PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY,

*
petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment
of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of
an employee That employee, herein private respondent !race de !u"man, contrarily
argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having
contracted marriage during her employment, which is prohi#ited #y petitioner in its
company policies She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation
of law, such a proscription #y an employer #eing outlawed #y $rticle %&' of the (a#or
Code
!race de !u"man was initially hired #y petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
)Supernumerary Pro*ect +orker,, for a fixed period from -ovem#er .%, %//0 until $pril
.0, %//% vice one C1 Tenorio who went on maternity leave
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4nder the 5eliever
$greement which she signed with Petitioner Company, her employment was to #e
immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period Thereafter, from 6une %0,
%//% to 6uly %, %//%, and from 6uly %/, %//% to $ugust 7, %//%, private respondent8s
services as reliever were again engaged #y petitioner, this time in replacement of one
9rlinda 1 :i"on who went on leave during #oth periods
2.3
$fter $ugust 7, %//%, and
pursuant to their 5eliever $greement, her services were terminated
;n Septem#er ., %//%, private respondent was once more asked to *oin Petitioner
Company as a pro#ationary employee, the pro#ationary period to cover %<0 days =n
the *o# application form that was furnished her to #e filled up for the purpose, she
indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she was single although she had
contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on >ay .', %//%
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=t now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the
two successive reliever agreements which she signed on 6une %0, %//% and 6uly 7,
%//% +hen petitioner supposedly learned a#out the same later, its #ranch supervisor
in ?aguio City, :elia > ;ficial, sent to private respondent a memorandum dated
6anuary %<, %//. re@uiring her to explain the discrepancy =n that memorandum, she
was reminded a#out the company8s policy of not accepting married women for
employment
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=n her reply letter dated 6anuary %B, %//., private respondent stated that she was
not aware of PT&T8s policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she
had not deli#erately hidden her true civil status
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Petitioner nonetheless remained
unconvinced #y her explanations Private respondent was dismissed from the company
effective 6anuary ./, %//.,
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which she readily contested #y initiating a complaint for
illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for nonCpayment of cost of living allowances
(C;($), #efore the 5egional $r#itration ?ranch of the -ational (a#or 5elations
Commission in ?aguio City
$t the preliminary conference conducted in connection therewith, private
respondent volunteered the information, and this was incorporated in the stipulation of
facts #etween the parties, that she had failed to remit the amount of P.,&70B< of her
collections She then executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner
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$ll of these took place in a formal proceeding and with the agreement of the parties
andDor their counsel
;n -ovem#er .&, %//&, (a#or $r#iter =renarco 5 5imando handed down a
decision declaring that private respondent, who had already gained the status of a
regular employee, was illegally dismissed #y petitioner Eer reinstatement, plus
payment of the corresponding #ack wages and C;($, was correspondingly ordered,
the la#or ar#iter #eing of the firmly expressed view that the ground relied upon #y
petitioner in dismissing private respondent was clearly insufficient, and that it was
apparent that she had #een discriminated against on account of her having contracted
marriage in violation of company rules
;n appeal to the -ational (a#or 5elations Commission (-(5C), said pu#lic
respondent upheld the la#or ar#iter and, in its decision dated $pril ./, %//A, it ruled that
private respondent had indeed #een the su#*ect of an un*ust and unlawful discrimination
#y her employer, PT&T Eowever, the decision of the la#or ar#iter was modified with the
@ualification that !race de !u"man deserved to #e suspended for three months in view
of the dishonest nature of her acts which should not #e condoned =n all other respects,
the -(5C affirmed the decision of the la#or ar#iter, including the order for the
reinstatement of private respondent in her employment with PT&T
The su#se@uent motion for reconsideration filed #y petitioner was re#uffed #y
respondent -(5C in its resolution of -ovem#er /, %//A, hence this special civil action
assailing the aforestated decisions of the la#or ar#iter and respondent -(5C, as well as
the denial resolution of the latter
% :ecreed in the ?i#le itself is the universal norm that women should #e regarded
with love and respect #ut, through the ages, men have responded to that in*unction with
indifference, on the hu#ristic conceit that women constitute the inferior sex -owhere
has that pre*udice against womankind #een so pervasive as in the field of la#or,
especially on the matter of e@ual employment opportunities and standards =n the
Philippine setting, women have traditionally #een considered as falling within the
vulnera#le groups or types of workers who must #e safeguarded with preventive and
remedial social legislation against discriminatory and exploitative practices in hiring,
training, #enefits, promotion and retention
The Constitution, cogni"ant of the disparity in rights #etween men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective
provisions To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section %A, $rticle ==
273
on the
:eclaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recogni"es the role of women in
nationC#uilding and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental
e@uality #efore the law of women and men Corollary thereto, Section & of $rticle
F===
