1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

Kyle Lawson, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 4:14-cv-00622-ODS
)
Robert Kelly, )
Defendant. )
___________________________________ )
)
State of Missouri, )
)
Intervenor. )

Suggestions in Support of Motion for Remand
I. Introduction.
This case was not properly removed from the state court. Only an originally named
defendant may remove a case from state court to federal court. State of Missouri is an intervenor,
not a defendant, and, therefore, is not entitled to flee the jurisdiction of the state court by filing a
notice of removal and take with it a case it voluntarily joined. For this reason, this case should be
remanded to the Circuit Court of Jackson County. Moreover, even if intervenors were permitted
to remove cases, removal has not been effectuated here.
II. Background.
This case is brought by Missouri citizens who were denied marriage licenses by Jackson
County officials because the citizens seek to marry someone of the same sex. (Doc. # 1-1). The
only defendant is Robert Kelly, who is named solely in his official capacity as Director of the
Jackson County Department of the Recorder of Deeds. Id., at 18. Plaintiffs alleged, and both
Defendant and Intervenor admit, that, as Director, Kelly is responsible for issuing marriage
licenses in Jackson County, Missouri. (Doc. # 2, at 3; Doc. # 5, at 8).
Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 1 of 12
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This action was commenced in state court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983.
1
The State
of Missouri was not named as a defendant, nor could it be. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that a State is not a person under section 1983).
2

On July 10, 2014, the State of Missouri moved to appear as an intervenor in this case.
(Doc. # 1-2). Missouris motion cited Missouri Revised Statutes section 527.110 and Missouri
Supreme Court Rule 87.04, both of which entitle Missouri to be heard when a statute is alleged
to be unconstitutional, as well as Rules 52.12, which governs intervention. Id. The request to
intervene was unopposed and, on July 11, 2014, the state court granted the motion to intervene.
(Doc. # 1-3). Missouri neither sought nor secured an order to become a defendant in this case.
3

On July 15, 2014, the State of Missouri filed a notice of removal in this Court. (Doc. # 1).

1
State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over section 1983 claims. See, e.g., Tafflin v. Levitt, 493
U.S. 455, 458-59 (1990) (recognizing that the state courts have inherent authority, and are thus
presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 82, at 130, 132 (A. Hamilton) (E. Bourne ed., 1947) ([T]he inference seems to be
conclusive, that the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of
the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.).

2
Because the relief sought here is prospective, the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit would apply if this were an action against a state official with some
connection to enforcing the exclusion of same-sex couples from eligibility for marriage licenses. See Mo.
Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2007). In Will, the Supreme Court
recognized that [o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief,
would be a person under 1983 because official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as
actions against the State. 491 U.S. at 71 n.10 (citations omitted). In Missouri, however, the issuance of
marriage licenses occurs at the county level. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 451.040. For this reason, in enacting the
marriage exclusion, the legislature provided that [n]o recorder shall issue a marriage license, except to a
man and a woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. 451.022. When challenging the constitutionality of state-law
provisions restricting the issuance of marriage licenses, the county recorder of deeds, in his or her official
capacity, is the proper defendant. See Glass v. Trowbridge, No. 14-CV-3059-S-DGK, 2014 WL 1878820
(W.D. Mo. May 12, 2014) (challenge to state statute brought against Recorder of Deeds for Howell
County); Amos v. Higgins, __ F.Supp.2d __, No. 14-004011-CV-C-GAF, 2014 WL 572316 (W.D. Mo.
Feb. 6, 2014) (challenge to state statute brought against Recorder of Deeds for Moniteau County); Nichols
v. Moyers, No. 4:13CV735 CDP, 2013 WL 2418218 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2013) (challenge to state statute
brought against Recorder of Deeds for Washington County). No state official is involved with the
issuance, or denial, of marriage licenses in Missouri.

3
The order allowing Missouri to intervene cites only Missouri Revised Statute section 527.110 and
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 87.04.

