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SUCCESSION REVOCATION AND ALLOWANCE

Gago vs. Mamuyac
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac
executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and
revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower
court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that
the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was
allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the
document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually
cancelled by the testator.
3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due
search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be
in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of
other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same
presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can
no longer be found after his death.
Gago v. MamuyacJohnson, J. (1927)
Nature: action to probate the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac
07/27/1918: Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament
01/1922: Mamuyac died. Francisco Gago petitioned for the probation of
Mamuyacs willopposed by Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon and
Catalina Mamuyac
CFI denied the petition for probation on the ground that the deceased executed a new willand
testament on April 1919
02/1925: action to secure the probation of the April 1919 will
Cornelio Mamuyac,Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon and Catalina Mamuyac opposed:
O Said will is a copy of the 2
nd
will and testament executed by Miguel Mamuyac
O cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel
O not the last will and testament of Miguel
that it had been cancelled and revoked in 1920
Witnessed by Fenoy who typed the will and Bejar who saw it actually cancelled byMiguel
(because Miguel sold to Bejar a house and the land where the house wasbuilt, he had to
cancel the 1919 will)
Issue:
WON the will in question had been cancelled in 1920?
Ruling: Yes
Lower court accepted positive proof of the cancellation that was not denied.
The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to
bepreserved. It therefore becomes difficult to prove the revocation.
Cancellation or revocation must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidenceshowing
that after due search, the original will cannot be found
Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
testator,when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that
thesame was cancelled or destroyed

Same presumption where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and
it cannot be found after his death.
It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the
knowledge or authority of the testator
The presumption of cancellation is never conclusive but may be overcome by proof that thewill
was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
Since the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and in viewof
the positive proof that it had been cancelled, the conclusion is that it had been cancelledand
revoked
In a proceeding to probate a will, the burden of proof is upon the proponent to establish
itsexecution and existence.
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SUCCESSION REVOCATION AND ALLOWANCE
In a great majority of instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revokingthem
there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence of itscancellation
perishes with the testator.
Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is
proven,however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate with all the
formalitiesand requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when
it ismade to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by
thetestator.
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter will
contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died without any
forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The oppositors to the
probate were his nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the probate
of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground that the
petitioner failed to prove its due execution.
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will. They
contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is valid and
thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the subsequent
disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a subsequent
will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for the reason that it
was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.
There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under the
principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator cancels or
destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the intention to make a
new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the new disposition fails of effect
for some reason.

Diaz v. De Leon
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the
requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately
returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the
testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the
incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to
withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own
statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was
subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed
hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.
Ignacia Diaz vs. Ana De LeonG.R. No. 17714, May 31, 1992
Jesus De Leon, the testator, executed 2 wills, shortly after the execution of the first will,he
asked it to be returned to him and ordered his servant to tear the document. The first will was
destroyed in the presence of a nurse. After some time, Dr. Cornelio Mapa askedthe testator
about the will, the testator said that it had been destroyed.The petitioner argued that there was
no revocation of the first will, while the contestantargued that the testator revoked his will by
destroying it, and by executing another willexpressly revoking the first will.
Issue:
Is the revocation of the first will made by the testator valid?
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the revocation made by the testator was valid. Altho
ugh the second will was found to not have satisfied the requisites in order toconstitute a
revocation, the destruction of a will
animo revocandi
constitutes, in itself, asufficient revocation (Sec.623, Code of Civil Procedure).
The testators intention of
revoking the will is also manifest from the fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he had made in his first will.
Manahan v. Manahan, 50 Phil. 448
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SUCCESSION REVOCATION AND ALLOWANCE
Facts: Donata Manahan died leaving a will. Engracia Manahan, her niece and the named
executor, filed a petition for probate of the will. Proper notice and publication were done.
Petition was granted. One and a half years later, Tiburcia, sister of Donata, filed a motion for
reconsideration and new trial contending that she is an heir of Donata but she was not notified
with the probate proceedings,therefore, the probate proceedings was void. It was denied.
Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Tiburcia needs to be notified.
Ruling: No. In this case, she is not a compulsory nor a voluntary heir. A non-heir person need
not be notified under sec 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
Gallanosa v. Arcangel
1. Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61
parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his
will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she
predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses
Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3
parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.
2. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs
filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the
ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for
annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result,
the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.
Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled
RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due
execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the
execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally,
that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.
The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only
be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the
judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4
years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

