Secularização e Nacionalismo

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Jose Santiago
Secularisation and Nationalism: A Critical Review
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social
compass
Secularisation and Nationalism:
A Critical Review
Jose SANTIAGO
Facultad de Ciencias Polticas y Sociologa, Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Abstract
The author aims to analyse the relationships between secularisation and nationalism.
In the course of the debate regarding the origin of nationalism, some scholars have
argued that nationalism has filled the void left by historical religions. Nationalism could
therefore be considered a religion of modernity, or a functional equivalent of historical
religions. The author aims to reconsider this issue. First, he explores the sociological
origins of the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity deriving from Durkheims
Sociology of Religion. Second, he provides an overview of the different versions of
this theory. Finally, he assesses the weaknesses of these approaches and proposes an
alternative theoretical framework in which to reconsider the relationships between
secularisation and nationalism.
Keywords
functional equivalent, nationalism, religion, secularisation
Rsum
Lauteur cherche analyser les relations entre scularisation et nationalisme. Dans le
contexte des dbats propos de lorigine du nationalisme, certains thoriciens ont argu
que le nationalisme a rempli un vide laiss par les religions historiques. Le nationalisme
pourrait, par consquent, tre considr comme une religion de la modernit ou un
quivalent fonctionnel des religions historiques. Lauteur invite reconsidrer ce sujet.
Au premier abord, il explore les origines sociologiques de la thorie du nationalisme
comme religion de la modernit qui procde de la Sociologie de la religion de Durkheim.
Corresponding author:
Jose Santiago, Departamento de Sociologa III (Estructura Social), Facultad de Ciencias Polticas y Sociologa,
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Campus de Somosaguas, Pozuelo de Alarcn, 28223, Madrid, Spain
Email: jasantiago@cps.ucm.es
432123SCP59110.1177/0037768611432125Santiago: Secularisation and nationalism: a critical reviewSocial Compass
2012
Article
4 Social Compass 59(1)
En second lieu, il propose un panorama des diffrentes versions de cette thorie. Enfin,
il value les points faibles de ces approches et propose un cadre thorique alternatif
permettant de reconsidrer les relations entre scularisation et nationalisme.
Mots-cls
quivalent fonctionnel, nationalisme, religion, scularisation
Introduction
In recent decades, social theory has attempted to explain the origin and foundations of
nationalism by highlighting the importance of the emergence of States, industrialisa-
tion, capitalism, etc. A common focus for explaining these origins is the process of
secularisation. This is the result of a common belief that nationalism has filled a void
left in the wake of the decline of historical religions. Nationalism could therefore be
considered a religion of modernity or a functional equivalent of historical religions.
The present article will examine this theory and its sociological origins and will set
out what we consider to be the most important contributions to this theory. This pres-
entation will lead to a critical evaluation and a discussion of the relationship between
secularisation and nationalism.
The sociological origins of the theory of nationalism as a
religion of modernity
The sociological origins of the theory which describes nationalism as a religion of
modernity or as a functional equivalent of historical religions can be found within a
particular theoretical framework, and in its interpretation of one specific historical
experience. This framework derives from Durkheimian sociology of religion, and the
historical experience is the French Revolution, as recounted and interpreted by intellec-
tual defenders of the Third French Republic such as A Mathiez and E Durkheim.
According to their interpretation, the Revolution was an attempt to establish a new civil
religion, which defenders of the Third Republic wished to revitalise in order to maintain
the unity of the French nation (Tiryakian, 1988).
For Durkheim, the object of this religion was to be the veneration of the individual.
In this particular French context, this objective also necessarily involved the venera-
tion of the nation, as French national(ist) ideology was based on the idea of universal
individual rights. Durkheim understood this, and sought to find points of compatibil-
ity between patriotism and the religion of humanity. It was therefore the French
national experience, together with its interpretation within the Durkheimian frame-
work, which created the conditions in which the idea of a religion of humanity, cham-
pioned by the 19th-century positivists, began to give way to the theory of nationalism
as a religion of modern times.
Durkheim believed that the secularisation of Christianity was an inevitable process,
and that society therefore required new religions which would fulfil the same function of
Santiago: Secularisation and nationalism: a critical review 5
integration as the historical religions. These new religions could no longer be based on
supernatural or divine ideas, because modern societies no longer worshipped the ancient
gods [who] grow old or die, but instead sought to convert the secular into the sacred.
Durkheim saw the French Revolution as a crucial moment in history, in which it was
easy to find new forms of the sacrality of modernity:
At that time things which were purely secular in nature were transformed into sacred
things: the Fatherland, Liberty and Reason All at once we saw society and its ideas directly
converted, with no transformation whatsoever, into objects of true veneration. (Durkheim,
1964: 214)
For Durkheim, the Revolution represented something unique in the history of
humanity. Society worshipped itself unconditionally, and did not require symbols in
which to see itself reflected.