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 2 of 12
3

III. Argument.
A plaintiff may challenge removal through a motion to remand. Steeby v. Discover
Bank, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1134 (W.D. Mo. 2013) (citing 28 U.S.C. 1447(c)).
4
Once, as here,
removal has been challenged, the removing party bears the burden of proving that removal is
proper and all procedural prerequisites are satisfied. Id. (citing State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v.
Valspar Corp., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 923, 932 (D.S.D. 2010)). All doubts about removal are
resolved in favor of remand. Id. (citing Cent. Iowa Power Co-op. v. Midwest Indep.
Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 561 F.3d 904, 912 (8th Cir. 2009)).
28 U.S.C.A. section 1441 allows that, under specified circumstances, a case filed in state
court may be removed by the defendant or the defendants to federal court. 28 U.S.C. section
1446 makes available removal procedures to [a] defendant or defendants desiring to remove any
civil action from a State court[.] [T]he right of removal is wholly statutory. State Farm, 824
F. Supp. 2d at 948 (citing 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 3721 (4th ed. 2008)). [T]he statute is to be strictly construed due to comity
concerns because the right to remove is in derogation of the power of state courts to hear cases
within their jurisdiction. Id. at 948-49 (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheet, 313 U.S. 100,
109 (1941)). Removal statutes must be strictly construed because they impede upon states
rights to resolve controversies in their own courts. Arnold Crossroads, L.L.C. v. Gander
Mountain Co., No. 4:12CV0506 HEA, 2013 WL 1789441 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2013) (citing
Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2002)), appeal dismissed, 751 F.3d
935 (8th Cir. 2014). Moreover, the party seeking removal must comply with certain procedural

4
A party objecting to removal must file a motion to remand within 30 days after the filing of the
notice of removal. Koehnen v. Herald Fire Ins. Co., 89 F.3d 525, 528 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting 28
U.S.C. 1447(c)). Plaintiffs motion for remand was filed within thirty days after notice of removal.
Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 3 of 12
4

requirements. Wright-Basch v. Wyeth, No. 4:06CV00278 ERW, 2012 WL 2885832 (E.D. Mo.
July 13, 2012).
Only a defendant can remove a case. The language of the statute is unambiguous,
allowing only that the defendant or the defendants are empowered to remove the case. 28
U.S.C. 1441; see also 28 U.S.C. 1446. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
opportunity to remove is afforded only to defendants. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313
U.S. 100, 104-05 (1941) ([T]he statutes governing removals have in terms given the privilege of
removal to defendants alone[.]). Thus, an intervenor may not remove a case to federal court.
See Potabe v. Robichaux, No. CIV. A. 99-1132, 1999 WL 455442, at *4 (E.D. La. June 25,
1999) (Section 1441(d) does not contemplate that a party may voluntarily intervene in a state
court action and then remove the case to federal court.).
5

Limiting the ability to remove solely to defendants makes sense. While a defendant
does have a right, given by statute, to remove in certain situations, plaintiff is still the master of
his own claim. Defendants right to remove and plaintiffs right to choose his forum are not on
equal footing. City of Univ. City, Mo. v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933
(E.D. Mo. 2002) (quoting Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiffs did not sue the State of Missouri. While Missouri certainly may be heard, it should not

5
See Conner v. Salzinger, 457 F.2d 1241, 1243 (3d Cir. 1972) (It is settled that the cited removal
statutes confine the right of removal from a state court to a federal district court to a defendant or
defendants.); see also Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2008) (For
more than fifty years, courts applying Shamrock Oil have consistently refused to grant removal power
under 1441(a) to third-party defendants.); First Nat'l Bank of Pulaski v. Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 461-62
(6th Cir. 2002) (As the statutory language makes plain, only the defendant or the defendants may
remove under 1441(a). . . . The majority view is that third-party defendants are not defendants for
purposes of 1441(a).); Florence v. ABM Indus., 226 F. Supp. 2d 747, 749 (D. Md. 2002) ([I]n
adopting the current language [of the removal statute], Congress intended to restrict removal jurisdiction
solely to the defendant to the main claim.); Wells Fargo Bank v. Gilleland, 621 F. Supp. 2d 545, 548
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (With regard to removal under 28 U.S.C. 1441, this Court agrees that counterclaim
defendants who were not defendants in the original action are not proper party defendants for removal
purposes.).

