JUDGE BONIFACIO | EVIDENCE DIGEST OF THE DIGEST OPINION RULE (RULE 130, SECS. 48-50) DILAG & CO. V. MERCED : Dilag fled a case against Merced for the theft of his truck. Merced claimed that he purchased the truck in good faith and he relied on his certifed copy of the certifcate of registration. Merced impugns the testimony of Aguilar, (as a witness to testify on the alleged tampering of the motor number), on the ground that he is not ualifed as e!pert on motor numbers. DOCTRINE: "here is no precise reuirement as to the mode in which skill or e!perience shall ha#e been acuired. $cientifc study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an e!pert. A witness may be competent to testify as an e!pert although his knowledge his knowledge was acuired through the medium of practical e!perience rather than scientifc study and research. UNITED STATES V. TRONO: "rono et al. were accused of ill treatment of three persons arrested, as a result of which one died. Defense admits the fact of arrest but denies ill treatment. Dr. %casiano testifed to the e&ect that the deceased had not died due to wounds but by hepatic colic, a disease su&ered by the deceased for a long time. DOCTRINE: 'ourts are not bound to submit to e!pert testimony. "hey are free to weigh them. "hey can gi#e or refuse to gi#e them any #alue as poof or they can counterbalance such e#idence with other elements of con#iction which ha#e been adduced during the trial. PEOPLE V. ADOVISO : Ado#iso was charged with double murder. (e o&ered in e#idence the testimony a )*% polygraph e!aminer who conducted a test on him. "he e!aminer+s report re#ealed that ,there were no specifc reactions indicati#e of deception to pertinent uestions rele#ant to the in#estigation of the crime.- DOCTRINE: 'ourts are not bound to submit to e!pert testimony. .aith and credit must not be #ested upon the lie detector test, which is not conclusi#e as the polygraph has not yet attained scientifc acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. PEOPLE V. VALLEJO : /alle0o was charged with rape with homicide. "he prosecution submitted D)A e#idence gathered from the body of the #ictim which matched the D)A profle of /alle0o. (e assailed the D)A analysis, claiming that it failed to show that the samples submitted for D)A testing were not contaminated after ha#ing been soaked in smirchy water before being submitted to the laboratory. DOCTRINE: %n assessing the probati#e #alue of D)A e#idence, courts should consider, among other things, the following data1 how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analy2ing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the ualifcation of the analyst who conducted the tests. STATE V. GARVER : 3ar#er et al. robbed and shot a person. (e set up the defense of insanity. 3ar#er+s mother related to the 0ury the history of her son+s insanity. "he court re0ected the phrases ,such a terrible shape- and ,physically ill- used in her testimony on the theory that they were mere opinions or conclusions of the witness. DOCTRINE: "he general rule is that a witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions. *ut lay witnesses are freuently permitted to use the so4called ,short4hand- descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to the court their impression of the general physical condition of a person. UNITED STATES V. STIFEL : $tifel allegedly murdered a person by sending him an e!ploding package consisting of a mailing tube with a screw4on top. "he e!pert testimony of a chemist and microanalyst indicated the materials used for the bomb were found to be microscopically identical to the materials which were in the stocky room where $tifel worked. "he e!pert testimony was assailed on the ground that the test was too new and unreliable and had not yet been accepted by scientists in its particular feld. DOCTRINE: 5n uestions of science, skill or trade or others of the like kind, persons of skill or e!perts may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to gi#e their opinion in e#idence. DAUBERT V. MERRELL : "wo minor children with serious birth defects, along with their parents alleged in their suit against respondent that the children+s birth defects had been caused by the mothers+ prenatal ingestion of a prescription drug marketed by respondent. DOCTRINE: $cientifc e#idence is admissible if supported by sound methodology. "he trial 0udge discharges his or her responsibility by acting as a gate4keeper, and admitting such e#idence as is supported by sound methodological principles, while e!cluding that built upon speculation and con0ecture. "his permissi#e rule honors one of the central tenets of the .ederal 6ules of 7#idence by fa#oring admissibility of all potentially rele#ant e#idence. 