The French Revolution therefore became an object of particular interest within
the Durkheimian theory of religion. Here Durkheim found proof that his general
theory of religion, based on his studies of totemic religion, was relevant to the mod-
ern world. This is the social context which led to the birth of the idea of nationalism
as a religion of modernity. It is no coincidence that when such a theory is put for-
ward, Durkheims work and his interpretation of the French Revolution offer some
weighty arguments: nationalism itself, through its conception of the nation as a
sacred communion, with its own doctrines, texts, liturgies, ceremonies, churches,
and priests, becomes a novel kind of anthropocentric, intra-historical and political
religion. As Durkheim remarked of French nationalism during the Revolution: A
religion tended to become established, which had its dogmas, symbols, altars and
feasts (Smith, 2000: 811).
The theory of nationalism as a religion of modern times stems from the notion of civil
religion. R Nisbet highlights the continuous flow between them when he states that the
notion of the religion of nationalism appeared precisely when the idea of civil religion
had apparently disappeared from the political discourse of the 19th century (Nisbet,
1983: 524). The Great War rendered the idea of a civil religion of humanity untenable,
and it became even more so in the post World War II period. It was in precisely this post-
war context that CJH Hayes wrote his first monograph, in which he defends the notion
of nationalism as a religion. Henceforth the nation becomes the primary object of interest
for the study of civil religion. This was understood by R Bellah, the great theoretician of
civil religion, who defined it as a collection of beliefs, symbols and rituals which sancti-
fied the national community and conferred a transcendental purpose on the political pro-
cess (Bellah, 1970).
It was in this context that the thesis which saw nationalism as a religion of modernity
began to gain ground. This thesis has today become a commonplace in explaining nation-
alism, and has evolved to accommodate the many contributions made to it: these range
from the most generic to the most theoretically informed, from those which consider the
theory from the perspective of a generic and formal concept of religion, to those which
emphasise the functions served by nationalism in the modern era.
Nationalism as a religion: a clich for the explanation of
nationalism
The theory of nationalism as a religion for the modern era has become common currency.
Certain thinkers have used this idea to explain nationalist passions. This is true, for
example, of H Seton-Watson:
There is actually a great deal we could say about the conception of a link between the growing
fanaticism of nationalities and the decline in religious belief. Nationalism has become a
surrogate religion. The nation, as understood by nationalists, has become a substitute for God.
(Seton-Watson, 1977: 465)
This great deal to say, however, far from being the preamble to a comprehensive
explanation, has on some occasions become a recurrent formula which is actually fairly
self-explanatory. What connections can be made between nationalism and religion in
order to claim the former as a substitute for the latter? Nationalism is often compared to
religion merely because of its myths and rites, which impact on the emotions and the
religious feeling of the individuals involved. From there it is a short step to regarding
nationalism as a religion or a functional equivalent of religion.
These vague theorisations can frequently be found in studies on nationalism. Two
examples of this, whose titles indicate their monographic nature, are the classic work by
CJH Hayes (1960), Nationalism, a Religion, and the more recent The God of Modernity
by JR Llobera (1994). Both authors dedicate little more than a chapter to setting out
theses which are theoretically very limited: their comparison of nationalism and religion
is based on an excessively generic and formal concept of religion, and is closely related
to a concept outlined by Durkheim (1899) in his article De la dfinition des phnomnes
religieux, later not only taken up by Mathiez but also implicit in the work of Hayes and
Llobera.
To make any headway with the theory of nationalism as a religion for the modern era
we will have to abandon this territory and look to the proposals of authors whose work
has centred on the functions served by modern nationalism.
Nationalism and social integration
The national(ist) ritual as social cement
Let us return to Durkheims legacy, where we find certain authors who consider that the
past role of religions as a mechanism for social cohesion is in the modern era fulfilled by
political rituals. Among the most noteworthy of these authors is undoubtedly E Shils
who, together with M Young, wrote The meaning of Coronation, an article published
originally in 1956, defending this theory. Following in Durkheims footsteps, these
authors argue that all societies need a moral consensus based on a central system of val-
ues and norms which make social integration possible and, according to Durkheimian
theory on religion, therefore acquire a sacred status. In spite of the fact that in modern
societies there is never consensus, the central norms and values are generally accepted to
a degree which makes life viable within such a society.
A consensus of values, however, is not permanently fixed within society and, as
pointed out by Durkheim, needs to be periodically revised through rituals which revive
a collective sense of social solidarity. Basing their work on this theory, Shils and Young
made an analysis of the meaning behind the coronation of Elizabeth II, which took
place in 1953, and reached the conclusion that the celebration of the event was a ritual
which served to reassert the moral consensus needed to maintain social integration: the
coronation of Elizabeth II was the ceremonial occasion for the affirmation of the moral
values by which the society lives. It was an act of national communion (Shils and
Young, 1975: 139).
Nationalism as the religion of modernisation
The 1960s saw a revival of Durkheims ideas thanks to the Functionalist School. In
accordance with Durkheim, some theoreticians maintained that modern societies need
common links which can guarantee social integration. Based on these hypotheses, the
functionalists centred their interest on the nation and on nationalism, concepts which
they considered to be providers of these communitarian relationships. Nationalism
therefore began to be depicted as the religion of modernisation, which served to stabilise
the structural imbalance caused by the process of modernisation itself. It was in fact
industrialisation and the subsequent loss of traditional ties which would turn nationalism
into a fundamental element within modern societies.
