Article VIII

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Article VIII Judicial Department

Sec. 1. Judicial Power
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Definition and scope
1. Santiago v. Bautista 32 SCRA 188 (1970) [concept of judicial function]
G.R. No. L-25024 | March 30, 1970 | Barredo
Petitioner-appellant: TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother,
Mrs. Angelita C. Santiago
Respondents-appellees: MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS, REBECCA
MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO, LUNA SARMAGO,
AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR MARCELO

Emergency Recit: Teodoro Santiago Jr. only ranked third in his graduating class. His
dad and mom went to court alleging that the committee on the rating of students
for honor committed gadalej. Issue is whether such committee is the tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial functions, contemplated under Rule 65, against which
certiorari may lie. Court ruled no. It is necessary that there be a law that give rise to
some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights
are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer. Such is not the case here.

Facts:
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. was a pupil in Grade Six at the public school named Sero
Elementary School in Cotabato City.
As the school year 1964-1965 was then about to end, the "Committee On The
Rating Of Students For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said
school for the purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class.
With the school Principal, Mrs. Aurora Lorena, as chairman, and Juanita Bautista,
Rosalinda Alpas, Rebecca Matugas, Milkita Inamac, Romeo Agustin, Aida Camino
and Luna Sarmago, as members, the above-named committee deliberated and
finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Ligat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr.
as first, second and third honors, respectively.
The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three
days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his
mother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of
honor students" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the
CFI of Cotabato, against the above-named committee members along with the
District Supervisor and the Academic Supervisor of the place.
The corresponding complaint filed alleged, inter alia (Just quickly read this!):
o that Teodoro Santiago, Jr. had been a consistent honor pupil from Grade I
to Grade V of the Sero Elementary School, while Patricia Ligat (second
placer in the disputed ranking in Grade VI) had never been a close rival of
petitioner before, except in Grade V wherein she ranked third;
o that Socorro Medina was coached and tutored during the summer vacation
of 1964 by Mrs. Alpas who became the teacher of both pupils in English in
Grade VI, resulting in the far lead Medina obtained over the other pupil;
o that the committee had been illegally constituted as the same was
composed of all the Grade VI teachers only, in violation of the Service
Manual for Teachers of the Bureau of Public Schools which provides that the
committee to select the honor students should be composed of all teachers
in Grades V and VI;
o that there are direct and circumstantial matters, which shall be proven
during the trial, wherein respondents have exercised grave abuse of
discretion and irregularities, such as the changing of the final ratings on the
grading sheets of Socorro Medina and Patricia Ligat from 80% to 85%, and
some teachers giving petitioner a starting grade of 75% in Grade VI, which
proves that there has already an intention to pull him to a much lower rank
at the end of the school year;
o that several district examinations outside of teachers' daily units and other
than periodical tests were given, ratings in which were heavily considered in
the determination of periodical ratings, whereas according to the Academic
Supervisor and Acting Division Superintendent of schools of the place such
district examinations were not advisable;

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o that there was a unanimous agreement and understanding among the
respondent teachers to insult and prejudice the second and third honors by
rating Socorro Medina with a perfect score, which is very unnatural;
o that the words "first place" in petitioner's certificate in Grade I was erased
and replaced with the words "second place", which is an instance of the
unjust and discriminating abuses committed by the respondent teachers in
the disputed selection of honor pupils they made;
o that petitioner personally appealed the matter to the School Principal, to the
District Supervisor, and to the Academic Supervisor, but said officials "passed
the buck to each other" to delay his grievances, and as to appeal to higher
authorities will be too late, there is no other speedy and adequate remedy
under the circumstances; and
o that petitioner and his parents suffered mental and moral damages in the
amount of P10,000.00.
They prayed the court, among others, to set aside the final list of honor students
and, during the pendency of the suit, to enjoin the respondent teachers from
officially and formally publishing and proclaiming the said honor pupils in Grade
VI in the graduation exercises the school was scheduled to hold on the 21st of
May of that year 1965. DENIED. The lower court ruled: (1) that there was violation
of par. 2 of Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which required that the petition
be accompanied by the judgment or order complained of; (2) administrative
remedies were not exhausted, they simply alleged that the school officials passed
the buck around; (3) there was no grave abuse of discretion and that the petition
states no cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not the committee on the ratings of students for honor is the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions against which an action for
certiorari may lie under Section 1 of Rule 65.

Held:
To resolve this problem the following tests may be employed:
1. that there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or officer
for hearing and determination of their respective rights and obligations.
2. the tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought must
have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision
on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that end.
3. the tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign
power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to
the legislative or executive department.
It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so called committee on the
rating of students for honor whose actions are questioned in this case exercised
neither judicial nor quasi judicial functions in the performance of its assigned
task. Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial
acts, it is necessary that there be a law that give rise to some specific rights
of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made,
and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought, in turn, before the
tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.
o As pointed out by appellees, however, there is nothing on record about any
rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such
function involves the determination of what the law is and that they are
therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi judicial functions. Worse
still, this Court has not even been appraised by appellant of the pertinent
provisions of the Service Manual of Teachers for Public Schools appellees
allegedly violated in the composition of the committee they constituted
thereunder, and, in the performance of that committee's duties.
At any rate, the situation brought before Us in this case, the seemingly one of
first impression, is not without substantial parallel. In the case of Felipe vs.
Leuterio, etc., et al., the issue presented for determination was whether or not the
courts have the authority to reverse the award of the board of judges of an
oratorical contest, and this Court declared that the judiciary has no power to
reverse the award of the board of judges of that contest and, for that matter, it
would not interfere in literary contests, beauty contests and similar competitions.
It was reasoned out thus:
o For more than thirty years oratorical tilts have been held periodically by
schools and colleges in these islands. Inter-collegiate oratorical competitions
are of more recent origin. Members of this court have taken part in them

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either as contestants in their school days (In the College of Law, U.P. annual
oratorical contest, first prize was awarded to Justice Montemayor in 1914
and to Justice Labrador in 1916), or as members of the board of judges
afterwards. They know some few verdicts did not reflect the audience's
preference and that errors have sometimes been ascribed to the award of
the judges. Yet no party ever presumed to invoke judicial intervention; for it
is unwritten law in such contests that the board's decision is final and
unappealable.
o Like the ancient tournaments of the Sword, these tournaments of the Word
apply the highest tenets of sportsmanship: finality of referee's verdict. No
alibis, no murmurs of protest. The participants are supposed to join the
competition to contribute to its success by striving their utmost: the prizes
are secondary.
o If fraud or malice had been alleged, the action should be directed against
the individual judge or judges who fraudulently or maliciously injured the
contestant. Not against the other judges or the board of judges as a whole.
But even were We to assume for the moment, as the court below apparently did,
that judicial intervention might be sought in cases of this nature, still, We are
inclined to sustain the order of dismissal appealed from for failure on the part of
appellant to comply with the requirements of Section 1 of Rule 65.
o To be sure, the lower court's holding that appellant's failure to accompany
his petition with a copy of the judgment or order subject thereof together
with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto
"is fatal to his cause" is supported not only by the provision of that Rule but
by precedents as well (Alajar v. CIR and NAWASA v. Municipality of
Libmanan).
It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the
programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in
the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he could
not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the committee of
teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition.
o The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such
decision of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the
circumstance that according to him, even before the filing of his petition
with the lower court on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed
the said committee's decision with various higher authorities of the above-
named school, who merely passed the buck to each other. Moreover,
appellant mentions in his petition various other documents or papers as
the Service Manual for Teachers allegedly violated by appellees in the
constitution of their committee; altered grading sheets; and erasures in his
Grade I certificate which appellant never bothered to attach to his
petition. There could be no doubt then that he miserably failed to comply
with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned.

FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is affirmed,
with costs against appellant.

2. In re Laureta 148 SCRA 382 (1987) [power to preserve its honor]
Full Title: IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST
ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. NO. 68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL.
Date: March 12, 1987 | PER CURIAM

Summary: In letters to the members of the First Division of the SC, Illustre accused
them of rendering an unjust judgment for a Civil Case wherein she was asking for her
share in the property of a deceased relative. In her letter, she threatened the Court
that they should tell her who was responsible for the minute resolutions that
dismissed her case and she threatened that she will go public. She then when to the
Tanodbayan and charged the SC Justices and the CA Justices with knowingly
rendering an unjust minute resolution. She also charged Justice Yap and SG Ordonez
for influencing the Justices in the dismissal of her case. Copies of the complaint were
also sent to newspapers. SC, after the dismissal of the complaint in the Tanodbayan,
required Illustre to show cause why she should not be held in contempt and for Atty.
Laureta, her counsel, to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. SC held that there is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's
authority and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its
honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his
client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

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Facts:
1. In almost identical letters, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa,
Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, addressed to
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT,
Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: It is important to call your attention to the
dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635 by an untenable minute-resolution (3 to be
specific), which we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly
promulgated by the First Division of the SC of which you are a member Your
attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes finish to our
case before the SC. There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this
case is far from finished by a long shot For at the proper time, we shall so act
and bring this case before another forum where the members of the Court can
no longer deny our action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but
are knowingly and deliberately promulgated We intend to hold responsible
members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these 3
minute- resolutions in question In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing
injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing that
they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why
we are requesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of
these resolutions in question. If, however, we do not hear from you after a week,
then we will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our
petition. We will then be guided accordingly. (FEELING)
2. The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap: As
Division Chairman, Associate Justice Yap did not even have the elementary
courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily inhibited himself from
participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, which he should have
done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After all
he is the law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordonez counsel for respondents, now
the distinguished Solicitor General ... indicative that even at this stage of the
proceeding in point of time, the SC still recognizes Atty. Ordonez as counsel for
respondents, even as he is already the Solicitor General. (Basically letter said that
by the time of the reorganization of the First Division, Ordonez was already SG
and by some magical coincidence, Yap was Chairman of Division and the letter
accused Yap of convincing the others that the Maravilla petition is without merit)
3. The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state: We assume, of course, that you
had studied the case thoroughly since you were with the original First Division
under the chairmanship of then Justice Claudio Teehankee We leave the next
move to you by informing us your participation in the promulgation of the
minute-resolutions in question The moment we take action in the plans we are
completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage.
4. SC en banc took up the background and history of the case, found no reason to
take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division, which
traced the history of the case, clarified that Justice Yap assumed his position in
this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution of dismissal was issued
on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First
Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordonez was respondents'
counsel; that upon realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from further
participation in the case; and that Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the
First Division only on 14 July 1986, after the compulsory retirement of Justice
Abad Santos on 12 July 1986.
5. Illustre again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz:
Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: 'Did you or did you
not approve the dismissal of our petition under the 3 minute resolutions? Yes or
No This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other
forum of justice where we will soon bring this case beyond the reach of the
newly reorganized SC The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody
stupid to swallow this statement hook, line and sinker. For Justice Yap we say:
Tell that to the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the
conscience of Justice Yap. (about Yap not knowing that Ordonez was counsel).
6. True to her threats, Illustre filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan.
Summary of those charged: Charge 1 (Ordonez and Yap), Charge 2 (Associate
Justices Javellana, Mendoza, and Cuevas of the IAC), Charge 3 (Associate Justices
Abad Santos, Cruz, Narvasa, Herrera and Yap of SC). All the foregoing, in
complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the tribunal of last resort,
1) upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the
Petition on the ground that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not
only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent but also as to the heirship of
petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the
proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of

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Justice Yap nor Solicitor General Ordonez to unduly influence the members of
the First Division.
7. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press,
which was widely publicized in almost all dailies, without any copy furnished this
Court nor the members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express:
ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES, thereby making it unjustly appear
that the Justices of this Court and the other respondents were charged with
"graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled
litigant and her counsel after having lost her case thrice in this Court.
8. The Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed Illustre's Complaint.
9. SC then required Illustre and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta to show cause for
contempt and disciplinary actions, respectively.

Issue: W/N Illustre should be held and in contempt and W/N Laureta should be held
administratively liable YES and YES

Held: ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt,
and is hereby fined in the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of
contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle
of punishment; and
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct,
rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice of
law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their
information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao
Laureta.

Ratio:
1. We find the explanations of both unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had done
nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court
dissipate in the face of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige
of human understanding," to use their own language.
2. Respondents' reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their
judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern
for the entire Court. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that
it refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that
after having read the Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986,
respondents would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. The
Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The CJ had promptly
announced his Statement that "the SC will take appropriate steps on the matter
upon its resumption of sessions on the first working day of the year. "
3. There is no vindicative reprisal involved. The Court's authority and duty under the
premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the
scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.
4. We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with Ilustre's letters
to the individual Justices, nor with the complaint filed before the Tanodbayan.
(the pleadings and the letters contained similar wordingsunequalled in the
entire history of the SC, unjust, and distortion of facts conjectures and
mistaken references; the insistence to know who took part in the deliberations
of the minute resolutions; the report received by the SC that the copies of the
complaint were distributed to the editors bearing Lauretas name)

Facts of the Real Case
1. It cannot be denied that this is the third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include
Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla) that a controversy involving the estate of the late
Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. While respondent Ilustre was not a
party in that case, upon remand of the case to the probate Court, she and other
children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix filed two Motions
for Intervention. Respondent Ilustre's participation in the estate involved,
therefore, harks back to that first case.
2. CA resolved the issue of intervention and ruled that there was no point to
allowing intervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et al., "for failure to show
any right or interest in the estate in question. " (will of Digna Maravilla excluded
her as collateral relatives and the testatrix, having no compulsory heir, had the
freedom to give it to anyone, in this case, Herminio Maravilla). The aforesaid
Decision was affirmed by this Court.

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3. Two years later, Ilustre, with Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for partition of
Dignas estate and for damages against the heirs of Digna's husband, who had
then passed away before the CFI of Negros Occidental. That Court, ordered "all
properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned in this case to go back to Ilustre. In
addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et al.
4. A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties before this
Court. SC referred the case to the CA, questions of fact being involved. The
CA dismissed the petition and denied certiorari. On MR, however, CA
reconsidered and set aside the CFI Decision. Ilustre challenged that reversal in
the present Petition for Review. Review was denied in an extended Resolution by
the First Division of this Court: (1) The Order of Default of the TC was issued in
grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was only one day late. (2) While appeal is,
indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, certiorari may be resorted to
when a party has been illegally declared in default. (3) The judgment of the TC
nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment and overturns the
pronouncements of both the CA and SC.

Minute Resolutions Proper
1. The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a
common occurrence in the Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their
petition which has been subjected to such recall. They have lost all objectivity in
this regard. They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the I
entire history" of the Supreme Court.
2. Justice Yap clarified that he was an official mission to Switzerland for the PCGG
after his appointment to the SC and did not assume his position in the SC upon
his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986 was
issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordonez was private
respondent's counsel. On June 11, 1986, Justice Yap, realizing that his former
partner, Atty. Ordonez, had submitted the pleadings for Illustres MR, inhibited
himself. Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14,
1986.
3. The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and
"Javellana Resolution" (previous Decisions) commends itself. Only a disgruntled
litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those judgments were accepted
"hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably
applicable. Thus it was that the First Division found it unnecessary, after further
study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due course Order,
which it had previously issued to give it "more time for further study." Contrary
to respondents' claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions
all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute
Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a
case.

Filing of Case against SC not Proper
1. Respondents' action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As
aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement: "(I)t is elementary that the SC is
supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the
judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them "unjust." " It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early
case of Arnedo vs. Llorente "controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy
and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error,
judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should
become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice
recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the court
which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into
which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which
the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions
submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties."
2. Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the RPC as to
"rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so
"in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the
prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision
rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the
same. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and
Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust"
cannot prosper.
3. Indeed, resolutions of the SC as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division,
speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond
investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled

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bills of the legislature. To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and
claim that the members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered and
"unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to act
upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand
would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such
collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of
regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy
the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter of all justiciable disputes.

In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of
fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in
her letters; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her
statements, conduct, acts and charges against the SC and/or the official actions of the
Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her
unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court.

We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the
Court for his stance of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum"
to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and
exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad
faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments; for
authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the
contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre;
for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth
in this Court's Resolutions of the First Division and en banc, as the Tribunal of last
resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other respondents
before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint
before the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a
defeated counsel in a case that has been brought thrice before this Court, and who
would readily accept anything but the soundness of the judgments of the Courts
concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the
Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.

3. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA 408 (2012)
[ODES no power to try and decide cases; E.O. No. 13 empowering it is
unconstitutional] guys wag kayo maniwala sa heading, SC said it was
constitutional

G.R. No. 196425 | July 24, 2012 | Perlas-Bernabe
Petitioner: Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.
Respondents: Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division, Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, and Hon. Cesar V. Purisima, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as
an ex-officio member of the Monetary Board

Emergency Recit: Pichay assails EO 13 issued by Noynoyskiboy creating the ODESLA
and the IAD, transferring the functions of GMAs PAGC thereto. He alleges that EO 13
illegally grants IAD-ODESLA judicial powers. The Court ruled that IAD-ODESLA is a
fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers. The
President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-
finding investigator cannot be doubted. As Chief Executive, he is granted full control
over the Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws

Facts:
On April 16, 2001, then President GMA issued E.O. 12 creating the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or
hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among
others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and
recommendations to the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Noynoy issued E.O. 13, abolishing the PAGC
and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-
ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A.
Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of
Trustees, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock

8

of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order signed by Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their
respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case
involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico
B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to
him in the ordinary course of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition.

Issues: Whether or not EO 13 is unconstitutional for
1. Usurping the power of the legislature to create a public office.
2. Usurping the power of the legislature to appropriate funds.
3. Usurping the power of Congress to delegate quasi-judicial powers to
admin agencies.
4. Encroaching upon the powers of the Ombudsman.
5. Violating the guarantee of due process.
6. Violating the equal protection clause.

Held: EO is constitutional.

Re: Usurpation of Power of Legislature to Create a Public Office
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department
under E.O. 292.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct
Office.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.

Re: Usurpation of Legislative Power to Appropriate Public Funds.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
While there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the
total amount appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of
the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced
from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal
appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to
appropriate funds when the President simply allocates the existing funds
previously appropriated by Congress for his office.

MAIN: The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested
with quasi-judicial powers.
Pichay avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which
is reserved to the Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an
express grant by the legislature, to administrative agencies. He points out that
the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-
ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,

while the
term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try
and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations,
preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly
states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of
PAGC."
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the
government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the President."
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President,
not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court
ruled in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo
v. The Philippine Truth Commission:rll
o Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the
judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

9

The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his
fact-finding investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is
granted full control over the Executive Department to ensure the enforcement of
the laws (Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution)
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the
corresponding power in the President to conduct investigations into the conduct
of officials and employees in the executive department.

Re: Other Contentions
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the
Ombudsman. While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of
the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal
accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a
fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so
until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the
Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and
the Equal Protection of the Laws. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying
the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. There are substantial
distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions
in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the
lower positions in government. Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right
to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took cognizance of the
administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to
oppose the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Limits
4. Noblejas v. Teehankee 23 SCRA 405 (1968) [no power to discipline in
other branch with equivalent rank of judge]
Petitioner: Antonio H. Noblejas, as Commissioner of Land Registration
Respondents: Claudio Teehankee, as Secretary of Justice, and Rafael M. Salas, as
Executive Secretary

ER: Teehankee as Sec of DOJ asked Noblejas, the Commissioner of Land Reg, to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. Noblejas argued that
since he has the rank and privileges of a Judge of the CFI, he can only be removed by
the Pres if the SC finds sufficient cause. Held: No. His interpretation is
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control
over executive officials. There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to
charge the judiciary with administrative functions except when reasonably incidental
to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by RA 1151.
Under 2 of said Act, the Commissioner is "entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance." The appropriation laws in the item setting forth the salary of said
officer, use the following expression: One Land Registration Commissioner with
the rank and privileges of district judge P19,000.00.
Sec. of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter requiring him to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for "approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-
subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the
original titles."
Noblejas answered that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and
compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First
Instance
Noblejas received a communication signed by the Exec. Sec, "by authority of the
President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists against you
for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner
was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above
charges."

Issue: w/n the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
SC, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the
rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance. NO.

10

First to militate against Noblejas stand is the fact that 67 of the Judiciary Act
providing for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites
that "No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the
President unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the SC and it is
nowhere claimed that the Commissioner is a District Judge, or in fact a member
of the Judiciary at all.
Second, Noblejas theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the SC and to be
suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would result in the same right
being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature
had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges, such as the Judicial
Superintendent of the DOJ, the SolGen, the City Fiscal of Quezon City and
Manila, SEC Commissioner.
Noblejas theory would mean placing upon the SC the duty of investigating and
disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the
consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the
President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials who are
presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly placed under the
President's supervision and control
Noblejas stand would also lead to the conclusion that the SolGen another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the SolGen
has the rank and privileges of a Justice of the CA, who are only removable by the
Legislature, through impeachment
Such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First
Instance. This conclusion gains strength by the fact that in the case of the Judges
of the Court of Agrarian Relations and the CTA, the organic statutes of said
bodies provide that they are to be removed from office for the same causes and
in the same manner provided by law for Judges of First Instance", or "members
of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of the Commissioner of
Public Service.
Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or removal procedure
prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision to
that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the
right to be investigated by the SC, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function
of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously
reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder: There is no inherent power in the
Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric: The US SC cannot be invested
with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes of review or otherwise. It
was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution, is invested
with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and
controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give
decisions which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the
exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative.
The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or
connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the
SC to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation
Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by
claiming that, he is endowed with judicial functions:
1
Serious doubt may well be

1
Sec. 4 of RA 1151. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration.
When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or
memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented
to him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds
with reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of
Land Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question
upon which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and
thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records certified
to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an
order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further, That, when a
party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner and the issue
involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty
days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.

11

entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of Deeds is a
judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process.
It will be noted that by specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land
Registration Commissioner "shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of
Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of any other
bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone.
That the Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are
not administrative; any bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the
corresponding department head.
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds
should constitute a judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of
the powers and duties of the Land Registration Commissioner will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or
executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.
The investigation and suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to
32 and 34 of the Civil Service Law are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in
excess of jurisdiction.

