ness) their hands were considerably strengthened
because of Soviet uncertainty over what the "est might do in the event the conference
failed. !nasmuch as Soviet analyses by no means ecluded #merican rec.lessness with
nuclear weapons) 8oscow might have been highly reluctant to press too vigorously for
the "est=s acceptance of eorbitant 4iet 8inh demands. Soviet awareness that the United
States had seriously considered active involvement in !ndochina prior to the fall of
;ienbienphu may therefore have been a significant lever for the "est in the Geneva
negotiations. >ad the opposite perception been true$had the Soviets) that is) been
confident that the #merican #dministration would be highly sober) conservative) and
cautious in responding to war situations$8olotov might have been instructed to play a far
more audacious game while the 4iet 8inh intensified their military operations. ;ulles=
reputation as a militant anti$<ommunist with tremendous influence on @isenhower
probably served the "estern cause well at Geneva.
#s a result) to conclude on this point) one of the Soviets= principal aims at the conference
was to diminish the possibility of #merican unilateral or multilateral intervention in the
li.ely belief that intervention would have built up tremendous pressure on 8oscow to
ma.e new commitments in Southeast #sia. "hile this
outloo. did not prevent the Soviets from at first see.ing to capitali2e on the change in
government in Paris from /aniel to 8endZs$*rance) it did wor. in the general direction
of a reasonable settlement that would be honorable for the *rench and still valuable to the
4iet 8inh. The 0ussians evidently believed that so long as the *rench +and the British1
were .ept interested in a settlement) the #mericans would be hard$pressed to disregard
their allies and intervene.
That 8oscow may have been anious about a wider war does not) however) address the
inenti'es it may have had in concluding the cease$fire. >ere) the @uropean ;efense
<ommunity treaty must have been uppermost in 8olotov=s mind. No evidence has been
found to support the contention that 8olotov eplicitly baited 8endZs$*rance with a
lenient !ndochina settlement in return for #ssembly reDection of @;<. But 8olotov need
not have been that obtrusive. Throughout %&'9 and into %&'5) Soviet propaganda was
dominated by comments on @;< and the danger of a rearmed Germany. !t was certainly
in Soviet interests to pressure the 4iet 8inh for concessions to the *rench) since removal
of the *rench command from !ndochina would restore *rench force levels on the
<ontinent and thereby probably offset their need for an @;<. Soviet interests thus
dictated the sacrifice of 4iet 8inh goals if necessary to prevent German remilitari2ation.
Given 8oscow=s belated attention to the !ndochina war) it appears that the consolidation
of 4iet 8inh gains short of complete reunification of 4ietnam was more than sufficient
to Dustify termination of the struggle in Soviet eyes$$and this perception) it might be
added) dovetailed with what seems to have been the <hinese outloo..
Thirdly) the worldwide Soviet peace offensive which gained priority in the aftermath of
Stalin=s death could be given added impetus through vigorous Soviet support of an
!ndochina settlement. This point) in fact) was the theme of 8olotov=s closing remar.s to
the conference on :uly 7%. >e called the accords "a maDor victory for the forces of peace
and a maDor step towards a reduction of international tensions." <onsidering that the
conference had demonstrated the value of international negotiations to settle dangerous
disputes) 8olotov said3 "The results of the Geneva <onference have confirmed the
rightness of the principle which is fundamental to the whole foreign policy of the Soviet
Union) namely) that there are no issues in the contemporary international situation which
cannot be solved and settled through negotiations and by agreements designed to
consolidate peace." #t a time when the United States was alleged to be Deopardi2ing
world peace with its "policy of strength)" the Soviet Union could lay claim to sparing no
effort in the struggle for ways to avoid a nuclear holocaust.
!n this light) <ommunist <hina was important to the USS0 as a partner in the peace
offensive. "hile 8oscow could not have wished to see <hina so gain in prestige as to
rival the Soviet Union in #sia or elsewhere) the 0ussians do seem) in %&'5) to have
considered a gain in <hinese influence highly desirable if only because the United States
would be bound to suffer a corresponding loss. #s 8olotov phrased it on :uly 7%3
...the Geneva <onference indicated the great positive importance that the participation of
the People=s 0epublic of <hina has in the settlement of urgent international problems.
The course of wor. at this <onference has shown that any artificial obstacles on the road
to <hina=s participation in the settlement of international affairs) which are still being put
up by aggressive circles of some countries) are being swept away by life itself.
Noteworthy is 8olotov=s omission of the additional claim made at the time by Pe.ing
that <hina=s participation was absolutely essential to the solution of #sian
problems. "hile the Soviet foreign minister was perhaps thin.ing in terms of <P0
admission to the United Nations) the <hinese apparently were loo.ing beyond the UN to
the .ind of full$scale diplomatic effort that would earn them #sia=s respect as founders of
what was later termed the "Bandung spirit." Nor did 8olotov assert that <hina=s wor. at
the conference had earned it a status e?uivalent to one of the maDor powers. The Soviets
were willing to admit that Pe.ing had gained a new importance as a result of the
conference) but they refused to go as far as the <hinese in asserting <hina=s first$ran.
status either in #sia or worldwide.
The Soviets) then) had much to gain from an honorable settlement of the !ndochina war
and much to ris. in permitting the tal.s to drag on inconclusively. The 4iet 8inh had
proven their strength as a national liberation movement and had been amply rewarded
with a firm territorial base assured by international agreement. "ith overriding interests
in "estern @urope) 8oscow no doubt found great appeal in giving the *rench a face$
saving "out" from !ndochina. That @;< was eventually defeated in the National
#ssembly +in #ugust1 was testimony not to the cleverness of any Soviet "deal" with
8endZs$*rance) but simply to a low$cost Soviet diplomatic gamble that paid off
handsomely.
;hinese 6@Heti'es
*or Pe.ing) a negotiated settlement of the !ndochina war represented an important
opportunity to propel <hina forward as a maDor #sian power whose voice in #sian
councils could not be ignored. "hen the Berlin <onference decided in *ebruary %&'5 to
hold an international conference on !ndochina) the <hinese applauded the move and
prophesied then that the People=s 0epublic) as an invitee) would thereby gain recognition
of its maDor role in #sian affairs. "ith the Geneva <onference coming at a time of
vigorous <hinese diplomatic activity in !ndia and Burma) Pe.ing probably considered a
settlement short of a complete 4iet 8inh victory acceptable) since it would prove <hina=s
sincere commitment to peace. >ad the <P0 spurred the 4iet 8inh on) it not only would
have been in conflict with the Soviets) whose aid was vital to <hina=s economic recovery
plans) but would also have lost considerable ground in the support <hou @n$lai=s travels
had earned. The war in !ndochina had become) for <hina) a demonstration test of its
sincerity in promoting peaceful coeistence. *rom the tactical standpoint) devotion to
peaceful coeistence may also have been seen as reducing the prospects of widespread
#sian support of) or participation in) the #merican plan for a regional alliance. "ith the
conference ended) <hina was in a position to offer #sian nations an alternative to alliance
with the United States$the concept of "collective peace and security)" sustained by mutual
agreement to foster the five principles.
The motive force behind <hina=s drive for #sian leadership during the period of the
Geneva <onference was the theme that negotiated solutions were possible for all
outstanding world problems. By the time of Geneva) Pe.ing had already been party to the
armistice in Aorea) to agreement with !ndia over Tibet) and to statements of mutual
respect issued bilaterally with !ndia and Burma. 8oreover) <hina had Doined with
8oscow in supporting negotiations of the !ndochina war as early as September %&'9)
while the Sino$!ndian and Sino$Burmese statements also contained calls for an early
settlement. The maDor role played by <hou @n$/ai at Geneva therefore not simply
affirmed <hina=s interest in peace) but as importantly established <hina=s reputation as a
fleible bargainer willing to negotiate disputes and ma.e concessions to resolve them.
!ndeed) once the conference ended) Pe.ing declared that the conference had proved that
negotiations could resolve such other @ast$"est problems as a final Aorea settlement)
arms control) nuclear weapons proliferation) German unification) and @uropean security.
0elatedly) <hina urged that the Geneva <onference was a benchmar. in the rise of the
People=s 0epublic to new prominence on the international scene. "The great significance
of the convening of the Geneva <onference)" the People(s Daily proclaimed before its
close) "lies in the fact that the <hinese People=s 0epublic is participating in the settlement
of #sian ?uestions as one of the Great Powers) thus putting an end to the era when the
#sian peoples were denied their say in their own problems." <hina stood not only for a
resurgent) decoloniali2ed #sia) but also as a Great Power. #s stated by the authoritative
/orld ;ulture>
The contributions of the <P0 at the Geneva <onference to the search for peace) and its
efforts to establish collective security in #sia) have received the universal recognition and
trust of the world=s peace$loving peoples and nations. Because of this) the position of the
<P0 as one of the world=s great nations has been even more affirmed and its international
prestige greatly elevated. The <hinese people feel etraordinary glory because of this.
The fact that <hina had) in !ndochina and as was not the case in Aorea) been invited to
Doin with the Big *our in discussing measures for the restoration of peace was considered
by Pe.ing to have given the <P0 still more international authority.
#ugmentation of <hinese prestige in #sia and throughout the world was a benefit due to
the conference6 but it does not fully eplain why <hina apparently pressed for a
settlement when she did rather than prolong the tal.s until better terms were available.
>aving negotiated at PanmunDom for two years) why did she ta.e less than three months
to conclude a cease$fire in !ndochinaN There seem to have been three reasons for <hina=s
reluctance to engage in etended discussions3 +%1 agreement with the Soviets that the
United States could intervene to spar. a wider war6 +71 consideration that /aos and
<ambodia had been effectively neutrali2ed6 +91 satisfaction that a communist state had
been established on <hina=s southern flan..
!n the first place) Pe.ing was convinced) to Dudge from its published comments on the
war) that influential men in "ashington) including Secretary ;ulles and the :oint <hiefs
of Staff) were ?uite prepared to move directly against <hina if circumstances permitted.
"ashington=s warnings to Pe.ing in %&'9 left room for the continuation of <hinese aid to
the 4iet 8inh) but Pe.ing could never be certain when that aid might become the pretet
for active #merican intervention. By %&'5) moreover) the <hinese had evinced greater
concern than before over the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons. >aving been
through a costly war in Aorea) and having decided as early as the fall of %&'7 to give
priority to "socialist reconstruction" at home) Pe.ing had nothing to gain from provo.ing
the United States. "ere the 4iet 8inh encouraged to strive for the maimum territorial
advantage) the United States$Pe.ing may have calculated$might withdraw from the
conference and change the nature of the war. Bnce those events occurred) the <hinese
advocacy of peace through diplomacy would have been irreparably undercut.
Pe.ing) moreover) was made clearly aware of the dangers inherent in continued fighting.
#t the conference) @den used the implied threat of #merican involvement against <hou
in much the same way as <hauvel had used it against Au2netsov. ;uring late 8ay) for
eample) @den warned <hou "again" of the dangers in the !ndochina situation6
unpredictable and serious results could come about. "hen <hou said he was counting on
Britain to prevent these from happening) the foreign secretary replied <hou was
mista.en) since Britain would stand by the United States in a showdown. *urthermore)
with the @isenhower$<hurchill warning of :une 7J that unacceptable demands made
against *rance would "seriously aggravate" the international situation) with ;ulles=
perceived pressure on 8endZs$*rance at the Paris meeting of mid$:uly) and with the
return of Smith to the conference table) the <hinese were given unmista.able signs that
"estern unity had finally been achieved and some .ind of coordination wor.ed out on
the settlement. #t that Duncture) the outstanding issue for Pe.ing was not how much
territory the ;04 would ultimately obtain) but how far <ambodia and /aos could be
pressed before the :uly 7( deadline passed.
By the deadline) as we have seen) <hou @n$lai=s hardened attitude in conversations with
the <ambodian and /aotian delegates had not swayed them from their hope of eventual
security coverage by the United States. *rom <hina=s standpoint) however) the vital
agreement had been secured3 None of the !ndochinese states was permitted to Doin a
military alliance or to allow the establishment of foreign military bases on their soil.
"hether the <hinese recogni2ed the alternative for the three states of obtaining protection
through a device such as the S@#TB Protocol is not .nown. "hen the accords were
signed) Pe.ing greeted them with the remar. that the restrictions upon !ndochina=s
military ties to the "est had dealt a severe blow to #merican regional security ambitions.
So long as the United States was not permitted to establish bases in the three countries
and to introduce military personnel there) <hina=s security re?uirements were fulfilled
even though) in their internal political ma.e$up) the three states might ta.e a strong anti$
<ommunist line. !t was perhaps because the <P0 had emerged with these advantages that
a <hinese Dournalist confided on :uly 793 ""e have won the first campaign for the
neutrali2ation of all Southeast #sia."
The supposed "neutrali2ation" of <ambodia and /aos was coupled with the securance of
a solid territory for the ;04 along <hina=s southern frontier. *urther territorial gains by
the 4iet 8inh would augment ;04 resources) but would not significantly enhance
<hina=s security. "ith agreement by the conference to stabili2e the military assets of both
2ones of 4ietnam and to forbid their military alignment with other nations) <hina could
feel some confidence that a divided 4ietnam would not present an immediate threat.
Thus) the agreements on <ambodia and /aos complemented the 4ietnam accord in
bolstering <hina=s security from the south even as it also meant a sacrifice of the 4iet
8inh=s capability for overrunning all 4ietnam.
The argument here is) in summary) that the Soviet Union and <ommunist <hina were less
concerned with the specific terms of the settlement than with attaining it once their basic
obDectives had been achieved. # settlement along lines that would satisfy the 4iet 8inh
need for territory) give *rance the satisfaction that it had not sold out) go far toward
fulfilling <hinese security re?uirements and political ambitions in Southeast #sia) and
reduce the possibility of a precipitate #merican withdrawal from the conference was) to
8oscow and Pe.ing) acceptable and even desirable. They saw advantages to themselves
in an early e?uitable agreement that clearly conflicted with 4iet 8inh terms) but not with
their own obDectives.
Precisely how <hou and 8olotov reasoned with >o <hi 8inh$by threat) persuasion) or a
combination of the two$will li.ely never be .nown6 but it seems reasonable to suppose
that) given the precarious political situation in South 4ietnam) the multitude of armed
sects and other groups hostile to the Saigon government) the continued eacerbating
presence of the *rench) and the economic and social vulnerabilities of a society wrac.ed
by war) Pe.ing and 8oscow could argue convincingly that South 4ietnam would never
cohere sufficiently to pose a viable alternative to the ;04. !t may thus have been the
<ommunists= epectation that the ;04 would as li.ely assume control of the entire
country by default as by an election victory in %&',. The <hinese) to be sure) accepted
the notion that the Geneva accords had) temporarily at least) created two 4ietnamese
governments rather than simply divided the country administratively. F;oc. ,5G But it is
improbable that either they or the Soviets anticipated that even an #merican$supported
South 4ietnam could survive. Put another way) the possibility of a prospering) anti$
<ommunist South 4ietnam may simply not have been a serious) and certainly was not an
immediate) concern for either <ommunist power. The Geneva <onference had created
*rench goodwill for 8oscow and added security for Pe.ing6 what might happen in South
4ietnam may) in %&'5) have seemed inconse?uential.
Biet Minh 6@Heti'es
The 4iet 8inh did not emerge as "losers" in the negotiations. They received the territorial
benefits of the settlement without having to cede the *rench or any neutral body control
of enclaves in northern 4ietnam. =!n addition) the ;04 was promised an opportunity
within two years to gain full control of the country through a ballot bo victory) although
it appears that 4iet 8inh leaders put more stoc. in a collapse of the southern regime
before the election date as the path to complete control of the country. !n /aos) the Pathet
/ao had not been disarmed immediately6 instead) they were permitted to regroup over a
wide epanse of terrain that would ma.e disarmament difficult to accomplish. #nd in
both /aos and <ambodia) the resistance elements were to be accorded full political rights
to participate) as individuals) in the %&'' elections.
!n their public commentaries on the Geneva accords) 4iet 8inh leaders displayed full
satisfaction. 8ilitary victories had gained political recognition) they said) than.s to the
support rendered by the Soviet and <hinese delegations. 4ietnam=s independence and
territorial integrity were admitted by Paris) >o <hi 8inh proclaimed. 8oreover) the
regroupment to two 2ones in 4ietnam was) as he put it) "a temporary action) a transitional
step in the reali2ation of a cease$fire) toward restoring peace and attaining the unification
of our country by means of general elections." No "administrative partition" was
intended6 nor would the "2onal arrangements" be permitted to interfere with 4ietnam=s
future unification3
North) <entral and South 4iet Nam are territories of ours. Bur country will certainly be
unified) our entire people will surely be liberated. Bur compatriots in the South were the
first to wage the war of 0esistance. They possess a high political consciousness. ! am
confident that they will place national interests above local interests) permanent interests
above temporary interests) and Doin their efforts with the entire people in strengthening
peace) achieving unity) independence and democracy all over the country . . . . our
people) armymen and cadres from North to South must unite closely. They must be at one
in thought and deed.
#nd Ton ;uc Thang vowed3 "The 4ietnam State will undoubtedly be unified through
general elections."
;espite these protestations of satisfaction and confidence) Tillman ;urdin=s report from
Geneva that members of the 4iet 8inh delegation were sharply disappointed by the
results and veed at pressure applied by their <hinese and 0ussian comrades seems on
the mar.. The 4iet 8inh command evidently believed$$and no *rench authority on the
spot doubted this$$that they could eliminate the *rench from Ton.in with one maDor
offensive and proceed from there against a wea.ened) demorali2ed *ranco$4ietnamese
army in #nnam. Surely >o <hi 8inh must have considered the possibility of #merican
intervention$$although this concern does not emerge as clearly from 4iet 8inh public
commentaries as it does from the official 8oscow and Pe.ing organs. But the 4iet 8inh
loo.ed to the Aorea eperience as having demonstrated that fighting and tal.ing
simultaneously was) as put by a mid$8ay 4N# broadcast) a tactic they could pursue for
two years +li.e the <hinese during the PanmunDom tal.s1 in order to maimi2e territorial
gains. "hether the 4iet 8inh ultimately envisaged the con?uest of all 4ietnam before
reaching agreement with the *rench to cease fire is debatable6 at the least) they) li.e the
*rench) probably regarded maimum control of population and territory as insurance
against future elections. Thus) to the 4iet 8inh) a settlement at the %-th parallel could
only have been regarded as a tactical blunder in violation of the guerrilla war theory and
practice they had mastered.
*orfeiture of considerable territory in 4ietnam was undoubtedly not the only ground for
the 4iet 8inh=s displeasure. Their fre?uent pronouncements on the "indivisibility" of the
4iet 8inh) *ree Ahmer) and Pathet /ao were largely ignored by <hou and 8olotov)
whose agreement on /aos and <ambodia seems to have given priority to <hinese
interests. #ccount had been ta.en) as <hou insisted) of the desirability of integrating the
resistance forces into the national Ahmer and /aotian communities) but those forces were
eventually to be disarmed and disbanded) or withdrawn. <onceivably) the 4iet 8inh
leaders never intended to leave /aos) or were assured by the <hinese and Soviets that the
agreements reached regarding the Pathet /ao were not meant to eclude future North
4ietnamese support. Nevertheless) any future 4iet 8inh contacts with the rebels would
be a clear violation of the Geneva accords and provide the occasion for intensified
/aotian ties to the "est.
The 4iet 8inh also yielded ground on national elections. Their hopes for an all$
4ietnamese political settlement soon after the cease$fire were ?uashed by the Soviets and
<hinese) who were disposed to accept a longer waiting period. *urthermore) the political
settlement itself was not given the priority the 4iet 8inh had originally demanded6 it
would be achieved) as phrased in the *inal ;eclaration) "in the near future)" as the result
of rather than as the precondition to) a military +cease$fire1 settlement. *inally) when the
time for a political settlement was at hand) the ;eclaration specified that an international
body would supervise it rather than the 4iet 8inh and "South" 4ietnamese alone. The
overriding interests of the Soviets and <hinese had ta.en the heart out of the initial 4iet
8inh proposals of 8ay %( and) in addition) had considerably undercut their "fallbac."
positions epressed in late 8ay and :une. :ean <hauvel was apparently correct when he
perceived) after private tal.s with the <hinese) that the 4iet 8inh were really on the end
of a string being manipulated from 8oscow and Pe.ing. "hen they moved forward too
?uic.ly) <hou and 8olotov were always at hand to pull them bac. to a more
accommodating position. Briefly put) the 4iet 8inh very li.ely felt they had been
compelled to give away much of what they had earned even as they ac?uired the
attributes of sovereignty for which they had fought.
;. 65FE;T!BES 6F T)E P#2T!;!P#3TS> T)E /ESTE23 5!: T)2EE
The 5ritish
*or Great Britain) the accords signalled the end of a war that more than once threatened
to involve the United States and ris. a regional conflagration. >ad the point of direct
#merican intervention been reached) the <hurchill government would have been faced
with an etraordinarily difficult decision3 whether to Doin with an old ally in a war
venture that Britain considered politically wrong and militarily foolish) or to brea. with
"ashington and thereby throw into ?uestion the #nglo$#merican alliance. Britain=s
consistent advice to delay irreversible military steps) including formation of a Southeast
#sia defense organi2ation) until the <ommunists had been given an opportunity to ma.e
good on their proclaimed devotion to a peaceful solution over !ndochina had been
grudgingly accepted by the United States6 the choice of following or ignoring #merican
leadership was averted.
# diplomatic untangling of the !ndochina problem) as Britain=s first hope) also became in
large measure its responsibility. !f the allies were not to be pressed into a military
response) it was as much up to @den as to Bidault +and) later) 8endZs$*rance1) to
establish the grounds for a settlement. #lthough final agreement at the conference
re?uired Soviet and <hinese preparedness to offer e?uitable terms) @den=s own
contributions cannot be eaggerated. "or.ing closely with 8olotov and <hou) @den
apparently earned their respect as a forthright) fleible) but firm negotiator. That the
accords were drawn up testified to @den=s persistence. They were a triumph of British
diplomacy to the etent that the <hinese and Soviets) in press commentaries immediately
following the close of the <onference) accorded the UA delegation the unusual accolade
of having) along with their delegations) rendered the most important services in the
agoni2ing process of reaching agreement.
#t the same time as the British successfully pushed through a settlement by diplomatic
rather than military means) they also reserved the right to Doin with the United States in a
regional security arrangement immediately after the conference. #s @den had told <hou)
the formation of a S@#TB would not be put off) even though the #ssociated States would
not become members. British membership in S@#TB represented another significant
diplomatic victory. They had on several occasions informed the United States that a
Southeast #sia pact formed in advance of or during the Geneva deliberations might be
interpreted as provocatory by the <hinese and reduce) if not eliminate) chances for a
settlement. The British never opposed the concept of S@#TB) but they cautioned against
poor timing. S@#TB=s establishment in September %&'5 was thus doubly welcomed by
/ondon3 !t satisfied Britain=s conviction that a much$needed regional organi2ation should
be formed to preserve what remained of !ndochina) not to ta.e action to recover it all
from the 4iet 8inh.
Britain=s opposition to forming S@#TB before or during the conference so as) in part) not
to provo.e the <hinese fitted with /ondon=s aspirations for better Sino$British relations.
Kuite unli.e the dominant voices in "ashington) <hurchill and @den were amenable to
attempting to achieve some .ind of wor.ing relationship with Pe.ing) particularly in
view of the ongoing guerrilla war in 8alaya. The conference) as @den noted in his :une
79 speech to the <ommons) had resulted in an improvement of Sino$British relations)
demonstrated by Pe.ing=s agreement on :une %-) after four years of silence) to echange
charges d=affaires. !n the remaining month of the conference) moreover) British youth
delegations traveled to <hina) and there were hopeful comments from both countries on
the possibilities for stepped up trade and the echange of cultural delegations. Thus) in
sharp contrast to the United States) Great Britain fully eploited this period of harmony
through diplomacy to change) rather than preserve) its pattern of contact with Pe.ing.
The Frenh
*rance probably had as much cause for satisfaction with the outcome at Geneva as any
other party to the conference. Paris had etricated itself from la sale guerre with honor)
yet had also retained a foothold in South 4ietnam and a close relationship with <ambodia
and /aos. The *rench Union lost much of its strength) but not all of its appeal) in
!ndochina. #t least in mid$%&'5) it appeared that *rench cultural and economic interests
in all three former colonies would be substantially preserved6 and even the ;04 had
indicated) at the close as well as at the beginning of the negotiations) that it aspired to
membership in the Union. *rench military power would have to be surrendered) of
course6Y but *rench influence could +and did1 remain in all three countries.
Y @ven as most *rench troops were withdrawn) a *rench military presence remained for
some time. The last troops did not leave 4ietnam until *ebruary %&', while) under the
military accords) *rench instructors remained in /aos and <ambodia and two bases
continued to function in /aos.
"hile the British were ready to Doin with the United States and other interested nations in
S@#TB) the *rench clearly intended) as evidenced by their concern over the location of
the demarcation line) that South 4ietnam have a defensible territory within which to
establish a stable regime competitive with the ;04. Y Y #s already
YY *rench interest was not confined to South 4ietnam after :uly 7%) %&'5. Soon
thereafter) Paris dispatched :ean Sainteny) its former chief negotiator with the 4iet 8inh
at *ontainebleau and ;alat in %&5,) to >anoi to represent *rench interests without
conferring recognition on the ;0C. *rance recogni2ed only one 4ietnam but in fact dealt
with two.
observed) Paris was not motivated by altruism alone6 a substantial territorial base was as
much for the preservation of *rench economic holdings in the South as for the future
security of the Saigon government. To Dudge from the *rench attitude) the Paris
government) no less than the #merican administration) loo.ed forward to participating
fully in the consolidation and rehabilitation of the G4N at least in the two years before
nationwide elections.
The #merians
The United States viewed the conference results with mied emotions. Bn the one hand)
the terms of the settlement conformed surprisingly well to those the #dministration had
agreed with the *rench and British would be acceptable. @ven as the #dministration
could not do more than agree to "respect" and "ta.e note" of the Geneva accords) it had to
concede that they represented a reasonable outcome given the chaotic state of #llied
relations before the conference) the reDection by *rance of a possible military alternative)
and the undeniable military superiority of the 4iet 8inh beyond as well as within
4ietnam. Bn the other hand) the settlement) viewed through the special lenses of the
@isenhower$;ulles #dministration) also contained the elements of defeat. Part of the *ree
"orld=s "assets" in the *ar @ast had been "lost" to the Sino$Soviet bloc +much as <hina
had been "lost" to 8ao Tse$tung=s forces16 our allies had begged off when offered a
chance to deal with the <ommunists by force of arms and) later) by an #sian$"estern
anti$<ommunist alliance ready for action6 and the United States had been compelled to
attend an international conference which not only confirmed to the <ommunists by
diplomacy what they had gained by force) but also enhanced their image elsewhere in
#sia and worldwide as standard$bearers of peace.
The view that Geneva had come out better than could have been epected was the one
offered publicly. The President) at a :uly 7% news conference) declined to critici2e the
accords. >e said they contained "features which we do not li.e) but a great deal depends
on how they wor. in practice." >e announced the Government=s intention to establish
permanent missions in /aos and <ambodia) and said the United States was actively
"pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organi2ation of a
collective defense in Southeast #sia in order to prevent further direct or indirect
<ommunist aggression in that general area."
Under Secretary Smith li.ewise was very guarded in remar.s two days later. ;enying
that Geneva was another "8unich)" Smith said3 "! am . . . convinced that the results are
the best that we could possibly have obtained in the circumstances)" adding that
"diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or
held on the battlefield." "hen ;ulles spo.e +also on :uly 791) he was much less
interested in the past than in the future. 0eferring to "the loss in Northern 4ietnam)" the
Secretary epressed the hope that much would be learned from the eperience toward
preventing further <ommunist inroads in #sia. Two lessons could be culled) he observed.
*irst) popular support was essential against <ommunist subversion6 "the people should
feel that they are defending their own national institutions." Second) collective defense
should precede rather than come during the aggression$a pointed criticism of British
policy during the crisis. # collective security system now in Southeast #sia) he
concluded) would chec. both outright aggression and subversion.
# point$by$point comparison of the Seven Points with the provisions of the accords
indicates that ?uite apart from what had happened to #merican interests in Southeast
#sia as a conse?uence of the conference) #merican diplomacy had) on balance)
succeeded3
+%1 The integrity and independence of /aos and <ambodia were preserved) and 4iet
8inh forces were to be withdrawn or disarmed and disbanded.
+71 Southern 4ietnam was retained) although without an enclave in the North and with
the partition line somewhat south of ;ong >oi.
+91 /aos) <ambodia) and "retained" 4ietnam were not prevented from forming "non$
<ommunist regimes" +in the case of 4ietnam) within the two$year preelection period16
nor were they epressly forbidden "to maintain ade?uate forces for internal security."
4ietnam=s right to import arms and other war materiel was) however) restricted to piece$
by$piece replacement) and its employment of foreign advisers to the number in the
country at the war=s close.
+5$'1 0ecalling ;ulles= interpretation of :uly - that elections should "be only held as long
after cease$fire agreement as possible and in conditions free from intimidation to give
democratic elements best chance)" the accords did not "contain political provisions which
would ris. loss of the retained area to <ommunist control"6 nor did they "eclude the
possibility of the ultimate reunification of 4ietnam by peaceful means." #lthough ;ulles
and 8endZs$*rance preferred that no date be set for the elections) the compromise two$
year hiatus gave the #mericans) the *rench) and the South 4ietnamese a considerable
breathing spell. The first priority) therefore) was to "give democratic elements best
chance"6 as was subse?uently determined by "ashington) this meant providing South
4ietnam with economic assistance and political support. @lections) as ;ulles indicated
then) and as the B<B concurred in #ugust) were agreeable to the United States6 but they
were two years away) and the immediate& primary tas0 was "to maintain a friendly non$
<ommunist South 4ietnam..." Thus) the corollary obDective +stated by the NS< in #ugust
and approved by the President1 "to prevent a <ommunist victory through all$4ietnam
elections" did not connote #merican intention to subvert the accords6 read in contet) the
phrase meant that #merican influence would aim at assuring that the <ommunists not
gain an electoral victory through deceitful) undemocratic methods in violation of the
*inal ;eclaration=s stipulation that they be "free."
+,1 The accords epressly provided for the transfer of individuals desiring to move from
one 2one to another.
+-1 The accords did seem) at the time) to have basically fulfilled the precondition of
providing "effective machinery for international supervision of the agreement." #lthough
the machinery would be the !<<=s rather than the UN=s) Under Secretary Smith noted that
the !<< would have a veto power on important ?uestions +referring) evidently) to the
unanimity rule16 would be composed of one genuine neutral +!ndia1 and one pro$"estern
government +<anada16 and would be permitted full freedom of movement into
demilitari2ed 2ones and frontier and coastal areas. Smith gave this assessment3
Ta.ing everything into consideration) ! strongly feel this Fthe control and supervision
arrangementG is satisfactory and much better than we were able to obtain in Aorea.
*rench feel) and @den and ! agree) that with such composition built$in veto will wor. to
our advantage. This setup is best *rench or anybody else could get) and ! feel it is within
spirit of point -. F;oc. -&G
;espite the overall concordance of maDor provisions of the accords with the Seven Points)
the fact that another piece of territory had been formally ceded to the <ommunists
obviously weighed heavily on the #dministration. "hen) in #ugust) papers were drawn
up for the National Security <ouncil) the Geneva <onference was evaluated as a maDor
defeat for United States diplomacy and a potential disaster for United States security
interests in the *ar @ast. The Bperations <ontrol Board) in its progress report on the then$
current NS< paper '5(') stated that the *inal ;eclaration of the conference "completed a
maDor forward stride of communism which may lead to the loss of Southeast #sia. !t
therefore recorded a drastic defeat of .ey policies in NS< '5(' and a serious loss for the
free world) the psychological and political effects of which will be felt throughout the *ar
@ast and around the globe." !n a separate report) the NS< was somewhat more specific
concerning the etent of the damage) but no less restrained. The <ommunists had
ac?uired "an advance salient" in 4ietnam for use in military and nonmilitary ways6 the
United States had lost prestige as a leader in #sia capable of stemming <ommunist
epansion6 the <ommunist peace line had gained at #merica=s epense6 and <ommunist
military and political prestige had been enhanced as the result of their proven ability to
eploit unstable situations in Southeast #sian countries without resort to armed attac..
The conclusion that emerges from the obvious contrast between the public and private
comments of #dministration officials and organs is that where #merican diplomacy fell
down was not at the conference but during the !ndochina crisis as a whole. Nearly al: the
revised #merican negotiatory priniples had emerged unscathed6 but #merican
o@Heti'es in !ndochina$$the elimination of the 4iet 8inh threat) preservation of the
strategically vital Ton.in ;elta) and obstruction of <ommunist political and military
epansionist policies in the region +all of which were enumerated in NS< '5('$$had still
been defeated. The United States had admirably maneuvered at Geneva in its self$limited
role of interested party6 but the #dministration) convinced that any attrition of what had
been regarded as "*ree "orld" territory and resources was inimical to #merican global
interests) could only view the settlement as the acceptance of terms from the <ommunist
victors. The tas. in 4ietpam in the two years ahead was therefore to wor. with what had
been "retained" in the hope) by no means great) that the ;iem government could pull the
country up by its bootstraps in time to present a meaningful alternative to >o <hi 8inh=s
;04.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 5) "U.S. and *rance in !ndochina) %&'($',"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section %) pp. %-&$7%5
Summary
#!D F62 F2#3;E !3 !3D6;)!3#& 1,.1-1,.-
The United States decision to provide military assistance to *rance and the #ssociated
States of !ndochina was reached informally in *ebruaryI8arch %&'() funded by the
President on 8ay %) %&'() and was announced on 8ay J of that year. The decision was
ta.en in spite of the U.S. desire to avoid direct involvement in a colonial war) and in spite
of a sensing that *rance=s political$military situation in !ndochina was bad and was
deteriorating. 8oreover) predictions that U.S. aid would achieve a mar.ed difference in
the course of the !ndochina "ar were heavily ?ualified.
The situation in which the decision was made was completely dominated by the ta.e$over
of and consolidation of power in <hina by the communists. Nationalist <hinese forces
had been withdrawn from mainland <hina and <ommunist <hinese troops had arrived on
the border of !ndochina in late %&5&. This period was the high water mar. of U.S. fears of
direct <hinese <ommunist intervention in !ndochina. N!@ ' of 7& ;ecember %&'( stated3
";irect intervention by <hinese <ommunist troops may occur at any time . . . it is almost
certain to occur in strength whenever there is danger either that the 4iet 8inh will fail to
maintain its military obDective of driving the *rench out of !ndochina) or that the Bao ;ai
Government is succeeding in undermining the support of the 4iet 8inh."
The rationale of the decision was provided by the U.S. view that the Soviet$controlled
epansion of communism both in #sia and in @urope re?uired) in the interests of U.S.
national security) a counter in !ndochina. The domino thesis was ?uite prominent. Bn ,
8arch %&'() the Secretary of ;efense wrote the President as follows3 "The choice
confronting the United States is to support the legal government in !ndochina or to face
the etension of communism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast #sia
and possibly westward . . ." ;espite this statement) it was a generally accepted
proposition that "regardless of current U.S. commitments for certain military assistance to
<hina) the U.S. will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of !ndochina
against overt) foreign aggression) under present circumstances."
The decision to begin military assistance to *rance and the #ssociated States of
!ndochina was not made under the illusion of great epectations. !n #pril %&'() the :oint
<hiefs would go no further than to say that prompt delivery of the aid would do no more
than create the "possibility of success." !n :uly %&'() General @rs.ine) after completing
his Presidential mission to !ndochina) reported that "the amount of aid and the scope of
the assistance thus far re?uested by the *rench were inade?uate to the needs of the
situation." #ll U.S. epectations seemed to have been underpinned by the :oint <hiefs=
belief that "attainment of United States obDectives in #sia can only be achieved by
ultimate success in <hina."
0esults of the decision were mied. #lthough implementation of the decision was
partially successful in that it enabled the *rench to continue the military campaign in
!ndochina to the time of the Geneva #ccords) military assistance was by and large a
failure as an instrument of U.S. policy3 the U.S. neither assured the *rench a military
success) influenced the political situation to advantage) nor prevented the loss of North
4ietnam to the communists at Geneva.
The U.S. 8##G !ndochina was unable to perform even the limited functions assigned it.
The *rench) never eager for U.S. advice) succeeded in limiting the function of 8##G to
order$ta.ing in the commercial sense.
<ontributing to the initial U.S. decision to aid the *rench) and to limiting the
effectiveness of the U.S. program of assistance) were +%1 setting impracticable
preconditions for assistance upon the *rench) +71 the U.S. proclivity to accept a slender
chance of success without weighing alternatives) +91 the suppression of alternatives
leading to decisional circularity and reinforcement of eisting policies) +51 repeated
failures of the U.S. to bargain effectively with the *rench) and +'1 the vulnerability of the
U.S. policy$ma.ing machinery to spoofing) particularly as regards U.S. credulity in
accepting *rench information at face value and in being susceptible to "red" scares.
The decision to provide assistance to *rance and the #ssociated States is the focus of this
discussion6 it was but one issue among hundreds preoccupying the United States
Government in the time period under consideration$the fall of <hina and the Aorean
"ar$and it was probably not regarded by those who made policy as among their critical
decisions. There is no evidence of any high U.S. official arguing that any signifiant
ommitment threshold was being crossed. There were) however) those who maintained
that the important anti$colonial stand of the U.S. was being undermined. These voices
+and they were basically from the public domain1 were drowned out by those who
advocated immediate security needs. The importance of the decision was that when the
U.S. was faced with an unambiguous choice between a policy of anti$colonialism and a
policy of anti$communism) it chose the latter. #nd) although the decision was not
perceived as getting the U.S. more deeply "involved" in !ndochina) it did mar. a tangible
first step in that direction.
T>@ U.S. #N; *0#N<@=S "!T>;0#"#/ *0B8 4!@TN#8) %&'5$%&',
4ietnam was the crucible of contemporary *rance. 8ilitary defeat by the 4iet 8inh$$
unprecedented victory of #sian over @uropean$$was but one political reagent3 there was
also intense frustration and disappointment among *rench of 0ightist$colon convictions
that snea.er$shod #sian peasants could undo a century of costly labor at *rance=s
"civili2ing mission)" and Deopardi2e the largest investment of *rench capital in the *ar
@ast. The Ton.in ;elta region represented in a special way all that 4ietnam meant to
*rance. Ton.in) of all 4ietnam) was where *rench economic sta.es were highest) where
the culture of *rance most completely overglossed indigenous ways) where stood
educational focus of 4ietnam$$the University of >anoi) with its *rench faculty$and where
<atholicism flourished among the rural fol.. Thus) evacuation of Ton.in per the dictates
of the Geneva Settlement stung less from a sense of humiliation over ;ien Bien Phu than
from a sense of abandonment3 an epoch had closed) *rance was demeaned.
>ad the Geneva Settlement been fulfilled) *rance might have retained a presence and
influence in 4ietnam that would have mollified both the 0ight and /eft. #fter all) no
significant body of opinion in *rance held the *rench should continue to mold
4ietnamese politics or that the *rench @peditionary <orps should remain there
undiminished$the reality of the ;04 and the eigencies of North #frica rendered such a
position untenable. The /eft and the <enter were ?uite willing for *rance to withdraw
under the Geneva formula6 even the "!ndochina" cli?ue within the army recogni2ed the
priority of #lgeria. But *rance in the end) at #merican instance) had to accept withdrawal
without the cover of general elections) and to accede to a second) further) more final
abandoment.
The supplanting of *rance by the U.S. in South 4ietnam) and the failure of the Geneva
Settlement) both well advanced by mid$%&',) denied the *rench /eft its prospects for
cooperation with >o <hi 8inh in a precedent$setting eperiment in coeistence. !t
disappointed moderates who had hoped to preserve *rench cultural influence and salvage
*rench capital. !t enraged 0ightists who interpreted #merican policies in 4ietnam
invidiously. None of these factions was prepared to ta.e a stand for *rance=s staying) but
all attempted to draw political sustenance from acerbic treatment of the U.S.
The whole episode of *rench withdrawal from 4ietnam) in fact) soured the "estern
alliance. !t is possible that *rance=s reDection of the @uropean ;efense <ommunity on
#ugust 9() %&'5) may have been in part payment for Soviet good offices on behalf of
*rance at Geneva. But it is certain that many *rench were persuaded that the U.S. and the
UA furnished inade?uate support to *rance during the latter phases of the war) and at the
<onference. #nd it is e?ually certain that #merican policy in the aftermath of Geneva
widely alienated affection for the U.S. in *rance) and created that lac. of confidence
which the Sue2 crisis of summer) %&',) translated into outright distrust.
#fter the Geneva <onference) all the governments involved in the #ccords) with one
significant eception) anticipated that *rance would remain in 4ietnam. The eception
was the State of 4ietnam) whose Premier) Ngo ;inh ;iem) was determined to uproot
*rench influence as a concomitant to the establishment of a genuinely independent
nationalist government. The policy of the United States was initially directed toward a
partnership with *rance) a Doint sponsorship of ;iem and the newly independent nation
he headed.
#lmost at once) however) U.S. policy began to respond to military urgency) and this in
turn caused the U.S. to move beyond partnership to primacy. !n September of %&'5)
S@#TB was brought into being) its protection etended to 4ietnam by a protocol to the
8anila Pact. The U.S. resolved through S@#TB to bal. further epansion of communist
dominion) and loo.ed to transforming 4ietnam into a .ey redoubt in the line of
containment. The U.S. was determined that 4ietnam would become politically sound)
economically self$sufficient) and militarily capable of providing for its own internal
security) coping with invasion from North 4ietnam) and contributing to the deterrent
strength of the S@#TB coalition. *rance) then beset with internal political divisions) and
plagued with #lgeria) evidenced doubt) indecision) and occasional reluctance in aiding
4ietnam toward the foregoing obDectives. The U.S. was not prepared to wait. !n late
September %&'5) the U.S. cut out the *rench as middle$men in all its assistance for
4ietnam) and began to deal directly with ;iem) his government) and his armed forces.
*rance did not readily accept this enlarged #merican role) nor was there complete
agreement with the U.S. Government that the United States should pursue a further
shouldering aside of *rance. Through the fall of %&'5) *rance$U.S. relations worsened)
and a policy debate developed in "ashington. Bnce again) military considerations
emerged as paramount. The :<S were originally opposed to the United States assuming
responsibility for training the #rmy of 4ietnam. They too. the position) however) that if
political considerations dictated such a U.S. involvement "the :oint <hiefs of Staff would
agree to the assignment of a training mission to 8##G Saigon) with safeguards against
*rench interference with the U.S. training mission." Bn Bctober 7,) %&'5) the Secretary
of ;efense) acting on behalf of the President) instructed the :<S to prepare a "long$range
program for the organi2ation and training of a minimum number of free 4ietnam forces
necessary for internal security." The development of this plan and an appropriate wor.ing
relationship with the *rench continued into %&'') and necessitated the dispatch to
4ietnam of General :. /awton <ollins) with #mbassadorial status) to obtain a tri$partite
agreement acceptable in Saigon) in Paris) and in "ashington. ;uring November %&'5)
the :<S epressed serious reservations about the success of such a combined underta.ing.
Nevertheless) the NS< considered the policy sound) and this Dudgment was confirmed
from the field by General <ollins. <ollins reported that3
!t would be disastrous if the *rench @peditionary <orps would be withdrawn
prematurely since otherwise 4ietnam would be overrun by an enemy attac. before the
8anila Pact Powers could be enacted.
<ollins recommended that the United States continue military aid to *rance to
"encourage the *rench to retain sufficient forces." !n the meantime) events in 4ietnam
seemed to support those who) li.e the :<S) continued to entertain strong reservations
about the future of Ngo ;inh ;iem and his government. ;iem managed to survive
attempted coups by army leaders) and succeeded in maintaining an unhappy peace with
the several armed factions of <ochinchina. But his political future remained ?uestionable
at best. #t the same time) the *rench mission in >anoi pressed hard to preserve *rench
economic and cultural prerogatives in North 4ietnam) and certain *rench political leaders
in Paris spo.e grandilo?uently of a cooperative modus 'i'endi with the ;04 becoming a
model for east$west relations$$a dis?uieting message for the U.S. Secretary of State and
those who shared his convictions within the #dministration. *inally) parallel to these
developments) the @mperor Bao ;ai) retaliating for ;iem=s vituperative political
campaign against him) actively sought to supplant ;iem.
#ll the foregoing tension resolved to two central issues between the United States and
*rance. The first was the ?uestion of how and by whom 4ietnam=s armed forces were to
be trained. The second) and more far$reaching) was whether Ngo ;inh ;iem was to
remain at the head of 4ietnam=s government) or whether he was to be replaced by another
nationalist leader more sympathetic to Bao ;ai and *rance. The first issue was resolved
relatively ?uic.ly. General <ollins struc. an agreement with General @ly in 4ietnam by
which) despite serious misgivings in Paris) *rance agreed to turn over the training of the
4ietnamese army to the U.S. and to withdraw *rench cadres. Bn *ebruary %7) %&'') the
U.S. assumed responsibility for training 4ietnamese forces) and the *rench disassociation
began.
But the political controversy over ;iem was less easily resolved. ;iem eacerbated
matters with increasingly vehement stricture against the *rench and Bao ;ai. The United
States on its part was insensitive to the impact within *rance of ;iem=s militant anti$
communism$fre?uently directed at the *rench /eft$and of the rancor aroused by U.S.
statements portraying #merica as the only friend of 4ietnamese nationalism. The U.S.
did alert) however) to *rench statements that ;iem was categorically incapable of
unifying 4ietnamese nationalists. *rench advice to the U.S. that ;iem should) therefore)
be replaced was seconded by #mbassador <ollins from 4ietnam. Throughout the winter
and spring) Secretary ;ulles and the ;epartment of State in general seemed disposed to
consider favorably suggestions that an alternative leader for the 4ietnamese be placed in
power. >owever) despite an ostensibly thorough search) no nationalist leader with
?ualities competitive with ;iem=s was identified.
Both the U.S. and *rance were then caught up in the sweep of events. The armed sects
directly challenged ;iem=s authority) and he responded with force. #n uneasy truce ended
the first clash in 8arch) and amid the mounting tension in #pril %&'') the U.S.) *rance)
and amid the mounting tension in #pril %&'') the U.S.) *rance) and Bao ;ai all sought
actively to bring about a change in the G4N. Bn 7J #pril) ;iem) against U.S. advice)
against *rench advice) and against the advice of his cabinet) moved again against the
sects. "hen Binh Huyen resisted in Saigon) he committed the 4ietnamese army to battle.
;iem=s forces won an immediate military victory) and simultaneously ;iem=s brother)
Nhu) co$opted a committee of nationalist figures who called for Bao ;ai=s removal) and
transfer of civil and military power to ;iem.
@ncouraged by ;iem=s success) the U.S. declared its une?uivocal support for him as
apposed to Bao ;ai. The U.S. choice presented acute difficulties for *rance. The *rench
Government was convinced that Nhu=s "0evolutionary <ommittee" was under 4iet 8inh
influence) and was strongly resentful of a renewed G4N campaign against *rench
presence. !n 8ay %&'') *rance) the U.S.) and Britain met in Paris to discuss @uropean
defense) but *rance promptly made 4ietnam the principal agenda item. *rance
maintained that the U.S.) in bac.ing ;iem) forced upon *rance the necessity for
withdrawing altogether from 4ietnam. The *rench *oreign 8inister *aure held that ;iem
was "not only incapable but mad . . . *rance can no longer ta.e ris.s with him." Secretary
;ulles in reply indicated that the U.S. was aware of ;iem=s wea.nesses) but stressed
;iem=s recent successes as indicating redeeming ?ualities. But) ;ulles pointed out
"4ietnam is not worth a ?uarrel with *rance)" and offered U.S. withdrawal in preference
to allied disunity. No decision was ta.en immediately) and during a recess Secretary
;ulles received advice from the :<S that ;iem seemed the most promising avenue to
achievement of U.S. obDectives) and that while withdrawal of the *rench @peditionary
<orps is "ultimately to be desired)" a precipitate withdrawal was to be prevented since it
would "result in an increasingly unstable and precarious situation" and the eventual loss
of South 4ietnam to communism. Secretary ;ulles then proposed to the *rench that they
continue to support ;iem until a national assembly were elected. British support for
;iem seems to have swayed *aure) and he accepted ;ulles= proposal. The tri$partite
meeting ended on a note of harmony) but the undertones were distinct3 the days of Doint
U.S.$ *rench policy were over6 thereafter) the U.S. would act independently of *rance in
4ietnam.
Bac.ed by the United States) ;iem refused to open consultation with the North
4ietnamese concerning general elections when the date for these fell due in :uly %&''.
Pressing his military advantage against the sects) he moved to consolidate his position
politically within South 4ietnam. !n Bctober) he won a resounding victory in a popular
referendum in which voters were given a choice between ;iem and Bao ;ai. #s ;iem=s
political strength grew) his relations with Paris deteriorated. !n ;ecember %&'') ;iem
suddenly terminated the eisting economic and financial agreements with *rance) and
called upon *rance to denounce the Geneva agreements and brea. relations with >anoi.
Soon thereafter) he withdrew South 4ietnamese representatives from the *rench Union
#ssembly.
Bn :anuary 7) %&',) general elections in *rance produced a government under Socialist
Guy 8ollet) a third of the members of which were communists or avowed neutralists. !n
early 8arch) 8ollet=s *oreign 8inister) Pineau) declared in a speech to the #nglo$
#merican Press #ssociation in Paris that *rance would actively see. policy position
bridging @ast and "est) and that there was no unanimity of policy among the U.S.) UA)
and *rance. >e cited UA 8iddle @ast policy and U.S. support for ;iem as contrary to
*rench interests) and condemned both powers for stirring up the 8oslem world to
*rance=s distinct disadvantage in North #frica. # few days later) at a S@#TB <ouncil
meeting in Aarachi) Pineau proclaimed the end of the "era of aggression)" and called for a
"policy of coeistence."
#ction followed Pineau=s line. Bn 8arch 77) %&',) *rance agreed with ;iem to withdraw
the *@< altogether. Bn #pril 7,) %&',) the *rench >igh <ommand in Saigon was
disestablished. Bn the due date for the general elections agreed to at Geneva) *rance
possessed no military forces in 4ietnam. #nd the date for the fulfillment of the political
portions of the Settlement) :uly %&',) coincided with the inception of the Sue2 crisis.
End of Summary
!. #!; *B0 *0#N<@ !N !N;B<>!N#) %&'($%&'5
#. T)E #ME2!;#3 PE2SPE;T!BE DEBE"6PS
1. The 7.S. and the Frenh ;olonial /ar
Because the early phase +%&5,$%&5&1 of the !ndochina war was an overt attempt by the
*rench to reassert authority and control over their !ndochinese colonies) the United
States) although aware that @uropean 0ecovery Program +@0P1 funds were indirectly
used to finance the war) refused to support that war directly. >owever) #merican actions
ta.en to assure a neutral position$refusal to sell armaments to the *rench for use in
!ndochina6 refusal to transport troops) arms) or ammunition "to or from Netherlands @ast
!ndies or *rench !ndochina"$$accompanied by public and private statements of anti$
colonialist sentiments) did constitute) at least in *rench eyes) a policy hostile to the
*rench interest in !ndochina. Therefore) early in %&5-) the ;epartment of State attempted
to reassure the *rench Government) and to ma.e U.S. policies and actions more palatable
to them3
...!n spite any misunderstanding which might have arisen in minds *rench in regard to
our position concerning !ndochina they must appreciate that we have fully recogni2ed
*rance=s sovereign position in that area and we do not wish to have it appear that we are
in any way endeavoring undermine that position) and *rench should .now it is our desire
to be helpful and we stand ready assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for
!ndochinese problem. #t same time we cannot shut our eyes to fact that there are two
sides this problem and that our reports indicate both a lac. *rench understanding of other
side +more in Saigon than in Paris1 and continued eistence dangerously outmoded
colonial outloo. and methods in area...
Neither direct nor indirect assistance to the *rench effort in !ndochina was deemed
"appropriate)" however) until the *rench too. concrete steps to grant autonomy to /aos)
<ambodia) and 4ietnam. The U.S. was prepared to support the "Bao ;ai solution" for
4ietnam when and if Bao ;ai ac?uired genuine independence. The U.S. warned *rance
against settling for a "native government Fheaded by Bao ;aiG which by failing to
develop appeal among 4ietnamese might become virtually FaG puppet government)
separated from FtheG people and eisting only by FtheG presence FofG *rench military
forces."
!n 8arch) %&5&) in the so$called @lysee #greement) *rance contracted with Bao ;ai to
grant "independence within the *rench Union" to 4ietnam) <ambodia) and /aos. ;espite
U.S. urgings) the @lysee #greement remained a potentially empty and ill$defined *rench
promise for eleven months. !n that period) the Nationalist forces of <hiang Aai$she. were
driven from the <hina mainland) and in November) 8ao=s legions arrived at the
!ndochina border. !n :anuary) %&'() >o <hi 8inh declared that his was the "only legal
government of the 4ietnamese people" and indicated his willingness to cooperate with
any nation willing to recogni2e it on the basis of "e?uality and mutual respect of national
sovereignty and territory." The <ommunist <hinese promptly responded with
reognition) followed by the Soviets. !n *rance) there was a sharp debate in the National
#ssembly between /eftist advocates of an immediate truce with the 4iet 8inh) and
Government supporters of ratification for the @lysee #greement. Bn 7 *ebruary %&'() the
*rench Government prevailed) and the @lysee #greement was formally ratified. Under
the circumstances) the United States determined that this action met its minimum
re?uirements for tangible *rench progress towards 4ietnamese autonomy. Bn 9 *ebruary)
President Truman approved recognition of the States of 4ietnam) /aos) and <ambodia.
"ithin three months the United States decided to etend economic and military aid to the
new States. Bn J 8ay %&'() the Secretary of State announced that3
The United States Government) convinced that neither national independence nor
democratic evolution eist in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism) considers the
situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military e?uipment to
the #ssociated States of !ndochina and to *rance in order to assist them in restoring
stability and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic development.
The U.S. involvement in the 4ietnam war originated with its decision to provide
assistance to *rance and the #ssociated States) and to form 8##G !ndochina. Therefore)
it is of particular importance to understand the reasons for the decision) the form of its
eecution) and its effects.
8. The ;ontainment of ;ommunism
U.S. chagrin and increasing concern over the post$"orld "ar !! epansion of the Soviet
Union in @urope) together with fear of further gains by communism) set the tone of U.S.
policy toward #sian communist nations in the %&5J$%&'( period. #s the Secretary of
State=s statement above indicates) these were the days of the "monolithic <ommunist
bloc)" dominated by the Soviet Union. # National Security <ouncil policy paper of %&5&
stated that3
The USS0 is now an #siatic power of the first magnitude with epanding influence and
interest etending throughout continental #sia and into the Pacific. Since the defeat of
:apan . . . the Soviet Union has been able to consolidate its strategic position until the
base of Soviet power in #sia comprises not only the Soviet *ar @ast) but also <hina north
of the Great "all) Northern Aorea) Sa.ahalin) and the Auriles.
The ?uestion of how best to oppose the epansion of communism in #sia was raised to
crisis proportions by the "loss" of <hina. #n etensive and acrimonious national debate
on foreign policy was stirred) conducted in the midst of growing public apprehension
over communist penetration) espionage) and subversion in @urope and within the United
States. 8any advocated increased aid to the <hinese Nationalists) who were regarded by
many) even at this late date) as the bulwar. containing communism in #sia. #lthough no
maDor emphasis was given !ndochina in %&5&) NS< papers did discuss the importance of
the *ranco$4iet 8inh struggle) and lin. the future of !ndochina with that of the rest of the
world3
!n any event) colonial$nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive
communist activities) and it is now clear that Southeast #sia is the target of a coordinated
offensive directed by the Aremlin. !n see.ing to gain control of Southeast #sia) the
Aremlin is motivated in part by a desire to ac?uire Southeast #sia=s resources and
communication lines) and to deny them to us. But the political gains which would accrue
to the USS0 from communist capture of Southeast #sia are e?ually significant. The
etension of communist authority in <hina represents a grievous political defeat for us3 if
Southeast #sia also is swept by communism we shall have suffered a maDor political rout
the repercussions of which will be felt throughout the rest of the world) especially in the
8iddle @ast and in a then critically eposed #ustralia.
!t was precisely the etension of communist authority over <hina referred to above that
led to increased emphasis in U.S. policy on !ndochina in late %&5& and %&'(.
*ollowing the <hinese <ommunist victories of %&5& and the movement of <hinese
<ommunist troops to the border of !ndochina in November of that year) NS< ,5
+*ebruary 7-) %&'(1 F;oc. %G concluded that "the ;epartments of State and ;efense
should prepare) as a matter of priority) a program of all practicable measures designed to
protect U.S. security interests in !ndochina." Bn the same day) following the <ommunist
<hinese +:anuary %J1 and the Soviet +:anuary 9(1 recognition of the >o <hi 8inh regime)
the United States announced its recognition of the Bao ;ai Government. Theretofore) the
U.S. had remained neutral) hesitating to choose between supporting *rance) a friendly
colonial power engaged in re$establishing its authority) or supporting the 4iet 8inh) a
communist$dominated independence movement in opposition to that @uropean ally. This
dilemma had been resolved by the victory of the <hinese <ommunists over the
Nationalists) and by the threat posed to !ndochina. The United States policy of support for
the *rench and the #ssociated States was adDudged one befitting an anti$colonial
democracy3 support of nationalism and independence6 opposition to attempted
encroachments thereon by international communism.
3. ?The "ine of ;ontainment? and ?The Domino Theory?
The logic of this shift in U.S. policy is found not only in the direct threat to Southeast
#sia posed by <ommunist <hina +and the Soviet Union1) but also in the broader strategic
concept of a line of containment) and in the early articulation of what later became .nown
as the "domino theory." ;iscussion of the line of containment centered about where that
line was to be drawn3 !ndochina) and) later) Aorea) fell on the free side of that line. The
domino notion had been advanced by General <laire <hennault) among others) in the
reference to Nationalist <hina6 the domino theory as applied to !ndochina reinforced the
decision of where to draw the line of containment. Both ideas were embodied by the :oint
<hiefs of Staff in a %&'( memorandum to the Secretary of ;efense evaluating "the
strategic importance) from the military point of view) of Southeast #sia"3
c. Southeast #sia is a vital segment in the line of containment of <ommunism stretching
from :apan southward and around to the !ndian Peninsula . . . The security of the three
maDor non$<ommunist base areas in this ?uarter of the world$:apan) !ndia) and #ustralia$
depends in a large measure on the denial of Southeast #sia to the <ommunists. !f
Southeast #sia is lost) these three base areas will tend to be isolated from one another6
d. The fall of !ndochina would undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of
Southeast #sia .
e. The fall of Southeast #sia would result in the virtually complete denial to the United
States of the Pacific /ittoral of #sia .
f. . . . Soviet control of all the maDor components of #sia=s war potential might become a
decisive factor affecting the balance of power between the United States and the USS0 .
g. # Soviet position of dominance over the *ar @ast would also threaten the United States
position in :apan . . . The feasibility of retention by the United States of its offshore
island bases could thus be Deopardi2ed. F;oc. 9G
This theory) whether more or less completely articulated) appears in the relevant NS<
papers of the !ndochina "ar period) and underlies all maDor U.S. policy decisions ta.en
relevant to the area.
-. 7.S. Pereption of the ;hinese ;ommunist Threat
!n the words of NS< ,5 +*ebruary) %&'(1) "The presence of <hinese <ommunist troops
along the border of !ndochina ma.es it possible for arms) material and troops to move
freely from <ommunist <hina to the northern Ton.in area now controlled by >o <hi
8inh. There is already evidence of movement of arms." N!@ ' maintained somewhat
later) as the decision to help the *rench was being re$eamined) that3 "The <ommunist
<hinese regime is already furnishing the 4iet 8inh materiel) training) and technical
assistance. Bfficial *rench sources report that <hinese <ommunist troops are already
present in Ton.in in some strength . . . ;irect intervention by <hinese <ommunist troops
may occur at any time . . . !t is almost certain to occur in strength whenever there is
danger either that the 4iet 8inh will fail to attain its military obDective of driving the
*rench out of !ndochina) or that the Bao ;ai Government is succeeding in undermining
the support of the 4iet 8inh." N!@ ' appeared on ;ecember 7&) %&'(.
#lthough the threat of intervention to be epected from <ommunist <hina did not again
reach this intensity or certainty during the remainder of the war$the estimated probability
of intervention declined consistently after the publication of N!@ '$estimates throughout
the period indicate continuing <ommunist <hinese provision of military arms) materiel)
and training to the 4iet 8inh) and the eistence of <ommunist <hinese potential for
direct intervention. No direct reference was made to possible 4iet 8inh resentment
toward) or resistance to) direct <hinese intervention.
!n sum) the U.S. perceived a maDor <hinese threat at the time the decision to support
*rance and the #ssociated States was made6 a high probability was assigned direct
<hinese <ommunist intervention at the time this decision was being confirmed6 this
assigned probability declined rapidly) and it remained low through the post$Aorean war
period. !t was believed that the <hinese were providing assistance to the 4iet 8inh
throughout the period late %&5&$%&'5.