Those theoreticians who saw a connection between modernisation and nationalism
found ample opportunity for study in the so-called political religions which emerged
with the birth of the decolonised States of Africa and Asia. These States needed new
mechanisms to unify the ethnic groups in the territories under their sovereignty, as well
as to encourage more individual involvement in society in order to facilitate economic
modernisation. The political elite of these States had to endow their countries with a
single moral, national authority which would transcend ethnic affiliations and at the
same time allow for individual involvement in the interests of the State. D Apter, the
leading authority on studies into the political religions of these decolonised countries,
coined the term to describe their political regimes, as it was through these instruments
that the state managed to maintain unity within the community. The State acted as a
moral entity, as the centre of a society which provided the sacred[,] employed in
many new nations to develop a system of political legitimacy and to aid in mobilising
the community for secular ends (Apter, 1963: 77). According to Apter, these emerging
political religions proved very attractive, as they satisfied human needs: Immortality,
identity, meaning and purpose are among the profound individual needs that both
church religion and political religion satisfy They make possible purpose in the face
of death and promote solidarity and cooperation (Apter, 1963: 91). Political religion is
also presented in this context as a functional equivalent to historical religions, as it
allows for the construction of a collective identity and gives meaning to the question of
immortality through the idea of continuity from one generation to the next within a
national community (Apter, 1963: 89)
1
. As we will see later, these arguments have been
used by contemporary researchers to support the claim that nationalism has become the
functional equivalent of historical religions.
It is in the heart of what is known as the School of Modernisation where we find one
of the most prestigious theoreticians of nationalism, E Gellner, taking the first steps
towards his theory. Gellner, although greatly indebted to functionalist ideas, developed
a much more comprehensive theory in order to explain the emergence of nationalism.
Nationalism as a functional equivalent of religion in the industrialised
era: the work of E Gellner
Gellner is considered the father of the modernists, for whom the notions of nation and
nationalism form part of the modern era. What makes Gellners work not only unique but
also original is the line of discussion which leads him to support a modernist thesis on
the origin of nationalism. His claim that the nation and nationalism are modern inven-
tions is not derived from historiographical research, but is a conclusion reached from his
wide, almost philosophical, perspective of the development of humanity. This is the
framework within which Gellner proposes his theory of nationalism.
Gellner saw nationalism as the logical conclusion to a stage in the history of
humanity in which industrial society predominated. It is a mechanism for social cohe-
sion which is exclusive to the modern era. Nationalism is therefore the functional
equivalent of the religion of pre-modern societies, in which nationalism could not
have existed due to the absence of the conditions necessary for the development of
such a mechanism for integration. According to Gellner, the history of humanity has
evolved through three types of society, which can be characterised according to their
economic structure: hunting and gathering societies, agricultural societies and scien-
tific-industrial societies.
In the context of this study it is important to highlight that one of the characteristics
of agricultural societies was the close link between culture, religion and the Church. This
relationship broke down with the advent of industrial society as, according to Gellner,
industrialisation brought with it the need for a culture which was accessible to the popu-
lation as a whole, something which only the State could guarantee. Culture was therefore
no longer linked to faith and the Church:
culture needs to be sustained as a culture, and not as the carrier or scarcely noticed
accompaniment of a faith. Society can and does worship itself or its own culture directly and
not, as Durkheim taught, through the opaque medium of religion. (Gellner, 1983: 135)
Religious symbols lose their validity as a route to the sacred. The totemic and theistic
symbols of tribal and agricultural societies are no longer required. In the nationalist era,
the sacred is experienced directly and not through symbols. As Durkheim stated in rela-
tion to the sacralisation of the French nation during the Revolution, society becomes its
own cult object without any need for transfiguration. In an industrial era society wor-
ships itself, and therefore also renders national culture sacred.
Nationalism and death
The notion of nationalism as a religion for the modern era has also been defended by
those who have recognised in it a new system of meaning which provides answers to
those ultimate questions which are at the heart of religion. It is often stated that
nationalism makes sense of the suffering caused by social relations, death and the desire
for immortality. This has led to the proposal that nationalism acts as (the functional
equivalent of) a religion of salvation of modern times. The sense nationalism gives to
death suffered in its name has even led to the suggestion that nationalism is a sacrificial
religion.
Nationalism as (the functional equivalent of) a religion of salvation
B Anderson is the author who has paid the most heed to the idea of nationalism as a
new religion of salvation and one which provides insights into the idea of death and the
desire for immortality. In his book Imagined Communities, he investigates these issues
in connection with his study on the cultural roots of nationalism. According to
Anderson, the fact that death and immortality are central issues in nationalism is the
key to differentiating nationalism from other contemporary ideologies such as Marxism
and Liberalism, and makes it possible to equate it with historical religions: [N]either
Marxism nor Liberalism are much concerned with death and immortality. If the nation-
alist imagining is so concerned, this suggests a strong affinity with religious imaginings
(Anderson, 1991: 10).
As Weber noted, the religions of salvation, such as Christianity, Hinduism and
Buddhism, serve the purpose of giving meaning to existence and the frailty of life.
