JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Repatriation; Petitioners loss of
his naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of
automatic restoration of his Philippine citizenship.While Frivaldo does not
invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here.
The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted
country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best,
what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship
was that he became a stateless individual.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere filing of certificate of candidacy wherein
Petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen, not a sufficient act of
repatriation.Frivaldos contentionthat he could not have repatriated himself
under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet
been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his
repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion
would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have
renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without
formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He
contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more,
already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisionssurely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet
been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until
this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Repatriation requires an express and
unequivocal act.It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the
more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This
country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager
arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
Same; Administrative Law; Election Law; Public Officers; Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements which must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office, but also during the entire
tenure.The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections
should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private
respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his
office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to
marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the
challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her
proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of
Frivaldos naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Vice of ineligibility cannot be cured by the will
of the people as expressed through the ballotThis Court will not permit the
anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing
exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the
people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice
of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Election Contest; Quo Warranto; The period
fixed for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is
mandatory and jurisdictional.I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the
Court. I agree that when the higher interests of the State are involved, the public
good should supersede any procedural infirmities which may affect a petition
filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a
person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding
the office of Governor of any province. It is an established rule of long standing
that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protestwhether quo warranto or
election contestis mandatory and jurisdictional.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The ten-day period for filing quo warranto petition
against a public officer must be strictly applied.As a rule, the quo warranto
petition seeking to annul the petitioners election and proclamation should have
been filed within ten days after the proclamation of election results. The purpose
of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed by law is
to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results
of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the
settlement of such disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the
Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who
performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office. However, where the
Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to
commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court should allow a person like
respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action. I must emphasize, however,
that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective
public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. Where the disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the
many grounds for ineligibility, I believe that the ten-day period should be applied
strictly.

PETITION to review the order of the Commission on Elections.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his
answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he
had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a means
of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators
agents abroad. He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto
petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in
accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League,
moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue
under the said section.

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20,
1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration
was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this
Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set
aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the
hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required
comments from the respondents.

In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition
in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo
from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab
initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one
for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldos
proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of
his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party,
Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal
capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.

Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not
repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure
this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution,
the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in
the private respondents argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was
not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed
that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldos incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness. In
support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where
a German nationals naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because
it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have
repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on
Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been
organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born
citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American
citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to
disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court
has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route
that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a long delay. We
cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and
the vital principles of public office to be here applied.

It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this
question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city
officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has already been made
by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically
claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner.

We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the public
respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the
COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret
the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as
having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A, Section 7, of the Constitution,
to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as
provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are
merely secondary to this basic question.

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the
Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the
Constitution allegiance at all times and the specific requirement in Section 42
of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a
qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines,
this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1,
of the Constitution.

In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following
certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California,
as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20,
1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of
Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BARENG
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in
his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was forced on him as a
measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through
his agents in the United States.

The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the
enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His
feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and
voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as
Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it
necessarynor do they claim to have been coercedto abandon their cherished
status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States,
unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared on oath, that I absolutely and
entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a
subject or citizen, meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The
martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who,
unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of
their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law
principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar.
This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the
Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows:

Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be
treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in
matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of
the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its
territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and
principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.

Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years
when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month
before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his
business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared
war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein.

That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict
between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third
state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively
claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or
not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of
other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our
own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that it
is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals.
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in
Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization
in the United States.

If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of
our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization, or by repatriation.