.. 7.S. Pereptions of the Situation /ithin Bietnam
Bn #pril ') %&'() the :oint <hiefs of Staff) referring to intelligence estimates) indicated to
the Secretary of ;efense their view that "the situation in Southeast #sia has deteriorated)"
and that) further) "without United States assistance) this deterioration will be accelerated."
+The implication that U.S. assistance would result in improvement over and above the
present situation cannot be detected in this carefully worded statement.1 The :oint <hiefs
of Staff went on to state that3
"!n general) the basic conditions of political and economic stability in this area) as well as
the military and internal security conditions) are unsatisfactory. These factors are closely
interrelated) and it is probable that) from the long$term point of view) political and
economic stability is the controlling factor. Bn the other hand) the military situation in
some areas) particularly !ndochina) is of pressing urgency."
N!@ ' was the over$all U.S. assessment of the situation in 4ietnam closest in time to the
U.S. decision to support the *rench and the #ssociated States. !t estimated the *rench
position as "critically endangered by the 4iet 8inh)" and as "precarious." <ombining the
more detailed estimates of this document with statements and estimates contained in
other U.S. documents contemporary with N!B ') the following picture emerges3
a. The Military Situation
+%1 *rench$4iet 8inh areas of control$see *igures %$'
+71 *orce ratio$*rench between %.' and %., to % 4iet 8inh6 vis$a$vis regular forces in the
Ton.in ;elta) the ratio was reversed$approimately %.%' 4iet 8inh to % *rench +N!@ '1.
+91 @?uipment status$*rench superiority) but 4iet 8inh improving due to <hinese aid.
+51 8obility$4iet 8inh superior6 *rench roadbound.
+'1 Strategy$*rench strategy lac.ing in aggressiveness) defensive) of doubtful value.
+,1 Status of 4ietnamese National #rmy$essentially none6 "only a slight chance that the
*rench can maintain their military position long
enough" to build such an army.
+-1 0elative capabilities$danger of a maDor military defeat of the *rench by the 4iet 8inh
in Ton.in within si to nine months) which would Deopardi2e the *rench position in the
remainder of 4ietnam) /aos) and <ambodia.
@. The Eonomi and Politial Situation
*rench resources badly strained6 little or no real nationalist 4ietnamese leadership)
government6 little popular support of Bao ;ai regime6 political and economic
situation generally poor.
. Frenh 6@Heti'es in Bietnam
*rench slowness and obstruction over the years in creating a 4ietnamese national
government and national army +8arch J) %&5&) agreements were not
ratified by *rance until *ebruary 7) %&'(1) and continued slowness in giving control of
the bureaucracy to the 4ietnamese) indicate a reluctant departure) if any departure) from
colonial obDectives.
d. Frenh 2esol'e to 2emain in Bietnam
"...there are grounds for ?uestioning the *rench will to remain in !ndochina."
Thus) the #merican perception of the situation in 4ietnam in %&'( was generally one of
gloom) with little light at the end of the tunnel6 in retrospect. it seems reasonably
accurate.
5. T)E 5E:!33!3: 6F #ME2!;#3 #!D
1. The Deision to #ssist Frane and the #ssoiated States
a. Frenh 2e+uest #id
United States involvement in the blea. !ndochinese situation was hastened when) on
*ebruary %,) %&'() the *rench re?uested U.S. military and economic assistance for the
prosecution of the !ndochinese war. The *rench forwarded their re?uest after deciding "to
set forth to the United States Government fully and fran.ly the
etreme gravity of the situation in !ndochina..."
...the truth of the matter was that the effort in !ndochina was such of a drain on *rance
that a long$term program of assistance was necessary and it was only from the United
States that it could come. Btherwise...it was very li.ely that *rance might be forced to
reconsider her entire policy with the possible view to cutting her losses and withdrawing
from !ndochina...loo.ing into the future it was obvious . . . that *rance could not continue
indefinitely to bear this burden alone if the epected developments in regard to increased
assistance to >o <hi 8inh came about . . . !n any event the *rench Government was
confronted with necessity of reducing the present *rench forces in !ndochina by at least
7')((( not only for budgetary reasons) but because additional men were urgently needed
in connection with *rench national military program.
Cet this appeal for aid) its thinly$veiled reinforcing arguments referring to withdrawal
and the defense of @urope +on the day following the severing of U.S.$ Bulgarian
relations1) was unaccompanied by a willingness to satisfy a U.S. re?uest for *rance to
announce the "evolutionary nature" of the governments of the #ssociated States) or to
clarify otherwise the *rench intentions toward !ndochina.
Bn *ebruary 7-) a ;epartment of State report on the position of the United States with
respect to !ndochina was submitted for the NS<=s consideration. !ssued on *ebruary 7- as
NS< ,5) the report concluded that3
%(. !t is important to United States security interests that all practicable measures be
ta.en to prevent further <ommunist epansion in Southeast #sia. !ndochina is a .ey area
of Southeast #sia and is under immediate threat.
%%. The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be epected to fall under
<ommunist domination if !ndochina were controlled by a <ommunist$dominated
government. The balance of Southeast #sia would then be in grave ha2ard.
%7. #ccordingly) the ;epartments of State and ;efense should prepare as a matter of
priority a program of all practicable measures designed to protect United States security
interests in !ndochina. F;oc. %G
To "facilitate" ;epartment of ;efense consideration of NS< ,5) then ;eputy Under
Secretary of State ;ean 0us. provided 8aDor General :ames >. Burns of BS; a brief
statement of ;epartment of State policy in !ndochina and Southeast #sia3
The ;epartment of State believes that within the limitations imposed by eisting
commitments and strategic priorities) the resources of the United States should be
deployed to reserve !ndochina and Southeast #sia from further <ommunist
encroachment. The ;epartment of State has accordingly already engaged all its political
resources to the end that this obDect be secured. The ;epartment is now engaged in the
process of urgently eamining what additional economic resources can effectively be
engaged in the same operation.
!t is now) in the opinion of the ;epartment) a matter of the greatest urgency that the
;epartment of ;efense assess the strategic aspects of the situation and consider) from the
military point of view) how the United States can best contribute to the prevention of
further <ommunist encroachment in that area.
!n a memorandum for the President of 8arch ,) %&'() the Secretary of ;efense described
U.S. options as follows3
The *rench are irrevocably committed in !ndochina and are supporting the three states as
a move aimed at achieving non$<ommunist political stability . . . The choice confronting
the United States is to support the legal governments in !ndochina or to face the etension
of <ommunism over the remainder of the continental area of Southeast #sia and possibly
westward...
@. The :riffin Mission
"hile the choice among alternatives awaited provision of the views of the :oint <hiefs of
Staff and the military departments) the Secretary of State sent to the *ar @ast "the Griffin
8ission)" which was given the tas. of surveying "the .inds and approimate value of
assistance needed" in !ndochina +among other countries1. ;eparting when it did) some
five months following the fall of Nationalist <hina) and headed by the former ;eputy
<hief of the #id 8ission to 8ainland <hina) the Griffin 8ission was probably intended
to avoid further attac.s on the State ;epartment=s #sia policy as well as to determine how
U.S. economic resources might effectively be employed in Southeast #sia.
Bn 8arch 77) the Griffin 8ission report recommended U.S. aid for a program of rural
rehabilitation) the provision of limited amounts of commodities and industrial e?uipment)
and a program of technical assistance. These measures were estimated to cost Q79.'
million for the period through :une) %&'%. The mission also recommended the
"psychological shoc. of ships with military aid material in the immediate future)" as a
measure to dramati2e the U.S. commitment to those on the scene.
. F;S Bie4s
Bn #pril ') the :oint <hiefs of Staff responded to a re?uest by the Secretary of ;efense
with recommendations for measures which) from the United States military point of view)
might prevent communist epansion in Southeast #sia. The si most important points
made by the <hiefs are these3
+%1 # recommendation for early implementation of military aid programs for !ndochina
and the other states of Southeast #sia) with funds already allocated to the states of
Southeast #sia) to be delivered at the earliest practicable date and to be augmented as a
matter of urgency with funds from the unallocated portion of the President=s emergency
fund. *or the net fiscal year) an estimated Q%(( mllion will be re?uired for the military
portion of this program.
+71 "!n view of the history of military aid in <hina) the :oint <hiefs of Staff urge that
these aid programs be subDect) in any event) to the following conditions3
"a. That United States military aid not be granted unconditionally6 rather that it be
carefully controlled and that the aid program be integrated with political and economic
programs6 and
"b. That re?uests for military e?uipment be screened first by an officer designated by the
;epartment of ;efense and on duty in the recipient state. These re?uests should be
subDect to his determination as to the feasibility and satisfactory coordination of specific
military operations. !t should be understood that military aid will only be considered in
connection with such coordinated operational plans as are approved by the representative
of the ;epartment of ;efense on duty in the recipient country. *urther) in conformity
with current procedures) the final approval of all programs for military materiel will be
subDect to the concurrence of the :oint <hiefs of Staff."
+91 "*ormation of a Southeast #sia #id <ommittee is recommended.
+51 "The :oint <hiefs of Staff recogni2e the political implications involved in military aid
to !ndochina. !t must be appreciated) however) that *rench armed forces . . . are in the
field and that if these were to be withdrawn this year because of political considerations)
the Bao ;ai regime probably could not survive even with United States aid. !f the United
States were now to insist upon independence for 4ietnam and a phased *rench
withdrawal from that country) this might improve the political situation. The *rench
could be epected to interpose obDections to) and certainly delays in such a program.
<onditions in !ndochina) however) are unstable and the situation is apparently
deteriorating rapidly so that the urgent need for at least an initial increment of military
and economic aid is psychologically overriding. The :oint <hiefs of Staff) therefore)
recommend the provision of military aid to !ndochina at the earliest practicable date
under a program to implement the President=s action approving the allocation of Q%'
million for !dochina and that corresponding increments of political arid economic aid be
programmed on an interim basis without preDudice to the pattern of the policy for
additional military) political and economic aid that may be developed later."
+'1 ". . . the :oint <hiefs of Staff recommend the immediate establishment of a small
United States military aid group in !ndochina . . . The :oint <hiefs of Staff would epect
the senior member of this group to sit in consultation with military representatives of
*rance and 4ietnam and possibly of /aos and <ambodia. !n addition to screening
re?uests for materiel) he would be epected to insure full coordination of military plans
and efforts between the *rench and 4ietnamese forces and to supervise the allocation of
materiel."
+,1 "The :oint <hiefs of Staff believe in the possibility of success of a prompt coordinated
United States program of military) political) and economic aid to Southeast #sia and feel
that such a success might well lead to the gaining of the initiative in the struggle in that
general area."
The last of these points is clearly fundamental to the underta.ing of any program of
assistance6 yet in the <hiefs= memorandum it appears only as the concluding portion of
the paragraph +paragraph %'1 recommending establishment of a military aid group in
!ndochina) and is subse?uently subDected to the ?ualification that "attainment of United
States obDectives in #sia can only be achieved by ultimate success in <hina." 8ore
remar.able) however) is the rarity with which even such e?uivocal predictions of success
appear in the available documents relating directly to the decision to provide assistance to
!ndochina. ;irect statements on the probable effectiveness of such United States
programs of the period are typically absent6 indirect statements are typically of the
implied$imperative +"we must do H if #sia is to be saved."1) or the negative$imperative
+if we do not do H) #sia will be lost"1. There was no assurance of military success given6
and the calculus of the decision$ma.ing process relating to the weighing of the
probability of success against the costs of failure of U.S. programs in the %&'( period is
not evident) unfortunately) in available documents.
d. Presidential #ppro'al
Bn 8ay %) %&'() President Truman approved the allocation of Q%( million to the
;epartment of ;efense to cover the early shipment of urgently needed military assistance
items to !ndochina) thus ta.ing the first crucial decision regarding U.S. military
involvement in 4ietnam. Bn 8ay J) the Secretary of State) in a statement at the
ministerial level meeting in Paris) announced United States assistance to the #ssociated
States and *rance. #nd on 8ay 75) the governments of *rance and the #ssociated States
were notified of the United States intention to establish an economic aid mission to the
#ssociated States) thus mar.ing the implementation of the recommendations of the
Griffin 8ission.
Bn :une 7-) %&'() President Truman) in announcing the onset of the Aorean war) also
stated that he had "directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the
forces of *rance and the #ssociated States in !ndochina and the dispatch of a military
mission to provide close wor.ing relations with those forces." F;oc. JG The concept of a
military assistance advisory group had also been approved) although the President did not
refer to 8##G in his public statement. #lso) in :une) following the recommendation of
the :oint <hiefs of Staff) the Southeast #sia #id Policy <ommittee was established.
e. Ers0ine Mission
The military mission dispatched by the President and headed by 8aDor General Graves B.
@rs.ine) US8<) arrived in Saigon on :uly %') and reported its findings on #ugust '.
General @rs.ine reported that a permanent solution of the !ndochina crisis went beyond
military action alone) the core of the problem being a deep$seated hatred and distrust of
the *rench by the population that precluded their cooperation in the prosecution of the
war. The mission also reported that the amount of aid and the scope of the assistance thus
far re?uested by the *rench were inade?uate to the needs of the situation.
The first elements of the U.S. 8##G were assigned to !ndochina on #ugust 9) %&'(6
Brigadier General *rancis G. Brin.) US#) assumed command as the first <hief of
8##G on Bctober %(. The mission of the 8##G was limited to provision of material
assistance to the *rench forces and indirect provision of military aid to the forces of the
#ssociated States6 General Brin. was directed not to assume any training or advisory
responsibilities toward the indigenous armies. But from the outset) the *rench rigorously
limited end$use inspections of 8##G to a small number of carefully prescribed visits.
f. F;S 2ee'aluation
#fter the initial decision to provide assistance to *rance and the #ssociated States had
been ta.en) the formation of an economic mission had been announced) the first shipment
of arms and e?uipment had arrived in !ndochina) and the 8##G had been approved and
was in the process of formation) concern mounted over the soundness of these moves.
The :oint <hiefs of Staff were again as.ed by the Secretary of ;efense to formulate a
position on future U.S. actions with respect to !ndochina) and the Southeast #sia #id
Policy <ommittee +S@##P<1 published) on Bctober %%) %&'() a draft "Proposed
Statement of U.S. Policy on !ndochina." The S@##P< statement proposed adding
another dimension to U.S. assistance policy3 "0egardless of current U.S. commitments
for provision of certam military assistance to !ndochina) the U.S. will not commit any of
its armed forces to the defense of !ndochina against overt) foreign aggression) under
present circumstances." The paper also recommended that the U.S. support the "prompt
acceleration of the formation of new national armies of the three #ssociated States)" and
a covering memorandum to the Secretaries of State and ;efense recommended that if
negotiations were conducted with the *rench) U.S. representatives should3
....secure *rench acceptance of the following conditions which shall attach to the
etension of U.S. assistance in the formation of national armies in !ndochina3 +%1 *rench
Union *orces would not be withdrawn from !ndochina until such #ssociated States
armies are fully trained and ready to act effectively in replacement6 +71 *rance would not
decrease its outlays for !ndochina below the %&'( rate during the period of the #merican
military aid re?uested6 +91 the national armies proDect would have the approval of the
three #ssociated States governments6 +51 the >igh <ommissioner for !ndochina) the
*rench <ommand) and the three #ssociated States would maintain full consultative
relations with the /egation and 8##G during the period of the formation of the armies.
The :oint <hiefs of Staff reevaluation appeared on Bctober 7-3 military aid should be
continued on an epedited basis. #gain the Dudgment was offered that genuine autonomy
and self$government had to be etended to the people of !ndochina to ameliorate the
basic cause of the deterioration of security in !ndochina3
lac. of popular support for the authorities. But the most clearly articulated and complete
epression of the :oint <hiefs= over$all position at year end is found in NS< ,5I%) a
November 7J paper by the <hiefs which ta.es account of a report from General Brin.
and the Southeast #sia #id Policy <ommittee=s draft of Bctober %%6 in fact) this statement
of short$ and long$run obDectives contained in NS< ,5I% was to remain the basis of
United States policy toward !ndochina for the duration of the *rench$!ndochina war3
S>B0T T@08 BB:@<T!4@S
a. The United States should ta.e action) as a matter of urgency) by all means practicable
short of the actual employment of United States military forces) to deny !ndochina to
<ommunism.
b. #s long as the present situation eists) the United States should continue to insure that
the primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and security in !ndochina rests with
the *rench.
c. The United States should see. to develop its military assistance program for !ndochina
based on an over$all military plan prepared by the *rench) concurred in by the #ssociated
States of !ndochina) and acceptable to the United States.
+%1 Both the plan and the program should be developed and implemented as a matter of
urgency. !t should be clearly understood) however) that United States acceptance of the
plan is limited to the logistical support which the United States may agree to furnish. The
aid provided under the program should be furnished to the *rench in !ndochina and to the
#ssociated States. The allocation of United States military assistance as between the
*rench and the national armies of !ndochina should be approved by the *rench and
United States authorities in !ndochina.
+71 Popular support of the Government by the !ndochinese people is essential to a
favorable settlement of the security problem of !ndochina. Therefore) as a condition to
the provision of those further increases in military assistance to !ndochina necessary for
the implementation of an agreed over$all military plan) the United States Government
should obtain assurances from the *rench Government that3
+a1 # program providing for the eventual self$government of !ndochina either within or
outside of the *rench Union will be developed) made public) and implementation initiated
at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the !ndochinese in opposition to
<ommunism.
+b1 National armies of the #ssociated States of !ndochina will be organi2ed as a matter of
urgency. "hile it is doubtful that the buildup of these armies can be accomplished in time
to contribute significantly to the present military situation) the direct political and
psychological benefits to be derived from this course would be great and would thus
result in immediate) although indirect) military benefits.
+c1 Pending the formation and training of !ndochinese national armies as effective units)
and as an interim emergency measure) *rance will dispatch sufficient additional armed
forces to !ndochina to insure that the restoration of peace and internal security in that
country will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over$all military
plan for !ndochina.
+d1 *rance will change its political and military concepts in !ndochina to3
i. @liminate its policy of "colonialism."
ii. Provide proper tutelage to the #ssociated States.
iii. !nsure that a suitable military command structure) unhampered by political
interference) is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations.
+91 #t an appropriate time the United States should institute chec.s to satisfy itself that
the conditions set forth in subparagraph c.+71 above are being fulfilled.
d. The United Sttates should eert all practicable political and diplomatic measures
re?uired to obtain the recognition of the #ssociated States by the other non$<ommunist
states of Southeast and South #sia.
e. !n the event of overt attac. by organi2ed <hinese <ommunist forces against !ndochina)
the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with
<ommunist <hina but should) in concert with the United Aingdom) support *rance and
the #ssociated States by all means short of the actual employment of United States
military forces. This support should include appropriate epansion of the present military
assistance program and endeavors to induce States in the neighborhood of !ndochina to
commit armed forces to resist the aggression.
f. The United States should immediately reconsider its policy toward !ndochina whenever
it appears that the *rench Government may abandon its military position in that country
or plans to refer the problem of !ndochina to the United Nations. Unless the situation
throughout the world generally) and !ndochina specifically) changes materially) the
United States should see. to dissuade the *rench from referring the !ndochina ?uestion to
the United Nations.
g. !nasmuch as the United States$sponsored resolution) "Uniting for Peace)" has been
adopted by the General #ssembly of the United Nations)
and should a situation develop in !ndochina in a manner similar to that in Aorea in which
United Nations forces were re?uired) the United States would then probably be morally
obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the United
Nations. !t is) therefore) in the interests of the United States to ta.e such action in
!ndochina as would forestall the need for the General #ssembly to invo.e the provisions
of the resolution) "Uniting for Peace."
The :<S also proposed long$term obDectives) urging the development of an underground
guerrilla warfare capability) a psychological warfare program +"to demonstrate the evils
of <ommunism. . . . and to warn . . . of renewed <hinese imperialism"1) and
encouragement of an appropriate regional security arrangement. These concepts formed
the heart of an NS< Staff Study of ;ecember 7J. The initial decision to give assistance
was confirmed after nearly one year=s continual re$eamination) and remained basic to
U.S. policy for the remainder of the war.
8. M#P for !ndohina
a. Magnitude
The U.S. military assistance program to the *rench and #ssociated States was
implemented rapidly) considering the maDor U.S. commitment to the Aorean war. !n a
somewhat premature Dudgment of outcomes) a progress report on the implementation of
NS< ,5 +8arch %') %&'%1 stated that "#merican military aid furnished the States= forces
and the #rmy of the *rench Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation
of the area against <ommunist aggression." Through %&'7 and into %&'5 the 8;#P
shipments to !ndochina increased steadily3 by *ebruary 9) %&'9) the United States had
shipped %9-)7(( long tons of material +775 ships= cargoes16 by :uly %&'5) approimately
%'()((( long tons had been sent) including %)J(( combat vehicles) 9()JJ- motor
transport vehicles) 9,%)'77 small arms and machine guns) 59J naval craft) 7 "orld "ar
!! aircraft carriers) and about '(( aircraft. By the conclusion of the Geneva agreements in
:uly) %&'5) the U.S. had delivered aid to !ndochina at an original cost of Q7),(( million.
Nonetheless) protests of the *rench at the slowness of deliveries and the "interference" of
8##G with *rench re?uests were recurrent) and pea.ed) during the crisis days of %&'5.
Cet these complaints probably reflected less genuine U.S. shortcomings than *rench
resentment of #merican efforts to advise) screen) inspect) and verify) and sheer
frustration. 8oreover) the vagaries of the *rench logistic system not only made the
8##G Dob more difficult) but further impeded combat supplies.
@. Effeti'eness
!n spite of the conditions under which U.S. assistance to *rance and the #ssociated States
was given) the 8##G during the period of the !ndochina war was little more than a
small +-( in %&'() 957 in %&'51 supply$support group which eerted far more influence
upon U.S. decisions than on the *rench. The *rench) never eager for #merican advice)
not only succeeded in limiting the function of 8##G to order$ta.ing in the commercial
sense) but in fact$through adroit pressuring of officials above the 8##G$sometimes
reduced 8##G to the position of ta.ing their military orders. #vailable data do not
permit detailed evaluation of the efficiency of 8#P) but it seems clear that *rench
restrictions on the U.S. 8##G reduced it to virtual impotence.
!f it would be an eror to evaluate the effectiveness of the U.S. program in terms of war
outcome) and if the efficiency of 8#P and 8##G cannot meaningfully be analy2ed) it
remains to evaluate the degree to which *rance met the conditions under which assistance
was tendered) which presumably impinged directly on U.S. political obDectives3
+%1 The United States obDective of insuring "that the primary responsibility for the
restoration of peace and security in !ndochina rests with the *rench" was fulfilled6 in fact)
it was insisted on by the *rench. Bn the one hand) U.S. military forces were never
directly engaged in the !ndochina war. Bn the other hand) the *rench) in retaining this
primary responsibility) preserved the prerogative to determine policy and the freedom to
reDect U.S. advice. U.S. "leverage" was minimal.
+71 The condition of basing the assistance program on "an urgently prepared *rench plan
acceptable to the #ssociated States and to the U.S." was frustrated in several ways. #t the
outset no overall plan was presented) and those portions of eisting plans to which U.S.
authorities were privy +e.g.) #llessandri=s pacification plan for the Ton.in ;elta1 were not
acceptable to U.S. thin.ing. Second) when the /etourneau$#llard and Navarre plans were
finally prepared +in %&'9) three years after the U.S. decided that a plan was a necessary
precondition for aid1) some U.S. observers reali2ed that these were more concepts than
plans. U.S. acceptance of the plans was more reluctant than the granting of Q9J' million
in additional assistance might indicate. *inally) the plans) once "accepted)" were not
vigorously carried out.
+91 The *rench met pro forma the condition that they provide the U.S. assurances that
they would grant self$government for !ndochina) and form national armies for the
#ssociated States. But it was clear throughout the war that) regardless of the amounts of
U.S. assistance rendered) *rance=s declarations of intent were grudgingly issued) and were
seldom followed by action. The *rench !ndochina war had to be lost before 4ietnam was
granted genuine independence.
+51 #lthough *rance did epand its forces in !ndochina) these forces were never sufficient
to the tas.. *rench draftees were never employed in !ndochina. *rance continually
pointed to its @uropean defense posture in eplanation. !n at least one case) U.S.
personnel were re?uested +e.g.) as aircraft mechanics1) and 7(( were provided) when a
pool of suitable personnel eisted in 8etropolitan *rance.
+'1 Statements to the contrary notwithstanding) the *rench did not ameliorate neo$
mercantilism or other colonial policies) or provide "proper tutelage" to the #ssociated
States6 nor did it develop a command structure suitable to the United States.
+,1 The U.S. "chec.s to satisfy itself that the conditions" imposed were being satisfied)
were) by and large) few and far between) and were conducted at the pleasure and within
the specifications of the *rench.
+-1 The *rench chose not to refer !ndochina to the United Nations. <ertainly the U.S.
assistance program bore on this decision6 whether or not it was the deciding factor is
unclear.
The effectiveness of the United States assistance program as an instrument of United
States policy$$?uite aside from the outcome of the war$$was thus ?uite low.
3. ;riti+ue
#s earlier sections of this paper have suggested) the U.S. was persuaded to involve itself
in the !ndochina war by the perceived need) following the fall of Nationalist <hina) to
hold a line against communists. This strategic drawing of the line at the <hinese$
!ndochina border was reinforced by the belief that the fall of !ndochina would
undoubtedly lead to the fall of the other mainland states of Southeast #sia) and that the
fall of Southeast #sia would eventuate in the virtually complete denial to the United
States of the Pacific /ittoral of #sia. Prospects for a *rench victory in !ndochina were
assessed in contemporary U.S. intelligence documents as poor6 nonetheless) the U.S.
provided military and economic assistance to the *rench and the #ssociated States in the
belief that a prompt) coordinated United States program of military) political) and
economic aid offered some prospect that *rance might succeed in gaining the initiative in
the struggle in that area. Si maDor points of criti?ue of U.S. policy follow3
a. The 7.S. Misestimated Frane
U.S. policyma.ers apparently reali2ed that the conditions they imposed upon the *rench
were impracticable to some degree. Nonetheless) they believed that pre$conditions were
necessary and could assist in convincing the *rench to mend their colonial ways and to
pursue the war with #merican methods) diligence) and aggressiveness. The *rench) long
noted for proficiency and precision in logic) re?uired no ;escartes to reali2e that the
United States was thus as.ing *rance +!1 to regain full responsibility for the !ndochina
"ar) and in particular for fighting and ta.ing casualties in that war6 +71 to follow the
"guidance" and "advice" of the United States on the eercise of this *rench responsibility6
and +91 having fought the war) presumably to a successful conclusion) to relin?uish
control over !ndochina. !n view of the *rench willingness to retain responsibility for the
war) it is not surprising that they were reluctant) at best) to accept propositions +71 and
+91. ;espite *rench pronouncements on their role in fighting communism) there is little
reason to believe that they regarded the !ndochina war in the same light as the U.S.
viewed the Aorean "ar. 0ather) their behavior resembled that of other colonial powers
who had fought to retain profitable cob$
flies.
@. Slim ;hane #epted @y the 7.S.
>ad U.S. policyma.ers recogni2ed the slimness of the chance of persuading *rance to
accept the three propositions specified above) they might have sought alternative courses
of action in !ndochina. #s it was) the possibility +as opposed to the probability1 of success
was their prime consideration) and) overestimating U.S. leverage for influencing a
favorable outcome) alternatives were not considered.
. ;irular 7.S. Poliy
Suppression of alternatives) both on the general and the particular level +see Note 5J for
an eample of the latter1) led to a circularity in and reinforcement of eisting policies$$
constant forced choices between "bad" and "worse."
d. Poor 5argaining
>aving ta.en a hard policy line toward the *rench) the United States failed to bargain
effectively. Thus) in circumstances not totally dissimilar from those prevailing in
4ietnam in subse?uent time periods) the U.S. continued to provide assistance
disregarding infractions of pre$conditions6 moreover) the pre$conditions for aid were not
modified. "ithout modification) the conditions became worse than meaningless3 standing
testaments to U.S. impotence) to be recogni2ed only when and how the *rench chose. The
U.S. became virtually a prisoner of its own policy. <ontainment of communism) concern
for the *rench in relation to the postwar @urope of N#TB) @;<) and the Soviet threat in
the "est) combined with a fear) based on "orld "ar !! strategy) that a *rench
withdrawal from !ndochina would leave eposed the U.S. flan. in Aorea) all compelled
the U.S. to continue aid. Cet none of these considerations should have precluded
modification of the U.S. bargaining strategy.
e. Misinformation
The U.S. policyma.ing machinery was highly vulnerable to spoofing) on at least three
counts3 +%1 the very strength of the U.S. position regarding communism must have been a
constant temptation) not always resisted) for other parties to cry "red" and thus to
manipulate the U.S.6 +71 dependence on official *rench sources for intelligence and other
information was potentially misleading6 +91 reliance on the high$level mission techni?ue
for gathering information to be used as a direct input to policy decisions proved
unsatisfactory.
f. ;osts 3ot /eighed
*inally) there is little indication that U.S. policyma.ers) their thoughts dominated by the
obDective of containing the monolithic communist bloc) faced up to the costs of winning
the !ndochina war) even while direct U.S. intervention was being considered. Nor does
the evidence suggest that consideration was given to the tangible and intangible costs of
providing U.S. military assistance to a power losing a war) including the potential impact
on the U.S. position in #sia. #nd) finally) available documents fail to reveal any
consideration given to the notion of sun. costs. There were) of course) voices in the
wilderness. #n unsigned) undated memorandum posed eight .ey ?uestions to be
answered by the NS< during the spring of 1,.-. <omment on the following four
?uestions) in relation to the time at which they were raised) is unnecessary3
$$:ust how important is Southeast #sia to the security interests of the U.S.N !s the analysis
in NS< '5(' still validN !s the area important enough to fight forN
$$>ow important is !ndochina in the defense of Southeast #siaN !s the "domino theory"
validN !s !ndochina important enough to fight forN !f not) what are the strategic
conse?uences of the loss of all or part of !ndochinaN
$$!f the U.S. intervenes in !ndochina) can we count on the support of the nativesN <an we
fight as allies of the *rench and avoid the stigma of colonialismN
$$!s there a strategic concept for the conduct of a war in !ndochina which offers promise
of early success. . . N
The decision of the United States to provide assistance to *rance and the #ss\ciated
States during the !ndochina "ar is usually treated lightly) if at all) in current histories.
Cet) both the ta.ing of the decision and its implementation were significant for and
remar.ably similar to subse?uent U.S. eperiences in 4ietnam.
!!. T>@ U.S. #N; *0#N<@=S "!T>;0#"#/ *0B8 4!@TN#8) %&'5$%&',
<>0BNB/BGC
- :uly '5
Diem appointed Premier of South Bietnam
Urged by #merica and *rance) @mperor Bao ;ai named Ngo ;inh ;iem
premier of South +*ree1 4ietnam. Bao ;ai remained legal) constitutionally
recogni2ed <hief of State.
7% :uly '5
:ene'a #ords signed
*rance became guarantor of 4ietnamese sovereignty) unity) territorial
integrity +<onference *inal ;eclaration) #rticle -16 with the P#4N)
guarantor of armistice agreements +Geneva #greements) #rticles 77) 791)
and all$4ietnam elections +<onference *inal ;eclaration) #rticle -1 *rance
agreed to withdraw the *rench @peditionary <orps at the re?uest of local
governments +<onference *inal ;eclaration) #rticle %() Unilateral
;eclaration) *rance1
J)%7 #ug
'56
7( #ug '5
3ational Seurity ;ounil meetingsI 3S; .-8,J8
US policies toward post$Geneva 4ietnam.
@conomic3 disassociate *rance from levers of command) integrate land
reform with refugee resettlement) wor. with the *rench but "encourage"
them to turn over financial) administrative) economic controls to the
4ietnamese. Give aid directly to the 4ietnamese$ not through *rance.
8ilitary3 wor. with *rance only insofar as necessary to build up
indigenous military forces able to provide internal security.
Political3 *rance must grant total independence +including right to
withdraw from *rench Union1 to South 4ietnam and support a strong
indigenous government. ;iem must broaden the governmental base) elect
an assembly) draft a constitution and legally dethrone Bao ;ai. *rench
support and cooperation for these poiicies was necessary6 retention of the
*@< was essential to South 4ietnamese security.
#ug '5
Sainteny Mission
:ean Sainteny was sent to >anoi to find ways to protect *rench economic
and cultural interests in the ;04. Political overtones of the mission
annoyed the US and General Paul @ly) >igh <ommissioner in the South.
@ly received firm assurance from 8endes$*rance that *rance was not
playing a "double game)" has not sent Sainteny for political bridge$
building purposes. 8endes$*rance reaffirmed *rench support for an
independent) strong South 4ietnam.
J Sep '5 Manila Pat Signed
;ulles= anti$communist military alliance was reali2ed in S@#TB.The
#ssociated States of !ndochina were covered by separate
protocol ensuring collective defense by S@#TB nations in case
ofsubversion or aggression.
7-$7& Sep
'5
/ashington ;onferene
*rance agreed to support ;iem +against the *rench belief that ;iem would
prove unable to unify or stabili2e the country16 agreed to .eep the *@< in
South 4ietnam but received no indication of possible US financial aid for
the *rench forces. *rance .new economic and military aid would be given
directly to 4ietnam but was led to believe she would have a hand in its
distribution by ambiguous US$drafted statements. The US military role in
4ietnam was not discussed because of a State$:<S split +;ulles wanted to
assume training responsibilities6 :<S did not because of political
instability) presence of *rench troops and Geneva restrictions1.
77 Bct '5
3S; #tion Program
The U.S. decided to ta.e firmer steps to strengthen ;iem) to tell Paris that
*rench support had been inade?uate. #n earlier :<S
concession to consider a training program for the N4# openedthe way for
the decision to inaugurate a "limited" U.S. role in mili
tary affairs.
75 Bct '5
Eisenho4er letter to Diem
#nnounced direct economic aid and military assistance from the U.S.6
demanded no 4ietnamese moves as reciprocation for aid.
*rance called it a carte americaine) said it violated the principle of Doint
action adopted in September.
J Nov '5
;ollins Mission
General :. /awton <ollins) given broad authority to coordinate all U.S.
programs and$$with *rench support$$get things moving) arrived in
4ietnam.
%9 ;ec '5
;ollins-Ely Minute of 7nderstanding
*rance will grant full autonomy to the 4N# by :uly %&'') the U.S. will
assume training responsibilities) the U.S. 8##G) !ndochina) will direct
the training program$under General @ly=s over all authority. *rench and
U.S. instructors will be phased out as 4N# efficiency increases.
"ashington approved the 8inute6 Paris obDected) particularly to the phase$
out of *rench trainers. *rance
did not relent and consent until %% *ebruary %&''.
%, ;ec '5
;ollins reommends Diem @e replaed
;iem=s failure to include ;r. Kuat in the cabinet as ;efense 8inister
confirmed <ollins= doubts about ;iem=s capacity to stabili2e the
government) or rally support for his regime. >e recommended Bao ;ai=s
return be considered) but if this were unacceptable) recommended the U.S.
withdraw from 4ietnam
%& ;ec '5 Trilateral Meetings& Paris (7.D.& 7.S.& Frane)
8endes$*rance insisted the time had come to consider an alternative to
;iem. 0ecommended <ollins and @ly study the problem and come up with
suggestions for a change by mid$:anuary. *rance felt Bao ;ai should be
involved in an alternative plan.
;ulles3 ;iem is the only suitable leader but we will consider alternatives
and will allow <ollins and @ly to consider the matter. But ;ulles made it
clear that <ongress would probably not appropriate funds to a 4ietnam
without ;iem. U.S. study of alternatives was cursory) however6 ;ulles was
sure ;iem could succeed) with proper direction6 he was more sure that no
other possible leader eisted.
7( :an ''
;ollins( report to 3S;
;ecember=s despair over ;iem had dissipated6 ;iem=s had acted well on a
few matters. <ollins recommended continued support for ;iem because
without it South 4ietnam will surely fall to communism and the rest of
other Southeast #sia will soon follow. The NS< approved <ollins= report.
%7 *eb ''
Training 2elations and !nstrution Mission (T2!M) opens
General B=;aniel) under @ly=s general supervision) too. charge of
programs to train and reorgani2e the 4N# along #merican lines. ;espite
friction between *rench and #mericans in Saigon and despite Paris$
"ashington disputes) officers in T0!8 seemed able to rise above
differences and initiate sound programs for the 4N#.
77 *eb ''
7nited Front announed
*rench subsidies to the <ao ;ai and >oa >ao sect armies$about 5()(((
men$ended in *ebruary. "hen ;iem refused to meet sect re?uests for
financial aid) integration of forces into the 4N# and recognition of spheres
of influence) previous sect cooperation with ;iem ceased. 0epresentatives
of the <ao ;ai) >oa >ao) ;an Ha +Ba <ut1) /ien 8inh +Thinh 8inh The1
and Binh Huyen +Bay 4ien1 forces met at Tay Ninh) agreed to wor.
together against ;iem. <ao ;ai Pope Tac headed the group.
7% 8ar ''
7nited Front ?ultimatum?
<laiming to spea. for the popular will) the United *ront as.ed that ;iem
form a government of national union and ma.e other political) economic)
military reforms. ;iem called this an ultimatum and refused to consider
the re?uest. The *ront then sent an emissary to Bao ;ai as.ing him to
intervene on its behalf. Bao ;ai refused.
7&$9( 8ar
''
Diem atta0s entral polie head+uarters
Brewing for months) the fight finally bro.e between ;iem and the Binh
Huyen +a coalition of gangsters and river pirates which ran gambling and
prostitution in <holon) and the Saigon$<holon police) paid Bao ;ai for his
protection and enDoyed some *rench support1. # company of paratroopers
too. over the central police station) driving the Binh Huyen bac. into
<holon. ;iem then wanted to go after Police <ommissioner Sang and end
Binh Huyen control. ;efense 8inister 8inh resigned when ;iem refused
to consult the cabinet over this. >owever) *rench representations
dissuaded ;iem from ta.ing on Bay 4ien=s ,(($man force at this
time) and the *rench then negotiated a truce between ;iem and the Binh
Huyen.
- #pr ''
;ollins and Ely agree Diem must go
<ollins says ;iem has proved himself incapable of inspiring unity) and
must be replaced. ;ulles demurs) then agrees to consider a
change if <ollins will fly to "ashington for consultations.
79 #pr ''
Diem proposes to @roaden the go'ernment
;iem calls for a national referendum and elections for a national assembly
within si months. The *ront scores the proposal.
7, #pr ''
Diem fires Sang
+<ollins had left Saigon for "ashington.1 ;iem replaces Sang with a man
loyal to his regime but Sang refuses to resign saying
only Bao ;ai had the legal authority to remove him.
7- #pr ''
Dulles agrees to a hange in Saigon
<ollins met with ;ulles in "ashington. ;ulles agreed to consider an
alternate to ;iem but was determined to .eep this from the
*rench until their purposes were clear and their promise to une?uivocally
support a new regime firm. Saigon was informed of this
new policy.
7J #pr ''
Diem hits the 5inh Euyen
;iem struc. at the SuretV$and Sang$after fighting erupted be tween the
4N# and Binh Huyen forces in <holon. The *rench said ;iem instigated
the fight6 #mericans supported ;iem=s version that the Binh Huyen began
firing first. "hatever its origin) the fight ended with a 4N# victory. The
Binh Huyen were driven out of <holon into the 0ung Sat swamps.
9( #pr ''
2e'olutionary ;ongress #nnouned
;iem=s brother Nhu had a hand in organi2ing this broad amalgam of
political interests behind a program calling for support of ;iem
against the Binh Huyen sects and Bao ;ai) in favor of broad representation
in the government. Generals The and Phuong) tired of the "wea."
0evolutionary <ongress) formed a 0evolutionary <ommittee whose
outloo. was more anti$Bao ;ai and anti$*rench than the <ongress. Present
and former 4ietminh supporters were members of the <ongress and
<ommittee.
8ay ''
5ao Dai(s ultimatum
Bao ;ai summoned ;iem to replace the #rmy <hief of Staff with his own
man. ;iem ignored the summons and orders.
% 8ay ''
The 7.S.> @a0 on the tra0 @ehind Diem
Because of ;iem=s victory$$superficial though it may have been$$over the
Binh Huyen) because of 4N# support for ;iem) ;ulles
canceled the cable of 7J #pril3 again) the U.S. will support ;iem.
J 8ay '' # 3ational ;ampaign launhed
;iem announced a national campaign to regain "wayward" provinces and
unify the country. Br3 he declared war on the sects. The
4N# fought over a year against >oa >ao and Binh Huyen forces) but
finally established control over them) over areas of sect influence and
control.
J$%% 8ay
''
Tripartite Tal.s) Paris
*aure3 "e cannot support ;iem$but 4ietnam is not worth a split in
*ranco$#merican relations. Therefore) *rance offers to withdraw from
4ietnam. ;ulles3 "e must support ;iem. But if a U.S. withdrawal would
prevent discord) the U.S. will consider it. Then) after hearing :<S and
<ollins= arguments against either precipitate *rench withdrawal or a U.S.
withdrawal) ;ulles urged *aure to Fwords missingG ;iem a while longer on
the grounds that he will broaden the government and call for elections.
*aure agreed$ against his own wishes and against strong popular pressure
and on several conditions +most of which re?uired action from ;iem and
which ;ulles coud not guarantee1. ;ulles then suggested *rance and the
U.S. apprise each other of policy and actions but pursue them more
independently than in the past. The days of Doint policy$$of togetherness in
4ietnam$$were over.
:uly %&''
Diem refuses to meet 4ith the D2B a@out eletions
*rance and Britain urged ;iem to hold consultations with >anoi for all$
4ietnam elections) as stipulated in the Geneva #ccords. The U.S.
suggested consultations but also suggested ;iem re?uest firm guarantees
+for secret ballot) UN or international supervision1 which the ;04 was
epected to reDect. But ;iem refused to meet with the North 4ietnamese.
>e had not signed the Geneva #ccords and denied being bound by them in
any way.
75 Bct ''
3ational 2eferendum
"ith &J percent of the vote) ;iem became President of the 0epublic of
4ietnam$$and Bao ;ai was dethroned.
#ug$;ec
%&''
Frano- Bietnamese ;onferenes
;iem wanted renegotiation of economic and financial accords reached in
%&'56 transfer of 4ietnamese affairs from the ministry of the associated
states to the *oreign Bffice6 abolition of @ly=s former post of >igh
<ommissioner6 termination of the military >igh <ommand and
4ietnamese authority over remaining *rench troops in 4ietnam. +The *@<
now numbered about 9')((($$'ie the %'()((($man force which *rance
spo.e of retaining in 4ietnam during the September %&'5 "ashington
<onference.1 *rance could not accept ;iem=s last demand6 had difficulty
satisfying the others) but finally made maDor concessions. ;iem=s response
was to withdraw 4ietnamese representatives from the *rench Union
#ssembly.
7, #pr ', Frenh )igh ;ommand a@olished
Bnly about ')((( *rench troops remained in 4ietnam6 most *rench
instructors had left T0!8. # *rench liaison mission with the !<< still
functioned) however) and *rance still served on the :oint #rmistice
<ommission with ;04 military representatives.
:uly) %&',
#ll-Bietnam eletions
;iem had refused to consult with the ;04 about elections in %&''6 he
refused to hold them in %&',. ;iem did agree to ta.e over the *rench
responsibility to support the !<<6 *rance would continue to finance !<<
operations. The :oint #rmistice <ommission gradually died of inactivity.
A@C #8@0!<#N P@0SBN#/!T!@S3 %&'5$%&',
81 Fan .3-81 Fan A1
President3 ;wight ;. @isenhower
Secretary of State3 :ohn *oster ;ulles
Secretary of ;efense3 <harles @. "ilson
#mbassador to 4ietnam3 ;onald 0. >eath +7' :un '7$7( #pr ''16
Gen. :. /awton <ollins) Special 8ission +J Nov '5$, 8ay ''16
G. *rederic. 0einhart +7( #pr ''$%5 8ar '-1
<hairman) :<S3 #rthur ". 0adford) #dm.) USN +%5 #ug '9$%' #ug '-1
<hief 8##G) !ndochina3
:ohn ". B=;aniel) /t. Gen.) US# +9% 8ar '5$79 Bct ''16
Samuel T. "illiams) /t. Gen.) was %st <hief of 8##G to 4ietnam +75 Bct ''$ 9% #ug
,(1
A@C *0@N<> P@0SBN#/!T!@S3 %&'5$% &',
Fun .--Fe@ ..
Prime 8inister3 Pierre 8endes$*rance
*oreign 8inister3 Georges Bidault
8inister for #ssociated States3 Guy /a <hambre
8inister for National ;efense3 0ene Pleven
>igh <ommissioner) 4ietnam3 General Paul @ly
83 Fe@ ..-31 Fan .A
Prime 8inister3 @dgar *aure
*oreign 8inister3 #ntoine Pinay
8inister for #ssociated States3 8. /a *orest
8inister for National ;efense3 General Pierre Aoenig
>igh <ommissioner) 4ietnam3 General @ly=s post abolished after his departure) :une
%&''. +Gen. :ac?uot assumed military responsibilities until #pril) %&',1
#mbassador) 4ietnam3 >enri >oppenot +:uly) %&''1
31 Fan .A-1A #pr .$
Prime 8inister3 Guy 8ollet
*oreign 8inister3 <hristian Pineau
8inister for National ;efense3 8aurice Bourges$8aunouvy
>igh <ommissioner) 4ietnam3 +General :ac?uot$military responsibilities until #pril
%&',1
#mbassador) 4ietnam3 8. Payart +November) %&',1
A@C SBUT> 4!@TN#8@S@ P@0SBN#/!T!@S3 %&'5$%&',
Mar -,-8A 6t ..
>ead of State3 Bao ;ai) @mperor
18 Fan .--1A Fun .-
>ead of State3 Bao ;ai
Premier3 Prince Buu /oc
8inister for *oreign #ffairs3 Nguyen Kuoc ;inh
$ Ful .--1 3o' A3
>ead of State3 Ngo ;inh ;iem +President3 79 Bct ''1
Premier3 Ngo ;inh ;iem
8inister for *oreign #ffairs3 Tran 4an ;o +:ul '5$8ay ''1 4? 4an 8au +:ul ''$Nov ,91
8inister for National ;efense3 Ngo ;inh ;iem +General 8inh served temporarily) early
%&''1.
#. !3T26D7;T!63> P6ST-:E3EB# EEPE;T#T!63S
1. Frane /ill Stay in Bietnam
#fter %(( years of investment) interest and influence) *rance got out of 4ietnam in less
than a year after the Geneva <onference of :uly %&'5. #nd *rance did Pot want to leave.
Bn :uly 7') three days after signing the Geneva #ccords) Prime 8inister 8endes$*rance
said *rance would maintain cultural and economic ties with North 4ietnam and would
assist the development of *ree +South1 4ietnam. The predecessor /aniel Government had
recogni2ed "4ietnam as a fully independent and sovereign state in possession of all
?ualifications and powers .nown in international law" on :une 5) %&'56 8endes$*rance
pledged to uphold and further that treaty. !n #ugust he announced a three$phase formula
to implement it. @conomic) administrative and financial ties with the #ssociated States
would be terminated as fast as possible. By ;ecember %&'5) the last vestiges of the
*rench colonial apparatus had been eliminated. >owever) 8endes*rance=s formula
viewed membership in the *rench Union as compulsory$$indicative of *rench desire to
stay in 4ietnam but inimical to demands lodged by ;iem and the United States for
independence which included the right to withdraw from the *rench Union.
#lso in #ugust) General Paul @ly) *rench >igh <ommissioner in 4ietnam) reaffirmed
*rench support of 4ietnamese independence and *rench readiness to further 4ietnamese
development. That the *rench had a role to play was clear3 *rench economic investment)
cultural institutions) military) political and administrative operations were already part of
South 4ietnamese life. That *rance must play a role was also clear. Under the Geneva
#ccords) *rance had pledged to guarantee all$4ietnam elections in %&',) guarantee
eecution of the armistice agreement) guarantee 4ietnamese sovereignty) unity and
territorial integrity) pledged to maintain the *rench @peditionary <orps until 4ietnam
re?uested its removal. General @ly had been delegated etensive political and military
authority to enable him to meet these obligations. >e wor.ed sincerely to persuade both
4ietnamese and *rench that mutual cooperation would be mutually beneficial) to erase
the colonialist tinge of *rench presence) to both speed and smooth the *rench transition
from master to e?ual partner of 4ietnam.
8. Diem> Frane /ill "ea'e South Bietnam
!n this endeavor) @ly received ?ualified support from *rench officials) "colons" and
military officers in 4ietnam. >e received sporadic support from Paris. >e received
almost no support from the 4ietnamese. *rance was not welcome in 4ietnam for many
reasons) a maDor one being Premier Ngo ;inh ;iem. # *rancophobe of the first order)
;iem wanted full independence for South 4ietnam and wanted *rance out of the country
as soon as possible. 8any shared ;iem=s
sentiments. *rance had Dust lost a long) devastating and demorali2ing war against
4ietnamese communists as well as 4ietnamese nationalists. *rench colonial rule had
been tight) previous *rench promises of independence had been bro.en. "hy believe
professions of *rench good intentions in %&'5 were any different from those of the pastN
#dded to this was the problematical relationship of *rance vis$a$vis South 4ietnam and
the ;emocratic 0epublic of North 4ietnam. Some South 4ietnamese epected *rance to
actively wor. toward accommodation with the 4iet 8inh and reunification of North and
South under 4iet 8inh direction. 8any more felt the fact of continued *rench presence
alone compromised South 4ietnamese independence. "To convince the people of
4ietnam that the administration was independent) it became a political necessity to be
anti$colonial and specifically anti$*rench."
3. The 7.S. /ill ?Foin? Frane in South Bietnam
*inally) *rance was not alone in 4ietnam. 8ore than ;iem) more than the psychological
damage done by colonial years) the United States made life in 4ietnam difficult for
*rance. The U.S. was eager to strengthen 4ietnam) needed and demanded *rench
cooperation) but offered little in return. U.S. policy insisted upon an immediate and
dramatic transformation of *rench policy. But the U.S. little understood what this meant
to *rance) what problems it created for *rench domestic and foreign policy or what U.S.
concessions might help effect the transformation.
#lthough remnants of the *rench @peditionary <orps remained until %&',) *rance was
out of 4ietnam to all intents and purposes by 8ay %&'') ten months after Geneva. These
months are characteri2ed by professions of *ranco$#merican cooperation but
demonstrations of *ranco$#merican division) characteri2ed by conflict of word and
action on several levels. Paris said one thing but did another) Paris said one thing and
*rench officials in Saigon did the opposite6 "ashington activities were not always in line
with "ashington pronouncements and the gulf between the thought and deed of Ngo
;inh ;iem only compounded an already sensitive situation. !t is during this period that
;iem established his rule) against *rench advice and best interests but with almost
unwavering support from Secretary of State :ohn *oster ;ulles. #nd it is the period
during which the anti$communist moralism of ;ulles and ;iem reDected any
rapprochement with the North) ultimately ensuring that the temporary military
demar.ation line would become a permanent division of 4ietnam.
5. !3!T!#" 7.S. P6"!;< T6/#2D !3D6;)!3#
The U.S. began revising policy toward !ndochina as the Geneva <onference closed. The
eercise was mar.ed by urgency dictated by the belief that Geneva had been a disaster
for the free world. Geneva gave <ommunist <hina and North 4ietnam a new base for
eploitation of Southeast #sia6 it enhanced Pe.ing=s prestige to "ashington=s dismay and
detriment6 it restricted free world room to maneuver in Southeast #sia. #nd its grant of
4ietnamese territory above the seventeenth parallel to the communist >o <hi 8inh was a
painful reminder of the scarifying *rench defeat by the 4iet 8inh) the first defeat of a
@uropean power by #sians +#sian communists at that1) a defeat shared by the United
States to the tune of more than Q%.' billion in economic and military assistance granted
*rance and the #ssociated States of !ndochina.
1. SE#T6> The 3e4 !nitiati'eG
The first step toward countering this disaster had been discussed with Britain and *rance
since the spring of %&'5) and "alter Bedell Smith=s comment as Geneva closed) ""e
must get that pactS)" heralded its inauguration. The Southeast #sian <ollective ;efense
Treaty was to be a "new initiative in Southeast #sia" to protect the U.S. position in the
*ar @ast and stabili2e "the present chaotic situation . . . to prevent further losses to
communism" through subversion or overt aggression. But the 8anila Pact) signed on
September J) %&'5) proved to be neither the new initiative nor the strong anti$communist
shield called for by Secretary ;ulles. 4ice #dmiral #. <. ;avis) deputy assistant
secretary and ;efense ;epartment representative at 8anila) reported the Pact left
Southeast #sia "no better prepared than before to cope with <ommunist aggression." The
failure was largely of #merican ma.ing. "hile ;ulles wanted to put the communists on
notice that aggression would be opposed) the :oint <hiefs of Staff insisted the United
States must not be committed financially) militarily or economically to unilateral action
in the *ar @ast and that U.S. freedom of action must not be restricted. The two obDectives
conflicted and one cancelled out the other. Thus) #rticle !4 of the treaty) the mechanism
for collective action in case of enemy threat) did not pledge automatic response with
force to force. !nstead) each signatory promised to "act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes." The United States) particularly 8r. ;ulles)
tried to put teeth into S@#TB through unilateral declarations of U.S. readiness to act.
;ulles defined the obligations under #rticle !4 as "a clear and definite agreement on the
part of the signatories) including the United States) to come to the aid of any member of
the Pact who under the terms of this treaty is subDected to aggression." >owever) ;ulles
failed to instill the same dedication to instant intervention in the other S@#TB members.
The obligation assumed at 8anila emphasi2ed the importance attached to Southeast #sia
by the U.S. Government. U.S. refusal to pledge un?ualified support to !ndochina
emphasi2ed the need for indigenous strength and stability in the area to counter
communist power) to ma.e infiltration and aggression less appeti2ing to the enemy. Bf
the three !ndochina states) most important yet least stable and least strong was South
4ietnam. Thus) the second step in policy development was to decide what the U.S. could
do to change the situation) a decision which turned on what *rance could or would do in
South 4ietnam.
8. #lternati'e Frenh Poliies
That *rance and the United States would eventually part company over 4ietnam might
have been predicted in #ugust %&'5) when U.S. policy toward 4ietnam was drawn.
*ormulae for economic) military and especially political courses of action were different
from$often antithetical to$*rench obDectives and interests.
The U.S. intelligence community felt if *rance "acted swiftly to insure 4ietnam full
independence and to encourage strong nationalist leadership . . . anti$*rench nationalist
activity might be lessened +and1 with *rench military and economic assistance$bac.ed by
U.S. aid$the 4ietnamese could proceed to develop gradually an effective security force)
local government organi2ation and a long range program for economic and social
reform." But there were three other routes or combinations of routes open to *rance in
post$Geneva 4ietnam. *rance could wor. to maintain *rench Union ties) indirect *rench
political control and economic domination rather than grant full independence to
4ietnam. Br) *rance could try to reach an agreement with the 4iet 8inh) epedite
elections and achieve a unified country in which *rench cultural) economic and political
interests could be maintained. # fourth possibility) thought li.ely only if the situation
deteriorated to the point of hopelessness) was a *rench decision to withdraw all military)
economic and administrative support from !ndochina.
Bf the four courses of action open to *rance) three were reDected by the @isenhower
#dministration. <ontinuation of *rench Union ties plus indirect *rench controls would be
impossible under ;iem) whose anti$*rench feeling ran deep) who had not in the past and
would not now accept anything less than complete freedom from *rance. #nd ;iem had
#merican bac.ing. ;ulles believed "the .ind of thing he stands for" is the "necessary
ingredient of success" and called the ;iem government the "nucleus for future efforts."
#ccommodation with the 4iet 8inh was anathema to both ;iem and the U.S. #lthough
#merican policy spo.e of ta.ing steps to prevent the complete absorption of the ;04
into the Soviet bloc) those steps amounted to nothing more than maintenance of a U.S.
consulate in >anoi. ;ulles in particular could not see >o <hi 8inh as #sia=s Tito and
refused to deal with him) thereby crushing 8endes$*rance=s hope that 4ietnam could
become an eperiment in peaceful coeistence. The U.S. was e?ually determined to
prevent the ?uic. withdrawal of the *rench @peditionary <orps from 4ietnam. !t was
believed3
in the last analysis) 4ietnamese security will be determined by the degree of *rench
protection and assistance in the development of a national army)
plus 4ietnamese energies and the will of other powers to guarantee 4ietnamese security.
Thus) United States policy re?uired *rance to grant full 4ietnamese independence
?uic.ly and to support a strong indigenous political regime) to maintain *rench military
presence but reduce military) economic and political controls. Basic guidance determined
at National Security <ouncil meetings on #ugust J and %7 became NS< '57&I7) issued
on #ugust 7(.
3. 7.S. 6@Heti'es in Bietnam> Politial& Eonomi& Military
The #merican formula for government in free 4ietnam rested on three legs.
!ndependence was first and more important. *rance must treat South 4ietnam as an
independent sovereign nation and the U.S. would deal with it on that basis. *ull
independence was the only way to win nationalist support away from the 4iet 8inh) and
nationalist support was thought to be essential to successful government in South
4ietnam. Secondly) the U.S. would urge Ngo ;inh ;iem to establish a government of
national union representative of dominant elements on the political scene. #fter bringing
some stability to the nation) a <onstituent #ssembly would be called and a constitution
drafted to herald the legal dethroning of @mperor Bao ;ai and inauguration of
democracy. *inally) the formula demanded firm *rench and U.S. support for ;iem.
;espite his rigidity) his penchant for a one$man show and his inability to communicate or
deal with people) ;iem was a nationalist untainted by past association with either 4iet
8inh or *rench. This ?uality) plus full independence) plus *ranco$#merican bac.ing and
encouragement for broad reform ultimately would result in a strong anti$communist
South 4ietnam. Br so the U.S. thought.
U.S. determination to bac. ;iem was made with the .nowledge that *rench support for
him was hardly enthusiastic. Guy /a <hambre) 8inister for the #ssociated States) faulted
;iem on three essential points3 ;iem would oppose a representative governments oppose
agrarian reform and refuse to depose Bao ;ai and create a republic. /a <hambre
epected a new government would be necessary to give South 4ietnam a chance of
winning the %&', elections.
#merican=s economic policy for South 4ietnam was designed to yield immediate political
advantage) cope with the staggering distortion of 4ietnamese economic life and ease
*rance out of economic affairs. U.S. planners believed integration of land reform
measures with refugee resettlement would fill a triple bill3 surplus land distributed among
the thousands of refugees would invite their political support) facilitate assimilation of
Ton.inese with <ochin$<hinese and bring the land to full productivity. #id would be
given directly to 4ietnam as befitting its independence and as a means to accelerate the
"disassociation of *rance from +economic1 levers of command." *rench domination in
this area) it was thought) stifled 4ietnamese efforts and contradicted 4ietnamese
independence. !t also inhibited #merican economic interests. 8ilitarily) the U.S. would
build up "indigenous military forces necessary for internal security . . . wor.ing through
the *rench only insofar as necessary." @actly how indigenous forces would be
developed was not decided until ;ecember %&'5) because *rance had some ideas about
what to do and the :oint <hiefs of Staff differed with State ;epartment opinions as to the
.ind of U.S. involvement re?uired.
-. The 7.S. ?;hooses? Poliy for Frane
!n effect) these policy decisions of #ugust %&'5 as.ed 8endes$*rance to overcome
"*rench traditional interests and emotions which have in the past governed the
implementation of policy in !ndochina." They as.ed for$$or demanded$$a "dramatic
transformation in *rench policy" because policy ma.ers believed this was necessary to
"win the active loyalty and support of the population for a South 4ietnamese
Government." The U.S. as.ed *rance to stay in 4ietnam militarily) to get out of
4ietnamese economic and political life) but at the same time "ashington as.ed for
*rench support and cooperation in implementing U.S. programs. This was probably
as.ing too much.
By ;ecember) the U.S. no longer as.ed for *rench support but demanded it. By
;ecember) the ?ualified U.S. commitment to ;iem had hardened) U.S. involvement in
4ietnam had deepened and U.S. activities there either dominated or simply ecluded the
*rench. Several forces converged to produce this change in U.S. policy. 0esolution of
differences within the @isenhower #dministration on military issues opened the way for
U.S. assumption of responsibilities in what had been an eclusively *rench preserve. The
belief that ;iem for all his failings and wea.nesses was the only available leader for
South 4ietnam) and that he needed stronger U.S. and *rench support to ?uell opponents
and speed development led to the creation of programs designed to provide that strong
support.
