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“Non-Traditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia: Emerging Infectious Diseases,” Regional Security Education Program (RSEP) Briefings for United States Pacific Fleet, Glasgow 102, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 22 July 2012.
“Non-Traditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia: Emerging Infectious Diseases,” Regional Security Education Program (RSEP) Briefings for United States Pacific Fleet, Glasgow 102, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 22 July 2012.
“Non-Traditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia: Emerging Infectious Diseases,” Regional Security Education Program (RSEP) Briefings for United States Pacific Fleet, Glasgow 102, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 22 July 2012.
Non-Traditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia:
Emerging Infectious Diseases
Sophal Ear, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Naval Postgraduate School PACFLT RSEP 22 July 2012
Disclaimer: Material contained herein is made available for the purpose of peer review and discussion and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Navy or the Department of Defense. But first, a bit about what I do. Gardening as metaphor. The Illusion of Control Gardening, on the other hand, may be a better metaphor. Gardeners have no illusion of control. We create the right growing conditions, nurture a healthy soil life, set up our lifestyles so we have time to tend our crops, and we plant a diverse variety of sturdy, healthy plants and watch them grow. We adjust as we go along - removing excess weeds, mulching, watering and fertilizing when necessary - and picking off pests. But ultimately - the end result almost always includes crop failures, and unexpected successes. And we will feel more like stewards, sometimes even observers, than masters of our domain. http://cseaperkins.wordpress.com/tag/sustainability/ We need leaders who think like gardeners By Maj. Joseph Bruhl, 16 July 2012 http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/ 2012/07/16/we_need_leaders_who_ think_like_gardeners http://csis.org/files/publication/110615_Peake_DoDOverseasLabs_Web_0.pdf Overseas U.S. Navy and Army Laboratories First, please raise your hand if you know what non-traditional security threats are. What are some NTS threats? Xiaolangdi Dam Contents 1. The Problems 2. Timeline Context 3. Indonesia Case Study 4. Cambodia Case Study 5. Enterovirus 71 & H1N1 6. Conclusion Myriad Problems Poor to non-existent surveillance Poor diagnostic laboratory capability Disincentives to report Viral sovereignty (Indonesia) Page 213:
In 2006, Indonesia claimed viral sovereignty over samples of H5N1 collected within its borders and announced that it would not share them until the WHO and developed countries established an equitable means of sharing the benefits (e.g., vaccine) that could derive from such viruses. Page 3:
in the poorest countries per capita expenditure on all aspects of health care [is] 3% expenditure in high-income countries staff in over 90% not familiar with quality assurance principles more than 60% of laboratory equipment is outdated or not functioning
August 2001 report 2010 [F]rom my own experiences in countries ( Central Asia, Southeast Asia, India, Sub-Saharan Africa) I believe the status has not changed much from the date of the [2001 GAO] report. - Director of Laboratory Systems Development at a major American university TimelineContext Human Pandemic Flu Timeline Spanish (H1N1) HK flu H3N2 HPAI H5N1 H7N2 H7N3 H10N7 Downside of Globalization: Global Reach of Diseases Quality of Health Care, 2002 H5N1: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Indonesia Case Study After FOUR decades, the Naval Area Medical Research Unit- 2 (Namru-2) is kicked-out of Indonesia And all because of one Minister? Maybe not. Issues Raised in Indonesia 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Cambodia Case Study Lucky guy, thanks to Namru-2... H5N1 Animal Outbreaks 2004-2008 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2007 2006 2005 2008 H5N1 Human Victims 2005-2008 Issues Raised in Cambodia 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% Low Staff Compensation Donor Dependence Pathologies Poor staff management/HR Patronage networks detrimental to work environments No compensation for culling Differing host and donor priorities Goal: reduce pandemic potential that could strike donor countries themselves
But lets end where we started on the study, with Indonesia and Cambodia Dateline: 11 April 2010 Namru-2 Jakarta is shutting down. I have been very sad. Not only because I am losing my job, but more than that, Indonesia will loss [sic] an established laboratory research coz [sic] of political reasons
--Senior Indonesian scientist Scientists Technology should be on tap, but not on top.
Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.
Churchill The end or the beginning?
25 June 2010: Director of Namru-2 Phnom Penh steps down
Former Namru-2 Jakarta Commanding Officer was to head Namru-2 Phnom Penh (but did not end up there)
Awareness of issues both in Indonesia and Cambodia for wherever Namru-2 ends-up. Thank you. Questions?