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METAPHYSICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND SCIENTIFIC

RATIONALITY

David Grnberg

Introduction. Collingwood (1966, p. 11) differentiates between
metaphysics as the science of pure being and metaphysics as the science, which
deals with the presuppositions underlying ordinary science. My use of
metaphysical will be in conformity with the latter throughout this paper. But it
also includesin contradistinction to Collingwoodontological presuppositions.
In the logical positivist tradition of philosophy of science there were no
place for metaphysicsor so it was claimedin either sense of the term
Collingwood has distinguished. On the other hand, in the post-Kuhnian
philosophy of science it has been claimed that science is not free of metaphysical
presuppositions. This has led to three different strands. (i) Science with
metaphysical presuppositions cannot be acceptable, since it makes science
irrational. (ii) Science is actually irrational, and thus cannot be differentiated from
other kinds of irrational activities in this respect. (iii) Science does have
metaphysical presuppositions, but this does not make science irrational. In this
paper I shall defend the third position, surprisingly enough, relying upon Carnaps
distinction between external and internal questions. It may sound surprising
because, as everybody knows, Carnap was one of the leading figures of logical
positivism. There is a growing literature, however, that documents that Carnap
anticipated many ideas of Kuhn, and Kuhn did not try to show that science is an
irrational activity, as many supposed, and he is quite close to Carnap as far as
rationality of science is concerned. (See, for example, Irzik and Grnberg 1995.)
In what follows, I shall first consider a rereading of Carnap that will reveal
the metaphysical involvement of science, and, second, a case study which is an
attempt of showing the rationality of a method of confirmation as an answer to an
external question in Carnaps sense, and, as such, when properly interpreted,
involves metaphysical presuppositions.

Carnaps distinction of external and internal questions. Metaphysical
presuppositions of science are typically ontological. For example, There are
sense-data (such as patches of color), There are physical entities (such as
tables), There are theoretical entities (such as electrons), and There are abstract
entities (such as numbers). Carnap considers such sentences as expressing only
pseudo-propositions when taken literally. However, they become meaningful
when reformulated as the expression of a decision to use a particular linguistic
framework. For example, to say that physical objects exist is tantamount to
accepting the so-called thing-language (i.e., a language in which the bound
variables range over physical things).
Now, acceptance of a linguistic framework for science involves the use of
formation and transformation rules, semantical rules, and methodological rules of
confirmation, such as the rules of a system of inductive logic. Carnap (1956, p.
207) calls external questions, questions concerning the choice of a linguistic
framework among alternatives. And since the result is based upon a decision, and
not on verification of a statement or a system of statements, these questions are
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practical.
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Once a particular linguistic framework concerning a particular
category of entities is accepted, the statement that there are entities of the given
category becomes analytically true relative to the accepted framework. For
example, the statement that there are physical objects is analytic relative to the
thing language. On the other hand, There are black swans in Australia is a
synthetic existential statement. Questions concerning the truth-value of
statements formulated in a given linguistic framework are internal questions.
(Carnap 1956, p. 207.) The two examples we mentioned above are answers to
internal questions.
Internal questions are theoretical in the sense that their answers are
propositions having truth-value. Note that the analyticity of the statement that
there are physical entities does not commit us to the theoretical acceptance of
reality of physical things, but only to the practical acceptance of the thing-
language, which is a matter of decision. But, such a decision is not arbitrary. It
can be evaluated by criteria of rationality, which are permanent and ultimate.
Carnap gives as examples of such criteria, efficiency, fruitfulness, and simplicity.
Kuhn (1977, pp. 320-329) also endorses similar ones, adding accuracy,
consistency, and scope to the list.
The rationality of a decision of choosing a linguistic framework for the
realization of a purpose consists in the conduciveness to the successful realization
of that purpose. The question whether a linguistic framework realizes its purpose
is itself a theoretical, or rather meta-theoretical, question in the sense that the
realization of a purpose is an objective fact. Science might have diverse purposes,
ranging from most practical to most theoretical ones. Of course, the most
desirable purpose of science is truth seeking. Questions of truth and falsity,
however, cannot arise at this stage, because scientific hypotheses can be
formulated and interpreted only by means of the constitutive rules of a given
linguistic framework. This is quite the same with Collingwood. For him what he
calls absolute presuppositions in a given epoch, like Every event has a cause,
are not propositions proper, and thus they do not have truth-value. Truth or falsity
of scientific statements is only relative to the accepted metaphysical
presuppositions, quite in the same way as an answer to an internal question is
based upon an answer given to an external question in Carnap. However,
Collingwood differs both from Carnap and Kuhn in that he does not have a
rational explanation regarding how a metaphysical presupposition (or a linguistic
framework) is chosen among alternatives. He just takes them as historical
contingencies
Thus, turning back to the choice of a linguistic framework (or
metaphysical presupposition in Collingwoods sense), the criteria of rationality are
the ultimate norms for evaluating the proper ontological presupposition
corresponding to a linguistic framework. In this sense we can consider them as
meta-philosophical presuppositions by means of which we choose a linguistic
framework among the alternatives. They can be formulated as normative rules