GALLANOSA V. ARCANGEL, 83 SCRA 676 (1978)
DOCTRINE: Article 838 of the Code requires probate as a condition precedent for the
effectivity of a will. Probate is limited to a determination of two issues: one, the testamentary
capacity of the testator, and two, the due execution of the will. Testamentary capacity has two
components: first, the soundness of mind of the testator, and second, the requisite age. Due
execution refers to the compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law. If the
proponents of the will are able to prove testamentary capacity and due execution, the probate
judge will forthwith issue and order admitting the will to probate. Once the probate order
becomes final, the testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will
becomes incontestable. Res judicata will apply to any attempt to reopen and or revisit the
issues of testamentary capacity and due execution.
Gallanosa illustrates the inevitable result of an attempt to reopen probate
proceedings long after the probate order has become final. It is important to note the present
procedural laws do not permit nor sanction the institution of an action for the annulment of a
will.
FACTS: Florentino Histosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was
80yrs. old. He died a childless widower on May 26, 1939 at Irosin, Sorsogon. He was survived
by his brother Leon Hitosis, his other brothers and sisters were all dead.
June 24, 1939 a petition for probate of his will was filed.
In that will, Florentino bequeathed his share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla
Dollentas, and, should Tecla predeceased him, as was the case, his share would be
assigned to the sps. Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro,
Teclas son by her first mearraige grew up under the care of Florentino and he had treated
Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla.
Florentino also bequeathed his separate properties of parcels of land of abaca land and
Riceland to his protg, Adolfo Fortajada, a minor.
Oppostion to the probate of the will was registered by the testators legal heirs, his surviving
brother, nephews and nieces.
October 27, 1939 the court rendered its decision, admitting the will to probate and appointed
Gallanosa as executor.
October 24, 1941 the testamentary heirs, spouses Gallanosa and Fortajada, submitted a
project of partition covering 61 parcels of land.
March 13, 1943 the project partition was approved by Judge Doroteo Amador. The
testators legal heirs did not appeal form the decree of probate and from the order of partition
and distribution.
February 20, 1952 Leon and the other legal heirs instituted an action against Pedro
Gallanosa fot the recovery of the said 61 parcels of land
August 14, 1952 Judge Anatolio C. Maalac dismissed the complaint on the ground of res
judicata. The legal heirs did not appeal from that order of dismissal.
September 21, 1967 15 yrs after the the dismissal of the previous action for recovery and 28
yrs after the probate of the will, the oppositors filed another action for the annulment of the will
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SUCCESSION REVOCATION AND ALLOWANCE
of Florentino Histosis, alleging that that there was fraud and deceit in the execution of the
document purporting to be the last and testament of Florentino Histosis.
The 1967 complaint upon motion of the defendants was dismissed by the respondent judge.
On motion for reconsideration, respondent judge granted it and set aside the order of
dismissal.
ISSUE: WON the private respondent have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of
Florentino Histosis and for the recovery of the 61 parcel of land adjudicated under that will to
the petitioners.
HELD: No
The lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering its order of dismissal
and in ignoring the 1939 testamentary case and the 1952 case, which is the same as the
instant 1967 case.
What the plaintiff seeks is the annulment of a last will and testament duly probated in 1939 by
the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to recover the lands
adjudicated to the testamentary heirs by the same court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will,
which action is a resuscitation of the complaint of the same parties that the same court
dismissed in 1952.

It is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from the defendants motion to dismiss
that plaintiffs 1967 action is barred by res judicata. The defense of res judicata, as a ground
for the dismissal of plaintiffs 1967 complaint, is a two- pronged defense because (1) the 1939
and 1943 decrees of probate and distribution and (2) the 1952 order of dismissal of the lower
court constitute bars by former judgment.

The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal alidity of the will.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness its execution
cannot be raised anymore. In Austria v. Ventenilla, a petition for annulment of a will was not
entertained after the decree of probate had become final.
It is fundamental concept in the organization of every jural system, a principle of public policy
that the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. the very object of which the courts
were constituted was to put an end to controversies.
Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest
1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will where they
gave two (2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't have their own child.
When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.
2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed in
1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the same was dismissed in
1954.
3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to law.
While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued
by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Hence this
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree of
probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res judicata. THe final
decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is conclusive as to the last will of
Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint
wills. (There was an error on the court but the decree has now become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on appeals
but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final
decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole world.
Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not include
the disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her properties were still not
within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the will with respect to her, must be on
her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de novo -- since a joint will is considered a
separate will of each testator.
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the
sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with
whom he had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed
alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was
an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

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SUCCESSION REVOCATION AND ALLOWANCE
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of
cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and
held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in
violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited
to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is
however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of
the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the
petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a
practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only
since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its
provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons
guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also
prohibited.
Guevara v. Guevara Digest
1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife,
stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter
Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which
he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke
the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a
portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based
on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She
alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to
circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court
for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.