Advisory opinions
5. Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio 33 SCRA 494 (1970) [no power to
give advisory opinions or recommend executive action]
Petitioners: THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Respondents: ANG CHO KIO @ ANG MING HUY and THE COURT OF APPEALS
ZALDIVAR, J.:

SUMMARY Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and
convicted of various offenses committed in the Philippines.After serving six and one-
half (6-) years of his sentence said respondent was granted conditional pardon on
July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines. The conditional pardon partly reads
as follows: condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and
never to return to this country. Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his
pardon and actually left the Philippines for Taipeh, Nationalist China. In the evening
of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport. Ang Cho Kio
was identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho
Kio who was deported to Taipeh. His identity having been established, Ang Cho Kio
was arrested, and the immigration authorities conducted an investigation regarding
his presence in the Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow him to
proceed with his trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentence that were imposed on him, for having violated the
conditioned of his pardon. The CA majority opinion affirms the reasons of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. However, the
majority opinion contains the recommendation that Ang Cho Kio be sent out at once
from this country and that he be allowed to leave Muntinlupa Prisons under guard
only when he has been booked for outward flight at the Manila International Airport
so as to avoid the possibility of any further violation of his conditional pardon. W/N
the recommendation in the majority opinion to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the
country on the first available transportation abroad should be deleted. YES. The
majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of the
lower court, and no more. We do not consider it proper that the majority of the
justices in the special division make a recommendation that would suggest a
modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive, after the same justices
have said in their opinion "that the Chief Executive may determine, alone and by
himself, whether the condition attached to a pardon given by him had been violated;
and in the exercise of this prerogative, the courts may not interfere, however
erroneous the findings may be."

FACTS:
Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried and convicted
of various offenses committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer
penalties, to wit: a total of forty-five (45) years, ten (10) months and twenty one
(21) days of imprisonment, P6,000 indemnity, and P5,000 moral damages, plus life
imprisonment and P6,000 indemnity.

After serving six and one-half (6-) years of his sentence said respondent was
granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of the Philippines. The
conditional pardon partly reads as follows:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, and upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the unexecuted portions of

12

the prison terms of prisoner ANG CHO KIO @ KIWA @ PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU
CHIO @ KE WA @ LUCIO LEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG is
hereby remitted on condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his
release and never to return to this country. Should the above-named prisoner
refuse to accept said condition, be shall continue serving his sentence and upon
the expiration thereof, he shall be deported from the Philippines for being an
undesirable alien.
Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and actually left the
Philippines for Taipeh, Nationalist China, on July 28, 1959.
In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International
Airport on a Philippine Air Lines plane from Taipeh, travelling under the name "Ang
Ming Huy."
He was booked on Philippine Air Lines earliest connecting flight to Honolulu on
June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m., or with a stop-over of about 72 hours in Manila.
He surrendered his passport to the immigration authorities at the Manila
International Airport, and was issued a note that his departure was scheduled for
June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m.
He left his luggage at the airport and was issued claim tags. He registered for a
three-day stay at the El Presidente Hotel at Paraaque, Rizal. He contacted his two
friends in Manila, Lim Pin and Go Bon Kim. These two friends invited him to stay
longer in the Philippines.
On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went to the Bureau of Immigration, where
his friend Lim Pin signed a letter addressed to the Commissioner of Immigration
requesting for a fourteen-day extension of stay in the Philippines for him.
Ang Cho Kio was identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the Immigration Bureau
as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh on July 18, 1959. His identity
having been established, Ang Cho Kio was arrested, and the immigration authorities
conducted an investigation regarding his presence in the Philippines.
The immigration authorities did not allow him to proceed with his trip to Honolulu.
On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were
imposed on him, for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.
Ang Cho Kio filed with the Executive Secretary a motion for the reconsideration of
the supplemental order of recommitment.
The Executive Secretary failed to act on the motion for reconsideration, and so Ang
Cho Kio filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Pasay Branch).
After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing
the petition for habeas corpus. The Court of First Instance of Rizal held that Ang
Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy was validly recommitted to prison by the President of
the Philippines in the exercise of his prerogatives pursuant to the provisions of
Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. In the decision of a special division of five justices, with three
justices concurring, and two justices concurring and dissenting, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal dismissing Ang Cho Kio's petition for habeas corpus.
The aforequoted portion of the majority opinion affirms the reasons of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. However, the
majority opinion contains the recommendation that Ang Cho Kio
... be sent out at once from this country and that he be allowed to leave
Muntinlupa Prisons under guard only when he has been booked for outward flight
at the Manila International Airport so as to avoid the possibility of any further
violation of his conditional pardon. At any rate it would be to the best interest of
the security and peace of this country to have the petitioner expatriated from the
Philippines, instead of being recommitted for a long duration of time to prison
where his presence may constitute a constant menace to our country's welfare and
bring about some sinister influence among the people with whom he will associate
or come in contact.
In due time the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration, praying for the deletion from the majority opinion of the
recommendation to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the country on the first available
transportation abroad.

ISSUE:
W/N the recommendation in the majority opinion to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the
country on the first available transportation abroad should be deleted. YES

RATIO:

13

SolGens contentions:
The Solicitor General maintains that the recommendation is not a part of the
decision binding upon the parties, and is uncalled for.
It gives the decision a political complexion, because courts are not empowered to
make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of
judicial powers.
There is no law which gives the court the authority to recommend to the President
the voluntary departure of an undesirable alien who is lawfully committed to jail.
The deportation of aliens sentenced by the courts for violation of the laws of the
land, and even the act of merely allowing such convicted aliens to voluntarily leave
the country, is an act of state exercised solely in the discretion of the Chief
Executive.
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the act of sending an undesirable alien out
of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor
attempt to influence, the political acts of the Chief Executive.

SC: We agree with the Solicitor General.
The case before the Court of Appeals was for habeas corpus. The only question to
be resolved by the Court of Appeals was whether, or not, the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, had rightly dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus.
The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence imposed upon
Ang Cho Kio. The sentence against him had long become final, and, in fact, he has
served part of the sentence when he was extended pardon, upon the condition that
he should leave the country, never to return.
The opinion of the three justices of the special division of the Court of Appeals, to
which the two other justices have concurred, found that the recommitment to
prison of Ang Cho Kio was done in the exercise by the President of the Philippines
of his power pursuant to the provision of Section 64(i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, and the courts should not interfere with the exercise of that
power.
The majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the decision of
the lower court, and no more.
The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those
expressly provided in the law and such law is the provision of Section 5 of the
Revised Penal Code.
2

Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of the
Court of Appeals, now in question, is not authorized under the aforequoted
provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court of Appeals was not called upon to review any sentence that was
imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho
Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary under the Director of
Prisons.
We do not consider it proper that the majority of the justices in the special division
make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or a correction of the
act of the Chief Executive, after the same justices have said in their opinion "that
the Chief Executive may determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition
attached to a pardon given by him had been violated; and in the exercise of this
prerogative, the courts may not interfere, however erroneous the findings may be."
When the Chief Executive, exercising his powers pursuant to Section 64(i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, ordered Ang Cho Kio recommitted to prison, it is
assumed that the Chief Executive had decided that Ang Cho Kio should be dealt
with that way under the circumstances.
For the court to suggest to the Chief Executive to modify his decision to recommit
Ang Cho Kio to prison by allowing him to leave the country instead is indeed to
interfere with the functions of the Chief Executive. It would be, as urged by the
Solicitor General, an interference on, or an attempt to influence, the exercise by the
Chief Executive of the political powers of his office.
The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or
be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the Chief Executive
to decide.

2
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which
is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe
that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and
the injury caused by the offense.

14

Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the
judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion, that would reflect on the
wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political
in nature.
It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the majority opinion of the
special division of the Court of Appeals simply represents the private opinion of the
three justices, and judges should be left free to express even their private opinions
in judicial decisions.
We believe, however, that the better practice should be that the decision of a court
should contain only opinion that is relevant to the question that is before the court
for decision. After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of
laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law.
We believe that judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their
decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the
propriety of their judicial actuations.
However, of the ten members of the Court, as presently constituted, only five are of
the opinion that the recommendation embodied in the decision of the majority of
the special division of the Court of Appeals, now in question, should be deleted
from the decision.

Two members of the Court are of a different opinion,

and three
others did not take part in the decision because of their official actuations relative
to the case of respondent Ang Cho Kio before it reached this Court. There is,
therefore, one vote less than the majority of the Court that is necessary to grant
the certiorari prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied, and the decision of the
special division of the Court of Appeals stands. No costs.

Justiciable Controversy
6. SBMA v. COMELEC 262 SCRA 492 (1996) [supra, Art. 6, Sec. 32; no
controversy when resolution is at proposal stage]
G.R. No. 125416 | September 26, 1996 | Panganiban
Petitioner: SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A.
CALIMBAS

Summary: Congress enacted The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone. Respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition
with the SB of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Then,
Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities for
local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled referendum Day
(July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed
Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan". Our issue here is whether or not there is an
existence of an actual case or controversy. NONE Deliberating on this issue, the Court
agrees with Garcia that indeed, the municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be
nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it
and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations
can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and
the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies,
not hypothetical questions or cases.

Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which provided for the creation of the Subic Special
Economic Zone.
RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. SBMA
was organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully
subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines with, among
other assets, "all lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, as
well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not
otherwise alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency.

15

The American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine
government. Immediately, SBMA commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence to join the
Subic Special Economic Zone. The SB of Morong submitted such to the Office of
the President.
Respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993. The petition prayed for the following (deleted the others):
(A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests' -- isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at
punong-puno ng malalaking punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman.
(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.
(K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng
salaping ipinagkaloob ng pamahalaang national o 'Internal Revenue Allotment'
(IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.
The SB of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al.
by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition respondents
resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC: If no favorable action
thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through their
duly authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian concerned.
Commission En Banc denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that
the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance. It further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on
the authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents.
Respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the
Comelec and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec
Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution
No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan
from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in
support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures.
Pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines issued
proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said
proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval
Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base within
the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of Activities
for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled
referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec
promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".

MAIN Issue: Whether or not there is an existence of an actual case or
controversy. NONE
Other Issues:
A. Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long
become final and executory"; namely G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al.
vs. Commission on Elections, et al. NO
B. Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s)
the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan;" YES
C. Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."

Ratio:
MAIN ISSUE: Justiciable Controversy
"Judicial power has been defined in jurisprudence as 'the right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of
proper jurisdiction' It is 'the authority to settle controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice
or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights' Thus, there can be no

16

occasion for the exercise of judicial power unless real parties come to court for
the settlement of an actual controversy and unless the controversy is such that
can be settled in a manner that binds the parties by the application of existing
laws. (got this from the footnote sa case)
"The 1987 Constitution now adds: 'Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (got this from the footnote
sa case) PLUS ANOTHER IMPORTANT ISSUE AT THE END.

First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment
Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T.
Garcia, et al. vs. Comelec on "the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or
not there can be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the subject
proposition.
SC: We disagree. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a
municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the
proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Sec. 32 of Art. VI provides in luminous
language: 'The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body'. An act includes a
resolution.
Black defines an acts 'an expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote
something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves, awards and determination x x x.' It is
basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
Constitution. In line with this postulates, we held in In Re Guarina that if there is
doubt or uncertainly as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or
provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
construction, that interpretations will be adopted which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to
disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used.' "
o In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal
resolution as the form by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of
the people may validly exercised. What is at issue here is whether
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form
and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine,
whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848.

Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848
Did respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and
implementing Resolution No. 2848? YES.
To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but
respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the
body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at
all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called
"referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the
ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was
the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this
exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

INITIATIVE: is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
"Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent
to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

17

REFERENDUM: is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an
act or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a
law, resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local
legislative bodies.

Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines initiative as the
"power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at
the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he
explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject
any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in
most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law."
"SEC. 120 LGC. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal process
whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose,
enact, or amend any ordinance.
"SEC. 126 LGC. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the legal
process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the
Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days
in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The Comelec
shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum."
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum
is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of
law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the
wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the
electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are
understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters
will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to
supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to
the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or
act submitted to the people is in the proper form and language so it may be
easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true
where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be
broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon
separately. Care must also be exercised that "no petition embracing more than
one subject shall be submitted to the electorate," although "two or more
propositions may be submitted in an initiative".
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and
supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of
elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so
already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise
of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.

Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities -- Ultra
Vires?
Petitioner maintains that Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra
vires or beyond the powers of the SB to enact, stressing that under Sec. 124 (b)
of RA 7160 (the Local Government Code), "local initiative shall cover only such
subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of the sanggunians to enact."
Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such ordinances or resolutions as
the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact. After the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong and the other municipalities concerned
(Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their resolutions of concurrence, and by
reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and bounds had
already been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in
accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such
concurrence and/or to substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer
within the authority and competence of the Municipal Council of Morong to
legislate. Furthermore, petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities included in
the questioned municipal resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to
impose. Hence, such withdrawal can no longer be enacted or conditionalities
imposed by initiative. In other words, petitioner insists, the creation of SSEZ is

18

now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation. Thus, Morong cannot
unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for such
concurrence as this would effectively render nugatory the creation by (national)
law of the SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be derived
therefrom. Once created, SSEZ has ceased to be a local concern. It has become
a national project.
On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument is
premature and conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a
proposal. If the people should reject it during the referendum, then there is
nothing to declare as illegal.

IMPORTANT: RESOLUTION IS AT PROPOSAL STAGE
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with Garcia that indeed, the
municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases.
We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides that "nothing
in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act."
The Supreme Court is basically a review court. It passes upon errors of law (and
sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of
lower courts as well as determines whether there had been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any "branch
or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is quite clear that
the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine
the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been
promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or
instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Comelec itself has made
no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The
Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.
2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no
power to pass upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we
are ruling that these matters are in fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the
Commission -- to which then the herein basic questions ought to have been
addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first
instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over
"approved propositions" per said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers may adjudicate and pass
upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as
discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals
or parts thereof are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local
legislative body to enact." Accordingly, the question of whether the subject of
this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of Morong to enact
may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties
thereon.
While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be fruitful
for the parties and the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the
question of whether Grande Island and the "virgin forests" mentioned in the
proposed initiative belong to the national government and thus cannot be
segregated from the Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient of
passing a municipal resolution. We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of
the full subscription and payment of the P20 billion authorized capital stock of
the Subic Authority by the Republic, with, aside from cash and other assets, the
"... lands, embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof, ..." which includes
said island and forests. The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that
may be taken up in the proper forum -- the Commission on Elections.
Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon
remand of the initiative is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the
capacity of the Municipal Council to enact, may be divided into several parts for
purposes of voting. Item "I" is a proposal to recall, nullify and render without
effect (bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of

19

1993. On the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said
resolution with another municipal resolution of concurrence provided certain
conditions enumerated thereunder would be granted, obeyed and implemented
(ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit and interest of Morong
and Bataan. A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want a total dismemberment
of Morong from the Authority -- but may not agree with any of the conditions
set forth in Item II. Should the proposal then be divided and be voted upon
separately and independently?
All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of
prematurity.

Epilogue
In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the
present controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the
questions involved here; (ii) the respondent Commission should be given an
opportunity to review and correct its errors in promulgating its Resolution No.
2848 and in preparing -- if necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said
Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass
upon the question of whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language
and whether such proposal or part or parts thereof are clearly and patently
outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore
violative of law.
In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as
concepts and processes, are new in our country. We are remanding the matter
to the Comelec so that proper corrective measures, as above discussed, may be
undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our people's aspirations for the
actualization of effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that
"(p)rovisions for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate
their purposes, to facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the voters of the
rights granted thereby." In his authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr.
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these "instruments which can be used should the
legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people." Impelled by a
sense of urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and form
to the constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased initiative and
referendum into the workings of local governments by including a chapter on
this subject in the local Government Code of 1991.And the Commission on
Elections can do no less by seasonably and judiciously promulgating guidelines
and rules, for both national and local use, in implementation of these laws. For
its part, this Court early on expressly recognized the revolutionary import of
reserving people power in the process of law-making.
Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of
expressing popular sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate
exercise. For it is but sound public policy to enable the electorate to express
their free and untrammeled will, not only in the election of their anointed
lawmakers and executives, but also in the formulation of the very rules and laws
by which our society shall be governed and managed.

Held: WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is
REMANDED to the Commission on Elections for further proceedings consistent with
the foregoing discussion. No costs.s

Distinguished from declaratory relief
7. Tano v. Socrates 278 SCRA 154 (1997) [hierarchy of courts]
Petitioners: ALFREDO TANO, et al (super dami, wag na).
Respondents: GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et al.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Summary: Petitioners were charged with violations of certain Ordinances and
Resolutions issued by the local government of Palawan concerning marine aquatic
organism. Questioning their constitutionality, they filed a case directly to the SC.
The court held that their action was premature. However, even
granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action ripe for the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the hierarchy of
courts. The hierarchy of courts, is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important

20

reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. The judicial
policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its]
primary jurisdiction.

Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City
enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN
ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF. (I
omitted some provisions already)
3

To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero
issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993, otherwise
known as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING
TO ENGAGE IN ANY BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION
OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS
REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A MAYORS PERMIT and City
Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE

3
Section 2. Purpose, Scope and Coverage. - To effectively free our City Sea Waters from
Cyanide and other Obnoxious substance, and shall cover all persons and/or entities operating
within and outside the City of Puerto Princesa who is are [sic] directly or indirectly in the
business or shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City.
Section 4. It shall be unlawful [for] any person or any business enterprise or company to ship
out from Puerto Princesa City to any point of destination either via aircraft or seacraft of any
live fish and lobster except SEA BASS, CATFISH, MUDFISH, AND MILKFISH FRIES.
Section 5. Penalty Clause. - Any person/s and or business entity violating this Ordinance shall
be penalized with a fine of not more than P5,000.00 or imprisonment of not more than twelve
(12) months, cancellation of their permit to do business in the City of Puerto Princesa or all of
the herein stated penalties, upon the discretion of the court.
Section 6. If the owner and/or operator of the establishment found vilating the provisions of
this ordinance is a corporation or a partnership, the penalty prescribed in Section 5 hereof shall
be imposed upon its president and/or General Manager or Managing Partner and/or Manager,
as the case maybe [sic].
FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993
TO JANUARY 1, 1998.
4

On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE
CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE
MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT:
FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS(SUNO). CROMILEPTES
ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND
SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA
MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER
SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR
MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5)
YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS.
5

Similarly, the LGU enacted ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993 Ordinance
Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms
6

Petitioners Alfredo Tano, et al were criminally charged in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Cuyo-Agutaya-Magsaysay and some charged in Puerto Princesa
City.

4
The purpose of the inspection is to ascertain whether the shipper possessed the required
Mayors Permit issued by this Office and the shipment is covered by invoice or clearance
issued by the local office of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and as to
compliance with all other existing rules and regulations on the matter.
Any cargo containing live fish and lobster without the required documents as stated herein
must be held for proper disposition.
In the pursuit of this Order, you are hereby authorized to coordinate with the PAL Manager, the
PPA Manager, the local PNP Station and other offices concerned for the needed support and
cooperation. Further, that the usual courtesy and diplomacy must be observed at all times in
the conduct of the inspection.
5
WHEREAS, scientific and factual researches [sic] and studies disclose that only five (5)
percent of the corals of our province remain to be in excellent condition as [a] habitat of marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms; WHEREAS, it cannot be gainsaid that the destruction and
devastation of the corals of our province were principally due to illegal fishing activities like
dynamite fishing, sodium cyanide fishing, use of other obnoxious substances and other related
activities; WHEREAS, there is an imperative and urgent need to protect and preserve the
existence of the remaining excellent corals and allow the devastated ones to reinvigorate and
regenerate themselves into vitality within the span of five (5) years;
6
Section IV. PENALTY CLAUSE. - Any person and/or business entity violating this Ordinance
shall be penalized with a fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine
Currency, and/or imprisonment of six (6) months to twelve (12) months and confiscation and
forfeiture of paraphernalias [sic] and equipment in favor of the government at the discretion of
the Court;

21

Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units,
prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original
jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993.
Petitioners caption their petition as one for Certiorari, Injunction With
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction,with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and pray that this Court: (1) declare as unconstitutional: (a) Ordinance No. 15-92,
dated 15 December 1992, of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa; (b)
Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993, dated 22 January 1993, issued by Acting City
Mayor Amado L. Lucero of Puerto Princesa City; and (c) Resolution No. 33,
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, dated 19 February 1993, of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan; (2) enjoin the enforcement thereof; and (3) restrain
respondents Provincial and City Prosecutors of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City
and Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Palawan from assuming jurisdiction over and hearing cases
concerning the violation of the Ordinances and of the Office Order.

Petitioners Contentions
First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which
the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had
the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit.
Third, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the
catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral
dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered
through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-
fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-
members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly
prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are
proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion.
Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the
criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be
dismissed.

Respondents Contention:
Ordinance No.2, Series of 1993 is a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments
power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment
and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such
as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a)
(1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC.
o The Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the
remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain
healthy for the future generation.
The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other
kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the
prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral
and allow those damaged to regenerate.
That there was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.
o Public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance
which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means;
while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman
who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a fisherman
who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the
former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the
Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.

Issue:
WON the petitions should be given due course NO, disregarded the hierarchy of
courts.
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
temporary restraining order issued on 11 November 1993 is LIFTED.

Ratio:
Preliminary stuff: Basically, their petitions have no merit.
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case.

