Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241

www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc
Creating transportation infrastructure through
state spaceport initiatives: Florida and other
examples
R. Handberg

University of Central Florida, Department of Political Science, HFA 414, Orlando,
FL 32816-1356, USA
Abstract
State governments have sought to improve and maintain the economic well being of their
citizens since the beginnings of the Republic. Consequently, their activities often have focused
on creating and improving the applicable transportation infrastructure, usually for the purpose
of generating growth in the states economy and ultimately improving its revenue base [1].
In this paper, that goal is addressed within a context not usually associated with state govern-
ments: the creation of state-run spaceports. The term run is used advisedly as most states
do not necessarily own or completely control their facilities. The spaceport effort being
mounted in Florida is the primary focus of the analysis, largely because it was the rst and
has encountered most of the problems that confront such efforts. 2002 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Spaceports; State spaceports; Transportation policy; Federal state relations; Space transpor-
tation; Transportation infrastructure; Space commerce; Space policy general
1. Introduction
The objective of every state government is clear: to position that states business
community so it can exploit to the fullest emerging economic opportunities. The
general realm of space commerce is no exception. This activity pattern stands well
within a long tradition of state economic activism but moves into realms normally

Tel.: +1-407-823-2608; fax: +1-407-823-0051.

E-mail address: handberg@mail.ucf.edu (R. Handberg).
0160-791X/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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226 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
controlled by the federal government. Thus, state spaceports become an interesting
example of multi-level intergovernmental policy-making. The participants, operating
in an extremely complex political and legal environment, proceed deliberately toward
that goal. There is no guarantee of success nor does any well-worn pathway exist to
follow. Each state becomes a pioneer, carving out its path toward hoped-for success.
2. States as agents of economic change
American politics, especially at the state level, has from its beginnings been an
alliance between state government and the dominant economic interests within each
state [2]. Business interests have long called upon state legislatures and governors
to provide incentives and safeguards in varying combinations to foster their economic
competitiveness [3]. Over time, the dominant business interests obviously shift in
their relative importance. The decline of lumbering or farming may lead to the rise
of manufacturing or, in modern times, tourism. Change remains a fact of life; states
continually strive to foster new industries while protecting older ones, an often delic-
ate political task as the formerly dominant economic interests resist their decline.
Regardless, each states responsiveness to its economic interests creates much of its
constitutional law, a circumstance that made John Marshalls reputation as a jurist. In
explaining the framework for federal power under the commerce clause in particular,
Marshall created great potential federal economic and regulatory power (not realized
until the 1930s, a situation from which the nation presently appears in partial
retreat) but he also carved out those exceptions that allow extensive state sup-
ported and regulated economic activity.
States have responded to these popular demands for their assistance by providing
subsidies such as granting land in exchange for performance, establishing franchises
(in effect, monopolies), abating certain legal obligations or taxes, and in some cases
building or assisting the building of certain infrastructure for future business use.
Historic examples include canals, railroads, turnpikes, access to natural resources at
nominal or no fee, and necessary services such as the provision of law and order.
More recently, states have aggressively solicited business relocations by providing
specic infrastructure needs including roads, schools, amenities, and training of local
workforce in skills necessary for the business, plus tax and other rebates [4,5].
Internationally, states have set up trade missions and sent delegations overseas
seeking access to markets in other countries for their products and soliciting foreign
investments in the state [1, p. 379; 6]. In the latter situation, the state clearly operates
within the legal and political constraint that the federal government alone conducts
the nations foreign policy. Thus, states cannot engage in any economic activities
with nations where such activities are restricted or prohibited by US foreign policy.
In any case, state activism in seeking greater economic opportunity for its citizenry
has a long, well-established history. An unsupportive state politician would be
unlikely to survive long politically.
Transportation infrastructure in the form of canals, roads, railroads, turnpikes, and
airports was one original and major object of state activity [2, pp. 52223]. The goal
227 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
is to ease the movement of goods, people, and services both within the state and
across state lines. Ease of accessibility facilitated economic development, which was
the goal. State-supported spaceport initiatives represent the latest wave in this histori-
cal process. The states again are being lobbied to step forward to foster what until
recently was only a fantasy of enthusiasts, similar to the dreamers who pushed steam
earlier and the twentieth century advocates of air travel. The states in this situation
truly have become laboratories of democracy or diversity since there presently exists
no established path.
The ve states examined briey here are struggling to create an institutional
arrangement in order to provide for economic development. Older solutions have
proven less useful as the states cope with an increasingly globalized economy. One
obvious analogy is to directly compare spaceports to their predecessors, airports [7].
As will be detailed, that analogy is not necessarily a useful one in some instances,
since spaceports were at rst more directly tied to federal priorities. Airports moved
more quickly to the use of private and non-federal public arrangments, i.e., municipal
airports. Spaceports began in an environment characterized by international and
national security concerns, all of which hampered development although in more
recent years a falloff in launch demand has become an issue that clouds the future
even more than security questions.
