Gross Immorality of Lawyer (Bigamy)

Manuel G. Villatuya vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos

A. C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) fled this complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent).
Facts:
In this Complaint for disbarment, complainant Villatuya charged Atty. Bede
S. Tabalingcos with:
1.) Unlawful solicitation of cases by setting up two fnancial consultancy
frms as fronts for his legal services;
2.) Non-payment of fees to complainant despite having promised to
complainant (a fnancial consultant), via a verbal agreement, that the latter
would be entitled to 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the
cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by
their clients; and
3.) Gross immorality for marrying two other women while his frst marriage
was subsisting, as supported by three diferent marriage contracts bearing
the name of respondent and three other women secured by the complainant.
In his defense, respondent asserted that complainant himself was
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job and that there was no
verbal agreement between them regarding the sharing of professional fees
paid by his clients. He presented documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid. Respondent also denied committing any
unlawful solicitation. Respondent did not specifcally address the allegations
regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
II. Issues
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
non-payment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married
thrice
III. Ruling
1. Under Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. There was no violation
of this provision in this case, for complainant failed to profer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
2. The Court held that respondent indeed used the business entities such as
Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., both
owned by him, to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the
facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.03 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers
from soliciting cases for the purpose of proft. A lawyer is not prohibited from
engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety arises, though,
when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as
to be inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar.
3. Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy
twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
IV. Adjudication:
The Court resolved the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos
as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and
solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct.
Moral Turpitude
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. vs. Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa
A.C. No. 7360 July 24, 2012
Atty. Catalan (complainant) fled this complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Joselito Silvosa (respondent).
Facts:
Complainant has three causes of action against Atty. Silvosa:
1. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case for
which he previously appeared as prosecutor hence violating Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Catalan also alleged that, apart
from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and have the
same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accuseds
favor;
2. Atty. Silvosa bribed his then colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.
Toribio) for 30,000 to uphold the charge of frustrated murder and not less
serious physical injuries in a case where Atty. Catalans brother was a
respondent; and
3. The Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa for direct bribery for having
demanded 15,000 from for the dismissal of a homicide case and for the
release of said accused Arsenio Cadinas despite the execution of an afdavit
of desistance of the complainant in said case.
In his defense, respondent claimed that his appearing as a defense counsel
for the accused was in compliance with the mandate to render legal services
to the needy and to the oppressed. On the second cause of action, Atty.
Silvosa dismissed Pros. Toribios allegations as self-serving. On the third
cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admitted his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserted that conviction under
the 2nd paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code does not involve
moral turpitude since the act involved does not amount to a crime.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Atty. Silvosa constitute valid grounds so as to
warrant his disbarment
Ruling:
Yes. First, when he entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides
that A lawyer shall not represent conficting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of facts. Indeed, the
prohibition against representation of conficting interests applies although
the attorneys intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.
Second,the records showed that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros.
Toribio. Pros. Toribio executed her afdavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the
failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then
President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros.
Toribio to make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the
other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution.
Third, Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disbarment. Atty. Silvosas fnal conviction of the crime of direct bribery
clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of
Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosas conviction
of the crime.
Adjudication:
Respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Inexcusable Negligence
Isaac C. Basilio, Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio vs. Atty. Virgil R. Castro
A.C. No. 6910 July 11, 2012
Before this Court is an administrative complaint fled by Isaac C. Basilio,
Perlita Pedrozo and Jun Basilio against respondent Atty. Virgil R. Castro
(Atty. Castro).
I. Facts
Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent to handle several
civil cases before MTC Bambang. In its Decision dated 10 February 2005,
MTC Bambang ruled against petitioners. When they appealed, the Regional
Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30
(RTC Br. 30) ordered its dismissal for their failure to fle the required
appellants memorandum despite notice. The Investigating Commissioner of
the IBP recommended that Atty. Castro be suspended for six months (later
modifed by the Board of Governors by imposing a three-month suspension)
for his failure to fle the requisite appellants memorandum before RTC
Branch 30 which led to the dismissal of the cases fled by complainants.
