Sie sind auf Seite 1von 8

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY

(

Quantitative Insights
GARP is Great: Time to Buy Quality Growth


Overview
Many investors have been frustrated by the lack of continuity in market
behavior since the beginning of March. Strategies and styles that were in
favor the second half of 2013 and the first two months of 2014 have
sharply reversed, all in the context of a market that remains near all-time
highs. While major moves in groups of stocks hurt some investors and
help others, they always create opportunities for those focused on
neglected areas of the market. While hyper growth stocks, a main
driver of the 25% S&P 500 return in the year to Feb 2014, have sharply
reversed, there appears to be opportunity in the GARP portion of the
universe, where growth is above average but valuations seem attractive
relative to both hyper growth and deeper value.
What happened? Hyper Sell-off of Hyper Growth
Stocks
Investors have quantified the recent rotation in a number of ways;
focusing on factors (valuation over momentum) and traditional styles
(value over growth). Figure 1 confirms both of these assessments, with
March and April characterized by strong long/short performance from
value (after controlling for other exposures) and significant
underperformance from the growth style. Figure 2 is an alternative way
of decomposing the recent rotation, bucketing stocks by their % Growth
(see box to left), which approximates how much of a firms enterprise
value is represented by future growth opportunities. Stocks with %
Growth > 40%, sometimes characterized as hyper growth stocks,
typically only represent about 10% of large cap market capitalization but
have recently represented much of the markets overall weakness.
























Market Commentary 15 April 2014
Key Insights:
Hedge Fund deleveraging has recently
accentuated a sell-off in hyper growth/strong
momentum stocks in the US.

With the multiple on the US market now
back in-line with history and multiple
dispersion among most US stocks
approaching historic lows, buyers must
differentiate on factors other than
valuation. Instead of picking stocks that
appear to be at a discount, focus on stocks
that should have a premium.

GARP is currently a sweet spot in the US
market - valuations are reasonable relative to
history and GARP names have
characteristics that should appeal to investors
in the current environment.
Adam Steffanus, CFA
+1 312 345 6193
adam.steffanus@credit-suisse.com

David Rones, CFA
+1 212 325 2427
david.rones@credit-suisse.com

Figure 1: The Valuation factor rotated into favor while
Momentum reversed. Value styles outperformed growth


-3.8%
0.3%
2.3%
-6.7%
-7.0%
-6.7%
5.2%
-2.9% -3.0%
8.1%
4.7%
4.1%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
Val uati on Momentum Qual i ty S&P Pure
Val ue -
Growth
S&P 500
Val ue -
Growth
Russel l
1000
Val ue -
Growth
F
a
c
t
o
r

&

S
t
y
l
e

L
o
n
g
/
S
h
o
r
t

R
e
t
u
r
n
s
Styl e & Factor Performance
Aug '13 - Feb '14
March - April 2014
Figure 2: The biggest underperformers have been
stocks with the highest growth expectations



11%
17% 17%
35%
-1%
-3%
-4%
-12%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
% Growth
< 10%
% Growth
10% - 20%
% Growth
20% - 40%
% Growth
>40%
Core & Val ue GARP GARP Hyper Growth
Average Return by % Growth (Present Val ue of
Growth Opportuni ti es) Bucket
Aug'13 - Feb '14
Mar - Apr 2014
HOLT % Growth approximates how much of
a firms EV is represented by its future growth
opportunities, as opposed to its existing
business. Stocks with % Growth > 40% tend
to represent hyper growth expectations. For
details see our full report.

Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Bloomberg
Data Date 4/10/2014

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



2
Are Hedge Funds to Blame? Well, they didnt help

Many have observed that stocks that have recently rotated out of favor
have been names broadly associated with high hedge fund ownership.
Data limitations prevent the impact of hedge fund buying (or selling)
from being fully quantified; however we can see that hedge fund net
long exposure has been declining (Figure 3). Many of the areas where
net long exposure has declined the most are sectors and industries
associated with high growth and strong momentum (see box on right).
Additionally, stocks with high ownership by hedge funds (per ownership
filings) have meaningfully underperformed since the beginning of
March (Figure 4).



