*inally) the U.S. believed *rance had not done enough for ;iem) believed the
schi2ophrenic *rench policy of professing support while acting to undermine ;iem=s
regime was largely to blame for 4ietnamese difficulties. This resulted in demands that
*rance live up to her promises. !t made unilateral #merican efforts more attractive$
*rench assistance might not be available in any case$and it inspired a feeling that
#mericans had to do more because the *rench were doing so little.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter 5) "U.S. and *rance in !ndochina) %&'($',"
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. 7%'$75%
;. TE3T#T!BE 7.S. !3B6"BEME3T 5E;6MES DEEPE2& F!2ME2
1. #doption of Military 2esponsi@ilities
#uthori2ation for General :ohn +!ron 8i.e1 B=;aniel) <hief of the 8ilitary #ssistance
and #dvisory Group +8##G1) !ndochina) to ta.e up the tas. of training the 4ietnamese
National #rmy +4N#1 was long in coming. General B=;aniel and *rench General @ly
had discussed U.S. participation in training in :une %&'56 B=;aniel drew up a
comprehensive plan for advisory assistance at all levels of the military establishment and
in :uly begged the U.S. to beef up the 8##G staff before #ugust %%) when the Geneva
prohibition against introduction of new military personnel went into effect. But the :oint
<hiefs of Staff obDected.
a. The F;S #rguments #gainst 7.S. Training the B3#
@arly in #ugust) the :<S listed four preconditions essential to the success of a U.S.
training effort in !ndochina) preconditions which should be met before training
obligations were assumed. *irst3
!t is absolutely essential that there be a reasonably strong) stable civil government in
control. !t is hopeless to epect a US military training mission to achieve success unless
the nation concerned is able effectively to perform those governmental functions essential
to the successful raising and maintenance of armed forces.
Secondly) that government "should formally re?uest that the United States assume
responsibility for training . . . forces and providing the military e?uipment) financial
assistance and political advice necessary to insure internal stability." The <hiefs saw no
role in training for the *rench6 the third precondition called for complete *rench
withdrawal from the country3
#rrangements should be made with the *rench granting full independence to the
#ssociated States and providing for the phased) orderly withdrawal of *rench forces)
*rench officials and *rench advisors from !ndochina in order to provide motivation and a
sound basis for the establishment of national armed forces. The United States from the
beginning should insist on dealing directly with the governments of the respective
#ssociated States) completely independent of *rench participation or control.
*inally) both "local military re?uirements and the over$all U.S. interests should dictate
the si2e and composition of indigenous forces."
@. Dulles( Bie4s
Bf the four preconditions) only the second presented no problem. The State ;epartment)
notably Secretary ;ulles) "alter *. 0obertson) #ssistant Secretary of State for the *ar
@ast) and Aenneth T. Coung) head of an interdepartmental 4ietnam Tas. *orce) obDected
to the other three stipulations. ;ulles outlined his thin.ing in a letter of #ugust %J to
;efense Secretary <harles "ilson. #greeing that the ;iem government "is far from
strong or stable" ;ulles pointed out that reorgani2ation and retraining of the army was
"one of the most efficient means of enabling the 4ietnamese Government to become
strong." <alling this "the familiar hen$and$egg argument as to which comes first)" ;ulles
made his preference clear. >e saw two courses of action open to the United States3
one) to strengthen the government by means of a political and economic nature and the
other) to bolster that government by strengthening the army which supports it.
;ulles wished to adopt both courses.
#s for the ?uestion of *rench presence or absence) ;ulles said3
!t would be militarily disastrous to demand the withdrawal of *rench forces from
4ietnam before the creation of a new National #rmy. >owever . . . there would seem to
be no insuperable obDection to the U.S. underta.ing a training program . . . while at the
same time the *rench *orces commence a gradual phasing out from that theater.
. The 3S; 5a0s Dulles
#doption of NS< '57&I7 indicates the U.S. Government found ;ulles= views more
persuasive that those of the :oint <hiefs of Staff. But while it was agreed to "wor.
through the *rench only insofar as necessary" to build up indigenous forces) the program
for bolstering the 4ietnamese army was not developed for several months.
d. F;S-State Split on Fore "e'el& Mission for B3#
Bn September 77) in a memorandum recommending establishment of a 8##G)
<ambodia +if "all *rench advisors ultimately" are withdrawn) if the U.S. deals directly
with Phnom Penh and if these caveats are written into a bilateral agreement with
<ambodia1) the :<S recommended against assignment of training responsibilities to the
Saigon 8##G because of the "unstable political situation" in South 4ietnam. !nstability
was noted "with concern" by the :<S in a second September 77 memorandum dealing
with development of forces in !ndochina) as was the cease$fire agreement +called "a
maDor obstacle to the introduclion of ade?uate U.S. 8##G personnel and of additional
arms and e?uipment"1. Because of these factors) the <hiefs considered "this is not a
propitious time to further indicate United States intentions with respect to the support and
training of 4ietnamese forces."
But the :<S had been directed by the NS< to address the ?uestion of 4ietnamese force
levels6 against their best wishes) one supposes) this memorandum forwarded their views.
# 795)(($man army was proposed for 4ietnam6 the annual cost of training and
maintaining this force$assuming *rance turned over to the 4N# arms and e?uipment
furnished under the U.S. 8ilitary ;evelopment #ssistance Program since %&'($was put
at Q57( million. #nother Q79.' million would be needed to train and e?uip the Navy and
#ir *orces. *urther) the :<S wanted speedy relin?uishment of *rench over$all command
of the 4N# and speedy withdrawal of *rench forces as the 4ietnamese "are capable of
eercising command of an effective force." *inally) the :<S re?uested "a definite
agreement . . . be obtained from the *rench Government with respect to the timing of
their programmed phased withdrawal" before U.S. assumption of training
responsibilities.
;ulles obDected to these proposals3
!t seems to me that the mission of the 4ietnamese National #rmed *orces should be to
provide internal security. The manpower and cost estimates +of the :<S1 would seem to
be ecessive in the above contet.
The Secretary called a *rench re?uest of Q99( million to support the *rench
@peditionary <orps) then epected to number %'()((( men through %&'') and the
4ietnamese plan to .eep 79()((( men under arms ". . . beyond what the United States
should consider feasible to support for maintaining the security of free !ndochina at this
time." !nstead) he called it "imperative" that the U.S. Government$e.g.) the :<S$"prepare
a firm position on the si2e of the forces we consider a minimum level to assure the
internal security of !ndochina."
# wee. later the <hiefs in turn obDected. The idea of training the 4N# for internal
security contradicted NS< %,7I7 which "envisages reliance on indigenous ground forces
to the maimum etent possible" in territorial defense. <iting the threat from
"considerable numbers of 4iet 8inh guerrillas and sympathi2ers....nown to be or
suspected of being within the territory of free 4ietnam" and the G4N "intention of
re?uesting the phased withdrawal of the *rench forces by %&'," the <hiefs said3
This would result in a complete military vacuum unless the 4ietnamese are ade?uately
prepared to ta.e over progressively as the *rench withdraw.
The force levels recommended on September 77 were reaffirmed as "the minimum
re?uired ultimately to carry out the . . . obDectives" of the 4N#) which should be "to
attain and maintain internal security and to deter 4iet 8inh aggression by a limited
defense of the Geneva #rmistice demar.ation line." The :<S pointed again to the
unstable political situation in 4ietnam) the 957$man 8##G ceiling and concluded3
Under these conditions) U.S. participation in training not only would probably have but
limited beneficial effect but also would assume responsibility for any failure of the
program. !n light of the foregoing and from a military point of view) the :oint <hiefs of
Staff consider that the United States should not participate in the training of 4ietnamese
forces in !ndochina. >owever) if it is considered that political considerations are
overriding) the :oint <hiefs of Staff would agree to the assignment of a training mission
to 8##G) Saigon) with safeguards against *rench interference with the U.S. training
effort.
e. #gain& the 3S; 5a0s Dulles& 2eommends a 7.S. Military Program in South Bietnam
Political considerations were overriding. The :<S concession to consider training the
4ietnamese for internal security alone coincided with deliberations in the Bperations
<oordinating Board over possible ways in which to strengthen the ;iem regime. # crash
program had been outlined by State) part of which was a limited interim training program
recommended by the B<B. #dmiral 0adford) <hairman of the :oint <hiefs of Staff)
believed this would set in motion the long$range training program proposed by General
B=;aniel in :une6 he still believed that program should not be adopted. But before the
:<S could consider or suggest revisions to the B<B proposal) the National Security
<ouncil met on Bctober 77 and approved a Doint State$;efense message to Saigon
authori2ing #mbassador ;onald >eath and B=;aniel to "collaborate in setting in motion
a crash program designed to bring about an improvement in the loyalty and effectiveness
of the *ree 4ietnamese *orces." The :<S were directed to recommend force levels
necessary to "accomplish the military obDective merely of the maintenance of internal
security."
0esponding on November %-) the :<S proposed a force of J&)(J' at an estimated cost of
Q%&9.% million for *iscal Cear %&', and approimately Q%(( million for the remainder of
*C %&''. To provide internal security and "in an attempt to stabili2e the ;iem
government" the :<S suggested prompt reduction in force and prompt reassigment of
selected personnel and units to maintain "the security of the legal government in Saigon
and other maDor population centers)" eecute "regional security operations in each
province" and perform "territorial pacification missions." /ater) military centers. would
be established for reorgani2ation and training of the military.
The <hiefs epressed serious reservations about the probability of 4ietnamese$$and
#merican$$success. *irst)
the chaotic internal political situation within 4ietnam is such that there is no assurance
that the security forces visuali2ed herein can be developed into loyal and effective
support for the ;iem Government) or) if developed) that these forces will result in
political and military stability within South 4ietnam. Unless the 4ietnamese themselves
show an inclination to ma.e individual and collective sacrifices re?uired to resist
communism) which they have not done to date) no amount of eternal pressure and
assistance can long delay complete <ommunist victory in South 4ietnam.
Secondly) "the cooperation and collaboration of the *rench 8##G" is vital to effective
eecution of the program$and the :<S doubted that support would be readily offered.
*inally) the <hiefs cautioned)
the above program does not provide ade?uate security for the #ssociated States against
eternal aggression after the withdrawal of the *rench forces. "ith the 4iet 8inh
increasing the si2e and effectiveness of their forces and with no forces in being
committed to mutual defense under the Southeast #sia <ollective ;efense Treaty) the
above long$range program would be insufficient to provide more than limited initial
resistance to an organi2ed military assault by the 4iet 8inh.
f. ;ollins #grees 4ith the 3S;
#nother memorandum of November %- indicated how ?uic.ly the United States had
moved to inaugurate the crash program approved at the Bctober 77 NS< meeting.
Secretary ;ulles outlined for President @isenhower the recommendations of General :.
/awton <ollins) special envoy sent to 4ietnam to over$see all U.S. operations) coordinate
them with *rench programs and get things moving. <ollins recommended the
"4ietnamese National #rmy . . . be reduced by :uly %&'' to --)(((. !t should be placed
under 4ietnamese command and control by that date. . . . The cost to the U.S. would be
two hundred million dollars annually. . . . The United States should assume training
responsibility . . . by :anuary %) %&'') with *rench cooperation and utili2ing *rench
trainers."
<ollins insisted that *rench forces be retained in 4ietnam3
!t would be disastrous if the *rench @peditionary <orps were withdrawn prematurely
since otherwise 4ietnam would be overrun by an enemy attac. before the 8anila Pact
Powers could act.
To "encourage the *rench to retain sufficient forces)" <ollins urged U.S. financial
support of at least Q%(( million through ;ecember %&''. General @ly concurred.
8. ;onditions in Bietnam !n'ite Firmer #tion
The situation in 4ietnam during the autumn of %&'5 invited an action program of some
.ind$any .ind. Premier ;iem barely controlled Saigon6 he was opposed by his army=s
chief of staff) by powerful sect politicians guarding significant special interests with
powerful sect armies6 he was at least tacitly opposed by many *rench in 4ietnam. The
countryside had been devastated by the war6 communications) administration and
financial operations were stalled6 an already prostrate economy was threatened by the
deluge of some J,()((( refugees from the north. Bver all hung "an atmosphere of
frustration and disillusionment" created by the Geneva #ccords and imposed partition)
"compounded by widespread uncertainty as to *rench and U.S. intentions." U.S. policy in
#ugust set out to correct the uncertainty.
a. The Military Threatens Diem
General Nguyen 4an >inh) <hief of Staff of the 4ietnamese National #rmy) was the first
coup$plotter to rise and first to fall. September threats of a military revolt were first
staved off by the mediation of U.S. #mbassador ;onald >eath and General @ly +who
doubted ;iem=s capacity to lead but wor.ed to prevent his violent downfall.1 Then ;iem
uncovered a coup plot) arrested some >inh supporters) removed the general from
command and ordered him out of the country. >inh refused to leave and continued his
machinations against the government. Plans for one coup in Bctober were dropped when
>inh was told revolt would mean automatic termination of U.S. aid. #nother scheduled
for Bctober 7, was foiled when <olonel @. G. /ansdale) head of the Saigon 8ilitary
8ission and chief <!# man on the scene) lured two .ey subordinates out of the country.
/ansdale invited >inh and staff to visit the Philippines. >inh unhappily declined but his
supporters$$one of whom allegedly was a *rench agent$$could not resist the chance to see
the inner wor.ings of the 8agsaysay$led) U.S.$supported operation against >u.
insurgents. *inally) in November) Bao ;ai was persuaded by #merica and *rance to
intervene on ;iem=s behalf. >e did) ordered >inh to report to <annes) and on November
%&) the general left the country. General >inh enDoyed some *rench support in his anti$
;iem activity. #mbassador >eath reported he received "?uiet encouragement if not
unofficial support" from many *rench officers and officials in Saigon and "at the wor.ing
level in Paris." >inh was also aided initially by the sects) later by the Binh Huyen.
@. The Sets Threaten Diem
The <ao ;ai and >oa >ao sects) basically religious groups with important political
controls and interests as well as private) *rench$subsidi2ed armies) wor.ed with >inh
through early September. Then) spurred by the .nowledge that precipitate action would
Deopardi2e #merican aid) the sects agreed to wor. with ;iem. /ast minute threats and
"heavy pressure" from *rench officials against coalition left sect leaders "di22y" but they
recovered sufficiently to accept cabinet positions on September 75. Sha.y to begin with)
the coalition never wor.ed3 ;iem refused to delegate responsibility to his eight new
ministers and they soon tired of trying to wor. through the government.
. #nd the 5inh Euyen 6ppose Diem
The Binh Huyen) too) considered Doining the coalition but pulled out when ;iem refused
to name Binh Huyen leader) "a colorful brigand named /e 4an +Bay1 4ien" 8inister of
the !nterior. Bay 4ien had forged a motley group of small$time gangsters into a fairly
sophisticated organi2ation of ,((( big$time gangsters and river pirates) and had been
helped in this endeavor by Bao ;ai and *rench colonial administrators. The Binh Huyen
controlled prostitution and gambling in <holon and the Saigon$<holon police force$
reportedly because Bay 4ien paid Bao ;ai some 5( million piasters for these privileges.
Still$dissident sect leaders such as Ba <ut) whose '((( >oa >ao adherents denounced
Geneva and refused cooperation with ;iem) and *renchmen opposed to ;iem abetted
Binh Huyen intrigues against the government.
3. Frenh "aCity Demands Strong 7.S. Programs
8ore than the 4ietnamese power struggles and ;iem=s inability to consolidate his rule)
*rench activities during the autumn of %&'5 galvani2ed the United States. *rom
ac?uiescence to U.S. demands in September) #merican policy ma.ers felt *rance had
moved toward opposition to U.S. demands by November. That this assessment of *rench
actions was either obDective or fair is ?uestionable.
a. The /ashington ;onferene& Septem@er& 1,.-
#fter *ranco$#merican discussions in "ashington in late September$the first in a
progression of monthly meetings on 4ietnam$the United States seemed to have scored
highest. *rance promised to support ;iem) to grant independence to 4ietnam ?uic.ly.
The transfer of financial) administrative) economic and other functions to the 4ietnamese
had begun and would be completed by ;ecember %&'5. That *rance bal.ed at U.S.
demands for an immediate grant of independence outside of the *rench Union is not
surprising3 *rench cultural) economic and political interests in 4ietnam were still strong6
the *renchman=s belief in the validity of the *rench Union was deep. No *rench
government dared defy public opinion by seeming to hasten the end of the *rench Union.
*rance felt the U.S. had an "almost psychological attachment to =independence= without
giving sufficient thought and attention to the practical problems and ris.s involved."
Secondly) the U.S. had been able to defer a commitment to finance the *rench
@peditionary <orps in 4ietnam although an indication that aid would be resumed) if not
resumption itself) had been the first order of *rench business at the "ashington
<onference. *rance agreed to maintain the <orps in 4ietnam but was told no aid figures
would be available until ;ecember.
Both *rance and the U.S. thought their respective economic aims had been won. *rance
obDected strongly to the idea of direct #merican aid to 4ietnam on the grounds that it
violated the Geneva #ccords) would needlessly provo.e <ommunist <hina) promote
graft and corruption in 4ietnam) and intensify the political struggle. Plus) "past +*rench1
sacrifices on behalf of 4ietnam and their obligation as a member of the *rench Union"
made *rench supervision of aid essential. To *rance) a compromise agreement drafted by
"alter Bedell Smith meant the U.S. accepted these arguments and was willing to give
*rance a hand in disbursing aid to the #ssociated States. The U.S. chose not to interpret
the agreement this way. The State ;epartment said the U.S. merely indicated willing$
mess to consult on such matters. Bn 7& Bctober) ;ulles told 8endes$*rance that the U.S.
alone would disperse aid6 by late November 8endes$*rance finally tired of arguing an
obviously lost cause and dropped the matter.
@. The 7.S. Faults Frenh Support for Diem
;espite apparent agreement at "ashington to bac. ;iem) Secretary ;ulles met with
8endes$*rance three wee.s later in Paris about the same subDect. "*or . . . ready
reference" #cting Secretary of State >erbert >oover ?uoted for ;ulles part of the 7&
September 8inute of Understanding in which the
....representatives of *rance and the United States agree that their respective governments
support Ngo ;inh ;iem in the establishment and maintenance of a strong) anti$
<ommunist and nationalist government. To this end *rance and the United States will
urge all anti$<ommunist elements in 4ietnam to cooperate fully with the Government of
Ngo ;inh ;iem in order to counter vigorously the 4iet 8inh and build a strong free
4ietnam.
...."hile @ly seems to have attempted honestly to carry out this agreement) the fact that
many *rench elements have never accepted ;iem solution must have wea.ened @ly=s
efforts and encouraged >inh camarilla in its recalcitrance. . . . Unless ;iem receives
unreserved U.S. and *rench support) his chances of success appear slight. "ith such
support) his chances are probably better than even) repeat even.
. #ommodation 5et4een Paris and )anoiG
#part from the ?uiet bac.ing given ;iem=s opponents by *rench officers and officials in
Saigon and persistent Paris proposals for a change in government +Prince Buu >oi) whose
"political ideologies" were repugnant to ;ulles) was a *rench favorite at this time1) the
U.S. found in *rench accommodative gestures toward >anoi ample proof that *rench
bac.ing for ;iem was reserved at best. #mbassador ;illon felt 8endes$*rance found in
4ietnam a "situation ideally designed to test +the1 bases of his fundamental political
philosophy of =peaceful coeistence=" and that his government grew more and more
"disposed to eplore and consider a policy loo.ing toward an eventual peaceful North$
South rapprochement." *rench insistence on strict legal interpretation of the Geneva
#ccords was one eample of accommodation thin.ing. *rance obDected to anything
which could possibly delay or destroy elections in %&',6 ;illon predicted Paris would
accept the results of elections "however academic that eercise may eventually prove to
be." But the most worrisome eample to those at the State ;epartment who lined up
against any .ind of accommodation was the Sainteny 8ission to >anoi.
d. Sainteny or ElyG
:ean Sainteny) credited with reaching short$lived independence accords with >o <hi
8inh in 8arch %&5,) was sent bac. to >anoi in #ugust %&'5 to find ways to protect
*rench business and cultural interests in Ton.in. Sainteny=s past success at
rapprochement gave the mission definite political overtones. General @ly wished Paris
had sent a "stupid type of consular official" not a man of Sainteny=s "active stripe"6 he
was disturbed enough to fly to Paris to tell 8endes$*rance he would resign if *rench
policy was to play a "double game" in North and South 4ietnam aimed at bac.ing
whichever side ultimately won. 8endes$*rance assured @ly that *rench policy was to
give maimum support to the anti$<ommunist elements in South 4ietnam and do
everything possible to assure their victory in %&',. @ly was placated and returned to
Saigon. But Sainteny remained in >anoi and maimum support for ;iem did not
materiali2e.
*rom another source came word that @ly was not "au courant" with *rench policy.
*rench Union <ounsellor :ac?ue 0aphael$/eygues) reportedly a member of the 8endes$
*rance "brain trust" on !ndochina) told #mbassador ;illon that Sainteny had convinced
Paris that South 4ietnam was doomed and the "only possible means of salvaging
anything was to play the 4iet 8inh game and woo the 4iet 8inh away from <ommunist
ties in the hope of creating a Titoist 4ietnam which would cooperate with *rance and
might even adhere to the *rench Union." 0aphael$/eygues said *rance deferred to U.S.
wishes over which government to support in Saigon to get money for the *rench
@peditionary <orps and to fi responsibility for the eventual loss of South 4ietnam on
the U.S.
!n ;ecember %&'5) Sainteny won >o <hi 8inh=s agreement to permit *rench enterprises
to carry on without discrimination. But if the contract pleased Paris it did not assure
*rench businessmen in Ton.in. 4iet 8inh legislation would regulate their operations6
profits could not be transferred outside the <ommunist orbit. 8ost *rench concerns
decided potential benefit was not worth the ris. of doing business with the ;04 and
despite Sainteny=s efforts to establish mied government$private corporations) most
withdrew from the North. Sainteny remained as a "general delegate" to the ;04.
e. The Mansfield 2eport
# final spur to U.S. action was the 8ansfield 0eport. #fter a fact$finding trip to South
4ietnam) Senator 8ansfield concluded his old ac?uaintance ;iem was the only man for
the Dob in Saigon. >e said the issue "is not ;iem as an individual but rather the program
for which he stands." That program "represents genuine nationalism) . . . is prepared to
deal effectively with corruption and ....demonstrates a concern in advancing the welfare
of the 4ietnamese people." The Senator felt it "improbable" that any other leadership
"dedicated to these principles" could be found and recommended the Government
"consider an immediate suspension of all aid to 4ietnam and the *rench Union *orces
there) ecept that of a humanitarian nature) preliminary to a complete reappraisal of our
present policies in *ree 4ietnam" if ;iem fell.
The 8ansfield 0eport elated ;iem +who proceeded to react with even more intransigent
self$righteousness to suggestions of change1) subdued the *rench and
annoyed Paris. *or those *renchmen who favored conciliation with the 4iet 8inh)
8ansfield=s analysis proved the validity of their policy. Bbviously) they said) if ;iem
falls the U.S. will heed 8ansfield and withdraw from 4ietnam. @?ually obviously) they
said) ;iem will fall. @rgo) *rance should start "betting on 4iet 8inh to win war." To
*rench officials willing to bac. ;iem the 0eport and "ashington=s endorsement of it was
a violation of the *ranco$#merican agreement to support another government if ;iem
fell. "hen 8endes$*rance reminded ;ulles of this and spo.e of the need to lay plans for
"another structure of government" which both *rance and the U.S. could support) ;ulles
was noncommittal.
-. 3S; #tion Program of 6to@er and Eisenho4er "etter to Diem
President @isenhower=s letter to ;iem of 75 Bctober +written #ugust and shown to the
*rench at that time6 held up until the political situation in South 4ietnam setled
somewhat6 finally approved for transmission at the Bctober 77 NS< meeting1 was called
a direct violation of the principle of cooperative action agreed upon in September by
8inister /a <hambre. *rench #mbassador Bonnet told Secretary ;ulles that "it was felt
+the letter1 had given ;iem full rein without re?uiring of him as a preliminary condition
that he should first succeed in forming a strong and stable government) even though this
preliminary condition had been a part of the basis of the "ashington agreements."
Bonnet added that the letter might be a violation of the armistice and the 4iet 8inh might
ta.e advantage of it. Then) when #mbassador ;illon suggested to the Kuai d=Brsay that
*rench support for ;iem had not been all that it might have been) /a <hambre was
inflamed. Not only was this a false allegation) it was a direct slur on General @ly) the
government in Paris and the glory of *rance. 8. /a <hambre said he was personally
convinced ;iem was leading South 4ietnam to disaster but would still support him3
"e prefer to lose in 4ietnam with the U.S. rather than to win without them . . . we would
rather support ;iem .nowing he is going to lose and thus .eep *ranco$U.S. solidarity
than to pic. someone who could retain 4ietnam for the free world if this meant brea.ing
*ranco$U.S. solidarity.
!n response) Secretary ;ulles formally told 8endes$*rance that both the @isenhower
letter and the stronger U.S. action were "in furtherance of the understandings reached at
"ashington." The U.S. had not "the slightest idea of ?uestioning the good faith of the
*rench government" but "many *rench officials have not concealed their belief that ;iem
has failed . . . and . . . should be replaced." This attitude produced an "impasse in Saigon"
necessitating firmer action. /a <hambre received this with "little comment" other than to
suggest appointment of Nguyen 4an Tam +General >inh=s father) Premier during
%&'7$%&'9 and a strong$$even oppressive$$administrator1 to the !nterior 8inistry. /a
<hambre called this a "way out of the mess . . . +for1 here is a man who .nows how to
fight <ommunists." #s in the past) the U.S. reDected the proposal.
.. More #tion> The ;ollins Mission
The initial U.S. action program rested on three assumptions3 that ;iem could be
persuaded to accept U.S. proposals) that >inh would obey the government) that the
*rench at all levels would cooperate. None proved immediately valid. So the U.S.
adopted yet another tactic. General :. /awton <ollins) U.S. 0epresentative to the N#TB
8ilitary <ommittee) was dispatched to 4ietnam on November J with the personal ran. of
#mbassador +>eath returned to the State ;epartment1. #s President @isenhower
described it) <ollins= mission was3
to coordinate and direct a program in support of +;iem=s1 government to enable it to3 +a1
promote internal security and political and economic stability6 +b1 establish and maintain
control throughout the territory6 and +c1 effectively counteract 4iet 8inh infiltration and
paramilitary activities south of the demar.ation line.
#fter initial resistance to the <ollins mission +seen as a precursor to complete U.S. ta.e$
over of !ndochina1) General @ly established a close wor.ing relationship with <ollins. #
seven$point program for political) military and economic action was ?uic.ly designed.
Bn ;ecember %9) @ly and <ollins signed a 8inute of Understanding agreeing that *rance
would grant full autonomy to the 4N# by :uly %) %&'' and that the U.S. would assume
training duties in :anuary. They agreed the *rench @peditionary <orps must remain in
4ietnam and the level of financial assistance suggested by <ollins +Q%(( million through
;ecember %&'' after which assistance was not contemplated1 was adopted by the *oreign
Bperations #dministration and subse?uently announced to Paris. #id was contingent
upon consultation with <ongress and "subDect to @ly and <ollins and the two
governments mutually agreeing on what is to be done in !ndochina."
A. Frane 6@Hets to ;ollins-Ely #greements
Paris was unhappy about the aid figure$$a third of what *rance re?uested. <onse?uently)
withdrawal of *rench forces was speeded3 of the %'()((( troops scheduled to remain in
4ietnam through %&'' all but 9')((( were phased out. 8onetary reasons were said to be
paramount but political and psychological pressures for the pull$out were probably more
important. There was strong sentiment in *rance for sending the *@< to North #frica
where it could serve the interests of *rance and the *rench Union. !n 4ietnam) *rench
soldiers served the free world but were hated by the 4ietnamese and ignored by the very
powers they aided) powers which did not care enough to properly defray *rench
epenses.
Paris was more upset by the 8inute of Understanding. ;uring November discussion with
;ulles) 8endes$*rance had said he doubted full autonomy could be assumed by the
4ietnamese by :uly %&'' and believed a readDustment of 8##G personnel for the new
training mission might violate the Geneva #ccords. These arguments) were reiterated at
;ecember Trilateral meetings. But 8endes$*rance=s real trouble was agreeing to phase
out *rench instructors. Neither the *rench people nor *rench soldiers would understand
why *rance was denied influence while re?uired to support such a heavy burden in
4ietnam. 8endes$*rance and General @ly insisted that if *rench instructors were
eliminated the U.S. automatically would have assumed primary responsibility for free
world policy toward !ndochina. +;ulles and General <ollins reDected that line of
reasoning but convinced neither the *rench nor others that it was fallacious.1
<ollins compromised in the 8inute of Understanding by agreeing to softer language
+both *rench and #merican instructors would be removed as 4ietnamese efficiency
increased1) hoping to assuage Paris. >e failed. "hen the 8inute was forwarded for final
approval 8endes$*rance stalled. *irst he had to study it closely to ensure no conflict with
Geneva was involved. Then on :anuary -) the *rench submitted a redraft of the 8inute
which omitted reference to General B=;aniel=s authority over *rench personnel.
<ollins was already annoyed by hedging in ;ecember) tantamount to a slap in the face of
@ly to whom full authority to negotiate the agreement had been delegated. >e refused to
"agree to +the redraft1 unless specifically instructed by higher authority" because lines of
authority were not spelled out. Cet @ly thought Paris had approved the original
agreement. >e urged <ollins to continue negotiations with the 4ietnamese on the basis of
the first 8inute) advice <ollins followed despite the Paris$"ashington snafu. Bn :anuary
%& and 7( a formal echange of letters finali2ed the agreement for U.S. assumption of
training duties and financial support +Q7%5.' million1 for the 4ietnamese forces. The
forces would be scaled down to %(()(( by ;ecember %&''. Both cost and force levels
were raised from <ollins= November recommendations in deference to 4ietnamese
arguments. The U.S. and *rance remained deadloc.ed until *ebruary %%) %&'') when the
terms$$but not the form$$of the original agreement were finally accepted. The net day)
General B=;aniel assumed responsibility for training 4ietnamese forces and the Training
0elations and !nstruction 8ission +T0!81 went into operation.
D. F2#3;6-#ME2!;#3 !MP#SSE 6BE2 D!EM
0esolution of military problems within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. and
*rance was a fairly maDor accomplishment. Political differences were not similarly
resolved. To support or not to support Ngo ;inh ;iem was the issue over which *rance
and #merica split.
1. Paris> Diem !s !ll-Suited for 2ule
#s noted above) *rance ac?uiesced in the retention of ;iem as Prime 8inister in
deference to U.S. insistence and *rench concern for U.S. financial assistance for the *@<
during the September "ashington conference. !n mid$November) 8endes$*rance
reaffirmed the 7& September agreement but said an alternative form of government had to
be considered unless ;iem implemented an energetic program within the net two
months. By ;ecember) when 8endes$*rance) ;ulles and @den met in Paris) the *rench
Premier made it clear he thought the time had come for a change. Two ways to
accomplish change were suggested. Bao ;ai could name a 4iceroy and give him full
authority to use the powers of <hief of State to unify the warring political factions. Tran
4an >uu) Nguyen Tan Tam or ;r. Phan >uy Kuat were possible candidates for this Dob.
Br) Bao Bai himself could return to Saigon and form a government with >uu as premier)
Tam as !nterior 8inister) Kuat in ;efense.
*rance wanted ;iem out of power for several reasons. U.S. policyma.ers did not seem to
fully appreciate how galling ;iem=s *ranco$phobia must have been) nor did the U.S.
seem to understand$$or allow for$$the divisive effect ;iem=s militant anti$communist
stance had within the *rench Government. /ittle consideration was given to charges that
the U.S. was undermining *rance by portraying itself as the only friend of 4ietnamese
nationalism. But the U.S. could appreciate the validity of *rench arguments that ;iem
had not been and perhaps would not be able to unify and stabili2e South 4ietnam.
8. ;ollins> Diem ;annot "ead South Bietnam
General <ollins had been s.eptical about ;iem from the outset6 by ;ecember he was
convinced an alternative to his government should be urgently considered. ;iem=s refusal
to name ;r. Kuat as ;efense 8inister triggered <ollins= recommendation. Both <ollins
and <olonel /ansdale had urged ;iem to accept Kuat) agreeing Kuat alone was strong
enough to unify the 4ietnamese armed forces behind the Saigon government. Bn
;ecember %9) <ollins suggested five reasons for ;iem=s adverse decision3
+%1 unwillingness to delegate control of 4ietnam armed forces to any strong man6 +71 fear
of Kuat as potential successor6 +91 opposition of sects +who also feared a strong man in
the defense post16 +51 influence of brothers /uyen and Nhu +anious to neutrali2e the
power of any potential successor16 +'1 desire Fmaterial missingG
#ccording to <ollins)
"hatever the reasons) the failure to utili2e Kuat epitomi2es lac. of unity among
4ietnamese and lac. of decisive leadership on part of ;iem...#cceptance of status ?uo
with 8inh elevated to ;efense 8inistry and sects reinforced in veto power over
government is simply postponing evil day of rec.oning as to when) if ever) ;iem will
assert type of leadership that can unify this country and give it chance of competing with
hard) effective) unified control of >o <hi 8inh.
Three days later) General <ollins communicated his "final Dudgment" on the situation. >e
made four recommendations3
#. <ontinue to support ;iem along present lines for short while longer but without
committing U.S. to specific aid programs6
B. <onsider urgently) as possible alternative) the early return of Bao ;ai6
<. !f after short period of further test ;iem Government fails to achieve substantial
progressive action and if return to Bao ;ai is acceptable to U.S. Government) to support
his prompt return6
;. !f return of Bao ;ai is not acceptable to U.S. Government) assuming ;iem
Government continues to demonstrate inability to unite free 4ietnam behind an
aggressive program) ! recommend re$evaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast #sia
with special attention +to an1 earlier proposal.
The earlier proposal) made by General <ollins on ;ecember %9) was that the U.S.
gradually withdraw from 4ietnam. <ollins said this was the "least desirable
+but1 in all honesty and in view of what ! have observed here to date this may be the only
sound solution."
3. State Department> Diem !s the 6nly #'aila@le "eader
The State ;epartment went along with <ollins= suggestion to avoid specific assistance
commitments at the present time but could not see salvation in Bao ;ai. # memorandum
from #mbassador >eath) then wor.ing in the *ar @ast Bureau is indicative of State
;epartment thin.ing. >eath first called attention to "massive opposition" faced by ;iem
and *rench unwillingness to firmly support him$$implying that all ;iem=s problems were
not ;iem=s fault. >e then spo.e of General <ollins= "attempt to achieve a rapid solution)"
said <ollins= "recommendations are now based on the circumstances of a satisfactory
settlement prior to :anuary %"$$thereby suggesting that one not loo.ing for a rapid
solution might not arrive at similar conclusions.
The memorandum closed with >eath=s interpretation of Secretary ;ulles= policy and his
own thoughts as to what ought to be done3
!n our view) General <ollins= recommendations ignore the basic factor that we would
assist a <ommunist ta.eover by a withholding of our aid) even if it must necessarily be
given to a government which is less than perfect. The Secretary has analy2ed the situation
as one in which we are conducting a time buying operation. !f we withhold our support to
4ietnam) it will be ta.en over sooner than if we etend smaller aid) at a figure of about a
third of last year. !n the meantime) we will proceed to do what we can to strengthen
<ambodia) /aos and Thailand. This is my understanding of the Secretary=s policy.
! recommend we inform the Secretary and General <ollins that we recogni2e the dangers
posed by the above policy) but that in the lac. of more useful alternatives that we will
continue to support ;iem) because there is no one to ta.e his place who would serve U.S.
obDectives any better. This includes the Bao ;ai solution which is opposed by the facts of
Bao ;ai=s lac. of support in 4ietnam and his past demonstrations of inability to govern.
The fear that a fiscal commitment of over Q9(( million plus our national prestige would
be lost in a gamble on the retention of *ree 4ietnam is a legitimate one) but the
withholding of our support at this Duncture would almost inevitably have a far worse
effect."
The substance of the memorandum was cabled to Secretary ;ulles) then in Paris for the
Tripartite *rench) U.S. and British discussions.
-. Deem@er Tripartite Tal0s
a. Frane Proposes #lternati'e to Diem& Dulles Seems to #+uiese
Bn %& ;ecember) 8endes$*rance opened the !ndochina tal.s by calling ;iem=s approach
"wholly negative)" said "not a single reform suggested +by
*ranco$#merican wor.ing groups advising the government on all matters1 had accepted
by ;iem)" that the "*rench Government now considered . . . a
approach would have to be made to ;iem." 0eaffirming his past agreement with ;ulles=
"thesis that we must do our maimum to permit ;iem Government to succeed" 8endes$
*rance added3
now . . . he was no longer sure that even maimum would help. >e said we must now
have alternate formula in mind. "ithout varying from our stated purpose of supporting
;iem Government as long as it eists we must now prepare in our minds Fmaterial
missingG
;ulles agreed the
tas. in South 4ietnam was difficult +but1 regarded basic factors as favorable. People were
opposed to communism and had great natural resources....they received greater aid from
abroad than North . . . situation was much improved now that there was full cooperation
between *rench and #merican authorities. The problem must not be approached in spirit
of defeatism. Bnly serious problem we have not yet solved is that of indigenous
leadership. "e cannot epect it to be solved ideally because there is no tradition among
indigenous people for self$government. "e must get along with something less good than
best. . . . +The U.S. was1 not repeat not committed to ;iem in any irrevocable sense. "e
have accepted him because we .new of no one better. ;evelopments have confirmed our
fears as to his limitations but no substitute for him has yet been proposed. Those
suggested in past varied from month to month. Now it is claimed that only Bao ;ai can
save situation. !f that is case) then we must indeed be desperate. . . . "e should continue
to bac. ;iem but eert more pressure on him to ma.e changes we consider necessary.
8endes$*rance suggested the U.S. and *rance approach Bao ;ai and mentioned the
*rench 4iceroy plan to replace ;iem. ;ulles countered by saying the U.S. and *rench
might use Bao ;ai but "we must go to him prepared with our own ideas and not . . .
simply accept his." ;ulles did not epect any 4iceroy to be able "to decide on alternate to
;iem and to set up machinery to implement our ideas . . . our Dob +is1 to create this
machinery." >e added)
"e must ehaust all our pressures on ;iem to get things done before considering
alternate solutions. . . . >e as.ed 8endes not to thin. we had obstinately closed our
minds to possible alternate solution. "e had not repeat not) but our investigation of
alternate must be done on careful basis and we must for present support ;iem.
8endes$*rance agreed. >e summari2ed his position as follows3
*irst) to support ;iem6 second) to study alternatives. <ollins and @ly should be instructed
to eplore further possibilities including Bao ;ai with great discretion . . . third point was
that @ly and <ollins should be re?uested to investigate matter of timing. >ow much
further delay can be toleratedN . . . "e must set deadline...
Then ;ulles agreed$$but added a fourth point3
!f the US should decide that there is no repeat no good alternative to ;iem we will have
to consider how much more investment we will be prepared to ma.e in !ndochina. Bur
policy would have to be reappraised. <ongressional committees . . . would have to be
consulted. 8ansfield believes in ;iem. . . . @ven slight chance of success in 4ietnam was
worth considerable investment. US had also to thin. of what happened in adDacent
countries$in <ambodia) /aos) Thailand and 8alaya. US situation was different from that
of *rench. *rench had an investment in lives and property in 4ietnam while ours
involved effect that fate of 4ietnam would have on rest of Southeast #sia.
@. 5ut Dulles 2eports& 3o 6ther Suita@le "eader ;an 5e Seen
#fter the Tripartite meetings) ;ulles reported his assessment of their outcome to Saigon.
>e said he had agreed with 8endes$*rance on four points concerning
;iem but had not agreed to a deadline for ;iem=s replacement. 0ather) "<ollins and @ly
would report late :anuary on overall situation."
;ulles called the "investment in 4ietnam Dustified even if only to buy time to build up
strength elsewhere in area" and concluded3
"e are going to have to maintain fleible policy and proceed carefully by stages in
4ietnam. . . . Under present circumstances and unless situation +in 4ietnam1 clearly
appears hopeless and rapidly disintegrating) we have no choice but continue our aid
4ietnam and support of ;iem. There no other suitable leader .nown to us.
*rance believed ;ulles had in fact committed the United States to consider a change with
which Bao ;ai would be associated by mid$:anuary. "ashington denied it and Paris
protests were unable to budge the State ;epartment. The U.S. and *rance did agree that
the Tripartite tal.s had given <ollins and @ly a mandate to study alternatives) however.
. The 7.S. "oo0s at #lternati'es
>aving told Paris the U.S. was not committed to either a deadline or an alternative
involving Bao ;ai) the U.S. proceeded to study alternatives. Secretary of ;efense "ilson
as.ed the :oint Staff to assess the impact on military commitments to Southeast #sia of
the loss of South 4ietnam) of continued but reduced assistance to that nation and of a
range of actions in between. The :<S responded by calling "ilson=s alternate options
incomplete) that consideration of increased aid) and institution of a unilateral program of
direct guidance to the G4N through an "advisory system" should be among U.S.
considerations.
Fmaterial missingG
#s a result of <ollins= recommendations the NS< endorsed a strong policy in 4ietnam3
the U.S. would continue to support the ;iem government and continue to press *rance to
carry out its commitments under the Smith$/a<hambre agreement. The NS< approved in
principle the programs of military and economic aid to implement <ollins=
recommendations +about Q'(( million1 and determined to see. reaffirmation of the
8anila powers= determination to react under the S@#TB treaty if hostilities were
resumed. ;ulles decided to "ta.e the plunge" and begin direct aid to 4ietnam on :anuary
%) %&''. The aid program was to be fleible and fluid) adDusted according to
circumstances and subDect to discontinuance at any time) as at present.
E. ;2!SiS 6F T)E SP2!3:& 1,..
"ith strong United States bac.ing) ;iem went into the sect crisis of the spring) %&''.
;ifferent from the military coup crisis of #utumn %&'5 and the Kuat cabinet crisis of
;ecember) the sect crisis was resolved by ;iem=s ta.ing firm action and was not followed
by another. !t was followed by the end of any real *rench presence in 4ietnam.
1. The Pro@lem of the Set #rmies
The sects had been ?uiescent but not ?uiet since <ao ;ai and >oa >ao ministers had
Doined the cabinet in September %&'5. The end of *rench subsidies for sect armies in
*ebruary shoo. them out of complacency. ;iem agreed to pay a part of what the armies
had received from the *rench to ease the transition of some 5()((( soldiers to civilian
life. But transition it was to be3 he would not tolerate armed bands separate from 4N#
command and separate from Saigon=s political guidance. Sect leaders had different
obDectives) however. They wanted to preserve their military forces by integrating) intact)
as many units as possible into the National #rmy. +"ith a 4N# force level of %(()((()
few could be accommodated6 in :anuary only ,)((( sect troops had been absorbed.1
Secondly) the sects wanted substantial government assistance for soldiers forced to leave
the military. 8ost important) they wanted recognition of their areas of influence and
;iem=s assurance that he would not encroach on their territories. ;iem would
countenance no part of this third re?uest.
Since ;ecember) a *ranco$#merican group headed by <ol. /ansdale and directed to
"come up with a peaceful solution" to the problem had wor.ed furiously) found a solution
and urged its prompt adoption. Generals <ollins and @ly decided to give the matter
further study. /ansdale=s reaction3
"e warned them that time was etremely short) that the sects were about to ta.e action
by arms and that a peaceful solution would have to be introduced immediately or the
opportunity would be lost. The opportunity was lost.
8. The 7nited Front ;hallenges Diem
/ost because <ao ;ai and >oa >ao sect leaders Doined with Bay 4ien in *ebruary) put
down hostilities among themselves and Doined in a United *ront of Nationalist *orces. !n
8arch) the United *ront demanded ;iem form a government of large national union. The
eight sect cabinet members resigned +although <ao ;ai Generals The and Phuong soon
changed their minds1. # United *ront delegate tried to convince Bao ;ai to withdraw
;iem=s powers as premier but the timely arrival of a personal letter from President
@isenhower outlining US obDectives and progress in 4ietnam proved more persuasive.
The letter either reassured Bao ;ai that the US had not written him out of the political
picture or made him thin. twice about Doining with the sects and thereby incurring US
wrath. "hatever the reason) he refused to intervene on behalf of the *ront. ;iem called
the *ront Program an ultimatum and would not budge.
*rance wanted Bao ;ai to mediate between ;iem and the United *ront. The US wanted
to issue a Doint declaration telling the sects both #merica and *rance opposed violence
and warning them that the *rench @peditionary <orps would bloc. any movement of
>oa >ao troops into Saigon to reinforce the Binh Huyen. @ly and Paris refused the
warning clause3 *rench troops would act only in protection of the lives and property of
*rench and foreign nationals.
3. Diem ;hallenges the 5inh Euyen
;uring this time) /ansdale was meeting almost nightly with ;iem. >e reports ;iem
was desperately trying to get *rench and US help to remove the SuretV from the control
of the Binh Huyen. *rench and US reactions to the problem were in the form of advice to
proceed slowly) to act with caution. @vents would not permit this.
Before dawn on the 7Jth of 8arch) a paratrooper company loyal to ;iem attac.ed and
overcame the Binh Huyen$controlled central police head?uarters. The net day) ;iem
told ;efense 8inister 8inh he planned to oust Binh Huyen Police <ommissioner /ai
4an Sang that afternoon$$8arch 7&$$and replace him with someone loyal to his regime.
8inh insisted ;iem at least consult the cabinet before ta.ing action. ;iem refused and
8inh resigned. 0epresentatives of General @ly were able to persuade ;iem to defer any
move against the SuretV) however.
Bn the night of 8arch 7&$9( the Binh Huyen struc. bac.. 8ortar shells fell on the palace
grounds and Binh Huyen trooys tried to regain the prefecture. They were repulsed by
National #rmy troops. The 4N# then moved to attac. the SuretV itself in retaliation but
*rench officers apparently cut off their gas and ammunition supplies temporarily to .eep
the National #rmy on the defensive. *ighting ended by 939( in the morning of 8arch 9(.
General @ly opposed a 4N# offensive against the SuretV head?uarters) not because it
might fail but because it was irrelevant. 0elevant was ;iem=s inability to defeat the sects
rapidly and decisively throughout the country. !f force were used to prove a minor point)
a long) bloody and maDor civil war would surely ensue. @ly was outraged at ;iem=s
attitude. >e felt the premier verged on megalomania and was ready to "put the city to
sword and flame to establish his authority. <ollins sympathi2ed with @ly) but also felt if
;iem did not prove he could control Saigon he would be forced to accede to sect
demands.
-. True-5ut 3o ;alm
Bn 8arch 9%) a 5J$hour cease$fire was won by General :ean Gambie2) trusted by both
the National #rmy and the Binh Huyen. The truce was etended into #pril but failed to
cool tempers or ease tensions. +<ao ;ai forces which had bro.en with the United *ront
were integrated into the National #rmy on 8arch 9%) however$$one happy note for
;iem.1
a. "ansdale Bersion
/ansdale) whose account of this and later developments is not at all flattering to the
*rench) says @ly decided to impose a cease$fire and won <ollins= concurrence. *rench
officers then moved in and stopped the fighting. /ansdale "saw #mbassador <ollins . . .
eplaining that only the Binh Huyen would gain by the cease$fire." But it continued3
#mbassador <ollins was sincerely convinced that the Binh Huyen could be induced by
*rench negotiations to withdraw from the SuretV and police control of the metropolis....
/ansdale reports the *rench had long been wor.ing against ;iem through the 4ietnamese
National #rmy +they used its G$, as an arm of *rench intelligence1
and that *rench soldiers under his command in the National Security ;ivision of T0!8
tried to sabotage the ;iem regime and US programs designed to strengthen
it.
The *rench had daily fed us the latest *rench propaganda line +;iem was wea.) ;iem
was bloodthirsty) the 4N# had low morale . . . was unable to fight) #mericans didn=t
understand the 4ietnamese) all whites must encourage only selected 4ietnamese loyal to
the *rench because the remainder would turn against all whites in another "night of the
long .nives" similar to that of %&5,.1 Now the *rench had been insistent that the National
#rmy was a hollow shell) that its officers would refuse to fight . . . that morale was so
bad the troops would desert rather than follow "bloody ;iem."
/ansdale implies <ollins fell for this "propaganda" but he) /ansdale) did not. Bn the
cease$fire) /ansdale reports3
The *rench told ;iem that if he tried to ta.e over SuretV head?uarters which was now
included in the *rench 2one) *rench troops would open fire on the 4ietnamese #rmy.
The US advised ;iem to be patient) that the *rench were really being helpful by
negotiating with the Binh Huyen. The cease$fire limit was etended . . . Si2eable sums
were being offered +by *rench1 to #rmy officers and to sect leaders who were remaining
loyal to ;iem and to entice them into being at least neutral. Those who refused were
subDected to character assassination attac.s...
@. Ely and ;ollins( Deision> Diem Must :o
Bn #pril -) <ollins and @ly discussed ;iem. @ly said ;iem could be maintained only by
overcoming enormous difficulties. #fter a full day of "soul$searching)" @ly had been
forced to conclude ;iem had to go to preserve 4ietnam for the free world. >e would
accept anyone but ;iem as premier. <ollins had been nearing a similar conclusion. Bn
8arch 9% he told the State ;epartment it was necessary to consider alternatives to ;iem.
# wee. later <ollins cabled ;ulles to insist ;iem be removed. >e recommended Tran
4an ;o +;iem=s foreign minister who also resigned from the cabinet in 8arch1 or ;r.
Kuat as replacements.
. Dulles( !ndeision
;ulles replied as he had in ;ecember3 he could not see how ;iem=s replacement would
solve the sect problem for any successor worthy of US assistance would still have to
contend with them. # change in premiers would damage US prestige throughout the *ar
@ast3 the US would be charged with paying lip se]vice to the cause of #sian nationalism)
then abandoning a nationalist leader when pressured by "colonial interests." Plus pro$
;iem <ongressional sentiment was a problem. The 8utual Security bill was under debate
and 8ansfield had made it clear that <ongress would be reluctant to appropriate funds to
a 4ietnam without ;iem. ;espite these difficulties) ;ulles eventually agreed to consider
a change if <ollins would personally come to "ashington for consultation.
d. Paris> Diem(s Time !s 7p
#t the same time Paris was fast losing patience. The time has come to form a government
responsive to dominant political forces in 4ietnam) to abandon the unrealistic U.S. policy
of maintaining and strengthening ;iem) said *rance. *ormation of a <onseil Superieur
was proposed) representative of ;iem and his supporters) the sects) intellectuals)
politicians and the army. The <onseil would decide policy and a cabinet of non$political
technicians headed by ;iem would implement it. But the U.S. reDected this plan saying
;iem should be allowed to stri.e bac. at the Binh Huyen with force and *rance and
#merica should support him$morally and logistically.
Then "ashington as.ed the Kuai d=Brsay to answer a set of ?uestions designed to elicit
specific *rench plans for the change in 4ietnamese government. Paris= reDoinder3 the
?uestions should be answered Dointly or the united *ranco#merican effort in 4ietnam
would be over and *rance would have to say publicly that the U.S. had assumed sole
responsibility for developments in 4ietnam. But in mid$#pril) *rance filled$in part of the
?uestionnaire$leaving blan. a successor to ;iem +only Doint consultation could decide
this1. Paris proposed <ollins and @ly draw up a slate of acceptable candidates for maDor
positions. The U.S. and *rench governments would agree on a final list) as. Bao ;ai to
summon representatives of various factions to <annes and on the basis of *rench$U.S.
recommendations) negotiate a solution to the sect$Binh Huyen$;iem impasse. Sect
support would be assured by their membership in a high council and a program of honors)
indemnification and integration of sect troops into the National #rmy.
e. 5ao Dai(s Plan
Bn #pril 7%) Bao ;ai announced his own plan for resolving the crisis) remar.ably similar
to that submitted by Paris. Bao ;ai wanted to summon various representatives to <annes)
name ;r. Kuat as premier) as. him to form a cabinet of technicians and a high council of
notables. Bn #pril 7,) Bao ;ai said he would implement the scheme unilaterally unless
the U.S. made some response by the following day.
8eanwhile) <ollins had left Saigon for consultations with ;ulles. /ansdale reports a
meeting held Dust before his departure3
>e +<ollins1 told /ansdale not to be worried by newspaper rumors that the US would
stop supporting ;iem. /ansdale as.ed then if his orders were to continue supporting
;iem6 <ollins said yes. 8embers of the country team privately felt that ;iem should be
supported by us) that the National #rmy was ready to support him and had the capability
of defeating the Binh Huyen.
f. Dulles( Deision> 7.S. /ill ;onsider a ;hange in 2egime
General <ollins and Secretary ;ulles met on #pril 7-. ;ulles agreed to consider shifting
support to either Kuat or ;o and a message to this effect was sent to Saigon. But ;ulles
determined not to discuss this with *rance until a full and fran. statement of her
intentions had been received. That statement was to include an une?uivocal assurance to
bac. whole$heartedly any new political arrangements in Saigon and to resolve "certain
ambiguities" in *rench policy toward North 4ietnam. Until this declaration appeared the
US would reveal no change of heart over ;iem.
.. Diem #ts #gainst the 5inh Euyen
Then the truce eploded. Bn 7J #pril) ;iem told /ansdale3
The #rmy and people laid the blame +for the crisis between the government and the Binh
Huyen1 on the *rench because they could see *rench armored vehicles and troops in the
streets evidently ready for action against the 4ietnamese. "e +/ansdale and an assistant1
told him that it loo.ed as the 4ietnamese still needed a leader) that ;iem was still
President) that the US was still supporting him.
That afternoon) ;iem=s private secretary called /ansdale. >e said the palace was
under heavy mortar fire) that the President was on another line tal.ing to General @ly)
that @ly stated that he couldn=t hear any eplosions and the President was holding the
mouthpiece out towards the eplosions so @ly could hear them. >ai +the secretary1 started
to as. what should be done) interrupted himself to say that the President had Dust ordered
the National #rmy to start returning the fire and had so informed @ly. >e hung up.
#gainst the advice of *rench) US and most cabinet advisors) ;iem had issued a decree
charging Police <ommissioner /ai 4an Sang with "very grave official misconduct" and
named <ol. Nguyen Ngoc /e to replace him. Sang refused to resign) saying only Bao ;ai
had authority to remove him. Binh Huyen troops in <holon apparently opened fire on
National #rmy units and Binh Huyen shells fell again on the palace. But within nine
hours after ;iem=s order to ta.e the offensive) the National #rmy had driven the Binh
Huyen bac. into <holon. *ires raged +set by the Binh Huyen) according to /ansdale16
hundreds were .illed or wounded.
A. /ashington #ts> 7.S. /ill (#gain) Support Diem
"ashington responded with alacrity to ;iem=s success) superficial though it was. Saigon
was told to forget ;ulles= earlier message about US willingness to see a change in
government. Policy had not changed after all3 the US supported ;iem. The Saigon
@mbassy burned the first message.
$. Diem and 6thers Defy 5ao Dai
Buoyed by his showing against Bay 4ien) ;iem ignored the summons from Bao ;ai
which appeared on #pril 7J. The @mperor ordered ;iem and General Ty to <aPines)
placed Binh Huyen sympathi2er General 4y in charge of the army and dispatched
General >inh to Saigon with personal instructions from Bao ;ai. ;iem refused to leave
Saigon) refused to allow General 4y to assume command) refused to allow General >inh
into the country.
Bn #pril 9( a new development surfaced. The National 0evolutionary <ongress of the
4ietnamese people was announced. Bac.ed by <ao ;ai Generals Phuong and The) >oa
>ao General Ngo) other attentiste politicians) it claimed to represent almost all political
parties in South 4ietnam. The <ongress declaration repudiated Bao ;ai) dissolved the
present government and called on ;iem to form a new government and elect a national
assembly to draft a constitution.
;iem was receptive to the program of the 0evolutionary <ongress) particularly since his
brother Nhu had a hand in drafting it. >e was probably not as receptive to some of the
activist members of the <ongress) however) most of whom Doined in a 0evolutionary
<ommittee. Generals Trinh 8inh The and Phuong confided to /ansdale3
The 0evolutionary <ommittee had grown out of the 0evolutionary <ongress *ront
organi2ation which ;iem=s brother Nhu had tried to organi2e some days earlier6 they had
followed +S88=s1 advice and had Doined with Nhu in the *ront but were dissatisfied with
some of the wea. organi2ations they felt Nhu was depending on) so had organi2ed
something more dynamic to meet the threat of 4y and Bao ;ai and called themselves the
0evolutionary <ommittee. They wanted Bao ;ai dethroned and wanted the *rench to
stop interfering in 4ietnamese affairs.
Support) bac.handed though it may have been) helped ;iem politically in 4ietnam and
with the United States. 8ilitarily he was never really threatened by Bao ;ai or Generals
4y or >inh +who was never able to deliver Bao ;ai=s special orders1. The National #rmy
was stronger than *rench and #mericans thought and it refused to obey General 4y. The
following episode) related to /ansdale by General Ty and <olonel Tran 4an ;on after
their temporary arrest by 4y) illustrates this. General 4y bragged about being able to get
anything he wanted from the *rench. Ty and ;on as.ed him to prove it. "+They1 . . .
as.ed him to call up the *rench and re?uest the armored vehicles which the *rench had
been holding at Bien >oa so long without delivering to the 4ietnamese #rmy. The
*rench rushed these vehicles to >inh=s house +4y=s head?uarters1) evidently having been
holding them Dust outside town for this emergency) where #rmy men too. them over and
drove them into the fight against the Binh Huyen. ;on said the *rench still hadn=t caught
on) still thought that 4y would use this armor to bring the #rmy into line to stop fighting
the Binh Huyen and be loyal to Bao ;ai. ;on added that the #rmy felt the same as the
0evolutionary <ommittee3 Bao ;ai was finished." General 4y retreated to ;alat +and
Bao ;ai=s !mperial Guards1) then left the country.
;uring these days) General @ly had grown more convinced that ;iem was not only
irresponsible) he was ?uite mad. @ly feared fighting would spread to the @uropean sector
but was unable to win #merican or British support for an attempt to reimpose the cease$
fire. #merican <harge d=#ffairs Aidder felt @ly himself was approaching hysteria and
that his emotional involvement compromised his usefulness to either *rance or the United
States. @ly=s premonitions of violence between 4ietnamese and *rench forces proved
unfounded. But violence did accompany ;iem=s final offensive against the Binh Huyen
which opened on 8ay 7 when the 4N# crossed the <hinese #rroyo and attac.ed Bay
4ien=s forces in <holon. By the following day) most of the Binh Huyen had been driven
out into the 0ung Sat swamps.
"hen <ollins returned to Saigon he urged ;iem to hold the 0evolutionary <ommittee in
chec. +<ollins) most of the *rench and *rench intelligence thought 4ietminh had
infiltrated the front organi2ation6 they feared ;iem would become its prisoner if he
bac.ed it too strongly1. <ollins wanted ;iem to reconstitute the government and get on
with reforms) leaving the problem of Bao ;ai to an elected national assembly. ;iem
followed this advice. >e invited some -(( elected counselors from 9& provinces to
consider Bao ;ai=s legality. #n @states General composed of '( counselors drew up a
program demanding Bao ;ai transfer all civilian and military powers to ;iem who would
eercise them until the assembly met$$within si months$$to draw up a constitution.
9. May Trilateral Meetings
a. Dulles 5a0s Diem
#t this same time) *rance) the United States and Britain met once again in Paris. The
Tripartite session had been called to discuss problems of @uropean ;efense but 4ietnam
was the real subDect. The positions of both Secretary ;ulles and *rench Prime 8inister
@dgar *aure +who succeeded 8endes$*rance in *ebruary %&''1 toward ;iem had
hardened. ;ulles insisted he be upheld3
;iem is only means US sees to save South 4ietnam and counteract +the1 revolutionary
movement underway in 4ietnam. US sees no one else who can. "hatever US view has
been in past) today US must support ;iem whole$heartedly. US must not permit ;iem to
become another Aarens.y.
...Bao ;ai . . . had irretrievably lost capacity to be anything but titular head of
government. . . . <ao ;ai and >oa >ao could be used but not Binh Huyen. . . . "ith
support +of *rance and US1 ;iem could sit on top of revolution. ;iem is only force of
moderation. *@< is certain stabili2ing influence. US was giving funds to support
4ietnamese army and could not see anyone else to give funds to but ;iem for that
purpose.
...!n US view present revolution is not yet dominated or influenced by <ommunists to
any appreciable degree. . . . Support of ;iem did not indicate US non$recognition of his
wea.nesses. US . . . had been and remained ready to support any other man who might be
presented by orderly process of law. +;ulles1 remar.ed that Dust before outbrea. of
fighting US was prepared to consider alternatives but he was not sure now that it would
have been practical. . . . !f there is a better man US is ready to consider him but . . . no
one has been suggested. #lthough <ollins had reached agreement with @ly in early #pril
to change ;iem he now believes we must support him.
@. The Frenh Position
*rench 8inister /a *orest had opened the meeting by pointing to consultations
+scheduled for :uly1 between North and South 4ietnam about elections. >e said *rance
felt South 4ietnam could win the contest if a "nationalist) stable and broadly based
government" were in control and that *rance wanted South 4ietnam to win.