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 4 of 12
5

be permitted to voluntarily make itself a party to a state court proceeding and then drag the case
to federal court. Indeed, the limited right of removal is intended to benefit persons involuntarily
sued in a state court, not those who undertake to voluntarily inject themselves into a state-court
proceeding. Here, Missouri invoked, and availed itself of, the state courts authority to permit it
to be heard as an intervenor, see Mo. Rev. Stat. 527.110; removal is not intended to provide
an escape hatch to those who voluntarily participate in a state-court proceeding.
In addition to the text of the removal statute and the underlying purpose of removal,
Congress evidenced its intent not to allow removal by intervenors by establishing a thirty-day
period from the time of formal service of process to effectuate removal. Intervenors, of course,
are never served with formal process, so their time to remove would never expire.
6
The Eighth
Circuit has noted that, in the removal context, the Supreme Court recognizes the difference
between notice and official service of process. Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca Rests., L.P.,
254 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001). The fact that, unlike a defendant, Missouri need not be served
with process prior to intervening demonstrates that an intervenor is not within the class of parties
that Congress intended to afford a right of removal.
7


6
Because this action challenges the constitutionality of Missouris laws, Plaintiffs were required to
give notice to the Attorney General. Mo. Rev. Stat. 527.110; Mo. S. Ct. R. 87.04. The requisite notice
was given on June 25, 2014. Service of notices in Missouri does not involve a summons. See Mo. Rev.
Stat. 1.190. Although the Attorney General was provided actual notice in advance, he received notice by
certified mail on June 30, 2014. Exhibit 1, Notice of Service Upon Attorney General of Missouri.

7
Because Missouri has a statutory right (though no obligation) to be heard in this case, if, as a
mere intervenor Missouri can remove this case to federal court, then Missouri could sit back and watch
the proceedings unfold in the state court forum before exercising its right to intervene and remove. With
no obligation that Missouri be served with process and, thus, no deadline to intervene or remove,
Missouri could even wait until after entry of a state court judgment to exercise its right to intervene and
then remove the case. See Nieto v. Univ. of N.M., 727 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1182 (D.N.M. 2010). This is a
further indication that Congress did not intend to provide the right of removal to intervenors.

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 5 of 12
6

In this case, removal was by an intervenor.
8
Missouri is an intervenor, not a defendant.
As discussed, supra, the State of Missouri cannotas a matter of lawbe a defendant in a
section 1983 action, which this case is.
9
See Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
Missouri itself seems to recognize that it is not a defendant. Missouri moved to intervene
as an intervenor, not a defendant. The order allowing intervention does not refer to Missouri as
a Defendant, but as an intervenor. (Doc. # 1-3). Moreover, the captions on Missouris filings in
state court, as well as in this Court, refer to Missouri only as an intervenor. (Docs. ## 1, 1-2, 2).
The proposed pleading attached to the motion to intervene answered the petition, never as a
defendant, but only (and repeatedly) as Intervenor. (Doc. # 1-2). Intervenor referred to itself
Defendant/Intervenors one timeat the beginning of its notice of removal, but by the time it
filed an Answer in this Court (later the same day), Missouri again described itself only (and

8
Only the intervenor removed this case. The named defendant, Kelly, has not filed a notice of
removal. Missouris notice indicates it is made with Kellys consent, further evidencing that the notice
itself was not a notice by Kelly or a joint notice. Moreover, while the notice commences with
Defendant/Intervenors, through counsel, hereby remove to this Court a lawsuit pending in the Circuit
Court of Jackson County, Missouri, the only counsel filing the notice is counsel for Intervenor, State of
Missouri, who designates himself as counsel for intervenor and does not purport to represent Kelly.
(Doc. # 1). (Intervenors civil cover sheet indicates that Kelly is represented by County Counselor W.
Stephen Nixon, who did not file a notice of removal on behalf of Kelly. Chief Deputy County Counselor
Jay D. Haden filed an Answer on behalf of Kelly (Doc. # 5)). Kelly was served with a summons and filed
a timely answer, but has not demonstrated any intent to remove this case from the state court.

Further
evidence that the notice of removal was not filed on behalf of Kelly is that, if it were, then it was
inadequate. A defendant desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district
court of the United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of
removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure together with a copy of all
process and orders served upon such defendant in such action. 28 U.S.C. 1446. The notice is not
signed by Kelly or his attorney and does not include the summons issued for Kelly, the return of service
on Kelly, or the case management order served upon Kelly. A copy of the return of service on Kelly,
which demonstrates he was served on June 26, 2014, is attached as Exhibit 2.