II. Issue
Whether or not Atty. Castro should be held administratively liable for his
failure to fle the mandatory appellants memorandum before RTC Branch
30
III. Ruling
Yes. The Court reiterated the well-settled rule that the failure of counsel to
fle the requisite appellants brief amounts to inexcusable negligence.
However, it appears that the conduct of Atty. Castro was not so grave as to
warrant a three-month suspension.
IV. Adjudication
Atty. Castro is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
Duty To Court
Criselda C. Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC, Br. 3, Nabunturan,
Compostela Valley
A.M. No. RJ-10-2257 July 17, 2012
Complainant fled a verifed complaint against respondent judge for Grave
Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative
to Criminal Case No. 6898 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo
Comania.
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she had given the judge P50,000, upon suggestion
of a prosecutor who told her that the judge should be compensated to favor
her cause and deny the petition for reinvestigation of the accused in a
criminal case where the complainants brother was gunned down. After the
frst payment, complainant also alleged that the judge wanted to borrow
P50,000 from her again but said request was not granted by the
complainant. Thereafter, complainant noticed certain irregularities
committed by the judge, such as the sending of notice hearings to
complainant belatedly and the conducting of bail hearings even without
application for bail.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judges acts amount to gross misconduct
constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes.The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as
to his impartiality, integrity and propriety.It is an ironclad principle that a
judge must not only be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial at all
times. Being in constant scrutiny by the public, his language, both written
and spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued Needless to state, any gross misconduct seriously undermines
the faith and confdence of the people in the judiciary.
Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail
hearings without a petition for bail being fled by the accused and without
afording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the
accused is strong. Clearly, Judge Clapis failed to observe the proper
procedure in granting bail. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere
defciency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of
well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.
In an earlier administrative case, in Humol vs. Clapis Jr., the Court
reminded the respondent judge of the duties of a trial judge when an
application for bail is fled, but in the present case, he ignored the same.
Therefore, we now impose upon him the extreme administrative penalty of
dismissal from the service.
IV. Adjudication
Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Nabunturan, Compostela Valley is dismissed from service for Gross
Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law.
Duty to Client
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc., represented by Gabriel H. Abad
vs. Atty. Richard V. Funk
A.C. No. 9094 (ugust 15, 2012
This disbarment case is against a lawyer who sued a former client in
representation of a new one.
I. Facts
Complainant Hocorma Foundation alleged that respondent Atty. Richard
Funk, whoused to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive
ofcer, and trustee of the foundation from 1983 to 1985 and served as its
counsel in several criminal and civil cases, fled an action for quieting of title
and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of Mabalacat Institute,
Inc. (Mabalacat Institute) using information that he acquired while serving
as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and in breach of attorney-client relationship.
In his defense, respondent claimed that in 1985 when Hocorma Foundation
refused to pay his attorney's fees, he severed his professional relationship
with it. The Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty. Funk to have
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.0312 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) with the aggravating circumstance of a pattern of misconduct
consisting of four court appearances against his former client, the Hocorma
Foundation.
II. Issue
Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confdence of a former
client in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he fled
several actions against such client on behalf of a new one
III. Ruling
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent
conficting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was
formerly the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating
his relationship with the foundation, he fled a complaint against it on behalf
of another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written
consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly
fduciary nature of their relationship, sound public policy dictates that he be
prohibited from representing conficting interests or discharging inconsistent
duties. An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional
misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conficts with that of
his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and
honest intention on the erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative.
IV. Adjudication
Atty. Richard Funk is suspended from the practice of law for one year
efective immediately.
Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty
Grace M. Anacta vs. Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion
A.C. No. 9074, August 14, 2012
In a Complaint for disbarment fled on August 22, 2007 with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), complainant
Grace M. Anacta (complainant) prayed for the disbarment of respondent
Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion (respondent) for "gross misconduct, deceit
and malpractice."
