Page 1 of 24

CHING T. CAMPOSAGRADO ATTY. KIT VILLASIS

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

BALAO et al vs. GMA
G.R. No. 186050
December 13, 2011
FACTS: The siblings of James Balao, and Longid (petitioners), filed with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of James Balao who was abducted by unidentified armed men earlier. Named
respondents in the petition were then President GMA, Exec Sec Eduardo Ermita, Defense Sec Gilberto Teodoro, Jr., ILG
Secretary Ronaldo Puno, National Security Adviser (NSA) Norberto Gonzales, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Alexander . Yano, PNP
Police Director General Jesus Verzosa, among others.
James M. Balao is a Psychology and Economics graduate of the UP-Baguio. In 1984, he was among those who founded the
Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of NGOs working for the cause of indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region.
According to witnesses testimony, James was abducted by unidentified men, saying they were policemen and were
arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white van.
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for (1) an inspection order for the inspection of
at least 11 military and police facilities which have been previously reported as detention centers for activists abducted by
military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain evidence relevant to the petition,
particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have on James; and (3) a witness protection
order.
the RTC issued the assailed judgment, disposing as follows:
ISSUE a Writ of Amparo Ordering the respondents to (a) disclose where James is detained or confined, (b) to release James
considering his unlawful detention since his abduction and (c) to cease and desist from further inflicting harm upon his
person; and
DENY the issuance of INSPECTION ORDER, PRODUCTION ORDER and WITNESS PROTECTION ORDER for failure of herein
Petitioners to comply with the stringent provisions on the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and substantiate the same
ISSUE: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced
disappearance.
HELD: NO; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule-making power for
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, albeit limited to these two
situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention, or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection of
law.
**
The trial court gave considerable weight to the discussion in the petition of briefing papers supposedly obtained from the
AFP indicating that the anti-insurgency campaign of the military under the administration of President Arroyo included
Page 2 of 24

targeting of identified legal organizations under the NDF, which included the CPA, and their members, as enemies of the
state.
We hold that such documented practice of targeting activists in the militarys counter-insurgency program by itself does
not fulfill the evidentiary standard provided in the Amparo Rule to establish an enforced disappearance.
In the case of Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court noted that the similarity between the circumstances attending a
particular case of abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,
carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. Accordingly, the trial court in this case
cannot simply infer government involvement in the abduction of James from past similar incidents in which the victims also
worked or affiliated with the CPA and other left-leaning groups.
**
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction of James on the very positions held by the
respondents. The Court in Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the doctrine of command
responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at all, in amparo proceedings.
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for
extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the
command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in
accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings
the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission,
for individual respondents criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does
not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),
the writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against violations or threats of
violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, is not an
action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liability requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on
the nature and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings];
it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial
killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial killings].
x x x x
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are
now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on
the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has
the power to enact. x x x[
Assessing the evidence on record, we find that the participation in any manner of military and police authorities in the
abduction of James has not been adequately proven. The identities of the abductors have not been established, much less
their link to any military or police unit. There is likewise no concrete evidence indicating that James is being held or
detained upon orders of or with acquiescence of government agents. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting
amparo reliefs. Such pronouncement of responsibility on the part of public respondents cannot be made given the
insufficiency of evidence. However, we agree with the trial court in finding that the actions taken by respondent officials
are very limited, superficial and one-sided. Its candid and forthright observations on the efforts exerted by the
respondents are borne by the evidence on record.
Page 3 of 24

**
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo
petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the
order. In this case, the issuance of inspection order was properly denied since the petitioners specified several military and
police establishments based merely on the allegation that the testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of
similar abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used as detention centers. In the same vein, the
prayer for issuance of a production order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it obtained confidential
information from an unidentified military source, that the name of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle.
Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned any fishing expedition by precipitate issuance of inspection and
production orders on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.

Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498
03 December 2009
PONENTE: Brion, J.
PARTIES:
PETITIONER: EN. AELINO I. RAON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police PNP; Police Chief uperintendent RAL
CATAEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection roup CID; Police enior uperintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA,
Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
RESPONDENT: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo
FACTS:
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo
by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY
Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message
to the latters Manila-based secretary, who advised Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis return.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a P professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow
student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police tation. More than a month later, or on
December 28, 2007, the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo
(petition) directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr.
Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-
PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet collectively referred to as petitioners, with the Court
of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7,
2008.
Page 4 of 24

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance
under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled
that when military intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the
missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and
his family, and directed the petitioners to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of
Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the
finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution
dated April 9, 2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the
threatened or actual violation of a victims rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition.
Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the court
to grant the privilege of the writ.
Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced
disappearance of the subject of the petition for the writ.
ANSWERS:
No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through tate or private party action.
Yes.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION
The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be
complete in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an
Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these
information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to
require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to
make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To
read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the
petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private
party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to
determine if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION
Page 5 of 24

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and
form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence.
Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the
standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under
circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part
of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.
Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] namely, of being
summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of
evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo
Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations.
The standard of diligence required the duty of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point,
too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and
investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner
needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above,
and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then
respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show
that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence
required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.
The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so
that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify
orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a rule, minor inconsistencies such
as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to
testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material
circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.
3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO
The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance [The writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of
violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It
does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at
least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court
shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
Page 6 of 24

primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.
The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time
and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for
the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be
the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in
progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive
laws that Congress may promulgate.
The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction The Amparo Rule expressly
provides that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. We note that
although the writ specifically covers enforced disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters
of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In
the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of Representatives and in the Senate on
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in
the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to address and
provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative
efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances
and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not
spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts
should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys
constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the power of the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private
party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly
procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can
provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the
public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial
intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following
terms:
Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo;
Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis;
Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
Page 7 of 24

Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of
material facts known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis,
and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and
PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the
Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for
consideration and action;
Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the
incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit
its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision were given to, and were
directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at
disclosure and investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the
circumstances of this case demand.
Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the aforementioned directives
particularly, the referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can
be applied to every Amparo situation.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga
City.


Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo
G.R. No. 180906
07 October 2008
PONENTE: Puno, C.J.
PARTIES:
PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
Page 8 of 24

Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo Petition
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition of Amparo.
Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
FACTS:
On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo hereafter referred to as Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
hereafter referred to as Reynaldo were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces eographical
nit CAF on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New Peoples Army NPA. After eighteen
(18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007.
On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order
before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting
in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to
Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs.
While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond
and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition.
On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule.
The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the
summary hearing and decide the petition.
On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and
unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official
assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while
under military custody.
Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions.
Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be invoked.
ANSWER:
It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements.
No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS
Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required With the secret nature
of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of
the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will
depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated
by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places
Page 9 of 24

where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION
Permutations of the Right to Security A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of
the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the niversal
Declaration of Human Rights DHR enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people. ome
scholars postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international
human right. It is the right to security of person as the word security itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the
UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of
the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a
search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a
crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of the
writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
tate guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, ection 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice.
Freedom from fear as a right In the context of ection 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus,
a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to
say that the right to security is actually the freedom from threat. iewed in this light, the threatened with violation
Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.
Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person
can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the
right to security of person to be invoked.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007
Page 10 of 24



DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ V HON. JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 182484 | June 17, 2007 | J. Brion
FACTS:
1. The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners and other John Does
numbering about 120.
2. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they
were the disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and
together with unidentified persons entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents
permission and against the objections of the private respondents security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo
structure.
3. In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and
prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private
respondents certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and
interposed a counterclaim for damages.
4. The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the private respondents favor, finding prior possession through
the construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
5. The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
6. On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction upon posting of a bond. The writ authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision was
actually issued by respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had complied with the imposed condition.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition.
7. The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners MR and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
8. Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special
Order a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the heriffs written notice to the petitioners to
voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
9. The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition in
CA.
10. Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition. Hence, the present petition for
certiorari with writs of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE: W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is proper
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in
form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.
Page 11 of 24

Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed
RTC orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been
guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the
petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for
having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address
these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo in line with the
extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for
the issuance of the Writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact.
On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn and unsworn is the overriding involvement of property
issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If
at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past
violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats and
harassments implied from the presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons.
Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the
petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition
fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for
information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
fishing expedition that this Court in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data had in mind in defining what the
purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data is fully in order. PETITION DENIED.


Canlas v. Napico

Facts:The petitoners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. They claim that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom
and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied in our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either
been demolished as of the time of filingof the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a courtjudgment. They
claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were issued by certain Land Officials. These Land Officials should be
summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the
PrivateRespondents

Issue : Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case.

