Propositional Attitudes and the De Re / De Dicto Distinction

PY4617 The Philosophy of Saul Kripke Week Two

Background: Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are mental states such as belief hope !oubt etc" that #at least on
stan!ar! $iews% relate in!i$i!uals to propositions"
Attitude reports are sentences that attribute propositional attitu!es" &"'" ()ohn belie$es that
'rena!es e*plo!e( (+lice !oubts that )ustin ,ieber is human("
-ne of the interestin' properties of attitu!e reports is that they seem to create referentially
opaque conte*ts #substitutin' co.referrin' terms within their scope may chan'e the
sentence(s truth.$alue%"
&"'"/ ()ane belie$es that 0eor'e &liot is male( may be true while ()ane belie$es that
1ary +nn &$ans is male( is false" ,ut (0eor'e &liot( an! (1ary +nn &$ans( co.refer"
These contrast with transparent conte*ts e"'" the position of ()ane( in the abo$e sentence
or positions within simple sentences with no operators"
Intensional transitive verbs #2T3s% are $erbs such as (worships( an! (seeks( that take an 4P !irect
ob5ect as in (&n'elbert worships 6eus(" They are use! to attribute intentional states that !o not
appear to be propositional attitu!es"
7or !etails see/ http/88plato"stanfor!"e!u8entries8intensional.trans.$erbs8
De Re vs. De Dicto Modal Claims
+ de dicto mo!al claim is one in which a whole proposition is attribute! a mo!al property #e"'
(2t is contin'ent that some platypo!es swim( or (4ecessarily e$ery husban! is marrie!(%"
+ de re mo!al claim is one in which an ob5ect is attribute! a mo!al property #e"'" (The Prime
1inister mi'ht ha$e ne$er been born( or (&$ery husban! is necessarily marrie!(%"
2f some de re mo!al claims are true essentialism follows/ ob5ects ha$e essences at least
insofar as they ha$e some properties necessarily #an! other properties only contin'ently%"
2n a de re mo!al sentence we ha$e a $ariable insi!e the operator(s scope that(s boun! by a
9uantifier or other term outsi!e that scope" We(re quantifying in" &"'"/ * #P* :;,*%
W"3" <uine famously re5ecte! essentialism an! ar'ue! that de re mo!ality was nonsense" =e
ima'ines a bicyclin' mathematician an! asks/ 2f there(s a fact of the matter about whether he is
necessarily two.le''e! or necessarily rational why !oes the answer seem to !epen! on how we
!escribe him>
Kripke(s reply/ 2t !oesn(t" That 'uy himself is ob$iously contin'ently two.le''e!"
<uine also ha! more principle! reasons for re5ectin' !e re mo!ality" =e purporte! to pro$e
that it is incoherent to 9uantify into an opa9ue conte*t" See his ?4otes on &*istence an!
4ecessity@ #http/88www"5stor"or'8stable8AB174CD%" The basic #$ery rou'hE% i!ea/
Fet S#t% be a true sentence containin' a term t" 2f t occurs in an opa9ue conte*t that
means that for some term t( such that t an! t( co.refer S#t(% is false" ,ut then in helpin'
!etermine the truth.$alues of S#t% an! S#t(% terms t an! t( !on(t simply contribute the
ob5ect they refer to" 2f they !i! the truth.$alue woul!n(t !ifferE
To un!erstan! this it mi'ht help to ima'ine S# % bein' a function to truth.$alues"
What are the ar'uments> 4ot simply ob5ects since t an! t( woul! pro$i!e the same
ar'ument an! thus the same $alue of the function" ,ut the $alues of the function are
!ifferent for t an! t(" So those terms pro$i!e !ifferent ar'uments"
So what !o t an! t( contribute> Perhaps mo!es of presentation of ob5ects or perhaps their
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own lin'uistic properties as in 9uotation #the insi!e of which is an opa9ue conte*t%"
The sole semantic function of a $ariable is to stan! for the ob5ects in the !omain of
9uantification" So they can(t contribute mo!es of presentation or anythin' else" )ust
ob5ects" So they can(t contribute what(s nee!e! to !etermine the truth.$alue of S"
7or a careful e*planation an! refutation of this ar'ument see Kaplan(s ?-pacity@"
From Modal Claims to Propositional Attitudes Reports
2n <:P+ <uine starts with e*amples that su''est that we nee! a !e re 8 !e !icto !istinction
for propositional attitu!e reports"
(Halph thinks someone is a spy( is 'enuinely ambi'uous" Ioes Halph 5ust think that there