While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless
claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose
his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have
the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of
his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldos contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270
because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted
seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation
unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open
the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this
country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting
their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends
that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already
effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal
declaration the law envisionssurely, Philippine citizenship previously
disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet
been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until
this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor
because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term
and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to
remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made
within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even
denied, that the evidence of Frivaldos naturalization was discovered only eight
months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor
in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that
he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of
the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case,
that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application
when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is
favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it
should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and
renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours,
for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once
rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant
children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act,
the renewal of his loyalty and love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED
from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered
to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of
the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur with a brief concurring statement.
Sarmiento, J., No part. Petitioner was my client.
Cortes, J., In the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion

I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the
higher interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any
procedural infirmities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on
Elections. I fail to see how the Court could allow a person who by his own
admissions is indubitably an alien to continue holding the office of Governor of
any province.
It is an established rule of long standing that the period fixed by law for the filing
of a protestwhether quo warranto or election contestis mandatory and
jurisdictional.1
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioners election and
proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation of
election results.2 The
_______________

1 Ferrer v. Gutierrez and Lucot, 43 Phil. 795 [1922]; and Nisperos v. Araneta Diaz
and Flores, 47 Phil. 806 [1925].
2 Section 253, Omnibus Election Code, B.P. Blg. 881.
257

VOL. 174, JUNE 23, 1989
257
Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections
purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed
by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the
results of an election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the
settlement of such disputes.3 The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the
Philippines to file quo warranto proceedings against any public officer who
performs an act which works a forfeiture of his office.4 However, where the
Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good reasons to
commence quo warranto proceedings,5 the Court should allow a person like
respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action.
I must emphasize, however, that my concurrence is limited to a clear case of an
alien holding an elective public office. And perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines.6 Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility,7 I believe
________________

3 Municipal Council of Masantol v. Guevarra, 44 Phil. 580 [1923].
4 Rule 66, Section 1, Rules of Court.
5 Rule 66, Section 2.
6 Section 253, Omnibus Election Code; See Casin v. Caluag, 80 Phil. 758 [1948].
7 Among them are corrupting voters or election officials with money or other
material considerations (Section 68, B.P. 881); committing acts of terrorism to
enhance ones candidacy (id.); overspending for election expenses (id.);
soliciting, receiving, or making prohibited contributions (Sections 89, 95 ,96, 97,
and 104 of B.P. 881); the use
of a void certificate of candidacy (Section 78, id.); engaging in partisan political
activity outside of the campaign period (Section 80, id.); destroying or defacing
lawful election propaganda (Section 83, id.); using prohibited forms of certificate
election propaganda (Section 85, id.); unlawful use of mass media (Section 86,
id.); coercion by a public
officer of subordinates to campaign for or against a candidate (Section 261-d,
id.); using threats and intimidation to force a person to campaign or to prevent
him from campaigning for or against a candidate (Section 261-e, id.);
electioneering within the prohibited space around or inside a polling place
(Section 261-k, id.); use of public funds for certain election purposes (Section
261 -u, id.); and use of a void certificate of candidacy (Section 78). Under Section
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, certain persons like ecclesiastics and
soldiers in the active service are disqualified from running for elective municipal
office.
258

258
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
San Luis vs. Court of Appeals
that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.
The pragmatic approach is also shown by the fact that the Court found it
inexpedient to wait for the final decision of COMELEC. This step is most unusual
but considering the total lack of any serious grounds for the petitioners claim of
having regained his Philippine citizenship, I am constrained to concur in the
procedure pro hac vice.
Petition dismissed.
Note.Mere taking of oath of allegiance is not sufficient for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship. A would-be repatriate must show by conclusive evidence
that he has the qualifications for repatriation or else file a petition with CFI.
(People vs. Avengoza, 119 SCRA 1.) [Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174
SCRA 245(1989)]






























JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA,
respondents.

Election Law; Petition for disqualification filed out of time.The records show
that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987
and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private
respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed
beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
Same; Same; Petition for disqualification cannot be treated as a petition for quo
warranto as it is unquestionably premature.The petition for the
disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature,
considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Contention that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
Petitioners contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,
therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for
under C.A. No. 63.In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed
to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1)
by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains.By virtue of his being the son of a
Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It
was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact.

