PRIVILEGE FROM ARREST

PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS G.R #. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the
need for his constituents to be represented.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives

HELD:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity
from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-
appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec.11, Art. VI of
the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional
foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class,
it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

PARLIAMENTARY FREEDOM OF SPEECH
OSMENA JR. VS. PENDATUM 109 PHIL. 863

FACTS:
Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their capacity as members of the
Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked for the annulment of the resolution on the
ground of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity. He further asked that the respondents should
not require him to substantiate his charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do
so he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour
privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon the dignity of
Garcia as the then President.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?

HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon member s of
the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it
does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are
considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.


TERMS OF OFFICE

SOCRATES VS. COMELEC et al., 12 November 2002

FACTS:
Incumbent Barangay official convened them-selves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate
the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed the office as Mayor of Puerto Prinsesa City;

PRA Passed a resolution No. 01-02 RECALL RESOLUTION which declared its loss of confidence in
Socrates, called for his recall, and it requested to the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for Mayor
within 30 days from the receipt of the resolution;

Socrates filed a petition to COMELEC praying ti nullify and deny due course to the recall resolution, but
COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition for lack of merit, and declared Hagedorn is Qualified to run in
the recall election;

Resolution No. 5673 was promulgated by the COMELEC en banc prescribing the calendar of activities
and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election, and it fixed the campaign
period of 10 days, which from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002;
.
Petitioner Socrates seeks to Nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which
gave due course to the recall resolution and scheduled recall election. He alleged that COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution;

Hagedorn Filed his certificate of Candidacy for Mayor for the said recall election;

A consolidated petition (SPA No. 02-492 and 02-539) filed by the petitioners before the COMELEC to
disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and prayed to cancel the his certificate of
candidacy, all this petition anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running a fourth
consecutive term, having been elected and served as mayor of the city of three consecutive term
immediately prior to instant recall election for the same post.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the recall
resolution and scheduling the recall election;

Whether or not, Hagedorn, who has been elected and served in three consecutive terms in office, is
qualified to run for Mayor in the said recall election.

HELD:
No, SC ruled that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of
the recall resolution and in scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.
Yes, the three term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, ART. 10 OF THE
Constitution, which states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This three term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, which provides:

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

These constitutional and statutory provisions have 2 parts: First, provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms
count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.

The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a
continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election of the same office following the end of the of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after
the three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the
continuity of service.

MENDOZA et al. VS. COMELEC AND ROMAN, December 17, 2002

FACTS:
Leonardo B. Roman, respondent here in , served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election (a
process of removing a local government official) held in 1993, he served as a governor from the period of
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995;

Since on May 14, 2001, respondent has previously as a governor of Bataan for two consecutive terms
(1995-1998 and 1998-2001)excluding the term wherein he succeeded the recalled/ removed governor.

On May 14, 2001. He was declared by the COMELEC as the winner for the Governor position. This, the
petitioner herein, Mendoza & Ibarra, filed for the petition of certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution of
COMELEC and declare the respondents election as Governor of Bataan on 14 May 2002 and void.

The petitioners alleged that the election of Roman Violates the Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution which
provides that: the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the contiuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the election of Roman as Governor exceed the limitation of terms as stated in the
constitution.

HELD:
No, the court en banc ruled that the election of Roman as Governor did not exceed the term limit of a
local elective official. A term during which succession to a local elective office takes place or a recall
election is held should not be counted in determining whether an elective local official has served more
than three consecutive terms.

The disqualification applies only if the terms are consecutive and the service is full and continuous.
Hence, service for less than a term, except only in case of voluntary renunciation, should not count to
disqualify an elective local official from running for the same position.