Command Lessons For Captains.

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Command Lessons For Captains
Airlines are now adapting their pilot training for aircraft captains in the light of recent aviation incidents involving highly
automated airliners.
The Royal Aeronautical Society held its first The Aircraft Commander in the 21
st
Century conference recently which was
organized by the RAes Flight Operations Group.
The conference sought to explore the changing role of the aircraft commander ,particularly as civil airliners get ever more
automated and complex.
This issue has recently been thrown into sharp focus,as incidents like Qantas QF 32 and Air France AF447 have demonstrated
differing responses from pilots to ever more complex aircraft.
In particular,the industry now is re-assesing the training given to pilots.A major theme that emerged from the conference was
tha,in the past 20 years,pilots have been taught to follow the ECAM (electronic centralized aircraft monitor) the computerized
glass display that in Airbus ( and Boeing as the EICAS engine indicating and crew alerting system) shows critical engine and
systems information.
Although this ECAM display makes life easy in many respects,following it blindly can lead to disaster.Previous training,said one
speaker,relied on following the ECAM procedure step-by-step and pilots never considered not doing the procedure.
Use The Force
This issue of displays showing spurious information was highlighted graphically by the keynote speaker at the
conference,Captain David Evans,who,as a Qantas A380 training and check captain,was one of the five flight deck pilots who
successfully resolved the QF32 incident in November 2010 after the No.2 Trent engine suffered an uncontained failure.
With the ECAM information overload deluging the crew with a barrage of error messages,the experienced captains had to
sort through and examine what these meant for the aircraft. In particular, the ECAM recommended that the crew shift the fuel
balance from one wing to another ,as an error message said wings not balanced as the imbalance limit had been exceeded.
However,the reason why the aircraft was becoming unbalanced was that there was a serious fuel leak caused by the exploding
engine-a situation that was obvious to anyone looking out of the window and seeing the damaged left hand wing leaking fuel.
Yet,had the crew followed procedure to the letter instead of using the force and disregarding the computer ,they would have
ended up pumping fuel into a leaking fuel tank with unknown consequences.At the very least this would have dramatically
shortened the available time for the crew to think through and solve the problem.
Reliance and dependence that the computer always knows best can be dangerous. As Captain Evans noted: What needs to
be brought back into the skies is a healthy scepticism about technology.
This view was enchoed in a later presentation by Captain Scott Martin ,an experimental test pilot as Gulfstream,who said the
correct approach was to treat the cockpit automation like a third pilot, but to be prepared to question it if it was not making
sense.In the final analysis,says Evans-airmanship or does this seem sensible? should trump any automated ECAM/EICAS
messages.
Yet this natural suspicion of technology runs counter to the future generations of pilots who will be drawn from todays
Generation Y and Z now at college or school. As Evans and others point out, these future captains born in the 1980s and
1990s,while being able to grasp new technology and systems far quicker than their predecessors as well as absorb new
information,will also,growing up with computers ,iPads and smart phones,instinctively trust technology more.
The problem is not only one of younger pilots relying on technology too much, but also older pilots who may be losing touch
with basic flying skills after years of relying on the autopilot.
Though aircraft accidents remain rare-a noteworthy statistics from the conference showed that while the most common
incident was a runway incursion/penetration-the most lethal in terms of lives lost is now loss of control in flight (LOC-I). The
RAes is in the forefront of work with both national and international regulators in addressing this problem and introducing loss
of control awareness and recovery training.
Solution?
The conference was asked: So what else can be done? As well at efforts from regulators to address the issue,the conference
also highlighted how individual airlines were addressing these command issues themselves,with more realistic dynamic flight
simulation scenarios,a back-to-basics approach and eve mentoring and recurrent leadership training for older experienced
captains.
Lessons from QF32 are already making their way into Qantas training.At the conference Captain Evans explained how Qantas
had started to introduce simulator scenarios based on real (but rare) scenarios to expose pilots to difficult command decisions.
One example chosen for a recent simulator LOFT (line oriented flight training) exercise was the scenario of flying an A380
through a volcano ash cloud,which could simultaneously set off fire arms on the flight deck and elsewhere (thanks to smoke
detectors) as well as flame out the engines. In the simulator exercise,pilot tubes would also be blocked by ash.
So what happened? With smoke warnings ,engines flamed out, the airspeed went blank and the aircraft went into direct law
with no autopilot. In particular, Evans noted, the ECAM logic prioritized the multiple (spurious) fire warnings over the engine
flame out warning.
However,for the pilots,understanding that the ash had caused the smoke detectors to trip,the priority should be to restart the
engines.
This simulator exercise clearly demonstrates to pilots how a highly automated aircraft could revert to a challenging manual
flying task for the pilots- simultaneously presenting them with information overload in the form of ECAM
messages.However,doing this in the simulator allows them to hone their command and decision making skills in a safe
environment.
Recurrent Command Training
Lufhansa is introducing a concept of ongoing command training for pilots. Captain Benard Kruse,VP Crew Training Lufthansa
,explained how the German flag carrier was implementing a form of ongoing training for its commanders.
The idea is that pilots continue to develop leadership competencies over their whole carrer.Thus,after moving up into a
command position ,regular training in soft skills ,such as decision making,situational awareness and CRM,would continue
along the career of a pilot-no matter how experienced he or she may be.