Space policy is an arena where the international ramications are especially potent;
therefore working out a solution demands greater exibility and openness to change.
Clark and Saiz [2] describe three general economic developmental strategies pursued
by states: (1) infrastructure development, (2) locational incentives, and (3) entrepren-
eurial. Infrastructure development is the most traditional creation of physical xed
assets for use by private economic agents. At the federal level, the Corps of Engineers
has created many such assets, while states have provided highways, sewers, and
water treatment plants. The locational incentives approach seeks to reduce the costs
of doing business relative to other states, such as reduced taxes. Entrepreneurial
approaches encourage new areas of economic activity, especially high-tech ende-
avors. State spaceports, as I will discuss, are engaged in all three activities although
they mostly began from an infrastructure perspective since they either had to build
new launch sites or signicantly modify existing federal launch facilities.
The physical possibility of state spaceports did not exist until the 1980s when the
federal government, under the impetus of the Reagan Administrations commitment
to downsize government, rst opened the door [8]. That administration moved with
mixed success toward fostering greater commercial engagement in space activity.
The commercial boom of the early 1980s was heightened by the hype associated
with the space shuttle which rst ew in 1981. The shuttle was projected to lower
ight costs by several factors and provide rapid turnaround between ights. None
of that occurred, so the space commerce boom was forced to move forward based
on other factors, including increased use of different launch vehicles.
However, the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (subsequently modied in
1988 and 1998 to enhance commercial space opportunities) established the possibility
of state spaceports although they would operate within the strict purview of federal
and international rules. The international legal regime effectively prohibited any non-
228 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
governmental space activities, although commercial and other participants could be
licensed by the federal government. In addition, launch technologies became less
cumbersome, raising the possibility of private launches. The rst private launch
(unsuccessful) occurred in 1982, but that effort forced needed changes in the regulat-
ory processes [9]. Finally, the end of the Cold War loosened the strict national secur-
ity regime aimed at preventing technology transfer to possible adversaries. The com-
bination of these factors domestic politics, technology improvements, and changes
in the international context created the original opportunity for states, as states,
to move into the eld.
3. Location as a function of technology
Not all states have seriously contemplated the prospect of establishing a state
spaceport, although the list is longer than one might expect. Two interrelated vari-
ables structure the choice or even consideration of the issue: location and the current
developmental status of space launch technology. The interactive effects of these
variables eliminates some potential candidates and encourages others. In this
instance, technology directly drives the locational choice, eliminating some states
while pushing others forward. For example, New Mexicos spaceport proposal, as
will be discussed briey, is premised upon development of a particular launch tech-
nology, the reusable launch vehicle (RLV), becoming operational and commercially
viable. Traditional space launch technology, the expendable launch vehicle (ELV),
operates by dropping stages or segments of the vehicle off while in ight in order
to reduce drag and weight. Thus, ELVs are most safely own over uninhabited areas,
which means that in the United States they are usually own out over the ocean.
Clearly, that coastal location is not an absolute requirement since Russia and China
both launch from inland areas. However, in Chinas case, that decision has resulted
in signicant loss of life in at least one launch accident. New Mexicos launch site
location is isolated from most population centers but by emphasizing RLV tech-
nology, most of the launch vehicle is sent into orbit and returned. Space shuttles
returning from orbit routinely overy populated areas when landing in either Califor-
nia or Florida. Obviously there are risks involved, but they are deemed manageable
even though the returning orbiter is not powered and has all the gliding characteristics
of a plunging rock.
Regardless, since most current and projected launch vehicles embody ELV
designs, states along the United States coastal areas are most likely to pursue such
options for economic development. As will be discussed, the major state spaceport
initiatives emphasize their location for safety and ease of operations including access
by customers. California, Florida, New Mexico, and Virginia also are exploiting
existing federal facilities at least partially. Only Alaska operates a totally state-owned
and run facility that is being built on Kodiak Island in the Gulf of Alaska, although
federal funds have been used.
Ones location on the earth has effects upon commercial launch prospects in sev-
eral other ways. For example, some sites the Kennedy Space Center (KSC)
229 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
cannot launch polar orbiting satellites, while sites closer to the equator benet from
the earths rotation, thus allowing larger payloads to be lifted to orbit at less cost;
a signicant commercial advantage. States within the US are limited as to the latter
aspect, but the polar orbiting question is a real consideration. In fact, location rep-
resents an advantage for different states in terms of launch direction and ease of
access for potential customers. How these respective facets will ultimately play out
remains unknown and is part of the evaluative process by the private sector which
is being enticed to use facilities that are being developed.