.









Case Study - Hedge Fund Exposure:

Since the beginning of March, the Internet
Software & Services industry has been the
second biggest negative contributor to Russell
1000 returns (only Biotechnology has been
more). While hedge funds significantly
increased net exposure to the industry in early
and mid-2013, net long exposure recently fell to
~30%, close to a 3-year low.







Hedge Funds reducing net long
exposure to Internet stocks



20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Jan-12 Jul-12 Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14
Internet Software & Servi ces
Net Exposure (as % of Gross)
Figure 4: Stocks with high hedge fund exposure have
meaningfully underperformed since the beginning of March






92%
94%
96%
98%
100%
102%
104%
Cumul ati ve Total Return by Hedge
Fund Exposure
High Hedge Fund Ownership
Low Hedge Fund Ownership
Tracking popular hedge fund names:

The HOLT Hedge Fund Exposure screens consist
of companies in the Russell 1000 with less than
25% ownership concentration and turnover
greater than $5mn/day. The High Hedge Fund
Exposure basket consists of the 50 stocks with
the highest hedge fund ownership and the Low
Hedge Fund Exposure basket consists of the 50
companies with the lowest hedge fund ownership,
as collected from public records.






Figure 3: US net long exposure has declined to its lowest
level since August 2012

0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Jan-12 Jul-12 Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14
US Net Exposure (as % of Gross)
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Bloomberg, Data Date 4/10/2014

Source: Credit Suisse Prime Services, Data Date 4/10/2014

Source: Credit Suisse Prime Services, Data Date 4/10/2014


HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



3
What next? Focus on Earnings / Cash Flow growth

Figure 5 demonstrates that while the first stage of the market recovery was driven by improvements in earnings expectations
(viewed as forward 12-month CFROI forecasts), the latter stage has been driven primarily by multiple expansion (see our report
Multiple expansion equals multiple disappointments - Why growth matters now). As we will demonstrate on page 4, hyper
growth stocks contributed to overall multiple expansion, however these represent only a small portion of the market. The
majority of the multiple expansion was driven by low P/E stocks outperforming, leading to P/E multiple convergence. After
eliminating the extremes of the universe (stocks operating at a loss and those with Economic P/E > 50X, about 7% of
stocks), multiple dispersion among US large caps is now at historic lows (i.e. multiples have converged, Figure 6).
























Buyers must differentiate on factors other than price

With the overall valuation of the market back to more normal levels and little pricing discrepancy among most stocks, investors
might need to abandon simple risk-on or relative value strategies. Instead, current conditions should favor investors that can
identify stocks with superior operating quality or growth potential that might warrant a premium (see our recent report Take
Your Pick: Why this market favors the stock picker). In prior periods of low dispersion, a focus on quality and momentum has
generated positive returns while valuation has been a relatively benign signal (Figure 7). Additionally, stocks with above
average quality and momentum characteristics have delivered superior forward looking growth, suggesting they should earn a
premium valuation relative to the market (Figure 8).













Figure 8: High quality and strong momentum are
good predictors of future growth.



0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
5% 7% 9% 11% 13% 15%
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l

g
r
o
w
t
h
Future growth
Five-year CAGR
Sales EPS
high quality & strong
momentum
rest of
market
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Universe: Largest 1000 US stocks by market cap
Average CAGR between Jan 1989 and December 2013
low quality &
weak momentum
Figure 5: While improving profitability forecasts helped
drive the market in 2009-2011, recently it has been
multiple expansion. Forecasted CFROI is now declining.






6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
10x
11x
12x
13x
14x
15x
16x
17x
18x
19x
20x
21x
22x
Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14
Foward Economi c P/ E & CFROI
Forecasted CFROI (rhs) Forward Economic P/E (lhs)
Figure 6: The current degree of dispersion in equity
multiples are approaching historic lows, suggesting
investors are valuing companies similarly.