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(the progenitor whereof dates #ack to #oth the %/&< and %/B& Constitution)
pointedly re@uires the State to afford full protection to la#or and to promote full
employment and e@uality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of
entitlement to tenurial security of all workers Similarly, Section %A of $rticle
F===
2%03
mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for
opportunities that would ena#le them to reach their full potential
. Corrective la#or and social laws on gender ine@uality have emerged with more
fre@uency in the years since the (a#or Code was enacted on >ay %, %/BA as
Presidential :ecree -o AA., largely due to our country8s commitment as a signatory to
the 4nited -ations Convention on the 9limination of $ll 1orms of :iscrimination $gainst
+omen (C9:$+)
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Principal among these laws are 5epu#lic $ct -o 'B.B
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which explicitly prohi#its
discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment,
promotion, and training opportunitiesG 5epu#lic $ct -o '/<<
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which #ans the )mailC
orderC#ride, practice for a fee and the export of female la#or to countries that cannot
guarantee protection to the rights of women workersG 5epu#lic $ct -o B%/.,
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also
known as the )+omen in :evelopment and -ation ?uilding $ct,, which affords women
e@ual opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment,
admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of
the $rmed 1orces of the Philippines and the Philippine -ational PoliceG 5epu#lic $ct -o
B&..
2%<3
increasing the maternity #enefits granted to women in the private sectorG
5epu#lic $ct -o B7BB
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which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the
workplace and in the education and training environmentG and 5epu#lic $ct -o 70A.,
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or the )>igrant +orkers and ;verseas 1ilipinos $ct of %//<,, which prescri#es as a
matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on
women, only in countries where their rights are secure (ikewise, it would not #e amiss
to point out that in the 1amily Code,
2%73
women8s rights in the field of civil law have #een
greatly enhanced and expanded
=n the (a#or Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in
$rticles %&0 to %&7 thereof $rticle %&0 involves the right against particular kinds of
night work while $rticle %&. ensures the right of women to #e provided with facilities and
standards which the Secretary of (a#or may esta#lish to ensure their health and
safety 1or purposes of la#or and social legislation, a woman working in a nightclu#,
cocktail lounge, massage clinic, #ar or other similar esta#lishments shall #e considered
as an employee under $rticle %&7 $rticle %&<, on the other hand, recogni"es a
woman8s right against discrimination with respect to terms and conditions of
employment on account simply of sex 1inally, and this #rings us to the issue at hand,
$rticle %&' explicitly prohi#its discrimination merely #y reason of the marriage of a
female employee
& $cknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional
guarantee of protection to la#or and security of tenure Thus, an employer is re@uired,
as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual
under his employ, to convincingly esta#lish, through su#stantial evidence, the existence
of a valid and *ust cause in dispensing with the services of such employee, one8s la#or
#eing regarded as constitutionally protected property
;n the other hand, it is recogni"ed that regulation of manpower #y the company
falls within the soCcalled management prerogatives, which prescriptions encompass the
matter of hiring, supervision of workers, work assignments, working methods and
assignments, as well as regulations on the transfer of employees, layCoff of workers,
and the discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees
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$s put in a case, an employer is
free to regulate, according to his discretion and #est #usiness *udgment, all aspects of
employment, )from hiring to firing,, except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those
which may #e provided #y law
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=n the case at #ar, petitioner8s policy of not accepting or considering as dis@ualified
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers #y our la#or laws and #y no
less than the Constitution Contrary to petitioner8s assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly
that her ties with the company were dissolved principally #ecause of the company8s
policy that married women are not @ualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely
#ecause of her supposed acts of dishonesty
That it was so can easily #e seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent
#y :elia > ;ficial, the #ranch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the
words of the latter, that )you8re fully aware that the company is not accepting married
women employee (sic), as it was ver#ally instructed to you,
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$gain, in the termination
notice sent to her #y the same #ranch supervisor, private respondent was made to
understand that her severance from the service was not only #y reason of her
concealment of her married status #ut, over and on top of that, was her violation of the
company8s policy against marriage ()and even told you that married women employees
are not applica#le 2sic3 or accepted in our company,)
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Parenthetically, this seems to #e
the curious reason why it was made to appear in the initiatory pleadings that petitioner
was represented in this case only #y its said supervisor and not #y its highest ranking
officers who would otherwise #e solidarily lia#le with the corporation
2.&3
Herily, private respondent8s act of concealing the true nature of her status from
PT&T could not #e properly characteri"ed as willful or in #ad faith as she was moved to