8 CALIDA, MANIGBAS, QUE, ROQUE, VILLARIN | GROUP 7 JUDGE BONIFACIO | EVIDENCE UNITED STATES V. BONDS: (artlaub was gunned down in his #an. *onds et al. were con#icted of conspiracy and federal frearms o&enses. "he gun used in the shooting and (artlaub+s #an were found abandoned behind a hotel, both spattered with blood. $erology tests showed that the blood matched those found in *onds+ blood. DOCTRINE: D)A tests meet the e!pert testimony reuirement. $cientifc e#idence is admissible if it is both rele#ant and reliable. "he following is a non4e!clusi#e list of factors1 (1) whether a theory or techniue can be tested, (8) whether the theory or techniue has been sub0ected to peer re#iew and publication, (9) the known or potential rate of error in using a particular scientifc techniue and the e!istence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniue+s operation an (:) whether the theory or techniue has been generally accepted in the particular scientifc feld. JIMENEZ V. COMMISSION : "he lot was donated by the 'ommission to the ;nited 'hurch, as e#idenced by a "'" and a Deed of Donation. <imene2 claims that their parents ne#er sold the lot to the 'ommission and ;nited 'hurch and that the purported signatures of their parents ha#e been found to be forgeries by go#ernment handwriting e!perts. DOCTRINE: 5pinions of handwriting e!perts are not binding upon courts. A fnding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting e!perts, because the 0udge must conduct an independent e!amination of the uestioned signature in order to arri#e at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. 6esort to these e!perts is not mandatory or indispensable to the e!amination or the comparison of handwriting. PEOPLE V. PRECIADOS : "he accused were claimed by the wife of the #ictim to ha#e conspired and murdered her husband by forcing him to drink insecticide. %n an a=da#it, she alleged that by peeping through a two4 inch hole in the 8 nd >oor of an old rice mill, she saw the appellant holding a hand grenade while his other arm was locked in a stranglehold around the neck of the other #ictim who knelt on the >oor. DOCTRINE: An a=da#it does not pro#e the truthfulness of the allegations made and contained therein. "he testimony of its single purported eyewitness, while positi#e, was less than credible. $uch testimony of the lone witness did not meet the test to sustain a 0udgment of con#iction which must be both positi#e and credible. PEOPLE V. DURANAN : A retard accused Duranan of raped her twice. Duranan posited that the retard+s mental age was not pro#en. ;nder the 6?', an essential element for the prosecution for rape of a mental retardate is a psychiatric e#aluation of the complainant+s mental age to determine if her mental age is under twel#e. DOCTRINE: %t is competent for the ordinary witness to gi#e his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person, pro#ided the witness has had su=cient opportunity to obser#e the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of the person in uestion. "herefore, the mother of the rape #ictim, though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how she was born, what she is su&ering from, and what her attainments are, is competent to testify on the matter. BURDEN OF PROOF & PRESUMPTIONS (RULE 131, SECS. 1-4) CIIL C!SES PORENELLOSA V. LTA: ?ornellosa bought a portion of the $anta 'lara 7state. After @ installments, the go#ernment refused to accept further payments. ?ornellosa found out that the lot had been subdi#ided into two smaller lots.
DOCTRINE: A party claiming a right granted or created by law must pro#e his claim by competent e#idence. (e is duty4bound to pro#e his allegations in the complaint and must rely on the strength of his e#idence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent. .urthermore, the law reuires that such transmission of real rights must be embodied in a public document. IFC V. TOBIAS: "obias bought on installment a Dodge truck. (e e!ecuted a promissory note which is secured by a chattel mortgage on the dodge truck. "he seller indorsed the promissory note to %.'