People v Boholst-Caballero [61 SCRA 180 (1974)]

Facts:
Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI of Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricideshe allegedly killed her husband, Francisco
Caballero, using a hunting knife. The couple was married in 1956 and had a daughter. They had frequent quarrels due to the husband's gambling and drinking
and there were times when he maltreated and abused his wife. After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family. In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with
her friends and when she was on her way home she met her husband who suddenly held her by the collar and accused her of going out for prostitution. Then he
said he would kill her, held her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then pushed her towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on her and
proceeded to choke her. Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line while holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground,
grabbed the hunting knife and thrust it into her husband's left side, near the belt line just above the thigh. He died2 days after the incident due to the stab
wound. Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she surrendered herself to the police along with the torn dress that she wore the
night before.

Issue:
WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in legitimate self-defense
Held:
Yes, she did. Acquitted

Ratio:
1.Burden if proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this case, the location and nature of the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the husband, was the
aggressor. With her husband kneeling over her and choking her, accused had no other choice but to pull the knife tucked in his belt line and thrust it into his
side. The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity where the knife was drawn from is a strong indication of the truth of the testimony of the accused. Based on
the re-enactment of the incident, it was natural for her to use her right hand to lunge the knife into husband's left side.

2.Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present;

Unlawful aggression.
The husband resorting to pushing her to the ground then choking her just because she was out caroling at night constitutes unlawful aggression, There was
imminent danger of injury.
Reasonable necessity of means employed.
While being choked, Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself.
Reasonable necessity does not depend upon the harm done but on the imminent danger of such injury.
Lack of sufficient provocation.
provocation is sufficient when proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Cunigunda) to
warrant the attack of her husband. All that she did to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband was to be out caroling at night.

ANALYSIS





People V Marivic Genosa
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant
she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical
Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would
reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu
Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in
itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband
and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position
that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to
oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the
appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at
about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the
method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of
domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would
amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the
defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
Intod V CA
FACTS:
Sulpicio Intod and 3 other men went to Salvador Mandayas house to ask him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group had a
meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya
should accompany the 4 men otherwise he would also be killed. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at
Palangpangans house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her
son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder.
Petitioner Intod seeks a modification of the judgment on the ground that he is only liable for an impossible crime {Art. 4(2)}. Petitioner contends that,
Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible. On the other hand,
Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible instead the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod
for attempted murder. Respondent likewise alleged that there was intent. Further, In its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed out that xxx. The crime
of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art 4 (2), RPC), but due to a cause of accident other that
petitioners and his co-accuseds own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the
crime is possible, m not impossible.

ISSUE:
Is petitioner is liable only for an impossible crime?

HELD:
[i]Under Article 4(2) of the RPC, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: 1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 2) the means employed is either a) inadequate or b) ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 1) legal
impossibility, or 2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended act, even if complete would not amount to a crime. Thus: legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances
where 1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 2) there is intention to perform the physical act; 3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and 4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a
person already dead falls in this category.

On the other had, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the cot pocket of another with the intention to steal the latters wallet and finds the pocket
empty.

The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said
place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which render the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
People v Narvaez
Appeal from decision of the CFI of South Cotabato
Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer
and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a
nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if
they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead. Defendant lost his equilibrium, and shot Fleisher with his shotgun.
He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceaseds gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischers
family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil
case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didnt pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in
defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
Issues:
1. WON CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim.
However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err. However, in
consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was
still pending, therefore putting ownership into question. Its accepted that victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defence of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these
requisites:
? Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards appellants property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he
should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaezs house and putting up fence. A536 of the CC also provides that possession may
not be acquired through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
? Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In case, killing was disproportionate to attack.
? Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited w/ the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to A13(6) RPC. These mitigating
circumstances are: voluntary surrender & passion & obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation)
Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault wasnt deliberately
chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill.
Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered 3 degrees (Art.
64) to arresto mayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He isnt liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for non-payment of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of A39 applicable to fines only & not to
reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages & costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its commission, considering
that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to RPC A22.
Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self defense. Penalty is 4 mos. arresto
mayor & to indemnify each group of heirs 4K w/o subsidiary imprisonment & w/o award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained 14 yrs so his
immediate release is ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not
so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

People V Ramos