Their persistence through so many centuries of human existence is explained by their
ability to provide answers to the issues of human suffering, especially death. They have
done so through the creation of highly influential systems of meaning which promise
immortality through the transformation of fatality into continuity. Anderson highlights
these aspects of historical religions by pointing out that the emergence of nationalism
in the 18th century coincided with the decline of religious thinking, which left existen-
tial problems such as suffering and death unanswered. In this context, nationalism
became a new focal point giving meaning to contingency through the secular transfor-
mation of fatality into continuity: It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into
destiny (Anderson, 1991: 12).
However, Anderson does not go on to analyse the process of secularisation and its
relationship with the origin of nationalism. He simply underlines the relationship exist-
ing between nationalism and the cultural systems that preceded it:
I am not claiming that the appearance of nationalism towards the end of the 18th century was
produced by the erosion of religious certainties Nor am I suggesting that somehow
nationalism historically supersedes religion. What I am proposing is that nationalism has to be
understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large
cultural systems that preceded it, out of which as well as against which it came into being.
(Anderson, 1991: 12)
The fact that immortality is promised in both nationalism and in the religions of salva-
tion has led to comparisons between them, and has also been the subject of comment on
various occasions by AD Smith. Like Anderson, Smith believes that nationalism cannot
simply be described as one more modern ideology:
only in the chain of generations of those who share an historic and quasi-familial
bond, can individuals hope to achieve a sense of immortality in eras of purely terrestrial
horizons. In this sense, the formation of nations and the rise of ethnic nationalisms appears
more like the institutionalisation of a surrogate religion than a political ideology. (Smith,
1989: 362)
The above references serve to show the extent to which the theory of nationalism as a
modern religion of salvation has been accepted by some of the most reputable names in
nationalist theory.
One particularly noteworthy theory is that held by L Greenfeld. She believes that
there is a close link between nationalism and the historical religions of salvation, but
that this does not derive from an alleged response to the issues of death and desire for
immortality. In an article entitled The Modern Religion? Greenfeld (1996) argues that
nationalism cannot provide an answer to the question of death, as it lacks the sense of
faith and transcendental orientation which characterises historical religions. This tran-
scendental orientation, together with a vision of the world which goes beyond the purely
physical, gives plausibility to the promise of immortality. If we are seeking elements
which serve to corroborate an analogy between nationalism and historical religions, we
will have to look beyond the issue of death.
According to Greenfeld, nationalism provides an answer to human suffering, although
not to the suffering of the body and its eventual decay, but rather to the suffering that
results from social order and relationships which produce rejection, humiliation, dishon-
our, injustice, etc. Greenfeld, like C Geertz, maintains that both historical religions and
nationalism are cultural systems which create a social order whereby these experiences
are justified and legitimated, and therefore render bearable the suffering caused by social
relations. Greenfeld asserts that nationalism is the functional equivalent of historical
religions, the former replacing the latter within a new structure of meaning which allows
for the development of individual and collective identities in the modern world
(Greenfeld, 1996: 170). In contrast to historical religions, which shaped the social con-
science of pre-modern society, nationalism has replaced religion as the main cultural
mechanism of social integration (Greenfeld, 1996: 171).
Greenfeld can thus identify with those who regard nationalism as a functional equiva-
lent of historical religions insofar as she is aware that in modern societies a shared cul-
tural structure can ensure social integration. In contrast to pre-modern societies, our
modern world and its profane order has been endowed with meaning thanks to national-
ism and its sacralisation of the secular.
Nationalisms secular focus, which makes it unlike religion, paradoxically explains why the
effects it produces on the human psyche and behaviour are often so similar With nationalism,
the heavens, so to speak, descend to earth; this world, the world of empirical reality and social
relations, becomes the sphere of the sacred. (Greenfeld, 1996: 173)
The author goes on to state that if religion were identical with spirituality, then national-
ism would truly be the modern religion and more of a religion, at that, than any we have
known before (Greenfeld, 1996: 173).
Nationalism as a sacrificial religion
Another reason for the positing of the theory of nationalism as a religion of modern times
is that nations are venerated because of the deaths produced in their name. There are
several versions of this theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity; here we will
analyse the works of B Kapferer, and C Marvin and DW Ingle.
Kapferer, like Anderson before him, has carried out an in-depth study into nationalist
imagery, and his book compares the nationalist movements of Sri Lanka and Australia.
Legends of People, Myths of State begins with the statement Nationalism makes the
political religious and places the nation above politics. The nation is created as an object
of devotion (Kapferer, 1988: 1). As far as Kapferer is concerned, the nation is made
sacred through its culture, which is itself worshipped as a religious entity, and it is the
religious contemplation of this culture which sparks nationalist passions. For this rea-
son the nationalist religions of both Australia and Sri Lanka should be considered as
such, not because of the beliefs and practices of the historical religions which they
incorporate, but rather as religions in their own right:
one modern nationalism is not necessarily more or less religious than another. Australians
assert a secular nationalism, Sinhalese an expressly Buddhist nationalism. What I stress is that
the religion of nationalism is in nationalism per se and not in the religious ideas it may
incorporate. (Kapferer, 1988: 5)
This supposition leads Kapferer to propose a general theory of nationalism and to
offer an alternative diagnosis of the process of secularisation:
War and death in war are common themes of modern nationalism What many scholars
recognise as the secularisation of the modern industrial world can be interpreted in another way.