30%
32%
34%
36%
38%
40%
42%
44%
46%
48%
50%
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
H
O
L
T

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

P
/
E

c
o
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t

o
f

v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
Degree of multiple dispersion
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT as of 3/31/2014
Universe: Largest 1000 companies with 0 < Economic P/E < 50
January 1989 - March 2014
Stocks trade at a wide
range of multiples
Stocks trade at
similar multiples
75th Percentile
(high dispersion)
25th Percentile
(low dispersion)
QE1
QE2
Twist
QE3
Figure 7: In periods of low dispersion, momentum
and quality tend to outperform value.


-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Low Normal High
A
v
e
r
a
g
e

1
2
m

f
o
r
w
a
r
d

L
/
S

r
e
t
u
r
n
Ecomonic P/E Dispersion
Valuation Momentum Quality
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 3/31/2014
Note: Current Economic P/E = 20.3x, 20-year Median = 19.5x
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 4/4/2014

Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 3/31/2014

Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 3/31/2014

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



4
But arent Value Stocks Cheap Relative to Growth Stocks?

No. Aggregate valuation analysis of style indices can be distorted by a
minority of companies with extreme valuations. For example, AMZN
represents a significant weight in most large cap growth indices and
has a traditional P/E of over 160x. While investors understand the
limitations of this measure, this nuance can be easily forgotten when
assessing index level valuations. Using the accounting-adjusted HOLT
Economic P/E (see right box), company valuations are assessed by
their % Growth cohort (similar to Figure 2). Hyper Growth stocks
those where 40% or more of current EV is represented by future
growth opportunities have seen multiples expand relative to the
market over the last year. Even after their recent underperformance,
Hyper growth stock valuations remain at a 75% premium to the
market compared to a long-term median of 66% (Figure 9). Value
stocks - those with % Growth less than 10% - are also unattractively
valued as they are at a slightly smaller discount than their long-term
median. The most attractively valued group appears to be
stocks with high, but not excessive, growth expectations (10-
40%). These GARP stocks typically earn a premium relative
to the market, but currently that premium is below average.

Figure 9: Using HOLT Economic P/E, hyper growth and value
look unattractive while GARP looks undervalued.




Conclusion
Hyper growth stocks have clearly been out of favor, significantly
contributing to the markets recent weakness despite their overall small
representation in large cap indices. Even after their recent
underperformance, their current valuations still warrant caution. That
said, with less scope for multiple expansion in the US and deeper value
stocks also not offering compelling relative value, GARP appears to
be the neglected and attractive pocket of the market. HOLTs
disciplined approach to quantifying growth expectations, combined with
quality and momentum characteristics historically associated with
superior achieved growth, can help investors identify GARP stocks
that should warrant a premium valuation.
75%
9%
2%
-10%
83%
15%
1%
-14%
47%
19%
5%
-12%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
% Growth
> 40%
% Growth
20% - 40%
% Growth
10% - 20%
% Growth
< 10%
A
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e

E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

P
/
E

P
r
e
m
i
u
m

(
D
i
s
c
o
u
n
t
)
Group Val uati on Rel ati ve to the Market - US Large Caps
4/4/2014
2/28/2014
4/30/2013
30 Year Median
"Aggressi ve" /
"Hyper" Growth
(~10% of Mkt Cap)
"GARP"
(~40% of Mkt Cap)
"Core & Val ue"
(~50% of Mkt Cap)
How does HOLT define quality?

HOLT defines quality as superior returns on
capital (CFROI) and achieved growth
characteristics relative to sector peers. High
quality stocks should grow because their high
returns on capital make incremental growth
accretive to investors. Strong momentum
characteristics confirm the markets belief that
they will grow. Companies that exhibit both high
quality and strong momentum characteristics have
historically generated superior forward looking
earnings and sales growth over a medium-term
time horizon (Figure 8).