There is no ambiguity in *rench policy between North and South 4ietnam. Presence of
*rance in North could not be erased by stro.e of pen. !t is *rench duty to protect her
cultural and economic presence there. Sainteny mission is designed for only that purpose.
*rance had given up thought of mied companies as result +US1 obDections and had now
surrendered coal mines....
/a*orest presented the *rench analysis of events over the past four months. "hile the US
could not argue his facts) the US could not accept /a*orest=s interpretation of them.
;ifferences between the two nations were more fundamental than at any time in the past.
*rance had loyally supported government of ;iem from beginning. #ny allegation to
contrary is untrue . . . *rance reached agreement with US last ;ecember to persuade "or
compel" ;iem to enlarge government. !t was agreed to give him until :anuary at which
time) if he had failed) we would loo. into matter of alternate discreetly. This was not
done. /ast 8arch present government bro.e into open conflict with sects. United *ront of
sects was formed against ;iem. Both ;ecember agreement and common sense told us at
that time that something +had1 to be done to avoid civil war. . . . *or this reason) Doint @ly$
<ollins approach was tried. !t was hoped they would arrive at Doint plan for solution.
"ashington appeared first to welcome this concept then changed its mind. <ollins left
Saigon when civil war was about to brea. out. Untenable truces were declared. "hen
they were about to epire Bao ;ai submitted his own plan . . . in order to try to reconcile
US and *rench failure to act. US failed to reply to Bao ;ai. !n absence of <ollins from
Saigon) Bao ;ai acted.
/a *orest continued
...that new 0evolutionary <ommittee appeared to have control. <ommittee is strongly
under 4iet 8inh influence. . . . There is violent campaign against *rench and *rench
@peditionary <ontrol. 4iet 8inh agents ma.e good use of it and certain #mericans do
not seem sufficiently aware of this. *rench Government does not wish to have its army
act as platform for 4ietminh propaganda. #rmy will not be maintained at any cost...
. Faure> /e /ill /ithdra4 to Sa'e the 7.S.-Frane #lliane
Then 8. *aure too. the floor) stating *rance was not in agreement with the United States
and that it was time to spea. fran.ly. >e said ;iem is "not only incapable but mad)" he
too. advantage of <ollins= absence to effect a "coup de force which won primary victory
but which has not contributed to any lasting solution" and "*rance can no longer ta.e
ris.s with him." ;iem will "bring on a 4iet 8inh victory) focus the hostility of everyone
on *rench" and force a brea. between *rance and the US.
*aure concluded with this significant statement.
;iem is a bad choice) impossible solution) with no chance to succeed and no chance to
improve the situation. "ithout him some solution might be possible) but with him there is
none. >owever) ! cannot guarantee any other solution would wor. nor is it possible to
clarify the situation. There seems to be fundamental disagreement between us. ! could
have claimed that since *rench position is predominant in 4ietnam) you should
accommodate your views more to ours) but ! have reDected this. "hat should be done
under the circumstancesN "hat would you say if we were to retire entirely from
!ndochina and call bac. the *@< as soon as possible. ! fully reali2e this would be a grave
solution) as it would leave *rench civilians and *rench interests in a difficult position. . . .
!f you thin. this might be a possible solution) ! thin. ! might be able to orient myself
towards it if you say so. !t would have advantage of avoiding all further reproach to
*rance of "colonialism" while at same time giving response to ;iem=s re?uest that *rance
should go. Since it contemplates the li?uidation of the situation and the repatriation of the
*@<) would the United States be disposed to help protect *rench civilians and the
refugeesN
Secretary ;ulles repeated his awareness of ;iem=s wea.nesses but did not agree with
*aure=s opinion. ;iem "showed so much ability that US fails to see how he can be got rid
of now . . . ;iem is stronger now than when Bao ;ai first withdrew his powers." ;ulles
said the worst aspect of the problem was the differences between *rance and the US3
"4ietnam is not worth ?uarrel with *rance." Then he matched *aure=s offer by saying the
US would withdraw from 4ietnam if that would solve the problem.
<hoice open to us is to have ;iem supported or to withdraw . . . US interest in 4ietnam is
simply to withhold area from communists. US will give consideration to any suggestion
*rench ma.e but must warn that US financial support may not be epected to any
solution which +;ulles1 can thin. of as alternative to ;iem.
*oreign Secretary 8ac8illan) calling British interests "more indirect but nonetheless
vital because +%1 interest in area itself and +71 interest in <ommunist threat from any area
in world)" made the obvious statement that a decision on 4ietnam was too grave to be
ta.en that evening. *aure and ;ulles agreed.
d. Dulles> ;ontinue 4ith Diem--@ut !ndependently of Frane
By 8ay %%) when the three ministers reconvened) ;ulles had received counsel from the
:<S and General <ollins. #s was their wont) the :oint <hiefs of Staff offered no opinion
about whether ;iem should or should not be continued +a matter for "resolution at the
governmental level"1 but then stated his government showed the "greatest promise of
achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of 4ietnam." #ddressing
the military aspects of the problem) the <hiefs found neither withdrawal of the *rench
@peditionary <orps nor withdrawal of US military support acceptable. The 4ietnamese
National #rmy was considered incapable of maintaining internal security) even less able
to resist outside aggression without outside military assistance. The US was barred by
Geneva from increasing its forces either to defend 4ietnam or to defend *rench civilians)
other foreign nationals or refugees. Thus) although withdrawal of the *rench
@peditionary <orps is "ultimately to be desired)" precipitate withdrawal at this time was
not3 it would "result in an increasingly unstable and precarious situation" and the eventual
fall of South 4ietnam to communism. The <hiefs felt *rance alone would be unable to
stabili2e the situation) that the 4N# would fall apart without "US moral and materiel
support)" and that the "best interest of *rance as well as the United States" warranted
energetic action to restore internal order and prevent South 4ietnam=s loss to the free
world.
General <ollins also opposed *rench withdrawal for three reasons3 first) the *@< was
responsible under the 8anila Pact for the defense of !ndochina and neither the US nor
Britain were prepared to ta.e over that responsibility. Secondly) *rench military
assistance +logistical support and training1 was essential to the development of the
4ietnamese forces. Third) although the presence of *rench troops was a source of
bitterness to the 4ietnamese) General <ollins believed the *@< was a stabili2ing
influence on 4ietnamese politics.
;ulles= proposal to *aure on 8ay %% reflected these Dudgments. @mphasi2ing that
!ndochina) for all its importance) must not be allowed to damage *ranco#merican
relations) that US support for ;iem must not be allowed to split the alliance) ;ulles
proposed that *rance continue to support ;iem until a National #ssembly could be
elected to determine the ultimate political structure of South 4ietnam) a structure which
might or might not include ;iem.
#gainst his own views) against *rench public opinion and on certain conditions) *aure
accepted the proposal. The Prime 8inister insisted the ;iem government be enlarged)
elections be held as soon as possible) the sect problem be resolved) anti$*rench
propaganda cease) Bao ;ai be retained as chief of state) *rench and #merican officials
deemed disturbing to *ranco$US harmony be removed from 4ietnam +/ansdale) for one1
and that the US assure him *rench economic) cultural and financial relations with South
4ietnam would be nurtured. #greeing to these stipulations) ;ulles added ;iem was not a
US puppet and he could not guarantee conditions involving 4ietnamese action would be
met. Then) saying the problem in 4ietnam did not lend itself to a contractual agreement
between *rance and the United States) ;ulles suggested each should state its policy and
proceed accordingly. !n effect) said ;ulles) the days of Doint policy are over6 the US will
act +more1 independently of *rance in the future.
F. T)E T/!"!:)T 6F F2E3;) P2ESE3;E !3 B!ET3#M
Bac. in 4ietnam) ;iem was doing well. >e had dealt the Binh Huyen a coup de grace6
the #rmy was pleased with its success against Bay 4ien) supported ;iem and rather
relished the chance to continue the fight against remaining sect armies. ;iem launched a
campaign against the sect armies on 8ay J) to regain control of wayward provinces and
solidify Saigon=s control throughout the country. The US) again) gave ;iem un?ualified
support and the *rench) again) reluctantly bac.ed him. Bao ;ai was a minor threat6 trying
to overthrow ;iem had been a blunder and his popularity was very low. Bn 8ay %() a
relatively un.nown group of "technicians" was named as ;iem=s cabinet) to function until
elections for a national assembly +held on 8arch 5) %&',1. General <ollins left 4ietnam
on 8ay %56 #mbassador G. *rederic. 0einhardt replaced him later in the month. #nd on
:une 7) General @ly=s mission terminated. General :ac?uot assumed military duties as
<ommissioner$General) duties which consisted primarily of supervising the increasingly
rapid pace of the *rench military pull$out.
1. #ll-Bietnam Eletions
#lthough political concessions made to the United States in 8ay and economic and
military actions ta.en before and after that time had reduced$ almost eliminated$*rench
presence and influence in 4ietnam *rance still was obligated to carry out the provisions
of the Geneva #ccords. Under increasing pressure from *rench public opinion to give
>anoi no pretet for renewing hostilities as long as the *rench @peditionary <orps
remained in South 4ietnam) the *rench Government urgently sought to persuade ;iem to
accept consultations about the elections scheduled to begin in :uly %&''. Britain wanted
to prevent any public repudiation of the #ccords and Doined *rance in urging ;iem to tal.
to the 4ietminh. But ;iem had not changed his view of the #ccords3 he had refused to
sign them and continued to insist he was not bound by them.
The United States stood between these etremes. # draft policy toward all$4ietnam
elections$$finally produced in 8ay %&''$$held that to give no impression of bloc.ing
elections while avoiding the possibility of losing them) ;iem should insist on free
elections by secret ballot with strict supervision. <ommunists in Aorea and Germany had
reDected these conditions6 hopefully the 4ietminh would follow suit.
;iem could not bring himself to sit down with the 4ietminh. <onsultations would give
the appearance of having accepted the Geneva settlement6 consultation with the 4ietminh
without the .ind of "estern bac.ing given 0hee and #denauer would be futile. Bn :uly
%,) ;iem said South 4ietnam could "not consider any proposal from the <ommunists"
without proof that they had mended their ways and were prepared to hold genuinely free
elections. But another reason was ;iem=s belief that he could not represent a sovereign
nation$$or be free of 4ietminh propaganda charges of being a colonialist puppet$$until the
*rench >igh <ommand and the *rench @peditionary <orps were gone. 8inister Nguyen
>uu <hau was dispatched to Paris to negotiate the withdrawal of the *@< from 4ietnam
+ecept naval and air forces which ;iem wanted under 4N# command1 and revision of
economic) cultural and financial accords. ;iem also wanted 4ietnamese affairs
transferred from the 8inistry of #ssociated States to the *rench *oreign office6 he
insisted the post of >igh <ommissioner be abolished and that @ly=s successor +>enri
>oppenot1 be credited as #mbassador.
8. Frano-Bietnamese Differenes& #utumn 1,..
*rance was anious to get the *@< out of 4ietnam +and into North #frica16 the matter of
turning the >igh <ommand over to the 4N# was not a problem. Placing *rench units
under 4ietnamese command was a definite problem) however and domestic politics
would not allow any immediate change of 4ietnam=s status within the *rench Union.
Tal.s stalled until :uly. ;iem accepted #mbassador >oppenot +whose duties) if not title)
were that of >igh <ommissioner1 and things moved a bit) then stopped when ;iem
arrested two *rench officers suspected of bombing electric power stations in Saigon and
said they would be tried by 4ietnamese courts. !n Bctober) *rance refused to tal. unless
the officers were released. The deadloc. was finally bro.en by the *rench in ;ecember.
Paris agreed the Kuai d=Brsay would handle 4ietnamese affairs) refused to accept the
assignment of a diplomatic representative from the ;04 to *rance and made it clear the
Sainteny mission was in >anoi solely for economic and cultural reasons. *rance had
already recogni2ed 4ietnam as a 0epublic after ;iem=s resounding$too resounding$
victory of &J percent of the vote in an Bctober popular referendum. ;iem finally released
the officers into *rench custody.
But these concessions produced no improvement in *rench$4ietnam relations. !n
;ecember) ;iem suddenly terminated the economic and financial accords wor.ed out at
the Paris conference of %&'56 mounting US activity fast drove the former colony from
franc to dollar area and stringent commerical regulations applied to *rench businesses in
South 4ietnam forced already outraged entrepreneurs out of the country in increasing
numbers. ;iem laid down these conditions on which he would consider renewed relations
with *rance. *rance had to
denounce the Geneva #greements) to renounce to spea. about the general elections in
%&',6 to approve openly and without reservation the policy of 8r. ;iem) to brea. all
relations with the 4ietminh and of course to call home the Sainteny 8ission.
Soon after this) ;iem withdrew South 4ietnamese representatives from the *rench Union
#ssembly.
There was little *rance could do. ;iem spo.e for a government no longer dependent on
*rench support) no longer near collapse. By *ebruary %&',) only %')((( *rench troops
remained in 4ietnam and %()((( of these were to be evacuated by the end of 8arch. The
>igh <ommand was abolished on #pril 7,) %&',. The net month) the US Temporary
@?uipment 0ecovery 8ission +T@081 entered 4ietnam and another 9'( military
personnel were added to the US advisory effort. *ew *rench instructors remained at the
T0!8.
3. /hat of Frenh 6@ligations 7nder the :ene'a #ordsG
But an important ?uestion remained. Under the Geneva agreements *rance was
responsible for protection and support of the !nternational <ontrol <ommission6
representatives of the People=s #rmy of North 4ietnam and *rance sat on the :oint
#rmistice <ommission charged with ensuring provisions of the armistice agreement were
met. *rance could not lightly cast off these obligations nor could *rance transfer them to
South 4ietnam3 ;iem denounced the Geneva accords and refused to be bound by them in
any way.
!n *ebruary) *rench *oreign 8inister Pineau described the difficult *rench position as a
result of certain conditions3
These are the independence granted to South 4ietnam and the Geneva accords some
provisions of which have up to date demanded and Dustified our presence in this country.
Particularly difficult was the ?uestion of !<< support. ;iem refused to associate South
4ietnam openly with the !<< but did agree to assume responsibility for its servicing if
*rance would leave a small mission in 4ietnam to fulfill *rench obligations. ;ulles li.ed
this idea. >is view was3 "while we should certainly ta.e no positive step to speed up
present process of decay of Geneva #ccords) neither should we ma.e the slightest effort
to infuse life into them."
@ight months later) ;iem finally relaed his uncompromising stand against Geneva)
agreed to respect the armistice and provide security for the !<<. !n :uly %&',) 4ietnam
promised to replace the *rench liaison mission to the !<<. *rance maintained
membership on the :oint #rmistice <ommission and continued to bear !<< epenses. But
*rance was never able to meet Geneva obligations concerning the elections of %&',) for
;iem matched his refusal to consult with the 4ietminh about elections with an adamant
refusal to ever hold them. Neither Britain nor the Soviet Union pressed the matter6 the
United States bac.ed ;iem=s position.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter ') "Brigins of the !nsurgency in South 4ietnam) %&'5$%&,("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section %) pp. 757$,&
Summary
*rom the perspective of the United States) the origins of the insurgency in South 4ietnam
raise four principal ?uestions3
%. "as the brea.down of the peace of %&'5 the fault of the U.S.) or of the ambiguities and
loopholes of the Geneva #ccordsN
7. "as the insurgency in essence an indigenous rebellion against Ngo ;inh ;iem=s
oppressive government) transformed by the intervention of first the U.S.) and then the
;04N
9. Br was it) rather) instigated) controlled) and supported from its inception by >anoiN
5. "hen did the U.S. become aware of the 4iet <ong threat to South 4ietnam=s internal
security) and did it attempt to counter it with its aidN
The analysis which follows rests on study of three corpora of evidence3
+a1 !ntelligence reports and analyses) including the most carefully guarded finished
intelligence) and pertinent National !ntelligence @stimates.
+b1 Unfinished governmental intelligence) field reports) and memoranda such as
interrogations of prisoners and translated captured documents) as well as contract studies
based on similar evidence.
+c1 Bpen sources) including the wor.s of former U.S. officials) 4ietnam correspondents)
and the li.e.
The U.S. has attempted to amplify +c1 by publishing "hite Papers in %&,% and %&,') in
which substantial citations were made from +b1 and interpretations offered consistent with
+a1. This study has benefited from further effort during %&,- and early %&,J to identify in
+b1 evidence which could be publicly released. But) based on the survey of +a1) +b1) and
+c1 reported on below) the U.S. can now present no conclusive answers to the ?uestions
advanced above.
Tentative answers are possible) and form a continuum3 By %&',) peace in 4ietnam was
plainly less dependent upon the Geneva Settlement than upon power relationships in
Southeast #sia$$principally upon the role the U.S. elected to play in unfolding events. !n
%&'- and %&'J) a structured rebellion against the government of Ngo ;inh ;iem began.
"hile the North 4ietnamese played an ill$defined part) most of those who too. up arms
were South 4ietnamese) and the causes for which they fought were by no means
contrived in North 4ietnam. !n %&'& and %&,() >anoi=s involvement in the developing
strife became evident. Not until %&,() however) did the U.S. perceive that ;iem was in
serious danger of being overthrown and devise a <ounterinsurgency Plan.
!t can be established that there was endemic insurgency in South 4ietnam throughout the
period %&'5$%&,(. !t can also be established$but less surely$ that the ;iem regime
alienated itself from one after another of those elements within 4ietnam which might
have offered it political support) and was grievously at fault in its rural programs. That
these conditions engendered animosity toward the G4N seems almost certain) and they
could have underwritten a maDor resistance movement even without North 4ietnamese
help.
!t is e?ually clear that North 4ietnamese communists operated some form of subordinate
apparatus in the South in the years %&'5$%&,(. Nonetheless) the 4iet 8inh "stay$behinds"
were not directed originally to structure an insurgency) and there is no coherent picture of
the etent or effectiveness of communist activities in the period %&',$%&'&. *rom all
indications) this was a period of reorgani2ation and recruiting by the communist party.
No direct lin.s have been established between >anoi and perpetrators of rural violence.
Statements have been found in captured party histories that the communists plotted and
controlled the entire insurgency) but these are difficult to ta.e at face value. Bernard *all
ingeniously correlated ;04 complaints to the !<< of incidents in South 4ietnam in %&'-
with G4N reports of the same incidents) and found >anoi suspiciously well informed. >e
also perceived a pattern in the terrorism of %&'-$%&'&) deducing that a broad) centrally
directed strategy was being implemented. >owever) there is little other corroborative
evidence that >anoi instigated the incidents) much less orchestrated them.
Three interpretations of the available evidence are possible3
6ption #$$That the ;04 intervened in the South in reaction to U.S. escalation)
particularly that of President Aennedy in early %&,%. Those who advance this argument
rest their case principally on open sources to establish the reprehensible character of the
;iem regime) on eamples of forceful resistance to ;iem independent of >anoi) and
upon the formation of the National /iberation *ront +N/*1 alleged to have come into
being in South 4ietnam in early %&,(. These also rely heavily upon ;04 official
statements of %&,($%&,% indicating that the ;04 only then proposed to support the N/*.
6ption 5$$The ;04 manipulated the entire war. This is the official U.S. position) and
can be supported. Nonetheless) the case is not wholly compelling) especially for the years
%&''$%&'&.
6ption ;$$The ;04 sei2ed an opportunity to enter an ongoing internal war in %&'& prior
to) and independent of) U.S. escalation. This interpretation is more tenable than the
previous6 still) much of the evidence is circumstantial.
The Dudgment offered here is that the truth lies somewhere between Bption B and <. That
is) there was some form of ;04 apparatus functioning in the South throughout the years)
but it can only be inferred that this apparatus originated and controlled the insurgency
which by %&'& posed a serious challenge to the ;iem government. 8oreover) up until
%&'J) neither the ;04 domestic situation nor its international support was conducive to
foreign adventure6 by %&'&) its prospects were bright in both respects) and it is possible to
demonstrate its moving forcefully abroad thereafter. Given the paucity of evidence now)
well after the events) U.S. intelligence served policy ma.ers of the day surprisingly well
in warning of the developments described below3
F#!"72E 6F T)E :E3EB# SETT"EME3T
The Geneva Settlement of %&'5 was inherently flawed as a durable peace for !ndochina)
since it depended upon *rance) and since both the U.S. and the 0epublic of South
4ietnam ecepted themselves. The common ground from which the nations negotiated at
the Geneva <onference was a mutual desire to halt the hostilities between *rance and the
4iet 8inh) and to prevent any widening of the war. To achieve concord) they had to
override obDections of the Saigon government) countenance the disassociation of the U.S.
from the Settlement) and accept *rance as one eecutor. @ven so) Geneva might have
wrought an enduring peace for 4ietnam if *rance had remained as a maDor power in
!ndochina) if Ngo ;inh ;iem had cooperated with the terms of the settlement) if the U.S.
had abstained from further influencing the outcome. No one of these conditions was
li.ely) given *rance=s travail in #lgeria) ;iem=s implacable anti$communism) and the
U.S.= determination to bloc. further epansion of the ;04 in Southeast #sia.
Therefore) the tragedy staged3 partition of 4ietnam) the sole negotiable basis found at
Geneva for military disengagement) became the prime casus belli. To assuage those
parties to Geneva who were reluctant to condone the handing over of territory and people
to a communist government) and to reassure the 4iet 8inh that their southern followers
could be preserved en bloc) the #ccords provided for regrouping forces to North and
South 4ietnam and for 4ietnamese freely electing residence in either the North or the
South6 the transmigrations severely disrupted the polity of 4ietnam) heated the
controversy over reunification) and made it possible for North 4ietnam to contemplate
subversive aggression. Both sides were fearful that the armistice would be used to
conceal construction of military bases or other preparations for aggression6 but these
provisions depended on a credible international supervision which never materiali2ed.
Partition and regroupment pitted North against South 4ietnam) and arms control failed
patently and soon. Geneva traded on long$run ris.s to achieve short$run disengagement.
*rance withdrew from 4ietnam) leaving the #ccords in the hands of Saigon. /asting
peace came between *rance and the 4iet 8inh) but the deeper struggle for an
independent) united 4ietnam remained) its international implications more grave) its
dangers heightened.
The Southeast #sia policy of the U.S. in the aftermath of the Geneva <onference was
conservative) focused on organi2ing collective defense against further inroads of
communism) not on altering status +uo. Status +uo was the two 4ietnams set up at
Geneva) facing each other across a demilitari2ed 2one. >anoi) more than other powers)
had gambled3 hedged by the remaining 4iet 8inh) it waited for either Geneva=s general
elections or the voracious political forces in the South to topple the Saigon government.
!n South 4ietnam) ;iem had begun his attempt to gain control over his people) constantly
decried ;04 subversion and handling of would$be migrants as violations of the Geneva
#ccords) and pursued an international and domestic policy of anti$communism. Both
4ietnams too. the view that partition was) as the <onference *inal ;eclaration stated)
only temporary. But statements could not gainsay the practical import of the #ccords.
The separation of 4ietnam at the %-th parallel facilitated military disengagement) but by
establishing the principle that two regimes were separately responsible for "civil
administration" each in distinct 2ones6 by providing for the regroupment of military
forces to the two 2ones) and for the movement of civilians to the 2one of their choice6 and
by postponing national elections for at least two years) permitting the regimes in >anoi
and Saigon to consolidate power) the Geneva conferees in fact fostered two governments
under inimical political philosophies) foreign policies) and socio$economic systems.
The Geneva powers were imprecise$probably deliberately indefinite$concerning who was
to carry out the election provisions. *rance) which was charged with civil administration
in the "regrouping 2one" of South 4ietnam) had granted the State of 4ietnam its
independence in :une %&'5) si wee.s before the #ccords were drawn up. Throughout
%&'5 and the first half of %&'') *rance further divested itself of authority in South
4ietnam3 police) local government) and then the #rmy of 4ietnam were freed of *rench
control) and turned over to the Saigon government. <oncurrently) the U.S. began to
channel aid directly to South 4ietnam) rather than through *rance. The convolution of
*rench policy then thrust upon the U.S. a choice between supporting ;iem or the *rench
presence in !ndochina. The U.S. opted for ;iem. By the time the deadlines for election
consultations fell due in :uly %&'') South 4ietnam was sovereign de fato as well as de
Hure& waing strong with U.S. aid) and *rance was no longer in a position to eert strong
influence on ;iem=s political actions.
#s early as :anuary %&'') President ;iem was stating publicly that he was unli.ely to
proceed with the Geneva elections3
Southern 4iet$Nam) since it protested the Geneva #greement when it was made) does not
consider itself a party to that #greement) nor bound by it.
!n any event) the clauses providing for the %&', elections are etremely vague. But at one
point they are clear$$in stipulating that the elections are to be free. @verything will now
depend on how free elections are defined. The President said he would wait to see
whether the conditions of freedom would eist in North 4iet$Nam at the time scheduled
for the elections. >e as.ed what would be the good of an impartial counting of votes if
the voting has been preceded in North 4iet$Nam by a campaign of ruthless propaganda
and terrorism on the part of a police state.
#s the deadline for consultations approached +7( :uly %&''1) ;iem was increasingly
eplicit that he did not consider free elections possible in North 4ietnam) and had no
intention of consulting with the ;04 concerning them. The U.S. did not$$as is often
alleged$$connive with ;iem to ignore the elections. U.S. State ;epartment records
indicate that ;iem=s refusal to be bound by the Geneva #ccords and his opposition to pre$
election consultations were at his own initiative. >owever) the U.S.) which had epected
elections to be held) and up until 8ay %&'' had fully supported them) shifted its position
in the face of ;iem=s opposition) and of the evidence then accumulated about the
oppressive nature of the regime in North 4ietnam. "!n essence)" a State ;epartment
historical study found) "our position would be that the whole subDect of consultations and
elections in 4iet$Nam should be left up to the 4ietnamese themselves and not dictated by
eternal arrangements which one of the parties never accepted and still reDects." Secretary
of State ;ulles eplained publicly that3
Neither the United States Government nor the Government of 4iet$Nam is) of course) a
party to the Geneva armistice agreements. "e did not sign them) and the Government of
4iet$Nam did not sign them and) indeed) protested against them. Bn the other hand) the
United States believes) broadly spea.ing) in the unification of countries which have a
historic unity) where the people are a.in. "e also believe that) if there are conditions of
really free elections) there is no serious ris. that the <ommunists would win.....
Thus) bac.ed by the U.S.) ;iem obdurately refused to open tal.s with the >anoi
government. >e continued to maintain that the Government of South 4ietnam had not
signed the Geneva #greements and thus was not bound by them.
Bur policy is a policy for peace. But nothing will lead us astray of our goal) the unity of
our country) a unity in freedom and not in slavery. Serving the cause of our nation) more
than ever we will struggle for the reunification of our homeland.
"e do not reDect the principle of free elections as peaceful and democratic means to
achieve that unity. >owever) if elections constitute one of the bases of true democracy)
they will be meaningful only on the condition that they be absolutely free.
Now) faced with a regime of oppression as practiced by the 4iet 8inh) we remain
s.eptical concerning the possibility of fulifihing the conditions of free elections in the
North.
Bn % :une %&',) the #ssistant Secretary of State for *ar @astern #ffairs) "alter
0obertson) stated3
President ;iem and the Government of *ree 4iet$Nam reaffirmed on #pril , of this year
and on other occasions their desire to see. the reunification of 4iet$Nam by peaceful
means. !n this goal) we support them fully. "e hope and pray that the partition of 4iet$
Nam) imposed against the will of the 4ietnamese people) will speedily come to an end.
*or our part we believe in free elections) and we support President ;iem fully in his
position that if elections are to be held) there first must be conditions which preclude
intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions eist there can be no
free choice.
President @isenhower is widely ?uoted to the effect that in %&'5 as many as J(O of the
4ietnamese people would have voted for >o <hi 8inh) as the popular hero of their
liberation) in an election against Bao ;ai. !n Bctober %&'') ;iem ran against Bao ;ai in
a referendum and won$$by a dubiously overwhelming vote) but he plainly won
nevertheless. !t is almost certain that by %&', the proportion which might have voted for
>o$$in a free election against ;iem$$would have been much smaller than J(O. ;iem=s
success in the South had been far greater than anyone could have foreseen) while the
North 4ietnamese regime had been suffering from food scarcity) and low public morale
stemming from inept imitation of <hinese <ommunism$including a harsh agrarian
program that reportedly led to the .illing of over '()((( small$scale "landlords." The
North 4ietnamese themselves furnished damning descriptions of conditions within the
;04 in %&'' and %&',. 4o Nguyen Giap) in a public statement to his communist party
colleagues) admitted in autumn) %&',) that3
"e made too many deviations and eecuted too many honest people. "e attac.ed on too
large a front and) seeing enemies everywhere) resorted to terror) which became far too
widespread. . . . "hilst carrying out our land reform program we failed to respect the
principles of freedom of faith and worship in many areas . . . in regions inhabited by
minority tribes we have attac.ed tribal chiefs too strongly) thus inDuring) instead of
respecting) local customs and manners. . . . "hen reorgani2ing the party) we paid too
much importance to the notion of social class instead of adhering firmly to political
?ualifications alone. !nstead of recogni2ing education to be the first essential) we resorted
eclusively to organi2ational measures such as disciplinary punishments) epulsion from
the party) eecutions) dissolution of party branches and calls. "orse still) torture came to
be regarded as a normal practice during party reorgani2ation.
That circumstances in North 4ietnam were serious enough to warrant Giap=s confiteor
was proved by insurrection among <atholic peasants in November %&',)
within two wee.s of his speech) in which thousands more lives were lost. But the
uprisings) though then and since used to validate the U.S.$bac.ed G4N stand) were not
foreseen in %&'' or %&',6 the basis for the policy of both nations in reDecting the Geneva
elections was) rather) convictions that >anoi would not permit "free general elections by
secret ballot)" and that the !<< would be impotent in supervising the elections in any
case.
The deadlines for the consultations in :uly %&'') and the date set for elections in :uly
%&',) passed without international action. The ;04 repeatedly tried to engage the
Geneva machinery) forwarding messages to the Government of South 4ietnam in :uly
%&'') 8ay and :une %&',) 8arch %&'J) :uly %&'&) and :uly %&,() proposing
consultations to negotiate "free general elections by secret ballot)" and to liberali2e
North$South relations in general. @ach time the G4N replied with disdain) or with
silence. The %-th parallel) with its demilitari2ed 2one on either side) became de facto an
international boundary) and$since Ngo ;inh ;iem=s rigid refusal to traffic with the North
ecluded all economic echanges and even an interstate postal agreement$one of the most
restricted boundaries in the world. The ;04 appealed to the UA and the USS0 as
cochairmen of the Geneva <onference to no avail. !n :anuary %&',) on ;04 urging)
<ommunist <hina re?uested another Geneva <onference to deal with the situation. But
the Geneva <o$<hairmen) the USS0 and the UA) responded only by etending the
functions of the !nternational <ontrol <ommission beyond its %&', epiration date. By
early %&'-) partitioned 4ietnam was a generally accepted modus vivendi throughout the
international community. *or instance) in :anuary %&'-) the Soviet Union proposed the
admission of both the G4N and the ;04 to the United Nations) the USS0 delegate to the
Security <ouncil declaring that "in 4ietnam two separate States eisted) which differed
from one another in political and economic structure Thus) reunification through
elections became as remote a prospect in 4ietnam as in Aorea or Germany. !f the
political mechanism for reunifying 4ietnam in %&', proved impractical) the blame lies at
least in part with the Geneva conferees themselves) who postulated an ideal political
settlement incompatible with the physical and psychological dismemberment of 4ietnam
they themselves undertoo. in :uly %&'5.
But partition was not) as the eamples of Aorea and Germany demonstrate) necessarily
tantamount to renewed hostilities. The difference was that in Aorea and Germany
international forces guarded the boundaries. !n 4ietnam) the withdrawal of the *rench
@peditionary <orps prior to the date set for elections in %&', left South 4ietnam
defenseless ecept for such forces as it could train and e?uip with U.S. assistance. The
vague etending of the S@#TB aegis over 4ietnam did not eert the same stabili2ing
influence as did N#TB=s <entral #rmy Group in Germany) or the United Nations
<ommand in Aorea. 8oreover) neither @ast Germany nor North Aorea enDoyed the
advantage of a politico$military substructure within the obDect of its irredentism) as the
4iet 8inh residue provided North 4ietnam. The absence of deterrent force in South
4ietnam invited forceful reunification6 the southern 4iet 8inh regroupees in the) North
and their comrades in the South made it possible.
Pursuant to the "regroupment" provisions of the Geneva #ccords) some %&()((( troops of
the *rench @peditionary <orps) and &(()((( civilians moved from North 4ietnam to
South 4ietnam6 more than %(()((( 4iet 8inh soldiers and civilians moved from South to
North. Both nations thereby ac?uired minorities with vital interests in the outcome of the
Geneva Settlement. !n both nations) the regroupees eerted an influence over subse?uent
events well out of proportion to their numbers.
!n North 4ietnam) the ;04 treated the southern regroupees from the outset as strategic
assets$$the young afforded special schooling) the able assigned to separate military units.
The southerners in the North) and their relatives in the South) formed) with the remnants
of the 4iet 8inh=s covert networ. in South 4ietnam) a means through which the ;04
might "struggle" toward reunification regardless of ;iem=s obduracy or U.S. aid for South
4ietnam. These people .ept open the ;04=s option to launch aggression without
transcending a "civil war" of southerners against southerners$no doubt an important
consideration with the United States as a potential antagonist. The evidence indicates
that) at least through %&',) >anoi did not epect to have to resort to force6 thereafter) the
regroupees occupied increasing prominence in ;04 plans.
*or ;iem=s government) refugees from the North were important for three > reasons3
firstly) they provided the world the earliest convincing evidence of the
undemocratic and oppressive nature of North 4ietnam=s regime. Though no doubt many
migrants fled North 4ietnam for vague or spurious reasons) it was plain that >o=s 4iet
8inh were widely and genuinely feared) and many refugees too. flight in understandable
terror. There were indications that the ;04 forcefully obstructed the migration of other
thousands who might also have left the North. !n %&'' and %&',) the refugees were the
most convincing support for ;iem=s argument that free elections were impossible in the
;04.
Secondly) the refugees engaged the sympathies of the #merican people as few
developments in 4ietnam have before or since) and solidly underwrote the U.S. decision
for unstinting support of ;iem. The poignancy of hundreds of thousands of people
fleeing their homes and fortunes to escape communist tyranny) well Dournali2ed) evo.ed
an outpouring of U.S. aid) governmental and private. The U.S. Navy was committed to
succor the migrants) lifting over 9(()((( persons in "Bperation @HB;US" +in which ;r.
Tom ;ooley$$then a naval officer$$won fame1. U.S. government$to$government aid)
amounting to Q%(( per refugee) more than South 4ietnam=s annual income per capita)
enabled ;iem=s government to provide homes and food for hundreds of thousands of the
destitute) and #merican charities provided millions of dollars more for their relief. U.S.
officials defending #merican aid programs could point with pride to the refugee episode
to demonstrate the special eligibility of the 4ietnamese for U.S. help) including an early)
convincing demonstration that ;iem=s government could mount an effective program
with U.S. aid.
Thirdly) the predominantly <atholic Ton.inese refugees provided ;iem with a cla?ue3 a
politically malleable) culturally distinct group) wholly distrustful of >o <hi 8inh and the
;04) dependent for subsistence on ;iem=s government) and attracted to ;iem as a co$
religionist. Under ;iem=s mandarinal regime) they were less important as dependable
votes than as a source of reliable political and military cadres. 8ost were .ept
unassimilated in their own communities) and became prime subDects for ;iem=s
eperiments with strategic population relocation. Bne heritage of Geneva is the present
dominance of South 4ietnam=s government and army by northerners. The refugees
cataly2ed ;iem=s domestic political rigidity) his high$handedness with the U.S.) and his
unyielding reDection of the ;04 and the Geneva #ccords.
The Geneva Settlement was further penali2ed by the early failure of the "!nternational
Supervisory <ommission" established by the #greement +#rticle 951 and cited in the
<onference ;eclaration +#rticle -1. "hile a :oint <ommission of *rench and 4iet 8inh
military officers was set up to deal with the cease$fire and force regroupment) the
!nternational <ommission for Supervision and <ontrol +!<<1) furnished by Poland) !ndia)
and <anada) was to oversee the #ccords in general. !ts inability to cope with violations of
the #rmistice in the handling of would$be migrants) vociferously proclaimed in both
Saigon and >anoi) impugned its competence to overwatch the general free elections) for
which it was also to be responsible.
@?ually serious for the Settlement) the !<< was epected to control arms and guarantee
against aggression. The armistice agreement signed by the *rench and the 4iet 8inh) and
affirmed in the several declarations of the Geneva <onference) included four main
provisions for arms control3 +%1 arms) bases) and armed forces were to be fied at the
level eisting in 4ietnam in :uly %&'5) with allowance for replacement of worn or
damaged e?uipment) and rotation of personnel6 +71 further foreign influences were to be
ecluded) either in the form of alliances) or foreign military bases established in either
North or South 4ietnam6 +91 neither party was to allow its 2one to be used for the renewal
of aggression6 and) +51 all the foregoing were to be overseen by the !<<. #s was the case
of the regroupment provisions) these arrangements operated in practice to the detriment
of the political solution embodied in the #ccords) for the !<<) the election guardian) was
soon demonstrated to be impotent.
The level of arms in 4ietnam in %&'5 was unascertainable. The 4iet 8inh had been
surreptitiously armed) principally by the <hinese) from %&'( onward. That 4iet 8inh
forces were ac?uiring large amount of relatively advanced weaponry was fully evident at
;ien Bien Phu) but neither the ;04 nor its allies owned to this military assistance. #fter
the %&'5 armistice) *rench) U.S.) and British intelligence indicated that the flow of arms
into North 4ietnam from <hina continued on a scale far in ecess of "replacement"
needs. Similarly) while U.S. military materiel had been provided to the *rench more
openly) no one$$neither the *rench) the 4ietnamese) the U.S.) nor certainly the !<<$$
.new how much of this e?uipment was on hand and serviceable after %&'5. The issue of
arms levels was further complicated by regroupment) *rench withdrawals) and the
revamping of the national army in South 4ietnam. The !<< could determine to no one=s
satisfaction whether the ;04 was within its rights to upgrade the armament of the
irregulars it brought out of South 4ietnam. Similarly) though the ;04 charged
repeatedly that the U.S. had no right to be in South 4ietnam at all) the !<< had to face the
fact that U.S. military advisors and trainers had been present in 4ietnam since %&'( under
a pentilateral agreement with /aos) <ambodia) 4ietnam) and *rance. !f *rance withdrew
its cadres in 4ietnamese units) could they not be "replaced" by #mericansN #nd if the
*rench were withdrawing both men and e?uipment in large ?uantities) did not 4ietnam
have a right under the #ccords to replace them in .ind with its own) #merican$e?uipped
formationsN To ;04 charges and G4N countercharges) it could reply with legalistic
interpretations) but it found it virtually impossible to collect facts) or eercise more than
vague influence over U.S.) G4N) or ;04 policy. The only maDor eample of U.S.=
ignoring the !<< was the instance of the U.S. Training and @?uipment 0ecovery 8ission
+T@081) 9'( men ostensibly deployed to 4ietnam in %&', to aid the 4ietnamese in
recovering e?uipment left by the *rench) but also directed to act as an etension of the
eisting 8##G by training 4ietnamese in logistics. T@08 was introduced without !<<
sanction) although subse?uently the !<< accepted its presence.
The ?uestion of military bases was similarly occluded. The ;04 protested repeatedly
that the U.S. was transforming South 4ietnam into a military base for the prosecution of
aggression in Southeast #sia. !n fact) as !<< investigation subse?uently established) there
was no wholly U.S. base anywhere in South 4ietnam. !t was evident) however) that the
South 4ietnamese government had =made available to the U.S. some portions of eisting
air and naval facilities$ e.g.) at Tan Son Nhut) Bien >oa) and Nha Be$for the use of
8##G and T@08. !<< access to these facilities was restricted) and the !<< was never
able to determine what the U.S. was shipping through them) either personnel or materiel.
By the same to.en) !<< access to ;04 airports) rail terminals) and seaports was severely
limited) and its ability to confirm or deny allegations concerning the rearming of the
People=s #rmy of 4ietnam correspondingly circumscribed. !nternational apprehensions
over arms levels and potential bases for aggression were heightened by statements
anticipating South 4ietnam=s active participation in S@#TB) or pronouncements of ;04
solidarity with <hina and 0ussia.
Not until %&'& and %&,% did the !<< publish reports attempting to answer directly ;04
charges that the U.S. and South 4ietnam were flagrantly violating the arms control
provisions of the Geneva #ccords. Similarly) though in its Tenth and @leventh !nterim
0eports +%&,( and %&,%1 the !<< noted "the concern which the 0epublic of 4ietnam has
been epressing over the problem of subversion in South 4ietnam)" it did not mention
that those epressions of concern had been continuous since %&'5) or attempt to publish a
factual study of that problem until :une %&,7. !n both cases) the !<< was overta.en by
events3 by late %&,() international tensions were beyond any ability of the !<< to provide
reassurances) and the U.S. was faced with the decision whether to commit maDor
resources to the conflict in South 4ietnam.
The Geneva Settlement thus failed to provide lasting peace because it was) as U.S.
National Security <ouncil papers of %&', and %&'J aptly termed it) "only a truce." !t
failed to settle the role of the U.S. or of the Saigon government) or) indeed) of *rance in
4ietnam. !t failed because it created two antagonist 4ietnamese nations. !t failed because
the Geneva powers were unwilling or unable to concert follow$up action in 4ietnam to
supervise effectively observance of the #ccords) or to dampen the mounting tension.
8utual distrust led to incremental violations by both sides) but on balance) though neither
the United States nor South 4ietnam was fully cooperative) and though both acted as they
felt necessary to protect their interests) both considered themselves constrained by the
#ccords. There is no evidence that either deliberately undertoo. to breach the peace. !n
contrast) the ;04 proceeded to mobili2e its total societal resources scarcely without
pause from the day the peace was signed) as though to substantiate the declaration of its
;eputy Premier) Pham 4an ;ong) at the closing session of the Geneva <onference3
"e shall achieve unity. "e shall achieve it Dust as we have won the war. No force in the
world) internal or eternal) can ma.e us deviate from our path....
;iem=s reDection of elections meant that reunification could be achieved in the foreseeable
future only by resort to force. ;iem=s policy) and U.S. support of it) led inevitably to a
test of strength with the ;04 to determine whether the G4N=s cohesiveness) with U.S.
support) could offset North 4ietnam=s drive to satisfy its unre?uited nationalism and
epansionism.
2EB6"T #:#!3ST M<-D!EM
By the time President Aennedy came to office in %&,%) it was plain that support for the
Saigon government among South 4ietnam=s peasants$$&(O of the
population$$was wea. and waning. The 8anifesto of the National /iberation *ront)
published in ;ecember %&,() trumpeted the eistence of a revolutionary organi2ation
which could channel popular discontent into a political program. !ncreasingly ;iem=s
government proved inept in dealing either through its public administration with the
sources of popular discontent) or through its security apparatus with the 4iet <ong.
;iem=s government and his party were by that time manifestly out of touch with the
people) and into the gap between the government and the populace the 4iet <ong had
successfully driven. "hen and why this gap developed is crucial to an understanding of
who the 4iet <ong were) and to what etent they represented South as opposed to North
4ietnamese interests.
The U.S. Government) in its "hite Papers on 4ietnam of %&,% and %&,') has blamed the
insurgency on aggression by >anoi) holding that the 4iet <ong were always tools of the
;04. <ritics of U.S. policy in 4ietnam usually hold) to the contrary) that the war was
started by South 4ietnamese6 their counter$arguments rest on two propositions3 +%1 that
the insurgency began as a rebellion against the oppressive and clumsy government of
Ngo ;inh ;iem6 and +71 that only after it became clear) in late %&,() that the U.S. would
commit massive resources to succor ;iem in his internal war) was the ;04 impelled to
unleash the South 4ietnamese 4iet 8inh veterans evacuated to North 4ietnam after
Geneva. *rench analysts have long been advancing such interpretations6 #merican
protagonists for them often ?uote) for eample) Philippe ;evillers) who wrote in %&,7
that3
!n %&'&) responsible elements of the <ommunist 0esistance in !ndo<hina came to the
conclusion that they had to act) whether >anoi wanted them to or no. They could no
longer continue to stand by while their supporters were arrested) thrown into prison and
tortured) without attempting to do anything about it as an organi2ation) without giving
some lead to the people in the struggle in which it was to be involved. >anoi preferred
diplomatic notes) but it was to find that its hand had been forced.
;evillers related how in 8arch %&,( the "Nambo 4eterans of the 0esistance
#ssociation" issued a declaration appealing for "struggle" to "liberate themselves from
submission to #merica) eliminate all U.S. bases in South 4ietnam) epel #merican
military advisors . . ." and to end "the colonial regime and the fascist dictatorship of the
Ngo family." Shortly thereafter) according to ;evillers) a People=s /iberation #rmy
appeared in <ochinchina and3
*rom this time forward it carried on incessant guerrilla operations against ;iem=s forces.
!t was thus by its home policy that the government of the South finally destroyed the
confidence of the population) which it had won during the early years) and practically
drove them into revolt and desperation. The non$<ommunist +and even the anti$
<ommunist1 opposition had long been aware of the turn events were ta.ing. But at the
beginning of %&,( very many elements) both civilian and military) in the Nationalist
camp came to a clear reali2ation that things were moving from bad to worse) and that if
nothing were done to put an end to the absolute power of ;iem) then <ommunism would
end up by gaining power with the aid) or at least with the consent) of the population. !f
they did not want to allow the <ommunists to ma.e capital out of the revolt) then they
would have to oppose ;iem actively.
Based on a similar analysis) #rthur Schlesinger) :r.) held that3
;iem=s authoritarianism) which increasingly involved manhunts) political reeducation
camps) and the "regroupment" of population) caused spreading discontent and then armed
resistance on the countryside. !t is not easy to disentangle the events of these mur.y
years6 but few scholars believe that the growing resistance was at the start organi2ed or
directed by >anoi. !ndeed) there is some indication that the <ommunists at first hung
bac. . . . it was not until September) %&,( that the <ommunist Party of North 4ietnam
bestowed its formal blessing and called for the liberation of the south from #merican
imperialism.
@vents in 4ietnam in the years %&'5 to %&,( were indeed mur.y. The ;iem government
controlled the press tightly) and discouraged realism in reports from its provincial
bureaucracy. @ven official U.S. estimates were handicapped by reliance upon G4N
sources for inputs from the grass roots of 4ietnamese society) the rural villages) since the
U.S. advisory effort was then largely confined to top levels of the G4N and its armed
forces. But enough evidence has now accumulated to establish that peasant resentment
against ;iem was etensive and well founded. 8oreover) it is clear that disli.e of the
;iem government was coupled with resentment toward #mericans. *or many
4ietnamese peasants) the "ar of 0esistance against *rench$Bao ;ai rule never ended6
*rance was merely replaced by the U.S.) and Bao ;ai=s mantle was transferred to Ngo
;inh ;iem. The 4iet <ong=s opprobrious catchword "8y$;iem" +#merican$;iem1 thus
recaptured the nationalist mysti?ue of the *irst !ndochina "ar) and combined the natural
enophobia of the rural 4ietnamese with their mounting disli.e of ;iem. But 4iet <ong
slogans aside) in the eyes of many 4ietnamese of no particular political persuasion) the
United States was reprehensible as a moderni2ing force in a thoroughly traditional
society) as the provider of arms and money for a detested government) and as an alien)
disruptive influence upon hopes they held for the Geneva Settlement. #s far as attitudes
toward ;iem were concerned) the prevalence of his picture throughout 4ietnam virtually
assured his being accepted as the sponsor of the fre?uently corrupt and cruel local
officials of the G4N) and the perpetrator of unpopular G4N programs) especially the
population relocation schemes) and the "<ommunist ;enunciation <ampaign."
#ltogether) ;iem promised the farmers much) delivered little) and raised not only their
epectations) but their fears.
!t should be recogni2ed) however) that whatever his people thought of him) Ngo ;inh
;iem really did accomplish miracles) Dust as his #merican boosters said he did. >e too.
power in %&'5 amid political chaos) and within ten months surmounted attempted coups
d=etat from within his army and rebellions by disparate irregulars. >e consolidated his
regime while providing creditably for an influ of nearly one million destitute refugees
from North 4ietnam6 and he did all of this despite active *rench opposition and
vacillating #merican support. Under his leadership South 4ietnam became well
established as a sovereign state) by %&'' recogni2ed de Dure by 9, other nations.
8oreover) by mid$%&'' ;iem secured the strong bac.ing of the U.S. >e conducted a
plebiscite in late %&'') in which an overwhelming vote was recorded for him in
preference to Bao ;ai6 during %&',) he installed a government$representative in form) at
least$drafted a new constitution) and etended G4N control to regions that had been
under sect or 4iet 8inh rule for a decade6 and he pledged to initiate etensive reforms in
land holding) public health) and education. "ith #merican help) he established a truly
national) modern army) and formed rural security forces to police the countryside. !n
accomplishing all the foregoing) he confounded those 4ietnamese of North and South)
and those *rench) who had loo.ed for his imminent downfall.
"hile it is true that his reforms entailed oppressive measures$$e.g.) his "political
reeducation centers" were in fact little more than concentration camps for potential foes
of the government$$his regime compared favorably with other #sian governments of the
same period in its respect for the person and property of citi2ens. There is much that can
be offered in mitigation of ;iem=s authoritarianism. >e began as the most singularly
disadvantaged head of state of his era. >is political legacy was endemic violence and
virulent anti$colonialism. >e too. office at a time when the government of 4ietnam
controlled only a few bloc.s of downtown Saigon6 the rest of the capital was the feudal
fief of the Binh Huyen gangster fraternity. Beyond the environs of Saigon) South
4ietnam lay divided among the 4iet 8inh enclaves and the theocratic dominions of the
<ao ;ai and the >oa >ao sects. #ll these powers would have opposed any Saigon
government) whatever its composition6 in fact) their eistence accounts for much of the
confidence the ;04 then ehibited toward the outcome of the Geneva Settlement. *or
;iem to have erected any central government in South 4ietnam without rec.oning
resolutely with their several armed forces and clandestine organi2ations would have been
impossible3 they were the very stuff of South 4ietnam=s politics.
;iem=s initial political tests reinforced his propensity to infleibility. The lessons of his
first %( months of rule must have underscored to ;iem the value of swift) tough action
against dissent) and of demanding absolute personal loyalty of top officials. #lso) by 8ay
%&'') Ngo ;inh ;iem had demonstrated to his satisfaction that the U.S. was sufficiently
committed to South 4ietnam that he could afford on occasion to resist #merican
pressure) and even to ignore #merican advice. ;iem .new) as surely as did the United
States) that he himself represented the only alternative to a communist South 4ietnam.
;iem was handicapped in all his attempts to build a nation by his political concepts. >e
had the etravagant epectations of a 0ousseau) and he acted with the 2eal of a Spanish
!n?uisitor. ;espite etensive travel and education in the "est) and despite his
revolutionary mien) he remained what he had been raised3 a mandarin of !mperial >ue)
steeped in filial piety) devoted to 4ietnam=s past) modern only to the etent of an intense)
conservative <atholicism. The political apparatus he created to etend his power and
implement his programs reflected his bac.ground) personality) and eperience3 a rigidly
organi2ed) over$centrali2ed familial oligarchy. Though his brothers) Ngo ;inh Nhu and
Ngo ;inh <an) created etensive personal political organi2ations of considerable power$$
Nhu=s semi$covert ;an "ao party borrowed heavily from communist doctrine and
techni?ue$$and though a third brother) Ngo ;inh Thuc) was the ran.ing <atholic bishop)
in no sense did they or ;iem ever ac?uire a broad popular base for his government.
;iem=s personality and his political methods practically assured that he would remain
distant) virtually isolated from the peasantry. They also seem to have predetermined that
;iem=s political history over the long$run would be a chronicle of disaffection3 ;iem
alienated one after another of the .ey groups within South 4ietnam=s society until) by late
%&,() his regime rested on the narrow and disintegrating base of its own bureaucracy and
the northern refugees.
Such need not have been the case. #t least through %&'-) ;iem and his government
enDoyed mar.ed success with fairly sophisticated pacification programs in the
countryside. !n fact) ;iem at first was warmly welcomed in some former 4iet 8inh
domains) and it is probable that a more sensitive and adroit leader could have captured
and held a significant rural following. @ven the failure of the Geneva #ccords to
eventuate in general elections in %&', at first had little impact upon G4N pacification.
The strident declamations of the ;04 notwithstanding) reunification of partitioned
4ietnam was not at first a vital political issue for South 4ietnam=s peasants. By and large)
as late as %&,% as ;evillers pointed out3
*or the people of the South reunification is not an essential problem. Peace) security)
freedom) their standard of living) the agrarian ?uestion$ these are far more important
?uestions to them. The stronghold of the sects over certain regions remains one of the
factors of the situation) as is also) in a general fashion) the distrustful attitude of the
Southerner towards the Northerner) who is suspected of a tendency to want to ta.e charge
of affairs.
The initial G4N pacification effort combined promises of governmental level reforms
with "civic action" in the hamlets and villages. The latter was carried out by "cadre" clad
in blac. paDamas) implementing the 8aoist "three$withs" doctrine +eat with) sleep with)
wor. with the people1 to initiate rudimentary improvements in public health) education)
and local government) and to propagandi2e the promises of the central government.
Unfortunately for ;iem) his civic action teams had to be drawn from the northern
refugees) and encountered <ochinchinese$Ton.inese tensions. 8ore importantly)
however) they incurred the enmity of the several Saigon ministries upon whose field
responsibilities they impinged. 8oreover) they became preoccupied with ;iem=s anti$
communist campaign to the detriment of their social service. By the end of %&',) the
civic action component of the G4N pacification program had been cut bac. severely.
But the salesmen were less at fault than their product. ;iem=s reform pac.age compared
unfavorably even in theory with what the 4iet 8inh had done by way of rural reform.
;iem undertoo. to3 +%1 resettle refugees and other land destitute 4ietnamese on
uncultivated land beginning in %&''6 +71 epropriate all rice land holdings over 75- acres
and redistribute these to tenant farmers beginning in %&',6 and +91 regulate landlord$
tenant relations beginning in %&'- to fi rents within the range %'$7'O of crop yield) and
to guarantee tenant land tenure for 9$' years. ;espite invidious comparison with 4iet
8inh rent$free land) had these programs been honestly and efficiently implemented) they
might have satisfied the land$hunger of the peasants. But they suffered) as one #merican
epert put it from "lac. of serious) interested administrators and top side command."
Government officials) beginning with the 8inister for #grarian 0eform) had divided
loyalties) being themselves land holders. 8oreover) the programs often operated to
replace paternalistic landlords with competitive bidding) and thus increased) rather than
decreased) tenant insecurity. #nd even if all ;iem=s goals had been honestly fulfilled$$
which they were not$$only 7(O of the rice land would have passed from large to small
farmers. #s it turned out) only %(O of all tenant farmers benefited in any sense. By %&'&)
the land reform program was virtually inoperative. #s of %&,() 5'O of the land remained
concentrated in the hands of 7O of landowners) and %'O of the landlords owned -'O of
all the land. Those relatively few farmers who did benefit from the program were more
often than not northerners) refugees) <atholics) or #nnamese$so that land reform added to
the G4N=s aura of favoritism which deepened peasant alienation in <ochinchina. *armer$
G4N tensions were further aggravated by rumors of corruption) and the widespread
allegation that the ;iem family itself had become enriched through the manipulation of
land transfers.
;iem=s whole rural policy furnishes one eample after another of political maladroitness.
!n :une %&',) ;iem abolished elections for village councils) apparently out of concern
that large numbers of 4iet 8inh might win office. By replacing the village notables with
G4N appointed officials) ;iem swept away the traditional administrative autonomy of
the village officials) and too. upon himself and his government the onus for whatever
corruption and inDustice subse?uently developed at that level. #gain) the G4N appointees
to village office were outsiders$$northerners) <atholics) or other "dependable" persons$$
and their alien presence in the midst of the close$.nit rural communities encouraged
revival of the conspiratorial) underground politics to which the villages had become
accustomed during the resistance against the *rench.
But conspiracy was almost a natural defense after ;iem launched his ;enunciation of
<ommunists <ampaign) which included a scheme for classifying the populace into
lettered political groups according to their connections with the 4iet 8inh. This
campaign) which featured public confessions reminiscent of the "people=s courts" of
<hina and North 4ietnam) invited neighbors to inform on each other) and raised further
the premium on clandestine political activity. !n %&',) the G4N disclosed that some
%'$7()((( communists had been detained in its "political reeducation centers)" while
;evillers put the figure at '()(((. By G^=N figures in %&,() nearly '()((( had been
detained. # British epert on 4ietnam) P. :. >oney) who was invited by ;iem to
investigate the reeducation centers in %&'&) concluded that) after interviewing a number
of rural 4ietnamese) "the consensus of the opinion epressed by these peoples is that . . .
the maDority of the detainees are neither communists nor pro$communists." Between %&',
and %&,() the G4N claimed that over %(()((( former communist cadres rallied to the
G4N) and thousands of other communist agents had surrendered or had been captured.
The campaign also allegedly netted over %(()((( weapons and 9)((( arms caches.
"hatever it contributed to G4N internal security) however) the <ommunist ;enunciation
<ampaign thoroughly terrified the 4ietnamese peasants) and detracted significantly from
the regime=s popularity.
;iem=s nearly paranoid preoccupation with security influenced his population relocation
schemes. @ven the refugee relief programs had been eecuted with an eye to building a
"living wall" between the lowland centers of population and the Dungle and mountain
redoubts of dissidents. Between #pril %&'- and late %&,%) the G4N reported that over
7(()((( persons$refugees and landless families from coastal #nnam$were resettled in
%5- centers carved from 77()((( acres of wilderness. These "strategic" settlements were
epensive3 although they affected only 7O of South 4ietnam=s people) they absorbed
'(O of U.S. aid for agriculture. They also precipitated unepected political reactions
from the 8ontagnard peoples of the >ighlands. !n the long run) by introducing ethnic
4ietnamese into traditionally 8ontagnard areas) and then by concentrating 8ontagnards
into defensible communities) the G4N provided the tribes "ith a cause and focused their
discontent against ;iem. The G4N thus facilitated rather than hindered the subse?uent
subversion of the tribes by the 4iet <ong. But of all ;iem=s relocation eperiments) that
which occasioned the most widespread and vehement anti$G4N sentiment was the
"agroville" program begun in mid$%&'&. #t first) the G4N tried to establish rural
communities which segregated families with .nown 4iet <ong or 4iet 8inh connections
from other citi2ens) but the public outcry caused this approach to be dropped. # few
months later) the G4N announced its intent to build J( "prosperity and density centers"
along a "strategic route system." By the end of %&,9) each of these J( agrovilles was to
hold some 5(( families) and each would have a group of satellite agrovilles of %7(
families each. !n theory) the agroville master plan was attractive3
there were provisions for community defense) schools) dispensary) mar.et center) public
garden) and even electricity. ;espite these advantages) however) the whole program
incurred the wrath of the peasants. They resented the corvee labor the G4N resorted to
for agroville construction) and they abhorred abandoning their cherished ancestral homes)
tombs) and developed gardens and fields for a strange and desolate community. Passive
peasant resistance) and then insurgent attac.s on the agrovilles) caused abandonment of
the program in early %&,% when it was less than 7'O complete.
Cet) for all ;iem=s preoccupation with rural security) he poorly provided for police and
intelligence in the countryside. 8ost of the #merican aid the G4N received was used for
security) and the bul. of it was lavished on the #rmy of 4ietnam. Security in the villages
was relegated to the Self$;efense <orps +S;<1 and the <ivil Guard +<G1$poorly trained
and e?uipped) miserably led. They could scarcely defend themselves) much less secure
the farmers. !ndeed) they proved to be an asset to insurgents in two ways3 they served as a
source of weapons6 and their brutality) petty thievery) and disorderliness induced
innumerable villagers to Doin in open revolt against the G4N. The #rmy of 4ietnam)
after %&',) was withdrawn from the rural regions to undergo reorgani2ation and
moderni2ation under its #merican advisors. !ts interaction with the rural populace
through %&'& was relatively slight. The S;< and <G) placed at the disposal of the
provincial administrators) were often no more venal nor offensive to the peasants than the
local officials themselves) but the corrupt) arrogant and overbearing men the people .new
as the G4N were among the greatest disadvantages ;iem faced in his rural efforts.