Same; Same; Same; Cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo vs. Comelec and Ramon L.
Labo vs. Comelec are not applicable to the case at bar.The cases of Juan
Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon
L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to
the case at bar. Same; Same; Same; Private respondent remains a Filipino and the
loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.In the instant case,
private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp.
107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

Same; Same; Same; Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.In the learned dissent of
Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea obtained
Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when
he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as
having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of
non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea
was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate
stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case
of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there
is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to
reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either express or implied.

Same; Same; Statement in the 1987 Constitution that dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law has no
retroactive effect.Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that
dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that
even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted
further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or
allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Dissenting

Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is
not a citizen.That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at
the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration.
Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is
not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register
because of the uncooperativeness of the past regime, he could have, under the
new dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting

As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the
foreign state is unmistakable as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made independently
of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed
by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as
the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is
unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting

By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration,
private respondent thereby, clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and
declared that he was an alien (and therefore not aFilipino Citizen) residing in the
Philippines and under its laws.Per certification of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26
January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No.
13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself
in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years
old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath
as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring

In the absence of evidence, Court cannot presume that private respondent had
ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time, a
citizen of the United States.In the absence of evidence, we cannot presume that
he had ceased to be a citizen of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same
time, a citizen of the United States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No.
63. The fact that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing
alone, does not amount to express renunciation.
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for
the disqualification of private respondent Emilio Lito Osmena as candidate for
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio Lito Osmea filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the
January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban,
for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its
incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a
Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and
is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28,
1958, respectively. (Annex B-1).

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial
Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private
respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to
continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the
following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American
citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of
Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. B);
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent
dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. C); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. D); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated
January 3, 1980 (Exh. E). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son
of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he
has been continuously residing in the Philippines sincebirth and has not gone out
of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter
in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes,
private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition
for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient
proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a
registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy
was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1)Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the
notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto.Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the
ground of inelligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file
a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on
November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification
of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for
disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of
time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated
as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is
unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed
Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondents
citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been
proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of
the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioners contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,
therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing
evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the
modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent
Osmena did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned
hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the
United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance
and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and being an American, private respondent must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws. (p. 81,
Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and
who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws
of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated,
however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are
not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court,
Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United
States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect
himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however,
found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there
were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who
did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.

Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an
Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976,
per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the
Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a
number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of
Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore,
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of
Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own
admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their totalallegiance to foreign
state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath
of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral
process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a
candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and
the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that
because Osmea obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American
citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he,
Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine
citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who
has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother
named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or
if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely
University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of
University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of
University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship.
When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship
must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied.
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law (Art. IV,
Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987
Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the concept of dual
citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that
under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance
shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution
of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., No partformerly counsel for Osmea Estate.
Melencio-Herrera, J., See dissent.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., Please see no part statement.
Cruz, J., See dissent.
Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.
Gancayco, J., On official leave.
Padilla, J., See dissenting opinion.
Sarmiento, J., I concur. Please see concurring opinion.
Corts, J., In the result.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a
choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in time in
his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24,
and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as
an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If,
in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so register because of the
uncooperativeness of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and
abandoned his alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law (Article
IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate conviction
shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be awaited for one to
consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect
affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms citizen and alien are mutually
exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what really matters in
the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the local state or he
is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not
those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by
express renunciation thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, there was such renunciation when the
petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United States in which he
renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar
oath after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in
which he stated that he was not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his
disavowal of Philippine citizenship. Express renunciation is a separate mode of
losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily dependent on naturalization
in a foreign country, which is another and different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he
cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he
has left her for another woman to whom he has totally and solemnly transferred
his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he married a second time
simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has
abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after
renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally
base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated
state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble this attitude may
appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we
should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved
here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and
of the United States. The question I think we must answer is: Was there an
express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private respondent when
he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24,
1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view
rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a made of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with full
awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the commercial
documents he signed suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the
Philippine government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and
using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone
constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem, though, is that
he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he actually did was register
with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory, presumably
so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This
was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to
register as an alien. Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this
decision, he categorically asked the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an
American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing
to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made independently
of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are prescribed
by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as
the repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is
unmistakable, as in the case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be
allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be
deserved to be retained. The Philippines for all her modest resources compared
to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother demanding total love
and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national
is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the
Philippines, and in its own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the
other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province
of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and
Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective jurisdictions. But that is not
the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in public office any person
who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a
relentless restriction we cannot ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner
Osmea enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e., Philippine and U.S. citizenships.
He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an American (U.S.)
mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was,
in my view, an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in
Board of Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Callano,1 express renunciation
means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder
like the private respondentof age, and with full legal capacity to act,
voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino citizen is
concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be
considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities
issued to private respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated
21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to Re-enter the Philippines No. 122018
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No.
D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh. E).2
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to
the private respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that
private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned
that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar, private respondent was
likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on
21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy
of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition
that private respondent is a duly-registered alien (American) residing in the
Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry
Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again
under oath, and verified from the records at the CID, wherein private respondent
expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of this document
cannot be underestimated. For, if private respondent believed that he is a
Filipino citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit,
since it is the right of every Filipino citizen to return to his country (the
Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn
Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is
again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien (American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already
registered as an alien with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien
Registration Act of 1950 (RA 562). Section 1 of said Act provides:
SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the
City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in
other localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other
office designated by the President. x x x.3 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988,
private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27
and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in the Philip-
pines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and
again in 1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an
alien with the Bureau of Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly,
distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that he was an alien (and,
therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification
should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated
by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in 19333hence, our
mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as an alien in 1958, he
was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45 years
old. However, private respondents immigration records disclose that he was
born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct
year of birth of private respondent (and that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as
stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958, when he first
registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered
as an alien, he was 41 years old