Benefit of using HOLTs Economic P/E:

Traditional valuation metrics are fraught with
inconsistencies that distort the underlying
economics of a business. HOLT removes
these inconsistencies by focusing on cash
flows generated by the total invested capital
base.

For example, Traditional P/E expenses R&D
which penalizes current earnings, distorts
invested capital, and clouds incremental rates
of return. HOLTs Economic P/E capitalizes
R&D providing a smoother measure that better
reflects the economics of growth.

Amazon (AMZN) Exampl e:

Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, FactSet, I/B/E/S


Economic
P/E
Traditional
P/E
Current 35 161
Average 40 354
10yr High 57 13,275
10yr Low 20 29
StDev 8 1,599
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 4/4/2014

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



5



































Figure 10: Screening for GARP ideas

Screen Criteria: US Large Cap Stocks excluding CFROE Financials
Quality & Momentum: Figure 7 suggests that when dispersion is low, high quality characteristics and strong momentum (CFROI
Revisions & Price Momentum) tend to outperform going forward. The screen identifies firms in the top 2 quintiles of each by sector.
% Growth: Based on relative valuation levels in Figure 9, stocks with above average, but reasonable, growth expectations are
attractively valued relative to deeper value and hyper growth stocks. The screen identifies % Growth between 10% and 40%.
Reasonable Price: Stocks have no more than 20% downside using the HOLT DCF warranted price and are undervalued using the
HOLT % to High DCF scenario, which uses high rather than consensus estimates to generate a systematic bull-case valuation.