In small groups of their peers, captains will be able to dedicate time to discussing and learning from each other on command
issues. In a sense,this lifelong learning might be thought of as recurrent training for non-technical command skills ,much as
the sim check provides a demonstration of a pilots continuing technical proficiency in operating an aircraft.
The training,called Captains Competence Enhancement (CCE) by Lufthansa ,would see tailored training for the individual
captain over the course of his/her entire career. Lufthansas concept is that captains would attend this two-day classroom
seminar course every four years.
The first day would see a refresher using a diagnostic personal skills assessment tool and,on the second day ,the captains
would be able to pick a module such as conflict,leadership or stress to concentrate on.
Emirates Goes Back To Basics
Emirates,which is expanding fast,but is not satisfied with minimum regulatory standards ,is also adapting its approach to
training in the light of recent events and is aiming at highest standards,a point well made by Captain Martin Mahoney,SVP
Flight Training at Emirates.
The fast growing Gulf carrier is recruiting and training a huge number of pilots- with some 624 new recruits training in the last
financial year and 322 new command slots created in the same period.
In Emirates , a pilot can expect to spend three to five years in the right-hand seat before being put forward for a command
slot.
Despite the airline only recruiting experienced pilots (First Officers with a minimum of 2500 hours on aircraft over 30 tonnes),
Emirates believes it needs to supplement the skills (especially human factors/soft skills) that candidates already have and fresh
ones that may have gone stale.
To that end,the carrier has introduced a basic aerodynamics course to refresh new entrants about the fundamentals of flight.
Intriguingly,it has also reversed the trend for distance learning in favour of a return to chalk and blackboard classroom
learning.
Why? Captain Mahoney contends that not only do pilots learn better by being in presence of other pilots ( as well as
reinforcing the pilot culture-an important factor in multicultural airline like Emirates)-but also in that the instructor can watch
the students eyes to see if the lessons have really been understood.In addition,Emirates is also boosting its pilots skills with
two manual handling simulator sessions every year for new commanders.
The airline has also introduced personality profiles for command upgrade candidates which are pilots eyes only (management
does not see them) and which provides potential captains with individual,practical feedback on their leadership style,as well as
strengths and weaknesses.
However,Captain Mahoney had harsh words for ICAOs Level 4 English standards,arguing that they are not worth the paper
they are written on. In fact ,he revealed that recent simulator tests of pilots from an unnamed defunct European charter
carrier saw a 50% failure rate due to their English not being up to the standard needed by Emirates.
These training methods,especially classroom-based learning,are not cheap,but are significant in the airlines efforts to make
sure its standards are the highest it can possibly achieve.In fact, Captain Mahoney noted during his presentation that Emirates
had even banned the phrase minimum regulatory standards from its in-company lexicon-arguing that it has no place in the
airlines culture.
Lessons From The Operating Theatre
But it is not just airlines themselves that are adapting their training of current and potential commanders.There is also fresh
input from outside the profession.
Though the flight deck is regarded as the gold standard for CRM (crew resource management) ,there may be lessons from the
medical sector, especially from surgeons ,who have a similar high-skilled job with large responsibilities and operate in teams.
Indeed, Professor Rhona Flin, an industrial psychology expert at the University of Aberdeen,observed that, in order to access
and fully exploit the working memory (analytical ,which experts now believe can hold up to four chunks at the same time), it
may be a case of the slower the better.
She noted that one surgeon had once been given advice Dont just do something ,stand there, indicating that slowing down
rather than rushing into action may contribute to better decision making in medical operations.
Though this may not be possible in some circumstances (Captain Sullenbergers Hudson ditching and the BA777 Heathrow
landing short of the runway needing fast reactions), taking a step back from the flashing displays and warnings may actually
improve critical thinking.
Was it perhaps due to the extra critical thinking time brought to the QF32 incident by five experienced captains that resolved
the problem successfully?
Decision-making relies on long-term memory containing models of the world that we use ,together with procedures and
experience .These might be characterized by the gut feeling or weve always done it this way.
This may work in some instances but,in more novel or unexpected situations,may make pilots (or surgeons) make the wrong
choices or continue down an incorrect path-even when it is obvious in hindsight that the decision was the wrong one.
Seniority
Any discussion of the selection, training and roles of aircraft commanders is incomplete without the issue of seniority raising its
head and that,too, was debated at the conference.
Depending on your viewpoint and your stage in your flying career, seniority can either be viewed as older mediocre captains
blocking career advancement for younger skilled pilots, or a necessary way in which the most experienced ,highest hour pilots
are given the most responsibility.
Though some in the airline industry recognize the inconsistency of an industry aiming for the highest standards yet at the
same time promoting the longest-served on an its your turnbasis,it is clear that completely dismantling this system would be
a major undertaking.
That aircraft (and crew) are now safer than ever is not in doubt and the statistics bear this out.However,the aviation industry is
always striving for perfection.Furthermore, there is growing unease that the previous ways of learning ( and command) need
adapting to new and future generations of automated aircraft.However,these new pilots,fluent in the latest crew management
skills,may also be lacking some basic stick and rudder skills and be too willing to trust the computer.In normal opearyions a
highly automated airliner is easier to fly than previous generations of aircraft but, in a non-normal situation ,it is comparatively
harder.