4. State spaceports: diversity across the states
4.1. Florida Spaceport Authority
In 1989, the State of Florida established the rst state-run spaceport called the
Spaceport Florida Authority (SFA). As originally envisioned, the SFA would exploit
the existing infrastructure at Cape Canaveral Air Station (the Air Forces Eastern
Test Range) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASAs spaceport). Unfortunately, the
economy turned down shortly after its establishment, limiting the availability of state
support owing to the unpredictable nature of the states sales tax revenues. Therefore,
the Authority pursued a variety of options to further economic development within
the state. Each option has a linkage to space activity but not necessarily in the form
originally envisioned as strictly supporting space launch activity.
The SFA is authorized under Florida Statutes (Chapter 331, Part Two) as a public
agency, but it has the authority to act as if it was a private entity. This provides the
exibility deemed necessary to work with either industry or the federal government
(and, by extension, international partners). The SFA has responsibility for space
transportation activities (broadly dened), other space-related economic develop-
ment, academic programs, and tourism development. In pursuit of these responsi-
bilities, the Authority has moved through several phases.
Initially, the thrust was heavily upon space launches since that remains the domi-
nant component of the space industry located in Florida. The catch was that the Air
Force (AF) operator of the Eastern Test Range was not terribly receptive, seeing
such activities as interfering with its national security mission and as clearly a sec-
ondary or even tertiary priority to AF missions. The SFA, therefore, in 1991 began
launching small rockets in Mexico, Cape San Blas in the Florida Panhandle (that
site was later destroyed by Hurricane Opal), and off Cape Canaveral. The launch of
a Brazilian satellite was possible only because it involved a Pegasus launch off the
Florida coast and did not lift off directly from an AF launch pad. The Pegasus is a
light-weight lifter which is launched by being air dropped from a L-1011 at about
30,000 feet, accelerating into low earth orbit (LEO). The AF provided range safety
support but otherwise had minimal involvement. The Spaceport has encountered
many more challenges than expected given bureaucratic inertia within the DOD
regarding access to federal facilities. As a result, using the discretion provided by
state law, the SFA pursued several options while continuing development of a semi-
230 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
independent launch facility semi-independent in that the DOD, through the AF,
continued to tightly control ight scheduling and range safety, meaning ultimately
access to their facility.
At rst, the primary focus was on conversion of Launch Complex 46 into a com-
mercially viable facility [10]. Access was controlled by the Navy rather than the AF,
a factor that eased SFA activities since the Navy foresaw only limited future need
for its facility; most of their missile test launches occur off the coast from submar-
ines. The use agreement, however, mandates that any physical changes made to the
facility must preserve the capability for launches by Navy missiles if required in the
unknown future. Launch Complex 46 is intended to be the worlds rst multi-user
launch pad for new commercial rockets [11]. Funding was derived from DOD ($6.2
million), industry ($1.3 million), and the Florida Department of Transportation
($487,000) sources. The latter reects the designation of space launch as another
form of transportation eligible for DOT funding.
The rst scheduled launch was to be in September 1997 with a NASA Lunar
Pathnder payload scheduled on a LMLV-2 (now Athena 2) vehicle, but the launch
was delayed until early 1998 [12]. The vehicle nally lifted off successfully in 1998.
Today, the intention is to expand up to 1012 launches a year. Signicantly more
may occur if alternate launch systems such as Pegasus are based in the area. The
SFA has proposed building a hangar for use by such systems. In response to a
rapidly changing marketplace, the SFA is moving to renovate Launch Complex 20
to accommodate launch-on-demand for small vehicles. There are situations when a
satellite fails in orbit and a replacement needs to be launched quickly. The SFA is
moving to provide that capability especially for military customers for whom lapsed
time may be critical [13]. This, however, assumes that recent reforms at the federal
level will become effective. Otherwise, launches will still remain multi-month or
year-long affairs.
Bridging the gap between SFAs founding in 1989 and the operationalization of
LC 46 in 1997 was a series of creative projects. For example, a Titan IV facility
for storage of solid rocket boosters was constructed at Camp Blanding, a state-owned
military facility near Jacksonville. The SFA operated as developer and construction
project coordinator, with funding from a combination of commercial loans and AF
funding of rail transportation upgrades. The SFA earned a fee and pays off the loan
through rents received from Lockheed Martin, builder of the Titan IV. The state
itself benets from sales tax revenues from the lease payments. A second more
passive project was that of nancier of the Apollo/Saturn V Center. A tourist attrac-
tion opened in December 1996 at KSC, through ticket sales surcharges the Center
repays the loan obtained by SFA. The SFA only holds the loan, having no operating
responsibilities. This project comes as part of its tourism development mandate.
Ongoing projects (aside from LC 46 and LC 20) included a Customer Service
Center which supports commercial space industry needs. This involved converting
an existing state facility at the Cape Canaveral Air Station to handle tasks necessary
to completing commercial space missions, including in-service training and broader
educational programs. For example, through the Florida Space Institute, an afliated
organization, hands-on training in payload processing and satellite technologies can
231 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
be provided. The Florida Space Institute is a multi-university Florida consortium that
supports the space industry. A longer-term goal is to open the SFA facilities to
various international launch competitors including possibly Russian, Ukrainian, and
Israeli launch vehicles [1416]. This is a logical extension of the SFAs existing
program but it remains controversial. US agged space launch companies are against
allowing foreign carriers to enter the US to launch, thus undercutting their prices.
