Literal Construction of Statutes

B. Premanand and ors. Vs. Mohan Koikal and Ors. AIR2011SC1925 (2011)4SCC266
Decided On: 16.03.2011
Judge: J. Markanday Katju, J. Gyan Sudha Mishra
Facts: Appeal against the judgment of the Full bench of the Kerala HC which had dismissed
appeal against the Judgment of the Single Judge which had ruled in favour of the respondents.
The respondents rank list (on 25.11.1987) was prepared before that of appellants (on 20.06.1992)
but the advice for appellants (on 08.07.1992) was sent before that of respondents (on
06.04.1993).
Issue: Inter se seniority on the post of Block Development Officer between general category
candidates (Respondents) and the SC/ST candidates (Appelants)
Relevant Provision:
Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1959
27(c) - Notwithstanding anything contained in Clauses (a) and (b) above, the seniority of a
person appointed to a class, category or grade in a service on the advice of the Commission shall,
unless he has been reduced to a lower rank as punishment, be determined by the date of first
effective advice made for his appointment to such class, category or grade and when two or more
persons are included in the same list of candidates advised, their relative seniority shall be fixed
according to the order in which their names are arranged in the advice list. (Emphasis added)
Judgment (Relevant Para.):
13. In our opinion, Rule 27(c) of the Rules is plain and clear. Hence, the literal rule of
interpretation will apply to it. No doubt, equity may be in favour of the Respondents because
they were selected earlier, but as observed earlier, if there is a conflict between equity and the
law, it is the law which must prevail. The law, which is contained in Rule 27(c), is clearly in
favour of the Appellants
24. No doubt in some exceptional cases departure can be made from the literal rule of the
interpretation, e.g. by adopting a purposive construction, Heydon's mischief rule, etc. but that
should only be done in very exceptional cases. Ordinarily, it is not proper for the Court to depart
from the literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which
is not permissible.
32. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other
words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.

State of Rajasthan Vs. Babu Ram AIR2007SC2018
Decided on: 05.06.2007
Judges: Dr. Arijit Pasayat and D.K. Jain, JJ.
Facts: The accused was charged under section 17 of the NDPS act but later acquitted and the
conviction and consequential sentence was set aside by the HC because of non-compliance of
section 50 of the act.
Issue: Whether the word "person" occurring in Section 50 would also include within its ambit
any bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc., being carried by such person and the
provisions of Section 50 have to be strictly complied with while conducting, search of such bag,
briefcase, article or container, etc.
Relevant Provisions:
S. 50- Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted:
(1) When any officer duly authorized under Section 42 is about to search any person under the
provisions of Section 41, Section 42 or Section 43, he shall, if such person so requires, take
such person without unnecessary delay to the nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the
departments mentioned in Section 42 or to the nearest Magistrate.
(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until he can bring him before
the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred to in Sub-section (1).
(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any such person is brought shall, if he
sees no reasonable ground for search, forthwith discharge the person but otherwise shall direct
that search be made.
(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.
Judgment(Relevant Para.)-
7. One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to
plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with,
any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity,
repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or
abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that
the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance
something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the
intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity (See Craies on Statute Law, Seventh
ed. page 83-85). In the well known treatise - Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice
G.P. Singh, the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words of the Statute
are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are
construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or
unless there is something in the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary
(See the Chapter - The Rule of Literal Construction -page 78 - Ninth ed.). This Court has also
followed this principle right from the beginning. In Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd.
MANU/SC/0005/1955 : [1955]1SCR1369 , S.R. Das, J. said:
The cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statute literally, that is, by giving to
the words used by the legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however,
such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court
may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the
ordinary rule of literal interpretation.
9. A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be
treated as body of a human being. They are given a separate name and are identifiable as such.
They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending
upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a
briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying
size, dimension or weight. However, while carrying or moving along with them, some extra
effort or energy would be required. They would have to be carried either by the hand or hung
on the shoulder or back or placed on the head. In common parlance it would be said that a
person is carrying a particular article, specifying the manner in which it was carried like hand,
shoulder, back or head, etc. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the
ambit of the word "person" occurring in Section 50 of the Act
Case remitted to the HC