. %.' demanded payment of the balance or to surrender the dodge truck. "obias replied that he will surrender the truck because it met an accident and there was too much delay in the repair. %.' alleged that it had no knowledge of the accident and decided not to get the truck anymore. DOCTRINE: "he allegation of %.' is a negati#e allegation and needs no e#idence to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. CRIMIN!L C!SES PEOPLE V. PAJENADO: ?a0enado shot a person and was con#icted for his murder and for illegal possession of a frearm. HELD: %n criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the o&ense charged lies on the 9 CALIDA, MANIGBAS, QUE, ROQUE, VILLARIN | GROUP 7 JUDGE BONIFACIO | EVIDENCE prosecution and that a negati#e fact alleged by the prosecution must be pro#en if ,it is an essential ingredient of the o&ense charged.- "he mere fact that the ad#erse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged should not relie#e the party making the a#erment of the burden of pro#ing it. A party who alleges a fact must be assumed to ha#e acuired some knowledge thereofA otherwise, he could not ha#e alleged the same. UNITED STATES V. DUBE: Dube was tried on an indictment charging him with robbery of a bank. (e did not deny that he committed the robbery, but introduced the testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist that he was a schi2ophrenic when he committed the o&ense. "he prosecution did not present e!pert opinion e#idence but relied instead on cross4 e!amination and the lay testimony of two bank tellers and Dube+s accomplice. HELD: A criminal defendant is presumed sane, but the introduction of e#idence of insanity dispels the presumption and sub0ects the prosecution to the burden of pro#ing sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. "he e!pert testimony is not conclusi#e e#en where uncontradicted. PEOPLE V. VERZOLA: /er2ola clubbed to *ernardo in the presence of <osefna. (is body was carried and left at the foot of the stairs of his house. /er2ola changed his clothes and went to the municipal building and reported to the police authorities that *ernardo had died in an accident. <osefna ga#e a written statement pointing to /er2ola as the assailant of *ernardo. /er2ola e!ecuted a written statement admitting that he clubbed *ernardo se#eral times. *oth /er2ola and <osefna repudiated their e!tra0udicial confessions. /er2ola claims that he killed *ernardo in self4 defense. DOCTRINE: )o such proof of self defense was adduced. 5nce an accused has admitted the killing of a human being, the burden is on him to establish the e!istence of any circumstance which may 0ustify the killing or at least attenuate the o&ense committed. "o establish his e!culpation, or the 0ustifcation for the act, he must pro#e such a=rmati#e allegation by clear, satisfactory and con#incing e#idence. PATTERSON V. NEW YORK: ?atterson became estranged from his wife, 6oberta. "he latter was ha#ing an a&air with )orthrup. ?atterson borrowed a ri>e and went to the residence of his father4in4law where he saw 6oberta in a state of semi4undress in the presence of )orthrup. (e killed )orthrup by shooting him twice in the head. %n )ew Bork, the $tate permits a person accused of murder to raise an a=rmati#e defense that he ,acted under the in>uence of e!treme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable e!planation or e!cuse.- DOCTRINE: A=rmati#e defenses constitute a separate issue that the defendant is reuired to carry the burden of persuasion. "he $tate need only pro#e the e!istence of the elements constituting the o&ense beyond reasonable doubt. Due process reuires that only the most basic procedural safeguards be obser#ed. "he state is only reuired to pro#e beyond reasonable doubt all the elements included in the defnition of the o&ense charged. ?roof of the e!istence or none!istence of a=rmati#e defenses is not constitutionally reuired. VERGARA V. PEOPLE: ?erpetual e!ecuted a promissory note and issued postdated checks corresponding to the amount of the loan for each a#ailment from the continuing credit line granted to it by C%/7'56. /ergara issued one of the checks in her capacity as ?resident and 3M of ?erpetual. "he check was dishonored for insu=ciency of funds. C%/7'56 #erbally informed /ergara of the dishonor of the check. DOCTRINE: ;nder the euipoise rule, where the e#idence on an issue of fact is in euipoise or there is doubt on which side the e#idence preponderates, the party ha#ing the burden of proof loses. %f the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of pro#ing the e#identiary facts that would establish the prima facie presumption of knowledge of the insu=ciency of funds the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts in fa#or of the accused. %n criminal cases, the