act the way she did mainly #ecause she wanted to retain a permanent *o# in a sta#le
company =n other words, she was practically forced #y that very same illegal company
policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of #eing dis@ualified from work +hile
loss of confidence is a *ust cause for termination of employment, it should not #e
simulated
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=t must rest on an actual #reach of duty committed #y the employee and not
on the employer8s caprices 1urthermore, it should never #e used as a su#terfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal, or un*ustified
=n the present controversy, petitioner8s expostulations that it dismissed private
respondent, not #ecause the latter got married #ut #ecause she concealed that fact,
does have a hollow ring Eer concealment, so it is claimed, #espeaks dishonesty hence
the conse@uent loss of confidence in her which *ustified her dismissal Petitioner would
asseverate, therefore, that while it has nothing against marriage, it nonetheless takes
um#rage over the concealment of that fact This impro#a#le reasoning, with interstitial
distinctions, pertur#s the Court since private respondent may well #e minded to claim
that the imputation of dishonesty should #e the other way around
Petitioner would have the Court #elieve that although private respondent defied its
policy against its female employees contracting marriage, what could #e an act of
insu#ordination was inconse@uential +hat it su#mits as unforgiva#le is her
concealment of that marriage yet, at the same time, declaring that marriage as a trivial
matter to which it supposedly has no o#*ection =n other words, PT&T says it gives its
#lessings to its female employees contracting marriage, despite the maternity leaves
and other #enefits it would conse@uently respond for and which o#viously it would have
wanted to avoid =f that employee confesses such fact of marriage, there will #e no
sanctionG #ut if such employee conceals the same instead of proceeding to the
confessional, she will #e dismissed This line of reasoning does not impress us as
reflecting its true management policy or that we are #eing regaled with responsi#le
advocacy
This Court should #e spared the ennui of strained reasoning and the tedium of
propositions which confuse through less than candid arguments =ndeed, petitioner
glosses over the fact that it was its unlawful policy against married women, #oth on the
aspects of @ualification and retention, which compelled private respondent to conceal
her supervenient marriage =t was, however, that very policy alone which was the cause
of private respondent8s secretive conduct now complained of =t is then apropos to
recall the familiar saying that he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused
1inally, petitioner8s collateral insistence on the admission of private respondent that
she supposedly misappropriated company funds, as an additional ground to dismiss her
from employment, is somewhat insincere and selfCserving Concededly, private
respondent admitted in the course of the proceedings that she failed to remit some of
her collections, #ut that is an altogether different story The fact is that she was
dismissed solely #ecause of her concealment of her marital status, and not on the #asis
of that supposed defalcation of company funds That the la#or ar#iter would thus
consider petitioner8s su#missions on this supposed dishonesty as a mere afterthought,
*ust to #olster its case for dismissal, is a perceptive conclusion #orn of experience in
la#or cases 1or, there was no showing that private respondent deli#erately
misappropriated the amount or whether her failure to remit the same was through
negligence and, if so, whether the negligence was in nature simple or grave =n fact, it
was merely agreed that private respondent execute a promissory note to refund the
same, which she did, and the matter was deemed settled as a peripheral issue in the
la#or case
Private respondent, it must #e o#served, had gained regular status at the time of
her dismissal +hen she was served her walking papers on 6anuary ./, %//., she was
a#out to complete the pro#ationary period of %<0 days as she was contracted as a
pro#ationary employee on Septem#er ., %//% That her dismissal would #e effected
*ust when her pro#ationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausi#le
conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure
2.B3
;n
the other hand, her earlier stints with the company as reliever were undou#tedly those
of a regular employee, even if the same were for fixed periods, as she performed
activities which were essential or necessary in the usual trade and #usiness of PT&T
2.73
The primary standard of determining regular employment is the reasona#le
connection #etween the activity performed #y the employee in relation to the #usiness
or trade of the employer
2./3
$s an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as she had #een
dismissed without *ust cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to full #ack wages, inclusive of allowances and other
#enefits or their monetary e@uivalent
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Eowever, as she had undenia#ly committed an
act of dishonesty in concealing her status, al#eit under the compulsion of an unlawful
imposition of petitioner, the threeCmonth suspension imposed #y respondent -(5C
must #e upheld to o#viate the impression or inference that such act should #e
condoned =t would #e unfair to the employer if she were to return to its fold without any
sanction whatsoever for her act which was not totally *ustified Thus, her entitlement to
#ack wages, which shall #e computed from the time her compensation was withheld up
to the time of her actual reinstatement, shall #e reduced #y deducting therefrom the
amount corresponding to her three months suspension
A The government, to repeat, a#hors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that
adopted #y petitioner PT&T The (a#or Code states, in no uncertain terms, as followsI
ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to
require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
shall not et married! or to stipulate e"pressly or tacitly that upon ettin married! a
woman employee shall be deemed resined or separated! or to actually dismiss!