Facts:
On November 15, 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent to
fle on her behalf a petition for annulment of marriage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for which she paid respondent P42,000.
In December 2004, respondent presented to the complainant a supposed
copy of a Petition for Annulment of Marriage5 which bore the stamped
receipt dated December 8, 2004 of the RTC, as well as its docket number,
Civil Case No. 04-25141. From then on, complainant did not hear from
respondent or receive any notice from the trial court relative to the said
petition. This prompted her to make inquiries with the Ofce of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Quezon City (OCC-RTC). To her surprise and dismay,
she discovered that no petition for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
25141 was ever fled before the said court.
Complainant demanded an explanation from respondent but never received
any reply, hence this complaint for disbarment was fled. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from
two years to four years and ordered respondent to return to the complainant
the amount of P 42,000.00, otherwise his suspension will continue until he
returns the sum involved.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent lawyer should be suspended from practice of law
for his gross misconduct, deceit and malpractice
Ruling:
The Court held that the confuence of the evidence submitted by the
complainant clearly, convincingly and satisfactorily established that indeed
the respondent has authored deceitful and dishonest acts by
misrepresenting that he had already fled a petition for annulment on behalf
of the complainant and pocketing the amount of P42,000.00. He even went
to the extent of presenting to the complainant a supposed copy of the
petition duly fled with the court.
In addition, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that
"a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." "The Code exacts from lawyers not only a frm respect for law, legal
processes but also mandates the utmost degree of fdelity and good faith in
dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their
fduciary relationship."
Adjudication:
Respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion is ordered SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for four years. He is also DIRECTED to return to the
complainant the amount of P42,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the
promulgation of the Decision.
Duty To Society
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Atty. Mariano R. Pefanco
A.C. No. 6116, August 1, 2012
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment fled by
complainant Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefanco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct constituting deceit and
grossly immoral conduct.
Facts:
Complainant fled a disbarment case against the respondent, alleging that
the latter undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduced to 10%, of
the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing Spouses Amable
and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of
the estate of the late Benjamin Yap. Despite receiving fees amounting to 40
million, the respondent failed to pay the agreed commission and
consequently wrote the complainant, informing him that that Sps. Yap
assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his
attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. Complainants demand for payment had
been ignored by respondent.
II. Issue
Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 9.02 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional responsibility
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which
prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law when he undertook to give
complainant commission despite the latter not having any authority to
practice law.
Adjudication:
Atty. Pefanco is suspended from the active practice of law for one year,
efective upon notice thereof.
Grave Misconduct
Mila Virtusio vs Atty. Grenalyn Virtusio
A.C. No. 6753 (2012)
This is a disbarment case fled by complainant Mila Virtusio against her
husband's distant relative, Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio.
Facts:
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1999 Atty. Virtusio convinced her to
buy a house and lot at North Olympus Subdivision in Novaliches, Quezon
City, from its developer, Stateland Investment Corporation (Stateland). She
agreed for Atty. Virtusio to use her personal checks in paying the seller with
Mila reimbursing her the amounts on several diferent occasions. To her
surprise however, she received several letters from Stateland to make good
the dishonored checks paid to them. Complainant discovered that the
respondent had failed to settle the accounts. For fear of losing the property,
complainant settled the overdue obligation.
She further alleged that Atty. Virtusio declined to return to her the money
the latter misappropriated despite demand. Only when she threatened to fle
a case against her did Atty. Virtusio agree to pay her by executing a deed of
sale in her favor covering her Mazda car. Despite the sale, however, Atty.
Virtusio pleaded with Mila and her husband to let her keep the car
meanwhile since she needed it in her work. When she refused to give up the
car, Mila fled a replevin case against Atty. Virtusio that the court eventually
decided in Milas favor. But, as it turned out, Atty. Virtusio had managed to
register the car in her childrens name and sold it to a third person.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Virtusio is guilty of grave misconduct in her dealings
with Mila
Ruling:
Yes. By her own account, Atty. Virtusio admitted misusing the money that
Mila entrusted to her for payment to Stateland. Her excuse is that she lost
track of her fnances and mixed up her ofce funds with her personal funds.