Rather it is the transformation of the religious as the sacralisation of the political. (Kapferer,
1988: 136)
Marvin and Ingle, having also considered the religious nature of the notions of sacri-
fice and death, agree that nationalism is the religion of modernity and base their theory
on studies carried out on North American nationalism. According to these authors,
nationalism, like other sectarian religions, is by definition a religion of bloody sacrifice.
They maintain that the religious character of nationalism is therefore inherently linked to
sacrificial violence. More specifically, it is the collective organisation of a killing which
changes a nation into a community of blood and not text (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 27).
Marvin and Ingles thesis stems from the Durkheimian interpretation of totemism.
They justify its application to North American society specifically, and to modern soci-
eties in general, by maintaining that these societies are as primitive as any studied by
Durkheim. The formation and cohesion of all these groups is based on the same violent
mechanisms. These authors are therefore in agreement with the Durkheimian theory
that religion (the sacred) facilitates the foundation and cohesion of a group which is
represented in a totem, and therefore venerated. However, Marvin and Ingle maintain
that Durkheim was unable to discover the ultimate principle which conserves the unity
of the group and makes sense of the totem: The underlying cost of all society is the
violent death of its members. Our deepest secret, the collective group taboo, is the
knowledge that society depends on the death of these sacrificial victims at the hands of
the group itself (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 21). In other words, what ensures the cohe-
sion of the group and maintains a sense of unity is not the sacrifice of an enemy, but
rather the sacrifice of a member of the same group. This explains why the totem is the
violently sacrificed body symbolised by the flag. The flag ritually transformed is
the god of society renewed (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 11). In other words, the flag is the
god of nationalism and its mission is to organise death (Marvin and Ingle, 1999: 25).
These authors highlight the scant attention paid to this national symbol, and the ten-
dency to forget that the flag has become the sacred object on which North American
civil religion has been based. This tendency to forget is explained by the taboo
responsible for maintaining the cohesion of the group. In fact, according to Marvin and
Ingle, the sacred object the flag hides a truth which must remain hidden if national
group cohesion is to remain intact. Under no circumstance must it be revealed that this
totem stands for self-sacrifice for the benefit of the group as a whole. If this reality
became known and violence were shown to be a basis for social life, then the sacred
would no longer be untouchable, and the cohesion of the national group would unravel.
It would mean the disclosure of the fact that, on our road to civilisation, basic sacri-
ficial violence has not been cast aside.
Secularisation and nationalism: a critical review
As we have seen, the theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity is now widely
accepted in social sciences. In fact it would be true to say that it is this theory which is
most often applied when considering the relationship between secularisation and nation-
alism. We have also seen how this theory is based on a functional(ist) perspective
whereby in modern secular societies nationalism serves the functions previously carried
out by the totemic and theistic religions in traditional and primitive societies. If we give
credit to these theories, nationalism must be considered a religion of modernity, as it has
filled the void left by traditional religions. In an ostensibly secularised world, national-
ism has not only facilitated social cohesion but has also met our need for a belief in a
meaningful world, particularly as regards basic issues such as death, humiliation and
injustice. Nationalism has therefore had an important impact on the two areas which both
Durkheim and Weber believed fundamental to our understanding of religion.
In spite of or maybe even because of the fact that the theory of nationalism as a
religion of modernity is now commonplace, it is undeniable that this theory, in all its dif-
ferent versions, contains serious flaws. In our opinion, this should lead us to reconsider
the relationship between secularisation and nationalism in other theoretical fields. The
flaws stem from both the theory itself and the arguments on which the theory is based. In
fact, the theory that nationalism has become a religion of modernity is based on func-
tional and/or theological arguments, which in turn derive from certain assumed theories
on the religious nature of individuals and of life in society that, in the field of modern
social sciences, are no longer sustainable.
The idea that the void left by historical religions generated a need for nationalism as
a religion which would address a series of basic functions is clearly a theological
argument. This is part of Durkheims legacy, whereby the emergence of new religions
became necessary and was in fact inevitable in the light of the process of differentiation.
This line of argument appeared in the first works on the relationship between secularisa-
tion and nationalism within the framework of modernisation theories: Nations must
emerge to fulfil the functions and needs once satisfied by the old communities (Smith,
1971: 52).
Gellners theory is also based on a teleological and functionalist principle which is
difficult to uphold. His theory counters simplistic interpretations which explain the
sacralisation of nations by assuming that they are the only elements susceptible to
receiving the transferences of sacredness occurring as a consequence of secularisation.
These interpretations arrive at this argument by a process of elimination, without
explaining why nations show a tendency towards sacralisation; whereas Gellner offers a
much more coherent theory: in industrial societies nationalism takes the role, or becomes
the functional equivalent, of historical religions. According to Gellner, nationalism is
functional within an industrial society, and it is this functionality which explains its
appearance. However, there are two possible criticisms of this line of thought. The first
is that the development of modern social sciences makes it impossible to admit that a
functional necessity can satisfy itself and therefore render a necessity a cause. Secondly,
the functional analysis proposed by Gellner turns individuals into mere puppets manipu-
lated according to the requirements of an industrial system.