Held : The petition is dismissed.

Page 12 of 24

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The threatened demolition of a
dwelling by virtue of a final judgmentof the court is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-
quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available

LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, et al. v. ERLINDA T. CADAPAN, et al.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, 184495, 187109, 31 May 2011, EN BANC, (Carpio Morales, J)


An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities
involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct
specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals.

Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that
have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best
position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and
security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be
expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek
to immediately protect.


Following the abduction of Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeo (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) by armed men
from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan (Spouses Cadapan) and Concepcion
Empeo (Empeo) filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court (habeas corpus case), impleading then Generals
Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt. Francis
Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of the Court, a writ of habeas corpus was issued,
returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals.

By Return of the Writ, the respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the
custody of the military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except Enriquez, who all attested
that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported
abduction and disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing.

Page 13 of 24

The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus petition there being no strong evidence that the missing persons are in
the custody of the respondents.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate courts decision. They also moved to present newly discovered
evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, herlyns mother-in-law who was allegedly threatened by
soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a military
camp.

During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeo filed before this Court a Petition for
Writ of Amparo (amparo case), with Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents. The petition impleaded
the same respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then
Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., (Gen. Esperon) then Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief
Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas.

Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her immunity from suit while in office.

By Resolution, the Court issued a writ of amparo returnable to appellate court, and ordered the consolidation of
the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition.

In the habeas corpus case, the appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the immediate release
of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the amparo case.

In reconsidering its earlier decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate court relied heavily on the testimony of
Manalo. It held that there is now a clear and credible evidence that the three missing persons, (Sherlyn, Karen and Merino),
are being detained in military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a lawful cause, they
should be immediately released from detention.

In the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspection order or production order in light of
the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees right to life, liberty and
security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went
on to direct the PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as indicated in the records to
ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the
three.

Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review, the Decision of the appellate court.

Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo, on the other hand, filed their own petition for review also challenging the same
Decision of the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned.
Page 14 of 24


Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before the appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in
Contempt of Court for failure of the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply with the directive of
the appellate court to immediately release the three missing persons. By Resolution, the appellate court denied the
motion, ratiocinating that while the Court, ordered the respondents to immediately RELEAE, or cause the release, from
detention the persons of herlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino, the decision is not ipso facto
executory. The use of the term immediately does not mean that that it is automatically executory. Neither did the
decision become final and executory considering that both parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme
Court.

ia a petition for certiorari filed before this Court, Erlinda Cadapan and Empeo challenged the appellate courts Resolution
denying their motion to cite respondents in contempt.


ISSUES:

Whether or not the Armed Forces Chief of Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff has command
responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention of the three aggrieved parties, Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino

Whether or not there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus decision or in an Amparo case to cause the
release of the aggrieved parties.


HELD:

Petition DISMISSED.

There is no showing that Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino were even remotely accountable and responsible for the
abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of his subordinates in an amparo proceeding,
a brief discussion of the concept of command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already decided by
the Court is in order.

Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows:
Page 15 of 24


The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed
combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept
of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability,"
whereby the superior is made responsible forcrimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the
perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)


It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that
points to criminal or administrative liability.

An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities
involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct
specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of
aggrieved individuals.

Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis enlightens:

[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or
extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearancefor purposes
of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance (emphasis and underscoring supplied)


Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz:

x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry
the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our
primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Page 16 of 24



Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability. The
Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to instances
of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to determine
the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments
complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix
criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary
proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)


In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in
the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.

Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851) to include command responsibility as a form of
criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is thus the
substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all
necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit
these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.

The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents that it found to be
responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that
the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez
and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

Page 17 of 24

The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack of merit as there is no showing
that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen
and Merino.

There is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision.

Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution for an amparo or habeas corpus
decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and
execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may
jeopardize the very rights that these writs seek to immediately protect.

The olicitor enerals argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The
Rules of Court only find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken, the
procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life,
liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent with the
extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo proceeding.

In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not
automatically executory. For that would defeat the very purpose of having summary
proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice
to further appeals that may be taken therefrom..