A lawyers gross misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
is ground for suspension or disbarment under the principle that, since good
moral character is an essential qualifcation for the admission to the
practice of law, maintaining such trait is a condition for keeping the
privilege.
Atty. Virtusio is guilty by her above acts of gross misconduct that warrants
her suspension for one year from the practice of law following Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Adjudication:
Atty. Grenalyn V. Virtusio is GUlLTY of gross misconduct and violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and IMPOSES on her the penalty of
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one year, efective immediately.
Gross Immorality
Maria Victoria Ventura vs Atty. Danilo Samson
A.C. No. 9608 (November 27, 2012)
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Danilo
Samson fled by Maria Victoria Ventura.
Facts:
Complainant fled a complaint for disbarment against the respondent for
grossly immoral conduct. She alleged that respondent had carnal knowledge
of her twice when she was still a minor, the frst being committed in the
maids room and the other committed in the respondents poultry farm.
Respondent did not deny the deed, but alleged that the sexual act was done
with mutual consent, the complainant even accepting the fees he had given
after the intercourse. Respondent also alleged that the complainant was of
loose morals and that complaint was only concocted so that the complainant
can extort money from him.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents act warrant disbarment
Ruling:
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, fagrant, or shameless, and
that show a moral indiference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community.
Respondent has violated the trust and confdence reposed on him by
complainant, then a 13-year-old minor who for a time was under
respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter between the respondent
and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no moment.
Respondent clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly
reprehensible act. Such conduct is a transgression of the standards of
morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.
Adjudication:
Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
Immoral Conduct, Violation of his oath of ofce, and Violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Procedural Requirements for Judges
Ofce of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Lyliha A. Aquino, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2244 (November 28, 2012)
Facts:
A group called The Trial Lawyers of Cagayan sent a letter to Chief Justice
Puno which contained therein allegations regarding the respondents corrupt
ways. The letter was forwarded to the OCA, which then conducted an
investigation on the matter, and found that the judge did not strictly follow
the procedural requirements in deciding adoption and annulment cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the respondent judge warrant an imposition of a
severe administrative penalty
Ruling:
No. Short-cuts in judicial processes cannot be countenanced by this Court
because speed is not the principal objective of trial.
Considering that Judge Aquino was not motivated by bad faith, malice and
caused no harm to any litigant, the Court will not mete out a serious
administrative penalty at this time, but rather, will impose a fne and warn
Judge Aquino that procedural omissions in the hearing of cases would not
always be tolerated.
Adjudication:
Accordingly, the Court imposes a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
on JUDGE. LYLIHA A. AQUINO with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Duty To Client
Amparo Bueno Vs. Atty. Ramon A. Raneses
A.C. No. 8383 December 11, 2012
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Ramon
Raneses fled on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
Facts:
Complainant hired the services of the respondent to represent her in a civil
case. Respondent allegedly convinced her to give P10,000 and another
P5,000 in order to bribe the judge and win the case. Despite the
complainants giving of the required money, however, she was shocked to
fnd out that the case turned out against her despite her counsels
assurance of winning the case. Worse, the respondent allegedly concealed all
the development of the case from her, including his failure to comment on
the adverse partys ofer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on
the case.
The respondent has also failed to attend the hearings set by the IBP.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of the respondent warrant disbarment from the
practice of law
Ruling:
Yes. In this case, Atty. Raeses committed a grave ofense. As explained
below, he committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned
both the judge and the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier
attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he practically
disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating
Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the case.
From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge
allegedly on the take, the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which
he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow ofenses such as
these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all to all lawyers,
their clients and the general public that the Court will not hesitate to act
decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of
our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that
these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the
Bar.