Ticker Company Name
Market
Cap $B
Sector Style % Growth % to Best % to High
Return Since
March 2014
GNTX GENTEX CORP 4.2 Consumer Discretionary Core 13% 32% 52% -7.8%
THO THOR INDUSTRIES INC 3.3 Consumer Discretionary Growth 23% 17% 47% 12.8%
BWA BORGWARNER INC 13.8 Consumer Discretionary Growth 22% -1% 15% -0.6%
WYNN WYNN RESORTS LTD 21.3 Consumer Discretionary Growth 38% -15% 12% -12.4%
WYN WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE CORP 9.1 Consumer Discretionary Growth 16% -3% 18% -1.9%
BYI BALLY TECHNOLOGIES INC 2.6 Consumer Discretionary Growth 15% 6% 41% -5.6%
AMCX AMC NETWORKS INC 5.1 Consumer Discretionary Growth 37% -8% 33% -7.7%
VIAB VIACOM INC 36.4 Consumer Discretionary Growth 21% -1% 16% -4.7%
LKQ LKQ CORP 8.2 Consumer Discretionary Growth 26% 32% 54% -1.4%
AZO AUTOZONE INC 17.2 Consumer Discretionary Growth 19% 3% 21% -4.0%
ORLY O'REILLY AUTOMOTIVE INC 15.1 Consumer Discretionary Growth 22% 0% 15% -5.0%
CPB CAMPBELL SOUP CO 13.9 Consumer Staples Core 10% -9% 5% 4.6%
HSY HERSHEY CO 22.1 Consumer Staples Growth 34% -10% 3% -6.5%
CAM CAMERON INTERNATIONAL CORP 13.7 Energy Core 13% 29% 62% -3.0%
CXO CONCHO RESOURCES INC 13.0 Energy Growth 12% 19% 50% 2.5%
BLK BLACKROCK INC 49.9 Financials Core 20% 32% 62% -1.6%
AMTD TD AMERITRADE HOLDING CORP 16.6 Financials Value 38% -4% 22% -9.6%
MCO MOODY'S CORP 16.4 Financials Growth 29% 4% 18% -2.1%
LPLA LPL FINANCIAL HOLDINGS INC 4.9 Financials Core 25% -13% 3% -9.0%
CBOE CBOE HOLDINGS INC 4.4 Financials Growth 33% 32% 67% -4.7%
TROW PRICE (T. ROWE) GROUP 20.5 Financials Growth 14% 65% 102% -2.8%
WDR WADDELL&REED FINL INC -CL A 5.8 Financials Growth 16% 75% 124% -1.2%
LAZ LAZARD LTD 5.5 Financials Growth 11% 8% 32% 3.6%
MMC MARSH & MCLENNAN COS 25.9 Financials Core 20% -1% 35% -0.9%
JLL JONES LANG LASALLE INC 5.2 Financials Value 12% 70% 105% -4.9%
STJ ST JUDE MEDICAL INC 18.0 Health Care Core 15% 1% 14% -6.1%
GILD GILEAD SCIENCES INC 100.5 Health Care Growth 26% 132% 537% -20.4%
JAZZ JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS PLC 7.5 Health Care Growth 30% 125% 183% -14.2%
SLXP SALIX PHARMACEUTICALS LTD 6.3 Health Care Growth 13% 75% 119% -6.2%
ACT ACTAVIS PLC 33.3 Health Care Growth 36% -10% 10% -12.4%
MTD METTLER-TOLEDO INTL INC 6.6 Health Care Growth 15% 0% 12% -7.7%
ROK ROCKWELL AUTOMATION 16.9 Industrials Growth 13% 25% 47% -0.2%
PNR PENTAIR LTD 15.4 Industrials Value 24% 22% 42% -2.3%
CBI CHICAGO BRIDGE & IRON CO 9.0 Industrials Growth 25% 28% 65% 0.1%
GGG GRACO INC 4.5 Industrials Growth 21% 99% 161% -6.1%
FLS FLOWSERVE CORP 10.4 Industrials Growth 16% 12% 40% -5.5%
PWR QUANTA SERVICES INC 7.8 Industrials Core 15% 14% 34% 3.0%
WAB WABTEC CORP 7.0 Industrials Growth 23% 36% 57% -7.3%
WBC WABCO HOLDINGS INC 6.4 Industrials Growth 20% 7% 41% 2.1%
IEX IDEX CORP 5.7 Industrials Core 19% 3% 17% -5.4%
TTC TORO CO 3.5 Industrials Growth 14% 6% 25% -5.2%
NLSN NIELSEN HOLDINGS NV 16.4 Industrials Core 32% 1% 17% -7.3%
AVGO AVAGO TECHNOLOGIES LTD 14.9 Information Technology Core 21% 21% 45% -1.8%
LLTC LINEAR TECHNOLOGY CORP 11.2 Information Technology Growth 24% 8% 33% 2.8%
ADS ALLIANCE DATA SYSTEMS CORP 13.1 Information Technology Growth 24% 89% 128% -10.1%
PAYX PAYCHEX INC 14.8 Information Technology Core 36% -10% 1% -1.7%
AKAM AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC 9.4 Information Technology Growth 27% -6% 10% -13.0%
MCRS MICROS SYSTEMS INC 3.9 Information Technology Core 15% 5% 22% -7.1%
APH AMPHENOL CORP 14.4 Information Technology Growth 30% 6% 27% 4.6%
TRMB TRIMBLE NAVIGATION LTD 9.6 Information Technology Growth 33% 5% 25% -1.9%
RPM RPM INTERNATIONAL INC 5.5 Materials Core 10% 26% 52% 0.9%
NEU NEWMARKET CORP 5.1 Materials Growth 18% -1% 13% 5.6%
CMP COMPASS MINERALS INTL INC 2.8 Materials Growth 23% -16% 1% -0.2%
BLL BALL CORP 7.8 Materials Growth 13% -1% 19% -0.8%
VAL VALSPAR CORP 6.0 Materials Growth 12% 10% 26% -5.0%
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 4/10/2014

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



6


























































Figure 11: Hyper Growth stocks

Screen Criteria: US Large Cap Stocks excluding CFROE Financials
Quality: The screen identifies bottom 2 quintiles of quality by sector.
% Growth: Based on relative valuation levels in Figure 9, stocks with hyper growth characteristics remain at an above average
premium relative to the market. The screen identifies % Growth > 40%
Expensive: Stocks are overvalued using the HOLT % to High DCF scenario, which uses high rather than consensus estimates to
generate a systematic bull-case valuation.




