dischare! discriminate or otherwise pre#udice a woman employee merely by reason
of marriae.$
This provision had a studied history for its origin can #e traced to Section 7 of
Presidential :ecree -o %A7,
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#etter known as the )+omen and Child (a#or (aw,,
which amended paragraph (c), Section %. of 5epu#lic $ct -o 'B/,
2&.3
entitled )$n $ct to
5egulate the 9mployment of +omen and Children, to Provide Penalties for Hiolations
Thereof, and for ;ther Purposes, The forerunner to 5epu#lic $ct -o 'B/, on the other
hand, was $ct -o &0B% which #ecame law on >arch %', %/.& and which regulated the
employment of women and children in shops, factories, industrial, agricultural, and
mercantile esta#lishments and other places of la#or in the then Philippine =slands
=t would #e worthwhile to reflect upon and adopt here the rationali"ation in Zialcita,
et al. vs. Philippine Air Lines,
2&&3
a decision that emanated from the ;ffice of the
President There, a policy of Philippine $ir (ines re@uiring that prospective flight
attendants must #e single and that they will #e automatically separated from the service
once they marry was declared void, it #eing violative of the clear mandate in $rticle %&'
of the (a#or Code with regard to discrimination against married women ThusI
%f first impression is the incompatibility of the respondent&s policy or reulation
with the codal pro'ision of law. Respondent is resolute in its contention that Article
136 of the (abor )ode applies only to women employed in ordinary occupations and
that the prohibition aainst marriae of women enaed in e"traordinary occupations!
li*e fliht attendants! is fair and reasonable! considerin the pecularities of their
chosen profession.
+e cannot subscribe to the line of reasonin pursued by respondent. All alon! it
*new that the contro'erted policy has already met its doom as early as ,arch 13!
1-.3 when /residential 0ecree 1o. 123! otherwise *nown as the +omen and )hild
(abor (aw! was promulated. 4ut for the timidity of those affected or their labor
unions in challenin the 'alidity of the policy! the same was able to obtain a
momentary reprie'e. A close loo* at 5ection 3 of said decree! which amended
pararaph 6c7 of 5ection 18 of Republic Act 1o. 6.-! re'eals that it is e"actly the
same pro'ision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the (abor )ode! which was
promulated on ,ay 1! 1-.2 to ta*e effect si" 667 months later! or on 1o'ember 1!
1-.2.
It cannot be ainsaid that! with the reiteration of the same pro'ision in the new (abor
)ode! all policies and acts aainst it are deemed illeal and therefore abroated. True!
Article 138 en#oins the 5ecretary of (abor to establish standards that will ensure the
safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by reulation
require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in
special occupations! such as those of fliht attendants! but that is precisely the factor
that militates aainst the policy of respondent. The standards ha'e not yet been
established as set forth in the first pararaph! nor has the 5ecretary of (abor issued
any reulation affectin fliht attendants.
It is loical to presume that! in the absence of said standards or reulations which are
as yet to be established! the policy of respondent aainst marriae is patently
illeal. This finds support in 5ection - of the 1ew )onstitution! which pro'ides9
5ec. -. The 5tate shall afford protection to labor! promote full employment and
equality in employment! ensure equal wor* opportunities reardless of se"! race! or
creed! and reulate the relations between wor*ers and employees. The 5tate shall
assure the rihts of wor*ers to self-orani:ation! collecti'e barainin! security of
tenure! and #ust and humane conditions of wor* " " ".$
,oreo'er! we cannot aree to the respondent&s proposition that termination from
employment of fliht attendants on account of marriae is a fair and reasonable
standard desined for their own health! safety! protection and welfare! as no basis has
been laid therefor. Actually! respondent claims that its concern is not so
much aainst the continued employment of the fliht attendant merely by reason of
marriae as obser'ed by the 5ecretary of (abor! but rather on the consequence of
marriae-prenancy. Respondent discussed at lenth in the instant appeal the
supposed ill effects of prenancy on fliht attendants in the course of their
employment. +e feel that this needs no further discussion as it had been adequately
e"plained by the 5ecretary of (abor in his decision of ,ay 8! 1-.6.