22

The first is composed of Alfredo Tano, and others who were chargd with
violation the Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1993, of the Province
of Palawan and City Ordinance No. 15-92 of Puerto Princesa City.
o The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is, of course, to prevent the
prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the
constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall
have been resolved.
o Their special civil for certiorari must fail on the ground of prematurity
amounting to a lack of cause of action.
There is no showing that the said petitioners, as the accused in the
criminal cases, have filed motions to quash the informations therein and
that the same were denied.
It must further be stressed that even if the petitioners did file motions
to quash, the denial thereof would not forthwith give rise to a cause of
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The general rule is that
where a motion to quash is denied, the remedy therefrom is
not certiorari, but for the party aggrieved thereby to go to trial without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses involved in said motion, and if,
after trial on the merits of adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Even where in an exceptional circumstance such denial may be the
subject of a special civil action for certiorari, a motion for
reconsideration must have to be filed to allow the court concerned an
opportunity to correct its errors, unless such motion may be dispensed
with because of existing exceptional circumstances.
Finally, even if a motion for reconsideration has been filed and denied,
the remedy under Rule 65 is still unavailable absent any showing of the
grounds provided for in Section 1 thereof. For obvious reasons, the
petition at bar does not, and could not have , alleged any of such
grounds.
The second set of petitioners is composed of the rest of the petitioners
numbering seventy-seven (77), all of whom, except the Airline Shippers
Association of Palawan -- an alleged private association of several marine
merchants -- are natural persons who claim to be fishermen.
o They merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they
would be adversely affected by the ordinances.
o Their instant petition is obviously one for DECLARATORY RELIEF, i.e., for a
declaration that the Ordinances in question are a nullity ... for being
unconstitutional.
o As such, their petition must likewise fail, as this Court is not possessed
of original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief even if only
questions of law are involved, it being settled that the Court merely
exercises appellate jurisdiction over such petitions.

Supposing they have a cause of action... (MAIN)
Even granting arguendo that the first set of petitioners have a cause of action
ripe for the extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the
hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or exceptional or
compelling circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us should be
allowed.
While we have concurrent jurisdiction with Regional Trial courts and with the
Court of Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence gives petitioners no
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
People v. Cuaresma:
o This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are

23

better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
The Court feels the need to reaffirm that policy at this time, and to enjoin strict
adherence thereto in the light of what it perceives to be a growing tendency on
the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land.
Santiago v. Vasquez:
o The propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts
must be put to a halt, not only because of the imposition upon the precious
time of this Court, but also because of the inevitable and resultant delay,
intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules
of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is
not a trier of facts. We reiterated the judicial policy that this Court will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of [its] primary jurisdiction.

You can skip these, but this is the actual resolution of the merits of the case.
Additional, even if there was a cause of action and no procedural obstacles:
After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the
Constitution petitioners claim to have been violated, we find petitioners
contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer from any
infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Ordinance No. 15-92 of the City of Puerto Princesa is effective only up to 1
January 1998, while Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan, enacted on 19
February 1993, is effective for only five (5) years.
These Ordinances were undoubtedly enacted in the exercise of powers under the
new LGC relative to the protection and preservation of the environment and are
thus novel and of paramount importance. No further delay then may be allowed
in the resolution of the issues raised.
It is settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units)
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
o To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt.Where doubt exists, even if well founded, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.

Petitioners are not subsistence or marginal farmers. Even if they were, the
preferential right of subsistence farmers are not absolute. The LGC can regulate
fishery privileges in municipal waters.
There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms
subsistence or marginal fishermen, they should be construed in their general
and ordinary sense.
o A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of
return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is
barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish while
a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines
a marginal farmer or fisherman as an individual engaged in subsistence
farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of
agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate
family. It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that
any petitioner falls within these definitions.
Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations
marine wealth.
The so-called preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use
of marine resources is not at all absolute.
o Regalian Doctrine: marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to
the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization ... shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.
Oposa v. Factoran: The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment ...

24

Under the LGC: The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters
7
and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, deleterious methods of fishing; and to
prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws.
o One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including
the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters.
Under RA No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP)
for Palawan Act: This statute adopts a comprehensive framework for the
sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing
the natural resources and endangered environment of the province, which shall
serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies
concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and
projects affecting said province.

RE: validity of the Ordinances and resolution
1. The nexus then between the activities barred by Ordinance No. 15-92 and
Ordinance No. 2 on one hand, and the use of sodium cyanide, on the other, is
painfully obvious. In sum, the public purpose and reasonableness of the
Ordinances may not then be controverted.
Both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a
closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a
period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the City
of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
o The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power
to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which
allows the establishment of closed seasons.

7
The term municipal waters, in turn, include not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters within
the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not comprised within the
national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves, or fishery reserves, but also marine
waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline from points
where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and fifteen kilometers from it.

o The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare
clause of the LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and
provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment.
The destruction of the coral reefs results in serious, if not irreparable, ecological
imbalance, for coral reefs are among the natures life-support systems.
2. RE: Office Order No. 23: We find nothing therein violative of any constitutional
or statutory provision. The Order refers to the implementation of the challenged
ordinance and is not the Mayors Permit.
3. RE: Ordinance No. 15: The majority is unable to accommodate this view that the
Ordinance is unenforceable for lack of approval of the DENR. If at all, the
approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing
and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with.

Sec. 2. Power of Legislature to Apportion Jurisdiction
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members

8. Malaga v. Penachos 213 SCRA 516 (1992) [injunctions against
infrastructure projects]
G.R. No. 86695 |September 3, 1992
PETITIONERS: MARIA ELENA MALAGA, doing business under the name B.E.
CONSTRUCTION; JOSIELEEN NAJARRO, doing business under the name BEST BUILT
CONSTRUCTION; JOSE N. OCCEA, doing business under the name THE FIRM OF
JOSE N. OCCEA; and the ILOILO BUILDERS CORPORATION
RESPONDENTS: MANUEL R. PENACHOS, JR., ALFREDO MATANGGA, ENRICO TICAR
AND TERESITA VILLANUEVA, in their respective capacities as Chairman and Members
of the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)-BENIGNO PANISTANTE, in
his capacity as President of Iloilo State College of Fisheries, as well as in
their respective personal capacities; and HON. LODRIGIO L. LEBAQUIN, respondents.

25

Ponente: CRUZ, J

SUMMARY: ISCOF through the PBAC advertised an Invitation to Bid for a
construction project of their Micro Lab Building. They published the details but did
not include the hour of the deadline of the submission. The petitioners submitted the
necessary documents on the day (the letter of intent in the morning and the docs in
the afternoon). However, they were considered as submitted late because per the
PBAC the deadline was at 10AM of December 2 and they submitted at 2PM (Malaga
and Najarro). Malaga et al, filed a complaint in RTC of Iloilo and the judge in the case
issued a preliminary injunction against PBAC. Penachos et al opposed this because
according to them this is contrary to Sec 1 of PD 1818 which stated that no court can
issue an injunction against projects of the government. RTC lifted the restraining
order. Issue is not whether a preliminary injunction can issue even if the same is
prohibited under PD1818. SC said that this finds similarity in another case (Datiles)
where the questioned law was PD605. SC held that the prohibition pertained to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in
controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. Justice
Teodoro Padilla made it clear that on issues definitely outside of this
dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D.
No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. This
case does not cover technical issues but questions the non-compliance of procedural
rules on bidding (lack notice since Malaga and others not informed of the change in
schedule other arguments detailed in the case).

FACTS:
This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which
prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure
projects of the government.
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28,
1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice
announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements (PRE C-1) was December 2, 1988 (note no hour), and that the bids
would be received and opened on December 12 at 3PM.
Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business
under the name of the B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted
their pre-qualification documents at 2PM of December 2. Petitioner Jose Occea
submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5.
All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off
time of 10AM on December 2.
On December 12, 1988, Malaga et al, filed a complaint with RTC Iloilo against the
chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. They
claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC
refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not included in
the list of pre-qualified bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other
documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.
Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding the project. Penachos et al, filed a motion
to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited from
issued restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory
injunctions by P.D. 1818 because Section 1 of the same law stated that NO
COURT can issue a preliminary injunction regarding projects of the government,
or any public utility operated by the government, including among others
public utilities for the transport of the goods and commodities, stevedoring and
arrastre contracts xxx. The movants also contended that the question of the
propriety of a preliminary injunction had become moot and academic
because the restraining order was received late, at 2PM of December 12,
1988, after the bidding had been conducted and closed at 11.30AM.
RTC DECISION: trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be construed at the
ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage
of P.D. 1818. Even if it were not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction would still fail because the sheriff's return showed that
PBAC was served a copy of the restraining order after the bidding sought to be
restrained had already been held. Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could
not be restrained from awarding the project because the authority to do so was
lodged in the President of the ISCOF, who was not a party to the case.


26

SOME OF THE IRREGULATIES POINTED BY THE MALAGA et al AND THE
COMMENT OF PENACHOS et al (included in SC petition): (madami sya but eto
yung medyo related sa issue on injunction)
PD1818 does not cover the ISCOF because of its separate and distinct corporate
personality.
o Respondent: Members of the Board of ISCOF are all government officials
and the funding of ISCOF is in the General Appropriations bill thus they
were a government institution.
The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of submission of
pre-qualification document on December 2 without indicating any time, yet after
10:00AM PBAC refused to accept petitioners' documents. The time and date of
bidding was published as December 12, 1988 at 3:00PM yet it was held at
10:00AM.
o Respondent: PBAC posted on the ISCOF bulletin board an announcement
that the deadline for the submission of pre-qualifications documents was at
10AM of December 2and the opening of bids would be held at 1PM same
day. As of 10AM, B.E. construction and Best Built construction had filed only
their letters of intent and only filed their docs at 2PM and thus stamped as
"submitted late." They were disqualified on Dec. 6 and have not taken
immediate action on the disqualification.
The Invitation to Bid, in mimeographed form, and the Itemized Bill of Quantities
were left blank. Also, the project in question was a "Construction," the private
respondents used an Invitation to Bid form for "Materials."
Preliminary Injunction not moot and academic: even if the bids had been
opened before the restraining order was issued, the project itself had not
yet been awarded.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE INJUNCTION CAN ISSUE? YES (made this up,
walang issue stated)

HELD: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining
order dated December 12, 1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D.
1818; b) ordering the chairman and the members of the PBAC board of trustees,
namely Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita
Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen
Najarro nominal damages P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the said chairman
and members from the PBAC board of trustees, or whoever among them is
still incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office. Costs against PBAC. Let a
copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the Ombudsman.

PD 1818 IS APPLICABLE: INJUNCTION CAN ISSUE (MAIN)
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as one that
refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-
owned or controlled corporations.
The same Code describes a chartered institution as any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and
is covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality (like it was created under the fisheries devt program which is a
priority project of the government and that 1.5M has been appropriated out of
the national treasury and that the funds and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law, etc).
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree.
Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito: Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained
in P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was declared that the
prohibition pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by
courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the
courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear, however,
that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving

27

questions of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from
exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
SC sees no reason why this ruling should not apply to PD 1818.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified
injunction of the bidding and the award of the project:
o (See the second bullet point on petitioners arguments as the first
irregularity) The change in sched was only posted in the bulletin board. Even
if there were 14 other contractors that qualified even with the change of
schedule this fact did not cure the irregularity in the notice (this is an
irregularity per PD1594).
o Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans,
specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days
before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M
and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on
December 2, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December
12. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November
12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding.
SC held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before
government contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the
requirement will, as a general rule, render the same void and of no
effect 11 The facts that an invitation for bids has been communicated to
a number of possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish
compliance with the requirements of the law if it is shown that other public
bidders have not been similarly notified.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the
discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely
technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. The purpose of
the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to
prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the
detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities
committed by PBAC.
THREE PRINCIPLES OF BIDDING: offer to the public, an opportunity for
competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter
which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the
system and thwarts and purpose of its adoption.
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-
qualification requirement and the bidding that caused the elimination of B.E. and
Best Built. It was not because of their expired licenses, as private respondents
now claim. Moreover, the plans and specifications which are the contractors'
guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus defeating the
guaranty that contractors be placed on equal footing when they submit
their bids. The purpose of competitive bidding is negated if some
contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans and specifications that
are to be the subject of their bids.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities
committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies. The
challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the
respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have
been denied.
It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted
without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and the party to
whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it. It has not been shown that the
irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any of
the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents
for the prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a result of the
anomalies described above.

Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary
may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the
previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

Sec. 4. Compositions and Sessions
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.

28

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including
those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence
of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Filling-in vacancy in Supreme Court; 90 days

9. De Castro v. JBC 615 SCRA 666 (2010)
March 17, 2010 | BERSAMIN, J.
G.R. No. 191002 Petitioner: ARTURO M. DE CASTRO | Respondents: JBC and PGMA
G.R. No. 191032. Petitioner: JAIME N. SORIANO | Respondent: JBC
G.R. No. 191057. Petitioner: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA) |
Respondent: JBC
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC. Petitioner: IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF
THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA
G.R. No. 191149. Petitioner: JOHN G. PERALTA | Respondent: JBC
Intervenors: PETER IRVING CORVERA; et al. (too many)
G.R. No. 191342. Petitioners: ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor
Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP GovernorEastern Visayas) |
Respondent: JBC
G.R. No. 191420. Petitioner: PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC. | Respondents: JBC
and PGMA

SUMMARY: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. These
cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Also considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the
Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments
within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Court ruled that prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the
Judiciary. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the
Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in
Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

FACTS:
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election.
All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question
whether the incumbent President (end of term of office is June 30, 2010) can
appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional
Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City,
respectively (Valenzuela), by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII

29

prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial
positions during the period therein fixed.
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a
letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the
Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
JBC passed a resolution: The JBC, in its en banc meeting unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice. It will publish the
opening of the position for applications or recommendations; deliberate on the
list of candidates; publish the names of candidates; accept comments on or
opposition to the applications; conduct public interviews of candidates; and
prepare the shortlist of candidates.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or
recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement on January
20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the
position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the
Court, namely: Carpio; Corona; Carpio Morales; Velasco, Jr.; and Nachura.
However, the last two declined their nomination through letters. Others either
applied or were nominated.
Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica & Atty. Gregorio M.
Batiller, Jr. (via telephone conversation). The JBC excluded from consideration
former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards set by the
JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the
Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of the Ombudsman).
JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for
the position due to the controversy now before us being yet unresolved. JBC
submitted its comment, reporting therein that the next stage of the process
would be the public interview of the candidates and the preparation of the short
list of candidates, including the interview of the constitutional experts, as may
be needed.

It stated:

Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the
shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article
VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court
shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section
15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential
appointments two (2) months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term and Section 261 (g), Article XXII of
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court.
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC
Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to
which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even
recognized that there might be the imperative need for an appointment during
the period of the ban, like when the membership of the Supreme Court should
be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particular
important question requiring expeditious resolution be divided;

and that
Valenzuela also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is
undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if there is any compelling
reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the
prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement. YES

RATIO:
I. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. The
incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential
appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the
Judiciary.

First. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have
explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions.
Although Valenzuela

came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly

30

rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the
confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado of this
Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition
not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail.
Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of
Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz.:
o The Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was
that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to
include a command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from
its occurrence.
o In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days (in the last sentence of Section 4
(1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
which is couched in stronger negative languagethat a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments
o The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Davide, Jr. to
add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph: WITH
RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE
APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE
LIST (of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide
stated that his purpose was to provide a uniform rule for lower courts.
According to him, the 90-day period should be counted from submission of
the list of nominees to the President in view of the possibility that the
President might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus need
more time to submit a new one.
o On the other hand, Section 15, Article VIIwhich in effect deprives the
President of his appointing power two months immediately before the
next presidential elections up to the end of his termwas approved
without discussion.
The reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance
or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the
express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative
of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, a command [to the President] to fill up any
vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence, which even Valenzuela
conceded.

The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period
was a true mandate for the President:
o MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court,
together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection
reads: Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.
MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill
the vacancy?
MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact
that in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a complete
complement.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shallan imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforcedshould not be disregarded.
Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a
definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be
defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section
15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language.
In this connection, PHILCONSAs urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is
timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the
Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently
of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that
the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article
VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and
should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.
Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief
Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in
the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not

31

be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed.

It will not do to
merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached
herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently,
Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy
and forgettable. We reverse Valenzuela.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the
Judiciary.
There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section
15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being
made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt
with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.

In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that: it appears that
Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those
made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first
refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a
Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:
o The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII
consists of the so-called midnight appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it
was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly
elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid
for reelection, became no more than a caretaker administrator whose
duty was to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming
President.
o Said the Court: The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if
few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action
and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and
appointees qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the
issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction
of almost all of them in a few hours before the inauguration of the
new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an
abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a
mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness
and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration
of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may
not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight
appointmentsthose made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their
number and the time of their makingbut also appointments presumed
made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential
election.
On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VIIallowing
appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein providedis
much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the
making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the
article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period
of the ban.
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in
the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition
to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and
their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial
positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that
there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. The
appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would
not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior processing of
candidates.
Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time
of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions
at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be
assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because
they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there.

Third. The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration
to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on
interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission.

32

As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments
in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the
JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some
sectors about the constitutionality of xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals
in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of
the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no application to
appointments to the Court of Appeals. This confirmation was accepted by the
JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for
the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section
16) concern the appointing powers of the President.
Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke
appointments made by an Acting President, and evidently refers only to
appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to appointments
in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine
the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.
Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments after the requirement was removed from
the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored
requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.
83

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to
appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of
ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and
Legislative Departments.
Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or
misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential
election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the
current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and
cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become
beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the
incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial
independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the
incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief
Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will
still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.
The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy
occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the
need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

II. To rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the
imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain
intent of the Constitution.
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948
can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.
o Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The provision calls for an Acting
Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice,
or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and
powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the
office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who
is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the
disability is removed.
A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is
composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed
by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for
every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by
the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is
preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over.

33

Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments
are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become
the leaders of their respective Departments.
However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms
the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the
entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the
life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal.
Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between
the retirement and the resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand,
and the appointment to and assumption of office of his successor, on the other
hand.
8

III. The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has no discretion to submit the list of
nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court to the President after the
vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the
Constitution for the President to make the appointment.
The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC
should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it
is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of
them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy.
The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy
occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for
the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be

8
1. When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18, 1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap
was appointed on the same day;
2. When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan was
appointed on the same day;
3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief Justice Andres Narvasa
was appointed the following day, December 8, 1991;
4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
was sworn into office the following early morning of November 30, 1998;
5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban was appointed the next day, December 20, 2005; and
6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno took his oath as Chief Justice at midnight of December 6, 2006.

unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally
deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect
on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making
the appointment
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the
Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of
the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President
lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus
herein should only refer to the

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court:
1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R.
No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature;
2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for
lack of merit; and
3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial
and Bar Council:
(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to
be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17,
2010;
(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position
of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and
(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other
vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees
corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

Referral to en banc; par. 3; cases only; modification of doctrine
10. Fortich v. Corona GR 131457 (1999) [involves matters]
G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | YNARES-SANTIAGO
Petitioners: HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON,
HON. REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

34

Respondents: HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON.
ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM

Summary: This case refers to two motions for reconsideration with motion to refer
the matter to the court en banc filed by respondents and intervenors assailing the
Courts resolution dated November 17, 1998, otherwise known as Win-Win
resolution, wherein the division of the Court voted two-two. This November 17
resolution affirmed the decision of this Court denying intervenors motion to
intervene. The case has its origin from a decision of the Office of the President
vesting rights to the land in dispute to petitioners and those similarly situated and
denying benefits to intervenors who were seasonal farmworkers. It is alleged that the
Win-Win resolution should have been referred to the Court sitting En Banc pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution when the 3-vote requirement was not
secured. Petitioners further alleged that the issues raised -whether or not the power
of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to approval of the DAR -
are of first impression.
SC stated that the motions filed by petitioners assailing the Resolution of this Court
dated November 17, 1998 partake of the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is clearly prohibited by Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule
52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in exceptional cases, the
Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, but the same must be filed
with express leave of court. Petitioners failed to secure the required prior leave from
the Court and the issue raised had been settled in the case of Province of Camarines
Sur, et al. vs. CA in the negative. A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the
Constitution reveals that there is a distinction between cases and matters, that
cases are decided while matters are resolved. Therefore, only cases are referred
to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained and does not apply in the resolution of motions for reconsideration.

BACKGROUND: This is an MR of SC Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998 declaring a win-
win resolution as having no legal effect as it was issued after the original decision
had become final and executory.
(From net, just so you know about previous case.) On March 29, 1996, the Office of
the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from
agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of
farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Compound in QC. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a
number of Presidential Candidates (98 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, politically motivated, win-win
resolution on Nov 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had
become final and executory. SC ruled that when the OP issued the Order dated June
23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, no one has
seasonably filed a MR. OP had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the OP has no more authority to
entertain the second MR filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.

FACTS:
Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated
November 17, 1998, wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration of our earlier Decision of April 24, 1998, as a result of which the
Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the said motions for
reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court
sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution. (case
was decided by a special second division. The Nov Resolution was decided by
second division).
Respondents and intervenors also assail our Resolution dated January 27, 1999,
wherein we noted without action the intervenors Motion For Reconsideration
With Motion To Refer The Matter To The Court En Banc filed on December 3,
1998, on the following considerations, to wit:
o the movants have no legal personality to further seek redress before the
Court after their motion for leave to intervene in this case was denied in the
April 24, 1998 Decision. Their subsequent motion for reconsideration of the
said decision, with a prayer to resolve the motion to the Court En Banc, was
also denied in the November 17, 1998 Resolution of the Court. Besides,
their aforesaid motion of December 3, 1998 is in the nature of a second
motion for reconsideration which is a forbidden motion (Section 2, Rule 52
in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). The
impropriety of movants December 3, 1998 motion becomes all the more

35

glaring considering that all the respondents in this case did not anymore
join them (movants) in seeking a reconsideration of the November 17, 1998
Resolution.
In their respective motions for reconsideration, both respondents and intervenors
pray that this case be referred to this Court en banc. They contend that
inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision dated April
24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a
decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to
and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional
provision:
o Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc.