9
If Missouri were determined to be a defendant, it could seek to have itself dismissed despite
having removed this case to federal court. See Lombardo v. Pa., Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 198
(3d Cir. 2008) ([W]hile voluntary removal waives a States immunity from suit in a federal forum, the
removing State retains all defenses it would have enjoyed had the matter been litigated in state court,
including immunity from liability.). Congress did not intend to allow a non-person to control the
forum in which a section 1983 case is decided but simultaneously retain the ability to escape any liability.

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 6 of 12
7

repeatedly) as Intervenor. (Doc. # 2). On this Courts docket sheet, State of Missouri identifies
its party type as an intervenor.
Missouri was permitted to be heard in this case as an intervenor, not a defendant. The
state courts order allowing intervention cites to Missouri Revised Statute section 527.110 and
Missouri Supreme Court Rule 87.04, both of which permit (but do not require) Missouri to be
heard in cases questioning the constitutionality of a statute. Neither authority requires, nor
allows, Missouri to become a defendant.
There is a difference between defendants and intervenors. [T]hroughout the Missouri
statutes and rules of civil procedure intervenors are treated as separate and distinct parties with
their own governing rules. McCoy v. The Hershewe Law Firm, P.C., 366 S.W.3d 586, 594 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2012). Thus, courts do not treat intervenors as normal plaintiffs, defendants, or
third-party plaintiffs or defendants upon intervention[.] Id. And, while McCoy involved the
determination of venue, there are many examples of intervenors being treated as a class of party
separate and apart from defendants. For example, Missouri Supreme Court Rule 51.05(d)
provides: Application for change of judge may be made by one or more parties in any of the
following classes: (1) plaintiffs; (2) defendants; (3) third-party plaintiffs (where a separate trial
has been ordered); (4) third-party defendants; or (5) intervenors. The Rules for intervention are
set off distinctly from rules governing every other type of party[.] McCoy, 366 S.W.3d at 594
(citing Mo. Rev. Stat. 507.030, .040, .060, & .080). While certainly entitled to participate as
an intervenor to protect its interests, Missouri is not a defendant. Missouri is an intervenor only,
not a defendant, and, thus, is not authorized by statute to remove this case.
Even if Missouri were characterized as a defendant, it still cannot remove this case after
intervention because, by intervening, it availed itself of the state courts jurisdiction and waived
Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 7 of 12
8

any objection to the forum. As noted, supra, at least one court has recognized that section
1441(d) does not permit a party to intervene in a state court action and then remove the case. See
Potabe, 1999 WL 455442, at *4. On the related question of whether intervenors waive their right
to change venue by voluntarily joining a case, federal courts are unequivocal: an intervenor
cannot question venue because by voluntarily bringing itself into the action it has waived its
privilege not to be required to engage in litigation in the forum in which it was initiated. Indeed,
decisional authority and commentators alike have recognized that [v]enue is a privilege personal
to a defendant in a civil suit and a person intervening on either side of the controversy may not
object to improper venue. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation,
& Enforcement, 791 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1173-74 (S.D. Ala. 2011) (quoting Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. C.A.B., 339 F.2d 56, 63-64 (2nd Cir.1964)and citing Intrepid PotashN.M., LLC v. U.S.
Dept of Interior, 669 F.Supp.2d 88, 91 (D.D.C. 2009); Beam Laser Sys., Inc. v. Cox Commcns,
Inc., 117 F.Supp.2d 515, 517 (E.D. Va. 2000); Asbury Glen/Summit Ltd. Pship v. Se. Mortg.
Co., 776 F.Supp. 1093, 1096 (W.D. N.C. 1991); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Train, 71 F.R.D.
391, 394 (N.D. Ill.1976); Recht v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studio, Inc., 2008 WL 4460379, at *2
(W.D. Wis. Sept. 29, 2008); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 2008 WL 4543013, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 9, 2008); 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
1918 (3d ed.) (The intervenor cannot question venue. By voluntarily entering the action the
intervenor has waived the privilege not to be required to engage in litigation in that forum.); 6
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.22[3] (3d ed.) (A person who intervenes as plaintiff or
defendant may not object to the venue chosen for the action. Since the intervenor specifically
invoked the jurisdiction of the court, any potential venue objections are considered waived.)).
Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 8 of 12
9