Adjudication:
Respondent Atty. Ramon A. Raeses is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law, efective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Impartiality of Judges
Amb. Harry C. Angping and Atty. Sixto Brillantes vs Judge Reynaldo G. Ros.
Regional Trial Court, Br. 33, Manila
A.M. No. 12-8-160-RTC December 10, 2012
Petitioners Ambassador Harry C. Angping (Amb. Angping) and Atty. Sixto
Brillantes (Atty. Brillantes) fled an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Reynaldo G. Ros (Judge Ros) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Manila, Branch 33. Petitioners charged Judge Ros for violation of
Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Facts:
The said letter-complaint emanated from the actions and rulings of Judge
Ros relative to Criminal Case Nos. 10-274696 to 10-274704 entitled, People
of the Philippines vs. Julian Camacho and Bernardo Ong, for qualifed
theft. Petitioners alleged that respondent judge was biased when he issued
an order dismissing the criminal cases for lack of probable cause within the
same day said case was rafed to him. When Judge Ros issued the order
resolving the motion for reconsideration after two (2) days from the fling of
the comment and without awaiting for PSCs reply, petitioners were
convinced that respondent Judge Ros acted with partiality and malice.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Ros is liable for violation of Canons 2 and
3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Ruling:
The respondent was charged with the violation of Canons 2 and 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. The said canons provide:
Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
Canon 3 A judge should perform ofcial duties honestly, and with
impartiality and diligence.
The Court partially agreed with the OCA when it recommended the
dismissal of the present administrative complaint in so far as the
respondents liability under Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
concerned. The OCA is correct in its observation that petitioners failed to
present evidence necessary to prove respondents partiality, malice, bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
Notwithstanding the above fndings, this Court is not prepared to concede
respondent Judges liability as to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which provides: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. The failure of the petitioners to present evidence
that the respondent acted with partiality and malice can only negate the
allegation of impropriety, but not the appearance of impropriety.
Adjudication:
The charge against Judge Reynaldo G. Ros for violation of Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct is hereby DISMISSED. However, for failing to live
up to the degree of propriety required of him under Canon 2 of the same
Code, he is hereby ADMONISHED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
Impartiality of Judges
Dr. Janos B. Vizcayno vs Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan-Compostela,
Cebu
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1772. December 5, 2012
Dr. Janos B. Vizcayno (Dr. Vizcayno) fled the present administrative
complaint against Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay (Judge Dacanay),
Presiding Judge of the 7t11 Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Liloan
Compostela, Cebu for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Abuse of Authority,
Manifest Partiality and Delay.
Facts:
Complainant is the defendant in a civil complaint for forcible entry and
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 650-R entitled, "Deodito R. Pulido, et al.
v. Janos B. Vizcayno," fled before the MCTC, Liloan-Compostela, Cebu. On
March 31, 2009, respondent judge (together with the plaintif who allegedly
fraternized with and entertained him), without notice to complainant,
conducted an ex-parte ocular inspection on the property subject of the civil
action. Complainant only learned of the ocular inspection through neighbors
Norma Tan, Herminia Domain, and Fernan Baguio. Feeling aggrieved,
complainant fled a motion for inhibition of respondent judge to hear the
civil action. The motion was set for hearing on April 24, 2009. However,
respondent judge opted to proceed with the hearing of the case on May 29,
2009. In a heated argument, complainant and his counsel moved that the
motion for inhibition be frst resolved, but respondent judge ignored the
same.
Complainant argued that respondent judge committed a gross violation of
the due process clause protected under the Constitution when the latter
conducted an ex-parte ocular inspection without notice to him. Also,
respondent judge failed to live up to that norm of conduct that "judges
should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial," when he
conducted the ocular inspection together with the plaintifs. Such act,
complainant claimed, was highly improper and grossly inappropriate, and
was a violation of Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (New Code of Judicial Conduct) which provides that "a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities."