The largest challenge facing the SFA and by necessity the KSC is the
proposed Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs) under development by NASA and the
DOD. As presently envisioned, RLVs are launch vehicles (called single stage to
orbit or SSTO) that y to orbit and return essentially in one piece, similar to an
airplane. Currently, launch vehicles (including the space shuttle) drop parts off
(boosters and fuel tank) as they ascend to orbit. Thus, the shuttle is only partially
reusable since the fuel tank is lost and the solid rocket boosters may be too damaged
for reuse. And as noted earlier, for the same reasons, multi-stage ELV rockets require
areas effectively devoid of human inhabitants for safety purposes. Thus, the major
federal spaceports (Vandenberg in California, Cape Canaveral and KSC in Florida,
and Wallops in Virginia) were established along the US coastlines.
In principle, RLVs also require a safety zone, but one that is much less extensive,
more like an airport. In fact, early test ights of the X-33 RLV demonstrator were
to occur completely over land, and later ights would have passed over populated
areas (albeit not heavily populated). While no one envisions ying over New York
City, the geographic location of older spaceports would not be as critical in the new
era. RLV ight technologies are only developmental at this point, but their potential
for forcing change is unsettling and their ultimate impact unclear. The goal of the
RLV technology effort, at least for NASA, is replacement of the space shuttle and
much of the expendable launch vehicle eet [17].
In response, the SFA and the KSC, plus industrial players, have organized into a
Florida RLV Support Committee whose purpose is to attract RLV development to
Florida as their primary or at least equally used launch facility. Initiated by local
Republican Congressman Dave Weldon, this committee began pushing development
of a new space/aviation facility adjacent to the space shuttle landing facility where
shuttles are processed for reight. The facility would consist of a hangar-like building
for the processing of RLVs, including at one time the now defunct NASA X-34
vehicle [18].
The uncertainties inherent in the RLV eld were driven home in early March 2001
when NASA effectively cancelled two RLV programs the X-33 VentureStar and
the X-34 Pathnder. This occurred because of extreme difculties getting certain
technologies to work successfully; they were characterized as not mature enough for
immediate use. Therefore, a new Space Launch Initiative (SLI) was launched to
address the RLV, including signicantly more federal funding. This initiative pro-
poses spending $4.8 billion over ten years to create the next-generation RLV. The
SFA can only observe these actions and await the nal outcome. Meanwhile, for
the indenite future, ELVs will continue as the primary means by which payloads
other than humans reach orbit.
For the SFA, the issue now is whether the small ELV launcher market can grow
232 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
sufciently to support such an effort. There are two difculties: the small-end ELV
market is limited because most are tied directly to national ag payloads, or the
payloads y on large rockets in multiple sets. Small payloads are often small research
satellites whose owners lack the resources or incentives to seek out launchers from
outside their nation state. The larger threat to the small ELV market is that, for
example, the Ariane 5 can lift multiple payloads simultaneously. Thus, the demand
for small ELVs is lessened. The Iridium satellite eet (66 plus 6 spares) ew to
orbit in multiple sets. Small ELVs could have own replacements into orbit but
Iridium went bankrupt only to return in a much reduced form with an uncertain
future. Whether replacements will be necessary is unknown. These uncertainties
plague the efforts of all states, as the market changes so rapidly that planning
becomes difcult.
4.2. California
In some respects, Californias efforts to establish a state spaceport appeared to be
the antithesis of the Florida model in that at rst it was more directly a private-sector-
driven approach. The argument is that such an approach permits greater exibility to
meet rapidly changing market needs. Californias interest in establishing a state spa-
ceport grew out of the double hit the states economy absorbed in the early 1990s.
As the national economy slowed in 19921993, then entered a recession, California
also confronted the onslaught of defense industry restructuring and consolidation in
the aftermath of the Cold Wars end. As a result, the states economy temporarily
collapsed, especially in southern California. One response was a proposal for a state-
run spaceport to be located at Vandenberg Air Force Base. The proposal was prem-
ised on the idea that Space Launch Complex 6 (SLC-6 or Slick 6) be refurbished
and renovated to accommodate commercial launches. Slick 6 had been converted to
a space shuttle launch facility in the mid-1980s by the AF but was immediately
mothballed without ever being used after the Challenger accident.