The loss of traditional links does not necessarily lead to an emergence of new secular
religions. Greenfeld comments on the theological argument which forms the basis of the
theory of nationalism as a religion of modernity:
Secularisation, it is claimed, left certain essential human needs unfulfilled and made
nationalism the substitute for religion necessary Such an inference, however, is
erroneous. The fact that nationalism replaced religion as the order-creating system
implies nothing at all about the historical connection between them, and lends no
justification to the kind of sociological theology that is the essence of such reasoning.
(Greenfeld, 1996: 176)
Greenfeld is critical of this theological reasoning, which she claims derives from
Gellner and Anderson. She does, however, share their view that nationalism is the func-
tional equivalent of religion in that nationalism has replaced religion as the primary
cultural mechanism for social integration (Greenfeld, 1996: 191). Greenfeld thus also
contributes to the theoretical framework which forms the basis for the theory of national-
ism as a modern religion, or its functional equivalent. In fact, all the aforementioned
authors have developed theories which, although differing in detail, are deeply rooted in
Durkheimian theory, whereby integration in modern societies is the product of a com-
mon culture, of a cultural consensus, built upon a set of shared norms and values which
become sacred. As we have already noted, this premise is shared by those theoreticians
who interpret national political rituals as mechanisms for social integration and who
understand that in societies undergoing a process of modernisation, nationalism becomes
a political religion responsible for integrating life in society. This is also the notion, albeit
differing in the details, on which Gellner bases his work.
This premise is extremely controversial. It has been scrutinised by the sociology of
religion under the microscope of civil religion. It was K Dobbelaere who realised the
implications of such a premise when raising the question: Do modern differentiated
societies need cultural integration, and what role does religion still play in it?
(Dobbelaere, 1981: 38). In this regard, R Fenn is one of the theoreticians who have the
most keenly questioned the idea that religion, or its functional equivalents in the form of
civil religions, provides the basis for the cultural integration of modern societies (Fenn,
1972, 1977). In our opinion, one of the most convincing answers to this question was
given by BS Turner in his book on the sociology of religion, where he states that it is
difficult to see how the analysis of religion as a social cement can be fully satisfactory with
respect to modern society. Even in its amended form as a civil religion, the notion of a sacred
canopy embracing contemporary society is not wholly convincing. (Turner, 1991: 58)
Turner is conclusive when he extends this argument to nationalism:
Most civil-religion arguments or arguments concerning nationalism are weak theories which
point to the presence of certain allegedly common practices and suggest that these have
integrative consequences the civil religion is at best loosely and only periodically connected
with the reactivation of a problematic conscience collective, but the precise connections
between these common sentiments and the structural arrangements of industrial society are
inadequately specified. (Turner, 1991: 59)
In modern societies, social integration is not brought about by cultural cohesion. Religion
has lost its capacity to bring together different sacred forms under the single united ban-
ner of a moral universe. The process of differentiation has meant the dispersal of the
sacred to spheres beyond the control of religion. It is in this sense that we can conclude
that modern societies are secular societies.
Alongside the notion that modern societies need a consensus of norms to ensure inte-
gration lies another argument which serves as the basis for the theory of nationalism as a
modern religion. This argument derives from the conception of nationalism as a device
which gives meaning to elementary experiences such as death. If we agree with Anderson
and Smith, two leading theoreticians on nationalism, we could conclude that nationalism
is a religion because it satisfies our desire for immortality. But is it true that nationalism
gives meaning to death? Is a nation a community which provides transcendence?
We should first clarify what is meant by transcendence. We refer to the answers pro-
vided by historical religions to matters of the afterlife and the immortality of an indi-
viduals soul. Death acquires meaning because it involves a supernatural reality. As we
understand it, in the case of nationalism, the death of an individual involves no tran-
scendence to meet the need for immortality. The nation does not provide any extra mean-
ing to make a militant nationalist feel that his physical death leads to an afterlife or
transcendence. Such meaning is only provided by supernatural religions. Moreover, the
mere fact of feeling part of a nation does not make it any easier to endow death with
meaning. (Militant) nationalists can find meaning in death, suffering, etc. not through
their national(ist) ideas, but rather through their religious beliefs. This is one of
the reasons why it cannot be stated that nationalism replaces religion. In this respect the
differences between the religious community and the ethno-national community are
obvious. As D Schnapper points out: A reference to matters transcendental will not hold
the same meaning as an inscription in a historic community nor as a political project. The
meaning experienced through religion is not that of a secular religion (Schnapper,
1993: 158). This sociologist therefore concludes that
it is too simplistic to describe nationalism as a substitute or supplement for supernatural,
historical religions or to state that nationalism has become a surrogate religion A
transcendental relationship is a different experience altogether from a political project, even
when the latter takes on an emotional quality: a sociologist should be able to take this into
account. (Schnapper, 1993: 158)
We agree with Schnapper. Transcendence linked to the supernatural is a specific charac-
teristic of historical religions, and is closely linked to the question of death. The experi-
ence of a national community is not the same as that of a religious community, whose
members, in one form or another, are linked to a supernatural power in a transcendental
environment which enables them to find meaning in a life that continues beyond the
boundaries of physical death. This kind of environment does not form a part of national-
ist thinking.
