VITUG v CA

F: This case involves the wills of the late Dolores Vitug. She was survived by h
er husband, Romarico, but different people were named as administrators-- Rowena
Faustina-Corona and Nenita Alonte.
On Jan 13, 1985, Romarico filed a motion asking for authority from the probate c
ourt to sell certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate
to cover his advances to the estate-- he claimed the advances were his personal
funds. The advances consisted of payments for estate tax, deficiency estate tax
, and increments to estate tax. He withdrew these from a savings account at the
Bank of America in Makati.
Rowena opposed the motion. Arg: The funds withdrawn from the savings account wer
e CPG properties and part of the estate. They cannot merely be disposed of-- the
re was no ground for reimbursement. [also sought Romarico's ouster as administra
tor for failure to include those sums in the inventory].
Rep Arg: The funds were his exclusive property having acquired them through a su
rvivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank WHEN THE WIFE WAS
STILL ALIVE. The survivorship agreement said that the property was originally sh
ared, but after the death of either person, the funds would be sole property of
the survivor.
TC: Agreement held valid. The motion was granted.
CA: Reversed. Treated the agreement as a conveyance mortis cause which did not c
omply with the formalities of a valid will under Art. 805 NCC; secondly, if it w
as a donation inter vivos, it was a prohibited donation under Art. 133 NCC/FC.
I: Whether or not the survivorship agreement should be treated as a will that wo
uld require the formalities under Art. 805 NCC. If it is not, whether or not it
is a valid donation inter vivos.
H/R: NO, it is neither.
Arg: The court, in Rivera v People's Bank and Macam v Gatmaitan sustained the va
lidity of survivorship agreements and treated them as aleatory contracts, and no
t wills or donations.
Court: First of all, the character of the agreement is completely outside of a w
ill-- among the characteristics of a will is that is done in mortis causa, and i
s purely personal to the testator [as to determination]. The bequest or device m
ust pertain to the testator.
Here: the monies were in the nature of conjugal funds/joint holdings, as in Rive
ra and Macam. There was no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one pa
rty-- effect: they are presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired while they
were married. When one of them died, the agreements being valid, they did become
the sole property of the surviving spouse, and not part of the estate.
Court: As for the donation angle, it cannot be a donation inter vivos because (1
) it was to take effect after the death of a party, and (2) it involved no conve
yance of properties to the other.
Here: It was not meant to circumvent CPG. It was effectively an investment, wher
e funds were to be used by the spouses as spouses, not in favor of the other as
an invididual [which would be a prohibited donation]. Since the funds were noted
conjugal, it cannot be said that one spouse pressured the other to place deposi
ts in the money pool.
The contract is an obligation with a term (death). It is allowed in spite of it
favoring a certain party, as per aleatory contracts under Art. 2010. It is akin
to a sweepstakes ticket or life insurance. It is a risky venture.
However, while an aleatory contract is not per se contrary to law, its operation
may be contrary to law. If it is used to circumvent the laws, it will be held v
oid (violative of public policy, morals, etc.).
Here: There is no evidence that it was used for unlawful pruposes.
Effect: It was separate property, and not part of probate proceedings.
--
DE LA CERNA v POTOT
F: On May 9, 1939, the spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca executed
a JOINT LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT where two parcels of land would be given to Manu
ela Rebaca, their niece, subject to their having an usufruct over the fruits of
the land while at least one of the testators is still alive.
Bernabe died, and the will was submitted to probate in the CFI Cebu-- it went th
rough unopposed. The probate court declared the will valid.
When Gervasia died in 1952, another petition for probate was heard wrt Gervasia-
- when Manuela Potot y Rebaca and her attorney failed to appear, the case was di
smissed, and the CFI eventually declared the testament null and void for violati
ng the prohibition of joint wills.
However, the CA reversed as the decree of probate in 1939 [the first death] was
issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and is conclusive on the due execution
of the testament as to Gervasa's will. It also noted that while the law prohibi
ts joint wills, the form has long been used. Further, there was indeed the fact
that the will was allowed in a previous probate court-- now, there is no alterna
tive except to give effect of even the prohibited provisions, as per Macrohon v
Saavedra [assumes that the joint will was valid except for the fact it was a joi
nt will.]
I: Whether or not the joint will should be declared invalid in spite of the fact
that it was previously declared as valid by a probate court.
- The probate court's judgment, although erroneous in terms of law, has long bee
n final and executory. The final judgment of the probate court had become bindin
g upon the whole word, and public policy and sound practice demand that at the r
isk of occassional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definit
e date fixed by law. (Manalo v Paredes, In re Estates of Johnson, Dy Cay v Cross
field)
- Although the will is technically void, the court is the one that makes the dec
ision as to the validity of the will and executes that decision. They had alread
y spoken with finality, hence the will should be given affect.
- The CA should have taken into account that the probate decree in 1939 could ha
ve only affected Bernabe's share as Gervasia was still alive. The properties wer
e conjugal, and given that the other spouse was alive, the probate court only ac
quired jurisdiction over the share of the deceased spouse. A will CANNOT be prob
ated during the lifetime of the testator.
- The joint will should have been reexamined and readjudicated as the joint will
was to be considered a separate will of each testator. The CFI was correct as t
o the participation of Gervasia in the properties in question-- the first 'will'
was valid because of the Court's final judgment, but the second had to be repro
bated, and this time, the will is invalid.
- Effect: Gervasia's interest should pass upon to the intestate heirs, unless th
ere is another valid will or unless Potot was the only intestate heir.
- Arg on common usage: Common usage does not make a will valid. Only repeal/amen
dment can change the law. [Art. 5 OCC, Art. 7 NCC]
--
DACANAY v FLORENDO
F: On October 20, 1940, Isabel Florendo died. Tirso Dacanay, her spouse, is seek
ing to probate a joint and reciprocal will executed by the two spouses-- it prov
ides that the surviving spouse would inherit all the properties of the deceased
spouse, though it also provided an agreement as to how the properties would be d
isposed of at the death of the surviving spouse.
The relatives of Isabel opposed the probate of the will on several grounds, incl
uding the prohibition on joint wills.
TC: Probate not allowed. Will N&V for violation of Art. 669 OCC [prohibition on
joint wills].
Appeal Arg: Art. 669 OCC was repealed by Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure), whic
h allegedly allowed joint wills instead of separate wills [prohibition merely ma
tter of extrinsic formality].
I: Whether or not the joint will may be probated given the supposed repeal of Ar
t. 669 OCC by Act 190.
H/R: NO!
- The issue was previously decided by the Court in In Re: Will of Bilbao. The wi
ll was substantially similar to the one in this case. The Court held that the Co
de of Civil Procedure did not supersede the Civil Code [it was a procedural law
that considers the substantive law]. At any rate, the prohibition is not violati
ve of law and public policy. It was meant to prevent certain tragedies that may
arise out of certain cases of joint wills. Art. 669 is still in force.
- Also, Art. 669 was reproduced ad verbatim in the NCC- impl. when the NCC was p
assed, Art. 669 was not incompatible with the CCP.