Organizationally, California has established several different institutions to handle
various facets of their spaceport efforts. That separation into distinct parts created
some early controversy over the proper relationship between the private and public
sector. In 1992, the Western Commercial Space Center (WCSC) was the host organi-
zation, providing the organizational basis for several subsidiary entities. In 1993, the
California Legislature designated WCSC as the California Spaceport Authority, an
act that clearly established its lead role in fostering state support for commercial
space operations. Under the umbrella of WCSC, the California Commercial Space-
port, Inc. (CCSI) functions as its operational arm. Initially, CCSI was responsible
for developing Slick 6. That responsibility was spun off to a joint venture called
Spaceport Systems International (SSI). The major corporate sponsor is ITT, which
invested $100 million. This joint venture developed and operates the California Spa-
ceport, providing a full spectrum of worldwide launch services. The rst launch
occurred in August 1997 with a NASA satellite using an Athena 2. The Spaceport
enables polar orbiting LEO, MEO, and sun-synchronous orbits. The facilities allow
processing and launching of small to medium payloads on Delta Il rockets larger
233 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
than those own from Florida. The Integrated Processing Facility is a modication
of the original shuttle program structure as is the launch pad. Building on this pre-
existing infrastructure provides the Spaceport much greater payload capacity than
otherwise would have been constructed originally. The Spaceport operates under
the auspices of the 30th Space Wing, the AF operator responsible for the Western
Test Range.
To further confuse matters, in 1996 the Central Coast Regional Technology
Alliance received state designation as the California Space Technology Alliance
(CSTA). In 1998, this organization was designated as the California Spaceport Auth-
ority. As a result of this organizational proliferation, the original parent organization,
the Western Commercial Space Center, concentrated its efforts on fostering education
and research. For example, its Highway to Space program works to foster RLV
technologies. The goal is to provide inexpensive access to space in order to create
opportunities for university research projects and hands-on experience in space sys-
tems. In early 2001, the WCSC and CSTA merged into the California Space Auth-
ority. Increasing competition and uncertainty about the future launch market forced
this consolidation in order to enhance competitiveness.
Californias spaceport confronts several serious competitors, including Florida,
Alaska, and some commercial enterprises. For example, a commercial venture called
Sea Launch operates out of southern California. This partnership between Boeing
and three international partners involves transporting rockets with their payloads out
into the Pacic Ocena for launch using Zenith rockets. This location increases the
size of payloads that can be lifted to geosynchronous orbit due to the earths rotation.
The primary advantage remains location given that the major US satellite builders
(Lockheed Martin, Hughes, and Loral) are located in the region. This proximity
facilitates access to the spaceport, reducing their costs of operation, and allowing
satellite vendors to more easily process their payloads prior to launch all advan-
tages touted by the California Space Authority.
4.3. Alaska
The State of Alaska was an unexpected competitor given its distance from the
lower 48 states and its harsher physical climate. The state organizational base is the
Alaska Aerospace Development Corporation, a public corporation chartered to oper-
ate the launch complex and full-service satellite ground station facilities in Fairbanks.
The state also has aggressively pursued development of spaceport facilities at the
Kodiak Launch Complex located on Kodiak Island, in the Gulf of Alaska, south of
Cook Inlet [19]. The sites advantages include immediate access to polar orbit and
launching over ocean, thereby reducing risk to people or property. The state has
deliberately distanced its facility from any federal government ties in order to avoid
what they perceive as Floridas federal dependency problems.
The primary virtues of the location are ease of access (being an island) and ready
access to polar orbit. Light-end payloads, including comsats, remote sensing, and
government scientic payloads, are envisioned as economic justication for the
facility. These smaller rockets require less processing time on the pad, meaning
234 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
smaller ground crews and less infrastructure development. With the 1995 change in
the partisan composition of Congress, Alaska also has been able to call upon Senator
Ted Stevens for support since he chairs the Appropriations Committee. That political
connection is central to successful development of the requisite infrastructure to con-
duct larger-scale ight operations. A federal grant has helped pay for development,
and the DOD has launched small payloads from the complex [20].
Prior to this development, a sounding rocket facility operated at Poker Flats,
located closer to the Arctic Circle. This facility, however, has obvious access and
weather problems that make it less attractive than Kodiak Island. Thus the Kodiak
facility will continue in operation because it brings certain physical phenomena into
reach that otherwise are unaccessible. Combining the two facilities is unlikely to
occur, although Poker Flats will remain marginally economical and operational.
NASAs space science program is currently its only customer, but that budget is
declining as the international space station comes on-line. In addition, NASA also
ies sounding rockets from Wallops Island in Virginia and Woomera in Australia,
and Canada is developing a competitor, SpacePort Canada, near Hudson Bay [21].
4.4. New Mexico
The initiative being developed by the State of New Mexico represents the most
uncertain of those currently underway. The Southwest Space Complex envisions
establishing the functional equivalent of an airport-type facility at White Sands Pro-
ving Ground [22]. The proposal is predicated on the expectation that RLVs will y
successfully, both technically and commercially. Flying such vehicles reduces the
demand for extremely large ight safety zones. That correlates to the airport analogy
in which safety zones are constructed on the assumption that ight accidents are
comparatively rare in terms of danger to the individuals and property on the ground.
New Mexico is lightly populated in the areas surrounding the proposed Spaceport,
thus further reducing those concerns.