ISSUE: Whether Win-Win resolution should have been referred to the Court sitting
En Banc pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution when the 3-vote
requirement was not secured NO

RATIO:

Cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved (main)
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand,
and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are decided while matters,
which include motions, are resolved.
The word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must
refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is
true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words
appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of
votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case,
the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of case
and not matter. The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the
voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer
it to the Court en banc.
On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the
losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of
the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must
therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.

Motions filed by petitioners assailing the Resolution of this Court partake of the
nature of a second MR which is prohibited by Rule 56, Sec 4, in relation to Rule
52, Sec 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
It is the movants further contention in support of their plea for the referral of
this case to the Court en banc that the issues submitted in their separate
motions are of first impression. This contention is flawed.
In the opinion penned by Justice Martinez during the resolution of the MRs on
Nov 17, 1998:
o Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of
no extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en
banc. Specifically, the issue of whether or not the power of the local
government units to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the DAR is
no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case of
Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held

36

that local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to
convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
o Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a
unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of this
Court. Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the
matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not deserve the
consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court
in the resolution of movants motions for reconsideration would be
inappropriate.

Second MRs must be filed with leave of court supported with extraordinary
persuasive reasons
True, there are exceptional cases when this Court may entertain a second motion
for reconsideration, such as where there are extraordinarily persuasive
reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second motions for reconsideration
must be filed with express leave of court first obtained.
In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior leave of court, but more
importantly, they have been unable to show that there are exceptional reasons
for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration. Stripped
of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions
subject of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for
reconsideration which have been denied in the Resolution of November 17,
1998. To be sure, the allegations contained therein have already been raised
before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.

Dismissal based on finality of case not a question of technicality but of substance
and merit
The crux of the controversy is the validity of the Win-Win Resolution dated
November 7, 1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect
considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had
already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for
reconsideration which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution. This
ruling, quite understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the part of
respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of
the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-
reaching effects, the case was disposed of on a technicality.
The situation, however, is not as simple as what the movants purport it to
be. While it may be true that on its face the nullification of the Win-Win
Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule pertaining to the reglementary
period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying consideration
therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. The succinct
words of Justice Panganiban are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of
Justice Martinez, viz: Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his/her case.
In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested
appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people
of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the
development of the property. The issue in this case, therefore, is not a question
of technicality but of substance and merit.

Intervenors must have actual and substantive interest in controversy. Seasonal
farm workers in the case are without sufficient interest over land in controversy.
In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award,
or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they
have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property.
As expressed in the opinion of Justice Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly
not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive
interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the
land. Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land.
Moreover, the Win-Win Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries
have yet to be carefully and meticulously determined by the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in
the controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the
issuance of the CLOA's to them does not grant them the requisite standing in
view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate
from a resolution that is null and void.

37

HELD: WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the following incidents, namely:
intervenors Motion For Reconsideration With Motion To Refer The Matter To The
Court En Banc, dated December 3, 1998; respondents Motion For Reconsideration
Of The Resolution Dated November 17, 1998 And For Referral Of The Case To This
Honorable Court En Banc (With Urgent Prayer For Issuance Of A Restraining Order),
dated December 2, 1998; and intervenors Urgent Omnibus Motion For The Supreme
Court Sitting En Banc To Annul The Second Divisions Resolution Dated 27 January
1999 And Immediately Resolve The 28 May 1998 Motion For Reconsideration Filed By
The Intervenors, dated March 2, 1999; are all DENIED with FINALITY. No further
motion, pleading, or paper will be entertained in this case.

Sec. 5. Powers of the Supreme Court
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent
of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.

1
st
: ripe for adjudication
11. PACU v. Sec. of Education 97 Phil. 806 (1955) [also under locus standi]
G.R. No. L-5279 | October 31, 1955

Petitioner: Philippine Association Of Colleges And Universities
Respondents: Secretary Of Education & The Board Of Textbooks
Ponente: J. Bengzon

Summary: PACU assails the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 which imposes among
others the requirement of: (1) securing a permit from the Sec. of Education before
opening a school to the public, and (2) the textbooks to be used in the private
schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to Board of
Textbooks which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks
which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity and honor of the
government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the
general policies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.

The SC held that the petitioning colleges and universities do not show how these
standards have injured any of them or interfered with their operation. Courts will not
pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show
that he suffered a wrong under the terms of law, and naturally needs no relief. In the
case at bar, first, none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of
them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
And they do not assert that the Sec. of Education has threatened to revoke their
permits. Second, there was no evidence that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited
this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuse to submit some
textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

38

FACTS:
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection and
recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public
Instruction." Under its provisions, the Dept. of Education has, for the past 37
years, supervised and regulated all private schools in this country apparently
without audible protest, nay, with the general acquiescence of the general public
and the parties concerned, until now.
The Philippine Association Of Colleges And Universities (PACU) request that Act
No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be
declared unconstitutional, because:
1) They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents
of liberty and property without due process of law;
2) They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children
for civic efficiency; and
3) Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power
and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful
delegation of legislative power.
The government on the other hand contend that:
1) the matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable
necessity of deciding the constitutional questions;
2) PACU is in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and
3) the Acts are constitutionally valid

Preliminary issue: WON there is a necessity of deciding the constitutional questions.
(made this up) NO. There is no justiciable controversy. [main]
Solicitor General: none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all
of them have permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
And they do not assert that the respondent Sec. of Education has threatened to
revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of lawand,
naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
SC: Sol Gen is correct.
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interests of litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection
against actual interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United
Public Works vs. Mitchell)
Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.
The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of
such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and
vital controversy between litigants. (Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, p. 1138.)
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint
of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. (Tyler vs. Judges)
Actions like this is brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual and positive
relief and courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest therein.
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. (Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks)

BUT the SC nevertheless discussed the constitutionality of the said act.

Issue 1: WON Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional for violating the due process of law.
NO.
PACUs argument: Section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended provides that before a
private school may be opened to the public it must first obtain a permit from the Sec.
of Education. This infringes the right of a citizen to own and operate a school which is
guaranteed by the Constitution. Any law requiring previous governmental approval or
permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of
previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government.
SC:
The requirement that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit
from the Secretary of Education was introduced by Commonwealth Act No. 180
approved in 1936 pursuant to a report made by the Board of Educational Survey.
It reported that there is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to
prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even immoral
character, from opening a school to teach the young. Thus, the great majority of

39

private schools from primary grade to university are money-making devices for
the profit of those who organize and administer them.
In view of these findings and recommendations, the Government in the exercise
of its police power to correct "a great evil" can validly establish the "previous
permit" system objected to by PACU.
Moreover, under Art. XIV, sec. 5 of the [1935 ata] Constitution "All educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State."
And the power to regulate establishments or business occupations implies the
power to require a permit or license. (53 C. J. S. 4.)

Issue 2: WON Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional for constituting an unlawful delegation
of legislative power. NO.
PACUs argument: The statutes confer on the Sec. of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards. Nowhere in this Act can one find any
description, either general or specific, of what constitutes a 'general standard of
efficiency, 'adequate instruction to the public and 'efficiency of instruction' which
under Sec. 1 of Act No. 2706:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general
standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that
the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the
class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary
or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and
regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of
instruction given in the same.
SC:
The Sec. of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient
instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school
calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of
students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been
satisfactorily in operation for 37 years which only shows that the Legislature did
and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in
charge of the Dept. of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum
requirements of adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of
any private school.
Moreover, "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered sufficient, in
the same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order"
"public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial merits of the case" have
been held sufficient as legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to
regulate

Issue 3: WON Act No. 2706 and the Sec. of Education have transcended the
governmental power of supervision and regulation. NO.
SC: The statute does not in express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives
him powers to inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official
permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause.
This does not amount to complete control.

Issue 4: WON the levy of 1% on gross receipts is valid. NOT ANSWERED.
PACUs Argument: The assessment of 1% levied on gross receipts of all private
schools for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision and
regulation under section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended by RA 74 is a tax on the
exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open a school, the liberty to teach etc.
This is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling religious
literature or of publishing a newspaper.
SC: There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy of 1 per
cent is truly a mere feeand not a taxto finance the cost of the Department's duty
and power to regulate and supervise private schools, the exaction may be upheld; but
such point involves investigation and examination of relevant data, which should best
be carried out in the lower courts.

Issue 5: WON Sec. 1 of RA 139 is valid. NOT ANSWERED. [also read this part]
PACUs Argument: Sec. 1 of RA 139 amounts to censorship textbooks to be used
in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted
to the Board (Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the use of
any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the dignity
and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to
be against the general policies of the government, or which it may deem
pedagogically unsuitable.

40

SC: No justiciable controversy has been presented. The court was not informed that
the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners
refused or intend to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
substantial privileges or rights for so refusing. The SC nevertheless assures PACU that
when and if, the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is
suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the courts will not
shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries and protect individual
liberties.

Decision: The petition for prohibition will be denied.

12. Tan v. Macapagal 43 SCRA 678 (1972) [also taxpayers suit]
Petitioner: EUGENE A. TAN, SILVESTRE J. ACEJAS and ROGELIO V. FERNANDEZ, on
their behalf and on behalf of the People of the Philippines
Respondents: DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL, on his behalf and on behalf of the other
Delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-34161 February 29, 1972
FERNANDO, J.

Emergency: Petitioners challenge, in a 5 page petition, the Laurel-Leido Resolution,
dealing with the authority of the 1971 concoms power to alter the countrys form of
govt. they claim it can merely propose improvements, but not alter the form of govt
under the constitution. SC denies. Now at hand is a 32-page MR. SC still denies. They
have no standing since the proposed amendments have yet to be acted upon. Thus,
no direct injury yet. BUT since dean wants us to know the ground for a taxpayers
suit, this is the pertinent line in the decisionYet, there are many decisions nullifying,
at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that the "expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for
the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."

Facts:
1. A five-page petition filed on October 6, 1971 by Eugene A. Tan, Silvestre J. Acejas
and Rogelio V. Fernandez, respectively, of Roxas City, Romblon and Davao City,
for declaratory relief as taxpayers, but purportedly suing on behalf of themselves
and the Filipino people.
2. They assail the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution, dealing with the range of
the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. They wish SC to declare that
it is "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Consti and RA 6132, to
consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present
Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the form
now outlined in the present Constitution[,] [the Convention being] merely
empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without
altering the general plan laid down therein."
3. It is without merit (highlighting the fact it was only 5-pages). Accordingly, on
October 8, 1971, this Court dismissed it. Then came on the last day of that
month a printed thirty-two page MR. It is evident that petitioners Tan et al. took
some pains this time, although the main reliance seems to be on a secondary
authority, American Jurisprudence.
4. The show of diligence is impressive but the persuasive quality is something else.
A perusal thereof yields the conclusion that petitioners are oblivious of the
authoritative precedents in this jurisdiction.
5. Considering, however, the compulsion of the fundamental principle of separation
of powers, this Court cannot exercise the competence petitioners Tan et al. would
erroneously assume it possesses, even assuming that they have the requisite
standing, which is the first question to be faced.

Issue 1: W/N petitioners had the requisite standing to seek a declaration of the
alleged nullity of a resolution of the Constitutional Convention. NO
1. Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity
of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement."
There has been a relaxation of this rule.
2. Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works. - "Again, it is well settled that the
validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds, upon the theory that the "expenditure of public funds, by an officer
of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes

41

a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer."
3. Moreover, where a constitutional question is raised, a Senator has usually been
considered as possessed of the requisite personality to bring a suit. Thus in
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, it was a member of the Senate who was heard by this
Court in a suit for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of the congressional
resolution proposing the parity rights amendment.

Likewise, in the latest case in
point, Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, it was a Senator who brought action
challenging the validity of Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
4. Petitioners in the present case cannot be heard to assert that they do qualify
under such a category. As far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, Court is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. It is our view
that a negative answer is indicated. Nor should petitioners feel discriminated
against just because in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, a member of the
Philippine Bar, now Delegate Ramon Gonzales, was allowed to prosecute his
action for prohibition instituted by him as a taxpayer. Petitioners have no cause
for legitimate resentment as such suit could be distinguished from the present.
5. Petitioner Gonzales (HE WAS ONLY MENITONED NOW IN THE ENTIRE CASE) in
accordance with the controlling doctrine had the good sense to wait before filing
his suit until after the enactment of the statute for the submission to the
electorate of certain proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was only then
that the matter was ripe for adjudication. Prior to that stage, the judiciary had to
keep its hands off.
6. The doctrine of separation of powers calls for the other departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit. The legislative and executive
branches are not bound to seek its advice as to what to do or not to do.
7. It is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture. At such a time, it may
pass on the validity of what was done but only "when ... properly challenged in
an appropriate legal proceeding."
8. Such a principle applies as well when the inquiry concerns the scope of the
competence lodged in the Constitutional Convention. The judiciary must leave it
free to fulfill its responsibility according to its lights. Its autonomy is to be
respected. Such should be the case not only because it is a coordinate agency
but also because its powers are transcendent, amounting as it does to submitting
for popular ratification proposals which may radically alter the organization and
functions of all three departments, including the courts.
9. It is therefore much more imperative that the rule of non-interference be strictly
adhered to until the appropriate time comes.
10. More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it,
there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made
concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be
instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction. That is the command
of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied. No costs.

2
nd
: Standing
13. Concepcion v. COMELEC 591 SCRA 420 (2009) [aggrieved party]
Concepcion v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 178624 | June 30, 2009

Petitioner: JOSE CONCEPCION, JR.,
Respondent: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Ponente: BRION, J.:

SUMMARY: NAMFREL filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation
Quick Count with COMELEC. COMELEC issued Resolution 7798 prohibiting any
barangay official from becoming a BEI or an official watcher. THE COMELEC approved
COMELECs Accreditation subject to the condition that Concepcion be replaced as
NAMFRELs Chairman. (NAMFRELs chariman who is the incumbent barangay chairman
of Forbes Park). NAMFREL sought the re-examination of the said denial but COMELEC
refused to reconsider its decision. NAMREL accepted this decision. Concepcion then
filed this petition ostensibly questioning the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, but
actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798. Concepcion has no legal
standing. He Is not an aggrieved party. The term "person aggrieved" is not to be
construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower courts order or
decision can question the said courts disposition via certiorari. The "person
aggrieved" under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action

42

of certiorari pertains only to one who was a party in the proceedings before the
court a quo.

FACTS:
January 5, 2007 - the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)
filed a Petition for Accreditation to Conduct the Operation Quick Count with the
COMELEC. The present petitioner then the incumbent Punong
Barangay of Barangay Forbes Park, Makati City was one of the signatories of
the NAMFREL petition in his capacity as the National Chairman of NAMFREL.
On the same date, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7798 pursuant to
Section 3 of EO 94 issued by Cory Aquino which provides:
No barangay official shall be appointed as member of the Board of
Election Inspectors or as official watcher of each duly registered major
political party or any socio-civic, religious, professional or any similar
organization of which they may be members., the COMELEC issued this
resolution to prohibit (EO) xxx
The appointment of barangay officials (Punong Barangay,
Kagawad,Secretary, Treasurer, Tanod), as Chairman/person and/or Member
of the BEIs or as official watcher of any candidate, duly registered major
political party, or any similar organization, or any socio-civic, religious,
professional [sic], in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. The
prohibition extends to barangay officials, employees and tanods, who are
members of accredited citizens arms. The barangay officials, employees
and tanods from staying inside any polling place, except to cast their vote.
Accordingly, they should leave the polling place immediately after casting
their vote. (RESO)
The COMELEC ruled on NAMFRELs petition for accreditation on April 2, 2007 in
the assailed Resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution), conditionally granting
NAMFRELs petition provided that Mr. Jose S. Concepcion, Jr., the National
Chairman of NAMFREL, and other officers/members similarly situatated, must first
be removed both as a member and overall Chairman of said organization.
o Mr. Concepcion, being the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Forbes Park,
Makati City, cannot be a member much more the overall chairman of the
citizens arm such as NAMFREL. This is explicitly provided for in COMELEC
Resolution No. 7798 promulgated on 5 January 2007.
o This accreditation shall be deemed automatically revoked in case petitioner
violates any of the provisions and conditions set forth herein.
Soon thereafter, NAMFREL filed a "Manifestation and Request for Re-
Examination" that: (1) contains information regarding NAMFRELs reorganization
and its new set of officers showing that the petitioner had stepped down as
National Chair and had been replaced by a new Chair; (2) manifests NAMFRELs
acceptance of the conditional grant of its petition for accreditation; and (3)
includes NAMFRELs request for a re-examination without further arguments of
the April 2, 2007 Resolution as it specifically affected the petitioners membership
with NAMFREL. In this Manifestation and Request for Re-examination, NAMFREL
outlined its various objections and concerns on the legality or validity of
Resolution 7798.
The COMELEC noted the information relating to NAMFRELs current officers, and
denied the request to examine its (COMELECs) interpretation of the April 2, 2007
Resolution prohibiting petitioners direct participation as member and National
Chairman of NAMFREL. NAMFREL did not question the COMELECs ruling.
Instead of a direct reaction from NAMFREL, the petitioner filed the present
petition for Certiorari, ostensibly questioning the COMELECs April 2, 2007
Resolution, but actually raising issues with respect to Resolution 7798.

Concepcions Contentions: COMELEC acted without statutory basis in issuing
COMELEC Resolution 7798; COMELEC erred in applying the said Resolution
retroactively and that Mr. Concepcion was not accorded due process as he was not
given an opportunity the COMELEC resolution 7798 or present his side. He also
argues that the said Resolution fails to comply with the requisites of valid
implementing rules and regulations. He also argues that he is not a watcher or a BEI
but the chairman of NAMFREL.

OSGs response: Resolution 7798 was issued by virtue of COMELECs quasi-legislative
power to implement election laws. EO No. 4 applied to May 14, 2007 national and
local elections. While EO No. 94 may have been issued primarily for the February 2,
1987 plebsicite, its spirit and intent find applicability and relevance to future elections.
While the petitioner is not appointed as member of the BEI or as watcher, he
nonetheless labors under a conflict of interest, given that a COMELEC-accredited
citizens arm is also entitled, under Section 180 of the OEC to appoint a watcher in

43

every polling place. Additionally, the fact that the petitioner is a barangay ychairman
and at the same time the NAMFREL Chair clearly raises questions on his neutrality
and non-partisanship.

ISSUE: WON Concepcion had standing to question Resolution 7798? -NO

RATIO:
A primary consideration for us in looking at the petition is its thrust or focus. The
petition mentions three legal instruments related with the case, namely: (1) EO
No. 94 issued by then President Aquino; (2) COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution
conditionally granting NAMFRELs accreditation, subject to the conditions that the
petitioner and similarly situated barangay officials shall not be included as
members or officials of NAMFREL; and (3) COMELEC Resolution 7798, issued
pursuant to EO No. 94 and which in turn is the basis for the April 2, 2007
Resolution.
The present petition, by its express terms, seeks to "set aside the En Banc
Resolution dated 02 April 2007 and the Order dated 8 May 2007 of Respondent
Comelec who, in grave abuse of discretion and in gross violation of Petitioners
right to due process of law, denied Petitioners right to associate when the
Respondent Comelec, as a condition of NAMFRELs accreditation as citizen arm,
directed the removal of Petitioner as overall Chairman and member."
In arguing for this objective, the petitioner directs his attention at Resolution
7798, not at the April 2, 2007 Resolution, as can be seen from the grounds
summarized above. In the process, he likewise raises issues that call for the
interpretation of Resolution 7798s underlying basis EO No. 94.
Expressed in procedural terms, the petitioner now seeks to assail, in his individual
capacity, a COMELEC adjudicatory resolution (April 2, 2007 Resolution) for its
adverse effects on him when he was not a party to that case.
NAMFREL (the direct party to the case and who had accepted the COMELEC
accreditation ruling), on the other hand, is not a party to the present petition. Its
non-participation is apparently explained by the position it took with respect to
the April 2, 2007 Resolution. In its Manifestation it stated that NAMFREL accepts
the terms of the accreditation and further manifests that it has commenced full
efforts into preparing for the performance of its duties and obligations as the
Commissions citizen arm.
Thus, the present petition is clearly the petitioners own initiative, and NAMFREL,
the direct party in the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution, has absolutely no
participation.
Another unusual feature of this case is the focus of the petition.
o While its expressed intent is to assail the COMELECs April 2, 2007
Resolution (an exercise of the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions), its
focus is on the alleged defects of Resolution 7798, a regulation issued
by the COMELEC in the exercise of its rulemaking power.

1
st
Defect: PETITIONER HAS NO PERSONALITY TO FILE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
Petitioner has no personality to file a petition for certiorari to address an
adjudicatory resolution of the COMELEC in which he was not a party to, and
where the direct party, NAMFREL, does not even question the assailed resolution.
OTHER VALID REMEDIES: NAMFREL had filed the present petition with the
petitioner as intervenor because of his personal interest in the COMELEC ruling.
He could have intervened, too, before the COMELEC as an affected party in
NAMFRELs Manifestation and Request for Examination. He could have expressly
stated before this Court the procedural problems he faced and asked that we
suspend the rules based on the unusual circumstances he could have pointed
out. None of these actions, however, took place.
Petitioner simply questioned the COMELECs April 2, 2007 Resolution without
explaining to this Court his reason for using Rule 65 as his medium, and from
there, proceeded to attack the validity of COMELEC Resolution 7798.
Hence, petitioner was not a party-in-interest.