Nor was Ngo ;inh ;iem successful in eercising effective leadership over the
4ietnamese urban population or its intellectuals. :ust as ;iem and his brothers made the
mista.e of considering all former 4iet 8inh communists) they erred in condemning all
non$;iemist nationalists as tools of Bao ;ai or the *rench. The ;iem family acted to
circumscribe all political activity and even criticism not sanctioned by the oligarchy. !n
late %&'-) newspapers critical of the regime began to be harassed) and in 8arch %&'J)
after a caustic editorial) the G4N closed down the largest newspaper in Saigon. #ttempts
to form opposition political parties for participation in the national assembly met vague
threats and bureaucratic impediments. !n %&'J) opposition politicians ris.ed arrest for
assaying to form parties unauthori2ed by Nhu or <an) and by %&'& all opposition political
activity had come to a halt. !n the spring of %&,() however) a group of non$communist
nationalist leaders came together$$with more courage than prudence$$to issue the
<aravelle 8anifesto) a recital of grievances against the ;iem regime. @leven of the %J
signers had been cabinet members under ;iem or Bao ;ai6 5 had been in other high
government positions) and others represented religious groups. Their manifesto lauded
;iem for the progress that he had made in the aftermath of Geneva) but pointed out that
his repressions in recent years had "provo.ed the discouragement and resentment of the
people." They noted that "the si2e of the territory has shrun.) but the number of civil
servants has increased and still the wor. doesn=t get done"6 they applauded the fact that
"the *rench @peditionary <orps has left the country and a 0epublican #rmy has been
constituted) than.s to #merican aid)" but deplored the fact that the ;iem influence
"divides the men of one and the same unit) sows distrust between friends of the same
ran.) and uses as a criterion for promotion fidelity to the party in blind submission to its
leaders"6 they described) despairingly) "a rich and fertile country enDoying food
surpluses" where "at the present time many people are out of wor.) have no roof over
their heads) and no money." They went on to "beseech the government to urgently
modify its policies." "hile the <aravelle 8anifesto thoroughly frightened ;iem) coming)
as it did) three days after Syngman 0hee was overthrown in Aorea) it prompted him only
to further measures to ?uell the loyal opposition. By the fall of %&,() the intellectual elite
of South 4ietnam was politically mute6 labor unions were impotent6 loyal opposition in
the form of organi2ed parties did not eist. !n brief) ;iem=s policies virtually assured that
political challenges to him would have to be etra$legal. Ultimately) these emerged from
the traditional sources of power in South 4ietnam$$the armed forces) the religious sects)
and the armed peasantry.
Through %&,() the only serious threats to ;iem from inside the G4N were attempted
military coups d=etat. !n his first %( months in office) ;iem had identified loyalty in his
top army commanders as a sine ?ua non for his survival. Thereafter he too. a personal
interest in the positioning and promoting of officers) and even in matters of military
strategy and tactics. 8any of 4ietnam=s soldiers found ;iem=s attentions a means to
political power) wealth) and social prominence. 8any others) however) resented those
who rose by favoritism) and obDected to ;iem=s interference in military matters. !n
November %&,() a serious coup attempt was supported by three elite paratroop battalions
in Saigon) but otherwise failed to attract support. !n the wa.e of the coup) mass arrests
too. place in which the <aravelle Group) among others) were Dailed. !n *ebruary %&,7)
two 4ietnamese air force planes bombed the presidential palace in an unsuccessful
assassination attempt on ;iem and the Nhus. #gain) there was little apparent willingness
among military officers for concerted action against ;iem. But the abortive attempts of
%&,( and %&,7 had the effect of dramati2ing the choices open to those military officers
who recogni2ed the insolvency of ;iem=s political and military policies.
;iem=s handling of his military impinged in two ways on his rural policy. ;iem involved
himself with the e?uipping of his military forces showing a distinct proclivity toward
heavy military forces of the conventional type. >e wanted the <ivil Guard e?uipped very
much li.e his regular army$$possibly with a view to assuring himself a chec. on army
power. There were a few soldiers) li.e General ;uong 4an 8inh) who sharply disagreed
with the President on this point. Nonetheless) ;iem persisted. >is increasing concern for
the loyalty of .ey officials) moreover) led him to draw upon the military officer corps for
civil administrators. *rom %&', on his police apparatus was under military officers) and
year by year) more of the provincial governments were also placed under military men.
By %&'J) about %I9 of the province chiefs were military officers6 by %&,() that fraction
had increased to nearly 7I96 by %&,7) -IJ of all provinces were headed by soldiers.
;iem=s bete noire was communism) and he appealed to threats from communists to
Dustify his concentration on internal security. !n #ugust %&',) G4N Brdinance 5- defined
being a communist) or wor.ing for them) as a capital crime. !n 8ay %&'&) by G4N /aw
%(I'&) the enforcement of Brdinance 5- was charged to special military tribunals from
whose decisions there was no appeal. But "communist" was a term not used by members
of the 8arist$/eninist Party headed by >o <hi 8inh) or its southern arms. Beginning in
%&',) the Saigon press began to refer to "4iet <ong)" a fairly precise and not necessarily
disparaging rendition of "4ietnamese <ommunist." There is little doubt that ;iem and
his government applied the term 4iet <ong somewhat loosely within South 4ietnam to
mean all persons or groups who resorted to clandestine political activity or armed
opposition against his government6 and the G4N meant by the term North as well as
South 4ietnamese communists) who they presumed acted in concert. #t the close of the
*ranco$4iet 8inh "ar in %&'5) some ,()((( men were serving in organi2ed 4iet 8inh
units in South 4ietnam. *or the regroupments to North 4ietnam) these units were
augmented with large numbers of young recruits6 a reported &()((( armed men were
ta.en to North 4ietnam in the regroupment) while the U.S. and the G4N estimated that
from '$%()((( trained men were left behind as "cadre." !f *rench estimates are correct
that in %&'5 the 4iet 8inh controlled over ,($&(O of rural South 4ietnam outside the
sect domains) these '$%()((( stay$behinds must have represented only a fraction of the
4iet 8inh residue) to which G4N figures on recanting and detained communists in the
years through %&,( attest.
*rom studies of defectors) prisoners of war) and captured documents) it is now possible to
assess armed resistance against ;iem much better than the facts available at the time
permitted. Three distinct periods are discernible. *rom %&'5 through %&'-) there was a
substantial amount of random dissidence in the countryside) which ;iem succeeded in
?uelling. !n early %&'-) 4ietnam seemed to be enDoying the first peace it had .nown in
over a decade. Beginning) however) in mid$%&'- and intensifying through mid$%&'&)
incidents of violence attributed to 4iet <ong began to occur in the countryside. "hile
much of this violence appeared to have a political motive) and while there is some
evidence that it was part of a concerted strategy of guerrilla base development in
accordance with sound 8ao$Giap doctrine) the G4N did not construe it as a campaign)
considering the disorders too diffuse to warrant committing maDor G4N resources. !n
early %&'&) however) ;iem perceived that he was under serious attac. and reacted
strongly. Population relocation was revivified. The #rmy of 4ietnam was committed
against the dissidents) and the <ommunist ;enunciation <ampaign was reinvigorated. By
autumn %&'&) however) the 4< were in a position to field units of battalion si2e against
regular army formations. By %&,() 4< could operate in sufficient strength to sei2e
provincial capitals for periods ranging up to 75 hours) overrun #04N posts) and cut off
entire districts from communication with the G4N$controlled towns. ;iem=s
countermeasures increasingly met with peasant obstructionism and outright hostility. #
U.S. @mbassy estimate of the situation in :anuary %&,( noted that3
"hile the G4N has made an effort to meet the economic and social needs of the rural
populations . . . these proDects appear to have enDoyed only a measure of success in
creating support for the government and) in fact) in many instances have resulted in
resentment . . . the situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has
tended to treat the population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with
an attitude of apathy or resentment.
!n ;ecember %&,() the National /iberation *ront of S4N +N/*1 was formally organi2ed.
*rom its inception it was designed to encompass all anti$G4N activists) including
communists) and it formulated and articulated obDectives for all those opposed to "8y$
;iem." The N/* placed heavy emphasis on the withdrawal of #merican advisors and
influence) on land reform and liberali2ation of the G4N) on coalition government and the
neutrali2ation of 4ietnam6 but through %&,9) the N/* soft$pedalled references to
reunification of 4ietnam. The N/* leadership was a shadowy crew of relatively obscure
South 4ietnamese. ;espite their apparent lac. of eperience and competence) however)
the N/* rapidly too. on organi2ational reality from its central committee) down through
a web of subordinate and associated groups) to villages all over South 4ietnam. "ithin a
few months of its founding) its membership doubled) doubled again by fall %&,%) and
then redoubled by early %&,7. #t that time an estimated 9(()((( were on its rolls.
Numerous administrative and functional "liberation associations" sprang into being) and
each member of the N/* normally belong simultaneously to several such organi2ations.
The .ey operational components of the N/* were) however) the /iberation #rmy and the
People=s 0evolutionary Party. The former had a lien on the services of every N/*
member) man) woman) or child) although functionally its missions were usually carried
out by formally organi2ed military units. The People=s 0evolutionary Party was eplicitly
the "8arist$/eninist Party of South 4ietnam" and claimed to be the "vanguard of the
N/*) the paramount member." !t denied official lin.s with the communist party of North
4ietnam beyond "fraternal ties of communism." #lthough the P0P did not come into
eistence until %&,7) it is evident that communists played a paramount role in forming the
N/*) and in its rapid initial growth. The official U.S. view has been that the P0P is
merely the southern arm of the ;04=s communist party) and a principal instrument
through which >anoi instigated and controlled the revolt against "8y$;iem." The
organi2ational genius evident in the N/*) as well as the testimony of 4ietnamese
communists in interrogations and captured documents supports this interpretation.
But significant doubt remains. 4iet 8inh stay$behinds testified in %&'' and %&', that
their mission was political agitation for the holding of the general elections promised at
Geneva. <aptured documents and prisoner interrogations indicate that in %&'- and %&'J)
although there was some "wildcat" activity by local communists) party efforts appeared to
be devoted to the careful construction of an underground apparatus which) though it used
assassinations and .idnapping) circumspectly avoided military operations. #ll evidence
points to fall of %&'& as the period in which the 4iet <ong made their transition from a
clandestine political movement to a more overt military operation. 8oreover) throughout
the years %&'5$%&,() a "front" seems to have been active in 4ietnam. *or eample) the
periodic report submitted by US8##G) 4ietnam) on %' :uly %&'-$$a time of ostensible
internal peace$$noted that3
The 4iet <ong guerrillas and propagandists) however) are still waging a grim battle for
survival. !n addition to an accelerated propaganda campaign) the <ommunists have been
forming "front" organi2ations to influence portions of anti$government minorities. Some
of these organi2ations are militant) some are political. #n eample of the former is the
"4ietnamese Peoples= /iberation 8ovement *orces)" a military unit composed of e$<ao
;ai) e$>oa >ao) e$Binh Huyen) escaped political prisoners) and 4iet <ong cadres. #n
eample of the latter is the "4ietnam$<ambodian Buddhist #ssociation)" one of several
organi2ations see.ing to spread the theory of "Peace and <o$eistence."
"hether early references to the "front" were to the organi2ations which subse?uently
matured as the N/* cannot be determined. !ndeed) to shed further light on the truth or
falsehood of the proposition that the ;04 did not intervene in South 4ietnam until after
the N/* came into eistence) it is necessary to turn to the events in North 4ietnam during
the years %&'5$%&,(.
)#36! #3D T)E !3S72:E3;< !3 S67T) B!ET3#M
The primary ?uestion concerning >anoi=s role in the origins of the insurgency is not so
much whether it played a role or not$$the evidence of direct North 4ietnamese
participation in subversion against the Government of South 4ietnam is now etensive$$
but when >anoi intervened in a systematic way. 8ost attac.s on U.S. policy have been
based on the proposition that the ;04 move on the South came with manifest reluctance)
and after massive U.S. intervention in %&,%. *or eample) George 8cTurnin Aahin and
:ohn ". /ewis) in their boo. The 7nited States in Bietnam) state that3
<ontrary to United States policy assumptions) all available evidence shows that the
revival of the civil war in the South in %&'J was underta.en by Southerners at their own$$
not >anoi=s$$initiative. . . . !nsurgency activity against the Saigon government began in
the South under Southern leadership not as a conse?uence of any dictate from >anoi) but
contrary to >anoi=s inDunctions.
#s discussed above) so much of this argument as rests on the eistence in South 4ietnam
of genuine rebellion is probably valid. The South 4ietnamese had both the means) the
4iet 8inh residue) and motive to ta.e up arms against Ngo ;inh ;iem. 8oreover) there
were indications that some ;04 leaders did attempt to hold bac. southern rebels on the
grounds that "conditions" were not ripe for an uprising. *urther) there was apparently
division within the /ao ;ong Party hierarchy over the ?uestion of strategy and tactics in
South 4ietnam. >owever) the evidence indicates that the principal strategic debate over
this issue too. place between %&', and %&'J6 all information now available +spring)
%&,J1 points to a decision ta.en by the ;04 leaders not later than spring) %&'&) actively
to see. the overthrow of ;iem. Thereafter) the ;04 pressed toward that goal by military
force and by subversive aggression) both in /aos and in South 4ietnam.
But few #dministration critics have had access to the classified information upon which
the foregoing Dudgments are based. Such intelligence as the U.S. has been able to ma.e
available to the public bearing on the period %&'5$%&,( has been s.etchy and not very
convincing3 a few captured documents) and a few prisoner interrogations. !ndeed) up until
%&,% the #dministration itself publicly held that Ngo ;inh ;iem was firmly in control in
South 4ietnam) and that the United States aid programs were succeeding in meeting such
threat to G4N security as eisted both within South 4ietnam and from the North. Too)
the vigorous publici2ing of "wars of national liberation" by N. S. Ahrushchev and the
"discovery" of counterinsurgency by the Aennedy #dministration in early %&,% tended to
reinforce the overall public impression that North 4ietnam=s aggression was news in that
year. Ahrushchev=s speech of , :anuary %&,%) made) according to Aennedy biographer
#rthur Schlesinger) :r.) "a conspicuous impression on the new President) who too. it as
an authoritative eposition of Soviet intentions) discussed it with his staff and read
ecerpts from it aloud to the National Security <ouncil." Thereafter) #dministration
leaders) by their fre?uently identifying that Ahrushchev declamation as a milestone in the
development of communist world strategy) lent credence to the supposition that the
Soviet Union had approved aggression by its satellite in North 4ietnam only in
;ecember l&,($$the month the N/* was formed.
#merican Aremlinologists had been preoccupied) since Ahrushchev=s "de$Stalini2ation"
speech at the 7(th <ongress of the <ommunist Party of the Soviet Union in *ebruary
%&',) with the possibilities of a genuine detente with the USS0. They were also bemused
by the prospect of a deep strategic division with the "<ommunist Bloc" between the
Soviets and the <hinese. Cet) despite evidences of disunity in the Bloc$$in Cugoslavia)
#lbania) >ungary) Poland) and @ast Germany$$virtually all eperts regarded North
4ietnamese national strategy) to the etent that they considered it at all) as a simple
derivative of that of either the USS0 or the <P0. P. :. >oney) the British authority on
North 4ietnam) tends to the view that >anoi remained subservient to the dictates of
8oscow from %&', through %&,%) albeit carefully paying lip service to continue
solidarity with Pe.ing. 8ore recently) a differing interpretation has been offered) which
holds that the >anoi leaders were in those years motivated primarily by their concern for
internal development) and that they) therefore) turned to the Soviet Union as the only
nation willing and able to furnish the wherewithal for rapid economic advancement. Both
interpretations assume that through %&,( the ;04 followed the Soviet line) accepted
"peaceful coeistence)" concentrated on internal development) and too. action in South
4ietnam only after 8oscow gave the go$ahead in late %&,(.
But it is also possible that the collo?uy over strategy among the communist nations in the
late %&'(=s followed a pattern almost eactly the reverse of that usually depicted3 that
North 4ietnam persuaded the Soviets and the <hinese to accept its strategic view) and to
support simultaneous drives for economic advancement and forceful reunification. >o
<hi 8inh was an old Stalinist) trained in 0ussia in the early =7(=s) <omintern colleague of
Borodin in <anton) and for three decades leading eponent of the 8arist$/eninist canon
on anti$colonial war. Presumably) >o spo.e with authority within the upper echelons of
the communist party of the Soviet Union. "hat he said to them privately was) no doubt)
?uite similar to what he proclaimed publicly from %&', onward3 the circumstances of
North 4ietnam were not comparable to those of the Soviet Union) or even those of the
<P0) and North 4ietnam=s policy had to reflect the differences.
Ahrushchev=s de$Stalini2ation bombshell burst in *ebruary %&', at a dramatically bad
time for the ;04. !t overrode the <hinese call for reconvening of the Geneva <onference
on 4ietnam) and it interfered with the concerting of communist policy on what to do
about ;iem regime=s refusal to proceed toward the general elections. #lthough the
Soviets issued in 8arch %&', a demand for G4N observance of the #ccords) its
diplomacy not only failed to bring about any action on behalf of the ;04) but elicited) in
#pril %&',) a sharp British note condemning >anoi for grave violations of the #ccords.
>anoi received the British note about the time that Ahrushchev proclaimed that the
Soviet was committed to a policy of "peaceful coeistence." #t the Ninth Plenum of the
<entral <ommittee of the /ao ;ong Party) held in >anoi that month) >o <hi 8inh
lauded "de$Stalini2ation)" but une?uivocally reDected "peaceful coeistence" as irrelevant
to the ;04. !n November %&'-) after more than a year of upheavals and evident internal
political distress in North 4ietnam) >o <hi 8inh and /e ;uan Dourneyed to 8oscow for
the <onference of <ommunist and "or.ers= Parties of Socialist <ountries. That
conference issued a declaration admitting the possibility of "nonPpeaceful transition to
socialism" remar.ably similar in thrust to >o=s %&', speech. *urther) Ahrushchev=s
famous :anuary %&,% speech was simply a precis of the ;eclaration of the November
%&,( <onference of <ommunist and "or.ers= Parties of Socialist <ountries. That %&,(
;eclaration) which formed the basis for Ahrushchev=s pronouncements on wars of
national liberation in turn eplicitly reaffirmed the %&'- ;eclaration.
Bther evidence supports the foregoing hypothesis. The ;04 was) in %&,() an
orthodoically constituted communist state. Both the government and the society were
dominated by the /ao ;ong +<ommunist1 Party) and power within the party concentrated
in a small elite$$>o <hi 8inh and his lieutenants from the old$time !ndochinese
<ommunist Party. This group of leaders were uni?ue in the communist world for their
homogeneity and for their harmony$there has been little evidence of the .ind of
turbulence which has splintered the leadership of most communist parties. "hile eperts
have detected disputes within the /ao ;ong hierarchy$$%&'- appears to be a critical year
in that regard$$the facts are that there has been no blood$purge of the /ao ;ong
leadership) and ecept for changes occasioned by apparently natural deaths) the
leadership in %&,( was virtually identical to what it had been in %&'5 or %&5,. This
remar.ably dedicated and purposeful group of men apparently agreed among themselves
as to what the national interests of the ;04 re?uired) what goals should be set for the
nation) and what strategy they should pursue in attaining them.
These leaders have been eplicit in setting forth ;04 national goals in their public
statements and official documents. *or eample) >o <hi 8inh and his colleagues placed
a premium on "land reform"$$by which they meant a communi2ation of rural society
along 8aoist lines. 8oreover) they clearly considered a disciplined society essential for
victory in war and success in peace. !t was also evident that they were committed to bring
about an independent) reunified 4ietnam capable of eerting significant influence
throughout Southeast #sia) and particularly over the neighboring states of /aos and
<ambodia. "hat is not .nown with certainty is how they determined the relative priority
among these obDectives.
!n the immediate aftermath of Geneva) the ;04 deferred to the Geneva #ccords for the
achievement of reunification) and turned inward) concentrating its energies on land
reform and rehabilitation of the war$torn economy. By the summer of %&',) this strategy
was ban.rupt3 the Geneva Settlement manifestly would not eventuate in reunification)
and the land reform campaign foundered from such serious abuses by /ao ;ong cadre
that popular disaffection imperiled ;04 internal security. !n #ugust %&',) the /ao ;ong
leadership was compelled to "rectify" its programs) to postpone land reform) and to purge
low echelon cadre to mollify popular resentment. @ven these measures) however) proved
insufficient to forestall insurrection6 in November %&',) the peasant rebellions bro.e out)
followed by urban unrest. Nonetheless) the ;04 leadership survived these internal crises
intact) and by %&'J appears to have solved most of the problems of economic efficiency
and political organi2ation which occasioned the %&',$%&'- outbursts.
But domestic difficulty was not the only crisis to confront the /ao ;ong leaders in early
%&'-. !n :anuary) when the Soviet Union proposed to the United Nations the admitting of
North and South 4ietnam as separate states) it signalled that the USS0 might be prepared
in the interests of "peaceful coeistence)" to ma.e a great power deal which would have
lent permanency to the partition of 4ietnam. >o <hi 8inh) in evident surprise) violently
dissented. "hen in *ebruary %&'- Ahrushchev went further in affirming his intention to
"coeist" with the United States) the ;04 ?uic.ly moved to realign its own and Soviet
policies. !n 8ay %&'-) the Soviet head of state) 4oroshilov) visited >anoi) and in :uly
and #ugust %&'-) >o <hi 8inh traveled etensively in @astern @urope) spending several
days in 8oscow. The 4oroshilov visit was given top billing by the >anoi Press and >o)
upon his return from 8oscow) indicated that important decisions had been reached.
Thereafter) >anoi and 8oscow marched more in step.
!n the meantime) the needs and desires of communist rebels in South 4ietnam had been
communicated directly to >anoi in the person of /e ;uan) who is .nown to have been in
South 4ietnam in %&'' and %&',) and to have returned to >anoi sometime before the fall
of %&'-. !n September of that year) upon >o=s return from @urope) /e ;uan surfaced as
one of the members of the /ao ;ong Politburo6 it is possible that he was already at that
time de facto the *irst Secretary of the /ao ;ong Party) to which position he was
formally promoted in September %&,(. !n %&'' and %&',) /e ;oan) from the testimony
of prisoners and captured documents) had been epressing conviction that ;iem would
stamp out the communist movement in South 4ietnam unless the ;04 were to reinforce
the party there. Presumably) he carried these views into the inner councils of the ;0y. !n
November %&'-) /e ;uan and >o traveled to 8oscow to attend the <onference of
<ommunist and "or.ers= Parties of Socialist <ountries. The ;eclaration of that
conference) ?uoted above) has since been cited repeatedly by both North and South
4ietnamese communists) as one of the strategic turning points in their modern history. /e
;uan) upon his return to >anoi from 8oscow) issued a statement to the effect that the
;04=s way was now clear. Ta.ing /e ;uan literally) it could be construed that the ;04
deemed the 8oscow ;eclaration of %&'- the "go ahead" signal from 8oscow and Pe.ing
for forceful pursuit of its obDectives.
There is some sparse evidence that the ;04 actually did begin moving in %&'J to set up
a mechanism for supporting the insurgency in South 4ietnam. But even had the decision
been ta.en) as suggested above) in late %&'-) it is unli.ely that there would have been
much manifestation of it in %&'J. The /ao ;ong leadership had for years stressed the
lessons that they had learned from eperience on the essentiality of carefully preparing a
party infrastructure and building guerrilla bases before proceeding with an insurgency.
4iet 8inh doctrine would have dictated priority concern to refurbishing the communist
apparatus in South 4ietnam) and it is possible that such a process was set notion during
%&'J. Brders were captured from >anoi which directed guerrilla bases be prepared in
South 4ietnam in early %&'&.
There is) however) other evidence that ?uestioning among the ;04 hierarchy concerning
strategy and tactics for South 4ietnam continued throughout %&'J and into %&'&.
<aptured reports from party head?uarters in South 4ietnam betrayed doubt and
indecisions among party leaders there and reflected the absence of clear guidance from
>anoi. 8oreover) in %&'J) and in %&'&) the ;04 did concentrate much of its resources
on agricultural and industrial improvement3 etensive loans were obtained from the
Soviet Union and from the <hinese Peoples 0epublic) and ambitious uplift programs
were launched in both sectors. !t is possible) therefore) to accept the view that through
%&'J the ;04 still accorded priority to butter over guns) as part of its base development
strategy.
!n the larger sense) domestic progress) "consolidation of the North)" was fundamental to
that strategy. #s General 4o Nguyen Giap put it in the /ao ;ong Party Dournal )o Tap
of :anuary %&,(3
The North has become a large rear echelon of our army . . . The North is the
revolutionary base for the whole country.
Up until %&'&) the economy of North 4ietnam was scarcely providing subsistence for its
people) let alone support for foreign military underta.ings6 by that year) substantial
progress in both agriculture and industry was evident3
North 4ietnam *ood Grain Per <apita
%&'' %&', %&'- %&'J %&'& %&,(
Ailograms 7,( 9%( 7J7 9%' 9'J 9(5
O %(( %%& %(& %7% %9J %%-
;ue mainly) however) to industrial growth) the Gross National Product reached a growth
rate of ,O per annum in %&'J) and sustained that rate thereafter. Both %&'J and %&'&
were etraordinarily good years in both industry and agriculture. # long$range
development plan launched in %&'J achieved an annual industrial epansion of 7%O per
year through %&,() chiefly in heavy industry. *oreign aid$both <hinese and Soviet$was
readily obtained) the USS0 supplanting the <P0 as prime donor. *oreign trade stepped
up mar.edly. <ompared with %&'') the ;04=s foreign commerce doubled by %&'&) and
nearly tripled by %&,(.
By %&'&) it seems li.ely that the ;04 had elected to pursue a "guns and butter" strategy)
and obtained re?uisite Soviet and <hinese aid. "hile pressing forward with its economic
improvement programs$which were showing definite progress$the ;04 prepared with
word and deed for large$scale intervention in South 4ietnam. !n 8ay %&'&) at the
*ifteenth Plenum of the <entral <ommittee of the /ao ;ong Party) a 0esolution was
adopted identifying the United States as the main obstacle to the reali2ation of the hopes
of the 4ietnamese people) and as an enemy of peace. The 0esolution of the *ifteenth
Plenum called for a strong North 4ietnam as a base for helping the South 4ietnamese to
overthrow ;iem and eDect the United States. # <ommunist Party history captured in
South 4ietnam in %&,,) and the testimony of high$ran.ing captives) indicate that South
4ietnamese communists still regard the resolution of the *ifteenth Plenum as the point of
departure for ;04 intervention.
"ithin a month of the *ifteenth Plenum) the ;04 began to commit its armed forces in
/aos) and steadily escalated its aid to the Pathet /ao. By the time the National /iberation
*ront issued its manifesto in ;ecember %&,() the conflict in /aos had matured to the
point that Pathet /ao$N4# troops controlled most of N@ /aos and the /aotian
panhandle6 moreover) by that time) the Soviet Union had entered the fray) and was
participating in airlift operations from North 4ietnam direct to Pathet /ao$N4# units in
/aos. #lso) by fall of %&'&) the insurgency in South 4ietnam too. a definite upsurge.
4iet <ong units for the first time offered a direct challenge to the #rmy of 4ietnam.
/arge 4< formations sei2ed and held district and province capitals for short periods of
time) and assassinations and .idnappings proliferated mar.edly. The Preamble of the
<onstitution of the ;04) promulgated on % :anuary %&,() was distinctly bellicose)
condemning the United States) and establishing the reunification of 4ietnam as a ;04
national obDective. ;uring %&'& and %&,() the relatively undeveloped intelligence
apparatus of the U.S. and the G4N confirmed that over 5)((( infiltrators were sent from
North 4ietnam southward$$most of them military or political cadre) trained to raise and
lead insurgent forces.
!n September %&,() the /ao ;ong Party convened its Third National <ongress. There >o
<hi 8inh) /e ;uan) Giap) and others presented speeches further corn$
mitting the ;04 to support of the insurgency in the South) demanding the U.S. stop its
aid to ;iem) and calling for the formation of a unified front to lead the struggle against
"8y$;iem." The 0esolution of the Third <ongress) reflecting these statements) is another
of those historic benchmar.s referred to in captured party documents and prisoner
interrogations.
!n November %&,() the 8oscow <onference of <ommunist and "or.ers= Parties of
Socialist <ountries once again declared its support of the sort of "Dust" war the ;04
intended to prosecute. The United States was identified as the principal colonial power)
and the right and obligation of communist parties to lead struggles against colonial
powers was detailed. By the time Ahrushchev cited that ;eclaration in his "wars of
national liberation" speech) the "liberation war" for South 4ietnam was nearly a year and
a half old.
The evidence supports the conclusion) therefore) that whether or not the rebellion against
;iem in South 4ietnam proceeded independently of) or even contrary to directions from
>anoi through %&'J) >anoi moved thereafter to capture the revolution. There is little
doubt that >anoi eerted some influence over certain insurgents in the South throughout
the years following Geneva) and there is evidence which points to its preparing for active
support of large$scale insurgency as early as %&'J. "hatever differences in strategy may
have eisted among 8oscow) Pe.ing) and >anoi) it appears that at each critical Duncture
>anoi obtained concurrence in 8oscow with an aggressive course of action.
#ccordingly) it was not "peaceful coeistence)" or concern over leadership of the
"socialist camp" which governed >anoi=s policy. "hat appeared to matter to >anoi was
its abiding national interests3 domestic consolidation in independence) reunification) and
4ietnamese hegemony in Southeast #sia. Both Soviet and <hinese policy seems to have
bent to these ends rather than the contrary. !f >anoi applied bra.es to eager insurgents in
South 4ietnam) it did so not from lac. of purpose or because of Soviet restraints) but
from concern over launching one more premature uprising in the South. Ngo ;inh ;iem
was entirely correct when he stated that his was a nation at war in early %&'&6 South
4ietnam was at war with both the 4iet <ong insurgents and with the ;0y) in that the
latter then undertoo. to provide strategic direction and leadership cadres to build
systematically a base system in /aos and South 4ietnam for subse?uent) large$scale
guerrilla warfare. Persuasive evidence eists that by %&,( ;04 support of the insurgency
in South 4ietnam included materiel as well as personnel. !n any event) by late %&'&) it
seems clear that >anoi considered the time ripe to ta.e the military offensive in South
4ietnam) and that by %&,( circumstances were propitious for more overt political action.
# recently captured high$ran.ing member of the National /iberation *ront has confirmed
that in mid$%&,( he and other /ao ;ong Party leaders in South 4ietnam were instructed
by >anoi to begin organi2ing the National /iberation *ront) which was formally founded
upon the issuance of its 8anifesto on 7( ;ecember %&,(. The rapid growth of the N/*
thereafter$$it ?uadrupled its strength in about one year$$is a further indication that the
>anoi$directed communist party apparatus had been engaged to the fullest in the initial
organi2ation and subse?uent development of the N/*.
U.S. P@0<@PT!BNS B* T>@ !NSU0G@N<C) %&'5$%&,(
8uch of what the U.S. .nows about the origins of the insurgency in South 4ietnam rests
on information it has ac?uired since %&,9) approimately the span of time that an
etensive and effective #merican intelligence apparatus had been functioning in
4ietnam. Before then) our intelligence was drawn from a significantly more narrow and
less reliable range of sources) chiefly 4ietnamese) and could not have supported analysis
in depth of insurgent organi2ation and intentions. The U.S. was particularly deprived of
dependable information concerning events in South 4ietnam=s countryside in the years
%&'5 through %&'&. Nonetheless) U.S. intelligence estimates through %&,( correctly and
consistently estimated that the threat to G4N internal security was greater than the
danger from overt invasion. The intelligence estimates provided to policy ma.ers in
"ashington pegged the 4iet <ong military offensive as beginning in late %&'&) with
preparations noted as early as %&'-) and a definite campaign perceived as of early %&'&.
Throughout the years) they were critical of ;iem) consistently epressing s.epticism that
he could deal successfully with his internal political problems. These same estimates
miscalculated the numerical and political strength of the 4iet <ong) misDudged the etent
of rural disaffection) and overrated the military capabilities of the G4N. But as strategic
intelligence they were remar.ably sound.
!ndeed) given the generally blea. appraisals of ;iem=s prospects) they who made U.S.
policy could only have done so by assuming a significant measure of ris.. *or eample)
on 9 #ugust %&'5) an N!@ too. the position that3
#lthough it is possible that the *rench and 4ietnamese) even with firm support from the
U.S. and other powers) may be able to establish a strong regime in South 4ietnam) we
believe that the chances for this development are poor and) moreover) that the situation is
more li.ely to continue to deteriorate progressively over the net year...
This estimate notwithstanding) the U.S. moved promptly to convene the 8anila
<onference) bring S@#TB into being with its protocol aegis over 4ietnam) and
eliminate *rance as the recipient of U.S. aid for 4ietnam. #gain on 7, #pril %&'') an
N!@ charged that3
@ven if the present empasse Fwith the sectsG were resolved) we believe that that it would
be etremely difficult) at best) for a 4ietnamese government) regardless of its
composition) to ma.e progress towards developing a strong) stable) anti$<ommunist
government capable of resolving the basic social) economic) and political problems of
4ietnam) the special problems arising from the Geneva #greement and capable of
meeting the long$range challenge of the <ommunists...
"ithin a matter of wee.s) however) the U.S. firmly and finally committed itself to
unstinting support of Ngo ;inh ;iem) accepted his refusal to comply with the political
settlement of Geneva) and acceded to withdrawal of *rench military power and political
influence from South 4ietnam. @ven at the 2enith of ;iem=s success) an N!@ noted
adverse political trends stemming from ;iem=s "authoritarian role" and predicted that)
while no short$term opposition was in prospect3
Bver a longer period) the accumulation of grievances among various groups and
individuals may lead to development of a national opposition movement...
There was no N!@ published between %&', and %&'& on South 4ietnam3 an N!@ of 8ay
%&'& too. the position that ;iem had a serious military problem on his hands3
The FG4NG internal security forces will not be able to eradicate ;04 supported guerrilla
or subversive activity in the foreseeable future. #rmy units will probably have to be
diverted to special internal security assignments...
The same N!B noted a waning of popular enthusiasm for ;iem) the eistence of some
disillusionment) "particularly among the educated elite)" some "dissatisfaction among
military officers)" but detected little "identifiable public unrest"3
The growth of dissatisfaction is inhibited by South 4ietnam=s continuing high standard of
living relative to that of its neighbors) the paternalistic attitude of ;iem=s government
towards the people) and the lac. of any feasible alternative to the present regime.
The %&'& N!@ again epressed serious reservations about ;iem=s leadership and flatly
stated that3
The prospects for continued political stability in South 4ietnam hang heavily upon
President ;iem and his ability to mantain firm control of the army and police. The
regime=s efforts to assure internal security and its belief that an authoritarian government
is necessary to handle the country=s problems will result in a continued repression of
potential opposition elements. This policy of repression will inhibit the growth of
popularity of the regime and we believe that dissatisfaction will grow) particularly among
those who are politically conscious....
;espite these reservations) U.S. policy remained staunchly and fairly uncritically behind
;iem through %&'&.
The National !ntelligence @stimates reservations re ;iem do not appear to have restrained
the National Security <ouncil in its two maDor reviews of U.S. policy between %&'5 and
%&,(. !n %&',) the NS< +in policy directive NS< ',%71 directed that U.S. agencies
#ssist *ree 4ietnam to develop a strong) stable) and constitutional government to enable
*ree 4ietnam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present
<ommunist 2one . . . FandG wor. toward the wea.ening of the <ommunists in North and
South 4ietnam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and
independent 4ietnam under anti$<ommunist leadership.
!n %&'J +in NS< 'J(&1 this policy) with its "roll$bac." overtones) was reiterated)
although revisions were proposed indicating an awareness of the necessity to adapt the
army of 4ietnam for anti$guerrilla warfare. Bperations <oordinating Board Progress
0eports on the implementation of the policies laid out in NS< ',%7 and 'J(& revealed
awareness that 4ietnam was under internal attac.) and that "in spite of substantial U.S.
assistance) economic development) though progressing) is below that which is politically
desirable."
4hile classified policy papers through %&'& thus dealt with ris.s) public statements of
U.S. officials did not refer to the Deopardy. To the contrary) the picture presented the
public and <ongress by #mbassador ;urbrow) General "illiams) and other
#dministration spo.esmen was of continuing progress) virtually miraculous
improvement) year$in and year$out. ;iem was depicted as a strong and capable leader)
firmly in command of his own house) leading his people into modern nationhood at a
remar.able pace. #s late as the summer of %&'&) #mbassador ;urbrow and General
"illiams assured the Senate *oreign 0elations <ommittee that 4ietnam=s internal
security was in no serious danger) and that 4ietnam was in a better position to cope with
invasion from the North than it had ever been. !n the fall of %&'&) in fact) General
"illiams epressed the opinion that by %&,% G4N defense budgets could be reduced) and
in the spring of %&,() he wrote to Senator 8ansfield that #merican military advisors
could begin a phased withdrawal from 8##G) 4ietnam the following year.
"hatever adverse Dudgment may be deserved by such statements or by the ?uality of U.S.
assistance to 4ietnam on behalf of its internal security) the #merican aid program cannot
be faulted for failing to provide ;iem funds in plenty. The U.S. aid program$economic
and military$for South 4ietnam was among the largest in the world. *rom *C %&5,
through *C %&,%) 4ietnam was the third ran.ing non$Nato recipient of aid) and the
seventh worldwide. !n *C %&,%) the last program of President @isenhower=s
#dministration) South 4ietnam was the fifth ran.ing recipient overall. 8##G) 4ietnam)
was the only military aid mission anywhere in the world commanded by a lieutenant
general) and the economic aid mission there was by %&'J the largest anywhere.
Security was the focus of U.S. aid6 more than -'O of the economic aid the U.S. provided
in the same period went into the G4N military budget6 thus at least QJ out of every Q%(
of aid provided 4ietnam went directly toward security. !n addition) other amounts of
nominally economic aid +e.g.) that for public administration1 went toward security forces)
and aid for agriculture and transportation principally funded proDects with strategic
purposes and with an eplicit military rationale. *or eample) a 7($mile stretch of
highway from Saigon to Bien >oa) built at Gen. "illiams= instance for specifically
military purposes) received more U.S. economic aid than all funds provided for labor)
community development) social welfare) health) and education in the years %&'5$%&,%.
!n 8arch %&,() "ashington became aware that despite this impressive outpouring of
treasure) material) and advice) the 4iet <ong were ma.ing significant headway against
;iem) and that U.S. aid programs ought to be reconfigured. !n 8arch) the :<S initiated
action to devise a <ounter$insurgency Plan +<!P1) intended to coordinate the several U.S.
agencies providing assistance to the G4N) and rationali2e the G4N=s own rural
programs. The <!P was wor.ed out among the several U.S. agencies in "ashington and
Saigon during the summer and fall of %&,(.
The heightened awareness of problems in 4ietnam did not) however) precipitate changes
in NS< policy statements on 4ietnam. BbDectives set forth in NS< ,(%7 +7' :uly %&,(1
were virtually identical to those of NS< 'J(&.
Planning proceeded against a bac.ground of developing divergence of view between the
;epartments of State and ;efense. #s #mbassador ;urbrow and his colleagues of State
saw the problem on the one hand) ;iem=s security problems stemmed from his political
insolvency. They argued that the main line of U.S. action should ta.e the form of
pressures on ;iem to reform his government and his party) liberali2ing his handling of
political dissenters and the rural populace. ;epartment of ;efense officials) on the other
hand) usually deprecated the significance of non$communist political dissent in South
4ietnam) and regarded ;iem=s difficulties as proceeding from military inade?uacy. !n this
view) what was needed was a more efficient internal defense) and) therefore) the
Pentagon tended to oppose U.S. leverage on ;iem because it might Depardi2e his
confidence in the U.S.) and his cooperation in improving his military posture. <ommunist
machination) as ;efense saw it) had created the crisis6 the U.S. response should be
"unswerving support" for ;iem.
"hile the <!P was being developed) ;epartment of ;efense moved to adapt the U.S.
military assistance program to the eigencies of the situation. Bn 9( 8arch %&,( the :<S
too. the position that the #rmy of 4ietnam should develop an anti$guerrilla capability
within the regular force structure) thus reversing an
antithetical position ta.en by General "illiams. ;uring %&'& ;iem had attempted to
form a number of special "commando" units from his regular forces) and the 8##G had
opposed him on the grounds that these would deplete his conventional strength. !n 8ay)
8##G was authori2ed to place advisers down to battalion level. !n :une) %&,()
additional U.S. #rmy special forces arrived in 4ietnam) and during the summer a number
of 0anger battalions) with the epress mission of counter$guerrilla operations) were
activated. !n September) General "illiams was replaced by General 8cGarr who)
consistent with the directives of the :<S) promptly began to press the training of 04N#*
to produce the "anti$guerrilla guerrilla." General 8cGarr=s desire for an 04N#* capable
of meeting and defeating the 4iet <ong at their own game was evident in the <!P when it
was forwarded to "ashington) in :anuary) %&,%) Dust before :ohn *. Aennedy too. office.
The <!P had been well coordinated within the U.S. mission in 4ietnam) but nly partially
with the 4ietnamese. The plan) as forwarded) incorporated one Dor point of difference
between the @mbassy and 8##G. General 8cGarr desired to increase the 04N#* force
level by some 7()((( troops) while #mbassador ;urbrow maintained reservations
concerning the necessity or the wisdom of additional forces. The #mbassador=s position
rested on the premise that ;iem wanted the force level increase) and that the United
States should not provide funds for that purpose until ;iem was patently prepared to ta.e
those unpalatable political measures the #mbassador had proposed aimed at liberali2ing
the G4N. The #mbassador held out little hope that either the political or even military
portions of the <!P could be successfully accomplished without some such leverage3
"<onsideration should) therefore) be given to what actions we ire prepared to ta.e to
encourage) or if necessary to force) acceptance of all essential elements of the plan." !n
the staff reviews of the <!P in "ashington) the divergence between State and ;efense
noted above came once more to the fore. Those +chiefly within ;B;1 who considered the
4< threat as most important) and who therefore regarded military measures against this
threat as most urgent) advocated approval and any other measures which would induce
;iem=s acceptance of the <!P) and his cooperation with 8##G. They were impatient
with #mbassador ;urbrow=s proposed "pressure tactics" since they saw in them
possibility of G4N delay on vital military matters) and the prospect of little profit other
than minor concessions from ;iem in political areas they deemed peripheral or trivial in
countering the 4<. Tipping the scales toward what might called the ;iemI8##GI;B;
priorities was the coincident and increasing need to "reassure" ;iem of U.S. support for
the G4N and for him personally. The fall of President Syngman 0hee of Aorea in #pril)
the abortive November %&,( coup d=etat in Saigon) #mbassador ;urbrow=s persistent
overtures for reform) and above all) uncertainties over U.S. support for the 0oyal /aotian
Government. This re?uirement to reassure ;iem was plainly at cross purposes with the
use of pressure tactics.
Ten days after President Aennedy came to office) he authori2ed a Q5% million increase in
aid for 4ietnam to underwrite a level increase and improvements in the <ivil Guard$$a
complete buy of the <!P. !n 8arch) #mbassador ;urbrow was replaced by *rederic. @.
Nolting. #mbassador ;urbrow=s closing interview
with ;iem in mid$8arch was not reassuring. "hile ;iem stated that he was prepared to
carry out the military aspects of the <!P) he dodged ;urbrow=s ?uestions on the political
action prescribed. !t was on this dis?uieting note that the Aennedy #dministration began
its efforts to counter the insurgency in South 4ietnam.
End of Summary
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter ') "Brigins of the !nsurgency in South 4ietnam) %&'5$%&,("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. 7-($J7
8#:B0 P0B4!S!BNS B* T>@ %&'5 G@N@4# #<<B0;S
Three #greements on the <essation of >ostilities for 4ietnam) /aos) <ambodia
Pro'isions Bietnam "aos ;am@odia
#. Disengagement&
Partition& and
Military
2egroupment

;isengagement of
combatants)
including
concentration of
forces into
provisional
assembly areas +and
provisional
withdrawal of other
party=s forces from
such areas in
4ietnam1
To be completed %'
days after effective
date of cease$fire in
each area
Provisional
assembly areas for
*rench Union
forces6 perimeter of
>anoi) perimeter of
>aiduong) perimeter
of >aiphong
To be completed %'
days after effective
date
of cease$fire +#ug.
77)
%&'51 F#rt. %%G
Provisional
assembly areas3 '
areas for reception
4ietnamese People=s
4olunteer forces6 '
No provision
Provisional
assembly areas for
4ietnam People=s
#rmy3 Kuang Ngai$
Binh ;inh perimeter
+<entral 4ietnam1)
Huyen$8oc) >am
Tan perimeter
+South 4ietnam1)
Plaine des :ones
perimeter) and <ape
<amau perimeter
+both South
4ietnam1
F#rt. %'G
areas for reception
*rench forces) %7
areas) one per
province) for
reception "fighting
units Pathet
/ao" F#rt. %7G
"ithdrawals of
forces) supplies and
e?uipment
*rench Union forces
to withdraw from
provisional
assembly areas to
regrouping 2ones
south of
demarcation line
within 9(( days
+8ay %&) %&''1)
according to
following schedule3
*rom >anoi
perimeter$J( days
+Bctober %%) %&'51
*rom >aiduong
perimeter$%(( days
+November %) %&'51
*rom >aiphong
perimeter$9(( days
+8ay %&) %&''
People=s #rmy of
4ietnam to
withdraw from
provisional
assembly areas to
regrouping 2one
north of
demarcation line
within 9(( days
*rench forces to
withdraw) ecept
from bases at Seno
and in 8eAong
4alley near or
downstream from
4ientiane) in %7(
days +Nov. 7()
%&'51 F#rt. 5) %7G
4ietnames People=s
4olunteers) ecept
those settled in /aos
before hostilities
+specia%
convention1) to
withdraw by
provinces in %7(
days +Nov. 7() %&'5
F#rt. 5) %9G
*rench armed forces
and military
combatant personnel)
combatant
formations of all
types which have
entered <ambodia
from other countries
or regions) and non$
native <ambodians
holding supervisory
functions in bodies
connected with
4ietnamese +;041
activities in
<ambodia to
withdraw within &(
days +Bct. 7%) %&'51
F#rt. 5G
+8ay %&) %&''1)
according to
following schedule3
*rom Huyen$8oc)
>am Tan$J( days
+Bctober %%) %&'51
*rom <entral
4ietnam !$J( days
+Bctober %%) %&'51
*rom Plaine des
:ones$%(( days
+November %) %&'51
*rom <entral
4ietnam %%$%((
days +November %)
%&'51
*rom <ape
<amau$7(( days
+*ebruary J) %&''1
*rom <entral
4ietnam %%%$9((
days +8ay %&)
%&''1 F#rt. %'G
Plans for
movements into
regrouping 2ones
To be
communicated
between the parties
within 7' days
#ugust %-)
%&'51 F#rt. %%G
No provision No provision
Provisional military
demarcation line
4icinity of %-_ N
latitude from the
mouth of the Song
Ben >at +<ua Tung
0iver1 and the
course of that river
+.nown as the 0ao
T.anh in the
mountain1 to the
village of Bo >o Su)
then the parallel of
Bo >o Su to the
/aos$4iet$Nam
frontier
F#rt. %$5) #nneG
No provision No provision
;emilitari2ed 2one
Bn either side of
demarcation line to
width of not more
than ' .ms. to act as
a buffer 2one F#rt.
%G
No provision No provision
"ithdraw of all
forces) supplies) and
e?uipment from
demilitari2ed 2one
To be completed
within 7' days
+#ugust %5) %&'51
F#rt. 'G
No provision No provision
"ithdrawal for
assembly or
regrouping through
territory of the other
party
*orces of the other
party to withdraw
provisionally 9 .ms.
on each side of
route of withdrawal
F#rt. %7G
No provision No provision
Bn$the$spot
demobili2ation
No provision
#ny military
personnel of the
fighting units of
"Pathet /ao)" who
so wish) may be
demobili2ed on the
spot F#rt. %5G
Ahmer 0esistance
*orces to be
demobili2ed on the
spot within 9( days
+#ugust 77) %&'5(
F#rt. 'G
<oncentration areas No provision
Pending political
setllement) fighting
units of "Pathet
/ao" to move into
provinces of Phong
Saly and Sam$Neus
and to move
between these two
provinces in defined
corridor along /aos$
4ietnam border.
<oncentration to be
completed within
%7( days +Nov. 7()
%&'51 F#rt. %5G
No provision
5. ;i'il
2egroupment and
#dministration

8ovement across
demarcation line or
Prohibited ecept by
specific permission
No provision No provision
into demilitari2ed
2ones
of the :oint
<ommission6 fully
authori2ed for the
:oint <ommission)
its organs) the
!nternational
Supervisory
<ommission and its
organs F#rt. ,)-)&G
<ivil administration
and relief in
demilitari2ed 2ones
0esponsibility of
the <ommanders in
<hief of the two
parties in their
respective 2ones on
either side of the
demarcation line
F#rt. %5G
No provision No provision
<ivil and
administrative
measures pending
general elections
!n each regrouping
2one) a1 civil
administration to be
in hands of party
whose forces to be
regrouped in that
2one) b1 civil
administration in a
territory to be
transferred to
continue in hands of
present controlling
force until the
withdrawing troops
have completely
left) c1 from :uly 7'
through completion
of troop
regroupment +8ay
%&) %&''1 any
civilians so desiring
may be permitted
and helped to move
to other 2one) d1
from :uly 79
through completion
of troop
regroupment) any
@ach party to refrain
from any reprisals
or discrimination
against persons or
organi2ations for
their activities
during hostilities
and to guarantee
their democratic
freedoms F#rt. %'G
No reprisals to be
ta.en against any
nationals or their
familieis) each being
entitled) without any
discrimination) to all
constitutional
guarantees
concerning
protection of person
and property and
democratic freedoms
F#rt. ') ,G
civilians so desiring
may be permitted
and helped to move
to other 2one F#rt.
%5G
/iberation and
repatriation of
PB"=s and civilan
internees
#ll PB"=s and
civilian internees
+latter term covering
all persons who
have been detained
by reason of
contributing in any
way to the "political
and armed struggle"
between the parties1
held by both sides
after the cease$fire
in each theater and
to be surrendered to
appropriate
authorities of other
party who shall
assist them in
proceeding to their
country of origin)
place of habitual
residence) or 2one
of their choice F#rt.
7%G
Same as for
4ietnam) ecept that
only foreign PB"=s
captured by either
party are to be
surrendered to
appropriate
authorities of other
party F#rt. %,G
Same as for 4ietnam
ecept that no time
period is given) and
that only foreign
PB"=s captured are
to be surrendered to
appropriate
authorities of other
party F#rt. JG
;. #rms ;ontrol
!ntroduction of troop
reinforcements and
additional military
personnel) including
instructors
Prohibited from :uly
79) %&'5) ecept for3
rotation of units)
admittance of
individual personnel
on a temporary duty
basis) and return to
4ietnam of
individual personnel
from leave or
temporary duty
abroad) which are
allowed under
defined and
controlled
Prohibited after
proclamation of
cease$fire) but
*rench may leave
maimum of %)'((
officers and N<B=s
to train /aotian
National #rmy F#rt.
,G
Prohibited after date
of cease$fire in
4ietnam and until
final political
settlement in
4ietnam) ecept for
purpose of "effective
defense of its
territory" F#rt. -G
conditions F#rt. %,G
!ntroduction of all
types of arms)
munitions) and other
war materiels)
including aircraft
Prohibited from :uly
79) %&'5) ecept for
piece$for$piece
replacement of war
materiel) arms)
munitions
destroyed) damaged)
worn out) or used up
after cessation
hostilities
+eception does not
apply to *rench
Union forces north
of demarcation
during 9(( day
withdrawal period1
#dmission of any
materials on
ecepted basis to be
under defined and
controlled
conditions F#rt. %-G
Prohibited after :uly
79) ecept for
specified ?uantities
of arms in
categories defined
as neceesary for
defense of /aos
F#rt. &G
Prohibited after date
of cease$fire in
4ietnam and until
final political
settlement in
4ietnam) ecept for
purpose of "effective
defense of its
territory" F#rt. -G
Specified points of
entry for ecepted
personnel and
replacement
material
%1 North of /ine3
/ao.ay) /angson)
Tien$Cen)
>aiphong) 4inh)
;ong$>oi) 8uong$
Sen
71 South of /ine3
Tourane) Kuinhon)
Nhatrang) Bangoi)
Saigon) <ap St.
:ac?ues) Tranchau
F#rt. 7(G
/uang$Prabang)
Hieng$Ahouang)
4ientiane) Seno)
Pa.se) Savanna.het)
Tchepone F#rt. %(G
No provision
@stablishment of
new military bases
in 4ietnam and /aos
and military bases of
foreign powers in
4ietnam) /aso)
<ambodia
Prohibited after :uly
79) %&'5 throughout
4ietnam F#rt. %J)
%&G
Prohibited after :uly
79) ecept for %1
*rench base at Seno)
71 *rench base in
8e.ong 4alley)
either in 4ientiane
Province or
downstream from
8ilitary bases of
foreign powers
prohibited after :uly
79 "so long as its
security is not
threatened" F#rt. -G
4ietiane. @ffectives
in these two *rench
bases may not
eceed 9)'(( men.
Bases of foreign
powers prohibited
"so long as its
security is not
threatened" F#rt. -)
JG
#dherence to
military alliances
Prohibited for both
sides from :uly 79)
%&'5 F#rt. %&G
No provision
8ay not Doin
agreements carrying
the obligation to
enter into military
alliance "not in
conformity with the
principles of the
<harter of the UN or
with the principles of
the agreement on the
cessation of
hostilities or) so long
as its security is not
threatened) to
establish bases on
<ambodian territory
for the military
forces of foreign
powers" F#rt. -G
Use of 2ones to
resume hostilities or
to further aggressive
policy
Prohibited from :uly
79) %&'5 F#rt. %&G
No provision No provision
D. !nternational
Super'ision and
;ontrol

0esponsibility for
ensuring observance
and enforcement of
terms and provisions
of the agreements
0ests with the
*rench and People=s
#rmy <ommanders
F#rt. 77G
0ests with the
parties F#rt. 75G
0est with the parties
[#rt. %(G
!nternational
<ontrol <ommission
To be composed of
!ndia) <anada)
Poland) with !ndia
Same as for
4ietnam3
>ead?uarters)
Same as for
4ietnam3
>ead?uarters)
as chairman) and to
be set up at time of
cessation of
hostilities "to ensure
control and
supervision."
>ead?uarters not
given F#rt. 7&) 95)
9,G
4ientiane F#rt. 7'G
Phnom$Penh F#rt.
%7G
*ied inspection
teams +of
!nternational
<ontrol
<ommission1
#t /ao.ay)
/angson) Tien$Cen)
>aiphong) 4inh)
;ong$>oi) 8uong$
Sen) Tourane)
Kuinhon) Nhatrang)
Bangoi) Saigon) <ap
St :ac?ues)
Tranchau F#rt. 9'G
#t Pa.se) Seno)
Tchepone)
4ientiane) Hieng$
Ahouang) Phong$
Saly) Sophao +Sam$
Neua1 F#rt. 7,G
#t Phnom Penh)
Aompong$<ham)
Aratie) Svay$0ieng)
Aampot F#rt. %7G
8obile inspection
teams +of
!nternational
<ontrol
<ommission1
Lones of action3
0egions bordering
land and sea
frontiers of
4ietnam)
demarcation lines
between regrouping
2ones) and
demilitari2ed 2ones
F#rt. 9'G
Lones of action3
/and frontiers of
/aos F#rt. 7,G
Lones of action3
/and and sea
frontiers of
<ambodia F#rt. %7G
:oint <ommission of
the parties
@stablished by the
parties to facilitate
eecution of
provisions
concerning Doint
actions by the two
parties +e?ual
number of
representatives of
the commands of
both parties1 F#rt.
99G
Set up to facilitate
implementation of
the agreement
+e?ual number of
representatives of
commands of
parties concerned
F#rt. 7JG
Set up to facilitate
implementation of
the agreement +e?ual
number of
representatives of
commands of parties
concerned F#rt. %5G
:oint <ommission
teams or groups
To be set up by
:oint <ommission
and governed by the
parties F#rt. 97G
*ormed by :oint
<ommission F#rt.
7JG
*ormed by :oint
<ommission F#rt.
%5G
!nternational
<ontrol <ommission
recommendations
%1 #dopted by
maDority) ecept
when dealing with
?uestions
concerning
violations) threats of
violations) or
problems which
might lead to
resumption of
hostilities) in which
cases unanmity
applies6 71 Sent
directly to the
parties and :oint
<ommission is
notified6 91
0ecommendation
concerning
amendments and
additions to
provisions of the
#greement may be
formulated with
unanimous
participation F#rt.
5() 5%G
%1 #dopted by
maDority) ecept
when dealing with
?uestions
concerning
violations) threats of
violations) or
problems which
might lead to
resumption of
hostilities) in which
cases unanmity
applies6 71 Sent
directly to the
parties and :oint
<ommission is
notified6 91
0ecommendation
concerning
amendments and
additions to
provisions of the
#greement may be
formulated with
unanimous
participation F#rt.
95) 9'G
%1 #dopted by
maDority) ecept
when dealing with
?uestions concerning
violations) threats of
violations) or
problems which
might lead to
resumption of
hostilities) in which
cases unanmity
applies6 71 Sent
directly to the parties
and :oint
<ommission is
notified6 91
0ecommendation
concerning
amendments and
additions to
provisions of the
#greement may be
formulated with
unanimous
participation F#rt.
%&) 7(G
#ppeal to members
of the Geneva
<onference
!f one party refuses
to put into effect a
recommendation of
the !nternational
<ontrol
<ommission the
parties concerned or
the <ommission
itself shall infrom
thee members of the
Geneva <onference.
!f unanimity is not
reached by the
<ommission in
cases where it
applies) a maDority
and one or more
minority reports
shall be submitted.
!f one party refuses
to put into effect a
recommendation of
the !nternational
<ontrol
<ommission the
parties concerned or
the <ommission
itself shall infrom
thee members of the
Geneva <onference.
!f unanimity is not
reached by the
<ommission in
cases where it
applies) a maDority
and one or more
minority reports
shall be submitted.
!f one party refuses
to put into effect a
recommendation of
the !nternational
<ontrol <ommission
the parties concerned
or the <ommission
itself shall infrom
thee members of the
Geneva <onference.
!f unanimity is not
reached by the
<ommission in cases
where it applies) a
maDority and one or
more minority
reports shall be
submitted. Te
<ommission shall
The <ommission
shall inform
members of the
conference in all
cases where its
activity is being
hindered. F#rt. 59G
The <ommission
shall inform
members of the
conference in all
cases where its
activity is being
hindered. F#rt. 9,G
inform members of
the conference in all
cases where its
activity is being
hindered. F#rt. 77G
E. Proedural
Matters

Parties and
signatories to
agreements
*or the <ommander
in <hief of the
People=s #rmy of
4ietnam) Ta$Kuang
Buu) 4ice$8inister
of National ;efense
of the ;046 *or the
<ommander in
<hief of the *rench
Union *orces in
!ndochina) Brig.
Gen. ;elteil F#rt.
5-G
*or the <ommander
in <hief of the
fighting units of
"Pathet /ao" and for
the <ommander in
<hief of the People=s
#rmy of 4ietnam)
Ta$Kuang Buu6 *or
the <ommander in
<hief of the *rench
Union *orces in
!ndochina) Brig.
Gen. ;elteil F#rt.
5%G
*or the <ommander
of the units of the
Ahmer 0esistance
*orces and for the
<ommander in <hief
of the 4ietnamese
+;041 military units)
Ta$Kuang Buu6 *or
the <ommander in
<hief of the Ahmer
National armed
forces) General
Nhie. Tioulong F#rt.
99G
@ntry into force of
agreements
@cept as provided)
75(( hours) :uly 77)
%&'5 +Geneva time1
F#rt. 5-G
@cept as provided)
75(( hours) :uly 77)
%&'5 +Geneva time1
F#rt. 5(G
(( hours) :uly 79)
%&'5 +Geneva time1
F#rt. 99G
@ffective date of
cessation of
hostilities
North 4ietnam3(J((
+local1) :uly 7-)
%&'5
<entral 4ietnam3
(J(( +local1) #ugust
%) %&'5
Southern 4ietnam3
(J(( +local1) #ugust
%%) %&'5 F#rt. %%G
(J(( +local1) #ugust
,) %&'5 F#rt. 5(G
(J(( +local1) #ugust
-) %&'5 F#rt. 7G

8#:B0 P0B4!S!BNS B* T>@ %&'5 G@N@4# #<<B0;S
<onference *inal ;eclaration +<*;1
and
Unilateral ;eclarations +U;1
+/aos) <ambodia) and *rance each made two unilateral declarations referring to the <*;1
Pro'isions Bietnam "aos ;am@odia
Principles of
political settlement
0espect for
"independence)
unity) territorial
integrity)" and
enDoyment of
"fundamental
freedoms
guaranteed by
democratic
institutions
established as a reult
of free general
elections by secret
ballot" F<*; #rt. -G
#ll citi2ens of /aos
and <ambodia to be
integrated without
discrimination into
the national
community and to
be guaranteed
enDoyment of rights
and freedoms
provided by the
constitution FU;
/aos and <ambodia6
<*; #rt. 9G
#ll citi2ens of /aos
and <ambodia to be
integrated without
discrimination into
the national
community and to be
guaranteed
enDoyment of rights
and freedoms
provided by the
constitution FU;
/aos and <ambodia6
<*; #rt. 9G
8ethod of political
settlement
"General elections
to be held in :uly
%&',) under
supervision of an
international
commission
composed of
representatives of
the 8ember States
of the !nternational
Supervisory
<ommission
referred to in the
agreement on
cessation of
hostilities.