Ticker Company Name
Market
Cap $B
Sector Style % Growth % to Best % to High
Return Since
March 2014
TSLA TESLA MOTORS INC 25.1 Consumer Discretionary Growth 84% -83% -73% -15.4%
SIX SIX FLAGS ENTERTAINMENT CORP 3.7 Consumer Discretionary Growth 44% -52% -30% -4.2%
BKW BURGER KING WORLDWIDE INC 8.9 Consumer Discretionary Growth 40% -56% -46% -4.1%
STZ CONSTELLATION BRANDS 15.2 Consumer Staples Core 46% -67% -56% -1.2%
LNG CHENIERE ENERGY INC 13.5 Energy Growth 98% -99% -84% 16.4%
OKE ONEOK INC 12.1 Energy Core 40% -46% -13% -0.4%
GPOR GULFPORT ENERGY CORP 6.2 Energy Core 57% -58% -44% 10.3%
CIE COBALT INTL ENERGY INC 7.2 Energy Core 43% -53% -42% -7.9%
ALR ALERE INC 2.8 Health Care Value 48% -123% -105% -6.5%
PKI PERKINELMER INC 5.0 Health Care Value 46% -59% -51% -1.3%
VRTX VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC 15.4 Health Care Growth 53% -49% -13% -18.3%
BMRN BIOMARIN PHARMACEUTICAL INC 8.8 Health Care Growth 67% -75% -60% -23.6%
INCY INCYTE CORP 7.7 Health Care Growth 74% -84% -75% -26.5%
ALKS ALKERMES PLC 5.9 Health Care Growth 58% -58% -48% -11.0%
SGEN SEATTLE GENETICS INC 4.8 Health Care Growth 70% -67% -47% -25.2%
THRX THERAVANCE INC 3.1 Health Care Growth 46% -42% -17% -24.4%
SCTY SOLARCITY CORP 5.0 Industrials Growth 68% -87% -80% -34.0%
ADBE ADOBE SYSTEMS INC 30.7 Information Technology Core 65% -69% -62% -9.9%
TWTR TWITTER INC 23.6 Information Technology Core 81% -85% -76% -24.7%
WDAY WORKDAY INC 13.2 Information Technology Growth 89% -98% -91% -31.1%
P PANDORA MEDIA INC 5.2 Information Technology Growth 83% -84% -80% -29.0%
CNQR CONCUR TECHNOLOGIES INC 5.1 Information Technology Growth 68% -76% -70% -26.1%
ADSK AUTODESK INC 10.4 Information Technology Core 48% -53% -43% -11.4%
NOW SERVICENOW INC 7.1 Information Technology Growth 81% -86% -78% -24.7%
SPLK SPLUNK INC 6.2 Information Technology Growth 90% -89% -84% -35.8%
N NETSUITE INC 6.3 Information Technology Growth 85% -85% -81% -27.4%
SSYS STRATASYS LTD 4.8 Information Technology Core 60% -47% -39% -23.0%
GRA GRACE (W R) & CO 7.4 Materials Core 47% -70% -56% -4.5%
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 4/10/2014

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



7
APPENDIX:



















Figure 12: Since mid-2013, the discount rate premium
and cumulative market cap of hyper growth rapidly
expanded, before quickly correcting in March and April
2014.


10.0%
10.5%
11.0%
11.5%
12.0%
12.5%
13.0%
13.5%
14.0%
-3.50 -3.25 -3.00 -2.75 -2.50
%

o
f

U
S

T
o
p

1
0
0
0

M
a
r
k
e
t

C
a
p
Wei ghted Di scount Rate Rel ati ve to the Market
Rel ati ve Val uati on and % Market Cap of "Hyper" Growth Stocks
June '13 - April '14
30-year Median
June
'13
Feb
'14
Apri l
'14
Figure 13: GARP stocks, those with % Growth between
10% and 40%, appear attractively valued relative to the
market.