are spies or !oes he ha$e information that mi'ht interest the J2+>
Similarly (Willar! hopes that a nei'hbour of his will !ie soon( (Halph !oubts the Prime
1inister will resi'n( (4e! assumes e$eryone is an i!iot("
The two rea!in's of these reports can be hi'hli'hte! by paraphrasin' sli'htly" 7or !e re we in
effect mo$e the !esi'nator or 9uantifier outsi!e the !escription of the attitu!e(s content" &"'"/
#1% There is someone Halph belie$es to be a spy" 8 Halph belie$es of someone that they are
a spy" 8 Someone is such that Halph belie$es that they are a spy"
These !e re reports look like they in$ol$e 9uantifyin' in/ * #Halph thinks * is a spy%"
7or !e !icto we lea$e all the material insi!e the !escription of the attitu!e(s content" &"'"/
#A% Halph belie$es that there are spies" 8 Halph belie$es that there is someone who is a spy"
+ similar ambi'uity arises with 2T3s"
&"'"/ (<uine is lookin' for a book( (+lice wants a new +pple pro!uct("
4ote/ =ere it(s har! to represent the ambi'uity lo'ically" <uine transforms the 2T3s into
propositional attitu!es e"'" takin' (* wants( to mean (* wants it to be the case that * has("
<uestion/ Ioes the !e re 8 !e !icto !istinction between reports line up with two kin!s of
attitudes> Watch out for sloppy talk here #e"'" (!e re belief( $s" (!e re belief report(%"
=ow mi'ht we un!erstan! the !istinction between attitu!es> 2s the !istinction
e*clusi$e or are !e re attitu!es a sub.cate'ory of !e !icto attitu!es>
&$en if you think !e re attitu!es aren(t re!ucible you still mi'ht think that not all !e
re reports report !e re attitu!es"""
2rre!ucibly !e re attitu!es are sometimes calle! (sin'ular thou'hts(" Their contents are
calle! (sin'ular propositions("
While <uine re5ects !e re mo!al claims in <:P+ he can(t brin' himself to re5ect !e re
attitu!e reports" ?We are scarcely prepare! to sacrifice the relational construction (There is
someone whom Halph belie$es to be a spy("@ #17K% ,ut <uine has worries"""
Is there a prolem !ith de re elie" reports#
2f the alle'e! theorem that it(s incoherent to 9uantify into an opa9ue conte*t were ri'ht we(!
nee! to fi'ure out how to analyLe !e re belief without 9uantifyin' in"
This !ri$es the rest of the paper <uine attempts to analyLe !e re attitu!e reports without
treatin' them as 9uantifyin' in thus respectin' his alle'e! theorem"
,ut a'ain Kaplan shows that the ?theorem@ is wron'"
<uine also thinks a problem can be seen more intuiti$ely/
Since belief reports are opa9ue terms in them must specify not simply what ob5ect
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someone(s belief is about but somethin' else e"'" a mo!e of presentation of the ob5ect
the way the belie$er thinks of the ob5ect" ,ut a $ariable can(t !o that" So it !oesn(t make
sense to 9uantify into a belief report"
The case of ,ernar! )" -rtcutt is meant to illustrate the problem"
The man at the beach M the man in a brown hat M -rtcutt"
Halph belie$es that the man in a brown hat is a spy"
Halph !oes not belie$e that the man at the beach is a spy but rather belie$es that the man
at the beach is not a spy"
So is -rtcutt such that Halph belie$es him to be a spy or not>
There shoul! be an answer to this 9uestion if 9uantifyin' in makes sense/
* #*M-rtcutt : Halph belie$es * is a spy%"
2f we say ?yes@ for a parallel reason !on(t we ha$e to say that -rtcutt is such that Halph
!oes not belie$e that he is a not a spy> ,ut then we(! contra!ict oursel$es/
* #*M-rtcutt : Halph belie$es that * is a spy : ; Halph belie$es that * is a spy%
Perhaps we !on(t ha$e to make the ?parallel@ 5u!'ement in the wi!e.scope ne'ation
case but we at least en! up attributin' a puLLlin' pair of beliefs to Halph/
* #*M-rtcutt : Halph belie$es that * is a spy : Halph belie$es that ; * is a spy%
$orries aout %&portation
Where (t( is a name or !efinite !escription an! (t e*ists( is true exportation is the mo$ement
from #C% to #6%/
(5) S belie$es that t is 7"
(6) S belie$es of t that it is F" 8 S belie$es t to be F" 8 t is belie$e! by S to be F"
The thesis of unrestricted exportation (UE) is that #C% entails #6%" 2"e" e*portation is always $ali!"