<onsultations will
be held on this
subDect between the
competent)
representative
authorities of the
two 2ones from 7(
:uly %&'' onwards."
F<*; #rt. -G
#ll /aotian and
<ambodian citi2ens
to participate freely
as electors or
candidates in
general elections by
secret ballot6 in
conformity with the
constitution) net
general elections to
ta.e place in the
course of %&'' by
secret ballot and in
conditions of
respect for
fundamental
freedoms FU; /aos
and <ambodia #rt.
9G
#ll /aotian and
<ambodian citi2ens
to participate freely
as electors or
candidates in general
elections by secret
ballot6 in conformity
with the constitution)
net general
elections to ta.e
place in the course of
%&'' by secret ballot
and in conditions of
respect for
fundamental
freedoms FU; /aos
and <ambodia #rt.
9G
0eprisals against
persons who have
collaborated with
one of parties during
war) or their families
8ust not be
permitted F<*; #rt.
&G
8ust not be
permitted F<*; #rt.
&G
8ust not be
permitted F<*; #rt.
&G
Protection of
individuals and
property
Provisions of
agreements on
cessation hostilities
must be strictly
applied F<*; #rt.
JG
Provisions of
agreements on
cessation hostilities
must be strictly
applied F<*; #rt.
JG
Provisions of
agreements on
cessation hostilities
must be strictly
applied F<*; #rt. JG
*ree choice of 2one
of residence
@veryone must be
allowed to decide
freely in which 2one
he wishes to live
F<*; #rt. JG
No provision No provision
Principle of relations
with 4ietnam) /aos
and <ambodia
The *rench
Government and
each memeber of
the Geneva
<onference
underta.es to
respect the
independence)
sovereignty) unity)
and territorial
integrity of
4ietnam) /aos and
<ambodia and to
refrain from any
interference in their
internal affaris FU;
*rance6 <*; #rt.
%%) %7G
The *rench
Government and
each memeber of
the Geneva
<onference
underta.es to
respect the
independence)
sovereignty) unity)
and territorial
integrity of
4ietnam) /aos and
<ambodia and to
refrain from any
interference in their
internal affaris FU;
*rance6 <*; #rt.
%%) %7G
The *rench
Government and
each memeber of the
Geneva <onference
underta.es to respect
the independence)
sovereignty) unity)
and territorial
integrity of 4ietnam)
/aos and <ambodia
and to refrain from
any interference in
their internal affaris
FU; *rance6 <*;
#rt. %%) %7G
Special
representation for
dissident elements
No provision Government of /aos
will promulgate
measures to provide
for special
representation) in
the 0oyal
#dministration of
Phong$Saly and
Sam$Neua
Provinces during
interval between
cesation hostilities
and general
elections) of the
interests of /aotian
Nationals who did
No provision
not support royal
forces during
hostilities FU;
/aosG
!ntroduction of arms
and force) adherence
to military alliances)
or establishment of
foreign bases
<lauses in
#greement on
<essation of
>ostitlities 4ietnam
noted F<*; #rt. 5)
'G
Government of /aos
will not Doin in any
agreement with
other states if it
includes the
obligation to
participate in a
military alliance not
in conformity with
the principles of the
UN <harter or with
the principles of the
agreement on the
cessation of
hostilities or) unless
its security is
threatened) the
obligation to
establish bases on
/aotian territory for
military forces of
foreign powers FU;
/aos6 <*; #rt. 5)
'G
"The 0oyal
Government of
<ambodia will not
Doin in any
agreement with other
States) if this
agreement carries for
<ambodia the
obligation to enter a
military alliance not
in conformity with
the principles of the
<harter of the United
Nations) or) as long
as its security is not
threatened) the
obligation to
establish bases on
<ambodian territory
for the military
forces of foreign
powers" FU;
<ambodia6 <*; #rt.
5) 'G
Use of territory to
further aggression
<lauses in
#greement on
<essation of
>ostilities in
4ietnam noted
F<*; #rt. 'G
The Government of
/aos undertoo.
"never to permit the
territory of /aos to
be used in
furtherance of a
policy of
aggression." FU;
/aosG
The Government of
<ambodia "resolved
never to ta.e part in
an aggressive policy
and never to permit
the territory of
<ambodia to be
utili2ed in service of
such a policy." FU;
<ambodiaG
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter ') "Brigins of the !nsurgency in South 4ietnam) %&'5$%&,("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 7) pp. 7J9$9%5
!. *#!/U0@ B* T>@ G@N@4# S@TT/@8@NT
#. !3T26D7;T!63> T)E F"#/ED PE#;E
The Geneva <onference of %&'5 brought only transitory peace to !ndochina. Nonetheless)
ecept for the United States) the maDor powers were) at the time of the <onference)
satisfied that with their handiwor.3 the truce averted a further U.S. military involvement
on the #sian mainland) and dampened a heightening crisis between @ast and "est which
might readily have led to conflict outside Southeast #sia. So long as these conditions
obtained) neither *rance) the U.A.) the U.S.S.0. nor <ommunist <hina were seriously
disposed to disturb the modus 'i'endi in 4ietnam. U.S. leaders publicly put the best face
possible on the Geneva Settlement$about all that might possibly have been obtained from
a seriously disadvantaged negotiating position) and no serious impairment to freedom of
United States action. But the U.S.) within its inner councils immediately after Geneva)
viewed the Settlement=s provisions for 4ietnam as "disaster)" and determined to prevent)
if it could) the further etension of communist government over the 4ietnamese people
and territory. U.S. policy adopted in %&'5 to this end did not constitute an irrevocable nor
"open$ended" commitment to the government of Ngo ;inh ;iem. But it did entail a
progressively deepening U.S. involvement in the snarl of violence and intrigue within
4ietnam) and therefore a direct role in the ultimate brea.down of the Geneva Settlement.
The Settlement of Geneva) though it provided respite from years of political violence)
bitterly disappointed 4ietnamese of North and South ali.e who had loo.ed toward a
unified and independent 4ietnam. *or the 4iet 8inh) the Settlement was a series of
disappointing compromises to which they had agreed at the urging of the Soviet Union
and <hina) compromises beyond what hard won military advantage over the *rench had
led them to epect. *or the State of 4ietnam in the South) granted independence by
*rance while the Geneva <onference was in progress) the Settlement was an arrangement
to which it had not been party) and to which it could not subscribe. The truce of %&'5) in
fact) embodied three serious deficiencies as a basis for stable peace among the
4ietnamese3
$$!t relied upon *rance as its eecutor.
$$!t ignored the opposition of the State of 4ietnam.
$$!t countenanced the disassociation of the United States.
These wea.nesses turned partitioned 4ietnam into two hostile states) and given the
absence of a stabili2ing international force and the impotence of the !<<) brought about
an environment in which war was li.ely) perhaps inevitable. # nominally temporary "line
of demarcation" between North and South at the %-th parallel was transformed into one
of the more forbidding frontiers of the world. # mass displacement of nearly 'O of the
population disrupted the polity and heightened tensions in both North and South. #nd
both the ;emocratic Government of 4ietnam +;041 in the North) and the Government
of 4ietnam +G4N1 n the South armed) with foreign aid) for what each perceived as a
coming struggle over reunification. Some of the main roots of the present conflict run to
these failures of Geneva.
5. T)E P#2T!T!63 6F B!ET3#M
1. Pro'isions for 7nifying Bietnam
The sole formal instrument of the Geneva <onference was the document signed by the
military commanders of the two hostile forces termed "#greement on the <essation of
>ostilities in 4iet$Nam)" dealing largely with the disengagement and regroupment of
military forces. #rticle %5 of the #greement contained one brief$$but fateful allusion$$to a
future political solution3
#rticle %5a. Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of
4ietnam) the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping 2one shall be in the
hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present
agreement....
# more general epression of the intent of the conferees was the unsigned "*inal
;eclaration of the Geneva <onference)" by which the <onference "ta.es note" of the
aforementioned #greement and several declarations by represented nations and3
recogni2es that the essential purpose of the agreement relating to 4ietnam is to settle
military ?uestions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line
is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or
territorial boundary . . . declares that) so far as 4ietnam is concerned) the settlement of
political problems) effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence)
unity) and territorial integrity) shall permit the 4ietnamese people to enDoy the
fundamental freedoms) guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of
free general elections by secret ballot. !n order to insure that sufficient progress in the
restoration of peace has been made) and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free
epression of the national will) general elections shall be held in :uly) %&',) under the
supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the member
States of the !nternational Supervisory <ommission) referred to in the agreement on the
cessation of hostilities. <onsultations will be held on this subDect between the competent
representative authorities of the two 2ones from 7( :uly %&'' onwards....
The ;04 approved the *inal ;eclaration) and) having failed in its attempts to bring about
immediate elections on unification) no doubt did so reluctantly. There has been some
authoritative speculation that the 4iet 8inh accepted this aspect of the Settlement with
deep cynicism6 Pham 4an ;ong) the ;04 delegate at Geneva is supposed to have
epressed conviction that the elections would never be held. But it seems more li.ely that
the communist powers fully epected the nascent G4N) already badly sha.en from
internal stresses) to collapse) and unification to follow with elections or not. !n any event)
the public stance of the ;04 stressed their epectations that the election would be held.
>o <hi 8inh stated une?uivocally on 77 :uly %&'5 that3 "North) <entral and South
4ietnam are territories of ours. Bur country will surely be unified) our entire people will
surely be liberated."
The Saigon Government was no less assertive in calling for unification of 4ietnam. !n a
note to the *rench of %- :uly %&'5) the G4N delegate at Geneva protested having been
left until then "in complete ignorance" of *rench intentions regarding the division of the
country) which he felt failed to "ta.e any account of the unanimous will for national unity
of the 4ietnamese people"6 he proposed) futilely) United Nations trusteeship of all
4ietnam in preference to a nation "dismembered and condemned to slavery." #t the final
session of the <onference) when called upon to Doin in the *inal ;eclaration) the G4N
delegate announced that his government "reserves its full freedom of action in order to
safeguard the sacred right of the 4ietnamese people to its territorial unity) national
independence and freedom." Thus the Geneva truce confronted from the outset the
anomaly of two sovereign 4ietnamese states) each calling for unification) but only one)
the ;04) committed to achieving it via the terms of the Settlement.
8. Frane /ithdra4s& 1,.--1,.A
*rance) as the third party in 4ietnam) then became pivotal to any political settlement) its
eecutor for the "est. But *rance had agreed to full independence for the G4N on :une
5) %&'5) nearly si wee.s before the end of the Geneva <onference. By the terms of that
:une agreement) the G4N assumed responsibility for international contracts previously
made on its behalf by *rance6 but) there having been no reference to subse?uent
contracts) it was technically free of the Geneva #greements. !t has been argued to the
contrary that the G4N was bound by Geneva because it possessed at the time few of the
attributes of full sovereignty) and especially because it was dependent on *rance for
defense. But such debates turn on tenuous points of international law regarding the
prerogatives of newly independent or partitioned states. *rance speedily divested itself of
responsibilities for "civil administration" in South 4ietnam. !n *ebruary) %&',) the G4N
re?uested *rance to withdraw its military forces) and on #pril 7,) %&',) the *rench
military command in 4ietnam) the signatory of the Geneva #greement) was dissolved.
*rance) torn by domestic political turbulence in which past disappointments and
continued frustrations in 4ietnam figured prominently) and tested anew in #lgeria)
abandoned its position in Southeast #sia. No doubt) an increasingly acerbic relation
between its representatives and those of the United States in South 4ietnam hastened its
departure) where #merican policy clashed with *rench over the arming and training of a
national army for the G4N) over *rench military assistance for the religious sects) over
*rench economic policy on repatriating investments) and over general *rench opposition
to ;iem. But more fundamentally) *rance felt itself shouldered aside in South 4ietnam
by the United States over3
+%1 Poliy to4ard the D2B. The *rench averred initially that >o was a potential Tito) and
that they could through an accommodation with him preserve their economic and cultural
interests in 4ietnam$$in their view) a "coeistence eperiment" of world wide
significance in the <old "ar. #s of ;ecember) %&'5) they were determined to carry out
the Geneva elections. @ventually) however) they were obliged to choose between the U.S.
and the ;04) so firmly did the U.S. foreclose any adDustment to the ;04=s obDectives.
+71 Poliy to4ard Diem. *rance opposed ;iem not solely because he was a cally
*rancophobe #nnamite) but because he threatened directly their posiin 4ietnam. >is
nationalism) his strictures against "feudalists)" his notions of moral regeneration all
conDoined in an enmity against the *rench nearly as heated as that he harbored against the
communists$$but to greater effect) for it was far easier for him to muster his countrymen=s
opinion against the *rench than against the 4iet 8inh. By the spring of %&'') the ;iem$
*rance controversy ac?uired military dimensions when *rench supported sect forces too.
up arms against the G4N. #t that time) while the U.S. construed its policy as aiding
"*ree 4ietnam)" the *rench saw ;iem as playing Aerens.y=s role in 4ietnam) with the
People=s 0evolutionary <ommittee as the Bolshevi.s) and >o) the 4iet 8inh /enin)
waiting off stage.
+91 Military Poliy. By the end of %&'5) the *rench were persuaded that S@#TB could
never offer security for their citi2ens and other. interests in 4ietnam) and had despaired of
receiving U.S. military aid for a *rench @peditionary corps of sufficient si2e to meet the
threat. U.S. insistence that it should train 04N#* increased their insecurity. "ithin the
combined U.S.$ *rench head?uarters in Saigon thereafter) officers of both nations wor.ed
side by side launching countervailing intrigues among the 4ietnamese) and among each
other. !n 8arch of %&',) as *rance prepared to accede to the G4N re?uest for withdrawal
of its remaining military forces) *oreign 8inister Pineau) in a Paris speech) too. the U.A.
and the U.S. to tas. for disrupting "estern unity. "hile Pineau selected U.S. support of
*rench$hating ;iem for particular rancor) he did so in the contet of decrying *rance=s
isolation in dealing with nationalist rebels in North #frica$$and thus generally indicated
two powers who had threatened the *rench empire since the U.A. intervened in Syria in
%&5%) and President 0oosevelt assured the Sultan of 8orocco that his sympathies lay
with the colonial peoples struggling for independence.
Ultimately) *rance had to place preservation of its @uropean position ahead of empire)
and) hence) cooperation with the U.S. before opposition in !ndochina. *rance=s vacating
4ietnam in %&', eased U.S. problems there over the short run) and smoothed ;iem=s
path. But the ;04=s hope for a national plebescite were thereby dashed. Bn :anuary %)
%&'') as the waning of *rance=s power in 4ietnam became apparent) Pham 4an ;ong)
;04 Premier) declared that as far as >anoi was concerned3 ". . . it was with you) the
*rench) that we signed the Geneva #greements) and it is up to you to see that they are
respected." Some thirteen months later the *oreign 8inster of *rance stated that3
"e are not entirely masters of the situation. The Geneva #ccords on the one hand and the
pressure of our allies on the other creates a very comple Duridical situation. . . . The
position in principle is clear3 *rance is the guarantor of the Geneva #ccords . . . But we
do not have the means alone of ma.ing them respected.
But the G4N remained adamantly opposed to elections) and neither the U.S. nor any
other western power was disposed to support *rance=s fulfillment of its responsibility to
the ;04.
9. ;iem 0efuses <onsultation) %&''
<ommunist epectations that the ;iem government would fall victim to the voracious
political forces of South 4ietnam were unfulfilled. ;iem narrowly escaped such a fate)
but with #merican support$albeit wavering) and accompanied by advice he often ignored$
;iem within a year of the Geneva <onference succeeded in defeating the most powerful
of his antagonists) the armed sects) and in removing from power *rancophile elements
within his government) including his disloyal military chiefs. >e spo.e from
comparatively firm political ground when) on :uly %,) %&'') before the date set for
consulting with the ;04 on the plebescite) he announced in a radio broadcast that3
"e did not sign the Geneva #greements....
"e are not bound in any way by these #greements) signed against the will of the
4ietnamese people. . . . "e shall not miss any opportunity which would permit the
unification of our homeland in freedom) but it is out of the ?uestion for us to consider any
proposal from the 4iet 8inh if proof is not given that they put the superior interests of
the national community above those of communism.
8oreover) ;iem spo.e with some assurance of #merican bac.ing) for the U.S. had never
pressed for the elections envisaged by the Settlement. #t the final session of Geneva)
rather than Doining with the <onference delegates in the *inal ;eclaration) the U.S.
"observer)" Under Secretary of State "alter Bedell Smith) had lin.ed U.S. policy vis$a$
vis 4ietnam to that for Aorea) Taiwan and Germany in these terms3
!n the case of nations now divided against their will) we shall continue to see. to achieve
unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are
conducted fairly.
#lthough the U.S. opposed elections in %&'5 because >o <hi 8inh would have then won
them handily) the records of the National Security <ouncil and the Bperations
<oordinating Board of the summer of %&'5 establishes that this government then
nonetheless epected elections eventually to be held in 4ietnam. But) two maDor
misapprehensions were evident3 +%1 the U.S. planned through "political action" to
ameliorate conditions in Southeast #sia to the point that elections would not Deopardi2e
its obDective of survival for a "free" 4ietnam6 and +71 the U.S. estimated that *rance
would usefully remain in 4ietnam. By the spring of %&'') although U.S. diplomacy had
brought the Southeast #sia Treaty Brgani2ation into being) and although ;iem had with
U.S. aid weathered a number of severe political storms) the U.S. was less sanguine than
its "political action" would suffice) and that further *rench presence would be helpful.
#ccordingly) it began to loo. closely at the conditions under which elections might be
held) and urged that 4ietnamese do the same. Bne definition of terms acceptable to the
U.S. was set forth in a State ;epartment memorandum of ' 8ay %&'') approved by
Secretary ;ulles3
The U.S. believes that the conditions for free elections should be those which Sir
#nthony @den put forward and the three "estern Powers supported at Berlin in
connection with German reunification. The United States believes that the *ree
4ietnamese should insist that elections be held under conditions of genuine freedom6 that
safeguards be agreed to assure this freedom before) after) and during elections and that
there be ade?uate guarantees for) among other things) freedom of movement) freedom of
presentation of candidates) immunity of candidates) freedom from arbitrary arrest or
victimi2ation) freedom of association or political meetings) freedom of epression for all)
freedom of the press) radio) and free circulation of newspapers) secrecy of the vote) and
security of polling stations and ballot boes.
#lthough the U.S. communicated to ;iem its conviction that proposing such conditions
to the ;04 during pre$plebescite consultations would lead promptly to a fiat reDection) to
;iem=s mar.ed advantage in world opinion) ;iem found it preferable to refuse outright to
tal. to the North) and the U.S. indorsed his policy.
-. Di'ided Bietnam> Status =uo #epted
The deadline for the consultations in :uly %&'') and the date set for elections in :uly
%&',) passed without further international action to implement those provisions of the
Geneva Settlement. The ;04 communicated directly with the G4N in :uly) %&'') and
again in 8ay and :une of %&',) proposing not only consultative conference to negotiate
"free general elections by secret ballot)" but to liberali2e North$South relations in general.
@ach time the G4N replied with disdain) or with silence. The %-th parallel) with its
demilitari2ed 2one on either side) became de facto an international boundary) and$since
Ngo ;inh ;iem=s rigid refusal to traffic with the North ecluded all economic echanges
and even an interstate postal agreement$one of the most restricted boundaries in the
world. The ;04 appealed to the U.A. and the U.S.S.0. as co$chairmen of the Geneva
<onference to no avail. !n :anuary) %&',) <ommunist <hina re?uested another Geneva
<onference to deal with the situation) but the U.S.S.0. and the U.A. responded only by
etending the functions of the !nternational <ontrol <ommission beyond its %&',
epiration date. By early %&'- the partition of 4ietnam was generally accepted
throughout the international community. !n :anuary) %&'-) the Soviet Union proposed the
admission of both the G4N and the ;04 to the United Nations) the U.S.S.0. delegate
declaring that "in 4ietnam two separate States eisted) which differed from one another
in political and economic structure..."
Professor >ans 8orgenthau) writing at the time) and following a visit to South 4ietnam)
described the political progress of the G4N as a "miracle)" but stated that conditions for
free elections obtained in neither the North nor the South. >e concluded that3
#ctually) the provision for free elections which would solve ultimately the problem of
4ietnam was a device to hide the incompatibility of the <ommunist and "estern
positions) neither of which can admit the domination of all of 4ietnam by the other side.
!t was a device to disguise the fact that the line of military demarcation was bound to be a
line of political division as well....
.. The Disontented
>owever) there were three governments) at least) for which the status ?uo of a 4ietnam
divided between communist and non$communist governments was unacceptable. The
GN4) while remaining cool to the ;04) pursued an active propaganda campaign
prophesying the overturning of communism in the North) and proclaiming its resolve
ultimately to reunify the nation in freedom. The United States supported the G4N)
having established as national policy in %&',) reaffirmed again in %&'J) these guidelines3
#ssist *ree 4iet Nam to develop a strong) stable and constitutional government to enable
*ree 4iet Nam to assert an increasingly attractive contrast to conditions in the present
<ommunist 2one. . . . "or. toward the wea.ening of the <ommunists in North and South
4iet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and
independent 4iet Nam under anti$<ommunist leadership. . . . Support the position of the
Government of *ree 4iet Nam that all 4iet Nam elections may ta.e place only after it is
satisfied that genuinely free elections can be held throughout both 2ones of 4iet Nam. . . .
Treat the 4iet 8inh as not constituting a legitimate government) and discourage other
non$<ommunist states from developing or maintaining relations with the 4iet 8inh
regime....
#nd the ;emocratic 0epublic of 4ietnam became increasingly vocal in its calls or
"struggle" to end partition. !n #pril) %&',) as the plebescite deadline neared) To <hi 8inh
declared ominously that3
"hile recogni2ing that in certain countries the road to socialism may be a peaceful one)
we should be aware of this fact3 !n countries where the machinery of state) the armed
forces) and the police of the bourgeois class are still strong) the proletarian class still has
to prepare for armed struggle.
"hile recogni2ing the possibility of reunifying 4ietnam by peaceful means) we should
always remember that our people=s principal enemies are the #merican imperialists and
their agents who still occupy half our country and are preparing for war....
!n %&',) however) >o <hi 8inh and the ;04 faced mounting internal difficulties) and
were not yet in a position to translate the partition of 4ietnam into asus @elli.
;. 2EF7:EES> D!S27PT!63 6F B!ET3#M(S S6;!ET<
1. Pro'isions for 2egroupment
#rticle %5 of the. "#greement on the <essation of >ostilities in 4ietnam)" which
provided for separate political administrations north and south of the %-th parallel) also
stated that3
%5+d1 *rom the date of entry into force of the present agreement until the movement of
troops is completed) any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish
to go and live in the 2one assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do
so by the authorities in that district.
!t is probable that none of the conferees foresaw the ramifications of that one sentence)
for it put in motion one million 4ietnamese refugees) most of them destitute) who became
at first heavy burdens on the ;04 and the G4N) and ultimately political and military
assets for both regimes. *or the United States) the plight of these peoples lent
humanitarian dimensions to its policy toward 4ietnam) and new perspectives to its
economic and military assistance.
8. ECodus to South Bietnam
!n accordance with #rticle % of the #greement on <essation of >ostilities) %&()((( troops
of the *rench @peditionary <orps were moved from North 4ietnam to the South. !n
addition) some &(()((( civilians eercised their option under #rticle %5 +d1 of the
#rmistice. "hile no wholly reliable statistics eist) there is agreement among several
authorities that the figures presented by the !nternational <ommission for Supervision
and <ontrol in 4ietnam +!<<1) citing chiefly the Saigon Government as its source) are
generally correct.
F!:72ES 6F M6BEME3T 6F P6P7"#T!63 !3 B!ET3#M 73DE2 #2T!;"E 1-(d)
3orth Kone to South Kone
Period
Ending
+i1 Total #rrivals +*igs.
given by the State of
4ietnam1
%&.'.'' By air 7%9),9'
By sea ''()J75

#cross provisional
demarcation line
%7)955
By other means 5%)975
Total J%J)%7-
+ii1 @stimate of arrivals not
registered +*igs. given by the
State of 4ietnam in #pril1
-()(((
Total JJJ)%7-
+iii1 *igs. given by P#4N %&.'.'' 5)-5&
7(.-.''

Up to
7(.-.''
TBT#/ J&7)J-,
The uncertainty of statistics concerning total numbers of refugees stems not only from
;04 reluctance to report departures) but also the turbulent conditions which then
obtained throughout 4ietnam) where the *rench were in the process of turning over
public administration to 4ietnamese) and wehre Saigon=s communicaations with refugee
relief operations in the field were at best tenuous. U.S. ;epartment of State analysis in
%&'- estimated the following composition and disposition of the refugees.
;!B!"!#3 2E:267PEES F26M T)E 362T)& 1,.--1,..
;ategory
3um@er
(#pproCimate)
%. 0egistered with G4N for refugee benefits ,5()((( 4ietnamese
%')((( Nungs
')((( <hinese
7. *erench citi2ens resettled or repatriated by
*rance
5()(((
9. <hinese absorbed into <hinese community
in South
5')(((

Total ,5()(((
4ietnamese
+0emainder) 7(()((( 4ietnamese ansorbed
without aid) e.g. dependents of military) civil
servants1

The G4N director of refugee programs that the refugees were composed) by trade) as
follows3
*armers -,O
*isherman %(O
#rtisans) small businessmen) students) government
employees) professional
%5O
But it was religious orientation which) ultimately assumed the greatest importance in
South 4ietnam=s political life3 an estimated ,'O of North 4ietnam=s <atholics moved to
the South) more than ,(()((( in all6 these) with 7)((( northern Protestants) were settled
in their own communities.
3. ;auses of the ECodus
The flight from North 4ietnam reflected apprehension over the coming to power of the
4iet 8inh. !nstitutionally) the 4iet 8inh were further advanced in North 4ietnam than
the South) and had in areas of the North under their control already conducted several
eperiments in social revolution.
F8aterial missingG
!!. 0@B@//!BN #G#!NST 8C$;!@8
#. D!EM(S P6"!T!;#" "E:#;<. B!6"E3;E #3D #3T!-;6"63!#"!SM
"orld "ar !! and the *irst !ndochina "ar left the society of South 4ietnam severely
torn. The :apanese) during the years of their presence from %&5($%&5') had encouraged
armed factionalism to wea.en the *rench administration and strengthen their own
position. The war between the 4iet 8inh and the *rench
$which began in South 4ietnam in September) %&5'$wrought further disunity.
Paradoically) the South suffered political damage compared to the North from having
been the secondary theater of both wars. The :apanese had sought during "orld "ar !! to
control it without si2able occupation forces. Similarly) in the *irst !ndochina "ar) the
*rench had practiced economy of force in the South so that they could concentrate in
Ton.in. *or conventional forces) both the :apanese and the *rench substituted irregular
warfare and a system of bribes) subversion) arms) military advice) and officially
condoned concessions in corruption. *rom %&5'$%&'5) the fighting in South 4ietnam was
more sporadic and diffuse than in the North) but in a societal sense) ultimately more
destructive. "hile in Ton.in the 4iet 8inh flowed in through and behind the *rench and
continued to build a nation and unify the people with surprising efficiency) in the South
they were unable to do so. Not only were the 4iet 8inh centers of power in the North
and the <hina base area too remote to support effectively the southern insurgency) but
also the *rench had imitated the :apanese in arming and supplying certain South
4ietnamese factions) fomenting civil war against the southern arm of the 4iet 8inh. The
results approached anarchy3 a virtual brea.down in public administration by *ranco$
4ietnamese central governments and deep cleavages within the 4ietnamese body politic.
By the summer of %&'5) conspiracy had become the primary form of political
communication in South 4ietnam) and violence the primary mode of political change.
Politically) as well as geographically) South 4ietnam consisted of three distinctive
regions3 the narrow) coastal plan of #nnam) thic.ly settled by 4ietnamese) where was
located >ue) the ancient 4iet capital and cultural center6 the >ighlands) sparsely
populated by 8ontagnard tribesmen) in which was situated the summer capital of ;alat6
and <ochinchina) the fertile) densely peopled river$delta area in which Saigon stood
Fmaps deletedG. <ochinchina had eperienced a political development mar.edly different
from that of #nnam. The last area of modern 4ietnam to be occupied by the 4iet people
in their epansion southward +Jth <entury) #.;.1) and the first area to fall to *rench rule
+mid$%&th <entury1) <ochinchina had been administered by the *rench directly as
a colony) while #nnam remained under the @mperor as a *rench protectorate. "hile the
mandarinal rule of the #nnamese court was more a matter of form than substance)
#nnam=s public administration preserved a degree of unity among the 4ietnamese despite
the impress of *rench culture. !n South 4ietnam) the *rench seemed to be a wholly
divisive influence. Though <ochinchina was the site of some of the achievements of
which *rench colonialists were most proud$$the chief seat of the rubber industry) and
focus of maDor feats of engineering with canals and railroads$$the <ochinchinese seem to
recall less the triumphs of *rench civili2ation than its burdens3 the *rench rubber
plantations) abrasive with their labor) high$handed with local peoples6 the oppressive
taes) and the *rench controlled monopolies on salt) alcohol and opium6 recurrent famine
in the midst of one of the earth=s richest farming regions6 socially restrictive schooling6
moderni2ing challenges to familial piety) village centralism) and other cherished
fundaments of 4iet culture. "hile #nnam$$and Ton.in to the north$$developed
indigenous political movements opposing *rench rule) these were mainly foreign$based)
foreign$oriented parties) such as the Nationalist Party +4NK;;1) a 4ietnamese copy of
the Auomintang) or the !ndochinese <ommunist Party +!<P1 of the <omintern) headed by
0ussian$trained >o <hi 8inh. !n <ochinchina) however) there emerged a number of
nationalist movements peculiar to that region) or principally based on that region. Saigon)
for eample) developed a range of leftist movements competitive with the !<P) including
two Trots.yite parties) as well as a number of 4NK;; splinter movements) and a
politically active gangster fraternity) the Binh Huyen. But the important differences were
in the countryside) where millions of 4ietnamese Doined wholly <ochinchinese religious
sects which propagated enophobic nationalism) established theocracies) and fielded
armed forces. *rench and :apanese policy had deliberately fostered conflict among these
several factions to the etent that <ochinchina was) in %&'5) literally fractioned among
the religious sects) the Binh Huyen) and the 4iet 8inh. "hile by %&'5 the 4iet 8inh
dominated #nnam and the >ighlands) control of <ochinchina eluded them) for all their
ruthless efficiency.
1. The 5inh Euyen
Saigon itself in %&'5 was under the rule of the Binh Huyen) a secret society of brigands
evolved from the Blac. *lag pirates which had for generations preyed on the city=s
commerce. The Binh Huyen ethos included a fierce$$albeit eclectic$$nationalism. They
collaborated with the :apanese during "orld "ar !!) and in September) %&5') led the
savage attac. against the *rench in Saigon which mar.ed the start of the *ranco$4iet
8inh "ar. The Binh Huyen leader) /e 4an +Bay1 4ien) subse?uently contracted an
alliance with the 4iet 8inh) allied his %9(( soldiers with their guerrillas) and served for a
time as the 4iet 8inh deputy commander for <ochinchina and one of its chief sources of
funds. Bay 4ien=s refusal to assassinate certain 4iet 8inh$condemned 4ietnamese
intellectuals reputedly stirred 4iet 8inh misgivings) and called the Binh Huyen favorably
to the attention of the National United *ront) an anti$communist) 4iet nationalist group
then operating out of Shanghai. !n %&5-) Bay 4ien was persuaded to cooperate with the
National United *ront. !nformed) the 4iet 8inh invited him to the Plain of 0eeds in an
attempt to capture him. Bay 4ien escaped) and thereupon threw in his lot with the *rench
and the State of 4ietnam) accepting a commission as the first colonel of the 4ietnamese
National #rmy. Bay 4ien afterwards paid Bao ;ai what <olonel /ansdale termed "a
staggering sum" for control of gambling and prostitution in <holon) and of the Saigon$
<holon police. The *rench accepted the arrangement because Bay 4ien offset the 4iet
8inh threat to Saigon. By %&'5) Bay 4ien was operating "Grande 8onde)" a gambling
slum in <holon6 "<loche d=Br)" Saigon=s preeminent gambling establishment6 the
"Noveautes <atinat)" Saigon=s best department store6 a hundred smaller shops6 a fleet of
river boats6 and a brothel) spectacular even by #sian standards) .nown as the >all of
8irrors. Besides a feudal fief south of Saigon) he owned an opium factory and
distribution system) and held substantial interests in fish) charcoal) hotels) and rubber
plantations. Besides the police apparatus and other followers numbering '((( to J((() he
had some 7'(( soldiers at his disposal. >e ruled Saigon absolutely6 not even 4iet 8inh
terrorists were able to operate there. 8oreover) he eercised significant influnce over the
<ao ;ai and the >oa >ao leaders.
8. The ;ao Dai
The <ao ;ai were a religious sect founded by a colonial bureaucrat named Ngo 4an
<hieu) who with one Pham <ong Tac conducted a series of spiritualist seances from
which emerged a new religious faith) and in the early %&7(=s) a "church" with clerical
organi2ation similar to 0oman <atholicism. The doctrine of the <ao ;ai was syncretic)
melding veneration of <hrist) Buddha) <onfucius) and /ao T2e with a curious occultism
which deified such diverse figures as :oan of #rc) 4ictor >ugo) and Sun Cat Sen. "ith
the dissolution of the authority of the central government during the %&5(=s and early
%&'(=s) the <ao ;ai ac?uired increasing political and military autonomy. The sect=s
%)'(()((( to 7)((()((( faithful comprised a loose theocracy centered in Tay Ninh) the
border province northwest of Saigon.
The <ao ;ai) too) cooperated first with the :apanese) and then with the 4iet 8inh6 and
the <ao ;ai leadership also found the latter uncomfortable allies. !n %&5-) the <ao ;ai
realigned with the *rench) agreeing to secure with their forces specified rural areas
against the 4iet 8inh in return for military assistance. #lthough plagued throughout its
history by minor heresy and factional disputes) the <ao ;ai became the largest political
movement in <ochinchina6 the <ao ;ai shared with the >oa >ao the distinction of being
the only important political forces to originate in the 4ietnamese peasantry. "hen ;iem
came to power in %&'5) Pham <ong Tac) the <ao ;ai Pope) had declared for Bao ;ai)
controlled some %')((( to 7()((( armed followers) and ruled the region northwest of
Saigon.
3. The )oa )ao
Southwest of Saigon there eisted the >oa >ao) a newer sect) similarly endowed with
politico$military autonomy) which repeatedly clashed with the <ao ;ai and the Binh
Huyen. !n %&9&) a mystic faith healer named >uynh Phu So) from a village named >oa
>ao) launched a reformed >inayana Buddhist movement Yhich swiftly ac?uired a wide
following. +#mong the 4ietnamese whom >uynh Phu So favorably impressed was Ngo
;inh ;iem.1 >uynh Phu So enDoyed :apanese protection) and with their aid) in %&55 the
>oa >ao formed armed bands) among the leaders of which there was one Tran 4an Soai.
# 4iet 8inh attempt to gain the assistance of the >oa >ao failed) and the 4iet 8inh on J
September %&5' massacred hundreds of >oa >ao faithful in the town of <an Tho. Tran
4an Soai replied in .ind) and in the ensuing wee.s <an Tho became the center of
etensive slaughter. *rench intervention stopped the violence) but turned the >oa >ao
against the *rench. !n #pril) %&5-) the 4iet 8inh eecuted >uynh Phu So) which caused
Tran 4an Soai to rally with 7)((( armed men to the *rench. >e was accepted into the
*rench @peditionary <orps with the ran. of general) and assigned the mission of
pacifying his own region. The *rench from that time forward) until %&'') paid the salaries
of the >oa >ao soldiers. #t the time ;iem came to office in %&'5) the sect had some
%)'(()((( believers) controlled most of the 8e.ong ;elta region) and had %()((( to
%')((( men under arms.
-. The Biet Minh
!n %&'5) the 4iet 8inh controlled some ,( to &( percent of South 4ietnam=s villages +by
*rench estimates1 and 9( to 5( percent of its territory +by U.S. estimates1. The bul. of
organi2ed 4iet 8inh forces were located in #nnam and the >ighlands) proimate to
Ton.in) and in regions free of competition from the armed sects. !n <ochinchina) they
were militarily strongest in areas along the <ambodian border and in the <amau
peninsula of the etreme south remote from the principal concentrations of people.
Nonetheless) their political organi2ation was pervasive) and in some localities) e.g.)
Kuang Ngai province in #nnam) the 4iet 8inh were the only effective government. #
hierarchy of 4iet 8inh committees paralleled the formal government from the village
#dministrative and 0esistance <ommittee +#0<1 through district) province) and what the
4iet 8inh termed "inter2one" or "region." No reliable estimates eist of the numbers of
cadres involved in this apparatus) but 4iet 8inh military forces of all types south of the
%-th parallel probably numbered around %(()(((. "hen orders were issued for the
Geneva regroupment) the "provisional assembly areas" designated coincided with the
areas in which 4iet 8inh strength had been greatest. ;uring the time allowed for
collecting forces for the move north) the 4iet 8inh evidently undertoo. to ban. the fires
of revolution by culling out of their units trained and reliable cadres for "demobili2ation)"
"recruiting" youth$$forcibly in many instances$$to ta.e their place) and caching weapons.
Particularly in #nnam and the >ighlands) then) the 4iet 8inh posed a significant
challenge to Ngo ;inh ;iem. >is test of strength with the 4iet 8inh) however) was to be
deferred by the Geneva Settlement and ;04 policy for some years.
.. #nti-;olonialism
The political prospects of Ngo ;inh ;iem when he accepted the premiership from Bao
;ai were dimmed not only by 4iet 8inh residue) and by the eistence of the armed sects)
but by the taint of colonialism #s far as most <ochinchinese peasants were concerned)
;iem was lin.ed to Bao ;ai) and to the corrupt) *rench dominated government he
headed. Studies of peasant attitudes conducted in recent years have demonstrated that for
many) the struggle which began in %&5' against colonialism continued uninterrupted
throughout ;iem=s regime3 in %&'5) the foes of nationalists were transformed from *rance
and Bao ;ai) to ;iem and the U.S.$$8y$;iem) #merican$;iem) became the universal
term of 4iet <ong opprobrium$$but the issues at sta.e never changed. There was)
moreover) some substance to the belief that ;iem represented no change) in that)
although Ngo ;inh ;iem too. office before the Geneva Settlement as prime minister
with "full powers civil and military)" he did not ac?uire actual administrative autonomy
until September) %&'56 proclaim independence until :anuary) %&''6 or ta.e command of
his army until *ebruary) %&''. There was perforce a significant carry$over of civil
servants from the pre$;iem days. The national flag and the national anthem remained
unchanged. 8oreover) the laws remained substantially as they had been3 the land$
holdings) against which was directed much peasant discontent) were based on pre$;iem
law6 and old legal proscriptions against nationalist political activities remained on the
boo.s during ;iem=s tenure of office. The onus of colonialism was among the heavy
burdens which Ngo ;inh ;iem had to shoulder from the outset.
5. 3:6 D!3) D!EM> 5#S!S 6F P6/E2
1. Politial 6rigins
"hy amid the military disasters of spring %&'5) Bao ;ai) head of the State of 4ietnam)
chose Ngo ;inh ;iem from among other 4ietnamese nationalists to form a government)
has long been debated. ;iem was an #nnamese <atholic who in his youth had some
eperience in public administration) first as governor of Phan Thiet province) and then
8inister of !nterior at Bao ;ai=s !mperial <ourt in >ue. !n %&99 ;iem discovered) after a
year in the latter office) that reforms he had been promised were being bloc.ed by high
*rench and #nnamite officials. >e promptly resigned his office and went into political
retirement$an act which earned him modest fame for integrity. Through the years of war
and distress in his homeland thereafter) ;iem had hewed to attentisme) and by refusing
public office) had avoided the political discoloration which besmirched more involved
4iet nationalists. Bao ;ai had sought him for his premier in %&5') >o <hi 8inh for the
;04 government in %&5,) the *rench for their "solutions" in %&5- and %&5&$all
unsuccessfully. >ence) ;iem=s reputation for incorruptible nationalism) to the etent that
he enDoyed one in %&'5) was based on an event 7( years old and a long period of political
aloofness. >e did come from a prominent family6 a brother) Ngo ;inh Thuc was a
leading <atholic clergyman with countrywide connections) and the family proper retained
some considerable influence in #nnam. But his personal handicaps were considerable3
bachelor) ascetic) shy) ineperienced) he seemed ill$fit for the seething intrigues of
Saigon.
Bne school of conDecture holds that the *rench pressed him upon Bao ;ai in the belief
that under him the newly independent State of 4ietnam would founder6 another that Bao
;ai advanced him to power convinced that his inevitable failure would eliminate him as a
political competitor. There are those who believe that ;iem was foisted upon the
4ietnamese and the *rench by a cabal of prominent #merican <atholics and a <!# agent.
!t can be said that ;iem was relatively well ac?uainted among leading #mericans) and
that Bao ;ai might correctly have regarded ;iem=s contacts in the United States as a
possible source of support for 4ietnam. "hatever the reasons for his selection) however)
at the time he too. office there were few who regarded ;iem as promising) and fewer
still openly willing to bac. him. !ndeed) from the time he too. office on - :uly %&'5) until
the following 8ay) he was virtually alone. Unaided by Bao ;ai) opposed by the *rench)
and proferred by #mericans mainly advice) criticism) and promises$but scant material
assistance$Ngo ;inh ;iem in ten months surmounted the partition of his nation by the
Geneva powers) two threatened military coups by his #rmy <hiefs of Staff) frenetic
clashes with the Binh Huyen armed sects) the withdrawal of the 4iet 8inh) and the influ
of &(()((( refugees from North 4ietnam.
8. Early 7.S.-Diem 2elations
;iem=s durability was one of those surprises in 4ietnam which prompted #mericans
thereafter to refer to the "miracle in 4ietnam." Bn - ;ecember %&'5) Senator 8ansfield
Dudged that U.S. "prospects for helping ;iem strengthen and uphold South 4ietnam loo.
very dim." U.S. #mbassador >eath reported from Saigon on %- ;ecember %&'5 a dim
view of ;iem=s chances since "there is every evidence that the *rench do not want ;iem
to succeed." !n a :anuary) %&'') report to the National Security <ouncil) General :.
/awton <ollins agreed with both analyses. Bn - #pril %&'') <ollins cabled from Saigon
that3 ". . . it is ny considered Dudgment that the man lac.s the personal ?ualities of
leadership md the eecutive ability successfully to head a government that must compete
with the unity of purpose and efficiency of the 4iet 8inh under >o <hi 8inh." Bn %&
#pril) <ollins again cabled3 "! see no alternative to the early replacement of ;iem."
Bn 7, #pril %&'') U.S. National !ntelligence @stimate ,9.%$7$'') "Possible
;evelopments in South 4ietnam)" too. the view that3
# political impasse eists in Saigon where the legally constituted government of Premier
;iem is being challenged by a venal special interest group) the Binh Huyen) which
controls the National Security Police) and is temporarily allied with some elements of the
religious sects....
@ven if the present impasse were resolved) we believe that it would be etremely
difficult) at best) for a 4ietnamese government) regardless of its composition) to ma.e
progress toward developing a strong) stable anti$<ommunist government capable of
resolving the basic social) economic) and political problems of 4ietnam) the special
problems arising from the Geneva agreement) and capable of meeting the long$range
challenge of the <ommunists.....
But opinion in "ashington swung sharply when) in late #pril) ;iem managed to survive
a severe test of arms with his army and the sects. Senators 8ansfield and
Anowland issued strong statements of support for him) and on 8ay 7 Senator >ubert
>umphrey told the Senate that3
Premier ;iem is the best hope that we have in South 4ietnam. >e is the leader of his
people. >e deserves and must have the wholehearted support of the #merican
Government and our foreign policy. This is no time for uncertainty or half$hearted
measures. . . . >e is the only man on the political hori2on of 4ietnam who can rally a
substantial degree of support of his people. . . . !f we have any comments about the
leadership in 4ietnam let it be directed against Bao ;ai. . . . !f the Government of South
4ietnam has not room for both these men) it is Bao ;ai who must go....
Bn & 8ay %&'') the :oint <hiefs of Staff Dudged that "the government of Prime 8inister
Ngo ;inh ;iem shows the greatest promise of achieving the internal stability essential
for the future security of 4ietnam." *ive months later) on %% Bctober) %&'') the National
!ntelligence @stimate was revised. !n N!@ ,9.%$9$'') =Probable ;evelopments in 4ietnam
to :uly %&',)" the U.S. !ntelligence #dvisory <ommittee found it possible to be more
sanguine concerning ;iem=s prospects3
;iem has made considerable progress toward establishing the first fully independent
4ietnamese government. . . . >e faced a basically unstable and deteriorating situation. . . .
The most significant articulate political sentiments of the bul. of the population was an
antipathy for the *rench combined with a personal regard for >o <hi 8inh as the symbol
of 4ietnamese nationalism....
;iem was forced to move slowly. #lthough possessing considerable national prestige as
a patriot) he was ineperienced in administration and was confronted at the outset by the
intrigues of Bao ;ai and other self$interested individuals and groups) who in many cases
benefited from *rench support....
;iem concentrated on eliminating or neutrali2ing the most important groups and
individuals challenging the authority of his government....By bribery) persuasion) and
finally force) ;iem virtually eliminated the Binh Huyen and the most important elements
of the >oa >ao sects as threats to his authority. #t the same time) he maneuvered the <ao
;ai$$the strongest of the sects$$into an uneasy alliance. #s a result of these successful
actions) ;iem gained prestige and increased popularity as a symbol of ;iem=s efforts to
establish a viable anti$communist government are still in doubt....
Provided the <ommunists do not eercise their capabilities to attac. across the %-th
Parallel or to initiate large$scale guerrilla warfare in South 4ietnam) ;iem will probably
ma.e further progress in developing a more effective government. >is position will
probably be strengthened as a result of increased popular support) the continued loyalty
of the 4N#) and a deterioration in the strength and cohesiveness of his non$<ommunist
opposition. The national government will probably increase the number of rural
communities under its control) particularly in areas now held by the sects....
!t is li.ely that ;iem=s stormy first %( months in office) :une) %&'5 to 8ay) %&'')
strongly conditioned his behavior in later years. >e must have been impressed almost at
once with the political importance of the army) and the essentiality of personally loyal
ran.ing officers. >e chose openly to oppose the armed sects against the advice of both his
#merican and *rench advisers) and his success no doubt instilled confidence in his own
Dudgments. The same events probably gave him reason thereafter to value head$on
confrontation with a foe over conciliation or compromise. #nd in his adamant stand
against consultations with the ;04 on plebescite) again contrary to initial #merican
advice) he no doubt learned that on maDor issues the U.S. sta.e in his future was
sufficiently high that he could lead) and #merican policy would follow. !n any event) he
moved with new assurance from mid$%&'' forward. !n many respects his first 9(( days
were his finest hours) when he was moving alone) rapidly) and with determination against
great odds.
3. Politial ;onepts> Family ;entralism and Personalism
But ;iem=s early victories were essentially negative) in eliminating or bypassing
obstacles. !t remained for him to provide programs for finding homes and occupations for
the refugees) for solving the politically crucial problems of rural land distribution and
taation) for installing capable and incorrupt public administrators) for stimulating the
economy) for improving the education system$in short) for coping with the whole broad
range of problems of governing a developing nation) each rendered especially acute by
South 4ietnam=s war trauma) internal dissention) and partition from North 4ietnam. To
cite but a few3 ,(()((( refugees were dependent on his government for subsistence6
J')((( people were Dobless as a result of the *rench troop withdrawal6 inter$provincial
communications were impaired$-(( miles of main road were war$damaged) one third of
the railway trac.age lay destroyed) ,J concrete bridges on J,( miles of trac. lay blown.
!n devising programs to meet these challenges) ;iem wor.ed from two primal concepts3
family centralism) and "personalism" as a state philosophy.
;iem was raised in a 8andarinal family) born to a tradition of high position in the social
hierarchy and governmental bureaucracy. !t was also a <atholic family) and ;iem
received a heritage of obdurate devotion to <hristianity under intense persecution$within
a century of his birth one hundred relatives had been burned to death by Buddhists in
central #nnam. >is rearing developed his reverence for the past) a capacity for hard
wor.) and a deep seated piety. Two *rench authors believed that his outloo. on life was
"born of a profound) of an immense nostalgia for the 4ietnamese past) of a desperate
filial respect for the society of ancient #nnam." There was some thought of his becoming
a priest) but he elected public administration6 his elder brother Thuc) the cleric) is said to
have speculated that ;iem found himself too infleible) too willful) too severe for the
priesthood. But above all else) ;iem=s early years impressed upon him the importance of
family in performing the duties of station3 the family was the first means of etending
personal power) the essential mode of political epression. !t is possible that ;iem
resorted to nepotism simply because he lac.ed a personal political apparatus which would
have permitted him to operate otherwise) but nepotism became the style of his rule) and it
was ?uite consistent with his upbringing.
"Society)" said ;iem) "functions through personal relations among men at the top." Bne
brother) Ngo ;inh Nhu) received the title of #dvisor to the President) and controlled the
semi$covert Personalist /abor 0evolutionary Party. >is wife) 8adame Nhu) became the
President=s official hostess) a deputy in the National #ssembly) and the founder$chairman
of the "oman=s Solidarity 8ovement. >er father became one of ;iem=s ambassadors)
and his wife the G4N observer at the UN. # second brother of ;iem) Ngo ;inh <an)
became the virtual overlord of #nnam) holding no official position) but ruling the region
in all respects. # third brother) Ngo ;inh Thuc) the #rchbishop of >ue and Primate of
4ietnam) also held no office) but functioned as Presidential advisor) and levered <atholic
opinion on behalf of ;iem. # fourth brother) Ngo ;inh /uyen) became an #mbassador.
Three family members$$Tran 4an <huong) Tran 4an ;o) and Tran 4an Bac$$served in
;iem=s first cabinet) and two other in$laws) Nguyen >uu <hau and Tran Trung ;ung)
held the .ey portfolios of Secretary of State at the Presidency and #ssistant Secretary of
State for National ;efense. Bne of the reasons General <ollins opposed ;iem may be a
letter he received in #pril) %&'') from a group of nationalists headed by former Premier
Nguyen Phan /ong) urging the United States to withdraw its support of ;iem on the
grounds that his brothers were effectively isolating ;iem politically. The observation
proved to be correct3 Ngo ;inh Nhu and Ngo ;inh <an increasingly gathered power into
their own hands) and non$family politicians found themselves ?uietly shunted aside.
Gradually) a concentration of power also occurred within the family circle) again toward
Nhu) 8me Nhu and <an) and at the epense of the more remotely related. The President=s
family thus became an entirely etra$legal elite which in class and geographic origin) as
well as religion) was distinct from the South 4ietnamese as a whole.
The ;iem family circle was promptly targeted by gossipers. !n Saigon) rumors were the
political medium) and stories were soon rampant that members of the family were looting
the government. By %&'-) the whispering campaign against the Nhus mounted to such
proportions that they issued a public statement denying that they had ever removed
money from the country) engaged in financial or commercial speculation) or accepted
bribes. But the impression remained) fed by numerous credible reports of official graft at
lower levels) that whether or not the ;iem family too. for personal gain) they too..
#nother disadvantage proceeded from the ;iem=s familial concentration of power3
bureaucratic overcentrali2ation6 ;iem himself seems to have been peculiarly at fault in
this instance) reserving for himself the power of decision in minute matters) and refusing
to delegate authority to subordinates who might have relieved him of a crushing
administrative burden. !n part) this may have been simply ineperience in handling a
large enterprise) but there seems to have been deeper) philosophical reasons$$a passion
for perfection) a distrust of other men) a conviction that all subordinates re?uired his
paternalistic guidance. The result was an impairment of an administrative system already
crippled by the absence of *rench civil servants. Subordinate officials) incapable of
ma.ing decisions) fearful of ma.ing them) or forbidden to ma.e them) passed upward
even minute matters on paper to the brothers Ngo) glutting the communications of
government) and imposing long delays on all) even important actions.
Personalism) as ;iem called his personal political philosophy) was a melange of #sian
and @uropean notions which resembled the *rench <atholic personnalisme of @mmanuel
8ounier) or the @ncyclicals of Popes /eo H!!! and Pius H!. 8ore accurately) it was a
blend of <hristianity) 8arism) and <onfucianism which stressed the development of
each individual=s moral character as the basis for community progress toward democracy.
;iem saw himself as a reformer) even a revolutionary) in the moral realm. >is central
social message was that each citi2en achieved moral fulfillment or harmony only if he
applied himself energetically to his civic duties) avoiding on the one hand the selfishness
of capitalism) and on the other) the selflessness of 8arist collectivism. "The basis for
democracy can only be a spiritual one)" said ;iem in his 8essage to the National
#ssembly on the <onstitution of %&',) and in New ;elhi in %&'-) he too. #sians to tas.
for losing sight of the spiritual essence of their political traditions3
...;oes not our spirituality of which we are so proud) simply conceal a narrow
conservatism and a form of escapism from concrete responsibilityN . . . >as not Buddhist
compassion become a pretet for not practicing Dustice . . . #nd is not tolerance) which so
many can mista.e for freedom) the result of paternalistic indulgenceN
#nd the same year) in Aorea) he spo.e of his hopes for restoring the spiritual strength of
4ietnam after "the tremendous material and political difficulties which assailed 4ietnam
after Geneva had plunged even the best of her sons into a state of apprehension colored
with despair....."
"e pursue two aims.
*irst we want to rearm the 4ietnamese citi2en morally and to ma.e him impervious to all
tyranny whatever its origin.
Second) we want to reinforce the spiritual cohesion of the 4ietnamese people) cohesion
which accounts for capacity to enDoy a largely decentrali2ed system without falling into
anarchy. Cet this cohesion has been largely sha.en by the impact of the west.
Cet man does not live only by the idea of liberty. >e must be given a minimum of
material support which will guarantee that liberty .
# G4N approved biography of ;iem eplained that he recogni2ed in communism the
antithesis of true freedom) precisely because communism denied the eistence of God
and the immortality of the soul. Personalism was the answer therefore to communism)
since3
Personalism is a system based on the divine) therefore spiritual law) which . . . etols
man=s transcendent value . . . The practice of Personalism is symbolic of good citi2enship
with a highly developed civic spirit....
/ate in ;iem=s reign) when his combat with the communists had been fully Doined) these
vague precepts were elaborated by his brother) Nhu) but hardly clarified3
The personalist conception holds that freedom in an underdeveloped society is not
something that is simply given or bestowed. !t can only be achieved through militancy
and vigilance) by doing away with all pretentions and pretets for not realistically
applying ourselves to our goals. !n a situation of underdevelopment) and during a
bleeding war of internal division) it may be argued that there is reason enough not to see.
to develop democracy) but our personalist approach is precisely militant in denying this.
>uman rights and human dignity are not static phenomenons. They are only possibilities
which men must actively see. and deserve) not Dust beg for. !n this sense) of believing in
the process of constantly perfecting of oneself in moral as well as practical ways our
personalist approach is similar to <onfucianism. Personalism stresses hard wor.) and it is
the wor.ing class) the peasants) who are better able to understand the concept than the
intellectuals. "e must use Personalist methods to reali2e democracy at the level where
people are fighting and wor.ing) and in our new scale of values it is those who participate
physically and selflessly in the fight against communism who are most privileged) then
those who courageously serve the villages without profit) and finally those who engage
diligently in productive labor for their own as well as for their villages= benefit....
Some #merican observers found these ideas with their emphasis on "democicy"
reassuring. Bthers) including General @dward /ansdale) urged on ;iem broader
ideological strategem of forming a "front" embracing the concepts of more traditional
4iet nationalist parties.
"Personalism)" li.e ;iem=s Spanish$style <atholicism) harbored little tolerance6 merely
different political theories were interpreted as competitive) and even dangerous.
Personalism thus limited ;iem=s political hori2ons) and almost certainly impaired his
government=s ability to communicate with the peasantry. "Personalism" became the
official philosophy of the state) and though government employees were re?uired to
attend wee.ly sessions on its tenets) it never succeeded in becoming much more than the
cant of ;iem=s administration) and the credo of the two political parties organi2ed and
directly controlled by his family.
5. Political Parties
The latter were peculiarly ;iemist3 paternally authoritarian) organi2ed as an etension of
family power. The pivotal organi2ation was the Personalist /abor 0evolutionary Party
+;an "ao 3han Bi ;ah Mang Dang1) an apparatus devised and controlled by Ngo ;inh
Nhu) semi$covert) self$effacing) but with members stationed at all the levers of power
within Saigon) and a web of informants everywhere in the country. Nhu envisaged the
<an /ao as the vanguard of ;iem=s underta.ings) and it became in fact the bac.bone of
the regime. ;rawing intelligence from agents at all echelons of government in the village)
in factories) schools) military units) the <an /ao sought to detect the corrupt or disloyal
citi2en) and was empowered to bring him to arrest and trial. The <an /ao) unfortunately
for ;iem=s political fleibility) concentrated on disloyalty. Ngo ;inh Nhu) who admitted
that the <an /ao closely resembled the communists in organi2ation and techni?ue) used it
to stifle all political sentiment competitive or opposed to Ngo ;inh ;iem.
The other ;iemist party was an open) "mass party)" the National 0evolutionary
8ovement +Phong Trao ;ah Mang =uo :ia1. ;iem himself was the honorary leader
of the Party) and it was the official vehicle for his political movement. The Party claimed
to have grown from %()((( members in %&'' to %)'(()((( in %&'&. !n that time it
ac?uired a maDority in the National #ssembly) and amassed strong voting records for
;iem and N08 candidates in elections at all levels. The Party claims to have originated
in "clandestine struggle for the revolution of national independence and human
emancipation" at the time ;iem resigned from Bao ;ai=s government in %&99) but
properly it came into being in Bctober) %&'5. The N08 was closely associated with the
National 0evolutionary <ivil Servants /eague +"ien Doan ;ong ;hu Mang =uo :ia1)
and since membership in the latter was a concomitant of government employment) the
civil service became the core of the N08. The relationship also established a N08$
/eague hierarchy parallel to) and in most instances identical with) the government
hierarchy down to the village level. Bbviously) too) the arrangement e?uated a party
membership with distinct advantages in dealing with the government. N08 strength
figures were probably eaggerated) and its active members$$those who attended party
functions and political indoctrination sessions$$were those in the /eague6 the N08 was)
in effect) a party of government employees or dependents.
;iem did not involve himself directly in the managing of either the <an /ao or the N08.
The former) as mentioned) was always the creature of Nhu. Nhu also controlled the
southern branches of the N08) but in #nnam and portions of the <entral >ighlands the
N08 was the tightly held instrument of Ngo ;inh <an. <an broo.ed no opposition
whatsoever6 Nhu) more confident in the regions where the <an /ao was most efficient)
occasionally permitted some political activity by minority groups) such as the <ao ;ai
and >oa >ao sects) and the Socialists. But that activity was tolerated only so long as it
was pro$;iem and supporting) rather than opposing) G4N policy.
These were the ideas and the political apparatus by which Ngo ;inh ;iem sought to weld
together a nation in the aftermath of Geneva. Their narrowness) their inappropriateness
for most <ochinchinese and #nnamites) virtually assured that the history of his regime)
after its initial successes) would become an almost unbro.en record of alienation of one
portion after another of the 4ietnamese body politic. This process of alienation
accentuated the failures of the Geneva Settlement) and ultimately led to Ngo ;inh ;iem=s
assassination.
;. ;63F"!;T /!T) T)E #2MED SE;TS
1. Defeat of the 5inh Euyen
#t the time he too. office) ;iem controlled scarcely a few bloc.s of Saigon) the capital
remaining firmly in the control of Bay 4ien and the Binh Huyen. Beginning in
September) %&'5) ;iem tried to divide and con?uer the sects. *our leaders from each of
the religious sects were brought into his cabinet in an effort to isolate the Binh Huyen)
and with U.S. assistance he sought to integrate the sect forces into the national army. >e
enDoyed some initial success in rallying <ao ;ai forces) and confident from assurances of
direct #merican aid) he shut down) in :anuary) %&'') the Binh Huyen concessions in
Saigon and <holon. !n the ensuing confrontation) the Binh Huyen swung the <ao ;ai and
the >oa >ao into a United *ront of Nationalist *orces) and) although *rench aid for their
forces had formally been withdrawn) continued to draw on *rench funds and advice. Bn
8arch 7&) %&'') fighting bro.e in Saigon in which sections of the city were burned.
#lthough a truce was struc.) the affair polari2ed relations between ;iem and the sects6
between ;iem and General <ollins) whose advice to conciliate he elected not to follow6
and between the #mericans and the *rench) over the viability of ;iem. "ashington
apparently decided at that Duncture to tempori2e with the sects) and to find an alternative
to ;iem. Before the instructions could be sent to Saigon) however) fighting was renewed.
@ven as the battle was Doined) Bao ;ai telegraphed orders to ;iem to travel to *rance.
