Daoang v Municipal Judge of San Nicolas (159 SCRA 369) March 28, 1988

RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY,
respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Facts: (VERBA LEGIS)
1. On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte to adopt the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The petition was set
for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor
General and ordered published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province
of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.
2. On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian opposed the
petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named
Estrella Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art.
335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.
3. After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption.
4. The petitioners contended, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla
and Wilson Marcos would not only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the
reduction of their legitimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and irrevocable disinheritance which
is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended
person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have
been made

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of
Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:
1. We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons
who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning
in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.
2. Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning
may be the subject of statutory construction.
3. In the present case, the petitioners (the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy)
cannot assail the adoption. Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to
persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the
relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is
geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a
useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that objective.


4. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec.
Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED.





G.R. No. L-3629 March 19, 1951
ELISEO SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
BELEN CABRERA, respondent.

Facts:
1.In the Public Service Commission Belen Cabrera filed an application for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain,
and operate in the City of Lipa, an ice plant with a 15-ton daily productive capacity and to sell the produce of said plant in
several municipalities of Batangas province as well as in the City of Lipa.
2. Eliseo Silva andOpulencia & Lat, holdres of certificates of public convenience to operate each a 15-ton ice plant, opposed the
application on the ground that their service was adequate for the needs of the public, and that public convenience did not
require the operation of the ice plant applied for by Cabrera.
3. Instead of the Commission conducting the corresponding hearing in order to receive the evidence to be presented by
applicant and oppositors, Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo by order dated July 14, 1949, commissioned Atty. Antonio H.
Aspillera, Chief of the Legal Division "to take the testimony of witnesses" in this case pursuant to the provisions of section
32 of Commonwealth Act No. 146 known as the Public Act. Attorney Aspillera conducted hearings, and received extensive
evidence, oral and documentary.
4. Thereafter, the Commission in banc rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: We authorize the
applicant to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City, and that applicant is a Filipino citizen and is financially qualified to install
and operate a 10-ton ice plant. The oppositions of Eliseo Silva and Opulencia & Lat are hereby overruled, and a certificate of
public convenience to operate a 10-ton ice plant in the City of Lipa is hereby granted to the applicant herein, Belen Cabrera,
the said certificate to be subject to the following.
5. Eliseo Silva, one of the oppositors filed the present petition for review assigning two errors, to wit:
ERROR I. That section 3 prohibits a hearing before any person other than a Commissioner in contested cases;
consequently, the delegation made by the Commission to Attorney Aspillera is illegal and contrary to law.
ERROR II. That the decision is not supported by evidence to warrant the Grant of the certificate to applicant-
respondent Belen Cabrera.
Ruling:
SEC. 32. The Commission may also, by proper order, commission any of the attorneys of the Commission or chiefs of
division to receive evidence, and it may likewise commission any clerk the court of first instance of justice of the
Peace of the Philippines to take the testimony of the witnesses any case pending before the Commission where such
witnesses reside in places distant from Manila and it would be inconvenient and expensive for them to appear
personally before the Commission.

Section 3 of the same Act as amended by Republic Act No. 178, relied upon by the petitioner:
Provided, however, That (1) all contested cases, (2) all cases involving the fixing of rates, and (3) all petitions for
reconsideration of orders or decisions shall be heard by the Commission in banc, and the affirmative vote of at least
two Commissioner shall be necessary for the promulgation of a decision or a non-interlocutory order: And, provided,
further, That in cases (1) and (2) the Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the
Commissioners, who shall report to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him to enable it to render its
decision. (Underlining is ours)

After examining the law, particularly the language used in section 3 and 32, above-quoted, we agree with the petitioner that
the delegation made to Attorney Aspillera especially considering the manner in which he received the evidence, was contrary
to the provisions of the public Service Act.
The law (sec. 3) is clear that in a contested case like the present, only the Commission in banc is authorized to conduct the
hearing, although said Commission may delegate the reception of the evidence to one of the Commissioners who shall report
to the Commission in banc, the evidence so received by him.