Lalita Kumari Vs. Govt. of U.P. AIR2014SC187
Judges: P. Sathasivam, C.J.I., Balbir Singh Chauhan, Ranjana Prakash Desai, Ranjan
Gogoi and Sharad Arvind Bobde, JJ.
Issue: Interpretation of Section 154 of the Code and incidentally to consider
Sections 156 and 157 also.
Judgment(Relevant Para.):
36. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of
interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation.
All that we have to see at the very outset is what does the provision say? As a result, the
language employed in Section154 is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. A plain
reading of Section 154(1) of the Code provides that any information relating to the
commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-in-charge of a police station
shall be reduced into writing by him or under his direction. There is no ambiguity in the
language of Section154(1) of the Code.
37. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the following observations of this Court in M/s.
Hiralal Rattanlal (supra) which are as under:
22...In construing a statutory provision, the first and the foremost rule of construction is the
literary construction. All that we have to see at the very outset is what does that provision say? If
the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision, the legislative intent is clear, we need
not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction of
statutes are called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear....
The above decision was followed by this Court in B. Premanand (supra) and after referring
the abovesaid observations in the case of Hiralal Rattanlal (supra), this Court observed as
under:
9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of
a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of
interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation, etc. can only be resorted to when
the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally
would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and
unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal
rule, vide Swedish Match AB v. SEBIMANU/SC/0693/2004 : (2004) 11 SCC 641.
45. . Reading 'shall' as 'may', as contended by some counsel, would be against the
Scheme of the Code. Section 154 of the Code should be strictly construed and the word 'shall'
should be given its natural meaning. The golden rule of interpretation can be given a go-by only
in cases where the language of the section is ambiguous and/or leads to an absurdity.

shall information book etc.

M/S Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Products v UoI AIR2000SC314
Decided on: 07.12.1999
Judges: S.P. Bharucha, R.C. Lahoti and N. Santosh Hegde, JJ.
Facts:
Issue: Whether the benefit of proforma credit procedure specified in Rule 56A (1) is available to
the appellants though the raw materials consumed by the appellants in their manufacture of the
final products are excisable under tariff items different from the one under which their final
products are excisable
Relevant Provision:
56. A. Special procedure for movement of duty-paid materials or component parts for use in
the manufacture of finished excisable goods-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, specify the excisable goods in respect of which the
procedure laid down in Sub-rule (2) shall apply.
(2) The Collector may, on application made in this behalf and subject to the conditions
mentioned in Sub-rule (3) and such other conditions as may from time to time be prescribed by
the Central Government, permit a manufacturer of any excisable goods specified under Sub-
rule (1) to receive, material or component parts or finished product (like asbestos cement), on
which the duty of excise or the additional duty under Section 2A of the Indian Tariff Act,
1934(32 of 1934), (hereinafter referred to as 'the countervailing duty), has been paid, in his
factory for the manufacture of these goods or for the more convenient distribution of finished
product and allow a credit of the duty already paid on such material or component parts or
finished product, as the case may be;
Provided that no credit of duty shall be allowed in respect of any material or component parts
used in the manufacture of finished excisable goods-
(i) if such finished excisable goods produced by the manufacturer are exempted from the
whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon or are chargeable to nil rate of duty, and
(ii) unless-
(a) duty has been paid for such material or component parts under the same item or sub-item
as the finished excisable goods; or
(b) remission or adjustment of duty paid for such material or component parts has been
specifically sanctioned by the Central Government;
Provided further that if the duty paid on such material or component parts (of which credit has
been allowed under this Sub-rule) be varied subsequently due to any reason, resulting in
payment of refund to, or recovery of more duty from, the manufacturer or importer, as the case
may be, of such material or component parts, the credit allowed shall be varied accordingly by
adjustment in the credit account maintained under Sub-rule (3) or in the account-current
maintained under Sub-rule (3) or Rule 9 or Rule 178(1) or, if such adjustment be not possible
for any reason, by cash recovery from or, as the case may be, refund to the manufacturer
availing of the procedure contained in this rule.

Judgment (Relevant Para.):
8. The language of the rule is plain and simple. It does not admit of any doubt in interpretation.
Proviso (i) and (ii) are separated by the use of conjunction 'and'. They have to be read conjointly.
The requirement of both the provisos has to be satisfied to avail the benefit. Clauses (a) and (b)
of proviso (ii) are separated by the use of an 'or' and there the availability of one of the two
alternatives would suffice.