The real gamble is whether RLVs become commercially viable and large enough
numbers y that existing spaceports cannot handle the resulting trafc volume. If
either of these assumptions fall by the wayside, then survival of New Mexicos
project becomes doubtful. However, geography aids this proposal in an interesting
way. The major US satellite builders, primary providers of payloads, are for the most
part located along the Pacic Coast. Cost-wise, this factor might prove a marginal
advantage given that the existing state spaceports already have developed procedures
and infrastructures to handle such payloads. New Mexicos legislature has provided
authority to operate and some initial funding but the future lies in the actions of
others.
In a fundamental sense, this proposal is the most speculative of any currently being
developed. RLV technology is under active development despite the cancellation of
the X-33 (a joint NASALockheed Martin project), but commercial ight even if
successful is likely a decade or more away. Alternative RLV approaches by private
consortiums are underway but their success remains problematic. In fact, most are
already failing due to investment capital shortages; their efforts are viewed as too
235 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
speculative. RLV ight enthusiasts were especially excited by the initial success of
the now-defunct Graham Delta Clipper, a subscale prototype SSTO vehicle [23]. The
difculty comes in scaling up that approach or others to meet commercial demand. If
success is achieved, the economics and technological demands of the eld change
completely. The problem is if. New Mexico is preparing the groundwork, but other
participants outside its control must complete their technological development goals.
Even more critical, as already indicated, traditional competitors like Florida are also
attempting to position themselves so they are not left out of the RLV revolution
when it nally arrives.
4.5. Virginia
At NASAs Wallops Island Facility on Virginias eastern shore, a continual cam-
paign of rocket and other high-altitude ights has occurred since 1947, even before
Cape Canaveral. Most of the early vehicles were high-altitude balloons or sounding
rockets such as Black Bart rockets that ew into suborbital space and promptly
fell back to earth. Exposure to microgravity and/or radiation of the payload usually
occurred within fteen minutes or less. Early solar physics was built upon obser-
vations drawn from such short duration ights. James Van Allen, of Van Allen Radi-
ation Belt fame, whose radiation detector ew to orbit in 1958 on Explorer I, began
his research career through such ights.
The Commonwealth of Virginia established the Virginia Commercial Space Flight
Authority as the institutional mechanism by which to exploit the commercial poten-
tial of Wallops Island in particular and to promote space-related business in Virginia
in general. The Authority is governed by an eleven-member board appointed by
the Governor. The Authoritys partners include the Virginia Economic Development
Partnership, Old Dominion University, NASA, Virginians Center for Innovative
Technology, and private industry.
In pursuit of its goals, in the spring of 1997 the Authority signed a thirty-year
agreement with NASA giving it access to the facilities [24]. The Flight Center pro-
vides corporations with a site to conduct payload, vehicle, and launch preparations. A
second launch pad is being constructed to facilitate operations, thus reducing ground-
processing times. The Flight Center already holds a ve-year $6 million contract
from the Air Force for launch of its Minutemen II/Orbital-Sub-orbital scientic pay-
loads. This ight program involves refurbishing obsolete Minutemen missiles as
cheap, lightweight, satellite launchers. Access to these vehicles is restricted to non-
prot, educational, and other designated organizations that otherwise could not afford
access to outer space. This access restriction exists to protect smaller commercial
launch vendors from losing potential customers to this subsidized ight option. The
long-range goal of the Authority is to achieve an annual ight rate of eight orbital
and four sub-orbital ights, a distant prospect at this point.
Similar to the Florida spaceport, the Authority has pursued international launch
companies as possible customers. The most active competition between the two was
for the Israeli Shavit rocket. Virginia was already encountering difculties with a
EuropeanRussian consortium vehicle called ROCKOT because of problems in
236 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
meeting environmental protection standards and restrictions on foreign participation
[25]. Regardless, the Authority continues aggressively pursuing available options
whether private or government-based.
Expanded state access to Wallops Island came as the result of the fact that NASA,
confronting signicant budget cuts, was searching for ways to downsize while not
losing total access to existing launch facilities. The Virginia Authority became that
mechanism, enabling NASA to scale down its operations. In 1995, there were serious
intra-agency discussions regarding closing Wallops Island as one possible budget
option. Being among the smallest facilities run by NASA, its loss was deemed most
acceptable within the agency. The ights out of Wallops Island could be moved to
other locations, an option clearly desired by others such as Alaska or Florida.
4.6. Others, hopefuls and long shots
Other states have also picked up the scent of economic potential in spaceports.
Most have clearly been excluded earlier by safety issues raised with the use of ELVs
and the uncertainties inherent in the whole launch process. Early rocket tests often
had fty percent failure rates until the technology was improved. Even today rockets
still have a signicant loss rate, especially during the launch phase meaning
exploding fuel and debris may be scattered some distance. The now-cancelled X-33
program solicited states to consider developing a spaceport within their borders. At
least eleven states responded with some degree of public interest and specicity.