G.R. No. 184769
05 October 2010
PONENTE: Carpio Morales, J.
PARTIES:
PETITIONERS: MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA
RESPONDENTS: ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Regional Trial Court: Original petition for issuance of a writ of habeas data
Supreme Court: Appealed to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to the Rules on the
Writ of Habeas Data
FACTS:
Page 18 of 24

Respondent Rosario G. Lim, also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO). On 04 June 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration
building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KMPANYA A MA BWAYA N OBYERNO. KAPAL N MKHA MO, LMAYA KA RITO, WALAN TAN NA LOOB.
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
In a Memorandum dated 04 July 2008, Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCOs Human Resource taffing, directed the
transfer of respondent to MERALCOs Alabang ector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTM Clerk, effective July 18, 2008 in light of
the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and
which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security.
The respondent however, did not agree with her transfer and filed an appeal with Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice- President and
Head of MERALCOs Human Resource Administration, and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. She
likewise claimed the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the
provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she
raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court RTC of Bulacan. he claimed petitioners unlawful act and omission
consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in
life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
In its Decision dated 22 eptember 2008, the RTC granted respondents petition including the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required. The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that recourse to a writ of
habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like
respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information or data
on the reported threats to her person.
Thus, the petition for review.
PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of habeas data may be properly issued to protect purely property or
commercial concerns where there is no clear showing of any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of the right to privacy in
relation to the rights to life, liberty, and security.
ANSWER: No.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS DATA
The remedy of habeas data can only be invoked to protect the right to privacy in relation to the rights to life, liberty, and
security The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth
Page 19 of 24

and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and
available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules.
The Writ of Habeas Data cannot be invoked in labor disputes where there is no unlawful violation of the right to life, liberty,
or security Castillo v. Cruz (G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009) underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del
Rosario (G. R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008) that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
ones employment are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful
violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right
to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in
her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at
all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real intent of management and could
be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on certiorari. The assailed decision of the trial court was reversed and
set aside

#7 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H.
RODRIGUEZ
GR NO. 191805
NOVEMBER 15, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the
NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers
for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed
against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may
not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Page 20 of 24


Issue:
Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit
Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for
his abduction.
Held:

No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas
data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance
or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the
power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.

Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has
also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command responsibility in civil
proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature.
Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility
in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in
the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
Page 21 of 24

superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as
his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.84
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston
Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a
climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very
least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators.
While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President,
we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible
disappearance. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have
known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 189155
07 September 2010
PONENTE: Perez, J.
PARTIES:
PETITIONER: MELISSA ROXAS
RESPONDENTS: PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS
AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, PC/SIPT/ LEON NILO DELA CRUZ, MAJ.GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY
GAMIDO LACADIN, DEX, RC, and ROSE
NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
Supreme Court: Petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Original Action for Petition
of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Page 22 of 24

FACTS:
Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States, enrolled in an exposure program to the
Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a
member.
On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in
Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting, 15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered
the house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained
for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army CPP-NPA). She was then separated from
her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and
landing, and some construction bustle.
She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs. She was informed
by a person named RC that those who tortured her came from the pecial Operations roup and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the Order of Battle.
On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She was sternly warned not to
report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family. After her release,
Roxas continued to receive calls from RC thru the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and
the sim card.
Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before the Supreme
Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the
government agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception
of evidence and appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data.
However, the court a quo absolved the respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible
for the abduction and torture of Roxas.
Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
PERTINENT ISSUES:
Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.
Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators is enough ground for
the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may be extended.
ANSWERS:
No.
It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence.
Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Page 23 of 24

Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate The use of the doctrine of
command responsibility as justification in impleading the respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal
basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.
The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ of amparo is a protective
remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty
or security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an
imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparo proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be impleaded not actually on the basis of
command responsibilitybut rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS
In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence In amparo
proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends
largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the
identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS
Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is an
indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended An indispensable requirement before the
privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there is an actual
or threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation
of the petitioners right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike
down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it modified the directive of the Court of the
Appeals for further investigation, as follows:
Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of
the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary
steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and b to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioners abduction and torture.
Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of
the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to
furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioners abduction and torture, subject to
reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
Page 24 of 24

Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the
petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those
that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy
of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide
protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by
this Court.
The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance with
the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such
determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its
consideration. It was declared that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to
accomplish its tasks under this decision