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Nigeria's security services face daunting challenges

Friday, February 10 2012
Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for a February 7 suicide car bomb attack on the
army's base in Kaduna. The Boko Haram insurgency and unrest related to fuel-price
rises have refocused attention on Nigeria's security forces, their capacity to cope, and
their political impact. The country's law-enforcement and defence institutions face two
demands: they must ensure public safety and national security in the broadest sense;
and underpin the security of an increasingly unpopular government.
What next
In the long term, Nigeria's security issues can only be brought under control through
major political reforms, broad-based growth and meaningful social development policies.
In the near term, current arrangements will struggle even to ensure containment.
Analysis
Nigeria's security forces -- with their long history of overseas peace-keeping (see
NIGERIA: Domestic challenges restrain foreign policy - January 6, 2012) -- are at full
stretch dealing with domestic challenges to peace and security:
G Following a coordinated spate of bomb attacks on police and security installations
in Kano on January 20, which have yet to cease completely, many police stations in
nearby regions have come to resemble fortresses.
G Military units were also called upon to quell protests after President Goodluck
Jonathan's decision in January to cut fuel subsidies caused a two-week national
strike (see NIGERIA: Storm over subsidies brings tipping point - January 10, 2012).
G Moreover, constantly-changing trends in civil crime -- eg, dynamite-aided bank
robberies or a spreading wave of kidnaps -- require continued and pro-active
interventions.
Security service impact
Nigeria has more than a dozen nationally-mandated, law-enforcement or paramilitary
bodies. Three will be of particular relevance in shaping events in future.
The military
The military has been increasingly involved in internal security in recent years, including
large Joint Task Force deployments in the Niger Delta and Maiduguri; deployments in
emergency-ruled jurisdictions such as metropolitan Jos; and soldiers aiding police in
preventive, anti-terror and anti-crime security in Abuja and other cities. Usually popular
with the country's citizens, the army was sharply criticised when Jonathan ordered it
onto the streets on January 17 to prevent a legal demonstration in Lagos.
Nigeria's army has a long history of political involvement. Recent political ructions have
fed speculation about a return to coups. That risk seems overstated:
Bystanders look at damage from an
improvised explosive device in
Kaduna. (REUTERS/Stringer)
Impact
G Boko Haram's growing
insurgency targets the
security services directly,
dividing state resources
between self-defence and
situation-control.
G A weak and constrained
federal government response
is encouraging challengers;
not only emergent
democrats, but also more
militant groups.
G Security self-provision,
ranging from community
militias to private security
firms, will continue in a self-
reinforcing cycle.
Risk of a military coup
remains minimal
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Nigeria's security services face daunting challenges
G The officer corps was thoroughly de-politicised in post-1999 reforms, and the crucial
positions of national security advisor and chief of army staff are occupied by figures
close to the presidency.
G Discontent lower-down seems to have been forestalled by a rumoured pay-rise for
the ranks during the fuel strikes, and by the lucrative danger money (and other
opportunities) which compensate front-line soldiers for being deployed against
militants or terrorists.
G The temptation to take over was thoroughly stress-tested during the last days of late
President Umaru Yar'Adua (see NIGERIA: Northern elite prepares challenge to
Jonathan - November 22, 2010).
Nigerian Police Force (NPF)
The police have become highly unpopular. Inspector-General Hafiz Ringim, previously a
state police chief under Jonathan in Bayelsa State, lost his job on January 25, after a
high-profile Boko Haram suspect escaped police custody. His predecessor Ogbonna
Onovo lost his job when he failed to get on top of kidnapping. New Inspector-General
Mohammed Dikko Abubakar may not be able to handle the job any better.
Meanwhile opposition parties, most vocally the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) ruling
the states of the South-West, are calling for state police to replace the current centrally-
run unitary force. Since this would place law-backed armed forces under the de facto
control of the 36 state governors, the federal government continues to refuse the
demand, arguing -- probably correctly -- that it would hasten national disintegration.
This leaves state governors with legal recourse to funding hybrid bodies, which use
police, army and other personnel in state-directed ways, such as Kaduna's Operation
Yaki or Lagos' Rapid Response Squad. Some state governments also quietly foster
informal-sector vigilantism which combines crime-fighting with political foot-soldiery -- an
increasing trend over the last decade.
The police themselves, aware of this trend, have continuously attempted to reposition:
G Reform limits. Reform attempts have in past tended to prioritise lucrative
procurement programmes. Abubakar is to implement a new review process. The
chair of the Police Service Commission (PSC), former veteran detective Parry
Osayande, will reviewing staff adequacy on the 370,000-officer force.
G Quiet successes. Donors have been enthusiastic in supporting the NPF's own
internal quiet reforms, such as its growing interest in community policing. The
better-trained and expanded police Anti-Bomb squad has been detecting and
defusing a large number of explosive devices before they cause damage. A recent
recruitment of senior police cadets under the PSC was hailed as a model exercise
for its avoidance of the usual corruption pitfalls.
However, the politicisation of police leadership via the revolving door of the top job, and
the practice of side-lining seniority in making the appointment, has a deleterious effect
on morale, professionalism and capacity -- promoting lobbying over performance.
The State Security Service (SSS)
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Nigeria's security services face daunting challenges
The SSS, the internal intelligence service, has been taking on an extensive 'FBI-style'
role in addressing civil and organised crime matters which call for in-depth intelligence-
gathering. This includes aiding (and at times competing with) the police in investigating
kidnapping, as well as terrorism.
The SSS has drawn criticism for its surveillance and occasional detention of opposition
politicians, activists and domestic and foreign journalists. However, this is balanced by
its undoubted professionalism: though it does not seem immune from the factors which
inhibit the operations of most Nigerian state institutions (see NIGERIA: Law signals
slowly improving transparency - June 16, 2011), its operatives are well-trained, on top of
their briefs and have gained a good name with the public in quickly and competently
intervening in crime and terrorism situations.
Insecurity trends
The security services must get to grips with other trends:
Kidnapping
There is likely to be no abatement in kidnapping in the South-East and Niger Delta
(which has reduced somewhat with the militant amnesty programme). There is a small,
but emergent, trend of expatriate kidnappings in the north -- not just Kano, where a
German national was kidnapped on January 26, but also quieter states such as Kebbi.
Speculation on linkages with kidnapping in the Sahara is intensifying (see AFRICA:
Post-Libya fall-out feeds Saharan insecurity - January 25, 2012).
Violence
Boko Haram activity will likely spread west and south into areas of northern Nigeria
where it has not yet made an impact: quieter states such as Adamawa, Zamfara,
Taraba, and possibly further afield. Meanwhile, areas of mixed, ethnic-religious make-up
prone to conflict -- such as Kaduna, Plateau and Bauchi -- face at best only uneasy
calm for the foreseeable future.
Terrorism
Lagos is still relatively detached from these trends. However, efforts to reinforce Abuja
will not remove the threat of terrorism from the capital.
The security services will
struggle to contain spreading
insecurity
Word Count (approx): 1188
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Oxford Analytica 2012. All rights reserved
No duplication or transmission of this document is permitted without the written consent of Oxford Analytica.
Contact us: www.oxan.com/about/contacts or call +44 1865 261 600 or in North America 1 800 965 766
Nigeria's security services face daunting challenges