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CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM
NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND (SEA 08)
1240 ISAAC HULL AVENUE SE
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD DC 20376-8010 5800
Ser OBB-MP/0077
6 Jun 2014
CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA (UNCLASSIFIED upon removal of
Enclosures (S} 1 (8} 1 (111 (12} 1 (18} 1 (19} 1 (26} 1 and (27})
FIRST ENDORSEMENT on RDML Kenneth M. Perry, USN
5800 Ser NOO/C-021 ltr of 15 Mar 14
From: Commander, Military Personnel Detachment,
Office of Naval Reactors, Department of Energy
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO STAFF QUALIFICATION CHEATING
AT NUCLEAR POWER TRAINING UNIT CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
ON OR ABOUT 03 FEBRUARY 2014
Ref: (b) Part V, MCM (2012 Ed.)
(c) VCNO ltr 5810 Ser N09D/14U112921 of 21 Mar 14
1. The report of investigation is hereby forwarded pursuant to
the guidelines in reference (a). The investigating officer's
findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations are approved,
subject to amplifying comments below.
2. The investigation team interviewed current staff, former
staff, and students, performed detailed forensic analysis, and
reviewed relevant documentation.
a. After interviewing more than BOO personnel including all
personnel currently assigned to the Nuclear Power Training Unit
(NPTU) Charleston and all personnel since 2004 who have
completed the written staff certification examination for the
Engineering Watch Supervisor watchstation (EWS exam) , the
investigating officer found that 78 personnel over the past
seven years were involved in the compromise of the EWS exam on
some level, including some individuals who have been reassigned
to the fleet.
b. The investigation examined additional areas and found no
evidence of cheating in any other staff qualification
examinations at Moored Training Ship (MTS) 626 or any cheating
at MTS-635, the other prototype at NPTU Charleston.
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CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA
CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA (UNCLASSIFIED upon removal
of Enclosures (5), (8), {11, {12), (18), (19), (26), and {27))
Subj : COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO STAFF QUALIFICATION CHEATING
AT NUCLEAR POWER TRAINING UNIT CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
ON OR ABOUT 03 FEBRUARY 2014
c . The investigating officer found that the l evels of
involvement ranged from knowledge of the compromise, to the use
of the exam key and dissemination to other sailors.
3 . Pursuant to references (b) and (c), the following actions
have been taken to hold sailors accountable for their actions
while assigned to NPTU Charleston . A total of seventy- eight
(78) sai l ors were f ound t o have been i nvol ved i n cheat ing while
assigned to the NPTU Charleston. The breakdown in the numbers
is as follows:
a. Ten (10) of the more serious cases are still under
investigation by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS) . The results of the NCIS investigation will be evaluated
after completion of the report, and all appropriate
administrative and disciplinary actions will be taken.
b . Sixty-eight (68) cases were adjudicated at Admiral's
Mast (Nonjudicial Punishment (NJP)).
(1) Thirty-six (36) of the 68 sailors were found to have
committed misconduct and were awarded punishment. Punishment
was suspended for two of the 36 sailors based on their minimal
involvement in the incident and their strong potential for
rehabilitation. The remaining thirty-four (34) sailors, in
addition to punishment received at Admiral's Mast, were
administratively removed from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program (NNPP), had their Security Clearances removed, and are
being processed for administrative separation from the U.S.
Naval service.
(2 ) Thirty-two (32) sailors were exonerated at Admiral ' s
Mast; their cases were dismissed entirely.
4. Chain of Command accountability actions are currently under
review. Appropriate actions will be taken to hold accountable
officials bearing responsibility for allowing incidents of
cheating at NPTU Charleston to continue undetected for at least
seven years.
5. Based on the facts discerned throughout the course of this
investigation, I am conducting a comprehensive review of
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CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA
CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA {UNCLASSIFIED upon removal
of Enclosures {5), {8), {11, {12), {18), {19), {26), and {27))
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO STAFF QUALIFICATION CHEATING
AT NUCLEAR POWER TRAINING UNIT CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA
ON OR ABOUT 03 FEBRUARY 2014
integrity throughout the NNPP. Specifically, I am pursuing two
k ey lines of effort to strengthen the culture of integrity and
ex amination security throughout the program.
a . I am implementing best practices across the program to
ensure robust measures are in place to mitigate the possibility
of examination compromises . This is being accomplished through
a combination o f admi ni s t ration and t echno l ogi cal measures.
b. I have directed additional assessments to improve our
understanding of the motives behind lapses of integrity, so that
we can address the fundamental issues in the culture, and
reinforce the culture of integrity across the Program.
Strengthening the integrity curriculum currently in place across
the training program will help fortify behaviors and values
expected from nuclear trained Sailors, and are critical to
continuing the success of the nuclear Navy.
6 . Although the great majority of the approximately 16,000
nuclear-trained Sailors continue to perform their duties with
integrity and honor, this incident identified a number of areas
in need of improvement in the Program. The NNPP has taken this
as an opportunity to conduct a thorough self-evaluation,
establish root causes, and apply appropriate corrective actions .
Copy to:
NAVIG
NCIS
J. M. RICHARDSON
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CONFIDENTIAL - RESTRICTED DATA

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