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Carnap (1963, pp. 941-942), however, was inclined to accept Bar-Hillels proposal to interpret
(rather than replace) a metaphysical proposition asserting the existence of a category of objects as
expressing the expediency of the linguistic framework referring to the objects in question. Thus,
metaphysical presuppositions, reinterpreted in accordance with Bar-Hillels proposal, may become
genuine theoretical theses for Carnap.
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like One ought to choose the most efficient linguistic framework or One ought
to choose the most simple linguistic framework and the like. Now, if the aim of
science is efficiency then one cannot further question why one ought to choose the
most efficient framework, simply because this is the very aim science is trying to
achieve at. (You cannot ask why you want to realize your purpose!) And it is in
this sense why these criteria of rationality are ultimate, i.e., they do not need any
further justification and, as such, they play the role of absolute presuppositions.
On the other hand, the thesis that these criteria are permanent is
justifiable in a historico-empirical way. Throughout the history of science,
scientists tried to discover the most efficient, simple etc. linguistic framework, or
scientific theory, so that the aims of science have never changed, and there is no
reason to assume that they will change in the future. Note that Collingwoods
absolute presuppositions are ultimate and permanent only in a given epoch, i.e.,
they are historical and, as such, strictly speaking, they are neither permanent nor
ultimate, and therefore cannot properly be called absolute. I shall turn now to the
case study.

A case study: Rationality of the method of confirmation constitutive
of the linguistic framework of a scientific theory. A method of confirmation
for Carnap consists in a particular credibility function (or class of credibility
functions), i.e., a function assigning to scientific hypotheses formulated in a
linguistic framework, a degree of confirmation. The credibility function (or class
of credibility functions) constitutes a system of inductive logic, which is
determined by a set of axioms. Therefore, the choice of a linguistic framework
requires a choice of a credibility function among alternatives. Carnap contends
that this choice is based upon a priori intuitive judgments.
I shall defend the view that these a priori intuitions are nothing but the
result of Carnap and Kuhns criteria of rationality (such as efficiency, fruitfulness
and the like) for the choice of linguistic frameworks. Carnap (1963, p. 978)
writes, The reasons [for accepting any axiom of inductive logic] are based upon
our intuitive judgments concerning inductive validity, i.e., concerning inductive
rationality of practical decisions (e.g., about bets). Now, the rationality of
practical decisions requires the expectation of the successful realization of the
purpose of the decided action. The efficiency of the action performed for realizing
such a purpose consists in the quickness and the easiness of that realization at
least cost. The basic axioms of inductive logic, namely, Kolmogorovs axioms of
probability calculus, have been deduced from the fairness of the betting systems.
(See Kemeny 1963, p. 720, n. 13.) This means that in case a betting system is fair,
the betting ratios satisfy Kolmogorovs axioms. And it is also proved that the
fairness of the betting system is deducible from the Kolmogorovs axioms,
namely, if the betting ratios characterizing a betting system satisfy Kolmogorovs
axioms, the betting system is fair. (See ibid., p. 720, n. 13.)
A betting system is fair just in case it is not possible that the bettor
always looses. It is strictly fair just in case it is fair, and, furthermore, the bettor
can sometimes win. (See ibid., 719-720.) An agent who decides to enter a betting
system performs an action whose purpose is gaining. Therefore, if an agent looses
without gaining at all she would not realize her purpose, and a fortiori her
acceptance of a bet would not be efficient. It follows that both fairness and strict
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fairness are necessary conditions of the efficiency of the action of betting. In
general the rationality of scientific activity results from the rationality of the
decision to use a suitable linguistic framework involving, in particular, a method
of confirmation. The adoption of a particular set of axioms of inductive logic
constitutes a particular method of confirmation. Let us remember that the choice
of a linguistic framework is an answer to an external question. Internal questions
refer to the activity of the scientists within a particular linguistic framework,
which has already been chosen. For Carnap internal questions refer to the
confirmation of hypotheses formulated within the framework. More precisely, an
internal question is of the form What is the degree of confirmation of scientific
hypothesis h given evidence e? The degree of confirmation is computed on the
basis of the credibility function characterizing the linguistic framework. Hence, a
hypothesis cannot be confirmed and, in general, an internal question cannot be
answered independently of a linguistic framework.

Conclusion. We see that science starts with ultimate and permanent
criteria of rationality that can be formulated as universal metaphysical norms of
purposeful actions. They express a priori intuitions and that is why we may call
them metaphysical. For each particular purpose these norms will serve to adopt a
particular linguistic framework. The rationality of the answers to internal
questions within a linguistic framework results from the rationality of the choice
of the framework, hence of the rationality of the answer to an external question.
For example, the rationality of the assignment of a degree of confirmation to a
hypothesis formulated in a given linguistic framework derives from the rationality
of the choice of the axioms of inductive logic for that framework.

David Grnberg
Philosophy Department, Middle East Technical University
david@metu.edu.tr

References

Carnap, R. (1956), Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in Meaning and Necessity (2
nd
ed.
enlarged), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Carnap, R. (1963), Replies and Systematic Expositions, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of
Rudolf Carnap, La Salle: Open Court.
Collingwood, R. G. (1966), An Essay on Metaphysics (first edition, 1940). Oxford: The
Clarendon Press.
Irzik, G. and Grnberg, T. (1995), Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close Allies?, British
Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 46, pp. 285-307.
Kemeny, J. G. (1963), Carnaps Theory of Probability and Induction, in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The
Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle: Open Court.
Kuhn, T. S. (1977), The Essential Tension. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.








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