Those included Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, North Carol-
ina, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington. Hawaii was an early possibility but
that faltered due to community opposition, especially by native Hawaiians [26].
Texas in fact identied three potential sites for possible VentureStar spaceports [27].
With the cancellation of both of NASAs RLV programs, most of these other
proposals will go on hold or fade away completely. The Space Launch Initiative
remains a decade or more away from producing a viable ight vehicle, let alone a
commercially useful one. States pursue multiple economic opportunities, and space-
ports are only one arrow in their quiver. For the established space launch states, the
stakes are higher.
5. Assessing the eld
As is clear from these brief summaries of ongoing state spaceport initiatives, there
is no consensus regarding the most optimal path to pursue. Except partially for Vir-
ginia, most spaceports have had to engage in signicant infrastructure development
in order to become active participants. The degree of such activity reects the status
of the launch site when the state activity was permitted access. Privatization of fed-
eral launch facilities has been a slow process given the militarys concerns about
future national security needs. In addition, the launch industry has only slowly con-
fronted the changed world within which it operates, and moves toward the private
sector have been slow, reecting inertia and a previously comfortable relationship
237 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
with the federal government. Competitive pressures, especially international, are
eroding that comfort level, making the launch industry more amenable to considering
other options.
External constraints exist that channel how such endeavors can be organized and
operated but those constraints are moving in different directions. The federal govern-
ment, the most immediate constraint because it is the conduit through which inter-
national restrictions get operationalized, is moving, albeit erratically, to accommodate
development of new enterprises. In September 1997, the FAA, DOD, and NASA
signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) establishing their respective roles in
the licensing and support of commercial spaceports including state-run initiatives.
The technicalities of the Agreement are less critical than the fact that the federal
government is now actively moving to accommodate such activities by coordinating
its activities in a signicant way. A major ongoing complaint has been the existence
of conicting, even contradictory, federal rules and policies which hamper any pro-
gress toward greater private sector involvement [28]. This Agreement followed two
presidential directives, one on the subject of space transportation (1994) and the
other on space policy (1996), both of which generally advocated an enhanced role
for non-federal government players.
This MOA was followed by several reports that dealt with the general question
of US space launch bases and ranges. These are the federal spaceports, if you
will the Eastern Test Range (the Cape) and the Western Test Range (Vandenberg).
The AF, which operates both, is being challenged by the growth in commercial
launches (approximately 40 percent of the total) since the AF is not funded for those
activities. The debate is over how to improve both test ranges plus how to pay for
the improvements since the commercial sector prots from the expenditures. Existing
federal law denes private-sector use as allowable only if excess launch capacity
exists [29]. The state spaceports, except for Alaska and partially Virginia, are directly
impacted by these discussions and whatever decisions result.
It has been suggested that four distinct options exist for future operation of the
test ranges. Those are: (1) publicprivate partnerships; (2) commercial operations;
(3) national, state, or regional spaceport authorities; or (4) full federal funding [29,
p. 1823]. Obviously, the third option is optimal for state spaceports. But, in testi-
mony before Congress, the Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Air Force Space Launch Facilities, Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., pronounced the commer-
cial operations and national, state, or regional spaceport authorities unacceptable
options [30]. That position reects military reluctance to give up control until pressed
hard by signicant political forces. That statement, made since Aldridge joined the
new Bush Administration DOD, may indicate much slower movement toward greater
exibility in federal spaceport operations.
By contrast, the international legal space regime continues to be indifferent, if not
hostile, to such private or nonfederal activities unless rmly controlled by national
governments. Thus, the degree of exibility available to state spaceports remains
bounded by external limitations as translated through the federal government. While
there is already some exibility, the issue is how much exibility the federal govern-
ment is willing to permit given its responsibilities internationally.
238 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
The various state spaceport initiatives have tracked quite well the changing
national economic parameters within which such efforts become potentially viable.
Floridas original effort began in 1989 just prior to the cataclysmic events of the
Cold Wars end which completely altered the policy environment. Floridas concept
reected an effort to exploit the language embodied in the earlier 1984 Space Launch
Commercialization Act. Being the forerunner under those conditions had two distinct
effects. First, it welded the program in the beginning to the old paradigm of govern-
ment-funded and -run launch facilities. The Authority attempted to work within those
parameters just as they began mutating toward a different set of conditions. Second,
the Authority suffered through the economic recession of the early 1990s which
delayed any commercial success by depleting potential investment sources, whether
private or through the State of Florida.
California came slightly later but that delay was sufcient to create different policy
contexts, both governmentally and privately. For the rst time private investors could
perceive some likelihood of sufcient economic return. That rate of return meant
that more money was made available to develop the physical infrastructure necessary
for launches, which in turn positioned them more quickly in the market. California
also beneted from the fact that Slick 6 was not desired by its builder the Air Force;
therefore, there were virtually no restrictions on limited use as had occurred in Flor-
ida with the Navy and renovation of Launch Complex 46. Alaska, a late starter, has
made a virtue out of its lack of federal spaceport facilities, citing its independence.