The same logic that prevents an intervenor from exercising the right to transfer venue supports
the notion that an intervenor may not remove a case from state court to federal court.
Moreover, even if the State of Missouri were a defendant entitled to remove this case,
remand is required here because there is an inadequate showing of Kellys consent to removal.
10

[A]ll defendants must consent to the removal. Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1062
(8th Cir. 2008). All defendants must join in the petition for removal, and each defendant [must]
officially and unambiguously consent to a removal petition filed by another defendant within
thirty days of receiving the complaint. Porter v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., No. 4:07-CV-1449 CEJ,
2007 WL 3236424, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2007) (quoting Moore v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 06-
0230-CV-W-REL, 2006 WL 1382330, at *2 (W.D. Mo. May 19, 2006)). Kelly has not officially
and unambiguously consented to removal.
Although it is true that the State of Missouris notice indicates Kellys consent, this is
insufficient because [t]here must be some timely filed written indication from each served
defendant, or from some person with authority to act on the defendants behalf, indicating that
the defendant has actually consented to the removal. Prichett, 512 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Getty
Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11 (5th Cir.1988)). Even if Missouri were
a defendant, one defendant may not speak for another in a removal petition. Unicom Sys., Inc.
v. Nat'l Louis Univ., 262 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Va. 2003). The statute requires all
defendants, individually, or through their counsel, to voice their consent before the court, not
through another partys attorney. Creekmore v. Food Lion, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D.
Va. 1992). As the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri has observed,
[s]everal courts have ruled that the mere filing of an answer, particularly when it is silent as to

10
Plaintiffs do not make any suggestion that the assertion by Intervenors counsel that Kelly
consented is untrue. Rather, they challenge compliance with the removal procedures.
Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 9 of 12
10

the issue of removal, does not demonstrate that the defendant unambiguously consents to
removing the case to federal court. Porter 2007 WL 3236424, at *2 (citing Unicom Systems,
Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d at 642 n.6 (collecting cases so holding); Local Union No. 172 v.. P.J. Dick,
Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1024-25 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (noting the great weight of the case law
requires strict compliance with section 1446); & Prod. Stamping Corp. v. Md. Cas. Co., 829 F.
Supp. 1074, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1993) (noting that because the time for filing an answer (20 days)
expires before the deadline for unanimous consent (30 days), the filing of an answer may be no
more than a careful lawyers decision to avoid the risk of default.... Because competing,
reasonable inferences exist, the mere filing of an answer is hardly a clear, unambiguous
expression of consent); McMahon v. Fontenot, 212 F. Supp. 812, 817-18 (D.C. Ark. 1963)
(finding that the filing of an answer by a non-removing joint defendant after the statutory time
period had lapsed was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over both defendants.)). As in Porter,
Kellys answer contained no clear, unambiguous expression of consent. Indeed, the answer was
silent as to the issue of removal. As such, the answer cannot be deemed consent to removal as
required by 1446(b). Thus, the case must be remanded. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for remand should be granted and this case
remanded to the Circuit Court for Jackson County for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert
Anthony E. Rothert, #44827
Grant R. Doty, #60788
American Civil Liberties Union
of Missouri Foundation
454 Whittier Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63108
(314) 652-3114
(314) 652-3112 (facsimile)

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 10 of 12
11

Gillian R. Wilcox, #61278
3601 Main Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 470-9938

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 11 of 12
12



Certificate of Service
I certify a copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel for Intervenor and counsel for
Defendant by operation of the courts CM/ECF system on August 12, 2014.

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert

Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10 Filed 08/12/14 Page 12 of 12
1

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI, AT KANSAS CITY
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

Kyle Lawson and Evan Dahlgren, and
Angela Curtis and Shannon McGinty,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Robert Kelly, in his official capacity as
Director of the Jackson County
Department of Recorder of Deeds,

Defendant.
)
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Cause No. 1416-CV_____