Requirement of Personality or Interest
The requirement of personality or interest is sanctioned no less by Section 7,
Article IX of the Constitution which provides that a decision, order, or ruling of a
constitutional commission may be brought to this Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
This requirement is repeated in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
applies to petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 of decisions, orders or rulings of
the constitutional commissions pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64.
o Section 1, Rule 65 essentially provides that a person aggrieved by any act of
a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions

44

rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may file a petition
for certiorari.
An aggrieved party under Section 1, Rule 65 is one who was a party to the
original proceedings that gave rise to the original action for certiorari under Rule
65.
o Tang v. CA and DBP v. COA (same gist): the term "person aggrieved" is not
to be construed to mean that any person who feels injured by the lower
courts order or decision can question the said courts disposition
via certiorari. The "person aggrieved" under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can
avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains only to one who was a
party in the proceedings before the court a quo. Otherwise the floodgates
to endless litigation will be opened.
The "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of
the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the
proceedings before the lower court.
The special civil action for certiorari may be dismissed motu proprio if the party
elevating the case failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the questioned
order or decision before the lower court.
Only one who was a party in the case before the lower court can file a MR since
a stranger to the litigation would not have the legal standing to interfere in the
orders or decisions of the said court.
In relation to this, if a non-party in the proceedings before the lower court has
no standing to file a motion for reconsideration, logic would lead us to the
conclusion that he would likewise have no standing to question the said order or
decision before the appellate court via certiorari.
The real party in interest who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in
the suit must prosecute or defend an action.
"Interest" means material interest, an interest in issue that the decision will
affect, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.

2
nd
defect: The Petitions Thrust is to nullify COMELEC Reso. 7798 NOT COMELECs
adjudicatory resolution
It opened with and professed to be an express challenge to the COMELECs
adjudicatory April 2, 2007 Resolution, but in its arguments solely attacks and
prays for the partial nullity of COMELEC Resolution 7798 issued in the exercise of
the COMELECs rule making power.
This approach is fatally defective because the petition thereby converts an
express challenge of an adjudicatory resolution made without the requisite
standing into a challenge for the nullity of a regulation through an original
Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
To be sure, a COMELEC adjudicatory action can be challenged on the basis of
the invalidity of the law or regulation that underlies the action. But to do this, a
valid challenge to the adjudicatory action must exist; at the very least, the
petitioner must have the requisite personality to mount the legal challenge to
the COMELEC adjudicatory action.
Where this basic condition is absent, the challenge is unmasked for what it really
is a direct challenge to the underlying law or regulation masquerading as a
challenge to a COMELEC adjudicatory action.1avvphi1
A challenge cannot be made in an original petition forcertiorari under Rule 65
dissociated from any COMELEC action made in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.
Concepcion made use of a backdoor approach to achieve what the petitioner
could not directly do in his individual capacity under Rule 65.
o It was, at the very least, an attempted bypass of other available, albeit
lengthier, modes of review that the Rules of Court provide.

Taxpayers
14. Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works 110 Phil 331 (1960-61) [supra Art. 2,
Secs. 24&39; requisites in questioning use of public funds] Read with
Gonzales v. Marcos 65 SCRA 624 (1975) [trust fund] and Gonzales v.
Narvasa GR 140835 (2000) [study on constitutional amendments]

Pascual v. Sec. of Public Works [incidental advantage]
December 29, 1960
Petitioner: Wenceslao Pascual, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal
Respondent: The Secretary Of Public Works And Communications, Et Al

45

ER: RA920 appropriated 85k for the construction of feeder roads. Pasqual argue that
since the projected feeder roads were private property at the time of the passage and
approval of RA920, the appropriation is void. Held: he has standing. The validity of a
statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in consequence
of its enforcement. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such
funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.

Facts:
On June 20, 1953 RA 920, "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works",
appropriating P85,000 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas, gen. Araneta, Gen.
Lucban, Gen. Capinpin, Gen. Segundo, Gen. Delgado, Gen. Malvar,Gen. Lim)" was
approved
At the time of the passage and approval of RA 920, the feeder roads were
"nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within
the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal" (between Shaw blvd and
Highway 54), which projected feeder roads "do not connect any government
property or any important premises to the main highway
Antonio Subdivision and the lands on which said feeder roads were to be
construed were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the
time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate
May 1953: Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal,
offering to donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal;
June 13, 1953: the offer was accepted but no deed of donation was executed.
Pasqual argue that since the projected feeder roads were private property at the
time of the passage and approval of RA920, the appropriation is void. The
construction with public funds would greatly increase the value of the
subdivision, and relieve Zulueta from constructing streets at his own expense
The appropriation was made by Congress because its members were made to
believe that the projected feeder roads were "public roads and not private streets
of a private subdivision"'
In order to give a semblance of legality to the appropriation Zulueta executed on
Dec 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate, an alleged deed of
donation of the 4 parcels of land constituting projected feeder roads, in favor of
the Gov't;
The donation was accepted by the Exec Sec. but being subject to an onerous
condition, it partook of the nature of a contract. This was the condition: The
within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street
purposes only and for no other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly
understood that should the Government violate the condition hereby imposed
upon it, the title to the land shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the
DONOR, JOSE C. ZULUETA.

Issue 1: w/n the law is void. Yes, not for public purpose (you can skip this I think).

The legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a
public purpose.
Money raised by tax can be expended only for public purposes, not for the
advantage of private individuals.
It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must
determine its validity as justifying a tax, not the magnitude of the interest to be
affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion.
Incidental to the public or state, which results from the promotion of private
interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use public money.
Under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be
used only for public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is
correlative with its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against
taxation except for public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for
one purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no appropriation of
state funds can be made for other than for a public purpose.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to
the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public.


46

The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its
passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently,
unless the latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with
retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute.
The lower court upheld the appropriation, as Pascual may not contest the legality
of the donation because it does not affect him directly. This conclusion is based
on the ff premises: (1) if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity; (2)
the appropriation may not be annulled w/o a previous declaration of
unconstitutionality of the donation; and (3) Art.1421 of the Civil Code has no
exception.
The legality of the appropriation depended on whether said roads were public or
private property when the bill was passed by Congress, or, when it was approved
by the Pres and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20,
1953
Since the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed
belonged to Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was
null and void.
The donation to the Govt, over 5months after the approval and effectivity of
RA902, made for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", to the
appropriation did not cure its basic defect.
Judicial nullification of the donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality
Art. 1421 is subject to exceptions. For instance, the creditors of a party to an
illegal contract may, under the conditions in Art.1177, exercise the rights and
actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent in his person,
including, his right to the annulment of said contract, even though such creditors
are not affected by the same, except indirectly.
Issue 2 (main): w/n pascual has standing. Yes.

The validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct
injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying,
at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State
for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer.

Although there are some decisions to the contrary, this is the prevailing view in
the US: In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the
requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is
that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and
may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys.
This view was not favored by the US SC in Frothingham vs. Mellon, insofar as
federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer
to its Federal Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal
corporation to its government. Indeed, under the composite system of
government existing in the U.S., the states of the Union are integral part of the
Federation from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys internally a
substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the
Federal Constitution. In fact, the same was made by representatives of each state
of the Union, not of the, except insofar as the former represented the people of
the respective States, and the people of each State has, independently of that of
the others, ratified said Constitution. The Federal Constitution and the Federal
statutes have become binding upon the people in consequence of an act of, and,
through the respective states of the Union of which they are citizens. The
peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal Government
of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen directly, not
by the people of the U.S., but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner
as the legislature thereof may direct.
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, and the
Republic of the Philippines is not identical to that obtaining between the people
and taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a
domestic viewpoint, to that existing between the people and taxpayers of each
state and the government thereof, except that the authority of the Republic of
the Philippines over the people is more fully direct than that of the states of the
Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national government is not
subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution
upon the states of the Union, and vice versa
The rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a
legislation appropriating local or state public funds which has been upheld by

47

the US SC has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted with
respect to acts of Congress of the US appropriating federal funds.
Examples: in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez, involving the expropriation of a
land by the Province of Tayabas, 2 taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene
for the purpose of contesting the price being paid to the owner, as unduly
exorbitant. In Custodio vs. President of the Senate, a taxpayer and employee of
the Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of an
appropriation for backpay of members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs.
Treasurer of the Philippines and Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, we
entertained the action of taxpayers impugning the validity of certain
appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same.
Like the petitioners in the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, Pascual is not merely a
taxpayer. The Province of Rizal, which he represents officially as its Provincial
Governor, is our most populated political subdivision, and, the taxpayers therein
bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the Philippines.

Read With:
Gonzales v. Marcos [trust fund]: the issue centered on the validity of the creation in
Executive Order No. 30 of a trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the
name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines entrusted with the task to
construct a national theatre. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees
accepted donations from the private sector and secured from the Chemical Bank of
New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National Investment & Development
Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from US Pres Johnson in the concept of
war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the Cultural Center building
estimated to cost P48 million. The Board of Trustees has as its Chairman the First
Lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos, who is named as the principal respondent.
Held: the funds administered by the President came from donations [and]
contributions not by taxation. There was that absence of the requisite pecuniary or
monetary interest. This is not to retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual
foreshadowed by People v. Vera, where the doctrine of standing was first fully
discussed. It is only to make clear that petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning,
has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's suit. Even on the assumption
that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not necessarily follow that
such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to be
passed upon. This Court, as held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, is not
devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.

Gonzales v. Narvasa [study on constitutional amendments]: The Preparatory
Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada by EO
43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same. Gonzales, in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation of the
Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of
presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. Held: He has no capacity.
1. He has no capacity as a citizen: The question in standing is whether a party has
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish
that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The interest
of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that
he has sustained or in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. Gonzales has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it
is only Congress, which can claim any injury in this case since, according to
Gonzales, the Pres has encroached upon the legislatures powers to create a
public office and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR
2. No standing as a taxpayer: A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise
a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed. Thus payers action is properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. Here, there is no
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by
the President EO 43, which appropriated for its operational expenses to be
sourced from the funds of the Office of the President. The appropriations for the
PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no
an appropriation at all. In a strict sense, appropriation has been defined as
nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed by the Constitution

48

that money may be paid out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by
law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular
use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from the State to
its creditors. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for
the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to
transfer funds pursuant to section 25 (5) of article VI of the Constitution.

15. Galicto v. Aquino 667 SCRA 150 (2012) [no material interest in future
increases in benefits]
Petitioners: Jelbert B. Galicto
Respondents: PNoy, Exec. Sec. Paquito Ochoa & DBM Sec. Florencio Abad
Ponente: Justice Arturo Brion

Summary: Because of the unraveling of the alleged excessive allowances and bonuses
of the MWSS Board, President Aquino promulgated EO 7, which provided for
principles in fixing the compensation and position classification system of GOCCs and
GFIs. Sec. 9 of EO 7 also imposes a moratorium on increases in salaries, allowances
and benefits of GOCCs, unless authorized by the President. Petitioner Jelbert Galictio,
a lawyer employed by PhilHealth, questioned EO 7s constitutionality, alleging among
others that it infringed on the GOCCs boards power to fix their respective
compensation scheme, as provided by earlier laws. I: W/N EO 7 is null & void. SC
dismissed the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities and for being
mooted by subsequent events. First, certiorari is not the proper remedy. An EO is
being questioned, so a declaratory relief filed in the RTC is the proper recourse.
Second, Galicto lacks locus standi for failing to demonstrate a material and formal
interest in the issue. His interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere
expectancy. The curtailment of future salary increases and benefits are merely
contingent events or expectancies. He has no vested rights to salary increases and,
therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail
EO 7. Finally, the issue has been mooted by the enactment of RA 10149, which
created the Governance Commission for GOCCs and allowed the President to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.

Facts:
On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation
Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers
and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) a (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing
obligations. Subsequently, the Senate, through the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of
GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and
GFIs have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives,
stock options, and other benefits, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17
urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large
and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and perks of members
of the GOCC & GFI governing boards.
Heeding the call of Congress, PNoy, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled
Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification
System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and for Other Purposes.
o EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs.
o A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI
employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to
the Task Force information regarding their compensation.
o Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries
and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO
8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite
period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances,
bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees
until December 31, 2010.
EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25,
2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs
from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of
directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional
benefits and allowances to their employees.
Petitioner Jelbert Galicto, a Filipino citizen and an employee of the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth). He is currently a Court Attorney IV and

49

is assigned at the PhilHealth Regional Office CARAGA. He filed this Petition for
Certiorari & Prohibition with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injuction and/or
TRO, seeking to declare EO 7s unconstitutionality.
He claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by EO 7s
implementation, which was issued with GADALEJ because: (among others)
o GOCCs dont need to have its compensation plans, rates & policies reviewed
by the DBM & approved by the President since PD 1597 only requires that
GOCC report them to the President and that the President has no power of
control over the fiscal powers of GOCCs
o The Joint Resolution is unpublished and cant be the basis for EO 7.
o EO 7 divests the BoD of GOCCs of their power to fix compensation, a power
which is a legislative grant and cannot be revoked by executive fiat
o EO 7, is by substance a law, and infringes on Congresss power
Respondents Arguments:
o Procedural (1) petitioner lacks locus standi; (2) petitioner failed to attach a
board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing him to question EO
7 in behalf of PhilHealth; (3) petitioners signature does not indicate his PTR
Number, MCLE Compliance Number and IBP Number; (4) the jurat of the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate a
valid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; (5) the
President should be dropped as respondent as he is immune from suit; and
(6) certiorari is not applicable to this case.
o Substantive President exercises control over the boards of the GOCCs and
GFIs; thus, he can fix their compensation packages; EO 7 was issued in
accordance with law for the purpose of controlling the grant of excessive
salaries, allowances, incentives and other benefits to GOCC and GFI
employees.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149,
otherwise known as the GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA
10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the compensation framework of
GOCCs and GFIs.

Issue: W/N EO 7 is null and void. Petition DISMISSED for its patent formal and
procedural infirmities, and for having been mooted by subsequent events.

Ratio:
CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY
Under the Rules of Court, petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition are availed
of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts. Since the issuance
of an EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for
certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy; instead a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63, filed with the RTC, is the proper recourse to
assail the validity of EO 7.
Liga ng mga Barangay National v. Mayor of Manila Although the petition
is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by
this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance
and executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.

PETITIONER LACKS LOCUS STANDI. (MAJOR)
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of standing
relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or
controversies.
Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question
when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened
injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."

50

Petitioner To support his claim that he has locus standi, Galicto contends that
as an employee of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7 and that he
has standing as a member of the bar in good standing.
Respondent Galicto is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in
salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies. The
petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek
judicial protection.
SC We are not convinced that Galicto has a personal stake or material interest
in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and
based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases
in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent
events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary
increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of
legal standing to assail EO 7.
Injury has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the courts time, as well
as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another
department of government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or
is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being
importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into
constitutional adjudication.
The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means
trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case;
more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciarys overruling the
determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such
as the President, and the clear approval by Congress. Indeed, the rationale goes
to the very essence of representative democracies.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is
instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing. This
supposed interest has been branded in IBP v. Zamora, as too general an interest
which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry. The mere
invocation to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true,
is not sufficient to clothe it with standing.
We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions
concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of
GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the
same cannot infuse or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental
importance or paramount public interest doctrine.
o Velarde v. SJS Even if the Court could have exempted the case from the
stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile
because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to
procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case.
o The transcendental importance should not to be abused.
Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal
interest in the issue, he cannot be considered to have filed the present case in
behalf of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant
failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate
from PhilHealth to act as its representative.

THE PETITION HAS A DEFECTIVE JURAT.
Galictos failure to include his PTR, IBP & MCLE numbers are inconsequential. He
is filing as a litigant and not acting as counsel anyway. A party who is not a
lawyer is not precluded from signing his own pleadings as this is allowed by the
RoC.
However, the petitioners jurat is defective. Indeed, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, dated
February 19, 2008, calls for a current identification document issued by an official
agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual as competent
evidence of identity. However, this may be waived by the Court.

THE PETITION HAS BEEN MOOTED BY SUPERVENING EVENTS.
Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the
present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1)
the lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the
allowances and bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2)
the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of
GOCCs and GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their
own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the President to
perform this act.
With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of 2011, the President is now
authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
The law also created the Governance Commission for GOCCs (GCG) (a body

51

attached to the Office of the President) (Not in the case, but just in Cande asks,
CLV is the head of GCG, a Cabinet-rank. Thats why he resigned as Dean, and
poof, Cande became Dean!)
This law amended R.A. No. 7875 and other laws that enabled certain GOCCs and
GFIs to fix their own compensation frameworks; the law now authorizes the
President to fix the compensation and position classification system for all GOCCs
and GFIs, as well as other entities covered by the law. This means that, the
President can now reissue an EO containing these same provisions without any
legal constraints.
Thus, the case is already moot (one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.)
In the words of the eminent constitutional law expert, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
the Court normally [will not] entertain a petition touching on
an issue that has become moot because x x x there would [be] no longer x x
x a flesh and blood case for the Court to resolve.
All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its
patent formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court
to resolve the other issues raised in the certiorari petition.

Citizens and associations; transcendental importance
16. Legaspi v. CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987) [access to records]
Petitioner: VALENTIN L. LEGASPI
Respondent: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
May 29, 1987
Ponente: CORTES, J.:

SUMMARY: Legaspis request for information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City was denied by the CSC. Sibonghanoy and Agas had
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
exams for sanitarians.. Legaspi prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus to
compel the CSC to disclose said information. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has
legal standing to bring the suit? Held: YES. The petitioner has firmly anchored his
case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which,
by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada that when
the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest,
and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that
he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. Thus, while the
manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the
government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of
said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its
performance may be compelled by mandamus in a proper case.

FACTS:
The CSC had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department
of Cebu City.
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as
civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
o Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, Legaspi
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
CSC to disclose said information.
The same remedy was resorted to in the case of Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera,
wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution was
invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various PDs,
letters of instructions etc.
o Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right
to information provided for in the Land Registration Act was claimed by a
newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand
access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering
data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta).
The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained

52

recognition in the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Consti.
9

The provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in
Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Consti with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development."
10

These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by
means of which the right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.
o What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions
and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity,
be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of
all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28).
o However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be
prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the
New Charter.
The SolGen challenges Legaspi's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter
does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service
eligibilities of the employees concerned. He further argues that there is no
ministerial duty to furnish the Legaspi with the information he seeks.

ISSUES:
1. W/N Legaspi has standing? YES. See discussion (1)
2. Is the Petition proper? YES. See Discussion (2) and (3).

HELD: WHEREFORE, the CSC is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the
position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu
City, as requested by Legaspi.

9
Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
10
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.

1. Legaspi has standing
A Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the
alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully
excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right.
o Legaspi in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense
that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in
the duty or act to be performed.
Legaspi has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, which is a public right.
o Tanada vs Tuvera: when the question is one of public right and the object
of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the Legaspi is a citizen, and therefore, part of the
general "public" which possesses the right.
The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in the Subido case, when
it held that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate
transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered
lands in the Office of the RoD shall be open":
o "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it
embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and
existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought
are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction.
The Legaspi, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that
right.
That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a
government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution

53

in order to uphold individual liberties, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and
liberty, the ultimate illusion.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 and 1987
Constitution expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford
access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government
research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the 1987
Consti with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
11

o In Tanada, the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court
declared as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned to
publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature as
well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability.
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in allowing the
examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the RoD, is
emphasized in Subido:
o Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is
unlawful, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of
registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not
flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong
to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the
officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.
Government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access
to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records
on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public.
In Subido, We recognized the authority of the RoD to regulate the manner in
which persons may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands.
However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are
confined to:
o 1.)prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that

11
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).

damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that 2.) undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and
documents and other employees may be prevented, 3.) that the right of
other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured
We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner
of inspection by the public of criminal docket records (Baldoza vs. Dimaano).
o Said administrative case was filed against the CSC judge for his alleged
refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon
a finding by the Investigating Judge that the CSC had allowed the
complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the CSC.
We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon the
manner of examining the public records were reasonable.
In both cases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate
the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to
prohibit.
o A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the
disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to
regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a
limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which
only the Legislature may impose. The second pertains to the agency charged
with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be
exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be
avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be
prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same
constitutional right by other persons shall be assured.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to
reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty
to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public
records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its
performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies.
The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.

3. The guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of
the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy

54

But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is
not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as
may be provided by law".
The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security.
o It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public
record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e.,
(a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b)
not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.

3.a. This question is first addressed to agency having custody of the desired
information. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of
showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public
concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there
is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a
term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen.
o In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it
relates to or affects the public.
The public concern invoked in Tanada, was the need for adequate notice to the
public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of
citizens. In Subido, the public concern deemed covered was the knowledge of
those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in
violation of the Constitution.
The information sought by the Legaspi in this case is the truth of the claim
of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the
positions to which they were appointed.
The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:
o Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and
fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions
which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by
competitive examination.
Public office being a public trust, it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to
their eligibilities for their respective positions.

3.b. It is not enough that the information sought is of public interest
For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the
species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the
CSC has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
Legaspi's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles.
o We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil
service examinations are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing
secret about one's civil service eligibility.
o The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the
absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of
civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the CSC to confirm or
deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative.

17. Joya v. PCGG 225 SCRA 568 (1993) [private funds]
G.R. No. 96541 | August 24, 1993 | Bellosillo
Petitioners: DEAN JOSE JOYA, CARMEN GUERRERO NAKPIL, ARMIDA SIGUION REYNA,
etc.
Respondents: PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his official capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and
CHAIRMAN MATEO A.T. CAPARAS

Summary: A Consignment Agreement was signed between PCGG and Christies of
New York to sell at a public auction the 82 Old Masters Paintings as well as the

55

silverware contained in 71 cartons believed to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the
late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. The petitioners filed for preliminary
injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks. They are claiming that they
have standing as taxpayers. Our issue in this case is whether or not the paintings and
silverware are public properties that will give them legal standing. No, they came
from private funds. The SC held that the paintings were donated by private persons
from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-
Philippine arts. Pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts
from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and
anniversary, an occasion personal to them. We need to emphasize that this Court has
the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of
an actual case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. We find
however that there is no such justification in the petition at bar to warrant the
relaxation of the rule.

Facts:
Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote Pres Corazon C. Aquino,
requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and
Woods International, Inc. (CHRISTIE'S) concerning the scheduled sale on 11
January 1991 of 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the
ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
Pres Aquino, through Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized
Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement.
Chairman Caparas, representing the Philippines, signed the Consignment
Agreement with Christie's. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to
CHRISTIE'S for sale at public auction the 82 Old Masters Paintings as well as the
silverware contained in 71 cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG
and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the agreement.