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an
express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he
was almost 21 years old___the age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under
the applicable Alien Registration Act (RA 562), an alien 14 years or over has to
register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:
The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age,
shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such
alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen
days thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on
whether to remain a Filipino citizen o r an alien has to be made at age 14, and
private respondent (although a bit late) made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in
favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had
been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine
Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention that vis-a-vis
the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced his Philippine
citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine
Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn, the Philippine
Government, through the immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private
respondents aforesaid representations, and registered and documented him
TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual
citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement
thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different countries. As early
as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor,
rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for
the following reason, among others:
x x x. Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be
taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the
application of the principle of jus soli to persons born in this country of alien
parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be
detrimental to both countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens.4
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now
provides___

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law. (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the
best of two (2) worlds maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally
brought about, the dual citizen has to make a choice at one time or another.
Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many ways to having two (2)
legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to
only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:
Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undersirable phenomenon. It
inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international conflicts. x
x x. Dual nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of
convenience rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of
commitment which is the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should
have a right to choose his own nationality, and this choice should be honored by
all countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the
Philippine Government___which, like many other countries, considers dual
allegiance as against national or public interest___to register him at least twice
(and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That choice pro tanto
was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as
a conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected
person who must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565
(Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see no valid
justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien under Philippine law while holding
private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: In fact,
in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia (p. 7, Decision). And that is exactly what private respondent
did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the
United States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, so be it, you are an Australian, yet to the private
respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court
says, never mind those sworn statements, you are still a Filipino. Sauce for the
goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander. The doctrinal basis of the
Courts decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that really
make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private
respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such
citizenship.
_______________

SARMIENTO, J., Concurring Opinion:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American
citizenship, only that he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The
important question, however, inheres in how he obtained American citizenship. I
find that there is a dearth of facts here.
For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost
Filipino citizenship (Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June
21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however,
became one by the application of the principle of jus soli, it is by force of
circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if
he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.
In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen
of the Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time, a citizen of the United
States. There must be a clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any
of the means enumerated by Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had
obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing alone, does not amount to
express renunciation.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu v. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No.
83882, January 24, 1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I regret, however, that I cannot participate in
this case because one of the principal counsel is my relative by affinity within the
fourth civil degree.
Petition dismissed. Resolution affirmed.
o0o

722

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