;iem disobeyed) and) convinced of his moral grounds in attac.ing the Binh Huyen)
committed his forces to combat. >is brother) Nhu) coopted a "0evolutionary <ommittee"
to confer emergency authority on ;iem. They were immediately successful) and by mid$
8ay) %&'') the Binh Huyen had been driven into the 0ung Sat swamp east of Saigon) and
their power in Saigon was bro.en. Bay 4ien escaped to Paris.
8. Bitory o'er the Sets
;iem=s forces then ranged out after the other armed factions. Tran 4an Soai of the >oa
>ao surrendered) and was given asylum. #nother >oa >ao leader) Ba <ut$$who had cut
off a finger to remind himself to fight the *rench) and had sworn not to cut his hair until
4ietnam was reunited$$was captured while negotiating surrender in return for a
commission as lieutenant general in the #04N. Bther leaders were bribed) and the
remainder fled or rallied to the G4N. By the end of %&'') ;iem appeared to have dealt
finally with the challenge of the sects.
!t was this apparent success which enabled ;iem to survive successfully pressures from
an even more powerful set of opponents3 those among his "estern allies who were
determined to replace him. The dimensions of his victory in 4ietnam were Dust becoming
evident when in 8ay) %&'') the North #tlantic Treaty Brgani2ation convened. There
promptly developed a sharp division of view between the *rench and the #mericans. Bao
;ai made .nown his opposition to ;iem) and the *rench threatened to pull out of
4ietnam unless ;iem were removed. *rom Paris) Secretary ;ulles reported that the
*rench held that3
...Time something to be done to avoid civil war. *rance warned that armed conflict$$first
civil war) then guerrilla warfare) then terrorism$$would result if we failed to ta.e action . .
. New 0evolutionary <ommittee . . . is strongly under 4iet 8inh influence . . . There is
violent campaign against *rench and *rench @peditionary <orps. 4iet 8inh agents
ma.e good use of it and certain #mericans do not seem sufficiently aware of this. *rench
Govt does not wish to have its army act as platform for 4iet 8inh propaganda. #rmy will
not be maintained in 4ietnam at any cost . . . <ontinuing with ;iem would have three
disastrous results3
+%1 . . . 4iet 8inh victory
+71 . . . focus hostility of everyone on the *rench) and
+91 . . . begin a *ranco$U.S. breach...
The *rench then proposed to the U.S. that the *rench @peditionary <orps be withdrawn)
and as.ed if the U.S. were willing to guarantee *rench civilians) and the refugees. *rom
"ashington) the following instructions to ;ulles were returned promptly3
President=s only comment on 4ietnam section of +your telegram1 was to reiterate position
that U.S. could not afford to have forces committed in such undesirable areas as 4ietnam.
This) of course) is :<S view in past. #m as.ing ;efense and :<S views...
#s.ed) the :<S too. the position that the ?uestion was fundamentally beyond their
purview) that neither the #04N nor the *rench @peditionary <orps seemed capable of
preserving the integrity of South 4ietnam against a 4iet 8inh onslaught) and that being
debarred from furnishing arms by the Geneva #greement) the U.S. was in no position to
protect *rench nationals. They suggested that Secretary ;ulles be advised that3
a. The government of Prime 8inister Ngo ;inh ;iem shows the greatest promise of
achieving the internal stability essential for the future security of 4ietnam.
b. The U.S. could not guarantee the security of the *rench nationals should the *rench
@peditionary <orps be withdrawn.
c. Possible United States actions under the Southeast #sia <ollective ;efense Treaty
could ultimately afford security to 4ietnam e?ual to that provided by the continued
presence of the *rench @peditionary <orps.
!n Paris) Secretary ;ulles managed to mollify the *rench. # .ey development was a
message from 8alcolm 8ac;onald) the British representative in Southeast #sia) urging
against ;iem=s replacement at that time. 8ac;onald) who was among ;iem=s severest
critics$he once remar.ed of ;iem that ">e=s the worst prime minister ! have ever seen"$
aligned the British with ;ulles) and eventually the *rench ac?uiesced in further support
of ;iem.
The defeat of the sects also opened a domestic political opportunity for ;iem. The
Popular 0evolutionary <ommittee his brother Nhu had formed during the height of the
sect crisis was a "front" of broad political compleion$the membership included
prominent nationalists and) as the *rench had pointed out) two former 4iet 8inh leaders6
it therefore had some substance as what Nhu termed the "democratic revolutionary forces
of the nation." The 0evolutionary <ommittee urged the dissolution of the Bao ;ai
government) and the organi2ing of general elections for a National #ssembly. Nhu acted
under its mandate) setting up a popular referendum in which) on Bctober 79) %&'') an
overwhelming vote for ;iem in preference to Bao ;ai was recorded. The 0evolutionary
<ommittee dissolved itself on 9% Bctober) apparently under some pressure from ;iem
and his brother.
9. The Triumph 0eappraised
But it is important to note that ;iem=s military victory over the sects) while impressive)
was by no means complete) and was certainly not as decisive as some #mericans were
led to believe. *or eample) an NS< report of %&'J mentioned that the 4ietnamese
#rmed *orces were still operating against the sects) and had "succeeded in practically
eliminating the Binh Huyen and <ao ;ai forces..." The ;eputy <hief) 8##G) 4ietnam)
stated in #pril) %&'&) that3 "The Binh Huyen group was completely eliminated as a
menace. The <ao ;ai group was pacified or reoriented. . . . The >oa >ao had been
reduced to a handful of the diehards..." These estimates notwithstanding) Binh Huyen
remnants fought off an #04N force north of Bien >oa) in %&',) and marauded along the
Saigon 0iver north of Saigon in Binh ;uong province throughout %&'- and %&'J. !n
%&'J) an insurgent force) among whom Binh Huyen were identified) sac.ed the 8ichelin
rubber plantations near ;au Tieng) and in 8arch) %&'&) #04N had a number of
encounters with Binh Huyen elements in the Binh ;uong$Bien >oa area. There is
evidence) though scanty) which indicates that the Binh Huyen survivors Doined with
"communist" groups for their depredations6 for eample) in the %&'J 8ichelin attac. the
combined gangster$communist strength was reported to be 9(($5((. #04N General
Nguyen <hanh Thi) who fought these particular forces) has told of capturing a Binh
Huyen soldier who died under torture without admitting more than that his band had been
communicating with communist forces from Tay Ninh province. The general also
described capturing in 8arch) %&'&) in the same operations) flags identical to that raised
in late %&,( by the "National /iberation *ront."
!n %&',) the <ao ;ai Pope) Pham <ong Tac) crossed the frontier of Tay Ninh into
<ambodia with a number of his followers) thence to remain in opposition to ;iem. Bay
;om) who had been the deputy of the captured >oa >ao leader) Ba <ut) also too. his
forces to the <ambodian border. !n %&',) ;iem sent Ba <ut) his hair still uncut) to the
guillotine. Bay ;om and another >oa >ao leader) 8uoi Tn) then too. an oath to avenge
Ba <ut) and opened guerrilla warfare against ;iem. Some four >oa >ao battalions are
reported to have conducted operations against the G4N continuously through %&,7. 8uoi
Tn in later years openly embraced the 4iet <ong cause.
!n brief) while ;iem=s victory over the sects was impressive) it was not wholly
conclusive) and the very obduracy and determination which won him early tactical
success seemed to impede his inducing the remaining sect dissidents to perform a
constructive role in the nation. 0ather) his policy invited a 4iet <ong$ sect alliance
against him. That some of the more startling early defeats of ;iem=s #04N forces by
4iet <ong in %&'& and %&,( occurred in the regions north of Saigon) where lur.ed <ao
;ai and Binh Huyen remnants) is more than coincidental.
D. 272#" P#;!F!;#T!63
1. Strategy
#mericans tended to loo. at ;iem=s s.ein of military and political successes in %&'' with
satisfaction) and to regard thereafter 4ietnam=s internal security with growing
complacency. But Ngo ;inh ;iem did not. To the contrary) ;iem seemed) if anything)
over$conscious of the fact that his test with the 4iet 8inh lay ahead) and that they posed
a threat more dangerous than the sects could ever have been) not only because they were
politically more pervasive) and not only because they had taught a generation of
4ietnamese peasants the techni?ues of armed conspiracy) but also because their tenets
offered competing solutions to the most pressing problems of the 4ietnamese people3
land and livelihood. ;iem=s counter is difficult to fault as a broad concept3 #04N forces
would reclaim for the G4N regions formerly held by the 4iet 8inh6 political
indoctrination teams moving with the troops would carry the message of ;iem=s
revolution to the people6 and then a broad follow$up program of <ivic #ction$ political
and social development) land reform) and agricultural improvements would be
inaugurated to meet fully the aspirations of the people. That these plans miscarried was
due in part to the resistance of the farmers they were intended to benefit) reacting
sometimes under 4iet <ong leadership) sometimes simply out of peasant conservatism.
But a principal portion of the blame for failure must be attributed to ;iem=s inept)
overbearing) or corrupt officials) to ;iem=s own unremitting anti$communist 2eal) and to
the failure of both he and his #merican advisers to appreciate the magnitude of the tas.s
they set for themselves) or the time re?uired to enact meaningful reform.
8. 2eoupying Biet Minh Territory
The first steps were faltering. !n early %&'') #04N units were sent to establish the G4N
in the <amau Peninsula in the southernmost part of the country. Poorly led) ill$trained)
and heavy$handed) the troops behaved towards the people very much as the 4iet 8inh
had led the farmers to epect. #ccompanying G4N propaganda teams were more
effective) assailing communism) colonialism) and feudalism$$meaning the rule of
*rancophile 4ietnamese) such as Bao ;ai=s$$and distributing pictures of ;iem to replace
the omnipresent tattered portraits of >o. # subse?uent operation in Kuang Nai and Binh
;inh) Bperation Giai Phong) reportedly went off more smoothly. Under #04N <olonel
/e 4an Aim) the troops behaved well toward the people) and the propagandists eploited
4iet 8inh errors to the etent that) as the last 4iet 8inh soldiers marched down toward
their ships) the populace Deered them. #merican advisers were active) and ;iem himself
visited this operation a wee. after the last 4iet 8inh had left) receiving what the
#mericans present considered a spontaneous welcome by the peasants. Nonetheless) the
<au 8au eperience became more typical of the #04N than the Binh ;inh affair.
*oreign observers fre?uently epressed opinion of the #04N in terms similar to the %&'-
view of correspondent ;avid >otham) who wrote that "far from giving security) there is
every reason to suppose that the army) buttressed by the <ivil Guard . . . is regarded by
the Southern peasant as a symbol of insecurity and repression."
3. ;i'i #tion
Nor were the follow$up <ivic #ction teams significantly more effective. These were
patterned after the G#8=s +Groupes #dministratifs 8obiles1 with which the *rench had
eperimented) modified to incorporate U.S.$*ilipino eperience. !n theory) they were to
have been drawn from the urban elite) to help the government establish communications
with the rural fol.. #cting on the doctrine of "Three "iths3 eat) sleep) and wor. with the
people"$$some %5(( to %J(( "cadre" undertoo.3 census and surveys of the physical needs
of villages6 building schools) maternity hospitals) information halls6 repairing and
enlarging local roads6 digging wells and irrigation canals6 teaching personal and public
hygiene6 distributing medicine6 teaching children by day) and anti$illiteracy classes by
night6 forming village militia6 conducting political meetings6 and publici2ing agrarian
reform legislation.
<olonel /ansdale described their origins and operations as follows3
Bne of the most promising ideas of this period came from Aieu <ong <ung) who was
sponsored by ;efense 8inister 8inh. <ung=s idea was to place civil service personnel
out among the people) in simple dress) where they would help initially by wor.ing
alongside the people) getting their hands dirty when necessary. The 4ietnamese
functionaries were aghast) since they cherished their des. wor. in Saigon and their
dignified white$collar authority) and they fought hard within the government machine to
.ill the idea. !t too. some months) with the personal intervention and insistence of
President ;iem) to get a pilot <ivic #ction program initiated. !t was given administrative
support by the 8inistry of ;efense) at first) simply because no other 8inistry would help)
although it was established as an entity of the Presidency and its policy decisions were
made in <abinet meetings.
"ith J(O of the civil service personnel stationed in the national capital) provincial
administrators were so under$staffed that few of them could function with even minimum
effectiveness. # *rench colonial administrative system) super$imposed upon the odd
4ietnamese imperial system was still the model for government administration. !t left
many gaps and led to unusually comple bureaucratic practices. There was no uniform
legal code) no uniform procedures for the most basic functions of government. The
<ommunists continued their political dominance of many villages) secretly.
<ung established a training center in Saigon and as.ed for civil service volunteers) for
field duty. "ith none forthcoming) he then selected a small group of young university
trained men from among the . . . refugees from <ommunist North 4ietnam after security
screening. >is training had added realism in the form of rough living ?uarters) outdoor
classes) and students learning to wor. with their hands by constructing school facilities.
#ll students had to dress in the "calico noir" of farmers and laborers) which became their
"uniform" later in the villages. +Provincial authorities originally refused to recogni2e
<ivic #ction personnel as government officials) due to the plebian dress6 <ung) dressed
in the same manner) and as a high functionary close to the President) made a rapid tour of
the provinces and gained grudging acceptance of this new style of government
employee.1
Briginally) four$man teams were formed6 during training) the members of each team were
closely observed) to Dudge their abilities) with the wea. and unwilling being weeded out.
#fter graduation) each team was assigned to a district of a province) with responsibility
for a number of villages. "hen the team finished its wor. in the first village) it would
move to a second village) revisiting the first village periodically to chec. on local
progress. This would continue until all villages in a district were covered) at which time
the civic action team directly under the government in the provincial capital would ta.e
over district wor.) now organi2ed and ready for administration.
"hen a team entered a village) they would call a village meeting) eplain their presence
and plans. The following morning) they would set to wor. to build three community
buildings with local materials6 if they had been successful in winning over the population)
the villagers pitched in and helped. Bne building was a village hail) for meetings of
village officials. #nother was a primary school. The third was a combination information
hail +news) information about the government) etc.1 and dispensary +using the village
medical .its developed by !<#1. *ollowing up was the building of roads or paths to lin.
the village with provincial roads) if in a remote area) build pit latrines) underta.e malaria
control) put in drainage) and underta.e similar community proDects. 4illagers were
trained to ta.e over these tas.s) including primary education and first aid.
The wor. of <ivic #ction teams) at the same grass$roots level as that of <ommunist
wor.ers) proved effective. They became the targets of <ommunist agents) with political
attac.s +such as stirring up local <ochin$<hinese against Ton.inese <ivic #ction
personnel1 and then murders. @ven while the field wor. was in its early development
stage) President ;iem ordered the teams to start wor.ing directly with #rmy commands
in pacification campaigns) as the civil government "troops" in what were essentially
combat 2ones. #s <ivic #ction proved itself) it was etended to all provinces south of the
%-th Parallel.
>ad the cadres been able to confine themselves to these missions) and had the several
Saigon ministries) whose field responsibilities they had assumed) been content to have
them continue to represent them) matters might have developed differently. #s it
happened) the cadres became preoccupied with ;iem=s #nti$<ommunist campaign) and
their operations came under bureaucratic attac. from Saigon agencies unwilling to allow
the <ivic #ction teams to carry their programs to the people. Both influences converted
the cadre into eclusively propagandistic and political instruments) and drew them away
from economic or social activities6 in late %&',) <ivic #ction was cut bac. severely. !n
%&'-) Aieu <ong <ung died) and Nhu absorbed the remnants into his organi2ation.
-. "and 2eform
But the salesmen were less at fault than the product. ;iem had to promise much and
deliver well to best the 4iet 8inh. >owever) his promises were moderate) his delivery on
them both slow and incomplete. The anarchy prevalent in the countryside during the *irst
!ndochina "ar had benefited the peasant by driving off the *rench and 4ietnamese large
landlords. "hen the 4iet 8inh "liberated" an area) they distributed these lands free to the
farmers) and generally won their allegiance thereby. <olumnist :oseph #lsop visited one
such 4iet 8inh controlled region in ;ecember) %&'5) Dust before they withdrew their
military forces) and reported that3
!t was difficult for me) as it is for any "esterner) to conceive of a <ommunist
government=s genuinely "serving the people." ! could hardly imagine a <ommunist
government that was also a popular government and almost a democratic government.
But this was Dust the sort of government the palmhut state actually was while the struggle
with the *rench continued. The 4iet 8inh could not possibly have carried on the
resistance for one year) let alone nine years) without the people=s strong) untied support.
Bne of ;iem=s primary failures lay in his inability similarly to capture loyalties among
his &( percent agricultural people. The core of rural discontent was the large land
holdings3 in %&'5 one ?uarter of one percent of the population owned forty percent of the
rice growing land. The ;iem program to ameliorate this situation for the land$hungry
peasants too. the form of3 +%1 resettlement of refugees and others on uncultivated land)
begun in %&''6 +71 epropriation of all rice land holdings above 75- acres) and
redistribution of these to tenant f armers) a program announced in %&',) but delayed in
starting until %&'J6 and +91 regulation of landlord$tenant relations) effected in %&'-)
which fied rents within the range %'$7' percent of crop yield) and guaranteed tenant
tenure for 9 to ' years. Both the resettlement and redistribution programs guaranteed
payments to former owners of the appropriated land6 although the land was reasonably
priced) and payment allowed over an etended period) the farmers faced payments) and
these immediately aroused opposition. Settlers moved into a wilderness) re?uired to clear
and irrigate theretofore unused land) could not see why they should pay for their
holdings. Tenant farmers were also disaffected) for though rents of 5( percent of crop had
been common before the way) many farmers) after eight or so rent$free years) could see
no Dustice in resuming payments to a long absent owner) particularly since the 4iet 8inh
had assured them the land was theirs by right. Nor were many mollified by redistributed
land. /and redistribution suffered according to one #merican epert) from a "lac. of
serious) interested administrators and topside command. Government officials) beginning
with the 8inister for #grarian 0eform) had divided loyalties) being themselves
landholders." But even if the goals of the program had been honestly fulfilled$$which
they were not$$only 7(O of rice land would have passed from large to small farmers.
Ultimately only %(O of all tenant farmers benefited. # bolder program) with a maimum
holding of %75 acres) could have put 99 percent of rice land up for transfer. #s it
happened) however) the distribution program was not only of limited scope) but) by %&'J
or %&'&) it was virtually inoperative. Bernard *all has reported that despite ;iem=s land
reforms) 5'O of the land remained concentrated in the hands of 7O of landowners) and
-'O in the hands of %'O. 8oreover) since the immediate beneficiaries were more often
than not Northerners) refugees) and <atholics) the programs ac?uired an aura of G4N
favoritism) and deepened peasant alienation. !n time there were also rumors of
corruption) with widespread allegations that the ;iem family had enriched itself through
the manipulation of the land transfers.
#s an eample of ;iem=s rural programs in action at the village level which serves to
demonstrate how they fell wide of the mar. of meeting rural epectations) that of the
village communal land is instructive. #fter the long period of disrupted public
administration during the *ranco$4iet 8inh "ar) land records were chaotic. Under
;iem) the G4N sei2ed outright nearly half a million acres of land whose title was
unclear. Some of this land was rented) the G4N acting as the landlord6 some was farmed
by #04N units6 and some was converted into communal land and the title passed to
village councils. The village councils were then supposed to hold an annual auction of
communal land) in which farmers wishing to use certain plots submitted sealed bids.
#lthough this seemed to the casual western observer an e?uitable system) in actuality it
was ?uite vicious. The bidding farmers were usually see.ing to rent land they had been
farming free for years. "hether this were the case or not) however) rice growing is a
labor intensive process which re?uires of the farmer a substantial capital investment year
by year to build up di.es and ditches. To assure himself that he would not lose this
investment) a man farming a plot declared communal land felt compelled to raise his bid
each succeeding year to avoid loss of that capital) and to preclude losing his hard wor..
The conse?uent competition) however modern) shoo. the roots of traditional #sian
farming communities) for the arrangement had the maDor disadvantage of creating
uncertainty over land from year to year$the antithesis of security for the rice$growing
peasant. To cap these disadvantages) village councils were often less than honest) and
tended to be considerably less willing than a paternal landlord to tide the farmer over
after a bad crop year6 if his subse?uent bid were low) he lost his land.
There is another chapter in the history of G4N$farmer relationships which illustrates
similar clumsiness. !n %&',) as the G4N launched its land reform program) Ngo ;inh
Nhu enlisted the aid of the <onfederation of 4ietnamese /abor) which had been
organi2ing tenant farmers in promoting the government=s policies through its rural
representatives. The G4N then proceeded to form its own) N08$connected) *armers=
#ssociations. The latter) interconnected with province officials and with landowners)
actively opposed the union organi2ers) with the result that many of the latter were Dailed.
"ithin a year or two) the union was destroyed for all practical purposes. *ew of the N08
*armers= #ssociations ever did function on behalf of the farmers6 of 7JJ associations
reported in$being by the G4N) a USB8 study in %&,% could find only 9' which
represented peasant interersts in any active sense.
.. Billage :o'ernment
# further eample of ;iem=s maladroitness was his abolishing elections for village
councils) a step he too. in :une) %&',) apparently out of concern that large numbers of
former 4iet 8inh might win office at the village level. The 4ietnamese village had
traditionally) even under the *rench) enDoyed administrative autonomy) and the village
council was a coterie of prominent residents who were the government in most simple
civic matters) adDudicating disputes) collecting taes) and managing public funds. Under
the national regulation of %&',) members of council and the village chief became
appointive officials) and their offices subDect to scrutiny by the ;iemist apparatus. The
results were again a thrusting forward of Northern <atholics) city dwellers) or other non$
local trustees of the G4N) to assume control at the .ey political level of South 4ietnam)
to handle fiscal matters) and to manage the communal lands. *or the same reasons that
the villagers had mistrusted the <ivic #ction cadre) they found the G4N officials strange)
and not a little incomprehensible. #lso) since these officials were the creatures of the
province chiefs) corruption at the province level$then) as in recent years) not uncommon$
was transmitted directly to the village. ;ang ;uc Ahoi) a young nationalist who rose to
become ;iem=s press officer) and then turned against him) regarded ;iem=s decision to
abolish the village councils his vital error3
@ven if the 4iet 8inh had won some elections) the danger of doing away with the
traditional system of village election was even greater. This was something that was part
of the 4ietnamese way of life) and the concept should have been retained without
interfering with ;iem=s legitimate desire$$indeed) his need$$for a strong central
government. The security problem eisted) but it wouldn=t have made much difference if
the 4iet 8inh had elected some village chiefs$they soon established their own
underground governments anyway. ;iem=s mista.e was in paraly2ing himself. >e should
have adopted a more intelligent and persuasive policy and concentrated at the outset on
obtaining the support of the people. !n that way) he could have properly challenged the
4iet 8inh.
Thus) Ngo ;inh began) in %&',) to place the "security problem" ahead of rural revolution.
A. The #nti-;ommunist ;ampaign
!ndeed) vocal anti$communism became more central to ;iem=s rural programs than land
reform. /i.e the <an /ao Party) the G4N borrowed heavily from communist techni?ue
in combating the 4iet 8inh and their residual influence$ urged on) in some instances at
least) by their #merican advisers. !n the summer of %&'') the government launched an
#nti$<ommunist ;enunciation <ampaign) which included a scheme for classifying the
populace into lettered political groups according to attitude toward the 4iet 8inh) and
village ceremonies similar to community self$criticism sessions. 4iet 8inh cadres and
sympathi2ers would appear before the audience to swear their disavowal of communism.
The penitents would tell tales of 4iet 8inh atrocities) and rip or trample a suitable 4iet
8inh symbol. !n *ebruary) %&',) tens of thousands of Saigon citi2ens assembled to
witness the "conversion" of 7)((( former 4iet 8inh cadres. Tran <hanh Tanh) head of
the G4N ;epartment of !nformation and Couth) announced in 8ay) %&',) that the
campaign had "entirely destroyed the predominant communist influence of the previous
nine years." #ccording to his figures) &5)(5% former communist cadres had rallied to the
G4N) '),%9 other cadres had surrendered to government forces) %%&)&'5 weapons had
been captured) -' tons of documents) and -(- underground arms caches had been
discovered. Bne Saigon newspaper boldly referred to Tanh=s proceedings as a "puppet
show"$$for which it was closed down. "hat relationship G4N statistics bore to reality is
not .nown.
>owever) for many peasants the #nti$<ommunist <ampaign was considerably more than
theatrics. ;iem) in a Presidential Brdinance of :anuary %%) %&',) epanded upon an
eisting system of political re$education centers for communists and active communist
supporters. The %&', order authori2ed the arrest and detention of anyone deemed
dangerous to the safety of the state) and their incarceration in one of several concentration
camps. The Secretary of State for !nformation disclosed in %&', that %')((( to 7()(((
communists had been in these centers since %&'5) a figure probably low at the time) and
undoubtedly raised thereafter. Bn 8ay ,) %&'&) the G4N promulgated /aw %(I'&) which
stiffened penalties for communist affiliations) and permitted trial of accused by special
military tribunals. That year #nti$<ommunist ;enunciation was also stepped up. !n %&,()
a G4N 8inistry of !nformation release stated that 5J)7'( persons had been Dailed
between %&'5 and %&,() but a *rench observer estimates the numbers in Dail at the end of
%&', alone at '()(((. P. :. >oney) who was invited by ;iem to investigate certain of the
reeducation centers in %&'&) reported that on the basis of his tal.s with former inmates)
"the consensus of the opinions epressed by these people is that . . . the maDority of the
detainees are neither communists nor pro$communists."
The #nti$<ommunist <ampaigns targeted city$dwellers) but it was in the rural areas)
where the 4iet 8inh had been most strong) that it was applied most energetically. *or
eample) in %&'& the !nformation <hief of #n Huyen Province +<au 8au region1
reported that a five wee. #nti$<ommunist <ampaign by the National 0evolutionary
8ovement had resulted in the surrender of J)%7' communist agents) and the denunciation
of &)J(, other agents and 7&)&-J sympathi2ers. To furnish the organi2ation and spar.
enthusiasm for such underta.ings) Ngo ;inh Nhu organi2ed in %&'J the 0epublican
Couth) which with 8adame Nhu=s Solidarity 8ovement) became a vehicle for rural
paramilitary training) political) and intelligence activities. Nhu saw the 0epublican Couth
as a means for bringing "controlled liberty" to the countryside) and it seems certainly to
have assisted in etending his control.
The G4N also tried to reorgani2e rural society from the family level up on the
communist cellular model. @ach family was grouped with two to si others into a 8utual
#id *amily Group +lien gia1) and a li.e number of lien gia comprised a .hom. There was
an appointed chief for both) serving as a chain of command for the community)
empowered to settle petty disputes) and obligated to pass orders and information down
from the authorities. @ach lien gia was held responsible for the political behavior of its
members) and was epected to report suspicious behavior +the presence of strangers)
unusual departures) and li.e events1. @ach house was re?uired to display on a board
outside a listing of the number and se of its inhabitants. These population control
measures were combined with improved systems of provincial police identification cards
and fingerprinting. The central government thus became visible$$and resented$$at the
village level as it had never been before in 4ietnam.
-. Population 0elocation
Security and control of the populace also figured in G4N resettlement plans. @ven the
refugee relief programs had been eecuted with an eye to national security. ;iem
visuali2ed a "living wall" of settlers between the lowland populace and the Dungle and
mountain redoubts of dissidents. *rom flying trips) or from military maps) he personally
selected the sites for resettlement proDects +Dhu Dinh Dien1$$often in locales deprived of
ade?uate water or fertile soil$$to which were moved pioneering communities of Northern
refugees) or settlers from the over$crowded #nnam coast. Between #pril %&'- and late
%&,%) one G4N report showed 7%()((( persons resettled in %5- centers carved from
77()((( acres of wilderness. Some of the resentments over payments for resettled virgin
land were mentioned above. 8ore importantly) however) these "strategic" programs drew
a disproportionate share of foreign aid for agriculture6 by U.S. estimates) the 7O of total
population affected by resettlement received '(O of total aid.
The resettlements precipitated unepected political reactions from the 8ontagnard
peoples of the <entral 4ietnam >ighlands. The tribes were traditionally hostile to the
4ietnamese) and proved to be easily mobili2ed against the G4N. !n %&'& the G4N began
to regroup and consolidate the tribes into defensible communities to decrease their
vulnerability to anti$government agents) and to ease the applying of cultural uplift
programs. By late %&,% these relocations were being eecuted on a large scale. !n
Aontum Province) for instance) 9')((( tribesmen were regrouped in autumn %&,%) about
'( percent of its total 8ontagnard population. Some of the hill people refused to remain
in their new communities) but the maDority stayed. !n the long run) the relocations
probably had the effect of focusing 8ontagnard discontent against the G4N) and
facilitating) rather than hindering) the subversion of the tribes.
But the relocations which cataly2ed the most widespread and dangerous antiG4N
sentiment were those attempted among the South 4ietnamese farmers beginning in %&'&.
!n *ebruary) %&'&) a pilot program of political bifurcation was ?uietly launched in the
areas southwest of Saigon which had been controlled by the 4iet 8inh. !ts obDective was
to resettle peasants out of areas where G4N police or military forces could not operate
routinely) into new) policed communities of two distinct political colorations. !nto one
type of these "rural agglomerations)" called +ui 0hu) where grouped families with
relatives among the 4iet 8inh or 4iet <ong) or suspected of harboring pro$4iet <ong
sentiments. !nto another type) called +ui ap) where grouped G4N$oriented families.
Security was the primary reason for selecting the sites of these communities) which
meant that in many instances the peasants were forced to move some distance from thieir
land. The *rench had attempted) on a small scale) such peasant relocations in %&'9 in
Ton.in6 ;iem encountered in %&'&) as had they) stiff resistance from the farmers over
separation from their livelihood and ancestral landhold. But ;iem=s plan also aroused
apprehensions during +ui 0hu designates over the #nti$<ommunist <ampaign. "ith a
rare sensitivity to rural protest) the G4N suspended the program in 8arch) %&'&) after
only a month.
!n :uly) %&'&) however) ;iem announced that the G4N was underta.ing to improve rural
standards of living through establishing some J( "prosperity and density centers" +0hu
tru mat1. These "agrovilles" were to be located along a "strategic route system"$$.ey
roads) protected by the new towns. Some J( agrovilles were to be built by the end of
%&,9) each designed for 5(( families +7)((( to 9)((( people1) and each with a
surrounding cluster of smaller agrovilles for %7( families. The G4N master plan
provided for each community defense) schools) dispensary) mar.et center) public
garden$$even electricity. The new communities seemed to offer the farmers many
advantages) and the G4N epected warm support. But the peasants obDected to the
agrovilles even more sharply than they had the earlier eperiment. The agrovilles were
supposed to be constructed by peasants themselves6 <orvee labor was resorted to) and
thousands of 0epublican routh were imported to help. *or eample) at one site$$4i Thanh
near <an Tho$$7()((( peasants were assembled from four districts) many more than the
number who could epect to profit directly from the underta.ing. 8oreover) even most of
those who were selected to move into agrovilles they had helped build) did so
unwillingly) for it often meant abandoning a cherished ancestral home) tombs) and
developed gardens and fields for a strange and desolate place. The settler was epected to
tear down his old house to obtain materials for the new) and received G4N aid to the
etent of a grant of Q'.'() and an agricultural loan to assist him in paying for his allotted
%.' acres of land near the agroville. Peasant resistance) and then insurgent attac.s on the
agrovilles) caused abandonment of the program) with only 77 out of J( communities
completed.
The agroville program was eventually superseded by the G4N strategic hamlet program)
formally launched by President ;iem in *ebruary) %&,7) which avoided the mista.e of
trying to erect whole new communities from the ground up. 0ather) the plan aimed at
fortifying eisting villages) but did include provisions for destroying indefensible
hamlets) and relocation of the inhabitants into more secure communities. The strategic
hamlet) ap hien luo) also eschewed elaborate social or economic development schemes)
concentrating on civil defense through crude fortifications and organi2ing the populace to
improve its military capability and political cohesiveness. !n some eposed sites) "combat
hamlets" were established) with a wholly militari2ed population. >igh goals were
established) the G4N announcing that by %&,9 some %%)((( of the country=s
%,)((($%-)((( hamlets would be fortified. !n this instance) as before) the G4N
encountered opposition from the peasants) and as before) the insurgents attac.ed it
vigorously. ;espite its relative sophistication) the strategic hamlet program) li.e its
predecessors) drove a wedge not between the insurgents and the farmers but between the
farmers and the G4N) and eventuated in less rather than more security in the countryside.
9. 2ural Seurity Fores
Security was the foremost consideration of the G4N=s rural programs) and #merican aid
was lavished on the G4N security apparatus in general. !t is surprising) therefore) that the
G4N tolerated so ineffective a security apparatus at the village level. The Self$;efense
<orps +S;<1 and the <ivil Guard +<G1) charged with rural security) were poorly trained
and e?uipped) miserably led) and incapable of coping with insurgents6 they could scarcely
defend themselves) much less the peasantry. !ndeed) they proved to be an asset to
insurgents in two respects3 they served as a source of weapons6 and their brutality) petty
thievery) and disorderliness induced innumerable villagers to Doin in open revolt against
the G4N. Nor was the #04N much better) although its conduct improved over the years6
in any event) the #04N seldom was afield) and its interaction with the rural populace
through %&'& was relatively slight. !t should be noted that the S;< and the <G) the
security forces at the disposal of the provincial administration) were often no more venal
nor offensive to the peasants than the local officials themselves. <orrupt) arrogant) and
overbearing) the men the people .new as the G4N were among the greatest
disadvantages of the G4N in its rural efforts.
The Pentagon Papers
Gravel @dition
4olume %) <hapter ') "Brigins of the !nsurgency in South 4ietnam) %&'5$%&,("
+Boston3 Beacon Press) %&-%1
Section 9) pp. 9%5$95,.
E. 725#3 P6"!T!;#" #"!E3#T!63
The rigidity of G4N rural political policy was mirrored in the cities3 the regime became
preoccupied with security to the eclusion of other concerns) with the result that step by
step it narrowed its active or potential supporters) aroused increasing fears among its
critics) and drove them toward etremism. !n a step similar to that he too. on village
council elections) ;iem abolished elections for municipal councils in %&',. The #nti$
<ommunist ;enunciation <ampaign had its urban counterpart) but communist strength in
the *rench$occupied cities had been less than in the countryside. Bpposition to ;iem
formed around the old nationalist movements) including the pro$Bao ;ai groups ;iem
labeled "feudalists)" around intellectual and individual professional politicians) and
eventually around military leaders. ;iem=s policies successively alienated each.
1. ?Feudalists?
The <ivic #ction teams which ;iem proDected into the former 4iet 8inh areas in %&''
trumpeted against "<ommunism) <olonialism) and *eudalism)" the last inveighing
against Bao ;ai) who was) at the time) still >ead of state. "*eudalist" was one epithet
applied sweepingly to the religious sects) and to all those whose position or fortune
depended upon Bao ;ai) from the Binh Huyen who had purchased its control over
Saigon$<holon from the @mperor) to civil servants and army officers loyal to Bao ;ai.
The label was virtually as damning as "<ommunist" in incurring the ungentle attentions
of Nhu or <an. !n the early years "feud`lists" and "communists" were often tarred by the
same brush. *or eample) the #nti$<ommunist ;enunciation <ampaign got underway in
Kuang Tn Province in %&'') under Ngo ;inh <an. But <an was also in pursuit of the
anti$communist ;ai 4iet +Great 4ietnam1 Party there) which had armed units and) for a
time) an anti$government radio station. #s with the communists) many ;ai 4iet were
.illed) imprisoned) or driven into eile. ;iem=s defeat of Bao ;ai at the polls in Bctober)
%&'') strengthened his hand against pro$Bao ;ai groups. "ith the withdrawal of the
*rench the following spring) it became imprudent for any politician or group who wished
to avoid <an /ao and N08 scrutiny to maintain ties with "feudalists" in hiding in
4ietnam) or operating from abroad. ;espite the fact that opposition 4ietnamese
nationalist parties had been strongly influenced in their organi2ation and methods by the
Auomintang) they had never developed sufficient internal discipline) cohesion or
following to admit of challenging ;iem after %&',. Such opposition political forces as
developed centered around individuals. +Bnly two non$;iem) non$communist political
parties survived the ;iem era3 the Nationalist Party of Greater 4ietnam +Dai Biet =ho
Dan Dang) the ;ai 4iet1 and the 4ietnamese Nationalist Party +Biet 3am =uo Dan
Dang) the 4NK;;11.
8. Dr. Dan
Until November) %&,() ;iem=s most prominent political opponent was ;octor Phan
Kuang ;an. ;r. ;an was a northern physician who had been caught up in nationalist
politics in %&5') and lived in eile after %&5-. >e returned to 4ietnam in September)
%&'') to head up a coalition of opposition to the G4N arrangenents for the 8arch) %&',)
elections for the National #ssembly. >e was arrested on the eve of those elections)
accused of communist and colonialist activities) and 3hough released) deprived of his
position at the University of Saigon 8edical School. >is subse?uent political career
underscores the astringent nature of ;iem=s democracy. !n 8ay) %&'- ;r. ;an formed
another opposition coalition) the ;emocratic bloc) which ac?uired a newspaper called
Thoi /uan. Thoi /uan became the best$selling newspaper in South 4ietnam +all papers
were published in Saigon) ecept <an=s government paper in >ue1) with a circulation of
about J()((( copies. #fter a series of statements critical of the G4N) Thoi /uan was
sac.ed by a mob in September) %&'-. Unheeding of that warning) the paper continued an
opposition editorial policy until 8arch) %&'J) when the G4N closed the paper) and gave
the editor a stiff fine and a suspended prison sentence for an article including the
following passage3
"hat about your democratic electionN
;uring the city$council and village council elections under the "medieval and colonialist"
Nguyen 4an Tam #dministration Funder Bao$;ai) in %&'9G) constituents were threatened
and compelled to vote6 but they were still better than your elections) because nobody
brought soldiers into Saigon by the truc.load "to help with the voting."
"hat about your presidential regimeN
Cou are proud for having created for 4iet$Nam a regime that you thin. is similar to that
of the United States. !f those regimes are similar) then they are as related as a s.yscraper
is to a tin$roofed shac.) in that they both are houses to live in.
!n the U.S.#.) <ongress is a true parliament and <ongressmen are legislators) i.e.) free
and disinterested men who are not afraid of the government) and who .now their duties
and dare to carry them out. >ere the deputies are political functionaries who ma.e laws
li.e an announcer in a radio station) by reading out loud tets that have been prepared
Ffor themG beforehand. . .
# month later) the ;emocratic Bloc collapsed. ;r. ;an attempted to obtain G4N
recognition for another party) the *ree ;emocratic Party) and permission to publish
another paper. No G4N action was ever ta.en on either application) but a number of ;r.
;an=s followers in the new party were arrested. "hen in 8arch) %&'&) the newspaper Tin
5a published an article by ;r. ;an) it was closed down. !n :une) %&'&) the newspaper
3guoi Biet Tu Do was similarly indiscreet) and met the same fate. !n #ugust) %&'&) ;r.
;an ran for a seat in the National #ssembly) was elected by a si$to$one margin over
;iem=s candidate running against him) but was dis?ualified by court action before he
could ta.e his seat. ;r. ;an=s career of opposition to ;iem ended in November) %&,()
when he became the political adviser to the group who attempted a oup d(etat. ;an was
arrested and Dailed) and remained there until the end of the ;iem regime three years later.
3. The ;ara'elle :roup& 1,A1
But ;r. ;an was an eceptionally bold antagonist of ;iem. No other politician dared
what he did. @ven he) however) was unable to bring any unity to the opposition. Such
other leaders as there were distrusted ;an) or feared the G4N. There was) however) one
occasion in the spring of %&,( when opposition to ;iem did coalesce. There was change
in the international political winds that year$a students= revolt in Aorea) an army revolt in
Tur.ey) demonstrations in :apan which resulted in cancellation of President @isenhower=s
planned visit. ;iem remembered %&,( well) as a "treasure chest for the communists."
The United States press and the world press started saying that democracy was needed in
the under$developed countries. This came Dust in time for the communists. Some of the
United States press even incited people to rebellion.
That year was the worst we have ever had . . . "e had problems on all fronts. Bn the one
hand we had to fight the communists. Bn the other) we had to deal with the foreign press
campaign to incite rebellion vis$a$vis Aorea. These were sore anieties) for some
unbalanced people here thought it was time to act. Teachers in the private secondary
schools began to incite the students to follow the eample of the Aorean students. #nd
then there were our amateur politicians who were outdated and thought only of ta.ing
revenge.
The last reference was to the <aravelle Group) who issued at the <aravelle >otel in late
#pril) %&,() a "manifesto" of grievances against the G4N. The eighteen signers were all
old$time politicans) leaders of the <ao ;ai and >oa >ao sects) the ;ai 4iet and the
4NK;; parties) and dissenting <atholic groups. @leven had been <abinet ministers6 four
had been in other high government positions. They organi2ed themselves as the Bloc for
/iberty and Progress) with a platform of constitutional revision toward greater power for
the National #ssembly against the Presidency. ;r. ;an could not be induced to Doin the
<aravelle Group) but in the ;iem cleanup after the November) %&,( coup attempt) the
G4N arrested most of the eighteen) and their Bloc disintegrated. The <aravelle 8anifesto
is reproduced below3
8#N!*@STB B* T>@ @!G>T@@N
The President of the 0epublic of 4iet$Nam
Saigon
8r. President3
"e the undersigned) representing a group of eminent citi2ens and personalities)
intellectuals of all tendencies) and men of good will) recogni2e in the
face of the gravity of the present political situation that we can no longer remain
indifferent to the realities of life in our country.
Therefore) we officially address to you today an appeal with the aim of eposing to you
the whole truth in the hope that the government will accord it all the attention necessary
so as to urgently modify its policies) so as to remedy the present situation and lead the
people out of danger.
/et us loo. toward the past) at the time when you were abroad. *or eight or nine years)
the 4ietnamese people suffered many trials due to the war3
They passed from *rench domination to :apanese occupation) from revolution to
resistance) from the nationalist imposture behind which hid communism to a pseudo$
independence covering up for colonialism6 from terror to terror) from sacrifice to
sacrifice$in short) from promise to promise) until finally hope ended in bitter disillusion.
Thus) when you were on the point of returning to the country) the people as a whole
entertained the hope that it would find again under your guidance the peace that is
necessary to give meaning to eistence) to reconstruct the destroyed homes) put to the
plow again the abandoned lands. The people hoped no longer to be compelled to pay
homage to one regime in the morning and to another at night) not to be the prey of the
cruelties and oppression of one faction6 no longer to be treated as coolies6 no longer to be
at the mercy of the monopolies6 no longer to have to endure the depredations of corrupt
and despotic civil servants. !n one word) the people hoped to live in security at last) under
a regime which would give them a little bit of Dustice and liberty. The whole people
thought that you would be the man of the situation and that you would implement its
hopes.
That is the way it was when you returned. The Geneva #ccords of %&'5 put an end to
combat and to the devastations of war. The *rench @peditionary <orps was
progressively withdrawn) and total independence of South 4iet Nam had become a
reality. *urthermore) the country had benefited from moral encouragement and a
substantial increase of foreign aid from the free world. "ith so many favorable political
factors) in addition to the blessed geographic conditions of a fertile and rich soil yielding
agricultural) forestry) and fishing surpluses) South 4iet Nam should have been able to
begin a definitive victory in the historical competition with the North) so as to carry out
the will of the people and to lead the country on the way to hope) liberty) and happiness.
Today) si years later) having benefited from so many undeniable advantages) what has
the government been able to doN "here has it led South 4iet NamN "hat parts of the
popular aspirations have been implementedN
/et us try to draw an obDective balance of the situation) without flattery or false
accusations) strictly following a constructive line which you yourself have so often
indicated) in the hope that the government shall modify its policies so as to etricate itself
from a situation that is etremely dangerous to the very eistence of the nation.
Poliies
!n spite of the fact that the bastard regime created and protected by colonialism has been
overthrown and that many of the feudal organi2ations of factions and parties which
oppress the population were destroyed) the people do not .now a better life or more
freedom under the republican regime which you have created. # constitution has been
established in form only6 a National #ssembly eists whose deliberations always fall into
line with the government6 antidemocratic elections$$all those are methods and "comedies"
copied from the dictatorial <ommunist regimes) which obviously cannot serve as terms
of comparison with North 4iet Nam.
<ontinuous arrests fill the Dails and prisons to the rafters) as at this precise moment6
public opinion and the press are reduced to silence. The same applies to the popular will
as translated in certain open elections) in which it is insulted and trampled +as was the
case) for eample) during the recent elections for the Second /egislature1. #ll these have
provo.ed the discouragement and resentment of the people.
Political parties and religious sects have been eliminated. "Groups" or "movements" have
replaced them. But this substitution has only brought about new oppressions against the
population without protecting it for that matter against <ommunist enterprises. >ere is
one eample3 the fiefs of religious sects) which hitherto were deadly for the <ommunists)
now not only provide no security whatever but have become favored highways for 4iet
8inh guerrillas) as is) by the way) the case of the rest of the country.
This is proof that the religious sects) though futile) nevertheless constitute effective anti$
<ommunist elements. Their elimination has opened the way to the 4iet <ong and
unintentionally has prepared the way for the enemy) whereas a more realistic and more
fleible policy could have amalgamated them all with a view to reinforcing the anti$
<ommunist front.
Today the people want freedom. Cou should) 8r. President) liberali2e the regime)
promote democracy) guarantee minimum civil rights) recogni2e the opposition so as to
permit the citi2ens to epress themselves without fear) thus removing grievances and
resentments) opposition to which now constitutes for the people their sole reason for
eistence. "hen this occurs) the people of South 4iet Nam) in comparing their position
with that of the North) will appreciate the value of true liberty and of authentic
democracy. !t is only at that time that the people will ma.e all the necessary efforts and
sacrifices to defend that liberty and democracy.
#dministration
The si2e of the territory has shrun.) but the number of civil servants has increased) and
still the wor. doesn=t get done. This is because the government) li.e the <ommunists) lets
the political parties control the population) separate the elite from the lower echelons) and
sow distrust between those individuals who are "affiliated with the movement" and those
who are "outside the group." @ffective power) no longer in the hands of those who are
usually responsible) is concentrated in fact in the hands of an irresponsible member of the
"family)" from whom emanates all orders6 this slows down the administrative machinery)
paraly2es all initiative) discourages good will. #t the same time) not a month goes by
without the press being full of stories about graft impossible to hide6 this becomes an
endless parade of illegal transactions involving millions of piastres.
The administrative machinery) already slowed down) is about to become completely
paraly2ed. !t is in urgent need of reorgani2ation. <ompetent people should be put bac. in
the proper Dobs6 discipline must be re$established from the top to the bottom of the
hierarchy6 authority must go hand in hand with responsibility6 efficiency) initiative)
honesty) and the economy should be the criteria for promotion6 professional
?ualifications should be respected. *avoritism based on family or party connections
should be banished6 the selling of influence) corruption and abuse of power must be
punished.
Thus) everything still can be saved) human dignity can be reestablished6 faith in an honest
and Dust government can be restored.
#rmy
The *rench @peditionary <orps has left the country) and a republican army has been
constituted) than.s to #merican aid) which has e?uipped it with modern materiel.
Nevertheless) even in a group of the proud elite of the youth such as the 4ietnamese
#rmy$where the sense of honor should be cultivated) whose blood and arms should be
devoted to the defense of the country) where there should be no place for clannishness
and factions$the spirit of the "national revolutionary movement" or of the "personalist
body" divides the men of one and the same unit) sows distrust between friends of the
same ran.) and uses as a criterion for promotion fidelity toward the party in blind
submission to its leaders. This creates etremely dangerous situations) such as the recent
incident of TayPNinh.Y
Y This refers to the penetration of the compound of the 97d #04N 0egiment in :anuary)
%&,() when communist forces .illed 79 soldiers and captured hundreds of weapons.
The purpose of the army) pillar of the defense of the country) is to stop foreign invasions
and to eliminate rebel movements. !t is at the service of the country only and should not
lend itself to the eploitation of any faction or party. !ts total reorgani2ation is necessary.
<lannishness and party obedience should be eliminated6 its moral base strengthened6 a
noble tradition of national pride created6 and fighting spirit) professional conscience) and
bravery should become criteria for promotion. The troops should be encouraged to
respect their officers) and the officers should be encouraged to love their men. ;istrust)
Dealousy) rancor among colleagues of the same ran. should be eliminated.
Then in case of danger) the nation will have at its disposal a valiant army animated by a
single spirit and a single aspiration3 to defend the most precious possession$our country)
4iet Nam.
Eonomi and Soial #ffairs
# rich and fertile country enDoying food surpluses6 a budget which does not have to face
military ependitures)YY important war reparations6 substantial profits
Y Y The military ependitures of the 4ietnamese budget are paid out of U.S. economic
and military aid.
from Treasury bonds6 a colossal foreign$aid program6 a developing mar.et capable of
receiving foreign capital investments$those are the many favorable conditions which
could ma.e 4iet Nam a productive and prosperous nation. >owever) at the present time
many people are out of wor.) have no roof over their heads) and no money. 0ice is
abundant but does not sell6 shop windows are well$stoc.ed but the goods do not move.
Sources of revenue are in the hands of speculators$who use the FgovernmentG party and
group to mas. monopolies operating for certain private interests. #t the same time)
thousands of persons are mobili2ed for ehausting wor.) compelled to leave their own
Dobs) homes and families) to participate in the construction of magnificent but useless
"agrovilles" which weary them and provo.e their disaffection) thus aggravating popular
resentment and creating an ideal terrain for enemy propaganda.
The economy is the very foundation of society) and public opinion ensures the survival of
the regime. The government must destroy all the obstacles standing in the way of
economic development6 must abolish all forms of monopoly and speculation6 must create
a favorable environment for investments coming from foreign friends as well as from our
own citi2ens6 must encourage commercial enterprises) develop industry) and create Dobs
to reduce unemployment. #t the same time) it should put an end to all forms of human
eploitation in the wor. camps of the agrovilles.
Then only the economy will flourish again6 the citi2en will find again a peaceful life and
will enDoy his condition6 society will be reconstructed in an atmosphere of freedom and
democracy.
8r. President) this is perhaps the first time that you have heard such severe and
disagreeable criticism$$so contrary to your own desires. Nevertheless) sir) these words are
strictly the truth) a truth that is bitter and hard) that you have never been able to .now
because) whether this is intended or not) a void has been created around you) and by the
very fact of your high position) no one permits you to perceive the critical point at which
truth shall burst forth in irresistible waves of hatred on the part of a people subDected for a
long time to terrible suffering and a people who shall rise to brea. the bonds which hold
it down. !t shall sweep away the ignominy and all the inDustices which surround and
oppress it.
#s we do not wish) in all sincerity) that our *atherland should have to live through these
perilous days) we$$without ta.ing into consideration the conse?uences which our attitude
may bring upon us$$are ringing today the alarm bell) in view of the imminent danger
which threatens the government.
Until now) we have .ept silent and preferred to let the @ecutive act as it wished. But
now time is of the essence6 we feel that it is our duty$and in the case of a nation in
turmoil even the most humble people have their share of responsibility$$to spea. the
truth) to awa.en public opinion) to alert the people) and to unify the opposition so as to
point the way. "e beseech the government to urgently modify its policies so as to
remedy the situation) to defend the republican regime) and to safeguard the eistence of
the nation. "e hold firm hope that the 4ietnamese people shall .now a brilliant future in
which it will enDoy peace and prosperity in freedom and progress.
Cours respectfully)
%. T0#N 4#N 4#N) ;iploma of >igher <ommercial Studies) former 8inister of
@conomy and Planning
7. P>#N A>#< SUU) #gricultural @ngineer) former 8inister of #griculture) former
8inister of /abor
9. T0#N 4#N >UBNG) Professor of Secondary @ducation) former Prefect of Saigon$
<holon
5. NGUC@N) /UU 4!@N) 8.;.) former Professor at the 8edical School) former >igh
<ommissioner of 0efugees
'. >UCN>$A!8 >UU) 8.;.) former 8inister of Public >ealth
,. P>#N >UC KU#T) 8.;.) former 8inister of National @ducation) former 8inister of
;efense
-. T0#N 4#N /C) former Governor of <entral 4iet$Nam
J. NGUC@N T!@N >C) 8.;.
&. T0#N 4#N ;B) 8.;.) former 8inister of *oreign #ffairs) <hairman of 4ietnamese
;elegation to the %&'5 Geneva <onference
%(. /@ NGB< <>#N) #ttorney at /aw) former Secretary of State for National ;efense
%%. /@ KU#NG /U#T) #ttorney at /aw) former Government ;elegate for North 4iet$
Nam) former 8inister of !nformation and Propaganda
%7. /UBNG T0BNG TUBNG) Public "or.s @ngineer) former Secretary of State for
National @conomy
%9. NGUC@N T#NG NGUC@N) 8.;.) former 8inister of /abor and Couth
%5. P>#8 >UU <>UBNG) 8.;.) former 8inister of Public >ealth and Social #ction
%'. T0#N 4#N TUC@N) #ttorney at /aw) former Secretary of State for !nformation
and Propaganda
%,. T# <>UBNG P>UNG) former Provincial Governor for Binh$;inh
%-. T0#N /@ <>#T) /aureate of the Triennial 8andarin <ompetition of %&(9
%J. >B 4#N 4U!) 0everend) former Parish Priest of Saigon) at present Parish Priest of
Tha$/a) Province of Tay$Ninh
The November) %&,() coup mar.ed the end of opposition by professional politicians
against ;iem. !n fact) all the <aravelle group were arrested and Dailed. Such political
activity among them as occurred in %&,7 and %&,9 was perforce subdued to the point that
it captured attention neither from opponents of ;iem) nor ;iem himself. But %&,( was
altogether too late for effective "loyal opposition" to form. By that time the G4N=s ability
to control the press) to manage demonstrations) to limit travel) and to imprison +and
worse1 at will) had virtually paraly2ed the intellectual elite of 4ietnam. Nor were labor
unions politically active) despite their power potential. #s early as %&', the G4N had
become alarmed over <ommunist influence in rubber wor.ers= unions in Binh ;uong
Province) and had arrested union leaders. *armers= unions were crippled by arrests of
union cadre) and the <an /ao proved itself ?uite capable of engineering elections within
the unions as effectively as it rigged those for the National #ssembly. The threat to ;iem)
when it came) arose from more traditional sources of power$$the religious sects and the
armed forces.
-. 2eligious Dissenters
;iem=s clash with the armed sects in %&'5 and %&'' had the unfortunate political
conse?uence of casting his regime in religious overtones which deepened as the Ngo
;inh <atholicism became more widely .nown. Together with ;iem=s obvious U.S.
bac.ing) these had the effect of accentuating his Bccidental) and especially #merican)
identity. The British <atholic writer and commentator on 4ietnam) Graham Greene)
observed in %&'' that3
!t is <atholicism which has helped to ruin the government of 8r. ;iem) for his genuine
piety has been eploited by his #merican advisers until the <hurch is in danger of
sharing the unpopularity of the United States. #n unfortunate visit by <ardinal Speliman .
. . has been followed by those of <ardinal Giliroy and the #rchbishop of <anberra. Great
sums are spent on organi2ed demonstrations for visitors) and an impression is given that
the <atholic <hurch is occidental and an ally of the United States in the cold war. . .
!n the whole of 4ietnam the proportion of <atholics to the population is roughly the same
as in @ngland$$one in ten) a ratio insufficient to Dustify a <atholic government. 8r.
;iem=s ministers are not all <atholic) but 8r. ;iem) Dustifiably suspicious of many of his
supporters) has confined the actual government to himself and members of his family. >e
underta.es personally the granting of eit and entry visas. . . . The south) instead of
confronting the totalitarian north with evidences of freedom) had slipped into an
inefficient dictatorship3 newspapers suppressed) strict censorship) men eiled by
administrative order and not by Dudgment of the courts. !t is unfortunate that a
government of this .ind should be identified with one faith. 8r. ;iem may well leave his
tolerant country a legacy of anti$<atholicism...
"hile 4ietnam has an ample record of religious intolerance$$especially intolerance for
<atholics$$calling into ?uestion 8r. Greene=s contrary characteri2ation) his prediction of
;iem=s impact proved correct. Bpen opposition to his government by civilians finally
manifested itself on the issue of "religous freedom" in >ue and Saigon in %&,9)
coalescing around militant Buddhists and students$$two groups that were) theretofore) for
all practical purposes politically mute. There is no doubt) however) that ;iem=s
<atholicism from %&'5 on acted to his disadvantage among the non$<atholic masses) and
enhanced the 8y$;iem image of his government=s being an instrument of alien power
and purpose.
F. TE3S!63S /!T) T)E #2MED F62;ES
The soldiers of 4ietnam presented ;iem with his first) and his last political challenges.
Part of the #rmy=s political involvement stemmed from patent military inefficiency in
;iem=s tight control) for which 04N#* leaders correctly held ;iem responsible. Part
also correctly can be attributed to vaulting ambition and venality among certain of ;iem=s
officers. #nd since the United States paid) schooled) and advised the 04N#*) it would
also be correct to consider the U.S. involved) if not responsible. The record of ;iem=s
relations with 04N#*) li.e his relations with other parts of 4ietnamese society) is a
history of increasing tensions) and of lowering mutual understanding and support.
1. ;lashes 4ith Franophiles& 1,.--1,..
;iem=s first interactions with his army were inauspicious. *rom September to November)
%&'5) #rmy <hief of Staff General Nguyen 4an >inh$a *rench citi2en who held a
commission in the *rench #ir *orce seemed on the verge of overthrowing ;iem. ;iem
ordered >inh out of the country6 >inh defied him. #n apparent coup d=etat in late Bctober
was bloc.ed by adroit maneuvering by <olonel /andsdale) and by assurance from
General <ollins to >inh that #merican support would be promptly withdrawn from
4ietnam were his plot to succeed. #s >inh recalled it3
! had only to lift my telephone and the coup d=etat would have been over. . . . Nothing
could have opposed the army. But the #mericans let me .now that if that happened)
dollar help would be cut off. That would not matter to the military. !f necessary) we
soldiers could go barefoot and eat rice but the country cannot survive without #merican
help.
;iem removed >inh on 7& November %&'5. The #cting <hief of Staff) General Nguyen
4an 4y) ;iem found "insufficiently submissive)" and replaced him on
%7 ;ecember %&'5 with General /e 4an Ty) .ic.ing 4y upstairs to be !nspector General.
!n #pril %&'') during the turmoil of the sect rebellion) Bao ;ai attempted to appoint 4y
as <hief of Staff with full military powers) and to recall ;iem to *rance. #s ;iem
committed his army to battle with the sects) 4y announced that) in the name of Bao ;ai)
and with the bac.ing of all but ten percent of the #rmy) he had assumed control of the
government. >owever) General Ty) ;iem=s <hief of Staff) remained loyal) rallied .ey
local commanders around ;iem) and 4y fled. "ithin wee.s both Generals >inh and 4y
were afield against ;iem in the 8e.ong ;elta) maneuvering a disparate army of >oa
>ao) *rench "deserters)" and others$$;iem=s forces again beat them) and both then went
into eile.
8. MilitariLing Pu@li #dministration
"hat ;iem remembered from these eperiences was that personal loyalty was the prime
re?uisite for high command. #s a result) he too. an intense and direct interest in the
appointments of military officers) and$$as in other endeavors$$found it easier to place his
trust in Northerners and <atholics. Before long) the upper echelons of the officer corps
were preponderantly from these groups) and closely netted to the ;iem family web of
preferment. #s G4N demands for loyal civil servants willing to forego the advantages of
Saigon multiplied) ;iem was impelled to shift trusted military officers into his civil
administration. The head of the General ;irectorate of Police and Security was a military
officer from %&', forward6 his subordinates in the police apparatus included a growing
number of military officers$for eample) all the Saigon district police chiefs appointed in
the year %&,( were soldiers. The government in the provinces reflected similar moves
toward militari2ation3
T0@N;S TB"#0; 8!/!T#0C B**!<@0S #S P0B4!N<@ <>!@*S
No. Provinces No. 8ilitary <hiefs O 8ilitary <hiefs
%&'J 9, %9 9,
%&,( 9, 7% 'J
%&,7 5% 9, JJ
There was a coetensive militari2ation of public administration at district and lower
levels.
3. Dissatisfation in the 6ffier ;orps
But if 4ietnam=s soldiers found the ;iem family a way to political power) wealth) and
social prominence) they had ample reason to be dissatisfied with ;iem=s intervention in
their professional concerns. The propensity of Ngo ;inh ;iem to control his military
with a tight rein etended to deciding when and where operations would be conducted)
with what forces) and often how they would be used. 8oreover) he involved himself with
the arming and e?uipping of the forces) showing a distinct proclivity to heavy military
forces of the conventional type) even for the <ivil Guard) which reinforced #merican
military leanings in the same direction. There were a few soldiers) li.e General ;uong
4an 8inh) who sharply disagreed with the President on both points. #nd there was a
growing number of young officers who resented the <atholic$Northern dominant cli?ue
within the military) who were dissatisfied with ;iem=s familial interference in military
matters) and who were willing to entertain notions that the G4N had to be substantially
modified. Nonetheless) until %&,9) there was little apparent willingness to concert action
against ;iem.