Finding that the delegation of the reception of evidence in this case as well as the exercise of the authority so given, are in
violation of section 3 of the Public Service Act as amended, we set aside the order of delegation of July 14, 1949, and declare all
the proceedings had thereunder to be null and void. Setting aside the decision appealed from, let this case be returned to the
Public Service Commission so that evidence may be submitted by the parties in a hearings before the Commission in banc of
before any of the Commissioners if properly authorized.


SILVA v CABRERA (68 Phil 381)
ELISEO SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FELICIANO OCAMPO, GABRIEL P. PRIETO and QUINTIN PAREDES, JR., in their capacities as
Commissioners of the Public Service Commission and BELEN CABRERA, respondents.
Rivera, Castano, Medina and Ampil for petitioner.
A.R. Aspillera for respondents Hons. Feliciano Ocampo, Gabriel P. Prieto and Quintin Paredes, Jr. Evaristo R.
Sandoval for respondent Belen Cabrera.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
1. Cabrera's application, filed on June 1, 1949, was a for a 15-ton ice plant and covered the
municipalities of Sto. Tomas, Tanuaan, Cuenca, Rosario, Alitagtag, San Juan de Bolbok and Ibaan,
province of Batangas. Oppositions were filed by: (1) Eliseo Silva, who operates a 5-ton ice plant
in the City of Lipa, with authority to sell his ice therein and in the municipalities of Malvar,
Tanauan, Talisay and Sto. Tomas, Batangas; (2) Antonio Zaragosa, who operates a 10-ton ice
plant in San Juan de Bolbok, Batangas, with authority to sell his ice therein and in the
municipalities of Rosario, province of Batangas, and Candelaria, province of Quezon; and (3)
Leoncio S. Opulencia and Leonor Lat, who are, likewise, authorized to operate a 5-ton ice plant
in Tanauan, Batangas
2. In July 14, 1949, Cabrera excluded the municipalities of San Juan de Bolbok and Rosario from her
application, whereupon Antonio Zaragosa withdrew his aforementioned opposition.
3. Cabrera and the remaining oppositors presented their evidence before the Chief, Legal Division,
Public Service Commission, Atty. Antonio Aspillera, who had been delegated therefor by Public
Service Commissioner Feliciano Ocampo, and thereafter, or on January 7, 1950, a decision was
rendered authorizing Cabrera to operate a 10-ton ice plant in Lipa City. On appeal taken by Silva,
this decision was, on March 19, 1951, annulled by the Supreme Court (in G.R. No. L-3629),
which ordered a rehearing before either the Commission en banc or one of the Public Service
Commissioners delegated therefor by the Commission, upon the ground that, under the Public
Service Act then in force, such function could not be otherwise delegated
4. During the pendency of the appeal, Cabrera had installed her 10-ton ice plant and started
operation on March 15, 1950. Cabrera applied for a provisional permit to continue operating her
ice plant. On May 31, 1951, at the hearing of this incident and rehearing of the cas. On July 26,
1951, Commissioner Ocampo granted Cabrera's petition for a provisional permit, subject to
cancellation or revocation at any time.
5. In fact, the meager evidence adduced by the respondent as against the overwhelming evidence
of the petitioner showing the lack of necessity for the installation of an additional plant of any
capacity in Lipa City in addition to the newly discovered evidence of the petitioner which the
Public Service Commission ignored, when construed by the Public Service Commission as
justifying the grant of a certificate of Public Convenience to the respondent, constitutes an
abuse of discretion to the prejudice and detriment of petitioner's business, which is entitled to
reasonable protection against ruinous competition.
6. Applicant's evidence is to the effect that Lipa is a growing and well populated city with new
commercial establishments which every day a considerable supply of ice have to be consumed;
that the ice plant of the oppositor which has produced only five tons since it was installed is
inadequate for the requirements of the public; that the people of Lipa have to get their ice from
ice dealers and the latter have to go to other towns to buy their ice and this results not only in a
higher price paid by Lipa people for the ice which they need but also in an irregular and
undependable service
7. That daily but more particularly on special occasions when there is an extraordinary demand for
ice, there is no way of obtaining this very necessary commodity
8. Our records show that there is now a 10-ton plant in Tanauan operated by Opulencia and Lat
and this operator is authorized, among other towns, to sell in Tanauan, Sto. Tomas and Lipa. We
have gone over the evidence presented by both parties at the rehearing very carefully and are
of the opinion that the preponderance thereof establishes the need for permitting the applicant
to operate a 10-ton plant in Lipa. We are convinced that a 5-ton production in Lipa can not be
sufficient for the ice needs of the public considering the population of over 50,000 people of the
City. There is also the population of over 60,000 people in the other towns of Alitagtag, Ibaan
and Cuenca, without counting the population of Tanauan which is now served by an ice plant in
that town. We are convinced that the operation of applicant's 10-ton plant in Lipa will
undoubtedly result in promoting public interests and convenience because thereby the ice
requirements of the public which can not be met by the present plant will be adequately served.
While it is true that ice is brought to Lipa by ice dealers, we are inclined to believe the evidence
of the applicant that the service of ice dealers results in higher price paid by the consumers and
at the same time is not reliable and regular because these dealers do not have the obligation of
bringing ice regularly. Undoubtedly an additional plant in Lipa to serve the proven needs of the
public will be more beneficial and convenient to the people of Lipa than to make them rely on
service of ice dealers. We believe, however, that applicant should only be authorized a 10-ton
plant and that the town of Tanauan should not be included in her territory inasmuch as there is
already in Tanauan a 10-ton ice plant, and we do not believe that with a 10-ton ice plant, in
Tanauan, it would be necessary for the applicant to send her ice to that town.
9. Without denying the existence of evidence on the facts thus found by the Commission, it is
urged that the proof to the contrary introduced by appellant Silva is more weighty than that of
appellee Cabrera. It is well settled, however, that the findings of fact made by the Commission
are conclusive upon this Court, as long as there is evidence reasonably supporting such findings
10. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner, Eliseo
Silva. It so ordered