prosecution+s cases must rise and fall on the strength of its own e#idence, ne#er on the weakness of the defense. PEOPLE V. MADERA: Madera was charged of two counts of rape. Madera did not present other e#idence other than his sole testimony. Madera argued that he could not ha#e raped the #ictim since his wife and her siblings were still awake and they were aware that he called her to massage him. "he #ictim identifed Madera as the accused by pointing to him during which she was crying. DOCTRINE: Dhen the issue in#ol#es the credibility of a witness, the trial court+s assessment is entitled to great weight, e#en fnality, unless it is shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or there was an o#ersight of some fact or circumstance of weight and in>uence. "he trial court has the uniue opportunity to obser#e the witness frsthand and note his or her demeanor and manner of testifying. PEOPLE V. TAMPOS: "he rape #ictim testifed that "ampos+ penis did not penetrate her organ. 5n re4direct, howe#er, she said that there was actual contact of the penis and her #agina. Dhen asked to point to the part of her body that was touched by the penis, complainant pointed to a part a little abo#e : CALIDA, MANIGBAS, QUE, ROQUE, VILLARIN | GROUP 7 JUDGE BONIFACIO | EVIDENCE the #agina. "he #ictim clarifed that "ampos+ organ did not ,pass- her #agina but only its lower portion. $he stated that it was ,not on the middle but on the lower portion- or on the lower tip of the #agina. DOCTRINE: $light penetration of the labia by the male organ still constitutes rape. %t is su=cient that there be entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum. Absence of hymenal laceration does not dispro#e se!ual abuse especially when the #ictim is of tender age. Mere touching, no matter how slight, of the labia or lips of the female organ by the male genital, e#en without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is su=cient to consummate rape. 6upture of the hymen or #aginal lacerations are not necessary for rape to be consummated. An intact hymen does not negate a fnding that the #ictim was raped. "o commit the crime of rape the rupture of the hymen is not indispensable. PEOPLE V. CUADRO: 'omplainant alleged on the witness stand that 'uadro, her step4 father, on f#e occasions, had se!ual intercourse with her by inserting his penis in her #agina. 'uadro denied the rape charges. "he defense insisted that the complainantEs grandmother helped the #ictim fle this rape case in order to force him and his common4 law wife to separate. DOCTRINE: "he #ictimEs actuation+s after the rape and her testimony during trial bear the earmarks of a credible witness. "he conduct of the #ictim immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsify of the charge. %n rape cases, the accused may be con#icted solely on the testimony of the #ictim, pro#ided such testimony is credible, natural, con#incing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Alibi is an inherently weak defense whose #alue loses a lot when time and distance do not make the imputed o&ense impossible of commission. PEOPLE V. ACAAC: Aca4ac was charged of rape. (e contends that the way complainant narrated the details of how she was allegedly raped is not the way an innocent child below 18 years of age testifes, but the way a woman, who is worldly and e!perienced in se!, will testify. DOCTRINE: Dhere an alleged rape #ictim says she was se!ually abused, she says almost all that is necessary to show that rape had been in>icted on her person, pro#ided her testimony meets the test of credibility. Denial cannot pre#ail o#er the positi#e identifcation and categorical testimony of complainant. "he rule is that between the positi#e declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negati#e statements of the accused, the former deser#es more credence. PRESUMPTIONS PASCUAL V. ANGELES: Angeles and Miguel ?ascual, in behalf of his sister 'iriaca ?ascual entered into a lease agreement for a certain parcel of land. After 'iriaca died, Miguel inherited the same from her. Despite demands and e!tensions, Angeles was still unable to comply to pay his rent notwithstanding his continued possession of the land. Angeles denied specifcally under oath the genuineness and due e!ecution of the lease attached to the complaint. DOCTRINE: "he tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Moreo#er, the presumption, therefore, is that the contract was e!ecuted for a good and su=cient consideration. ORMAC!EA V. TRILLAMA: 5rmachea fled a collection claim against "rillana that were engaged in a business together with Cawa as their managing agents. "rillana e!ecuted #ales which stated that he owed the business. "he business was dissol#ed. "rillana claimed that he had already paid the debt after deli#ering tuba to Cawa. (e presented a document signed by Cawa stating that he had no more debt to the partnership. "he document was dated after the dissolution of the partnership. DOCTRINE: Dhere the e#idence of indebtedness is in the possession of the creditor, it is presumed that the debt has not been paid yet. PEOPLE V. PADIERNOS: ?adiernos was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of her husband. $he claimed that he pushed her against the wall and he reached under the bed for his gun. $eeing this, she pulled a knife from under the bed, closed her eyes, and started slashing from side to side. )on4 presentation of the written statement of a witness to the police ga#e rise to the presumption that it ,contained declarations disastrous to the prosecution case.- DOCTRINE: "he presumption that suppressed e#idence is unfa#orable does not apply where the e#idence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution. Dhere the defense fails to show their inability to acuire and use for themsel#es e#idence allegedly suppressed by the prosecution, the presumption that the allegedly suppressed e#idence is unfa#orable will not apply. YEE !EM V. UNITED STATES: Bee (em was arrested for possessing opium, in #iolation of the Act of .ebruary F, 1FGF, which prohibits importation and possession of opium, and which pro#ides a presumption of guilt for mere possession of said opium. H CALIDA, MANIGBAS, QUE, ROQUE, VILLARIN | GROUP 7 JUDGE BONIFACIO | EVIDENCE DOCTRINE: "he presumption of guilt for mere possession of opium is constitutional. %n order that legislation presumption of one fact from e#idence of another may not constitute a denial of due process, it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact pro#ided and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate. COUNTY COURT V. ALLEN "hree adult males and a si!teen year old female were 0ointly tried for possession of two loaded handguns, a loaded machine gun, and o#er a pound of heroin, all disco#ered by the police after being stopped for speeding. A )ew Bork statute pro#ides that, with certain e!ceptions, the presence of a frearm in an automobile is presumpti#e e#idence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the #ehicle. DOCTRINE: "he presumption of possession is rational because of the e!istence of a ,rational connection- between the basic facts that the prosecution pro#ed and the ultimate fact presumed. SANDSTROM V. MONTANA: $andstrom, a schi2ophrenic, was charged with ,deliberate homicide- for purposely or knowingly causing <essen+s death. "he defense howe#er held that he was entitled to a lesser sentence since, although he confessed to the crime, he did not commit the act knowingly or purposely, as pro#en by the testimonies of two mental health e!perts. "he 0udge instructed the 0ury that ,the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary conseuences of his #oluntary acts.- DOCTRINE: %n a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged, a 0ury instruction to the e&ect that the ,law presumes that a person intends the ordinary conseuences of his #oluntary acts- #iolates the due process reuirement that the state pro#e e#ery element of a criminal o&ense beyond a reasonable doubt, since the 0ury might interpret the presumption as a conclusi#e presumption. PEOPLE V. CARINO: A bodyguard of Mayor $anche2 was killed by an unknown assailant. 'ariIo et al. were men of Mayor $anche2. "hey alighted from a 0eep and entered the alley leading to the house. 'ariIo et al. shot /alentin+s brother. DOCTRINE: 6elationship, by itself, does not gi#e rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior moti#e, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. "he relationship of a witness to the #ictim would e#en make his testimony more credible, it being unnatural for a relati#e who is interested in #indicating the crime charged and prosecute another person other than the real cuplrit. 6elati#es of #ictims of crimes ha#e a natural knack for remembering the faces of the assailants more than anybody else, and would be concerned with obtaining 0ustice for the #ictim by ha#ing the felon brought to 0ustice and meted the proper penalty. %n the absence of any improper moti#e on the part of the witness, his relationship to the #ictim cannot impair the weight of his testimony.