Nationalism therefore does not give meaning to death. However, in certain circum-
stances, nation and death can be closely related, particularly when death and suffering
are the result of the fight for a national(ist) cause. When killing or death takes place in
the name of the nation, nationalism can confer meaning on these experiences through
the construction of structures of meaning which explain or legitimise them. Weber has
already highlighted how essential experiences such as suffering and death create the
social conditions necessary for the social production of sacrality. When a national cause
creates these experiences, nationalism becomes an important focus of sacralisation. A
good example is one we have already discussed: the work of Kapferer on Sri Lankan
and Australian nationalisms. But even here it would be wrong to infer that nationalism
is a device for satisfying the desire for immortality. In fact, the sacred obligations
sought by nations can lead to suffering and death, but this does not necessarily mean
that nationalism provides an answer to the question of death as the inevitable destiny of
human beings.
It is no accident that when Anderson discusses the relationship between nationalism
and death he mentions the tombs of the unknown soldiers.
2
We believe that the error
committed by Anderson and Smith lies in their confusion of the question of an individu-
als immortality with something quite different: the immortality of the nation itself. It is
only in this way that we can discuss nations as transcendent communities, not because
they make sense of the death of an individual, but rather because they themselves are
immortal, eternal. It is for this reason that they can be considered cultural, secular sys-
tems capable of providing meaning and creating social order.
The fact that nationalism makes powerful legitimisations of the deaths and suffering
which take place in its name should not, however, lead us to conclude, as do Marvin
and Ingle, that nationalism is a sacrificial religion. This thesis has value if its
application is restricted to North American nationalism, as the latters imperialist
nature renders sacrifice in the name of the nation necessary, but it cannot be extrapo-
lated to all nationalisms. The bond created by nationalism cannot be explained by its
attitude to death. This does not mean that a national bond has not on many occasions
been constructed or consolidated thanks to the shedding of sacrificial blood, but this
fact cannot explain the essential nature of such a bond.
All this leads us to conclude that nationalism should not be considered a religion of
modernity, as it does not perform any of the functions attributed to it. Nationalism does
not solve problems of social integration, nor does it give meaning to essential experi-
ences such as death. As for the frequent comparisons made between nationalism and
religion, we should in fact be seeking quite the opposite; given that these are devices for
giving meaning within two very different types of community, we should be looking at
clear, well defined differences between them. In this respect we agree with E Balibar
when he states that
attention will turn then, as the attention of political philosophy and sociology have turned for
three centuries, towards the analogy of religion, making nationalism and patriotism out to be a
religion if not indeed the religion of modern times In reality, the opposite argument is
correct. Incontestably, national ideology involves ideal signifiers on to which may be
transferred the sense of the sacred and the affects of love, respect, sacrifice and fear which have
cemented religious communities; but that transfer only takes place because another type of
community is involved here. (Balibar, 1991: 95)
The relationship between secularisation and nationalism should therefore be classed
alongside other theoretical frameworks, other than the various versions of the thesis of
nationalism as a modern religion. A nation cannot be considered a community which
fulfils the same functions as a religion, nor can its emergence be explained by the need
to fill the void left by the abandonment of a religion. This functionalist-evolutionary idea
presents the relationship between religion and nationalism in terms of a model which can
be considered linear and compensatory; nationalism therefore appears to be a new reli-
gion due to the decline of historical religions. If we were to follow this linear, compensa-
tory model to its logical conclusion, we could not then account for the nationalisms that
are specifically based on religion. What is the role of nationalism in these cases, if the
historical religions are not in decline?
Nationalism cannot thus be considered a religion which questions the very process of
secularisation, but rather the opposite: the raison detre of nationalism is found in the
process of the secularisation of political power. It is here, and not because of any social
cohesion or justification of death, that we find the nub of the question. Modernity brought
with it the institutionalisation of a new society which required an absolute to replace the
old legitimacy and authority of the Church. Secularisation saw the political sphere break
away from the religious and create this absolute, which was to become fundamental to
political power. H Arendt traces a line linking the traditional religious sanctioning of poli-
tics, the secularisation of political power and its sacralisation to the absolute of the nation:
the incarnation of a divine absolute on earth was first represented by the vicars of Christ
himself, by the bishop and pope, who were succeeded by kings who claimed rulership by virtue
of a divine rights until eventually, absolute monarchy was followed by the no less absolute
sovereignty of the nation. (Arendt, 1963: 195)
It was the French Revolution which marked the beginning of the modern period when
sovereignty (and sacrality) would be transferred from the king to the nation.
Once more we see how the Revolution marks a milestone in the relationship between
the secularisation and sacralisation of nations. Durkheim understood this, and as we have
already discussed, interpreted the Revolution as a historical experience which gave rise
to a new civil religion and temporarily served to facilitate social integration through the
sacralisation of lay concepts such as fatherland. In the light of this, could we now go on
to describe revolutionary cults as examples of the Durkheimian theory of religion and of
the sacred? Durkheim certainly believed that the revolutionary experience demonstrated
the heuristic value of his theory of religion. However, what the Revolution brought with
it was not a change in the forms of religion which integrate society, but rather a change
in the sources of power which required sacralisation. La fte rvolutionnaire 1789
1799 by M Ozouf provides valuable insights into this topic, and leads us to conclude
that the revolutionary process was not a religious experience, but rather stemmed from
a need for the sacred, as a crucial element in the institutionalisation of a new society. A
society instituting itself must sacralise the very deed of its institutionalisation (Ozouf,
1976: 332). The French Revolution in fact transferred the sacrality reserved for the
Catholic Church to a new religion of the patria.