-. The Early ;oup #ttempts& 1,A1 and 1,A8
Bn November %%) %&,() three paratroop battalions stationed in Saigon$considered by
;iem among his most faithful$cooperated in an attempted oup d(etat. The leadership
consisted of a small group of civilians and military officers3 >oang <o Thuy) a Saigon
/awyer6 /t <olonel Nguyen Trieu >ong) Thuy=s nephew6 /t <olonel 4uong 4an ;ong)
>ong=s brother in law6 and <olonel Nguyen <hanh Thi) the commander of the paratroops)
who was apparently brought into the cabal at the last moment. The coup failed to arouse
significant general pro$coup sentiment) either among the armed forces) or among the
populace. Troops marched on Saigon) and rebels surrendered. !n *ebruary) %&,7) two
4ietnamese air force planes bombed the Presidential palace in an unsuccessful attempt on
President ;iem and the Nhus$$properly) an assassination attempt rather than a oup
d(etat.
But the abortive events of %&,( and %&,7 had the effect of dramati2ing the choices open
to those who recogni2ed the insolvency of ;iem=s political and military policies. "hen
;iem was overthrown in November) %&,9) he was attac.ed by an apparatus that had been
months in preparation. Unli.e the earlier incident) the %&,9 coup was actively supported
by virtually all the generals of 04N#*) and was openly condoned by large sectors of the
populace.
:. T)E B!ET ;63:
1. Diem and ;ommunists
Ngo ;inh ;iem presided over a state which) for all the lip service it paid to individual
freedom and #merican style government) remained a one party) highly centrali2ed
familial oligarchy in which neither operating democracy) nor the prere?uisites for such
eisted. Bn %% :anuary) %&',) in G4N Brdinance Number ,) President ;iem decreed
broad governmental measures providing for "the defense of the state and public order)"
including authority to detain "individuals considered a danger to the state" or to "national
defense and common security" at re$education centers. Bne month after the date of the
scheduled Geneva plebescite) on 7% #ugust %&',) the Government of 4ietnam
proclaimed Brdinance Number 5-) which defined as a breach of law punishable by death
any deed performed in or for any organi2ation designated as "<ommunist." 8oreover) the
G4N was forced to use violence to establish itself in its own rural areas. !n :uly) %&',)
the month the Geneva elections were scheduled to have been held) the U.S. #rmy attache
in Saigon noted in his monthly report that3
Brders have reportedly been issued to all 4iet 8inh cadres in *ree 4iet Nam to increase
their efforts to reorgani2e and revitali2e the military units in their 2ones of responsibility.
These cadres have) however) encountered considerable difficulty in motivating their
adherents to wor. for the <ommunist cause. The military and political cadres are ma.ing
little progress due to the <ommunist ;enunciation <ampaigns promoted by the
Government of the 0epublic of 4iet Nam...
The same report submitted an #04N estimate of 5)9(( armed 4iet 8inh in all of *ree
4iet Nam) and recorded small #04N s.irmishes with 4iet 8inh
south of Saigon) clashes with %( >oa >ao battalions) J <ao ;ai battalions north and west
of Saigon) and incidents of banditry north of Bien >oa by Binh Huyen. But) in a
relatively short time) the fighting subsided) the 4ietnamese #rmy was withdrawn from
the countryside for retraining) reorgani2ation) and moderni2ation under the US 8##G)
and South 4ietnam ostensibly settled into the first peace it had .nown in a decade. Peace
rested) however) or strong central government. !n an article published in the :anuary)
%&'-) Foreign #ffairs) an #merican analyst stated that3
South 4iet Nam is today a ?uasi$police state characteri2ed by arbitrary arrests and
imprisonment) strict censorship of the press and the absence of an effective political
opposition. . . . #ll the techni?ues of political and psychological warfare) as well as
pacification campaigns involving etensive military operations have been brought to bear
against the underground.
Police states) efficiently organi2ed and operated) have historically demonstrated much
greater ability at countering insurgency than other sorts of governments. South 4ietnam
in fact succeeded in %&'' and %&', in ?uelling rural dissidence through a comprehensive
political and military assault on sect forces and other anti$government armed bands using
its army) the civic action cadre) the <ommunist ;enunciation campaign) and a broad
range of promised reforms. 8oreover) at its worst) the Government of South 4ietnam
compared favorably with other #sian regimes with respect to its degree of repressiveness.
Nor did it face endemic violence mar.edly different from that then prevalent in Burma)
!ndonesia) South Aorea. #nd its early "counterinsurgency" operations were as
sophisticated as any being attempted elsewhere in #sia. !n %&'-) the Government of 4iet
Nam claimed that its pacification programs had succeeded3
"e believe that with clear) even elementary ideas based upon facts....we can imbue . . .
first the youth and ultimately the entire population with the spirit and essential obDectives
of . . . civic humanism. "e believe that this above all is the most effective antidote to
<ommunism +which is but an accident of history1....
"e can see that the 4iet$8inh authorities have disintegrated and been rendered
powerless.
P. :. >oney) the Br!tSsh epert on 4ietnam) agreed6 his evaluation as of early %&'J was as
follows3
The country has enDoyed three years of relative peace and calm in which it has been able
to carry on the very necessary wor. of national reconstruction. The most destructive
feature in the national life of 4ietnam throughout recent years has been the lac. of
security in the countryside) which obliged farmers and peasants to abandon the ricefields
and to flee to the large cities for safety. Today it is possible to travel all over South
4ietnam without any ris.. The army and security forces have mopped up most of the
armed bands of political opponents of the Government) of <ommunists and of common
bandits. Bne still hears of an isolated raid) but the old insecurity is fast vanishing. . .
#fter a %&'& trip) however) >oney detected dangerous unease in the countryside3
*or the overwhelming maDority of the 4ietnamese) heirs to eperience of a century of
*rench colonial rule) the Government is a remote body which passes laws) collects taes)
demands labour corvVes) ta.es away able$bodied men for military service) and generally
enriches itself at the epense of the poor peasant. "Government" is associated in the
minds of the villagers with eactions) punishments) unpaid labour) and other unpleasant
matters. These people are members of families and members of villages) and their
loyalties to both are strong. But these loyalties do not etend beyond the village) nor has
any past eperience taught the peasants why they should. The idea that the peasants
should assume any responsibility for the Fetra$villageG government themselves would be
so alien to their thin.ing as tobe comic. @ducated 4ietnamese are well aware of this) as
many of their actions show....
Such political parties as eisted in 4ietnam before the advent of independence were all
clandestine) so that any political eperience ac?uired from these by the 4ietnamese
peasants will have been of secret plotting for the overthrow of the Government. Since
independence) they will probably have been subDected to attempted <ommunist
indoctrination by the 4iet <ong) but this too will have had an anti$Government slant.
Since %&'5) the peasants have been fed on a diet of puerile) and fre?uently offensive
slogans by the 8inistry of !nformation. These serve) if indeed they serve any purpose at
all) to ma.e the peasant distrust the Government of Ngo ;inh ;iem. The peasants) for all
their naavetV) are far from foolish and they are not deceived by slogans alleging to be true
things which they .now) from their own personal eperience) to be untrue. #ny political
eperience among the peasantry) then) is more li.ely to prove a liability than an asset to
any Government.
;iem .new that his main political dissent was centered not among his fellow mandarins)
in his press) or among his military officers) but in the peasantry. #nd the prime challenge
was) as ;iem saw it) communism) precisely because it could and did afford the peasants
political eperience.
<ommunism was) from the outset of ;iem=s rule) his bete noire. !n %&'') after the victory
over the sects) and Dust before General :ohn ". B=;aniel ended his tour as <hief) 8##G
4ietnam) ;iem tal.ed to the General about 4ietnam=s future3
>e spo.e about the decentrali2ation of government that he had been advised to underta.e)
but felt that the time was not yet right. >e felt that) since his country was involved in a
war) warli.e control was in order. >e remar.ed that the 4ietminh propaganda line never
mentioned <ommunism) but only land reform. . . . ;iem wants land reform too....
!n his message to the #merican *riends of 4ietnam in :une) %&',) ;iem ac.nowledged
progress) but warned that3
"e have arrived at a critical point. . . . "e must now give meaning to our hard sought
liberty. . . . To attain that goal we need technicians and machines. Bur armed forces
which are considerably reduced must however underta.e an immense tas. from the
military as well as the cultural and social point of view. !t is indispensable that our army
have the wherewithal to become increasingly capable of preserving the peace which we
see.. There are an infinite number of tas.s in all fields to complete before the year=s end.
;iem=s preoccupation with security paradoically interfered with his ability to compete
with the communists in the countryside. !n effect) he decided on a strategy of postponing
the politici2ing of the peasants until he had epunged his arch$foes. ;iem=s official
biography underscores this point3
The main concern of President Ngo ;inh ;iem is therefore to destroy the sources of
demorali2ation) however powerful) before getting down to the problem of endowing
4ietnam with a democratic apparatus in the "estern sense of the word.
8adame Nhu) his sister$in$law) was vehement that any political liberali2ation would have
operated to 4iet <ong advantage3 "!f we open the window) not only sunlight) but many
bad things will fly in) also." To hold a contrary view does not necessarily argue that
democrati2ation was the only way ;iem could have met his political opposition in the
villages6 it does seem) however) that in failing to meet aspirations there by some
departure from inefficiently repressive course he adopted) ;iem erred. !n concluding that
he did not have to rec.on with peasant attitudes) ;iem evidently operated from two
related misapprehensions3 that somehow the peasants would remain politically neutral
while he eliminated the communists) and that the 4iet <ong were essentially a destructive
force. !t was not that ;iem could not vocali2e a sound estimate of the communist political
threat6 his own description of communist operations to an #ustralian Dournalist was ?uite
accurate3
!n <hina) during the !ndo$<hina war and now here) the <ommunists have always
sheltered in open base areas of difficult access) in areas where there are no roads. They
have made their head?uarters in the Dungle. <autiously) sometimes only one man at a
time) they move into a village and establish a contact) then a cell until the village is theirs
to command. >aving got one village) they move to a second village and from a second to
third) until eventually they need not live in any of these villages) but merely visit them
periodically. "hen this stage is reached) they are in a position to build training camps
and even start crude factories and produce home$made guns) grenades) mines) and booby
traps.
This is all part of the first phase. The second phase is to epand control and lin. up with
<ommunist groups in other bases. To begin with) they start acts of violence through their
underground organi2ations. They .ill village chiefs) headmen) and others wor.ing for the
government and) by so doing) terrori2e the population) not necessarily by acts of violence
against the people but by demonstrating that there is no security for them in accepting
leadership from those ac.nowledging the leadership of the government. @ven with much
smaller numbers of troops than the constituted authority) it is not difficult now for the
<ommunists to sei2e the initiative. # government has responsibility for maintaining
supply to the civil population of .eeping railways) rivers) and canals open for traffic) of
ensuring that rural crops reach the mar.ets and that in turn commodity goods are
distributed throughout the country. The <ommunists have no such responsibility. They
have no roads and bridges to guard) and no goods to distribute.
;iem failed to perceive that the "first phase" was crucial) or that the 4< were) from the
very outset) constructing while they destroyed) building a state within South 4ietnam
with more effective local government than his own.
/i.e many another issue in 4ietnam) the problem was in part semantics. "<ommunists"
during this period formally recanted for the G4N by the thousands6 thousands more
"communists" were incarcerated by the G4N for "political reeducation." But Brdinance
5- of %&', notwithstanding) "communist" is a term which has not been used since the
%&5(=s by 4ietnamese serving the 8arist$/eninist Party headed by >o <hi 8inh of the
;04. These referred to themselves as members of the 4ietnam "or.ers Party +;ang /ao
;ong1) as members of one *ront or another) or as resistance fighters) or fighters for
national liberation. Nor was "4iet 8inh" a useful name) since 4iet 8inh) a nationalist
front) included numerous non$communist) or at least non$party members. !n %&',) the
Saigon press began to distinguish between the 4iet 8inh and communists by referring to
the latter as "4iet <ong)" a fairly precise) and not necessarily disparaging) rendition of
"4iet Nam <ong$San)" which means "4ietnamese <ommunist." The National /iberation
*ront of South 4ietnam +N/*1 much later condemned the term as "contemptuous)" and
pointed out that the G4N had applied it indiscriminately to all persons or groups "who
are lu.ewarm toward the pro$U.S. policy even on details." There can be no doubt that
;iem and his government applied the term somewhat loosely within South 4ietnam) and
meant by it North as well as South 4ietnamese communists) whom they presumed acted
in concert.
8. The Biet Minh 2esidue
#t the close of the *ranco$4iet 8inh "ar) some ,()((( men were serving in organi2ed
4iet 8inh units in South 4iet Nam. *or the regroupments to North 4ietnam) these units
were augmented with large numbers of untrained young men$who were later .nown
among the regroupees in North 4ietnam as "soldiers of Geneva." # reported &()(((
soldiers were ta.en to North 4ietnam in the evacuated units) while the U.S. and the G4N
estimated that ')((( to %()((( trained men were left behind as "cadre." !f *rench
estimates are correct that in %&'5 the 4iet 8inh controlled over ,( to &( percent of South
4ietnam=s villages outside the <ao ;ai and >oa >ao regions) those ')((( to %()((( cadre
must have represented only a small fraction of the remaining 4iet 8inh apparatus$cadre)
local wor.ers) sympathi2ers$in the countryside. G4N figures themselves attest to this. !n
%&'' and %&', alone) the G4N claimed %(()((( communist "cadre" rallied or
surrendered.
Neither ;iem=s G4N nor the U.S. .new a great deal about the 4iet 8inh in the period
%&'5$%&,(. By %&,-) however) new information had begun to accumulate from
interrogations of prisoners and defectors) and captured documents. *or eample) in
8arch) %&,-) a study was published of 79 4iet 8inh who stayed behind during the
regroupment of %&'5$%&''. #ll the men of the sample told consistent stories) and
although an admittedly narrow basis for generali2ation) the stories ring true. Upon
departure) the 4iet 8inh leaders assigned some of these stay$behinds active roles6 others
were simply told to return to their homes as inactives) and wait for further instructions. !t
is ?uite clear that even the activists were not instructed to organi2e units for guerrilla war)
but rather to agitate politically for the promised Geneva elections) and the normali2ation
of relations with the North. They drew much reassurance from the presence of the !<<)
and up until mid$%&',) most held on to the belief that the elections would ta.e place.
They were disappointed in two respects3 not only were the promised elections not held)
but the amnesty which had been assured by the Geneva Settlement was denied them) and
they were hounded by the #nti$<ommunist campaign. #fter %&',) for the most part) they
went "underground." They were uniformly outraged at ;iem=s practices) particularly the
recurrent G4N attempts to grade the populace into lettered categories according to
previous associations with the 4iet 8inh. 8ost of them spo.e of terror) brutality and
torture by G4N rural officials in carrying out the <ommunist ;enunciation campaigns)
and of the arrest and slaying of thousands of old comrades from the "resistance." Their
venom was epended on these local =T!cials) rather than on ;iem) or the central
government) although they were prepared to hold ;iem ultimately responsible. # veteran
who had been a Party member since %&9, characteri2ed the years %&''$%&'& as the most
difficult years of the entire revolution.
"hat these cadre did in those years is revealing. Bnly four of the 79 were engaged in
military tas.s. 8ost spent their time in preparation for a future uprising) in careful
recruitment in the villages$$concentrating on the very families with 4iet 8inh ties who
were receiving priority in the G4N=s attentions$and in constructing base areas in the
mountains or Dungles. The 4iet 8inh activists sought out the inactives) brought them
bac. into the organi2ation) and together they formed the framewor. of an epanding and
increasingly intricate networ. of intelligence and propaganda. *ew spo.e of carrying
weapons) or using violence before %&'&) although many boasted of feats of arms in later
years. They felt that they lac.ed the right conditions to stri.e militarily before %&'&6 their
mission was preparation. !n several instances) the 4iet <ong used terror to recruit former
4iet 8inh for the new movement) threatening them with "treason" and elimination6
caught between the G4N and the 4<) many old 0esistance members Doined the "New
0esistance." But most spo.e of ma.ing person$to$person persuasion to bring in new
members for the movement) relying mainly on two appeals3 nationalism and social
Dustice. They stressed that the #mericans had merely substituted a new) more pernicious
form of tyranny for that of the *rench) and that the 8y$;iem combine was the antithesis
of humane and honest government. Bne respondent spo.e of this activity in these terms3
*rom %&'- to %&,( the cadres who had remained in the South had almost all been
arrested. Bnly one or two cadres were left in every three to five villages. "hat was
ama2ing was how these one or two cadres started the movement so well.
The eplanation is not that these cadres were eceptionally gifted but the people they
tal.ed to were ready for rebellion. The people were li.e a mound of straw) ready to be
ignited....
!f at that time the government in the South had been a good one) if it had not been
dictatorial) if the agrarian reforms had wor.ed) if it had established control at the village
level) then launching the movement would have been difficult.
These interviews underscored three points on which the G4N was apparently in error.
*irst) with respect to the stay$behinds themselves) by no means were all dedicated
communists in the doctrinaire sense. 8any reported that they resented and feared the
communists in the 4iet 8inh) and apparently might have been willing to serve the G4N
faithfully had it not hounded them out of the society. There were several among the
group) for eample) who had entered Saigon) and there found a degree of freedom which
.ept them off the 4iet <ong roles for years. Second) with regard to the peasants in
general) the 4iet 8inh were widely admired throughout the South as national heroes) and
the G4N therefore committed a tactical error of the first magnitude in damning all 4iet
8inh without ?ualification as communists. Third) the G4N created by its rural policy a
climate of moral indignation which energi2ed the peasants politically) turned them
against the government) sustained the 4iet <ong) and permitted "communists" to outlast
severe G4N repressions and even to recruit during it.
The foregoing precis of the %&,- study presents views which are paralleled in a captured
4iet <ong history) written around %&,9) which describes the years after %&'5 as follows3
@HP@0!@N<@S B* T>@ SBUT> 4!@TN#8 0@4B/UT!BN#0C 8B4@8@NT
;U0!NG T>@ P#ST S@4@0#/ C@#0S
;uring the past nine years) under the enlightened leadership of the Party <entral
<ommittee) the people and the Party of South 4ietnam have eperienced many phases
along the difficult and complicated path of struggle but they have also gained many
victories and eperiences while pushing the South 4ietnam liberation revolution and
creating the conditions for peaceful reunification of the country....
#fter the armistice) the South 4ietnam people reverted to political struggle through
peaceful means by demanding personal rights) freedom and negotiations concerning
general elections in accordance with the stipulations of the Geneva #greement so that the
country could be peacefully reunified.... The Party Fwords illegibleG party were changed
in order to guarantee the leadership and forces of the Party under the new struggle
conditions.....
*rom the end of %&'5 until %&', several important changes occurred in the South
4ietnam situation. !mperialist #merica ousted and replaced imperialist *rance) turning
South 4ietnam into a colony +a new type of colony1 based on U.S. military power. The
Ngo ;inh ;iem government was clearly shown to be a government composed of
bureaucratic) dictatorial and family$controlled feudalists and capitalists who committed
crimes for the #merican imperialists and massacred the people) massacred
revolutionaries and massacred the oppositionists. Both the #mericans and ;iem made
every effort to oppose the implementation of the Geneva #greement and made every
effort to subvert the peaceful reunification of our fatherland.....
!mmediately after the re$establishment of peace) the responsibility of South 4ietnam was
to use the political struggle to demand the implementation of the Geneva #greement. The
struggle responsibilities and procedures were appropriate for the situation at that time and
corresponded with the desires of the great maDority of the masses who wished for peace
after nearly %( years of difficult resistance.
#t that time) although the #mericans$;iemists used cruel force to oppose the people and
the revolution) and the masses struggled decisively against this repression in many places
and at many times) the contradictions had not yet developed to a high degree and the
hatred had not yet developed to a point where the use of armed struggle could become an
essential and popular struggle tactic. !n South 4ietnam since %&'') than.s to the armed
movement of the sects) we were able to avoid the construction of an armed propaganda
force) since we only had a few former bases which were needed in the political struggle
and for the creation of a reserve force.
*rom %&'- to %&'J) the situation gradually changed. The enemy persistently sabotaged
the implementation of the Geneva #greement) actively consolidated and strengthened the
army) security service) and administrative apparatus from the central to the hamlet level)
crudely assassinated the people) and truly and efficiently destroyed our Party. By relying
on force) the #merican$;iemist regime was temporarily able to stabili2e the situation and
increase the prestige of the counterrevolutionaries. #t this time) the political struggle
movement of the masses) although not defeated) was encountering increasing difficulty
and increasing wea.ness6 the Party bases) although not completely destroyed) were
significantly wea.ened) and in some areas) ?uite seriously6 the prestige of the masses and
of the revolution suffered. But in reality) the years during which the enemy increased his
terrorism were also the years in which the enemy suffered maDor political losses Fwords
illegibleG The masses became more deep seeded and many individuals who formerly
supported the enemy now opposed them. The masses) that is to say) the peasants) now
reali2ed that it was impossible to live under such conditions and that it was necessary to
rise up in drastic struggle. *aced with the fact that the enemy was using guns)
assassinations and imprisonment to oppose the people in their political struggle) many
voices among the masses appealed to the Party to establish a program of armed resistance
against the enemy. "ithin the Party) on the one hand) the members were saturated with
the responsibility to lead the revolution to a successful overthrow of the enemy) but on
the other hand) the maDority of the party members and cadres felt that it was necessary to
immediately launch an armed struggle in order to preserve the movement and protect the
forces. !n several areas the party members on their own initiative had organi2ed armed
struggle against the enemy....
Up to %&'&) in South 4ietnam) the #mericans$;iemists had fully constructed a large
army) e?uipped with modern weapons) along with a large and well armed administrative)
police and security apparatus. ;uring the years in which the masses were only using
political struggle) the #mericans$ ;iemists used the military) security and administrative
apparatus to launch various campaigns to terrori2e) mop up and oppress the movement)
no different from during the period of warfare. Because they were determined to crush
the revolution and control the people at every moment) they could not avoid using every
type of repression.
!n opposing such an enemy) simple political struggle was not possible. !t was necessary
to use additional armed struggle) but not merely low level armed struggle) such as only
armed propaganda) which was used to support the political struggle. The enemy would
not allow us any peace) and in the face of the enemy operations and destructive pursuit)
the armed propaganda teams) even if they wished to avoid losses) would never be able to
engage the enemy in warfare and would never be able to become an actual revolutionary
army. This is an essential fact of the movement and the actual movement in South
4ietnam illustrates this fact. Therefore) at the end of %&'&) when we launched an
additional armed struggle in coordination with the political struggle against the enemy) it
immediately too. the form in South 4ietnam of revolutionary warfare) a long range
revolutionary warfare. Therefore) according to some opinions at the beginning of %&'&)
we only used heavy armed propaganda and later developed "regional guerrillas. . .
This version of events from %&'5 through %&'& is further supported by the report of
interrogation of one of the four members of the <ivilian Proselyting Section of the 4iet
<ong SaigonIGia ;inh Special Lone <ommittee) captured in November) %&,56 the
prisoner stated that3
The period from the #rmistice of %&'5 until %&'J was the dar.est time for the 4< in
South 4ietnam. The political agitation policy proposed by the <ommunist Party could
not be carried out due to the arrest of a number of party members by 04N authorities.
The people=s agitation movement was minimi2ed. >owever) the organi2ational system of
the party from the highest to the lowest echelons survived) and since the party remained
close to the people) its activities were not completely suppressed. !n %&'& the party
combined its political agitation with its military operations) and by the end of %&'& the
combined operations were progressing smoothly.
4iet <ong "political agitation" was a cunning blend of the 4iet 8inh nationalist
charisma) eploitation of G4N shortcomings) enophobia) and terror. ;rawing on the
years of 4iet 8inh eperience in subversive government and profiting from 4iet 8inh
errors) the 4iet <ong appealed to the peasants not as 8arist revolutionaries proposing a
drastic social upheaval) but ?uite to the contrary) as a conservative) nationalist force
wholly compatible with the village$centered traditionalism of most farmers) and as their
recourse against "8y$;iem" moderni2ation. Bne #merican authority summed the 4iet
8inh eperience evident in 4iet <ong operations as ten political precepts3
%. ;on=t try for too much6 don=t smash the eisting social system) use it6 don=t destroy
opposition organi2ations) ta.e them over.
7. Use the amorphous united front to attac. opposition political forces too large or too
powerful for you to ta.e over6 then fragment their leadership) using terror if necessary)
and drown their followers in the front organi2ation.
9. #t all times appear outwardly reasonable about the matter of sharing power with rival
organi2ations although secretly wor.ing by every means to eliminate them. ;on=t posture
in public.
5. ;ivide your organi2ation rigidly into overt and covert sections and minimi2e traffic
between the two. The overt group=s chief tas. is to generate broad public support6 the
covert group see.s to accumulate and manipulate political power.
'. Use communism as dogma) stressing those aspects that are well regarded by the
people6 don=t hesitate to interpret 8arism$/eninism in any way that proves beneficial.
Soft$pedal the class$struggle idea ecept among cadres.
,. ;on=t antagoni2e anyone if it can be helped3 this avoids the formation of rival blocs.
-. Bearing in mind that in 4ietnam altruism is conspicuous by its absence) blend the
proper miture of the materialistic appeals of communism and the endemic feelings of
nationalism. "in small but vital gains through communism) large ones through
nationalism. Plan to win in the end not as <ommunists but as nationalists.
J. Use the countryside as the base and carry the struggle to the cities later6 in rural areas
political opportunities are greater and ris.s smaller. #void the lure of the teahouse.
&. But forge a city alliance. 8obili2ation of the farmer must create a strong farmer$
wor.er bond.
%(. "or. from the small to the large) from the specific to the general6 wor. from small
safe areas to large liberated areas and then epand the liberated areas6 begin with small
struggle movements and wor. toward a General Uprising during which state power will
be sei2ed.
The same epert termed General Uprising "a social myth in the Sorelian sense) perhaps
traceable bac. to the <ommunist myth of the general stri.e)" and cited 4iet <ong
documents which describe how the 7'(( villages of 4ietnam will be led toward a
spontaneous final and determinant act of revolution3
The 0evolution) directed toward the goal of the General Uprising) has these five
characteristics3 . . . !t ta.es place in a very favorable worldwide setting. . . . !t is against
the neocolonialism of the U.S.#. . . . The government of 4ietnam is unpopular and
growing wea.er. . . . The people have revolutionary consciousness and are willing to
struggle. . . . !t is led by the Party) which has great eperience.
>o and Giap thus coated 8ar and 8ao with *rench revolutionary romanticism. ;iem)
the moral reformer) also drew heavily upon the same traditions for "peronalism." Bne of
the tragedies of modern 4ietnam is that the political awa.ening of its peasants was to
these) the most virulent) and vicious social theories of the era.
But doctrine was not the sole heritage the 4iet <ong received from the 4iet 8inh.
Perhaps more important was the "0esistance" organi2ation3 the hierarchy etending
upward from hamlet and village through provincial to regional authorities capable of
coordinating action on a broad scale. The 4iet 8inh complied with military
regroupments under the Geneva #ccords but were not obligated to withdraw the
"political" apparatus6 in fact) the Settlement provided guarantees for it in its provisions
against reprisals +#rmistice) #rticle %5c) and <onference *inal ;eclaration) #rticle &1)
and for liberation of political prisoners +#rmistice) #rticle 7%1. Anowledge of the
techni?ues of clandestine politics) appreciation for the essentiality of tight discipline) and
trained personnel constituting a widespread) basic organi2ational framewor. were all
conferred on the 4iet <ong.
3. 2ural Biolene and :B3 ;ounters& 1,.$-1,A1
By early %&'J) Saigon was beginning to sense that pacification had eluded the G4N even
as it had the *rench. !n ;ecember) %&'-) the ill$fated newspaper) Thoi /uan) pointed out
that terrorism was on the rise) and that3
Today the menace is heavier than ever) with the terrorists no longer limiting themselves
to the notables in charge of security. @verything suits them) village chiefs) chairmen of
liaison committees) simple guards) even former notables. . . . !n certain areas) the village
chiefs spend their nights in the security posts) while the inhabitants organi2e watches....
The most urgent need for the population today is security$a ?uestion to which we have
repeatedly drawn the attention of the authorities.
Spectacular assassinations have ta.en place in the provinces of #n Giang and Phong$
;inh Fin the 8e.ong ;eltaG. !n the village of Than$8y$Tay) armed men appeared in the
dead of night) awa.ened the inhabitants) read a death sentence) and beheaded four young
men whose heads they nailed to the nearest bridge. . .
The security ?uestion in the provinces must be given top priority3 the regime will be able
to consolidate itself only if it succeeds in finding a solution to this problem.
Besides the incidents cited) there had been a mass murder of %- in <hau$;oc in :uly)
%&'-6 in September the ;istrict <hief at 8y Tho with his whole family was gunned down
in daylight on a main highway6 on %( Bctober a bomb thrown into a <holon cafe inDured
%9 persons) and on 77 Bctober) in three bombings in Saigon) %9 #mericans were
wounded.
#lso in Bctober a clandestine radio in 4ietnam purporting to spea. for the "National
Salvation 8ovement" was bac.ing armed insurgents against ;iem. !n "ashington) U.S.
intelligence indicated that the "4iet 8inh underground" had been directed to conduct
additional attac.s on U.S. personnel "whenever conditions are favorable." U.S.
intelligence also noted a total of 9( armed "terrorist incidents initiated by <ommunist
guerillas" in the last ?uarter of %&'-) as well as a "large number" of incidents carried out
by "<ommunist$lead FsicG >oa >ao and <ao ;ai dissident elements)" and reported "at
least" -' civilians or civil officials assassinated or .idnapped in the same period.
0obert Shaplen wrote that3
By %&'J) the 4ietminh had fully resumed its campaign of terror in the countryside)
.idnapping government officials and threatening villagers....in an average month the local
and regional units were becoming involved in a score of engagements. Usually) these
were hit$and$run <ommunist attac.s on Self$;efense <orps or <ivil Guard head?uarters)
the purpose of which was both to sei2e weapons and to heighten the atmosphere of terror.
Guns should have been plentiful in the countryside of 4ietnam. The :apanese) the *rench
and even the G4N armed the sect forces. #nd both the sects and the 4iet 8inh had
operated small arms factories$for instance) General /ansdale visited a <ao ;ai weapons
factory at Nui Ba ;en in Tay Ninh in %&''. The 4iet 8inh cached arms as they withdrew
from their "liberated areas" in %&'5 and %&''. #04N veterans and deserters from the
force reductions of %&'5 and %&'' carried weapons into the hinterland. The 4< attac.ed
for weapons to ma.e up for losses to the G4N) and to e?uip units with similar types to
simplify logistics.
!n :anuary) %&'J) a "large band" of "communist" guerrillas attac.ed a plantation north of
Saigon) and in *ebruary) an #04N truc. was ambushed on the outs.irts of the capital. !n
8arch) the Saigon newspaper ;an$<ung complained that3 "our people are fleeing the
villages and returning to the cities for fear of communist guerrillas and feudalistic
officials Bernard *all published an article in :uly) %&'J) in which he mapped the pattern
of assassinations and other incidents from #pril %&'- to #pril %&'J) and announced the
onset of a new war3 *all=s thesis was challenged by a senior U.S. adviser to the G4N)
who argued that the increasing casualty figures represented not a structured attempt to
overthrow the G4N) but were simply a product of police reporting in the hinterlands.
There can be no doubt that the latter view was partially correct3 neither the U.S. nor the
G4N .new what was "normal" in the rural areas) and police reporting) with U.S. aid) had
been improved. But the deadly figures continued to mount. George #. <arver of the <!#)
in his %&,, Foreign #ffairs article) agreed with *all3
# pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge) directed against the
representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very
good. The former were li?uidated to win favor with the peasantry6 the latter because their
effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of <ommunist obDectives. The terror was
directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the
functioning of organi2ed political society) school teachers) health wor.ers) agricultural
officials) etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted
slowly and steadily. By the end of %&'J the participants in this incipient insurgency)
whom Saigon ?uite accurately termed the "4iet <ong)" constituted a serious threat to
South 4iet Nam=s political stability.
/i.e most other statistics concerning 4ietnam) figures on the etent of the terrorism
varied widely. The G4N reported to the !<< that in %&'-) %&'J) and the first half of
%&'&) 4iet <ong murdered ,' village officials) '% civilians) 7J <ivil Guardsmen) and %(
soldiers. G4N official reports provided the U.S. @mbassy in Saigon recorded a
significantly greater toll of civilians3
<!4!/!#N #SS#SS!N#T!BNS #N; A!;N#PP!NGS !N SBUT> 4!@TN#8
By Kuarter) *rom G4N 0eports to U.S. @mbassy
%&'J %&'& %&,(
% 7 9 5 Total % 7 9 5 Total *irst ' months
8urders -7 '% 7, 55 %&9 '7 95 5, &- 799 -J(
#bductions -9 97 ,, ,' 79, 55 '9 ,- %-& 959 7J7

:ournalists and scholars) studying open sources) put the figures even higher. ;ouglas Pi.e
reported %-(( assassinations and 7((( abductions in the years %&'-$ %&,(. Bernard *all
estimated murders of low$level G4N officials as follows3
8ay %&'- to 8ay
%&'J
to 8ay %&'& to 8ay %&,( to 8ay %&,%
-(( %7(( 7'(( 5(((
*all reported that the G4N lost almost 7(O of its village chiefs through %&'J) and that by
the end of %&'&) they were becoming casualties at the rate of more than 7O per month.
Through %&,9) *all calculated) %9)((( petty officials were eliminated by the 4<. The
New Cor. Times estimated that 9)((( local government officials were .illed or captured
during %&,() and Time maga2ine reported in the fall of %&,( that the G4N was losing
7'( to 9(( per month to a "new <ommunist offensive"3 The U.S. ""hite Paper" of %&,%
cited losses of %5(( local officials and civilians during %&,(. But if there was disparity
among numerical estimates) most reports) public or private) concluded that the violence
was real) anti$government) rising in intensity) and increasingly organi2ed.
!n mid$%&'J Bernard *all correlated the locus of rural violence reported in South
4ietnam with complaints lodged with the !<< in >anoi by the ;04 on behalf of "*ormer
0esistance members)" alleging G4N violations of the "no reprisals" provisions of the
Geneva #ccords +#rmistice) #rticle %5c1. The detail in these complaints indicated an
intelligence apparatus in South 4ietnam.
"The conclusion is inescapable)" he wrote) "that there must be some coordination
between the rebels and the North 4ietnamese Government." #bout that ame time) U.S.
intelligence reported that 4iet <ong$bandit operations north of aigon seemed to be part of
a calculated campaign of economic sabotage. #cPording to one description of the village
near 8y Tho which was studied very ritensively around mid$%&'J3
...*or the first time Fthe villageG eperienced the activities of a relatively new political
movement$$Mat Tran Dan To :iai Phong Mien 3am Biet 3am +National *ront for the
/iberation of 4ietnam1 referred to by the South 4ietnamese government as the 4iet <ong
or 4ietnamese <ommunists . . . and invariably called the 4iet 8inh by the villagers. !n
the vicinity of Fthe villageG the initial efforts of the 4iet <ong were largely confined to
anti$government propaganda.
Bne 4< pamphlet of late %&'J from the 8e.ong ;elta reads as follows3
Support the Dust struggle of the people to overthrow the government of the #mericans and
;iem F8y$;iemG) to establish a democratic regime in the South) and to wor. for general
elections which will unify the country by peaceful means.
But) if "struggle" sounds innocuous enough in @nglish) the word fails to carry the
intensity of the 4ietnamese e?uivalent) dau tranh. # 4< rallier put it this way3
Dau tranh is all important to a revolutionist. !t mar.s his thin.ing) his attitudes) his
behavior. >is life) his revolutionary wor.) his whole world is dau tranh. The essence of
his eistence is dau tranh.
#nd) the term "Dust struggle of the people" sheathed the terror integral to 4iet <ong
operations. !n Pi.e=s estimate3
!nsurgency efforts in the %&'J$%&,( period involved violence such as assassinations but
few actual armed attac.s. This was so partly because the cadres had little military
capability but chiefly because doctrine counseled against violence....
*or the true believers operating throughout the South this was a time of surreptitious
meetings) cautious political feelers) the tentative assembling of a leadership group) and
the sounding out of potential cadres whose names went into a file for future reference. !t
meant wor.ing mainly with non$<ommunists and) in many cases) .eeping one=s
<ommunist identity a secret.....
;iem=s own party newspaper) the N08=s ;ah Mang =uo :ia) published an article in
*ebruary) %&'& which reported that "the situation in the rural areas is rotten)" and
described communist cells established in the villages collecting taes and conducting
"espionage)" supporting local guerrilla forces responsive to a hierarchy of provincial and
regional committees.
*rom mid$%&'& onward) there was a definite upsurge in 4iet <ong activity) mar.ed not
only by the increase in terrorism noted in the statistics presented above) but also by the
fielding of large military units which sought) rather than avoided) engagement with units
of ;iem=s regular army. Bn 7, September %&'& two companies of the #04N 79d
;ivision were ambushed by a well$organi2ed force of several hundred identified as the
"7d /iberation Battalion"6 the #04N units lost %7 .illed) %5 wounded) and most of their
weapons.
Bn 7' :anuary %&,( the same 4iet <ong battalion launched an attac. coordinated with
four guerrilla companies$a total force of 9(( to '(( men$which penetrated the compound
of the 97d 0egiment) 7%st #04N ;ivision at Tay Ninh) .illed 79 #04N soldiers) and
netted a large haul of arms and ammunition. Bn 7& :anuary %&,( an insurgent band
sei2ed the town of ;ong Hoai) some sity miles north of Saigon) held the place for
several hours) and robbed a *rench citi2en of 7(()((( piasters. !n the same month) large
4< forces opened operations in the <amau peninsula and the 8e.ong ;elta. !n Aien >oa
province 4< units numbering hundreds effectively isolated the province capital from si
of its eight districts. Bernard *all) in his continuing study of 4iet <ong operations)
detected a new strategy operating3 a shift during %&'& and early %&,( from base
development in the ;elta to isolation of Saigon. "hether or not the incidents plotted by
*all constituted a strategy as he thought) they were patently more coherent. # U.S.
intelligence assessment submitted - 8arch %&,( described 4< plans) confirmed from a
variety of U.S. and G4N sources) to launch large scale guerrilla warfare that year "under
the flag of the People=s /iberation 8ovement)" which was identified as "red) with a blue
star." The 4< were reportedly moving into position to eercise one or more of three
strategic options by the end of %&,(3 +%1 incite an #04N revolt6 +71 set up a popular front
government in the lower ;elta6 +91 force the G4N into such repressive countermeasures
that popular uprisings will follow.
#n #04N coup d=etat did ensue) although it was neither 4< incited nor successful6 nor
was there any general revolt in the ran.s. No popular front government was set up. But
the G4N was prompted to a succession of repressive countermeasures which may have
aided the 4iet <ong much as they had epected. Prodded by the rural violence) ;iem
began his "counterinsurgency" in early %&'& with the reintensification of population
classification and relocation programs. Bn , 8ay %&'&) the G4N promulgated /aw
%(I'&) which set up three military tribunals which could) without appeal) adDudge death
for crimes under Brdinance 5- of %&',$the anti$communist law. !n actuality) these
tribunals were used sparingly) usually for show$case trials of terrorists. But the eistence
of /aw %(I'& furnished grist for 4< propaganda mills for years.
Bn - :uly) %&'&) the G4N launched its "prosperity and density centers"$the "agroville"
program$and Ngo ;inh Nhu and his wife plunged into organi2ing rural youth) women)
and farmers= organi2ations. >owever) Dust as the 4< Tet offensive of %&,J attenuated
P=0evolutionary ;evelopment)" the 4< upsurge of late %&'& and early %&,( disrupted the
new G4N organi2ational efforts) and reinforced ;iem=s conviction that security was the
paramount consideration. The U.S. assessment of 8arch %&,( cited widespread abuse of
police powers by local officials for etortion and vendetta) and pointed out that arbitrary
and corrupt local officials compromised G4N efforts to root out the 4< "undercover
cadres." 8oreover3
...."hile the G4N has made an effort to meet the economic and social needs of the rural
populations through community development) the construction of schools) hospitals)
roads) etc.) these proDects appear to have enDoyed only a measure of success in creating
support for the government and) in fact) in many instances have resulted in resentment.
Basically) the problem appears to be that such proDects have been imposed on the people
without ade?uate psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained. Since
most of these proDects call for sacrifice on the part of the population +in the form of
allegedly "volunteer" labor in the case of construction) time away from Dobs or school
labor in the case of rural youth groups) leaving homes and lands in the case of regrouping
isolated peasants1) they are bound to be opposed unless they represent a partnership effort
for mutual benefit on the part of the population and the government....
The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has tended to treat the
population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy
or resentment.
-. The Founding of the 3ational "i@eration Front
;espite their epanding military effort) the 4iet <ong remained a formless) "faceless" foe
until late in %&,() when the National /iberation *ront was announced as the
superstructure of the insurgent apparatus) and the political voice of the rebellion.
Thereafter) the 4iet <ong sought publicity) and thereby ac?uired identity as a South
4ietnam$wide organi2ation of three maDor components3 the N/* itself) the /iberation
#rmy of South 4ietnam) and the People=s 0evolutionary Party.
a. 6rganiLation and 6@Heti'es
The precise dates of the forming of the N/* constitutes one of the pu22les of the war. #s
mentioned above) in the years %&'5 to %&,() peasants) captured documents and prisoners
referred fre?uently to "the *ront)" meaning the insurgent movement) and "*ront" flags
had been captured as early as %&'&. These were probably references to 4iet 8inh carry$
over organi2ations) such as they were) rather than a specific leadership group or structure)
with a set of defined obDectives. Nguyen >uu Tho) the first <hairman of the N/*) stated
in a %&,5 interview over 0adio >anoi that3
#lthough formally established in ;ecember %&,() the *ront had eisted as a means of
action without by$laws or program since %&'5 when we founded the Saigon$<holon
Peace <ommittee. . . . 8any of the members of the FN/*G <entral <ommittee were also
members of the Peace <ommittee.....
>uynh Tan Phat) Tho=s 4ice <hairman in the N/*) was reported in late %&'' serving on
the "@ecutive <ommittee of the *atherland *ront" +8at Tren To Kuoc1) controlling Doint
4iet 8inh$>oa >oa operations against the G4N in the plain of 0eeds. <ommunists have
been Doining front organi2ations lin.ing anti$government minorities. . . . F@amples areG
the =4ietnamese Peoples= /iberation 8ovement *orces= FandG . . . ) the =4ietnam$
<ambodian Buddhist #ssociation.=
# number of authorities) mainly *rench) have lent credence to an assertion that the N/*
was formed by a group of 4iet 8inh veterans in 8arch) %&,() somewhere in
<ochinchina6 but the N/*) as such) received no international publicity until after
;ecember 7() %&,(. Bn :anuary 7&) %&,%) >anoi 0adio broadcast in @nglish to @urope
and #sia its first announcement concerning the N/*3
# "National *ront for the /iberation of South 4ietnam" was recently formed in South
4ietnam by various forces opposing the fascist Ngo ;inh ;iem regime. This was
revealed by 0euters in Saigon and by different papers published in . . . Phnom Penh)
capital of <ambodia. This *ront was created after a period of preparation and after a
conference of representatives of various forces opposing the fascist regime in South
4ietnam. #ccording to these forces) the "National *ront for the /iberation of South
4ietnam" on ;ecember 7() %&,() issued a political program and a manifesto....Fthe
manifestoG reads3 "*or a period of nearly a hundred years) the 4ietnamese people
repeatedly rose up to fight against foreign aggression for national independence and
freedom. . . . "hen the *rench colonialists invaded our country for the second time) our
compatriots$determined not to return to the former slavery$made tremendous sacrifices to
defend national sovereignty and independence. The solidarity and heroic struggle of our
compatriots during nine years led the resistance war to victory. The %&'5 Geneva
#greements reinstalled peace in our country and recogni2ed the sovereignty)
independence) unity and territorial integrity of 4ietnam. Under these circumstances) our
compatriots in South 4ietnam would have been able to live in peace) earn their livelihood
in security and build a life of plenty and happiness. >owever) #merican imperialists who
had in the past helped the *rench colonialists massacre our people have now replaced the
*rench in subDugating the southern part of our country through a disguised colonial
regime. . . . The National *ront for the /iberation of South 4ietnam calls on the entire
people to unite and heroically rise up and struggle with the following program of action3
"NB0T> 4!@TN#8
":an. 9%) %&,%
=%. To overthrow the disguised colonial regime of the imperialists and the dictatorial
administration) and to form a national and democratic coalition administration.
=7. To carry out a broad and progressive democracy) promulgate the freedom of
epression) of the press) of belief) reunion) association and of movement and other
democratic freedoms6 to carry out general amnesty of political detainees) dissolve the
concentration camps dubbed "prosperity 2ones" and "resettlement centers)" abolish the
fascist law %($'& and other anti$democratic laws.
=9. #bolish the economic monopoly of the United States and its henchmen) protect
homemade products) encourage the home industry) epand agriculture) and build an
independent and sovereign economy6 to provide Dobs to unemployed people) increase
wages for wor.ers) armymen) and office employees6 to abolish arbitrary fines and apply
an e?uitable and rational ta system6 to help forced evacuees from North 4ietnam who
now desire to reDoin their native places6 and to provide Dobs to those who want to remain.
=5. To carry out land rent reduction) guarantee the peasants= right to till their present plots
of land) and redistribute communal land in preparation for land reform.
='. To eliminate the U.S.$style culture of enslavement and depravation6 to build a national
and progressive culture and education) eliminate illiteracy) open more schools) and carry
out reform in the educational and eamination system.
=,. To abolish the system of #merican military advisers) eliminate foreign military bases
in 4ietnam) and to build a national army defending the fatherland and the people.
=-. To reali2e e?uality between men and women) and among different nationalities) and
reali2e the right to autonomy of the national minorities in the country6 to protect the
legitimate interests of foreign residents in 4ietnam6 to protect and ta.e care of the
interests of overseas 4ietnamese.
=J. To carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality6 to establish diplomatic relations
with all the countries which respect the independence and sovereignty of 4ietnam.
=&. To reestablish normal relations between the two 2ones of 4ietnam for the attainment
of peaceful reunification of the country.
=%(. To oppose aggressive wars) actively defend world peace.
"The manifesto concludes by calling on various strata of the people to close their ran.s
and to carry out the above program. The appeal was addressed to the wor.ers) peasants)
and other wor.ing people) to the intellectuals) the industrialists) and trades) national
minorities) religious communities) democratic personalities) patriotic armymen) and
young men and women in South 4ietnam.
"#ddressing the 4ietnamese living abroad) the manifesto called on them =to turn their
thoughts to the beloved motherland and actively contribute to the sacred struggle for
national emancipation.="
!t is clear that the N/* was not intended as an eclusively communist enterprise. 0ather
it was designed to encompass anti$G4N activists) and to eploit the bi$polar nature of
politics within South 4ietnam. !n the period %&'5$%&,() prior to the N/*=s "creation)" the
obDectives of insurgents in the South) other than overthrow of 8y$;iem) were vague.
<ommunists in the South no doubt shared the overall obDectives of the ;04) and were
aiming at unification of all 4ietnam under the >anoi government. Some rebel nationalists
were no doubt aware of the communists= ambitions) but would have regarded such an
outcome as acceptable) if not desirable. Bthers) disillusioned by the actions of the ;iem
regime after %&',) simply loo.ed toward the establishment of a genuine democratic
government in the South. Some peasants may have been fighting to rid themselves of
government) or to oppose moderni2ation) loo.ing only to village autonomy. The sects) if
not struggling for a democratic regime) were fighting for their independence) as were
some of the tribal groups who chose to Doin the N/*. The National /iberation *ront
formulated and publicly articulated obDectives for all these.
George <arver reported that3
Bn *ebruary %%) %&,%) >anoi devoted a second broadcast to the N./.*.=s manifesto and
program) blandly changing the language of both to tone down the more blatant
<ommunist terminology of the initial version. >owever) even the milder second version
+which became the "official" tet1 borrowed etensively from /e ;uan=s September
speech Fat the Third National <ongress of the /ao ;ong Party in >anoiG and left little
doubt about the *ront=s true sponsors or obDectives.
The "tone down" of communism was fairly subtle) if >anoi so intended its revision) since
the alterations consisted mainly in additions to the Ten Points of phraseology drawn from
the preamble of the 8anifesto6 references to "agrarian reform)" in those terms) were)
however) cut. There was a mar.ed increase in condemnatory citations of "8y$;iem)" so
that) in eight of ten points in the action program) epelling the U.S. was clearly identified
as the way the desired goal would be reached.
Pi.e refers to an "organi2ing congress" of the N/* held in ;ecember) %&,() of ,(
participants) at which plans were announced for convening the first regular N/* congress
within a year. Several postponements obtruded) and the meeting did not ta.e place until
*ebruary$8arch %&,7. Nonetheless) a <entral <ommittee continued in the interim to
further define N/* purposes6 the subse?uent statements differed from the %&,( 8anifesto
mainly on points of emphasis. *or eample) "reunification of the country" +Point & of the
8anifesto1 was downplayed from %&,( through %&,7. Bn the first anniversary of the
N/* 8anifesto) 7( ;ecember %&,%) its leaders issued a supplementary series of interim
or "immediate action" demands. These called for3
%. "ithdrawal of all U.S. military personnel and weapons from South 4ietnam and
abolition of the Staley Plan.
7. #n end to hostilities.
9. @stablishment of political freedoms.
5. 0elease of political prisoners.
'. ;issolution of the National #ssembly and election of a new assembly and president.
,. @nding the resettlement program.
-. Solution of 4ietnam=s economic problems.
J. @stablishment of a foreign policy of non$alignment.
#lthough "immediate action" was probably intended to open the way toward formation of
a coalition government and thence to ties with >anoi) there was no mention of
reunification6 nonetheless) >anoi in ;ecember) %&,%) listed N/* obDectives as "peace)
independence) democracy) a comfortable life) and the peaceful unification of the
*atherland." Bne li.ely reason for the N/*=s omission of reunification from "immediate
action" was its desire to broaden its base on anti$;iem) anti$U.S. grounds$without
alienating anti$<ommunists who might otherwise support the movement. #gain) when
the first regular N/* congress met from *ebruary %, to 8arch 9) %&,7) the earlier basic
obDectives of the *ront were endorsed) ecepting reunification. The 0adio >anoi
broadcast on the congress added "advancing to peaceful unification of the *atherland" to
a list from which this obDective was conspicuously absent in the N/* releases. Bn :uly
7() %&,7) the anniversary of the Geneva #ccords) the N/* issued a declaration that3
The <entral <ommittee of the National /iberation *ront of South 4ietnam believes that
in the spirit of 4ietnamese dealing with 4ietnamese solving their own internal affairs)
with the determination to put the *atherland=s interest above all else) the forces that
oppose U.S. imperialism in South 4ietnam will) through mutual concessions) be able to
reach a common agreement for united action to serve the people.
The same statement contained a new "four point manifesto"3
%. The U.S. government must end its armed aggression against South 4ietnam) abolish its
military command) withdraw all its troops and personnel) as well as the troops and
personnel of U.S. satellites and allies) and withdraw all weapons and other war e?uipment
from South 4ietnam.
7. <oncerned parties in South 4ietnam must stop the war) re$establish peace) and
establish conditions throughout South 4ietnam to enable the South 4ietnamese to solve
their own internal affairs. The South 4ietnam authority Fthat is) governmentG must end its
terror operations.
9. There must be established a national coalition government) to include representatives
of all political parties) cli?ues) groups) all political tendencies) social strata) members of
all religions. This government must guarantee peace. !t must organi2e free general
elections in South 4ietnam to choose a democratic National #ssembly that will carry out
the urgently needed policies. !t must promulgate democratic liberties to all political
parties) groups) religions6 it must release all political prisoners) abolish all internment
camps and all other forms of concentration FcampsG) and stop the forced draft of soldiers
and the military training of youth) women) public servants) and enterprise) economic
independence. !t must abolish monopolies and improve the living conditions of all
people.
5. South 4ietnam must carry out a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. !t must
establish friendly relations with all nations) especially with her neighbors. !t must not
enter any military bloc or agree to let any country establish military bases on her soil. !t
must accept aid from all countries FifG free of political conditions. # necessary
international agreement must be signed in which the big powers of all blocs pledge to
respect the sovereignty) independence) territorial integrity) and neutrality of South
4ietnam. South 4ietnam) together with <ambodia and /aos) will form a neutral area) all
three countries retaining full sovereignty.
#s the anticipated fall of the ;iem government drew near in %&,9) N/* statements of
goals increasingly stressed the anti$#merican) probably to shift the
focus of N/* attac. away from a disappearing obDective$$the defeat of ;iem) and
possibly because the N/* could not manipulate or adapt to the Buddhist
struggle movement. ;emands issued by the N/* five days following ;iem=s fall in
November) %&,9) were probably intended to ta.e credit for changes in G4N policy then
underway) since) ecept for halting conscription) the ;uong 4an 8inh government was
underta.ing every reform the N/* called for. >owever) the first etensive official
statement of the N/* <entral <ommittee following ;iem=s downfall) issued November
%-) %&,9) did reassert the reunification obDective3
<oncerning the reunification of 4ietnam) as was epounded many times by the South
4ietnam National /iberation *ront) the 4ietnam *atherland *ront and the ;04
government) it will be reali2ed step by step on a voluntary basis) with consideration given
to the characteristics of each 2one) with e?uality) and without anneation of one 2one by
the other.
<oncerning coalition government there was less vacillation in N/* emphasis) although
there was some detectable variation in the welcome etended from time to time to anti$
communist political movements. Similarly) the obDective of "neutrali2ation" was constant.
<ambodia was held up as a model) and there was some implication in early N/*
statements that it would accept international supervision of "neutrali2ation." Beginning in
%&,9 N/* statements were couched to convey the notion that "reunification" and
"neutrali2ation" were distinct one from the other) apparently out of deference to ;04
reaction against proposals to neutrali2e North 4ietnam.
@. "eadership
The N/* founders were shadowy figures most of whom had earned modest repute on the
mur.y fringes of 4ietnamese politics. They seem to have been chosen with an eye to
avoiding .nown <ommunists) and to obtaining wide representation from South 4ietnam=s
complicated society. #lthough the N/* <entral <ommittee reserved places for '7
members) only 9% names were publici2ed as founding members) indicating either a large
covert membership) or) more li.ely) simple inability to find eligible persons to fill the
posts. # U.S. study of -9 N/* leaders in %&,' indicated that almost all were born in
South 4ietnam) and almost all were highly educated. 8ost had histories of anti$*rench
political activity) or identification with religious movements) and it appears that if many
were not themselves crypto$communists) they had .nown and wor.ed with communists
for years. The prime eample of the group is Nguyen >uu Tho) who was the first
formally elected chairman of the Presidium of the <entral <ommittee of the N/*. Tho
was a <ochinchinese lawyer) once a socialist) who spent some months with the 4iet 8inh
in the 8e.ong ;elta in %&5-. >e thereafter led anti$*rench and anti$US demonstrations)
defended a number of 4ietnamese before Saigon courts for crimes related to the
"0esistance)" and served some time in *rench Dails. >e also edited a clandestine 4iet
8inh newspaper aimed at Saigon intellectuals. !n #ugust) %&'5) he became vice
chairman of the leftist Saigon Peace <ommittee) or 8ovement for the ;efense of Peace
+8;P1. !n November) %&'5) according to <!# information) Tho and others in the 8;P
were arrested) and Tho spent the net seven years in ;iem=s detention centers.
8ysteriously released in ;ecember) %&,%) the <!# reported him elected to N/* office at
the congress of 8arch) %&,7. ;ouglas Pi.e=s information has Tho active in Saigon
politics through %&'J) at which time he was Dailed. >is N/* biography states that "he was
liberated by a daring guerrilla raid on the Dail in %&,%)" but Pi.e) unable to find any record
of such a raid) concludes that Tho was provisional chairman and was selected <entral
<ommittee <hairman at the organi2ing meeting.
. De'elopment
The N/* rapidly too. on organi2ational reality from the <entral <ommittee down
through a web of subordinate and associated groups to villages all over 4ietnam. Pi.e
estimates that within a few months of its founding in ;ecember) %&,() its membership
doubled) doubled again by autumn) %&,%) and then redoubled by early %&,7) at which
time 9(()((( 4ietnamese were on its roles. These were members of the "liberation
associations)" N/* per se) of which there were administrative associations +e.g.)
provincial head?uarters1 and functional associations +e.g.) Couth /iberation #ssociation16
or) they belonged to one of several political parties) including the communist party)
affiliated with the N/*6 or) they served in the /iberation #rmy. Normally) each man)
woman and child belonged to many organi2ations simultaneously. # *rench analysis of
4iet 8inh organi2ation aptly described the N/*3
The individual is enchained in several networ.s of independent hierarchies.... a territorial
hierarchy.... running from the family and the bloc. to the interprovincial government) and
associations that incorporate male and female youth groups) groups of mothers) of
farmers) factory) and plantation wor.ers= syndicates . . . they could Dust as well include
clubs of flute players or bicycle racers6 the essential thing is that no one escapes from this
enrollment and that the territorial hierarchy is crossed by another one) which supervises
the first and is in turn supervised by it) both being overseen by police organi2ations and
the F<ommunistG Party.
The .ey operational components of the N/* were the /iberation #rmy and the People=s
0evolutionary Party) as the communists within the N/* termed themselves. The former
had a lien on the services of every N/* member) man) woman or child) although
functionally its missions were usually carried out by formally organi2ed and trained
paramilitary or full$time units. #ll "4iet <ong" units were) from %&,% on) regarded as
part of the /iberation #rmy.
There can be little doubt that communists played a maDor role in organi2ing the N/*.
#lthough ;iem=s <ommunist ;enunciation campaign had foreclosed "*ront" activity) the
communists of South 4ietnam possessed the leadership) tight subordination and
conspiratorial doctrine necessary for them to survive6 moreover) they were) as 8ilton
Sac.s characteri2ed them) "the most persevering) most cohesive) best$disciplined) and
most eperienced political group in 4ietnam. The People=s 0evolutionary Party was not
formed until :anuary) %&,76 it was eplicitly the "8arist$/eninist Party of South
4ietnam)" and it purported to be the "vanguard of the N/*) the paramount member." !n
%&,7) it had some 9')((( members. The /ao ;ong Party had continued low level overt
activity) as well as covert operations) in South 4ietnam throughout the years %&'' to
%&,7. *or eample) leaflets were distributed over the /ao ;ong imprimatur. But the P0P
denied official lin.s with the /ao ;ong Party of the ;04 beyond "fraternal ties of
communism." The denial implies the ?uestion3 "hat roles did the ;04 and the /ao
;ong Party play in the years of patient wor. necessary to bring the N/* to flower in so
short a time after %&,(N "hat role did they play in the insurgency overallN
The official U.S. view has been that the P0P is merely the southern arm of the /ao ;ong
Party) and one instrument by which >anoi instigated and controlled the revolt against
"8y$;iem." ;ouglas Pi.e=s analysis led him to concur) with reservations3
The 4iet 8inh elements in South 4ietnam during the struggle against the *rench had of
course included many non$<ommunist elements. . . . #fter %&'5 many 4iet 8inh entered
the ran.s of the new ;iem government) and even a decade later many of the top military
and civilian governmental figures in Saigon were former 4iet 8inh. Nevertheless the
4iet 8inh elements) made up chiefly but not entirely of <ommunists) continued to offer
resistance to the ;iem government. . . . !n terms of overt activity such as armed incidents
of the distribution of propaganda leaflets the period was ?uiet and the <ommunists within
the remnant 4iet 8inh organi2ation relatively inactive. !n addition) much of the activity
that did ta.e place apparently was the wor. of impatient cadres operating in the South
independently of >anoi=s orders....
Such action on their part and the religious sects is understandable) and the emergence of a
clandestine militant opposition group could be epected....such an effort would be in
complete harmony with 4ietnamese social tradition and individual psychology. But there
is a vast difference between a collection of clandestine opposition political groups and the
organi2ational weapon that emerged) a difference in .ind and not Dust degree. The
National /iberation *ront was not simply another indigenous covert group) or even a
coalition of such groups. !t was an organi2ational steamroller) nationally conceived and
nationally organi2ed) endowed with ample cadres and funds) crashing out of the Dungle to
flatten the G4N. !t was not an ordinary secret society of the .ind that had dotted the
4ietnamese political landscape for decades. !t proDected a social construction program of
such scope and ambition that of necessity it must have been created in >anoi had
imported. # revolutionary organi2ation must build6 it begins with persons suffering
genuine grievances) who are slowly organi2ed and whose militancy gradually increases
until a critical mass is reached and the revolution eplodes. @actly the reverse was the
case with the N/*. !t sprang full$blown into eistence and then was fleshed out. The
grievances were developed or manufactured almost as a necessary afterthought. The
creation of the N/* was an accomplishment of such s.ill) precision) and refinement that
when one thin.s of who the master planner must have been) only one name comes to
mind3 4ietnam=s organi2ational genius) >o <hi 8inh.