DELEGATION OF POWERS CASES

CASE DIGESTS

ARANETA VS DINGLASAN
Political Law First Emergency Powers Cases

FACTS: Araneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case.
Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with
the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No.
671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma.
Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines;
he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from
disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is
attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is
otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA
671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had
likewise ceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.

HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular
session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were
issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead
of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the
SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate. Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding
dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if war continues to rage on,
new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it
is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.









RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA
Political Law Second Emergency Powers Cases

FACTS: Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546 issued in
1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public
works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces
and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other
calamities. These EOs were pursuant to Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior
to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671
but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception
that war is still subsisting as a fact.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.

HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA
671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies
or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended.
Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency
he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the
president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight.
For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while Congress might delegate its
power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote.
In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take
them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may
be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the agent is
necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the
same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the
will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is
coupled with interest.















PEOPLE VS. VERA
Political Law Equal Protection Probation Law

FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the
lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging
that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila
CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application.
However, Judge Vera upon another request by Cu Unjieng allowed the petition to be
set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to
provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that
the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional
because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law
provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the
power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is
granting freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not equal protection is violated when the Probation Law provides
that only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer may the probation system be applied.

HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and
is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there
is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying
out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is
violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it
is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act
No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said
probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to
the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can
provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation
within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no
probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. The SC
declared the old probation law as unconstitutional.




EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. POEA
Non delegation of legislative power; subordinate legislation

FACTS: A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits and
burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of
non-delegation of powers.

HELD: No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers. The authority to issue
the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797. ...
"The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or
competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department
of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.

US VS. ANG TANG HO
Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed
and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of
Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the
Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01 August 1919, the GG issued
EO 53 which was published on 20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which
rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily,
criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale
was done on the 6
th
of August 1919. On 08 August 1919, he was charged in violation
of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months
imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is
an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the
act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the
crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued
pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the SC, wholly fails to provide
definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in
use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the
exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the
act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be
left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact
or event.

YNOT VS. IAC
Police Power Not Validly Exercised

FACTS: There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos
(EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the
movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional
for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority
provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid
exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the
indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement
of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the
same would ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the
challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the
law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of
the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative
authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken.












TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

FACTS: The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However
the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946,
known as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical
Education (BME) whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for
admission into a recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act
requires from applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance (cea) to
medical school from the BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then
Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, established a uniform admission test called
National Medical Admission Test as additional requirement for issuance of a certificate
of eligibility.

Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS
Order no. 2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for
securing (cea).

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the
constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement

Held: The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health
and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to
practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative
regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of
governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a
legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in
the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state
of our social and economic development, are widely known.

The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like
the NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical
education in the country."

PALAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS: During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the
Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-
three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin. Soon after the date last mentioned,
or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as
well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said
municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that
said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective
January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third
paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent herein relies upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan
ISSUE: W/N the President, who under this new law cannot even create a barrio, can
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities
HELD: On Cardona vs Municipality of Binangonan, such claim is untenable, for said
case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory
from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan),
likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. It is obvious, however, that,
whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law
creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is strictly a
legislative function or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix a standard the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself
the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of
checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of
a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.
The power of control under the provision Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the Consti
implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may
be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the
national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than
that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although
he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary
action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said
council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He
may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any
disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding
provincial board.

Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in
effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including
therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would
thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the
power of control denied to him by the Constitution.