The Commission on Audit (COA) through Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo
submitted to Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the
Consignment Agreement to the effect that: (a) the authority of PCGG Chairman
Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; (b)
the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c) PCGG had a
poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the assets
subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their
disposal was prohibited by law.
PCGG through its new Chairman David M. Castro, wrote Aquino defending the
Consignment Agreement and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman
Domingo.

Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal issued a certification that the items
subject of the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of
protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino
cultural heritage.

After the oral arguments of the parties, we issued our resolution denying the
application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the
artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a
restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the
proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.

Issue: Whether or not the paintings and silverware are public properties that will give
them legal standing. No, they came from private funds.

Ratio:
On Legal Standing
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a
law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question
must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or
controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary
to the determination of the case itself.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to
protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an

56

action.
12
The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is
brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question.
o "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.

Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be
personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right
of some third and related party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to
the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to
procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right
recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a
governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds.
Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned
with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have
the legal personality to restrain the Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting
contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture,
and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection
Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important
cultural properties.
Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and by the people in
general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the
unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been
deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation
of the Constitution.

On Private Funds

12
This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons
having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined
as plaintiffs.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law.
They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from
different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation,
which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-
Philippine arts.
The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its
president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members
thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and
appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to
the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on
their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these
paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however
should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional
and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or
statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be
raised only by the proper parties, the true owners thereof, whose authority to
recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the
artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do
not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorized disposition.
NOT MANDAMUS: Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed
by concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In
Legaspi v. CSC, this Court laid down the rule that a writ of mandamus may be
issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In
the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required
of respondent officials under the Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of

57

an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Petitioners' claim for the
continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a
privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for
mandamus.
NOT TAXPAYERS SUIT: Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit.
Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of
official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the
governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon
the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously,
petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the
disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that
petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from
private sources and not with public money.

On Actual Controversy
Petitioners submit that the resolution by the Court of the issues in this case will
establish future guiding principles and doctrines on the preservation of the
nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as
a whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be
moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not
cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this
petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the
auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is
long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public
interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in the
petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.
Section 2 of R.A. 4846, as amended by P.D. 374, declares it to be the policy of
the state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and national
cultural treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. As to what
kind of artistic and cultural properties are considered by the State as involving
public interest which should therefore be protected. The answer can be gleaned
from reading of the reasons behind the enactment of R.A. 4846.
13

Clearly, the cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection
of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national
cultural treasures." "Important cultural properties" are cultural properties which
have been singled out from among the innumerable cultural properties as having
exceptional historical cultural significance to the Philippines but are not
sufficiently outstanding to merit the classification of national cultural treasures.
On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found
locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or scientific value
which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court
takes note of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the
Italian paintings and silverware subject of this petition do not constitute
protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural
Properties Register of the National Museum.
We agree with the certification of the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it
is the Director of the Museum who is authorized to undertake the inventory,
registration, designation or classification, with the aid of competent experts, of
important cultural properties and national cultural treasures.
21
Findings of
administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only
respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial

13
WHEREAS, innumerable sites all over the country have since been excavated for cultural
relics, which have passed on to private hands, representing priceless cultural treasure that
properly belongs to the Filipino people as their heritage;
WHEREAS, it is perhaps impossible now to find an area in the Philippines, whether
government or private property, which has not been disturbed by commercially-minded diggers
and collectors, literally destroying part of our historic past;
WHEREAS, it is believed that more stringent regulation on movement and a limited form of
registration of important cultural properties and of designated national cultural treasures is
necessary, and that regardless of the item, any cultural property exported or sold locally must
be registered with the National Museum to control the deplorable situation regarding our
national cultural properties and to implement the Cultural Properties Law.


58

evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities because of their
acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned.
In view of the foregoing, this Court finds no compelling reason to grant the
petition. Petitioners have failed to show that respondents Executive Secretary and
PCGG exercised their functions with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of
their jurisdiction.

Held: WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is
DISMISSED.

18. Board of Optometry v. Colet 260 SCRA 88 (1996) [unregistered
organizations]
Petitioners: BOARD OF OPTOMETRY, represented by its Chairman, DR. PRIMITIVA Y.
PEREZ-SISON, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, represented by its
Commissioner, HERMOGENES P. POBRE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, represented by its
Secretary, DR. HILARION M. RAMIRO, BUREAU OF FOODS AND DRUGS, represented
by its Director, DR. QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, represented by its Secretary, SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ, JR., and
BUREAU OF HIGHER EDUCATION, represented by its Director, MONA D. VALISNO
Respondents: HON. ANGEL B. COLET, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 29, ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., represented by its President and
Chairman of the Board, MIGUEL P. ACEBEDO, OPTOMETRY PRACTITIONERS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (OPAP), represented by its President, DR. MIRIAM
F. LLAVE, CENEVIS OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION (COA), represented by its President,
DR. ROBERTO RODIS, JR., ASSOCIATION OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM OPTOMETRIST
(ACMO), represented by its President, DR. CYRIL CORALES, SOUTHERN MINDANAO
OPTOMETRIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS., INC. (SMOAP), represented by its
President, DR. ELMER VILLAROSA, and REPUBLICA A. PANOL, No. 9 Gen. Malvar St.,
Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City

Summary: Respondents, OPAP, COA, ACMO and SMOAP prayed for injunctive relief
against the implementation and enforcement of the Revised Optometry Law of 1995
(RA8050), claiming the same was unconstitutional. This was granted by the RTC.
However, the petitioners claim that the trial court judge erred in issuing the writ since
the respondents have no locus standi. Considering that the private respondents COA
and ACMO are not registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the
respondent associations are not duly registered optometrists as certified to by the
PRC, they cannot question the validity and enforcement of RA 8050.
The Court held that the respondents have no locus standi. Only natural and juridical
persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. To be a
juridical person, the law must grant the association a personality separate and distinct
from that of its members. However, for having failed to show that they are juridical
entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed
to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action. Likewise, since OPAP, COA,
ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious
reasons, be deemed real parties in interest.

Facts:
R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education,
Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the
Revised Optometry Law of 1995, was a consolidation of House Bill (HB) No.
14100 and Senate Bill (SB) No. 1998, which were respectively approved by both
Houses and, thereafter, reconciled by the Bicameral Conference Committee. The
Reconciled Bill was then separately ratified by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives and approved into law by the President on 7 June 1995.
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition
for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, enjoining, restraining,
restricting, and forbidding implementation or enforcement of R.A. No. 8050, or
any of its provisions, or its Code of Ethics, during the pendency of the case, until
further orders of the court.
14
(Grounds not too impt but for fyi, in footnotes).

14
GROUNDS:
1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the
Reconciled Bill which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate
panel, thereby derogating the orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and
vitiating legislative consent;
2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to
reasonable safeguards against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due
process of law in that it authorizes optometrists to engage in acts of practice within the
zone of medical practice through permitted use in certain kinds of diagnostic
pharmaceutical agents thereby exposing and subjecting those who avail of the services

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CONTENTS OF THE PETITION:
o CAPTION: the petitioners were Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.; Optometry
Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist
Association (COA); Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO);
and Southern Mindanao Optometrist Association of the Philippines
(SMOAP) each allegedly represented by its president.
o BODY: The body of the petition, however, gave no details as to the juridical
personality and addresses of these alleged associations, save for Acebedo
Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well
as their profession and home addresses.
o COMPLIANCE: The names of Miguel Acebedo, representing Acebedo Optical
Co., Inc.; Miriam F. Llave, representing the OPAP; and Republica A. Panol,
another petitioner in Civil Case No. 95-74770, did not appear in the
registration books of the Board of Optometry to be authorized optometry
practitioners in the Philippines, as evidenced by certifications issued by the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC).
o Private respondents COA and ACMO were neither registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as evidenced by the certifications
issued by the latter.
RTC Ruling: Judge Angel V. Colet, issued a TRO, and later on a writ of
preliminary injunction, restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the petitioners from
undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or implementation of the
Revised Optometry Law [R.A. 8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics issued
thereunder.
o The court is inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights
affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is
likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights.

of optometrists to definite hazards which would inflict upon them impairment of vision,
resultant blindness, or possible loss of life;
3. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of
legislative power when it provides for a penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of eight
years and a fine not exceeding P40,000.00 upon any person found violating any rule or
regulation promulgated pursuant to said law;
4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services
in violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and
5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and
restrictions, hence, it falls within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which
safeguards the guaranty of due process of law.

Issues: WON the respondents have locus standi to question the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 8050 NO

Petitioners Contentions
For a party to have locus standi to question the validity of a statute, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
o Private respondents do not have the requisite personal and substantial
interest to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050 for, per the
certifications of the SEC, private respondents COA and ACMO are not
registered associations; and two of the alleged presidents of the
respondent associations are not duly registered optometrists as certified
to by the PRC.
Private respondents did not allege in their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770,
and in their Rejoinder to the Opposition therein, their capacity to bring suit as
required by Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents Contentions
They have, as held by the trial court, locus standi under the rule of Public Right
pursuant to Tanada vs. Tuvera, citing Severino vs. Governor General.
o As also found by the trial court, their rights as optometrists or optical
companies would be adversely affected by the assailed law.
They seek to protect their Constitutional rights to property and freedom of
expression from enforcement of the provisions of the challenged law, which bar
truthful advertisements and impose vague and unreasonable conditions for the
continued practice of their profession.
o Insofar as private respondents Acebedo Optical Co., Inc., and Panol are
concerned, the said law would likewise adversely affect the conduct of their
business of maintaining optical shops and expose them to threats of criminal
prosecution.
They also seek, as taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to
bar the enforcement of the law because it endangers the publics health, a
danger clearly seen from the oppositions to the law filed before both houses of
Congress.

60

Held:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged order of 25 August
1995 of respondent Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 granting the
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued on 1 September 1995 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

Ratio:
Issue#1 LOCUS STADI Respondents have no locus standi.
Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in
a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
o Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical
person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its
members.
There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA,
ACMO, and SMOAP.
o FIRST: the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 makes no
mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is
it claimed therein that they are juridical entities.
These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party
must be averred.
o SECOND: not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents
representing the associations, which were offered in evidence in support of
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such associations
mentioned or named.
o FINALLY: In their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents
chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their
associations.
For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents
OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal
personality to bring an action, such as Civil Case No. 95-74770.
A real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.
o Since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical
entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in
interest.
o Moreover, since the names of private respondents Miguel Acebedo, Miriam
F. Llave, and Republica A. Panol do not appear in the registration books of
the Board of Optometry as authorized optometry practitioners in the
Philippines, they do not have the requisite personal and substantial interest
in the case.
o Even further, although private respondents Roberto Rodis, Jr., Cyril Corales,
and Elmer Villarosa claim to be practicing optometrists, the petition in Civil
Case No. 95-74770 is bereft of any allegation to make them real parties in
interest to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050.
ALSO, even as a class suit (respondents also claim standing on their capacity as
taxpayers and citizens, under the concept of Public Right, to bar the
enforcement of the law because it endangers public health.), petition will still
fail.
o They failed to allege this in their petition, and they likewise failed to allege
the existence and prove the requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons,
and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all
before the court.
o Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is
the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties.
o While they claimed their petition in Civil Case No. 95-74770 was a taxpayers
suit, and although this Court, in a catena of cases, has shown liberality in
granting locus standi to taxpayers in taxpayers suits, the private respondents
have not adequately shown that this liberality must be extended to
them. Their plea of injury or damage is nothing but a sweeping
generalization.

Additional Issue (Briefly) WON there was a valid cause of action NO

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As a special civil action for declaratory relief, its requisites are: (1) the existence
of a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination.
o On this score, we find no difficulty holding that at least the first and
fourth requisites are wanting.
Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the
following requisites are first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2)
the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of
the case.
o There is yet no actual case or controversy with respect to rights or
obligations under R.A. No. 8050.
o This is plain because Civil Case No. 95-74770 is for declaratory relief. Then,
too, as adverted to earlier, the private respondents have not sufficiently
established their locus standi to question the validity of R.A. No. 8050.
The respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued a
writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of R.A. No. 8050, as
well as of the Code of Ethics promulgated thereunder, if one has been issued.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such
courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation of a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the
majority of those who participated in its discussion.
To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape,
that the challenged act be struck down.

19. Tondo Medical v. CA 537 SCRA 746 (2007) [standing is determined by
merits of case even in cases of transcendental importance]
G.R. No. 167324 | July 17, 2007
Petitioners: TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH
INSTITUTE FOR TROPICAL MEDICINE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (and a lot more!)
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, SECRETARY OF HEALTH MANUEL M. DAYRIT, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT EMILIA T. BONCODIN
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

SUMMARY: Tondo Medical and other hospital employees association groups
question the issuance of the HSRA and EO102 of Estrada. For the HSRA and the other
guidelines, they said that the provision regarding fiscal autonomy such as collection
of user fees and the corporate restructuring of government hospitals are
unconstitutional because it made free medicine and medical services inaccessible to
the disadvantaged. The petitioners also assail that EO102 because the order also
sought to reorganize these public hospitals, including redeployment. The other
petitioners also assailed this contending that the EO was usurpation of legislative
power since the same measures need to be embodied in a law. The CA denied the
petition of Tondo Medical et al. stating that the issue does not present a justiciable
controversy and that the petitioners have no standing. Issues now are whether there
is a justiciable controversy and if the issue is of transcendental importance that would
give Tondo Medical and the others standing. SC said that the arguments given by the
petitioners have no merit. The consti provisions they cited are non-self executory and
needs further legislation. It is also well within the power of control of the Executive to
reorganize offices under the Office of the President. More importantly, although the
issue may have transcendental importance, it does not automatically give the
petitioners standing. Tondo Medical et al, failed to show any present substantial
interest. Even in cases in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of
transcendental importance, the petitioners still be able to assert substantial interest.
Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the
law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,

62

subordinate, or inconsequential interest. In this case, there was no substantial interest
presented by the parties since there is no injury to them.

FACTS: (Assails the CA decision to deny the nullification of HSRA and EO 102)
HEALTH SECTOR REFORM AGENDA (HSRA)
In 1999, the DOH launched the HSRA, a reform agenda developed by the HSRA
Technical Working Group after a series of workshops and analyses with inputs
from several consultants, program managers and technical staff possessing the
adequate expertise and experience in the health sector. It provided for five
general areas of reform: (1) fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2) secure
funding for priority public health programs; (3) promote the development of local
health systems and ensure its effective performance; (4) strengthen the capacities
of health regulatory agencies; and (5) expand the coverage of the National
Health Insurance Program.
Petitioners (Tondo Medical Association and other hospital associations)
questioned the first reform agenda involving the fiscal autonomy of government
hospitals, particularly the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate
restructuring of government hospitals. According to the HSRA provision this will
be done to reduce the dependence on direct subsidies from the government.
Tondo et. al, also assailed the issuance of a draft administrative order issued by
the DOH entitled "Guidelines and Procedure in the Implementation of the
Corporate Restructuring of Selected DOH Hospitals to Achieve Fiscal Autonomy,
and Managerial Flexibility to Start by January 2001; and Administrative Order
No. 172 of the DOH, entitled "Policies and Guidelines on the Private Practice of
Medical and Paramedical Professionals in Government Health Facilities," for
imposing an added burden to indigent Filipinos, who cannot afford to pay for
medicine and medical services.
o They alleged that the implementation of the aforementioned reforms had
resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantaged Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is
void for being in violation of the following consti provisions (dami guys mga
more than 10! Most of them are in Articles 2 and 15 like mga social order,
social justice, protection of rights of workers)

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 102
On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order
No. 102, entitled "Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of
Health," which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH.
Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being
the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services
and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local
government units. The provisions for the streamlining of the DOH and the
deployment of DOH personnel to regional offices and hospitals read that there
will be a Rationalization and Streamlining Plan (RSP) prepared by DOH which
shall be the basis of the intended changes containing strategies, programs,
structural and org shifts etc. EO also included redeployment of personnel per the
RSP, funding and separation of benefits (theres a lot of provision of EO cited,
omitted them).
Tondo et al, contended that a law, such as Executive Order No. 102, which effects
the reorganization of the DOH, should be enacted by Congress in the exercise of
its legislative function. They argued that Executive Order No. 102 is void, having
been issued in excess of the Presidents authority.
Petitioners Elsa O. Guevarra, Arcadio B. Gonzales, Jose G. Galang, Domingo P.
Manay, Eduardo P. Galope, Remedios M. Ysmael, Alfredo U. Bacuata and
Edgardo J. Damicog, all DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive Order
No. 102 on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of
them were suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance
to get to their new place of work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to
far-flung areas.
Tondo et al also pointed out several errors in the implementation of the RSP.
Certain employees allegedly suffered diminution of compensation, while others
were supposedly assigned to positions for which they were neither qualified nor
suited.
CA DECISION: Denied the petition for several reasons among which was the
failure to show any particularized interest for bringing the suit, nor any direct or
personal injury sustained or were in the immediate danger of sustaining.

ISSUES:

63

1. Whether or not the question on HSRA and EO 102 is a justiciable
controversy. NO
2. Whether or not the issue petitioners have standing due to
transcendental importance. NO

HELD: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court
AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November
2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid.

RATIO:
ON THE JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY: As a general rule, the provisions of the
Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for
their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the
fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-
executing (these include those cited by the petitioners which are only mere guidelines
and still need judicial enactments).

POWER OF THE PRESIDENT: President may, by executive or administrative order,
direct the reorganization of government entities under the Executive Department. This
is also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes (Admin Code,
General Approriations Act of 1993) who gave the president the power of control over
the executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power to reorganize them.
DOH is an agency which is under the supervision and control of the President and,
thus, part of the Office of the President.

IMPLEMENTATION OF EO 102 (mostly admin matters): Tondo et al pointed out
several flaws in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102, particularly the RSP.
The RSP was allegedly implemented even before the DBM approved it. The facts show
otherwise.
It was only after the DBM approved the Notice of Organization, Staffing and
Compensation Action and after the Presidential Committee on Effective
Governance (PCEG) issued Memorandum Circular No. 62 approving the RSP, that
then DOH Secretary Alberto G. Romualdez issued on Department Circular No.
275-C, Series of 2000 creating the different committees to implement the RSP.
Petitioners also maintain that the Office of the President should have issued an
administrative order to carry out the streamlining, but that it failed to do so.
Such objection cannot be given any weight considering that the acts of the DOH
Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, are presumed to be the acts of the
President. As alter ego, their actions are presumed regular.

REORGANIZATION: DOH employees, assailed the validity of Executive Order No. 102
on the ground that they were likely to lose their jobs, and that some of them were
suffering from the inconvenience of having to travel a longer distance to get to their
new place of work, while other DOH employees had to relocate to far-flung areas.
SC: In several cases, this Court regarded reorganizations of government units or
departments as valid, for so long as they are pursued in good faiththat is, for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. On the other
hand, if the reorganization is done for the purpose of defeating security of
tenure or for ill-motivated political purposes, any abolition of position would be
invalid.
None of these circumstances are applicable since none of the petitioners were
removed from public service, nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH
that would unquestionably result in their dismissal. The reorganization that was
pursued in good faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the efficiency of
the department and to implement the provisions of the LGC on the devolution of
health services to local governments.

SLIGHT FACTUAL DISCUSSION ON STANDING: Without identifying the DOH
employees concerned, much less including them as parties to the petition, petitioners
went on identifying several errors in the implementation of Executive Order No. 102.
They alleged that unidentified DOH employees suffered from a diminution of
compensation since RATA would no longer be received. It was also claimed theat new
unnamed DOH employees were matched to unidentified positions. Lastly, unspecified
DOH employees were deployed or transferred during the three-month period before
the national and local elections in May 2001, in violation of Section 2 of the Republic
Act No. 7305, also known as "Magna Carta for Public Health Workers."
Petition shows that none of the petitioners, who are working in the DOH, were
entitled to receive RATA at the time the petition was filed. Nor was it alleged
that they suffered any diminution of compensation.

64

Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees
concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular
No. 312, Series of 2000.
Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are properly addressed by
an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of 2000

and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated.
The validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected.
Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid,
although they may be abused or misabused, and may afford an opportunity for
abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to
be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the
end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

TRASCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE:
In a number of cases, the Court upheld the standing of citizens who filed suits,
wherein the "transcendental importance" of the constitutional question justified
the granting of relief.
Domingo v. Carague: dismissed the petition when petitioners therein failed to
show any present substantial interest. It demonstrated how even in the cases
in which the Court declared that the matter of the case was of
transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial
interest.
o Present substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity
of the law, requires that a party sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of its enforcement. It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or
future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.
Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Comelec: A citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.
o This case likewise stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which
are of transcendental importance cannot be invoked where a partys
substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys standing is determined by
the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof.
After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners substantive claims, this Court finds that
the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.

20. Anak Mindanao v. Exec. Sec. 531 SCRA 583 (2007) [abstracts claims]
G.R. No. 166052. August 29, 2007. CARPIO-MORALES
Petitioners: ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP, as represented by Rep. Mujiv S.
Hataman, and MAMALO DESCENDANTS ORGANIZATION, INC., as represented by its
Chairman Romy Pardi
Respondents: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, and THE
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN/LAND REFORM, THE HON. RENE C. VILLA, respondents.

Summary: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO Nos. 364 and 379,
transforming Dept of Agrarian Reform to Dept of Land Reform. PCUP was placed
under control and supervision under Dept of Land Reform while NCIP is placed as an
attached agency. OSG concedes that AMIN has requisite legal standing, being a
member of Congress but questions MDOIs legal standing. Court ruled that vague
propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will work injustice and
violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the requisite standing.
Neither would its status as a peoples organization vest it with the legal standing to
assail the validity of the executive orders. A party who assails the constitutionality of a
statute must have a direct and personal interest. For a concerned party to be allowed
to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. An examination of MDOIs
nebulous claims of negative impact and probable setbacks shows that they are too
abstract to be considered judicially cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers
between the challenged action and alleged injury is too attenuated.