4ote N& !oes not commit you to the inference from (Halph !oes not belie$e that the man
at the beach is a spy( to (The man at the beach is not belie$e! by Halph to be a spy(" We(re
!ealin' only with positi$e belief reports" #Thou'h 7 coul! be ne'ati$e e"'" (not a spy("%
The 9uestion of whether N& is correct is an sub.9uestion of the more 'eneral 9uestion/
What(s the relationship between !e !icto an! !e re attitu!e reports>
<uine(s worry abo$e can be seen as a worry for N&" We mi'ht want to a$oi! ha$in' to say that
* #*M-rtcutt : Halph belie$es that * is a spy : Halph belie$es that ; * is a spy%"
Kripke has another worry/ N& woul! pre$ent us from capturin' the !e re 8 !e !icto
!istinction because it will result in #A% yiel!in' #1% when it shoul!n(t"
Suppose S correctly belie$es that there are spies #!e !icto%" 4ow S can conclu!e from the
armchair that the tallest spy is a spy #!e !icto%" ,y N& S belie$es the tallest spy to be a spy
#!e re%" 2t follows that there is someone S belie$es to be a spy" ,a! resultE
+ number of philosophers ha$e trie! to !efen! this conse9uence e"'" Iennett Sosa" They say
the !e re reports really !o follow from the !e !icto reports #to'ether with minimal
assumptions about the belie$er%"
They try to e*plain away the !ata as merely pra'matic" 1ore on this below"
Kripke(s more ?sweepin'@ worry/
Suppose Halph falsely belie$es that p"
4ow let 0 be the comple* property of bein' either Oi!entical with the tallest spy an! such
that pP or Oi!entical with the &iffel Tower an! such that not.pP"
2f Halph belie$es that the tallest spy is a spy then he can infer #falsely% that the 0 is a spy"
#=e(ll think that the 0 is whate$er is i!entical with the tallest spy an! is such that p an!
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that(s 5ust the tallest spyE%
4ow by N& it follows that the 0 is belie$e! by Halph to be a spy"
,ut the 0 is the &iffel Tower #since it(s not true that p nothin' satisfies the first !is5unct
of 0 so whate$er is 0 is whate$er satisfies the secon! !is5unct%"
4ow Kripke assumes that since (the 0( is outsi!e the !escription of the attitu!e(s
content in the !e re report it occurs in a transparent conte*t" So we can substitute any
co.referrin' term for (the 0( e"'" (the &iffel Tower("
So the &iffel Tower is belie$e! by Halph to be a spy" ,a! resultE
'he pragmatic !asteasket
Proponents of N&/ 2f )ane merely belie$es that there are spies an! then infers that the shortest
spy is a spy it(s true to say (There(s someone )ane belie$es to be a spy(" 2t only soun!s ba! for
pra'matic reasons"
Kripke/ You can(t 5ust consi'n phenomena to the pra'matic wastebasket without 'oo! reason"
So what are the pra'matic principles that are meant to !o the e*planatory work here>
&*ample of a pra'matic principle/ 1akin' an utterance that is weaker than what woul! be
con$ersationally appropriate will su''est that the stron'er statement isn(t true"
,ut this principle can(t be the one at work in the )ane case" The !e re report !oesn(t
seem inappropriately weak an! there isn(t any su''este! falsity of a stron'er statement"
Kripke ar'ues that the inappropriateness in the )ane case isn(t simply pra'matic because it(s
correct to e*plicitly deny that there(s someone )ane belie$es to be a spy"
Someone coul! propose that the !enial is pra'matically -K but false but that proposal
woul! re9uire yet more support" The appropriateness of the !enial isn(t pre!icte! by the