-3.5%
-2.5%
-1.5%
-0.5%
0.5%
1.5%
% Growth >
40%
% Growth 20-
40%
% Growth 10-
20%
% Growth <
10%
Di scount Rate Di scount (Premi um)
4/30/2013
2/28/2014
4/4/2014
30 Year Median
Figure 14: The underperformance of Momentum and outperforemance of Value are nontable in magnitude


0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
1.10
O
c
t
-
1
1
N
o
v
-
1
1
D
e
c
-
1
1
J
a
n
-
1
2
F
e
b
-
1
2
M
a
r
-
1
2
A
p
r
-
1
2
M
a
y
-
1
2
J
u
n
-
1
2
J
u
l
-
1
2
A
u
g
-
1
2
S
e
p
-
1
2
O
c
t
-
1
2
N
o
v
-
1
2
D
e
c
-
1
2
J
a
n
-
1
3
F
e
b
-
1
3
M
a
r
-
1
3
A
p
r
-
1
3
M
a
y
-
1
3
J
u
n
-
1
3
J
u
l
-
1
3
A
u
g
-
1
3
S
e
p
-
1
3
O
c
t
-
1
3
N
o
v
-
1
3
D
e
c
-
1
3
J
a
n
-
1
4
F
e
b
-
1
4
M
a
r
-
1
4
A
p
r
-
1
4
M
a
y
-
1
4
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

l
o
n
g
/
s
h
o
r
t

r
e
t
u
r
n
HOLT Composite Factor Swaps
Quality Momentum Valuation
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 4/4/2014
Source: Credit Suisse HOLT, Data Date 4/11/2014

HOLT INVESTMENT STRATEGY



8




CREDIT SUISSE QUANTITATIVE & STRATEGY TEAMS


Trading: Ana Avramovic +1 212 325 2438 ana.avramovic@credit-suisse.com
Victor Lin +1 415 836 7643 victor.lin@credit-suisse.com


Hedge Funds: Jon Kinderlerer + 1 212 325 1394 jon.kinderlerer@credit-suisse.com


HOLT/Quant: Michael Valentinas +1 312 345 6178 michael.valentinas@credit-suisse.com
Adam Steffanus +1 312 345 6193 adam.steffanus@credit-suisse.com
David Rones +1 212 325 2427 david.rones@credit-suisse.com


Derivatives Edward K. Tom +1 212 325 3584 ed.tom@credit-suisse.com
Mandy Xu +1 212 325 9628 mandy.xu@credit-suisse.com
Terry Wilson +1 212 325 4511 terry.wilson@credit-suisse.com



Global Market Commentary Disclaimer
References to Credit Suisse include all of the subsidiaries and affiliates of Credit Suisse AG operating under its investment banking division. For more information on our structure, please follow
the attached link: https://www.credit-suisse.com/who_we_are/en/what_we_do.jsp

This material has been prepared by individual traders or sales personnel of Credit Suisse and not by Credit Suisse's research department. It is intended only to provide observations and views of
these traders or sales personnel, which may be different from, or inconsistent with, the observations and views of Credit Sui sse research department analysts, other Credit Suisse traders or sales
personnel, or the proprietary positions of Credit Suisse. Observations and views expressed herein may be changed by the trader or sales personnel at any time without notice. Credit Suisse
accepts no liability for loss arising from the use of this material.

This material does not purport to contain all of the information that an interested party may desire and, in fact, provides only a limited view of a particular market. It is not investment research, or a
research recommendation, as it does not constitute substantive research or analysis. The information provided is not intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment
decision and is not a personal recommendation. While it has been obtained from or based upon sources believed by the trader or sales personnel to be reliable, each of the trader or sales
personnel and Credit Suisse does not represent or warrant its accuracy or completeness and is not responsible for losses or damages arising out of errors, omissions or changes in market
factors.