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Dacanay should be held administratively liable for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for conducting an
ocular inspection without informing the parties
Ruling:
We have previously ruled that an ocular inspection without notice to nor
presence of the parties is highly improper.13 Good and noble intentions
notwithstanding, Judge Dacanays actuations gave an appearance of
impropriety. His behavior diminished public confdence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. We have repeatedly stressed that all those
involved in the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach. Their conduct must, at all
times, be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility free from
any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. As the administration of justice
is a sacred task, this Court condemns and cannot countenance any act on
the part of court personnel that would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the judiciary.
Adjudication:
Respondent Judge Jasper Jesse G. Dacanay is found guilty of committing
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in violation of Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and is
imposed a fne of P30,000.
Duty to Client
Emilia O. Dhaliwal vs. Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing
A.C. No. 9390 August 1, 2012
Emilia O. DhaIiwal fled a complaint for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against Atty. Abelardo B. Dumaguing.
Facts:
Emilia Dhaliwal was having some legal issues purchasing a parcel of land
from Fil-Estate Development, Inc. Their case reached the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). She then engaged the services of Atty.
Abelardo Dumaguing in the year 2000. Atty. Dumaguing was given
P342,000.00 for him to consign with the HLURB. With the consignment, he
fled a petition with the HLURB to compel Fil-Estate to deliver the title to
Dhaliwal. However, a week later, Atty. Dumaguing withdrew from the HLURB
the amount of P311,819.94.
In 2003, Dhaliwal terminated the services of Atty. Dumaguing. In the same
year, Dhaliwal lost in the HLURB case. She then demanded Atty. Dumaguing
to return to her the P311,819.94 he earlier withdrew. Atty. Dumaguing
refused to return said amount. Dhaliwal fled an administrative complaint
against Atty. Dumaguing.
In his defense, Atty. Dumaguing said that the reason why he deemed it not
proper to return the said amount to Dhaliwal is that he fled a motion for
reconsideration with the HLURB but the latter had not yet acted on it. Atty.
Dumaguing attached a copy of the said motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dumaguing violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Ruling:
Yes. It was established that the attached motion for reconsideration was a
mere fabrication because it did not contain proof that the same was fled
with the HLURB nor was there proof that the other party was notifed.
Atty. Dumaguing violated Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states, among others, that: A lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.
A lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same
for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such
act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It
impairs public confdence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Adjudication: Atty. Dumaguing is hereby suspended for six months from
the active practice of law, efective immediately.
Duty to Court
Leave Division Ofce of the Court Administrator vs Judge Macarine,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen. Luna, Surigao del Norte
A.M. No. MTJ-10-1770 July 18, 2012
Facts:
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now
Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting authority to travel to
Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where
he would celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his travel
abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not
submit the corresponding application for leave pursuant to the OCA Circular
49-2003. For his failure to submit the complete requirements, his request for
authority to travel remained unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with
his travel abroad without the required travel authority from the OCA.
On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA that his
leave of absence for the period of September 9-15, 2009 had been
disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by the Court. When
asked regarding his failure to comply with said OCA circular, respondent
stated that he and his family few in immediately to Manila from Surigao for
his authority to travel at the Supreme Court on September 9 yet opted not to
do in view of the constraint and futility of completing the requirements
before their scheduled fight.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge must be held liable for violating
OCA circular 49-2003
Ruling:
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the
administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who
wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of
absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a
certifcation from the Statistics Division, Court Management Ofce of the
OCA, as to the condition of his docket, based on his Certifcate of Service for
the month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from
date of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
For travelling abroad without having been ofcially allowed by the Court, the
respondent is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Under Section
9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, violation of Supreme Court
directives and circular is considered a less serious charge and, therefore,
punishable by suspension from ofce without salary and other benefts for
not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or a fne of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Adjudication:
Respondent Judge Ignacio B. Macarine, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Gen.
Luna, Surigao del Norte, is hereby given the ADMONITION that he acted
irresponsibly when he opted not to immediately secure a travel authority
and is saved only from the full force that his violation carries by the
attendant mitigating circumstances. He is also WARNED that the
commission of a similar violation in the future will merit a more severe
penalty.