FACTS:
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the constitutionality of EO Nos. 364 and 379

65

(which amended EO 364), both issued in 2004 by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo

TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM INTO THE DEPARTMENT
OF LAND REFORM
WHEREAS, one of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is Social
Justice and Basic [N]eeds;
WHEREAS, one of the five anti-poverty measures for social justice is asset reform;
WHEREAS, asset reforms covers [sic] agrarian reform, urban land reform, and
ancestral domain reform;
WHEREAS, urban land reform is a concern of the Presidential Commission [for]
the Urban Poor (PCUP) and ancestral domain reform is a concern of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP);
WHEREAS, another of the five reform packages of the Arroyo administration is
Anti-Corruption and Good Government;
WHEREAS, one of the Good Government reforms of the Arroyo administration is
rationalizing the bureaucracy by consolidating related functions into one department;
WHEREAS, under law and jurisprudence, the President of the Philippines has
broad powers to reorganize the offices under her supervision and control;

SECTION 1. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby transformed into the
Department of Land Reform. It shall be responsible for all land reform in the
country, including agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain reform.
SECTION 2. The PCUP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of
the Department of Land Reform. The
Chairman of the PCUP shall be ex officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land
Reform for Urban Land Reform.
SECTION 3. The NCIP is hereby placed under the supervision and control of the
Department of Land Reform.The Chairman of the NCIP shall be ex officio
Undersecretary of the Department of Land Reform for Ancestral Domain Reform.

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 364

Section 1. Amending Section 3 of Executive Order No. 364.Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 364 shall now read as follows:
Section 3. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
15
shall be an
attached agency of the Department of Land Reform.
Section 2. Compensation. The Chairperson shall suffer no diminution in rank
and salary.

ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioners locus standi or legal standing YES for AMIN, NO for MDOI
2) Whether the placing the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under
the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency is legal YES

RATIO:
I. AMIN has requisite legal standing being member of Congress. MDOI status as a
peoples organization does not vest it with legal standing. (MAIN)
OSG, on behalf of respondents, concedes that AMIN has the requisite legal
standing to file this suit as member of Congress.
Petitioners find it impermissible for the Executive to intrude into the domain of
the Legislature. They posit that an act of the Executive which injures the
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. They add that to the extent
that the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in his office.
The OSG questions, however, the standing of MDOI, a registered peoples
organization of Teduray and Lambangian tribesfolk of (North) Upi and South Upi
in the province of Maguindanao.
As co-petitioner, MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative impact of
NCIPs becoming an attached agency of the DAR on the processing of ancestral
domain claims. It fears that transferring the NCIP to the DAR would affect the

15
Republic Act No. 8371 created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples

66

processing of ancestral domain claims filed by its members.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
It has been held that a party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must
have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must
show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.
An examination of MDOIs nebulous claims of negative impact and
probable setbacks shows that they are too abstract to be considered
judicially cognizable. And the line of causation it proffers between the
challenged action and alleged injury is too attenuated.
Vague propositions that the implementation of the assailed orders will work
injustice and violate the rights of its members cannot clothe MDOI with the
requisite standing. Neither would its status as a peoples organization vest it
with the legal standing to assail the validity of the executive orders.
Cases of La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos and Cruz vs Secretary
DENR are inapplicable.
o Petitioners in first case alleged personal and substantial injury resulting
from the mining activities permitted by the assailed statute.
o The indigenous peoples leaders and organizations were not the petitioners
in Cruz case but were intervenors who sought and were allowed to be
impleaded, not to assail but to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
Moreover, MDOI raises no issue of transcendental importance to justify a
relaxation of the rule on legal standing. To be accorded standing on the ground
of transcendental importance, the following elements must be established: (1) the
public character of the funds or other assets involved in the case, (2) the
presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of government, and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.
The presence of these elements MDOI failed to establish, much less allege.

II. The President may transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Now, on AMINs position. AMIN charges the Executive Department with
transgression of the principle of separation of powers.AMIN contends that since
the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be transformed,
merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. AMIN cites the
naming of the PCUP as a presidential commission to be clearly an extension of
the President, and the creation of the NCIP as an independent agency under the
Office of the President. AMIN contends that any reorganization of these
administrative agencies should be the subject of a statute. AMINs position fails
to impress.
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control over
executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President alone. And it lays
down a limitation on the legislative power. The Constitutions express grant of
the power of control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out
reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.
In establishing an executive department, bureau or office, the legislature
necessarily ordains an executive agencys position in the scheme of administrative
structure. Such determination is primary, but subject to the Presidents continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure. As far as bureaus, agencies
or offices in the executive department are concerned, the power of control may
justify the President to deactivate the functions of a particular office. Or a law

67

may expressly grant the President the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The Administrative Code of 1987 is one such law.
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer any agency under the Office
of the President to any other department or agency, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
Gauged against these guidelines, the challenged executive orders may not be
said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule
of law.
AMIN argues, however, that there is an anachronism of sorts because there can
be no policy and program coordination between conceptually different areas of
reform. AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of ordering the law which, so it
alleges, can be said of the Constitutions distinct treatment of these three areas,
as reflected in separate provisions in different parts of the Constitution.
The Court is not persuaded. The interplay of various areas of reform in the
promotion of social justice is not something implausible or unlikely. Their
interlocking nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid pigeonholing of
executive tasks among the members of the Presidents official family. Notably,
the Constitution inhibited from identifying and compartmentalizing the
composition of the Cabinet. In vesting executive power in one person rather than
in a plural executive, the evident intention was to invest the power holder with
energy.
AMINs interpretation fails to clearly establish that the so-called ordering or
arrangement of provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to imply
a signification in terms of government hierarchy from where a constitutional
mandate can per se be derived or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the
ordering or layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional drafting
but one of intention in government structuring. With its inherent ambiguity, the
proposed interpretation cannot be made a basis for declaring a law or
governmental act unconstitutional.
A law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it
must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.
AMIN glaringly failed to show how the reorganization by executive fiat would
hamper the exercise of citizens rights and privileges. It rested on the ambiguous
conclusion that the reorganization jeopardizes economic, social and cultural
rights. It intimated, without expounding, that the agendum behind the issuances
is to weaken the indigenous peoples rights in favor of the mining industry. And
it raised concerns about the possible retrogression in DARs performance as the
added workload may impede the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program.
AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the NCIP as an attached agency
of the DAR, the President altered the nature and dynamics of the jurisdiction and
adjudicatory functions of the NCIP concerning all claims and disputes involving
rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples. Nor has it
been shown, nay alleged, that the reorganization was made in bad faith.

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Executive Order Nos. 364 and 379
issued on September 27, 2004 and October 26, 2004, respectively, are declared not
unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.

Other rules: Raise at earliest opportunity & Constitutionality is the very lis
mota
21. People v. Vera 65 Phil 56 (1937-1938) [exception to the rule on earliest
opportunity]
G.R. No. L-45685 | November 16, 1937 | Laurel
Petitioners: The People of the Philippines and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation
Respondents: Jose O. Vera (Judge of CFI Manila) and Mariano Cu Unjieng

Emergency Recit: This case is all about the constitutionality of Act No. 4221. SC ruled
that the question of constitutionality has been properly raised. The People of the
Philippines is a proper party to the proceedings, having substantial interest therein.
Also, apart from the fact that the Court can pass on the question of constitutionality,
even if it has not been raised at the earliest opportunity, in its sound discretion, the
importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits,
strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be
now resolved.

Facts:

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Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants in criminal case People v. Mariano
Cu Unjieng et al (this was a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Phil
history both in length of time and bulk of evidence presented: case was field in
1931 and was only decided upon in 1935; additional info, crime was never
mentioned in the case). CFI of Manila rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging
from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision
mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party,
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation.
Upon appeal, the sentence was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five
years and six months of prision correccional to seven years, six months and
twenty-seven days of prision mayor. The judgment was affirmed in all other
respects. Mariano filed an MR and four successive motions for new trial, which
were denied, and final judgment was accordingly entered on Dec 18, 1935.
The instant proceedings for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition
have to do with the application for probation filed by Mariano before the trial
court, under the provisions of Act No. 4421 of the defunct Philippine Legislature.
Herein respondent Mariano states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of
the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he
would observe good conduct in the future.
o CFI Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing. The fiscal and the private
prosecution filed an opposition alleging that section 11 of the said Act
violates the equal protection clause for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the islands and because it endows the provincial boards
with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective
provinces (Art III, Sec 1). It was also alleged that Act No. 4221 is an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces
(Art VI, Sec 1).
o Judge Vera promulgated a resolution in Spanish! (Nganga. Yo no hablo
espanol, sorry! Arriba arriba! Caldereta!) But context clues reveal that Vera
denied the application for probation.
o So, fiscal filed a motion for execution of the judgment. Pending hearing of
the said motion, Mariano elevated the case to the SC via petition for
certiorari.

Issues (sobrang daming issues presented by Mariano, so SC identified the
fundamental issues):
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly
raised in these proceedings. YES because of transcendental importance.
2. In the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

RE: 1
ST
ISSUE
It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless (1) that question is properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases and (2) is necessary to a determination of the
case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.

Proper party?
In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that the constitutional issue has been
squarely presented not only before this court by the petitioners but also before
the trial court by the private prosecution. The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera,
however, acting as judge of the court below, declined to pass upon the question
on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are
affected by the statute, may not raise said question. While therefore, the court a
quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to
consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party.
Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question
the constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held
that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where
the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in
question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its being
brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to
be given the statute.

69

o The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the
Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the
constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action
is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of grater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the
mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws. And, even if we were to concede that the issue was
not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it does not
follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of
certiorari and prohibitions.

Earliest opportunity?
It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may
not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not considered
on appeal.
But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the
exercise of sounds discretion, may determine the time when a question
affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented.
o Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp conflict of authorities,
it is said that the question may be raised for the first time at any stage of
the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal. Even in civil cases, it
has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional
question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a
determination of the question is necessary to a decision of the case. And it
has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by an
appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court
below.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the constitutionality of Act
No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant case. For, while the court
will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is indispensable, wisdom
and just respect for the legislature renders it proper to waive it if the case in
which it arises can be decided on other points. It has been held that the
determination of a constitutional question is necessary whenever it is essential to
the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded solely on a
statute the validity of which is attacked. There is no doubt that the respondent
Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No. 4221 now being
assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, that court will also take cognizance of
the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its
validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that may persons
accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for probation;
that some of them are already on probation; that more people will likely take
advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of about four years since his first
conviction. All wait the decision of this court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and
to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand that the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.

We have reached the conclusion that the question of the constitutionality of Act No.
4221 has been properly raised.

RE: CONSTITUTIONALITY
The constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is challenged on three principal grounds: (1)
That said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive; (2) that it
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (3) that it denies the
equal protection of the laws.

(1) Pardoning Power
The Probation Act does not conflict with the pardoning power of the Executive.
The pardoning power, in respect to those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation Law had never been enacted.
The President may yet pardon the probationer and thus place it beyond the
power of the court to order his rearrest and imprisonment.

70

(2) Undue Delegation (MAIN)
The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely: "The legislative neither
must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have." The rule, however, admits of exceptions
(e.g. delegation to local authorities, delegation to the people at large [i.e.
initiative and referendum], and delegation provided by the Constitution [war
powers by President]). The case before us does not fall under any of the
exceptions mentioned.
In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power
or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. The general rule,
however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail may
be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by
executive officers and administrative boards.
o For the purpose of Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act
should take effect in their respective provinces. The provincial boards of the
various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and
application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the
provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of
the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a
virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. (Thus,
unconstitutional.)
[On contingent legislation] It is true that laws may be made effective on certain
contingencies, as by proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people
of a particular community.
o But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the
Prohibition Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be
ascertained by the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the
entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial board. The
discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited.
[On option laws] It may also be true that the legislature may enact laws for a
particular locality different from those applicable to other localities and courts in
may jurisdiction have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option
laws to the vote of the people.
o But option laws thus sustained treat of subjects purely local in character
which should receive different treatment in different localities placed under
different circumstances. In matters of general of general legislation like that
which treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of
probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and
absolute as provided in Act No. 4221.
It in conceded that a great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature
not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the
elaboration and execution thereof.
o But, it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a
limitation of power and one of these time-honored limitations is that,
subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.
We conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and
unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for
this reason, unconstitutional and void.

(3) Equal Protection
Section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the
law and is on that account bad. One province may appropriate the necessary
fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may
refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in
the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person otherwise
coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another
province would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination.

Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition
is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.


71

Political questions; requisites
22. Torrecampo v. Metropolitan 649 SCRA 482 (2011) [executive policy]
G.R. No. 188296| May 30, 2011

Petitioner: Bgy. Captain Beda Torrecampo
Respondents: Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System (MWSS), Diosdado Jose
Allado (MWSS Administrator), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) &
Hermogenes Ebdane (DPWH Secretary)
Ponente: J. Carpio

Summary: A day after personnel and heavy equipment from the DPWH entered a
portion of Bgy. Matandang Balara to implement the C-5 Road Extension Project over
lots owned by the MWSS, Bgy. Captain Torrecampo filed a petition for injunction in
the SC against MWSS and DPWH. He alleges that the said project would result to
injury to him and 8 million residents of Metro Manila; would endanger their health for
3 aqueducts responsible for the water supply in the area could be damaged.
Technically, the integrity of the pipes underneath is compromised in cases of heavy
loadings. Torrecampo then insisted that the RIPADA area, consisting of Pook Ricarte,
Pook Polaris and Pook Dagohoy, located in Bgy. University of the Philippines, Diliman,
QC, is a better alternative. On the other hand, MWSS seeks the dismissal of
Torrecampos petition for it does not present a justiciable matter that requires the
Court to exercise its power of judicial review. As orally argued by Agra, the filing of
the petition is premature as there is yet no road expansion project to be
implemented. In fact, the entry of DPWH in the area is done to conduct study on the
area and on the location of the aqueducts.

The SC held that Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction. Despite the presence of
judicial power under Article I, Section VIII of the Constitution, a review of Executive
policy is not under the jurisdiction of the courts for such policies lies only within the
wisdom of the Executive branch. The determination of where, as between 2 possible
routes, to construct a road extension is obviously not within the province of this
Court. Moreover, DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to determine whether a
road can be safely constructed on land beneath which runs the aqueducts. Absent
such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no GADALEJ can be alleged attributed to
them.

FACTS:
Bgy. Captain Torrecampo of Bgy. Matandang Balara, QC, in his capacity as
taxpayer and on behalf of his barangay constituents and 8 million Metro Manila
residents, filed the present petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Manila Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS) and Diosdado Jose M. Allado (Allado) in his official capacity as
Administrator, and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and
Hermogenes Ebdane (Ebdane) in his official capacity as Secretary to enjoin then
from implementing the Circumferential Road 5 (C-5) Extension Project over Lot
Nos. 42-B-2-A, 42-A-6 and 42-A-4 (subject lots), all of which are owned by the
MWSS. The C-5 Road Extension Project will connect the South Luzon Expressway
(SLEX) to the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX).
o Toreccampos constituents reported to him that personnel and heavy
equipment from the DPWH entered a portion of the Bgy. to implement the
C-5 Road Extension Project.
o He alleged (thru Atty. Alfredo L. Villamor, Jr.) that if the MWSS and the
DPWH are allowed to continue and complete the C-5 Road Extension Project
within Bgy. Matandang Balara, 3 aqueducts of the MWSS which supply water
to 8 million Metro Manila residents will be put at great risk. This is in
pursuance to the fundamental right to health under Sec. 15, Art. 2 of the
1987 Constitution.
o He insisted that the RIPADA area, consisting of Pook Ricarte, Pook Polaris
and Pook Dagohoy, located in Bgy. University of the Philippines, Diliman,
QC, is a better alternative to subject lots.
o And this petition for injunction has to be filed directly with the SC rather
than with the lower court, pursuant to Sec. 3 of RA 8975 An Act to Ensure
the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of Government
Infrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary
Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions, Providing Penalties for Violations.
In the hearing for the TRO:
o Assistant Sol Gen Eric Remegio Panga, lead counsel for DPWH, asserts
among others that the proposed C-5 Road Expansion Project shall not be
undertaken pending completion by the DPWH of studies and tests on the

72

safety concerns, including the determination of the existence and actual
location of the aqueducts in the area.
o Atty. Alberto C. Agra [Dean will ask this for sure!] for MWSS finds as
premature the filing of the petition for injunction as there is yet no road
expansion project to be implemented (no justiciable controversy). The
project as conceived has yet to pass prior review by the MWSS after
submission by the DPWH of a detailed study as to actual engineering design
and actual tests for the conduct of any construction work.
The SC then required the parties to submit memoranda.
1) MWSS, through the OGCC, [kaya pala si Agra] explained the purpose of the
MWSS and its participation in the C-5 Road Extension Project.
Under RA 6234 (the MWSS Charter), the MWSS owns and has jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems within the
development path of the expanding Metro Manila area, Rizal province, and a
portion of Cavite province.
o The MWSS installed 3 sub-terrain aqueducts that connect raw water from
the La Mesa Dam to the Balara Filtration Plant located in Bgy. Matandang
Balara, Diliman, QC. Portions of these aqueducts are located underneath
Commonwealth Avenue in QC, and are buried in varying depths because of
the uneven surface of QCs landscape.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1395 (PP 1395), issued by then Pres. GMA in 2007,
declared and reserved certain parcels of land of the RIPADA area as (1) an access
highway for the new road alignment of the C-5 [Road] Extension Project that will
connect the NLEX and SLEX, and (2) housing facilities for deserving and bonafide
occupants, to include those active and retired UP employees presently residing in
the said communities.
o This land is bounded by University Valley Subdivision on the North,
Katipunan Avenue on the South, Tandang Sora Avenue on the East, and
Dagohoy Street on the West.
o PP 1395 directed the MMDA, under the direct supervision of the Office of
the President, to coordinate with DPWH for detailed engineering plans and
designs for the access highway as well as with the Land Registration
Authority and Land Management Bureau of the DENR for a comprehensive
development plan for housing facilities for the affected families in the areas.
Then MMDA Chairperson Bayani Fernando wrote to then MWSS Administrator
Lorenzo H. Jamora and proposed the utilization of certain MWSS properties for
constructing Medium Rise Buildings (MRBs) for the affected families who will be
displaced by the C-5 Road Extension Project.
o In its 1
st
resolution, the Board of Trustees of the MWSS, in a Resolution
declined the request stating that the 60-meter wide aqueduct [Right-of-Way]
ROW was designed to provide enough space for the rehabilitation,
upgrading, and maintenance of the 3 main aqueducts turned over to Manila
Water Company which have been in existence for more than 50 years, and
maintenance thereof has to be undertaken to ensure sustainability of water
supply. The area should also be insulated from disruptions and disturbances
such as increased traffic, construction activities, and heavy loadings, as the
subject areas were not technically designed to withstand such dynamic
activities.
But in its 2nd resolution, MWSS allowed DPWH to use the MWSS Balara-La Mesa
aqueduct ROW, including the area of the Capitol Golf Course for preliminary
studies in the implementation of the C-5 Road Extension Project; as a
consequence of which, DPWH entered the said properties of the MWSS to
conduct the necessary complete study and detailed design of the C-5 Road
Extension Project, including test pitting and geothermal profiling.
2) In its Memorandum, DPWH, through the OSG stated that to execute the
Magsaysay Avenue Congressional Avenue segment of the C-5 Road Extension
Project, the DPWH will follow the direction of the existing Katipunan Avenue
Tandang Sora Avenue road connection. A portion of Tandang Sora road, from
Magsaysay Avenue to Damayan Road, will be widened to attain a 30-meter road
width, allowing three lanes per direction. This road-widening aspect would affect
Lots 42-A-4 and 42-B-2-A of the MWSS.

[For easy understanding: There are 2 plans concerning the extension of C-5. One
would traverse Tandang Sora in Bgy. Matandang Balara. The other thru RIPADA within
UP which is currently being pursued by MMDA. Pursuant to PP 1395, the proposed
relocation site of UP residents who will be displaced by the C-5 Road Extension
Project shall be within MWSS property along Tandang Sora. To the proposed
Medium-Rise Buildings by MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando, MWSS objected for it
would create disturbance on the aqueducts. BUT note that MWSS allowed DPWH (the

73

project executor of the 1st plan) to conduct the necessary study and design of the
proposed road extension project on top of the aqueducts.]

Issue: WON MWSS and DPWH should be enjoined from commencing with and
implementing the C-5 Road Extension Project along Tandang Sora Road, affecting
MWSS properties. NO.

Held:
Torrecampo is not entitled to an injunction. Torrecampo seeks judicial review of
a question of Executive policy, a matter outside this Courts jurisdiction.
Torrecampo failed to show that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion that would warrant the exercise of this Courts extraordinary certiorari
power.
At the outset, we declare that Torrecampo seeks judicial review of a question of
Executive policy, and quotes the Constitution as a thin veil for his weak
arguments:
o Violation of Consti Section 16, Article 2 The State shall protect the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.
o Violation of Consti Section 6, Article XI The use of property bears a social
function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and
similar collective organizations, shall have the right to own, establish and
operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
These issues, however, are dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. This does not fall under the definition of judicial power
under Section 1, Article 8 of the Consti Judicial power includes the duty of the
court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Under the guise of the relative importance of the rights of a lesser number of
motorists to a wider road vis-a-vis the rights of some 8 million residents of
Metro Manila to clean and potable water, Torrecampo wants this Court to
determine whether the Tandang Sora area is a better alternative to the
RIPADA area for the C-5 Road Extension Project.
o The determination of where, as between 2 possible routes, to construct a
road extension is obviously not within the province of this Court. Such
determination belongs to the Executive branch.
Moreover, in this case the DPWH still has to conduct the proper study to
determine whether a road can be safely constructed on land beneath which runs
the aqueducts (as orally argued by Agra). Without such study, the MWSS, which
owns the land, cannot decide whether to allow the DPWH to construct the road.
Absent such DPWH study and MWSS decision, no GADALEJ can be alleged
against or attributed to respondents warranting the exercise of this Courts
extraordinary certiorari power.