People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164) En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C.
Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an information dated 14
August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. Accused admits to possession
of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the
lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one
year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the governor is exempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm
Held:
The law is explicit that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or
ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms,
parts of firearms, or ammunition except when such firearms are in possession of such public officials and public
servants for use in the performance of their official duties; as those firearms and ammunitions which are regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors or marines, the Philippines Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers,
municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails. It is the first and fundamental
duty of courts to apply the law; Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them. The law cannot be any clearer, there being no provision
made for a secret agent. Reliance in the decision in People v. Macarandang is misplaced, and the case no longer
speaks with authority to the extent that the present decision conflicts with. It may be note that in People v.
Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment of the accused as a
secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put
him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered
by section 879, Thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the
appealed judgment.





United Christian Missionary Society v Social Security System (December 27, 1969)
UNITED CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY SOCIETY, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR WORLD MINISTERS, BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSION OF THE
REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA, BOARD OF MISSION OF THE EVANGELICAL UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, COMMISSION OF
ECUMENICAL MISSION ON RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, petitioners,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

Teehankee, J.:

FACTS (VERBA LEGIS)
1. The five petitioners originally filed on November 20, 1964 separate petitions with respondent Commission,
contesting the social security coverage of American missionaries who perform religious missionary work in
the Philippines under specific employment contracts with petitioners.
2. After several hearings, however, petitioners commendably desisted from further contesting said coverage,
manifesting that they had adopted a policy of cooperation with the Philippine authorities in its program of
social amelioration, with which they are in complete accord.
3. They instead filed their consolidated amended petition dated May 7, 1966, praying for condonation of
assessed penalties against them for delayed social security premium remittances in the aggregate amount of
P69,446.42 for the period from September, 1958 to September, 1963. petitioners alleged that they had
labored under the impression that as international organizations, they were not subject to coverage under
the Philippine Social Security System, but upon advice by certain Social Security System officials, they paid to
the System representing their back premium for September. They further claimed that the penalties assessed
against them appear to be inequitable, citing several resolutions of respondent Commission which in the past
allegedly permitted condonation of such penalties.
4. Respondent System filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that "the Social Security Commission has no
power or authority to condone penalties for late premium remittance, to which petitioners filed their
opposition of June 15, 1966, and in turn, respondent filed its reply thereto of June 22, 1966. Upon petition of
the System's Counsel, the Commission gave the parties a further period of fifteen days to submit their
Memorandum consolidating their arguments, after which the motion would be deemed submitted for
decision.
5. On September 22, 1966, respondent Commission issued its Order dismissing the petition, as follows: in the
absence of an express provision in the Social Security Act vesting in the Commission the power to condone
penalties, it cannot legally do so. Commission Resolution No. 878 also states that th Social Security
Commission ruled that it "has no power to condone, waive or relinquish the penalties for late premium