3
If the French Revolution can be seen as critical to the understanding of the secu-
larisation of political power and the birth of the nation, Durkheims legacy has led to
the French Revolution being presented as an illustration of the relationship between
secularisation and nationalism by the theoreticians who advocate nationalism as a
modern religion. According to this model, the void left by Christianity was filled by
the new religion of nationalism, and this explains its emergence. What the French
experience demonstrates, however, is a specific case of the sacralisation of a nation
which takes place in opposition to a supernatural religion. We therefore find our-
selves faced with a nationalism constructed in opposition to religion. However, we
must inevitably conclude with Greenfeld that nationalism certainly did not emerge
amidst the religious void it aimed to fill: The varied and complex history of the
relationship between nationalism and religion cannot be narrowed to a linear
sequence. Though a product of independent developments, nationalism emerged in a
world seething with religious enthusiasms (Greenfeld, 1996: 176). Indeed, we can-
not examine the relationship between religion and nationalism by taking a purely
linear, evolutionist-functionalist model whose only point of reference is the specific
French case. According to Greenfeld, the historical connection between secularisa-
tion and nationalism deriving from this model does not stand up when analysing
other forms of nationalism.
As we have seen above, the French experience serves as a model to show that the
relationship between secularisation and nationalism cannot be generalised. This experi-
ence is an ideal example of the transformation of historical religion into secular national-
ism, a typical-ideal process that serves as a reference for the narrowest theories on
modernisation and secularisation, for which modernity implies the decline of ethnic
communities and religion, and its substitution by forms of social integration based on the
nation-state and on civic and secular nationalism.
This linear-evolutionist scheme yields before the contributions made by the new
sociology of religion, which states that the process of secularisation does not involve
the decline of religion, and that religion is not incompatible with modernity. For this
reason, and in view of the excessive emphasis given to the French case, we should con-
sider the different kinds of relationship between nationalism and religion existing in the
modern era. In agreement with W Spohn, we could apply S Einsestadts concept of
multiple modernity to show the multiple forms of relationship existing between religion
and nationalism, one of which would be the French example, which is itself a European
exceptionalist model of secular nationalism (Spohn, 2003; Rieffer, 2003). We could
therefore follow in Spohns footsteps and distinguish different geographical areas
according to their pattern of secularisation. But it would also be possible to show the
fundamental difference between those nationalisms which build a nation in opposition
to the Church, as in the French example, and those where religion plays a role in national
identity. The analysis of the relationship between secularisation and nationalism may be
different depending on whether the type of nationalism is religious or secular. In the
first case, national identity is constructed around the backbone of religion, while in the
second, national identity is constructed from secular traits which have no connection
with supernatural religions.
When considering the idea that nationalism emerges to fill a gap left by religion, we
find many cases of nationalisms which spring from religious contexts. For this reason, a
thesis which states that nationalism substitutes religion can be upheld only in the cases
of secular nationalism and not in cases of religious nationalism, as the latter bases its
definition of itself on religion.
Notes
1. Although Apter centred his analysis on the political religions of the new nations which had
arisen from the decolonised States, the concept of political religions has also been used to
explain some aspects of the ideologies of already consolidated States in the West, as in the case
of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and Nazism in Germany (Sironneau, 1982).
2. It should be remembered that according to Anderson, the significance for nationalism of the
Tombs of the Unknown Soldiers provides the strongest evidence that nationalism is a great
cultural system which should be aligned with other cultural systems such as the old religious
community, and not with political ideologies, as is commonly the case. Could we possibly
imagine a Tomb of the Fallen Liberals? (Anderson, 1991: 10).
3. Along the same lines, L Hunt has highlighted the role played by the execution of Louis XVI
in the sacralisation of the new national society which was under institutionalisation. Under the
old regime, the monarchy would have formed the sacred centre of French society. Therefore
(k)illing the king was essential to the regeneration the resacralisation of the French nation
(Hunt, 1988: 34). According to R Girards concept of the sacred, the execution of Louis XVI
was a way of protecting society from its own violence and thus restoring harmony in a nascent
society (Hunt, 1988: 39).
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Biography
Jose SANTIAGO is Professor of Sociology at the University Complutense of Madrid and a mem-
ber of GERICR (Groupe Europen de Recherche Interdisciplinaire sur le Changement Religieux)
and GRESCO (Grupo de Estudios Socio-Culturales Contemporneos). He is the author (with A
Prez-Agote) of La nueva pluralidad religiosa (2009, Ministerio de Justicia ) and La situacin de
la religin en Espaa a principios del siglo XXI (2005, CIS). He is the editor (with A Prez-Agote)
of Religin y poltica en la sociedad actual (2008, UCM-CIS).
Address: Departamento de Sociologa III (Estructura Social), Facultad de Ciencias Polticas y
Sociologa, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Campus de Somosaguas, Pozuelo de Alarcn,
28223, Madrid, Spain.
Email: jasantiago@cps.ucm.es.

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