Division ____

NOTICE OF SERVICE UPON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI
In accordance with Mo. Rev. Stat. 527.110 and MO. R. CIV. PRO. 87.04, the
undersigned certifies that a copy of the petition in the above-referenced case, which alleges, inter
alia, that state statutes and a state constitutional provision are unconstitutional, was sent by
United States certified mail with first-class postage prepaid, on June 25, 2014, to Attorney
General Chris Koster, Missouri Attorney Generals Office, Supreme Court Building, 207 West
High Street, P.O. Box 899, Jefferson City, Missouri 65102. The certified mail tracking number is
7010 0290 0001 5129 8797.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert
Anthony E. Rothert, #44827
Grant R. Doty, #60788
American Civil Liberties Union
of Missouri Foundation
454 Whittier Street
St. Louis, Missouri 63108
(314) 652-3114
arothert@aclu-mo.org
gdoty@aclu-mo.org
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Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10-1 Filed 08/12/14 Page 1 of 3
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Gillian R. Wilcox, #61278
American Civil Liberties Union
of Missouri Foundation
3601 Main Street
Kansas City, Missouri 64111
(816) 470-9938
gwilcox@aclu-mo.org

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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Certificate of Service

The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing was sent by United States
mail with first-class postage prepaid, on June 25, 2014, to the following:

General Chris Koster
Missouri Attorney General
Supreme Court Building
207 W. High St.
P.O. Box 899
Jefferson City, Missouri 65102


Robert Kelly
Jackson County Recorder of Deeds
415 E.12th St., Room 104
Kansas City, Missouri 64106

/s/ Anthony E. Rothert

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Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10-1 Filed 08/12/14 Page 3 of 3
TN TIIE 16TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COIIRT, JACKSON COfINTY, MISSOURI
J.Idgeor DiviSon:
EDITH L MESSNA
Case Number: 141GCYI5024
File
Pldntiff/Feiitioner:
KYLE LAWSN
vs.
Pl dntiff'
gFditimer'
sAttuney/Adckess
ANTHONY EDWARDROTHRT
454t /t-ilTTtERSTREET
sr Lours Mo 63108
Dde#/Re*ordent:
ROBERTT KELLY
CourtAddresi:
415 E 1fth
KANSASCITY, MO 64106
Ndureof Sit:
CC Deda*ory &dgnrent
Surnmons in Civil Case
The State of Missouri to:
415 EAST 12TH STREET
ROOM 104
KANSASCTTY,MO 64106
ROBERT T KELLY
IN HIS OFFTCIAL CA}ACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE JACKSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OFRECONDER OT DEEDS
COURTEEAL OF
JACKSON COUNTY
PRIVATE PROCE$$ $ENUIN
You are rummoned to appear before this court and to lile your phading to the pefftion, e copy of
which ls attached, and to ssr.ye a copy ofyour ploading upon the attotney for Plaintiff/Petitioner at the
above addrers all wlthin 30 dayr after receiving this summons, exclusive day ofservice. Ifyou fail to
demanded in the peftion.
I
file your pleading judgment by default may be taken against
Sheriff s or Server's Return
Note to servirrg offtcer; &nnrnons *toutd be rdurred to the crurt wi thi n thi rty drys dter the dde of i sste.
I certify thd I hareservedthe&ovesmnpnsby: (deck ote)
I
Oeivdng a copy of tle sJrnmonsrrd a mpy of the pdition to tle DderdaltlRespondert.
I
teavirg a copy of the s.irnmons and acopy of thepdition d thedrrdlirq
place or usd *ode of the DderrdarURespordent with
person of tfe Ddenda{' dRespordenf s fani I y ova the
4e
of 1 5 yeaq
dd i veri rg a copy of tle s.rnrnons and a oopy ofJhe
(
of $. Lo.Is), MO, on
be sworn before a notary publlc if not served by an authorized officer:
ad svorntrobdorelrEon
Notary Public - Notary Seal
' State o, Missouri
CommissionbUldt Clay County
Commission Expires: May 4, 201drY
$mmons $_.-..--*-
Non E$
$siff'sDeputy Sdry
&pplemrfrd $rchage $_*__l_0,04_
Mile{e $-.---.".-...---....--"-..- {-miles@$.-permile)
Total
A copy of the summons and a
@y
of the pdition must be sved on each DderdanVRe+ondent. For rndhods of ervice on dl dases of
Crvil RocpdureForm No. 1, Rdes54.01
*54.05,
#.13, dd *.n: 506. 1 20
-
506. 140, td 506. 150 RSt\4 o
OSCA
C/-08)
Stu!30 (JAKSIICC) For Court Use Only: Document Id # 14-SMCC-7158 1ol 1
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Case 4:14-cv-00622-ODS Document 10-2 Filed 08/12/14 Page 1 of 1