inappropriateness of ori'inal assertion"
That p is con$ersationally inappropriate !oesn(t imply that not.p will be appropriate"
&*ample from 0rice/ 2n normal li'htin' an! circumstances it(s inappropriate to say of
a re! thin' (That looks re!(" ,ut it(s not appropriate to say that (That !oesn(t look re!(E
Iennett proposes #rou'hly% that the !enial is appropriate because the ori'inal report is
true only for somewhat tri$ial reasons"
Kripke(s reply/ This isn(t a real principle" 2f it(s for tri$ial reasons that )ane belie$es that
fish swim it(s not thereby appropriate to say that )ane !oesn(t belie$e fish swim"
+nother of Kripke(s points a'ainst the proponent of N& is that there(s a connection between
the truth.$alues of !e re reports an! the e*tensions of pre!icates like (suspect(" &"'" suppose
the police are in$esti'atin' only three people #a b an! c% for Smith(s mur!er but they(re
completely on the wron' track" Smith(s mur!erer is actually !" 2ntuiti$ely (The police ha$e
three suspects( is true" ,ut if N& is ri'ht Smith(s mur!erer is belie$e! by the police to be the
perpetrator" So on that $iew won(t it wron'ly come out that the police ha$e four suspects>
2(m not sure 2($e spelle! out this ob5ection precisely as Kripke inten!e! it" Think about
whether you can impro$e on the abo$e"
2f Kripke(s ri'ht there are some restrictions on e*portation" What mi'ht they be> =e says
?when a speakerQs use of a term makes him sufficiently en rapport with its ob5ect it is
e*portableR this howe$er !oes not say all that much@"
Jompare Kaplan(s $iew in ?<uantifyin' 2n@"
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(ome )uestions to think aout as *ou read +and i" *ou,d like- to log aout.
Ioes the paraphrase strate'y work in e$ery case where there(s a !e re 8 !e !icto !istinction
in$ol$in' an 2T3> &*plain"
Why isn(t there a !e re 8 !e !icto !istinction for some 2T3s e"'" (worships(> 2s it !ue to
somethin' about the nature of worshippin' or somethin' more lin'uistic>
+re there any interestin' points of !isanalo'y between the ways we !raw the !e re 8 !e !icto
!istinction for mo!als an! attitu!es>
What !o you think about <uine(s e*planation of !e re attitu!e reports> Ioes his strate'y
succee!> +re you sympathetic to his postulation of le*ical ambi'uities in attitu!e $erbs>
Since <uine 'i$es an analysis of !e re belief that(s meant to a$oi! the problem his ?theorem@
poses coul! he ha$e use! the same strate'y to come up with an analysis of !e re mo!ality>
Kripke writes that ?the assumption of unrestricte! e*portation !oes not ob$iously collapse
<uineQs !istinction between the two rea!in's of (2 want a sloop(@" Why not> What(s the
!ifference between this an! the belief case>
&$aluate the su''estion from Kripke(s opponent in fn AC an! Kripke(s reply"
2n your $iew which !e re attitu!e reports about Halph(s beliefs are true> Which are false>
Jan you come up with a pra'matic principle that can !efen! N& from Kripke(s worry abo$e
#where 2($e written (Kripke has another worry(%> What about the ?more sweepin' worry@>
2s (t( really in a transparent conte*t as it occurs in a !e re report of the form (t is belie$e! by *
to be 7(> What are the reasons for your answer> 0i$e e*amples of your own to support your
$iew"
2n your $iew what #if any% are the restrictions on e*portation>
&*plain what the toy !uck fallacy is as precisely as you can" Jan you 'i$e some e*amples of
your own>
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