In a 'ain attempt to i'e meanin to its position! respondent went as far as in'o*in
the pro'isions of Articles ;8 and 816 of the 1ew )i'il )ode on the preser'ation of
marriae as an in'iolable social institution and the family as a basic social institution!
respecti'ely! as bases for its policy of non-marriae. In both instances! respondent
predicates absence of a fliht attendant from her home for lon periods of time as
contributory to an unhappy married life. This is pure con#ecture not based on actual
conditions! considerin that! in this modern world! sophisticated technoloy has
narrowed the distance from one place to another. ,oreo'er! respondent o'erloo*ed
the fact that married fliht attendants can proram their li'es to adapt to pre'ailin
circumstances and e'ents.
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations!
or it should ha'e cateorically e"pressed so. The sweepin intendment of the law! be
it on special or ordinary occupations! is reflected in the whole te"t and supported by
Article 13; that spea*s of non-discrimination on the employment of women.
The *udgment of the Court of $ppeals in Gualberto, et al. vs. Marinduque Mining &
Industrial Corporation
2&A3
considered as void a policy of the same nature =n said case,
respondent, in dismissing from the service the complainant, invoked a policy of the firm
to consider female employees in the pro*ect it was undertaking as separated the
moment they get married due to lack of facilities for married women 5espondent
further claimed that complainant was employed in the pro*ect with an oral understanding
that her services would #e terminated when she gets married ?randing the policy of
the employer as an example of )discriminatory chauvinism, tantamount to denying e@ual
employment opportunities to women simply on account of their sex, the appellate court
struck down said employer policy as unlawful in view of its repugnance to the Civil
Code, Presidential :ecree -o %A7 and the Constitution
4nder $merican *urisprudence, *o# re@uirements which esta#lish employer
preference or conditions relating to the marital status of an employee are categori"ed as
a )sexCplus, discrimination where it is imposed on one sex and not on the
other 1urther, the same should #e evenly applied and must not inflict adverse effects
on a racial or sexual group which is protected #y federal *o# discrimination
laws 9mployment rules that for#id or restrict the employment of married women, #ut
do not apply to married men, have #een held to violate Title H== of the 4nited States Civil
5ights $ct of %/'A, the main federal statute prohi#iting *o# discrimination against
employees and applicants on the #asis of, among other things, sex
2&<3
1urther, it is not relevant that the rule is not directed against all women #ut *ust
against married women $nd, where the employer discriminates against married
women, #ut not against married men, the varia#le is sex and the discrimination is
unlawful
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4pon the other hand, a re@uirement that a woman employee must remain
unmarried could #e *ustified as a )#ona fide occupational @ualification,, or ?1;J, where
the particular re@uirements of the *o# would *ustify the same, #ut not on the ground of a
general principle, such as the desira#ility of spreading work in the workplace $
re@uirement of that nature would #e valid provided it reflects an inherent @uality
reasona#ly necessary for satisfactory *o# performance Thus, in one case, a noC
marriage rule applica#le to #oth male and female flight attendants, was regarded as
unlawful since the restriction was not related to the *o# performance of the flight
attendants
< Petitioner8s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of $rticle %&' of the
(a#or Code on the right of a woman to #e free from any kind of stipulation against
marriage in connection with her employment, #ut it likewise assaults good morals and
pu#lic policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her
status, a privilege that #y all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangi#le and
inaliena#le right Eence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may esta#lish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should
not #e contrary to law, morals, good customs, pu#lic order, or pu#lic policy
2&/3
Carried to
its logical conse@uences, it may even #e said that petitioner8s policy against legitimate
marital #onds would encourage illicit or commonClaw relations and su#vert the
sacrament of marriage
Parenthetically, the Civil Code provisions on the contract of la#or state that the
relations #etween the parties, that is, of capital and la#or, are not merely contractual,
impressed as they are with so much pu#lic interest that the same should yield to the
common good =t goes on to intone that neither capital nor la#or should visit acts of
oppression against the other, nor impair the interest or convenience of the pu#lic
2A%3
=n
the final reckoning, the danger of *ust such a policy against marriage followed #y
petitioner PT&T is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as
an inviola#le social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the
nation That it must #e effectively interdicted here in all its indirect, disguised or
dissem#led forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land is not
only in order #ut imperatively re@uired
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the petition of Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company is here#y :=S>=SS9: for lack of merit, with dou#le costs against
petitioner
SO ORDERED.
omero, Puno, Mendo!a, and "orres, #r., ##., concur