remittances which may be imposed under the Social Security Act. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
dismissed and petitioners are directed to pay the respondent System, within thirty (30) days from receipt of
this Order, the amount of P69,446.42 representing the penalties payable by them.
6. Upon failure of the petitioners to comply with this Order within the period specified herein, a warrant shall
be issued to the Sheriff of the Province of Rizal to levy and sell so much of the property of the petitioners as
may be necessary to satisfy the aforestated liability.

ISSUE: WON respondent Commission has the authority under the Social Security Act to condone the penalty
prescribed by law for late premium remittances.
RULING: No, the Commission has no authority. We find no error in the Commissions Act.
1. The plain text and intent of the pertinent provisions of the Social Security Act clearly states the mandatory
imposition of the 3% penalty per month for late payment of premium remittances. No discretion or
alternative is granted to respondent Commission. In this concept, good faith or bad faith is rendered
irrelevant. From the moment the remittance of premiums due is delayed, the penalty immediately attaches
to the delayed premium payments by force of law. SEC 22. Remittance of premiums. (a) The contributions imposed in the
preceding sections shall be remitted to the System within the first seven days of each calendar month following the month for which
they are applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. "Every employer required to deduct and to remit such
contribution shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the system, as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides
the contribution a penalty thereon of three per centum per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid.
2. Petitioners contend that Section 3 of the Act states that it has the authority to condone the penalty for late
payment under Section 4 (1), whereby it is empowered to "perform such other acts as it may deem
appropriate for the proper enforcement of this Act. Section 4 of the Social Security Act precisely enumerates
the powers of the Commission and nowhere in the power states that the Commission is granted expressly or
by implication the authority to condone penalties imposed by the Act.
3. It is set by SC that the funds contributed to the System by compulsion of law are funds belonging to the
members which are merely held in trust by the Government."[[4]] Being a mere trustee of the funds of the
System which actually belong to the members, respondent Commission cannot legally perform any acts
affecting the same, including condonation of penalties, that would diminish the property rights of the owners
and beneficiaries of such funds without an express or specific authority therefor.
4. Where the language of the law is clear and the intent of the legislature is equally plain, there is no room for
interpretation and construction of the statute.
5. Petitioners cite 14 instances in the past wherein respondent Commission had granted condonation of
penalties. They charge the Commission with grave abuse of discretion in not having uniformly applied to their
cases its former policy of granting condonation of penalties. They invoke more compelling considerations of
equity in their cases. The past instances of alleged condonation granted by the Commission mere unilateral
conclusion asserted by petitioners, it will not be recognized without a review of the pertinent records of said
cases.
6. Petitioners' lack of intent to deliberately violate the law may be conceded, and was borne out by their later
withdrawal in May, 1966 of their original petitions in November, 1964 contesting their social security
coverage. The point, however, is that they followed the wrong procedure in questioning the applicability of
the Social Security Act to them, in that they failed for five years to pay the premiums prescribed by law and
thus incurred the 3% penalty thereon per month mandatorily imposed by law for late payment. The proper
procedure would have been to pay the premiums and then contest their liability therefor, thereby preventing
the penalty from attaching.
7. No grave abuse of discretion was committed, therefore, by the Commission in issuing its Order dismissing
the petition for condonation of penalties for late payment of premiums, as claimed by petitioners in their
second and last error assigned. Petitioners were duly heard by the Commission and were given due
opportunity to adduce all their arguments, as in fact they filed their Memorandum in lieu of oral argument
and waived the presentation of an additional memorandum.











Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Phil.FACTS:
Appellants' applied for an urban real estate loan which was approved by appellee bank on April80, 1953. they
executed the mortgage contract on
March 23, 1954
, and that the release of theamount of the said loan of P19,500.00 was to be made in instalments subject to
certainconditions. That the loan obtained from DBP is to be received in several releases and to be paidlater in
instalments, under the terms and conditions specified in the loan agreement. That
thefirst release of P4,200 was made on April 29, 1954, and the other releases were madesubsequent thereafter,
then the balance of the loan were all availed of and received by him later than June, 1953. Rodriguez paid the
instalments as they fell due. When a balance of aboutP14,000.00 remained unpaid, quijano offered to pay for the
said outstanding balance with hisback pay certificate pursuant to Republic Act. No. 897, The Amendatory Act of
June 20, 1953.The Bank refused to accept the said tender of payment in certificate on the ground that the loanwas
not incurred before on June 20, 1953.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the obligation of the petitioners was subsisting at the time of the approval of Republic Act No. 897,
the Amendatory Act of Julie 20, 1953 to Republic Act 304.Whether or not there is a room for interpretation or
construction.
HELD:
Thus even before the amendment of the Back Pay Law, when said law limited the applicabilityof back pay
certificates to "obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this Act," thisCourt has ruled that obligations
contracted after its enactment on June 18, 1948 cannot comewithin its purview.WHEREFORE, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed. No costs.
Stat. Con.:
Clear and unambiguous provisions of law offer no room for interpretation or construction. TheSupreme Court has
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is theapplication of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only whensuch literal application is impossible. No process
of interpretation or construction need beresorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.
Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary





The Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v The Commissioner of Customs (May 31, 1971)
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
Fernando, J.:
FACTS:
From December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills (petitioner) exported Pollard and/or bran which was
loaded from lighters alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while anchored near the breakwater. The
Commissioner of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals (respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of wharfage
dues on the said exportations in the sum of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by petitioner under protest. In
this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc. would want the Court to interpret the words products of the Philippines
found in Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, as excluding bran (ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground
that, coming as they do from wheat grain which is imported in the Philippines, they are merely waste from the
production of flour. Another main argument of the petitioner is that no government or private wharves or
government facilities were utilized in exporting such products. In that way, it would not be liable at all for the
wharfage dues assessed under such section by respondent Commission of Customs. On the other hand, the stand
of respondent Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was liable for wharfage dues upon receipt or
discharge of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in foreign trade regardless of the non-use of government-
owned or private wharves. Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the action taken by the Commissioner of
Customs under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and Customs Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not such collection of wharfage dues was in accordance with law
RULING/HELD:
As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be levied ,collected and paid on all
articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines exported from the Philippines,
a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage." appears to be quite precise. Section 2802 refers
to what is imported and exported. The objective of this act must be carried out. Even if there is doubt to the
meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to be attained. If
petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of
the Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It was desirable then that
the gates to such efforts at unjustified restriction of the coverage of the Act are kept closed. Otherwise, the end
result would be not respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative mandate. The decision of respondent Court of
Tax Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed with costs against petitioner.





National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no
part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment(Labor
Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plantof the Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the firm before the same office for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike against the firm,
alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union; unfair labor practice; non payment
of living allowances; and employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit. The
strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers
and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining
order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of
picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code,
Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.
Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has
been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by
law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the
jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article 217 vested
the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to
money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters
after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa
130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money
claims of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the
way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it
can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the
scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing
that accompanied a strike. The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set aside the
20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said
court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the
civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also made permanent the restraining
order issued on 5 August 1982.