However, the downside is that its physical distance from potential users limits its
viability and adds costs. Despite the rhetoric, Alaska has attempted through its Con-
gressional delegation (small but strategically placed in the case of Senator Ted
Stevens) to leverage federal involvement by obtaining a DOD grant to develop the
site and mandate several launches from Alaska [31].
The dilemma facing all state spaceports is the simple fact that the market for
launches remains unknown but nite [32]. No one can accurately predict which
launch vehicles will nd customers; therefore, decisions about what size and type
launch facility to build remain gambles. A wrong choice may render a particular
spaceport unusable for certain launch vehicles. Generic launch facilities require spe-
cial modications to accommodate different vehicles, raising the cost of doing busi-
ness and possibly imposing delays on follow-up launches by other vendors. Central
to these proposals is that they will be cheaper and faster than federal government
or international equivalents. Impediments to achieving those goals render them less
viable [13].
More troublesome is the fact that international competitors continue to develop
equivalent launch systems. Given uctuations in currency exchange rates, the state
spaceports can be undersold price-wise. The one factor that reduces the effect of
price is that the small satellites, which are an international speciality, are usually of
insufcient economic value to justify an international carrier competing for the
launch. The exception is when multiple satellite systems y, such as Globalstar (28
comsats) or Teledesic (288 comsats), there exists the technical likelihood that the
satellites can be launched in clusters. In late 1997 and early 1998, Iridium (a 66
comsat constellation) was launched in clusters of ve by larger launch vehicles. By
239 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
skimming the market, the larger ELVs leave many fewer launches for the smaller
vehicles of the type to be own out of state spaceports. The point is that the state
spaceports compete not just in a national but an international marketplace, one in
which they remain very small players. Niche markets are ne as long as the niche
remains in place but its narrowness limits exibility. Plus, the niche can evaporate
when the market changes.
One aspect of state spaceports that appears to have surprised the policy
entrepreneurs who rst pushed through the programs is the degree to which they
have had to generate their own business. Despite the entrepreneurial nature of what
they were doing, most approached the issue from an infrastructure perspective. Satel-
lite launches are occurring continually, but that market has been slow to move in the
direction of these purportedly cheaper alternative launch venues. In effect, through
education programs and small business alliances, the spaceports must generate a
market for their services. This was partially a result of the technology lag briey
discussed earlier, where small and medium launch technologies have been slow to
come to fruition. But more interesting is the fact that the spaceport programs,
especially those in Florida, California and Virginia, are partially retracing the foot-
steps of earlier transportation innovations. For example, as railroads spread across
the country, they had to generate sufcient paying trafc to justify the investments.
One method was to create a local population that needed the railroads services.
Therefore, recruiters went to Europe, bringing migrants to the Plains and Western
states to populate the land, creating the potential markets necessary for railroads to
survive. State spaceports have encountered the same situation: they have had to popu-
late the eld with participants who in the future will require their services.
Originally, the assumption was that sufcient demand existed, even if initially
latent. One had only to build these new lower-cost facilities and everyone would
come. The conceptual model was that of the airport, a proven source of economic
growth for many communities. In that situation, usually the market already existed,
and expansion of the airport allowed more ights thus increasing the faciltys econ-
omic multiplier effect. For state spaceports, the demand has been weak or nonexistent
and what existed could be satised in principle by using existing federal launch
facilities. One had to generate demand across a broad front of activities. Traditional
sources of space business are hard to wean from their federal partners. Conversely,
reliance upon only a single or predominantly single source for payloads was also
likely to be counterproductive over the long term. As a number of players have
discovered, even NASA is not immune to down cycles. NASAs xation on the
International Space Station has limited its launch needs for smaller vehicles [33].
The result is a situation in which state spaceports have been forced to become more
imaginative and innovative than they originally envisioned. The very circumstances
of change that made these initiatives possible have not stopped churning the waters.
6. Conclusion
State spaceports fall clearly within the parameters of state economic development
policy efforts. But, despite their exotic product, such efforts have proven a mixture
240 R. Handberg / Technology in Society 24 (2002) 225241
of the mundane and the imaginative rather than following one of the developmental
strategies identied earlier. Clearly, there is an entrepreneurial policy aspect as space-
ports work to generate other participants whose economic growth will in the future
create business for the spaceport. That indirect approach mirrors the incubator
approach pursued in other contexts within state economic efforts. Thus, state space-
ports have their eyes on the heavens but their feet are rmly grounded on the earth.
Space activity justies itself economically only by its impact on the Earth. These
endeavors are working to accomplish that goal.
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Roger Handberg is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida. He has actively
published in the elds of public policy generally with particular emphasis upon space policy, defense policy
and judicial policy. His work has appeared in ve books, 140 articles and over 110 professional papers. The
most recent work has been in the area of space policy with regards to the military and the burgeoning priv-
ate sector.