Decision: The petition for prohibition will be denied.

Effect of unconstitutionality; par. 2(a); operative fact doctrine
23. De Agbayani v. PNB 38 SCRA 429 (1971) [operative fact]
Plaintiff-Appellee: FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI
Defendants-Appellants: PHIL. NATL BANK & THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
PANGASINAN

Summary: De Agbayani obtained a loan (secured by a real estate mortgage) worth
P450 from PNB. This was to mature after 5 years (1944). In 1959, PNB sought to
foreclose the real estate mortgage. De Agbayani claimed foreclosure was barred by
prescription, 15 years having already lapsed. PNB argued that the claim hasnt
prescribed yet, even if the period from the time of issuance of EO 32 to the time
when RA 342 was declared invalid will be deducted from the counting of period. (FYI:
EO 32 was issued in 1945 and it provided for debt moratorium; RA 342 was issued in
1948 and it provided for extension of the debt moratorium. Here, RA 342 (the debt
moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers.
However, RA 342 was declared unconstitutional by the Rutter case.)
Held: Has the action prescribed? NO. The general rule is that an unconstitutional act
cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. However, prior to the declaration of
nullity, such challenged act was in force and had to be complied with. This is so

74

because a period of time may have elapsed before the judiciary can exercise the
power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity of the act. When RA
342 (and EO 32) were declared invalid, a period of time have elapsed during w/c the
same were in full force and effect. This is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. During the 8-year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in
force, prescription did not run. The error of the lower court in sustaining De
Agbayanis suit is thus manifest. From the time De Agbayanis loan matured to the
time extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by PNB, the time consumed is
six days short of 15 years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10,
1945, the effectivity of EO 32, to May 18, 1953, when Rutter was promulgated
(declared the RA & EO invalid), covering 8 years, 2 months and 8 days. Obviously
then, when resort was had to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was
time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Facts:
Plaintiff De Agbayani obtained a loan worth P450 from defendant PNB dated July
19, 1939. This was secured by a real estate mortgage (a property in Pangasinan
w/ TCT 11275).
As of Nov 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.
As early as July 13, 1959, defendant PNB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the
recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.
De Agbayani countered that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long
prescribed, 15 years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She
was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the Provincial Sheriff,
w/c was eventually made permanent.
PNB prayed for the dismissal of the suit, as even on De Agbayanis own theory,
the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from Mar 10,
1945 (when EO 32
16
was issued) to July 26, 1948 (when the subsequent legislative

16
Under EO 32 providing for a debt moratorium, it was specifically stated: Enforcement of
payment of all debts and other monetary obligns payable w/in the Philippines, except debts
and other monetary obligns entered into in any area after declaration by Presidential
Proclamation that such area has been freed from enemy occupation and control, is temporarily
suspended pending action by the Commonwealth Govt. EO 32 was issued on March 10,
1945.
act
17
extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid), were to be
deducted from the computation of the time, during which the bank took no legal
steps for the recovery of the loan.
Lower court ruled in favor of De Agbayani.

Issue (made this up): Has the action prescribed if the moratorium under EO 32 and
later RA 342 subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the
computation? NO.

Held: De Agbayanis suit is dismissed. SC ruled in favor of PNB.

Ratio:

An unconstitutional act cannot be the source of any legal rights/duties.
The lower court adhered to the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, EO,
or municipal ordinance cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor
can it justify any official act taken under it.
Once judicially declared repugnant to the fundamental law, it becomes a mere
scrap of paper. As the new Civil Code puts it: When the courts declare a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.

Prior to being nullified, the existence of the unconstitutional act must be
reckoned with.
A period of time may have elapsed before the judiciary can exercise the power of
judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of
what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

17
According to 2, RA 342 (1948), EO 32 remains in full force and effect for the war sufferers,
as for them, the emergency created by the last war was still existent. Then came this specific
provision: All debts and other monetary obligns payable by private parties w/in the Philippines
originally incurred or contracted before Dec 8, 1941, and still remaining unpaid, any provision/s
in the contract creating the same or in any subsequent agreement affecting such oblign to the
contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and demandable for a period of 8 years from and
after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the US Philippine War Damage
Commission, w/o prejudice, however, to any voluntary agreement which the interested parties
may enter into after the approval of this Act for the settlement of said obligns.

75

US SC decision (quoted in Araneta v. Hill, Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, and
Fernandez v. Cuerva & Co.) says, The actual existence of a statute, prior to such
a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
That is precisely what happened in connection with RA 342, the moratorium
legislation, w/c continued EO 32, issued by then President Osmea, suspending
the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable
by war sufferers.

RA 342 was declared invalid
At the time of the issuance of EO 32 in 1945 and of the passage of the RA in
1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was
confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her
liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945. Radical measures were
devised to tide her over until some semblance of improvement in her economy
noted. As a result, the suspension of enforcement of payment of the obligations
then existing was declared first by EO 32 and then by RA 342.
When the RA was first questioned, the Court was correct in rejecting the
contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional for
constituting an impairment of the obligation of contracts. Considering the
circumstances then, such remedial device was needed and badly so. Time passed
however, and conditions did change.
When the RA was again assailed in 1953, the question was whether it satisfied
the rational basis test as of such date. If it was found unreasonable, the right to
non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail over the assertion of
community power to remedy an existing evil.
In Rutter v. Esteban (1953), RA 342 was held unreasonable and oppressive, and,
therefore, should be declared null and void and without effect. J. Bautista Angelo
opined, [These] obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the
issuance of EOs 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited
because of the enactment of RA 342 and would continue to be unenforceable
during the 8-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. [This] means that the creditors would
have to observe a vigil of at least 12 years before they could affect a liquidation
of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive.

Conclusion
As of the time of adjudication, it was apparent that RA 342 could not survive the
test of validity. EO 32 should likewise be nullified. Before such decision,
however, they were not constitutionally infirm. Hence, we must yield to the
prevailing principle that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its
being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached.
Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid
governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were war sufferers, this
Court has made clear its view in a series of cases that during the 8-year period
that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining De Agbayanis suit is thus manifest.
From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings were started by PNB, the time consumed is six days
short of 15 years. The prescriptive period was tolled however, from March 10,
1945, the effectivity of EO 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering 8 years, 2 months and 8 days. Obviously
then, when resort was had to the foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there
was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.


76

24. Phil. Coconut v. Republic, supra [retroactive application to avoid
injustice] ALREADY ASSIGNED (1 please make sure proper issue is there
and re-upload) (Deadline July 31, 8pm)

Automatic review; par. 2(d)
25. People v. Mateo 433 SCRA 640 10 (Deadline July 31, 8pm)

Change of Venue; par. 4
26. People v. Gutierrez 36 SCRA 172 (1970)
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO PATAO,
VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO, CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO
PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO
PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-
TWO (82) JOHN DOES
Ponente: REYES, J.B.L., J.

Summary: A group of armed men set fire various inhabited houses in Bantay, Ilocos
Sur. Two informations were filed for arson with homicide and arson. The Secretary of
Justice issued AO 221 which authorized Judge Anover of San Fernando La Union, to
hold special term in Ilocos Sur. AO 226 was also issued by the Secretary of Justice
which authorized Judge Gutierrez (Vigan) to transfer the case to Judge Anovers Court
in La Union. Prosecution moved that Judge Gutierrez allow a transfer of the case to
the La Union Circuit Court by virtue of said AOs and for security and personal safety
of the witnesses. The accused opposed the transfer of the case, claiming that the
transfer of the case would be railroading them into a conviction. Judge Gutierrez
denied the transfer. Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts and
the AOs did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto
specified and individual cases. The SC, in the exercise of the Judicial Power vested by
the Constitution upon it and other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and
jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a case pending in a Court of
First Instance be transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same district
whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and there are serious and
weighty reasons to believe that a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over
the case would not result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of
justice. In the present case there are sufficient and adequate reasons for the transfer
of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, in the interest
of truth and justice.

FACTS
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons descended on
barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire
to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in
barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential
houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of
various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa.
After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state
prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him,
on 10 June 1970 filed in the CFI of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations

77

(Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V for arson). It charged
17 private respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified persons.
Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on 15 June
1970 voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29 July.
Issuance of AO 221: On the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice
issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover, of the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at
San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur, from and after
1 July 1970.
Issuance of AO 226: Three days thereafter, on 18 June 1970, the Secretary
further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario
Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit
Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No.
5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the
Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a
transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the
AOs just mentioned and calling attention to the circumstance that they were
issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from
Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of
security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused
opposed the transfer.
Judge Gutierrez declined the transfer sought, on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the
Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more
expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to
subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right
at the very inception of these cases.
o It is contended that AO 226 merely authorized the court below, but
did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to
the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the
circumstances justified any such transfer.
In view of this denial, the prosecution resorted to this writ of certiorari and
mandamus filed before the Supreme Court to set aside the order of denial
of the transfer and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to
remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at
either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.

ISSUE:
1. WON the Secretary of Justice has the power to determine what court should
hear specific cases? NO.
2. WON Judge Gutierrez should have transferred the venue of the case in the
interest of justice?- YES

Secretary of Justice has no power to assign cases to be heard.
The present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to
determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in
the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the
time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary, and while not
directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the
rights and immunities of the accused or civil party.
It could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining
the outcome of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with
the Administration's preferences.
The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts for the
purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and
to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein,
nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual
cases to the circuit courts.
Neither do Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such
intention; particularly since Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in
Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the
same year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that the transfer to
Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First
Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here operating to nullify any

78

executive arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to
either tribunal.
The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970 by
Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely
authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 44-V and 47-V
(People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, reveals that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of
imperatively directing transfer of specified cases.
Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order
No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his
discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore
mentioned.

Impending Miscarriage of Justice
It is unfortunate that Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of
the prosecuting officers that the cases against private respondents herein
should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the
refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan,
Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered.
The fear thus expressed can not be unfounded when account is taken of the
circumstances that some eighty-two (82) are still unidentified and at large;
that one of the accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to
an influential family in the province, being concededly the son of the
Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that
the reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal
cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to
silence them; that it is not shown that the Executive branch is able or willing
to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable
time thereafter, that even if armed security escorts were to be provided, the
same would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault
against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have proved; that
Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between 1 January and 31 May
1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported committed in said
province, of which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that the
promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk
of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial
District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and Governor
Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to
N-2 to petitioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by the complaining
witnesses, who had on a previous occasion freely given evidence before the
investigators in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of
transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are
to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice
and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.

Propriety of the Transfer of Venue based on the Rules of Court
Respondents contention: A transfer of the trial site can not be made, because it is a
rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that one who commits a crime is amenable
therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed, because jurisdiction of
a CFI in the Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory and they can not
take jurisdiction of persons charged with one offense committed outside of that
limited territory. This is stated in Rule 110 Section 14(a) of the Rules of Court.
18

SC: The purpose of the rule invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to
compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the
province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience
in looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place."
Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the
prosecution, as in the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should
have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience
lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the trial according to the
exigencies of truth and impartial justice.
Here, to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its
witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a

18
"in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredient thereof took place."

79

mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which
courts have been established.
Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section
14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the
actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice
demand that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions
wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law
would become the highest injustice "summum jus, summa in juria."

Accused, not prejudiced by transfer of trial to another place.
Accused cannot complain that to transfer the trial to a site where the
prosecution's witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would be
equivalent to railroading them into a conviction.
Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to be heard, the
prosecution will always be obligated to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the prosecution being given full
opportunity to lay its case before a proper arbiter; for a dismissal of the
charges for lack of evidence in a verdict that the prosecution can neither
challenge nor appeal.

Power of the Supreme Court to transfer trial of cases
The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as may be established by law (Article VIII, Section 13),
and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes
reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice.
The courts "can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve
and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective
institution of government"
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring
the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring
site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.
o This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in the
courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Philippine courts
admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the American pattern
with the enactment of the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on June 11,
1901, by the Philippine Commission, then composed of a majority of able
American Lawyers, fully familiar with the institutions and traditions of the
common law.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of the Judicial Power
vested by the Constitution upon it and other statutory courts, possesses
inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a
case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred to another Court of
First Instance within the same district whenever the interest of justice and
truth so demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that
a trial by the court that originally had jurisdiction over the case would not
result in a fair and impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice
o Among the earliest measures of the Philippine Commission, after
the establishment of Civil Government under American
sovereignty, was the enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136,
"An Act providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine
Islands." This Act in express terms abolished the then
existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First Instance,
and substituted in their place the courts provided therein.
Even if not expressly provided for in Act 136, the power to transfer the
place of trials when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally
essential and possesses no inferior rank.
Not only has there been since then no proof of any specific
pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by our
Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law
establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No. 5179, in its Section
4, provides express legislative recognition of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within
their respective districts:Provided, however, that cases shall be heard
within the province where the crime subject of the offense was
committed. And provided further, that when the interest of justice so
demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be

80

heard in a neighboring province within the district ... (Emphasis
supplied)
Application to the case: Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been
satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in question with the CFI of Ilocos Sur, in
which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the informations;
since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather
than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by
compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur,
because its witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein,
and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to
have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of
judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree
that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in
Baguio City, at the earlier available date. The adjudication of the case by a judge
other than respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any doubt or
suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by the trial Judge's being
beholden to the Crisologo family.

Power to Promulgate Rules; par. 5
Enforcement of constitutional rights; pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts
27. Santero v. CFI-Cavite 153 SCRA 728 (1965) [rules of court v. civil code]
Petitioner: Princesita Santero, Federico Santero and Willie Santero
Respondent: CFI of Cavite, Anselma Diaz, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina, Miguel, all
surnamed Santero, and Reynaldo Evaristo (Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Pablo Santero
Date: September 14, 1987 | Paras, J.

Summary: Petitioners and Respondents are all natural children of Pablo, the
deceased. Their mothers were not married to him. Respondents filed a Motion for
Allowance from the intestate estate of Pablo. CFI granted. Petitioners are contesting
this because Rule 83 of the ROC states that the widow and minor or incapacitated
children are entitled to receive allowance from the estate but they contend that
Respondents are all of majority age and gainfully employed or married, except
Miguel. SC said that what controls is the provisions of the NCC stating that children
of deceased are entitled to support without distinction as to minors or those that
have attained age of majority. Since its a substantive law, it should prevail over the
ROC which is a procedural law.

Facts:
1. Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie Santero (Petitioners) are
children of the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel Santero (Respondents) are 4 of the 7 children by Pablo
Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the
late Pablo since neither of their mothers was married to their father. Pablo was
the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
2. The issue in this case springs from the Motion for Allowance filed by
Respondents through their guardian, Anselma in 1981 wherein the ground cited
was for support which included educational expenses, clothing and medical
necessities, which was granted. Again, Respondents filed a Motion for Allowance
in 1982, citing the same grounds. Petitioners opposed and contended that the
wards for whom allowance is sought are no longer schooling and have attained
majority age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They likewise allege
that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the said allowance
because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they constitute
funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the
Kawit property from which said administrator derives the only income of the
intestate estate of Pablo.
3. In the Reply to the Opposition filed by Anselma, she admitted that some of her
children are of age and not enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds
but will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested allowances. She
cited Art. 290 of the Civil Code
19
and Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
20

4. CFI granted the allowance to the Respondents (2k each).

19
Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical
attendance, according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes
his education or training for some trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
20
Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under the
direction of the Court, such allowance as provided by law.

81

5. While the case was pending in the SC, Respondents filed another Motion for
Allowance to include Juanita, Estelita and Pedro Santero as children of Pablo with
Anselma praying that an order be granted directing the administrator to deliver
6k to each of the 7 children as their allowance. CFI granted again but Petitioners
asked the CFI to reconsider. An Amended Order was issued directing Anselma to
submit her clarification or explanation as to the additional 3 children included.
Anselma stated that in her previous motions, only the last 4 minor children were
included and her first 3 who were then of age should have been included since
all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their
shares in the inheritance of Pablo under Art. 188 of the NCC.
6. CFI issued another Order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of
the 3 additional recipients or children of Anselma.

Issue:
1. W/N CFI acted with abuse of discretion in granting the allowance to Respondents
despite the fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully employed
with the exception of Miguel?
Held: WHEREFORE, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, the instant Petition
is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.

Ratio:
1. Petitioners argue that Respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they
have already attained majority, 2 are gainfully employed and 1 is married as
provided for under Sec. 3 Rule 83, of the ROC. Petitioners also allege that there
was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for
tuition fees, book and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses
for school term 1982-83 because these wards have already attained majority age
so that they are no longer under guardianship.
2. The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3 but Arts. 290 and 188
21
of
the NCC. The fact that Respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is
of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their
right to allowance under Art. 188. While the ROC limit the allowances to the

21
Art. 188. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse
and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to
them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which
exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the NCC gives the
surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, Respondents are
entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo. Since the provisions of the NCC, a substantive law, gives the
surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule
83 which is a procedural rule. (Spouse however must be legitimate spouse)
3. Extra: It is not true that the Motion for Allowance was granted without hearing. It
contains a Notice of Hearing addressed to the lawyers for Petitioners. It was duly
received because lawyer filed an Opposition.

28. Damasco v. Laqui 166 SCRA 214 (1988) [prescription of crimes v. rules of
court]
G.R. No. 81381 September 30, 1988

P: EFIGENIO S. DAMASCO
R: JUDGE HILARIO L. LAQUI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Metropolitan Trial
Court, Br. 59, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PADILLA, J.:

SUMMARY
Petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged with the crime of grave
threats committed. After trial, respondent judge found that the evidence presented
did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of light threats. Petitioner states
that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on
17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days. (Incidentally the affidavit complaint
was filed with the Fiscal's Office only on 7 September 1987, or after the lapse of 61
days from 8 July 1987.) Upon the other hand, the crime of light threats, which is a
light offense, prescribes in two (2) months which means sixty (60) days. W/N it was
proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after finding him guilty of the
lesser offense of light threats but which has already prescribed. NO. In the case
of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that where an accused has been
found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver offense
charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed. To

82

hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a circumvention of the
law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver
offense.

FACTS:
In an Information dated 11 September 1987, but filed only on 17 September 1987
with the Municipal Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided over by
respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui, petitioner Atty. Eugenio S. Damasco was charged
with the crime of grave threats committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1987, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threaten one Rafael K. Sumadohat with the infliction upon his person of a wrong
amounting to a crime, that is, by then and there uttering the following remarks, to
wit:
BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ... MAYROON
AKONG BARIL, BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, respondent judge found
that the evidence presented did not establish the crime of grave threats but only of
light threats. As a result, petitioner was convicted of the latter crime and was
sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and the costs.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the dispositive part
of respondent Judge's decision, contending that he cannot be convicted of light
threats, necessarily included in grave threats charged in the information, as the
lighter offense had already prescribed when the information was filed.
Petitioner states that the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information
was filed only on 17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days. (Incidentally the
affidavit complaint was filed with the Fiscal's Office only on 7 September 1987, or
after the lapse of 61 days from 8 July 1987.) Upon the other hand, the crime of
light threats, which is a light offense, prescribes in two (2) months which means
sixty (60) days.
In denying petitioner's motion, the lower court held that:
Just to disabuse the mind of the movant, let it be said that the Court is fully aware
of the respective date of the commission of the offense and of the filing of the
information. The Court holds on to the principle that the allegation in the
information confers jurisdiction and that jurisdiction once acquired cannot be lost.
Thus, since the Court acquired jurisdiction to try the case because the information
was filed within the prescriptive period for the crime charged, which is Grave
Threats, the same cannot be lost by prescription, if after trial what has been proven
is merely light threats.
Respondent Judge denied the "Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the Dispositive
Portion of the Decision" apparently with the misimpression that what was being
questioned was the court's jurisdiction over the offense charged, ratiocinating that
jurisdiction, once acquired, cannot be lost. But such is not the case.
True, the allegations in the Information confer jurisdiction upon the courts, and
once acquired, such jurisdiction cannot be lost. However, this principle is not
applicable in the case at bar. The jurisdiction of the lower court over the crime was
never questioned.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for respondent Judge to still convict petitioner after
finding him guilty of the lesser offense of light threats but which has already
prescribed. NO.

RATIO:
In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that where an accused
has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the graver
offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would be to sanction a
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accussing the
defendant of the graver offense.
Incidentally, in the case of Felino Reyes vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and
People of the Philippines, a Memorandum prepared by this ponente for the Court,
entitled "An Examination of the Rule Which Holds That One Cannot Be Convicted
Of A Lesser Offense Includible Within a Greater Offense, Where Prosecution For The
Latter Was Commenced After Expiration Of Limitations Applicable To The Lesser
Offense," discusses a possible attempt to depart from the rule laid down
in Francisco vs. CA, by invoking the principle of presumption of regularity in the

83

performance of official acts and duties, and by interpreting the phrase "prescription
of a crime or offense" as merely "a bar to the commencement of a criminal action.
However, Philippine jurisprudence considers prescription of a crime or offense as a
loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute an act prohibited and punished
by law. Hence, while it is the rule that an accused who fails to move to quash
before pleading, is deemed to waive all objections which are grounds of a motion
to quash, yet, this rule cannot apply to the defense of prescription, which under Art.
69 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes criminal liability.
To apply the suggestion in the aforecited memorandum could contravene said
Article 89, which is a part of substantive law. This position is further strengthened
by Sec. 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which added extinction of
offense as one of the exceptions to the general rule regarding the effects of a
failure to assert a ground of a motion to quash.
Thus, as suggested by the cited memorandum, a departure from the ruling
in Francisco vs. CA, can be done only "through an overhaul of some existing rules
on criminal procedure to give prescription a limited meaning, i.e., a mere bar to the
commencement of a criminal action and therefore, waivable. But this will have to
contend with the Constitutional provision that while the Supreme Court has the
power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and the legal assistance to the
underprivileged, such rules shall not however diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE.

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Political Law Review Case Digests Dean Sedfrey Candelaria

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