This material is provided for informational purposes and does not constitute an invitation or offer to subscribe for or purchase any of the products or services mentioned. It is directed exclusively at
Credit Suisse's market professional and institutional investor clients (e.g. QIBs) as defined by the rules of the relevant regulatory authority, and must not be forwarded or shared with retail
customers or the public. It is not intended for private customers and such persons should not rely on this material. Moreover, any investment or service to which this material may relate will not be
made available by Credit Suisse to such private customers.

This material may have previously been communicated to the Credit Suisse trading desk or other Credit Suisse clients. You should assume that the trading desk makes markets and/or currently
maintains positions in any of the securities mentioned above. Credit Suisse may, from time to time, participate or invest in transactions with issuers of securities that participate in the markets
referred to herein, perform services for or solicit business from such issuers, and/or have a position or effect transactions in the securities or derivatives thereof. Information provided on any trades
executed with Credit Suisse will not constitute an official confirmation of the trade details, and all preliminary trade report information is subject to our formal written confirmation.

FOR IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES on companies covered in Credit Suisse Investment Banking Division research reports, please see www.credit-suisse.com/researchdisclosures. To obtain a
copy of the most recent Credit Suisse research on any company mentioned please contact your sales representative or go to http://www.credit-suisse.com/researchandanalytics.
Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, expressed or implied is made regarding future performance.
Backtested, hypothetical or simulated performance results have inherent limitations. Simulated results are achieved by the retroactive application of a backtested model itself designed with the
benefit of hindsight. The backtesting of performance differs from the actual account performance because the investment strat egy may be adjusted at any time, for any reason and can continue to
be changed until desired or better performance results are achieved. Alternative modeling techniques or assumptions might produce significantly different results and prove to be more
appropriate. Past hypothetical backtest results are neither an indicator nor a guarantee of future returns. Actual results wi ll vary from the analysis.
Investment principal on securities can be eroded depending on sale price or market price. In addition, there are securities on which investment principal may be eroded due to changes in
redemption amounts. Care is required when investing in such instruments.

HOLT Disclaimer
The HOLT methodology does not assign ratings or a target price to a security. It is an analytical tool that involves use of a set of proprietary quantitative algorithms and warranted value
calculations, collectively called the HOLT valuation model, that are consistently applied to all the companies included in its database. Third-party data (including consensus earnings estimates)
are systematically translated into a number of default variables and incorporated into the algorithms available in the HOLT valuation model. The source financial statement, pricing, and earnings
data provided by outside data vendors are subject to quality control and may also be adjusted to more closely measure the underlying economics of firm performance. These adjustments provide
consistency when analyzing a single company across time, or analyzing multiple companies across industries or national borders. The default scenario that is produced by the HOLT valuation
model establishes a warranted price for a security, and as the third-party data are updated, the warranted price may also change. The default variables may also be adjusted to produce
alternative warranted prices, any of which could occur. The warranted price is an algorithmic output applied systematically across all companies based on historical levels and volatility of returns.
Additional information about the HOLT methodology is available on request

CFROI, CFROE, HOLT, HOLT Lens, HOLTfolio, HOLTSelect, HS60, HS40, ValueSearch, AggreGator, Signal Flag, Forecaster, Clarity is Confidence and Powered by HOLT are trademarks or
registered trademarks of Credit Suisse Group AG or its affiliates in the United States and other countries.

HOLT is a corporate performance and valuation advisory service of Credit Suisse.

2014 Credit Suisse Group AG and its subsidiaries and affiliates. All rights reserved.

For region specific disclosures, including information about applicable registrations and certain regulatory disclosures, please follow the links below:
Americas: https://www.credit-suisse.com/legal/en/ib/market_commentary.jsp
Europe: https://www.credit-suisse.com/legal/en/ib/europe.jsp (Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited is authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.)
Asia: https://www.credit-suisse.com/legal/en/ib/market_commentary_disclaimer_asia.jsp
General investors in Japan should open the following link and read it:
https://www.credit-suisse.com/jp/investment_banking/ja/disclaimer/
Please note that this is market commentary and not a research publication.

To discuss these and other ideas, please contact:

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen