t d , _

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HANDBOOK OF
36
POSI TI VE PSYCHOLO GY
Ed.i tod, by
C. R, Snyci er
5hene
f .
Lopez
OXFOiTD
vxl 9( r , t l t ? r ' l l l l
zqtl
I
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How We Become Moral
The Sour ces of Mor al Mot i vat i on
Mi chael Schul man
The fronf-page stories in our newspapers pro-
vide us, almost daily, with horrifi.c descriptions
of murders, assaul$, rapes, and tyrannies. Yet
there are other 5fsliss-usually deeper in the
pages of the paper/ with srnaller headlines-rhat
recount extraordinary acts of moral courage,
hndness, and self-sacrifice.
'
In rrying to explain the good and bad of our
species, we psychologists (like newspaper edi-
tors) have also paid much more attenrion to our
malevolence than our moraliry. In classical psy-
choanalytic theory, for example, aggression and
acquisitiveness are viewed as fundamental to
our narures, whereas our moral motives emerge
only after an arduous process of socialization
(prirnarily through the supposed resolution o.f
the Oeclipus complex, at about age 7, according
to Freud, t92717960). Similarly, in prominent
behavioral theories, concern for others is based
on learned, or secondary, reinforcers that are
derived from rnore egocentric primary reinforc-
ers (e.g., Hull, Lg52; Slcinner, 1,g7!J,
Such motivational theories explain behavior
in terrns of some benefit or reinforcement to the
individual doing the behaving. But moraliry is
about geffing reinforced by some benefit to a4-
. ' - * .
other. Therefore, n theory of rnoral motivation
has to account for the sources of this capaciry
to be reinforced by beneficial outcomes to oth-
ers-an unususl challenge.
Correspondingly, a theory of moral education
has to fiigure out how to strengthen this capocity
so rhat individuals become rruly concerned
about the well-being of others, rqther than be-
having wefl merely to acquire external rewnrds
such as money or p.raise, or fo avoid punishers
such as a spanking or ostracism. This, too, is
challenging because radirional motivational re-
search has been Iocused much more on how
already-esrablished reinforcers (like food,
money, and praise) strengthen behavior than on
how to go about srrengthening reinforcers
(Schulman, 1990, 1996).
Unfortunately, even the "moral develop-
rnent" theories of Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg
(1969i otter little insight into moral morivation.
These theorists paid little attention to the
soilrces of aad indfuidual diJferences in our
moral motives. lnstead, they looked for univer-
sals (6r "stages") in children' s conceptiorts of
justice and propriety as they age (conceptions
which, by the way, rarely have been found to
499
\
5OO PART VI . I I , I TERFEBSONAL APPROACHES
t:orrcl ate wi rh measures of moral acti on such a-.
hel pi ng or honesr y; sce Schul man end Mekl er ,
799+, pp.16-77).
My goal i n t hi s chapr er i s t o show r har our
rnoral rnotives are &s primarv, pclrverful, and
emot i onal l y i nt ense as our aggr essi ve and ac-
qui si ti ve oncs; that concern for others emerges
sponf nr r cor r sl y i n ver y young chi l dr en
f uncon-
nccted t0 any devel opmenml srages and l ong be-
fore thc Oedi pus compl ex i s supposedl y rc-
sol ved); and chor moral i ry i s so cruci al to our
survi val as a speci es rhat i r hss evol ved i n fhree
sep6rate forms, produci ng si gni fi cant i ndi vi dual
di fferences i n "moral sqyl es."
Mtrrder ond mayhem rnay grab the headl i nes,
bur i f ki ndness, or ar l east ci vi l i ty, were not
morc comrnon, thcn the humcn race woul d
l i kc' l y have gone the way of rhe di nosaurs. i n-
deed, vari ous studi cs show rhat chi l dren per-
form fnr more hel pful and cooperati ve i nrerac-
ti ons than hosti l e oncs (Hay & Rhei ngol d, 1984;
Wnlrers, Perrce, & Dnhms
,
L95n, although the
hosti [e ones tend to get noti ced more.
A Theory of Moral Moti vati on
Msrk Twain (!967), conremplating the sources
of moraliry reckoned that
"there are several
good protecrions againsr remptnrions but the
surest
js
cowardice" (p. 4j. Obviously, fear of
punishment does keep sorne people frorn yield-
ing to ternptations and doing harm-at least
some of rhe time. Bur we do not ordinarily
thi nk of fear of puni shment as a moral moti ve.
On the contrary, the rnoral person resists temp-
tati on and treats others wel l out of "i nternal "
moti vcs, doi ng so even when he or she can get
away wi rh doi ng otherwi se.
5o what is the source of our moral motives I
Actually, one can distinguish at least three in-
de pendent sources-empathy, principles, and
moml affiliations-suggesting that nature has
been engaging in what engineers call "redun-
dont" design. Engineers build in redundancy so
that vital mechanisms have brckup sysrems in
case they fail. Nature often uses the sarne srrat-
egy, which is presumably why many of our vi-
tal organs and senses corne in pairs, such as our
kidneys, ovaries, eyes, and ears.
lf moral motivation does derive from three
independent sources (indicaring
redundant de-
sign), if suggests rhar consciences, liJce kidneys,
are crirical to our sunrival. We, like all social
cnimals, flourish as our group flourishes, and
our group fl nuri shes best when there i s har-
mony and hel pful ness amang
.members.
Br:r
har monv and hel pf ul ness sr e not aut omat i c f nr
us. i r i o, r ve ar e emi nent l v copabl e of har mi ng
each other and cre frequentl y roused to do sn.
Nor, l i l .e some soci al ani mal s., do rve have i n
-
sti ncti ve mechsni sms to hel p us resol ve confl i cts
( e. g. , we do not cut omadcal l y t er mi ncce an at -
uck against an opponent who signals submis-
si on by bari ng hi s neck). Insread, whar we hu
-
rnans do hnve, or are capabl e of havi ng, nrc
porverful consci ences rhat move us to care about
others and aspi re rcrward hi gh moral i deal s.
What Does
"Moral "
Mean?
Philosophers, theologians, mlk show hosts, and
countiess others have argued endlessly about
tl re meani ng of moral , Some of the confusl on
arises from the ftct that in common discourse
the word has more than one meani ng, As used
in this chapter, moral refers only to acts itr-
tended to produce kind andlor
fair
outcontes.
This is a core meaning of rhe term in ell rnajor
cthical and religious rradirions and probobly is
its most common usage.
Thus, according to rhis definition, when we
call an act rnoral, it is not because of some phys-
ical aspect of the behavior or even because some
good was achieved; rather, it is because we have
inferred that 6ome good intention lay behind
the act, that the actor' E rrue goal was to produce
a kind outcome m benefit one or more others,
or s fair outcome to provide each relevant party
with the tenefit hc or she deserves (typically
based on consi deradons of equi ty or equal i ry),
In other words, we have inferred that the rrue
reinforcer for the act was benefit ro one or more
others, and that the act was not undertaken out
of coercion or obligation or to induce reciproc-
i ry. (When we refer rc peopl c as moral , and not
just
their acts, it is because we believe their ac-
tions generully spring from such benevolcnt in-
tentions.)
But the intention to produce kind and fair
outcomes is nor the only meaning of rnoral. For
examplc, serual morality generally refers to re-
fraining frorn sex except in approved ways un-
der authorized clrcunstances, and its motive
sources (such as religious and communiry
traditions, sexual rivalries, faboos, and aver-
sionsJ are very different from those motivaring
the inclinarion ro rreat orhers t<indly and fairly.
lndeed, many of us know " geod" (that is, kind)
peopl e rvho do nor adhere to tradi ri onal sexual
i
I
i
. t
-r.-
codes, as l vel l as "bad"
frhat
i s, ntean) peopl e
rrho.do. Sexual
' behavior
ihat rnight be censured
in ccrcain sexualiw-based moralitiEs
fsuch
as
premari tal or gav scxj mi ghr nor even enter i nto
consi deradons of characrer i n a rnordi rv based
on kindness and fairness. (ln this regard, be-
ceu.se we ss a society are iess inclined than ear-
l i er generari ons to base j udgrnents
of characrer
on sexual behavi or, when rel i gi ous l eaders and
menral heolrh professionals call for a rerurrl to
tradi ti onal sexual mores, they frequentl y j usti fy
thei r posi ti on more i n rerrns of cl ai ms about
physical and psychological health than virrue;
e. g. , Uckona, 1991, p. 357. )
l n another di fferent concepri on of moral i ty,
moral starus i s conti ngent on obedi ence to au-
th.ori ti es, such as to porents or rel i gi ous or po-
[i ti cal l eaders. Here, roo, the moti vati onal
sources are not the same as those that prompc
kindness and fairness. Indeed, there are many
i nstances when
the moral i ty of obedi ence and
the moral i ry of kl ndness and fai rness pul l i n op-
poslre directions (which is why, in rhis day and
oge, few would nccept
"I was jusr following or-
ders" as fl tenabl e moral defense).
The Three Moral Systems
A comprehensive understanding of moral mo-
tivation musf take into account three separare
and i ndependenr sources: (a) the arousal o[ em-
pathy; (b) moral affiliations (or identifications
with moral models); and (c) the commitment to
principles or personal standards o[ right and
rvrong. In more experiencial terms, one rnight
sry we become moral because we are: (a) rnoved
by people' s feelings (especially thcir sufferingJ;
(b) moved by the goodness of moral models;
and (c) moved by ideas of the " geed," such as
nobl e pri nci pl es and i deal s.
Ernpathy
Ernpathy refers to rhar remarkable capaciry we
hurnans have to experi ence what other peopl e
ilre feeling, ro imagine ourselves in another' s
psychological
place and feel his or her joys and
sorrows as if they were our own. Like many
psychological
attribures, rhe capacity fo.r empa-
rhy rnay be a normal l y di stri buted characteri s-
tic, and, as Marrin Hoffman (1977) and others
have demonsfrated,
chi l dren ofi en begi n to ex-
hi bi t si gns of empathy, sponraneousl y, bv thei r
18th monrh. For exampl e, chi l dren of thi s age
CHAPTEH 36. HOW WE BECOME MORAL 501
rvi l l shorv concern and sadness rr.hen a parenr
or si bl i ng appears sad and al so offer hel p, sav,
b-v offering m share rheir "comforter" bianlcei
(\' oung. Fox, & Zahn-l,Vaxler, 19991. Ernparhv.
thu-., becomcs a source of rnorat moti vari on bv
i nduci ng rl rrui sri c acrs ro rnal ce someone el se
feel betrer.
Empathic responses are akin ro reflexes in the
sense that rhey are unl earned reacti ons to rhe
emoti onol sreres of orhers- And rhey can be ex-
traordi nari l y i ntense. Anyone l vho has been un-
abl e to ease the pai n of someone he or she hos
fel t t' or-a
parenr wi th a hurt or si ck chi l d, for
i nstance-l cnows horv i ncense rhe psychol ogi cal
di scomforr of an empathi c response can bc. Bur
chi l dren and odul ts do not fcel empathy for
everyone; someone perceived as an enemy or
even a competi ror i s not l i kel y to crousc em-
pathy (see Cassel l , thi s vol ume]. The more si m-
ilar we believe orhers are to us, rhe more likely
we will be to etnporhize wirh them and rreat
them well (Eisenberg, 1983).
A growing body of research by C. Daniel Bar-
son (L990; see abo Batson, Ahmad, Ushner, &
Tsang, this volume), among others, has dcm-
onstrared a direct relarionship betrnreen ernparhy
and altruisrn: We tend ro help and prorecr those
widr whom we ernparhize and are less likely to
do them harm (Feshbach & Feshbach, Iglgi
Roberts & Strayer, 7996; Toi & Batson, 1982).
Conversely, low empathy scores are associated
with a higher propensity for antisocial behavior
and delinquency (Cohen & Strayer, 1996).
The rccent research into Wfllf an{s syndrorne,
c genetically based disorder, which ([ike Dou.rn' s
syndrotneJ has physiognomic, physioiogical,
and behavioral nranifestations, rnay help un-
cover the geneti c roots of empathy. Among the
characterisrics of those born with rhis syndrome
are unusual l y strong empathi c responses to oth-
ers (Eower, 2000J.
Moral Affiliations
Moral affiliacions/ our second sourcl' of moral
motivation, produce rnoraliry through idenrifi-
cati on wi th "good" othcrs such as a parent, a
mentor/ a polidcal or religious figure, or even a
fictional character. It is common for children to
l ove goodness i n others, sponraneousl y and
wi thour i nstructi on or prompti ng. Thi s may be
why so rndny chi l dren are enrhral l ed by Mr,
Rogers, Bcrney, and orher caring characrers. No
one has to teach them this response or force
them to watch these TV shorvs. Chi l dren do noc
5@, PART VI . I NTERPEBSONAL APPROACHES
rurn on A' f r. Rogers or Banrcy for adt' enrure or
laugh-.; no, they wsq6l1-seidly and ardendv-
because rhsy are narurai l v attrrcred ro exem-
pl ars oF goodness-
'
Throui h such i denri fi ori ons rvi rh moral ex-
empl ars, chi l dren l earn what ro s.av ro rhern-
sel ves and what rhev s/roul d do when faced rvi th
t empt or i ons, t hei r or vn nest v i mpul ses" or ot h-
I
. .
. .
. ' er s i n. n' ei d. T. h. y. 1vqn! . t o l i ve. up r o t he. st an- .
.
dards of the admi red model s, to be l i ke thenr,
feel one wi th them, and be worrhy of thei r ad-
mi r ar i on i n t ur n. ' The wor ds and i mages of r he
model then become gui des for behavi or (Sears,
Mrccoby, & Levi n, 1957j .
As chi l dren enfer rhe grade school years,
thei r moral model s may become l ess genteel
model s of vi rrue thsn Mr. Rogers and Barney,
For boys, rhey are ofren acri on herocs who, for
the sake of j usti ce
and decency, a.p t.he "bad
grlys" into oblivion. Heroines for girls are fre-
quentl y cari ng fi gures wi th spunk and dcrer-
mi nati on who can take charge when someonc
nceds hel p. In thei r gqmes and fanrasi es, chi l -
dren cornmonly take on thc personas of their
herocs, i denti Fyi ng wi th them qui re l i reral l y-
someti mes even weari ng thei r costumes-snd
i nternal i zi ng thei r val ues. (Unforrunarel y, some
youngsi ers i denti fy more rcodi l y wi rh desruc-
rive.figures, prrricularly if they appear power-
ful , perhaps because these chi l dren are enti ced
more by images o[ domination and force rhan
by i mages of l ove.)
Many of us have hnd moral models-some
renl, some fictional-rhar have stayed in o.ur
thoughrs throughour our l i ves, gui di ng and i n-
spi ri ng us to express our besi sel ves. Ir mi ghr
be a rel i gi ous fi gure l i ke Chri sr or the Rebbe, a
loving grandparent, a fictional chara*er like At-
ricus Finch in To Kill e Mockingbird, or the srir-
ri ng presence of Marti n Lurher Ki ng
Jr.;
for
Martin Luther King
]r.,
ir was Gandhi.
Our communi ons wi th our moral model s ure
frequentl y i ntcnse (even i f they are fi *i onal
characters or peopl e we have onl y read aboutJ,
and sur desi re ro honor and l eel one wi th thcm
gi ves them substanci al i nfl uence over us, evl i n
l eadi ng to confessi ons of trarugressi ons i n order
to reestabl i sh our sense of bel ongi ng i n rhe
communi ty of rhe good (Sears et a.!., L952). Em-
ul ari ng such good fi gures and tuki ng on rhei r
values as our own makes us, liice them, worEhy
beings. And often, through rhern, we feel ern-
bedded in a mor.ri comrnuniry
F-g.,
our family,
church, Iodge, country) thaf provides us with.o
source of pride.
Through i nternal i zari on, chj l dren begi n
i o
judg. their behavior as "righr" and "' \yrong,,"
and noi j usc
as effecti ve or. i ne.ftecti ve i n gerri n,q
rhem rvhat rhey rvant. Li ke emparhv, affi l i aci on-
based moral i rv surrs uery eady, as yung
as
age2, and may al so be a nor mal l v di s*i but ed
characreri sri c. Gi ven the central i ry of l ovci n
rhc
i nr er nal i zdf i on pr ocess, . i c. i s. nor sur pr l si ng r hat . .
i nternal i zsri on of' parental rul ei i s most' euj dcnr
i .n chi l dren rvhose parenr! rrear them wi rh
wsrmth and sensi ri vi ry, expl ai n thei r rul es
clearly, give ftrm correcrives, but do not rely on
physi cal puni shmcnr- (Grusec, 1966; Horr,
DeWol[, Wozniak, & Burts, 7992; Londerville
& Mai n, 1981; Stayton, Hogan, & Sqker-
Ainsworrh, a97L; Zahn-Waxler, Radl<e-Ycrrorv,
& King, 7979),
Pri nci pl es
The rhi rd foundrri on sro.ne of moral rnoi l vari on
i s the forrnati on of pri nci pl es or personal scan-
dards of ri ght and wrong. These ate rql es of
conduct that we believe we oughc to live up ro
regardl ess of the appro.val or di sapproval of pn r-
ents or any authoriry, and evcn when lve do not
fcel ernpathy for rhose with whom we interccr,
Our rnoral sundards fl ' re eustai ned by our i rnag-
i nnri ons-becnuse we can foresee thar l i vi ng up
to thern wi l l bri ng about a more i deol wori d.
Once such standards are escabl i shed, we ti y
ro mal<e our actions consistent with them and
pay a pri ce i n sel f-esreern when we fal l short'
(Greenstein,
1976; Rol<each, 1973), Personsl
srandords, then, are the rules of conduct we es-
pouse for the srice of our ideals. A single pre-
cept, such as
"Do
unto others as yoLl woul d
have them do unfo
-you,"
if adopted ns a per-
sonal standard and i nvoked at moral choi ce
poi nts, can affect one' s behavi or i n a grear rcnge
of ci ranmstances.
Li ke the devel opment of empathy and moral
affiliodons, children appedr to develop principles
of ri ght and wrong spontaneousl y by thc age of
3. For exampl e, young chi l dren seem to rccog-
ni ze wi th l i ttl e or no i nsrructi on rhor harmi ng
i s bad and hel pi ng i s good. Even chi l dren who
do not always do or pre?er the good recognizc
that one shoul d hel p and shoul d not harrn. Ask
a 3-year-ol d i n a nursery school i f i t i s ol cay to
eat on one si de of the room. If there i s a rul e
agai nst i t, he wi l l say no. Then ask hi m, "What
i f teacher says i t' s okay?" He' l l answer, "Yes,
then i y' s okay." Nexr ask hi m i f i t i s okay to
push
i ohnny
otf rhe choi r i f you wanr to si r i n
/
i c Agai n he rvi l i sav no
fwen
i f he someri me-<
pushesJ. Then ash' agai n, "Whar i f
.reacher
savs
ir' s olcav?" He will rep' lv,
' N-o.
teacher
shoul dn' t sav t hat - -
On thei r own, chi l dren seem ro recogni ze rher
rhere shoul d be rul es agai nsc harm.i ng, rul es
rhat are not based on authCIri ri es- In a seri es of
srudi es, El l i or Turi el (19SJ) and hi s col l eagues
have repeatedl y demonsrrated thi s seemi ngl y
i nrri nsi c recogni ri on of rhe si gni fi cance of moraI
rul es (rul es about behovi or rhot i rnpa*s on feel -
i ngs) i n compari son ro other l ci nds o[ rul es
(such as conventionsl rules
.abqut
rvhere one is
supposed to ecr). Mo' reover, childre.n are rnuch
more accepri ng of thei r parenrs' enforcement of
moral rules (such as a rule against stealing) than
conventi onal rul es (srrch as rul es abour chores).
Along with this intrinsic sensiriviry to harm-
ing and heipi.ng, personal rnoral srandards may
o,[so derive from rhe child'g intrinsic "mastery
motive," Psychologists have long recognized
thar chi.ldren have a natural desire to grin mas-
tery over the environmenr and excel
[MacTurk,
McCarthy, Vieze, & Yarrow, \987; White,
1959J. The mas' tery goals of babies are biologi-
cally deterrnined but as children get oldcr, their
norions of what is worth mastering come in-
creasingly under the inftuence of the culture
thcy grow up in, parcicularly by wha' t their par-
snts and significant others extol as the highest
hurnan achievernents.
When the ad.ults in their lives define excel-
lence in terms of moral str.iving and not
just
as
achievement in sports or school or business,
children bccorne mere apt to strive to live up to
mornl values. As Martin Hoffman
t1975J
found,
pflrents who openly espouse "altruistic' / values
such as "showi ng consi derari on of other peo-
p[e' s feel i ngs" and "goi ng out of one' s way ro
hcl p other peopl e" were rnore l i kel y to have
chi l dren who "care about how other ki ds fcel
ond try not
' to
hurt thei r feel i ngs" and who
"sfick
up foi some lcid that the other kids are
nilking,
fun of or calling' names.f'
The evaluative categories
' "good"
and
"bad"
nrr' ul reody very i mportant for 3-year-ol ds, who
readily apply them to their own acrions (Di-
Vcsta
& Stauber, L971; Masrers,; Furman, &
Earden,
7977),.When children rank rhemselves
high
on the good,/bad scale, they are laying the
foundation
for the developrnenr of a positive
ttrurul
i denti ty, seei ng themsel ves as moral
agr.' nts
who judge
their accions according ro
rt' hethcr
they meet moral criteria- They then
begin
t,r deiine rhernselves in terrns oi rheir
CHAPTEf l 35. HOW WE BECOME MORAL
general moral goal s
(".g., "T l vant ro be a good
person"; and rhei r.r' rl oral affi l i ado.ns and posi -
tions on moral issues (r.g.,
*l
am s gclod Chri' s-
tian' 1;
"l' rn
for civ' il rights"; "l' nr agai' nsr rhc
dearh penal ry"). Once a posi ti ' ,re moral i denri rv
i s esrebl i shed and one thi nks of onesel f as a per-
son rvho
' stands
for the good," one' s sel f-
esteern depends nn behavi ng i n c manner thar
i s consi srent wi th that i dendry (Hart & Fegl ey,
lses).
We adopr moral standsrds rs our orvn for the
same reason that rve adopt any behavi oral stan-
dards: because we believe they will lead ro de-
si rabl e outcomes. Chi l dren corne to bel i eve thor
.living up to moral standards wilt produce desir-
abte outcomes through personal experi ence and
observation (they find that sharing toys leads tc
rnore fun with playmates), as well as through
thei r i magi nati ons (they foresee the ki nds of be-
hqvior that wiil lead ro a better world).
Their beliefs are also affected by inspirationnl
and persuasive messages from the adults and
pccrs with whom they interacl OI ail the crea-
tures on earth, onl y human bei ngs can be i n-
spired toward higher ideals; indeed, one might
say that we are the inspirable species, Adoles-
cents seem parricularly susceptible to inspira-
tional messages that convey a vis.ion of a bctter
world that is within reach (Bronfenbrennef,
te62).
Young children are also responsive to per-
suasive arguments about moral rules.
]une
Tapp
(Tapp & Kohlberg, 1977) coined the lovely
phrase
"persuasi on
ro vi rtue" based on her re-
'
search finding that children as young as 5 could
understand the connection beween moral rules
and the reasons gi ven to support them. More-.
over, she found that children this age believe
that rules and laws can be changed if they are
more-harmful than good. In other research,
children were rnore likeiy to adopt parental
standards as their own when rhey wcrc per-
suaded that the i,r parents' rules were fair,
Yo' unlsteis whd
lartiilpited
in formulating the
rules rhey were asked to follow were parficu-
larly comrnited to those standards (Elder, 1963;
Pi kas, 1961).
Additionally, Eva Fogelman (1994), in her re-
search on Christian rescuers of
Jews
during the
Hol ocaust, has i sol ated the srme three moti va-
tional sources rhar I have just described. Some
rescued
]ews,
risking their own lives and those
of family members, out of empathy, saying
they were moved by rhe sufferi ng rhey wi t-
nessed and could not turn rheir backs on those
PART VI . TNTERPERSONAL APPROACHES
rt' ho rvere vi cti mi eed. Others rescued more out
of pri nci pl e than empsi hv, expl ai ni ng thar they
sarv evi i and couJd nnr l i ve rvi rh themsei ves i f
rhev di d not ta.l i e a stand agai nsr i r, These peo-
pl e ml l ced i n t er ms of i nj ust i cc r at her r han an
emoti onal conneci on to suffcri ng i ndi vi dual s.
Sri l l others rescued because of thei r connecdon
to a rnoral l eader or moral communi ry, such as
rhei r fami l y or church.
In surn, Iooki ng ar our three sources of moral
r nor i vat i on, one mi ght say t hat mor al i t y i s
bosed on the l rcad (on pri nci pl es or cogni ti vel y
based standards of ri ght and wrong snd rhe rec-
ogni ti on of onesel f as a morol agent), on rhe
heart (on empothi c reacti ons to anorherts feel -
i ngsl , and on t he r t r or al cor r r r t ur r i f y ( on i den-
ti fi cari on wi th moral exempl ars such es parcnts,
her oes, and mor ol gr oups) .
Mor al Emot i ons
Associated with each moral motivationul process
are positive and negadve feeling states that in-
fluence rhe kinds of actions we take toward oth-
ers. The negative .feelings are grrf/t (connected
to empathy), shame (connccrcd to rnoral affili-
arions), and seff-loathing (connected to princi-
ples). When we are cmpathically "inside" the
feel i ngs of another, dny poi n we i nfl i ct on hi m
or her boomerangs back to us in the forrn of
guilt. There is sornc evidence tor guilt in tod-
dlers (Zahn-Waxler e t ol., 1979), but it becornes
more common as children appronch their fourth
or fi fth yeor.
When we violate the standards of admire' d
and internalized moral models, we feel unwor-
thy of their love and ashamed ro lace them.
When we violate our own moral principles, we
experience self-loathing, n fceling of being
ashamed of onescl f, of not bei ng abl e to l i ve
wi rh onesel f.
On rhe posittve emotional side, we experience
empathic good feelings when making someone
with whom we ernpathize feel good; we feel
proud and worthy of our rnoral model' s lovc
when we live up to his or her standards; and we
feel proud of oursel ves and have a sense of per-
sonal integriry or whoieness (and no cognitive
dissonance) when living up to our own moral
standards.
These emorional stares, both the positive and
the negative, are powerful moti' vators. For ex-
ampl e, when peopl e descri be rhei r experi ence of
gui l t, rhev often use words l i ke agorri :i rrg and
oaertheln ring to cont.elr the inrensitv of ifreir
sufferi ng The negari ve morai emoti ons are
srrong cnough to l erd some to thoughts oi su-
i ci de. On the posi ri ve si de, some peopl e cre
brought to tears of reverence i n the presence of
thei r moral heroes or when they read thc
speeches o[ Abrahem Li ncol n or the Bi l l of
Ri ghts or other tracts that embody hurnanki nd' s
hi ghesr i deal s and nobl est sent i ment s.
Moral Styl es
As any parenr rvi th more rhan one chi l d knows,
from earl y chi l dhood, i ndi vi duai s appear ro di f-
fer in thcir relative endowments o[ ernpathy,
thei r afJi ni ty for moral pri nci pl es, and thei r con-
nections wirh moral exernplars. Sorne children
seem to be narurally more empathic than oth-
ers, whereas orhers seem more prone to arric-
ulate persona.l standards or principles fior thern-
selvcs; still others get attached more readilv to
moral exemplars and express thcir moralinT
through their affiliations with caring individuals
and o.rganizations.
Here is where redundancy.comes in: A child
who i s l ow on empathy may turn out to be a
person of high principle, or vice versa. Parenrs
rnay worry because rhcir child does not seern t0
have a "good heartr" in the sense that he does
not spontaneousl y put hi msel f i n another' s
pl ace or feel deepl y for others. But thi s chi l d
may turn out lo be a person of honor and rnoral
courage, someone with high ideals and a high
capacity fcr self-loathing when he fails to live
up to those i deal s.
Recognizing thesc three sources of moral rno.
tivation and the moral sryles they generate can
be useful for a therapist, educator, or parent,
especially when dealing with children who are
havi ng soci at probl ems, By assessi ng the rel a-
tive strengths of rhese three sources of moral
rnotivation in a child, one can ascertain whether
ernpathic appeals (such as "Think how you
woul d feel ") are more or l ess i i kel y to be effec-
tive than appeals in terms of ideals (such
as
"What ki nd of worl d woul d i r be i f everyone
did thatt") or affi.liations (such as "ls that rhe
w^y s Scout i s supposed to behave?."J.
Also, if one recognizes serious deficiencies in
any of the rhree are&st such as a chiid who ex-
peri ences l i ttl e empathy for others or onl y for
very few others, one can set up a program to
boisrer rhar area, sa' l' , b-v mlking more abour
feelings ruirh rhe cJ-rild and by rvldenin6
his or
hernoti on of rvho shoul d be thought ofi _..us,,
ond therefore rvorrhy
oF empothvl
Pareng mav not pur i r i nro rvord-., bur rhev
usuaily recognize these differences
in their chil-_
dren. As one father rol d me after I di scussed
these moral styl es i n a l ecnrre,
,,you,ve
i ust de-
scri bed my fhree daughters.
Each i s moral , bur
each in her olvn lvay.r, I am currently devel-
opi ng an assessrnent
i nstrurnenc
to eual uace
chi l dren' s rel ari ve srrengrhs
and rveal i nesses i n
these three moral domai .ns.
Fost er i ng Mor af i t y i n Chi l dr en
Ther; i s.ampl e evi dence that chi l dren,s capaci -
ties for rhe developmenr
of emparhy, morni of-
filiarions, and principles
.*.riu berrueen the
second and foylh years of life, beginning
shordy after children starr to toddle .biut
"ni
maneuver i ndependendy
i .n thei r soci al .worl ds
(Burleson,
L982). There is also arnple evidence
that how these capacities unfold .on bu affected
by the social environments
in which children
develop, including the ways rhey are treated and
instructed. by parenrs, peers, and significanr oth-
' ers.
In other words, during their early yedrst
childrcn
sponraneously develop whar *ijt,r U.
culled wsceptibilities
ro rnorai influence,,ia
in-
structi on. These. suscepti bi l i ri es
can be parri _
ti oned i nto our three domai ns.
Thus,
when a parenr says,
,rThink
how you
would
feel if sorneone did that co you,,, she is
rapping
into the child' s empathic capacities.
When she invokes the Golden Rule or explains
rhat
"everyone here deserves to be tieated
equally.,"
she is engaging his capacity to develop
principles.
And when she frowns and rells him,
"l t dl sappoi nts
me when you treat someone that
wry"
or "That' s not ho.w mernbers of our fam_
ily behave," she is engaging his capaciry for
moral
affiliation.
Thcorists
have long debared whether moral-
ity is
"taught" or
-caught,,,
with some arguing
that
morality needs ro bu instilled througi exl
pticit
dernands and declararions about rigf,r and
wrong
(Benneff,
l9g3), and others contending
that,
rnoral i ry
i s best l nsdl l ed by bri ngi ng ui
cntl dren
i n an atmosphere where adul ts sxpress
moral
corcerns and provide moral *od.l,
(Brvan
k Walbelc, Ag7Al. According ro the
" rno
ral m o dvarion ". frarrewo rk p resen-ted he re,
CHAPTER 35. HOW WE BECOME MOBAL 5I } 5
both approaches
have val ue, and borh have a
pl ace i n eoch .of
rhe rhree moral dornai ns.
Fosterin g Morality Through Enrpathy
St udj es of how par eng f ost er empat hv f t nd t har
an i mponanr techni que i s di recc i nstrucri on ro
chi l dren to pur chemsel ves i n anorher' s ptace
fBornetr,
Horrrard, Ki ng, & Di no, 19g0; Hughcs,
Tlngte, & Sarvin, 1981; Krevans & Gibbs, fiSel.
Chi l dren
need ro l earn rhe i rnpacr of thei r be-
havi or on others, and often rhi , crn be accom-
plished rvidr simple reminders such ss
.Thinli
how you woul d [ee[,, or
,,Rernernber
when you
were treeted thet way.,'
When such rerni nders
are not suffi ci enr,
one
can i nrensi fy the emparhy-arousi ng
sti mul i by
gtving the child more deraiJed lnformstion
about the other person, especia.fiy about his or
her sdvings and strugglei, or by having him
i magi ne or even rol e-pl ay aspects of the other
person' s experience (Chandle+
L97J; Iannotri,
Le78),
Empathy sta.rts frorn an awareness of an-
other' s feelings, and one way parents can edu-
cate their children nbout feetings is by including
di scussi ons of emoti ons and thei r causes i ;
everyday conversations
with their children, in-
dudi ng accounts of the parenrs, own emoti onal
experiences (Feshbach,
19S3), Various srudies
tlol thar helping children focus on rhe feelings
of others and recognize the similarities beweJr,
themselyes
and others will increase rhe likeli-
hood of ernpathic responses to thern (Houston,
199Q; Krebs, 1975),Ir is also helpfut when par-
ents acknowledge and commend rhe child,s ien-
derheerted feelings, point our and praise com-
passionate people in the communicy, and speak
about their own renderhearted
irnpulses. Stiries
about compassionace
fictional arld real-life he-
roes, farnous and unsung/ will aiso help convey
the message that empathic concern for others is
both good and narural (see Schulrnan & Mekler,
1994, chap. 3).
Empathy leads to a desire to be helpful or
ease someone' s pai n. But frequendy chi l dren
are too confused about how ro hel p, or roo shy
or insecure ro actually offer help or comfori.
Prompcs and instructions from parents and
other.caregivers
on when and hor,rrto help can
go a- long way toward providing children with
the know-how and courage to take that crucial
step from
t' eeling /or
someone to acually doing
something on his or her behalf (Staub.
lrgTir).-
PART VI . I NTERPERSONAL APPROACHES
Foste ring Moraliry Thro ugh Affiliatisns
.Research teams led r.r* Grazvna Kochanska
{Knchan-<l i a,
,{.ksan, k Koeni g 1995J, Susan
Londer vi l l e f l onder vi l l e
& Mai n, 1981) , and
Donel da Srsyton (Stayton et al ., 1971) found
thar.parents rvhn rvere sens.i ti ve, accepti ng and
cooperati ve rvi th thei r chi l dren and rvho han-
dlcd thern in a warm and offectionate manner
hod thc rnost cooperati ve chi l dren. Even before
thcy rvere 2 ycars ol d, chi l dren of such par-
enrs were showi ng si gns of i nternal i zed con-
trol s, remi ndi ng themsel ves of parenral i nj unc-
ti ons.
Chi l dren apparenrl y take far more seri ousl y
a rul e or t repri mand from a parenr who i s or-
di nri ri l y encouragi ng and accepci ng-onc who
they know is fundamentally on their side-then
from one who is routinely restrictive and harsh.
The goal of mnral trai ni ng i s not an obedi ent
child but a cooperative one, and the best way to
produce rr coopcrative child turns out to be be-
i ng n cnoperati ve parent. Moral i nstructi on of-
ten involves aslcing children to give uP or
Post-
ponc doing or gctting things they wanr, which
is not ulways easy for rhem, But it is rnuch eas-
i cr i f they bel i eve thei r parenrs *ul y want to
help thcm achieve their goals (at least those
goals that are not harmful to others or thetn-
sel ves) .
Parents also foster internalization by giving
children clearly and forcefully stated rules, and
good reasons for following chem (Clark et al.,
t977; Sanders & Dadds, L982). "Take turns
playing with the toy" is easicr for a child to
undergrand than the si rnpl e command "Sharel "
When parents give reasons for their rules, such
as "Everyone shoul d have an equal chance to
have fun, " they teach a child about the purpose
'
behi nd a rul e rnd that bei ng "Eogd" rneans
stri vi ng.for certai n openl y stated val ues and not
rnergly following parental order.s blindly and
inechairicrliy. Only by understanding the rea-
sons bchind rules cun I child carry moral les-
sons i nto new si tuati ons and al so be better pre-
pared to resist the inducegents of imtnoral
authority figures.
t
Thc srudi es conducted by Zahn-Waxl er et al .
(7979) affirm that punishrnenr by parents was
rror associated with high ultruism in children,
and si mpl v gi vi ng a chi l d "prohi bi ti ons wi thout
erpl anati ons" worked agai nst the devel opmenr
of al trui sm. On the other hand. i ncreased i nter-
nrrlizarion w&s associate d with ernorionalIy
toned disapprovals and expressions of disap-
pointment ol'er mora{ inf.racti'ons
fRad}e-
Yorrotv 8< Zahn-Waxler, 19S+).
Bc,.uuse inrernalizstion involves tailting to
onesel f, parents and caregi vers can teach chi [-
dren i n verv di rect wEys what to' say o them-
selve.s in ordinarily rroublesome situations- For
etampl e, .i f parenu fi nd thar rhei r youngster i s
likely to picli on a dassmete after a bad day on
rhe bal l fi el d, they can actual l y hel p hi rn work
out whqr he mi ght tel l hi msel f when such oc-
casi ons eri se (such es, "\t' s not ri ght to rry to
make myself feel betrer by mafting sQmeone
el se feel bad.";. l ndeed, parents can provi de spc-
ci fi c i nstructi ons on many morol ski l l s, such as
conflict resolution, sportsmanship, construcrive
criticism, and weicoming.
Other useful techni ques i ncl ude goodbehao'
ior assigrrrnents (calied
"mitzvahs"
in rradi-
tional
}ewish
pracrice), in which a youngster
rnust choose and perform a good deed that ben-
efits someone, and positioe attributions, in
which n child who does something good (such
as sharing, helping, or defending) is told that he
has a
"good
heatt" or that he i s a ki nd person
(Jensen & Moore, 7977; Toner, Moore, & Em-
mons, 1980), Most parenti ng rnanual s advi se
?arents,
probably wisely, to criticize the act, nor
rhe child, when their child misbehaves. With re-
gard to prosocial bchavior, research suggests
thac when I youngster i s hnd and fai r, i t i s
e{fective to praise thc act and the child (see
Schulman & Melcler, 1994, chap, 2), -
Fosteri ng Moral i ty Through Pri nci pl es
One can help a child develop personal standards
through both dnsp irattonal and pracricdl dis-
course. For example, moral ideals can be in-
spired by giving children a vision of a rnore hu-
rnane and just world and teaching thern that
their actions as individuals count toward bring-
'
ing those
ldgals inco being'
(br
.roward
sutVelt-' . .
ing thern). Most children want goodness to pre-
vail and cre readily inspired by visions of a
better family, a betrer cnrnmunity, and a better
wo.rld.
Practlcal messages are designed to get chil-
dren to focus on the long-term effects of their
acti ons, that i s, on whether or not what they do
will, in the long rury lead to worthy ends-for
example, that giving everyone an egual chance
and an equal say yi el ds better oudcornes than
hogging and shoving and shouting each orher
down (Levitt, Weber, Clark, & McDonnelL
L985J. Similarly, rerninding them of occasions
when they fel r good after hel pi ng others shoul d
i ncrease the probabi l i qy drat rhey rti l l adopt a
srandard l i ke "One shoul d hel p others i n need."
A reclnique that erabraces both rhe inspira-
tionai end the practical raps inro youngsrers'
narural eagerness to piece rogerher rheir own
vi si ons of "the good." As Socrates and other
moral philosophers have long established, ques-
tions like What is a good life? and What is
worth dying
for?
have an alrnost magical allure
for
)routh.
The quest for ensrvers, whether
rhrough dialogue, reading, or privare reflection,
can turn out to be transformative, sdmuladng
youngsrers to reeson their way toward moral
comrnitmenm and an articuleted moral idendry.
Di scussi ons can al so i ncl ude the parents' own
moral confusi ons ("I' m not sure i f I' m harmi ng
or hel pi ng the homel ess peopl e on the srreer
' whea
I give them money"), as weil as a sym-
patheti c exami nati on of the chi l d' s moral di l em-
mas (such as trying to sadsFy opposing demands
by friends).
While reasoning can help one ascertain what
one uuly values and whecher one' s actions are
consistent with those values and an effeaive
xleans to fuifill thern, morality is never ulri-
mately based on reason. One can never prooe
that the moral life is the best choice. As moral
philosophers have pointed our, one cannor rea-
son one' s way from an
"is"
(a statement about
the way things areJ to an
"ought"
(a starernent
about the way things should beJ.
Actually, a moral inclination is more like a
taste or an aesthetic response
' than
it is a product
of inference and. dedu*ion. A chitd does not
reason her way to hating cruelty or loving
goodness, or feeling ernpathy for someone' s
sufiering, or being moved by noble ideals,
just
as she does not reason her way to hating spin-
ach and loving ice crearn; rhey all derive
.from
her biological predispositions and personal his-
tory. One might say thet the goal of mo.ral ed-
ucation is to ,qake hndness and fairness "taste
good."
Whether morai education is based on empa-
thy, affiliations, or principles, caregivers need to
remernber that moral growth is an ongoing pro-
cess, anil that morality is not a qualiry that one
either does or does not possess ir some univer-
sal and everlastin g way (Hartshorne & May,
1930J. Although there is Iongitudinal evidence
for consistency in "prosocial disposirions" frorn
early childhood into aduirhood (Eisenberg er al.,
1999), few of us, children or adults, always do
the right thing and mosr of us do better in
CHAPTER 36. HOW WE BECOME MORAL 507
some areas than orhers (such as rhe person *' ho
' *' i .l l
chear on a spouse bur not an empi over).
Moreover, nelv remptations and moral quan-
daries alwavs arise, rvhich makes it criticallv im-
portent to help the child develop his or her
idendty as a moral agent, as sorneone rvho
wants to be moral and rvho, after moral lapses,
resolves to do betrer the next time.
A positive moral idenriry is easier to susmin
when there is suficient oprimisrn and hope thot
things can be made better. Children develop op-
timism and hope in various weys (Seligman,
7995; Snyder, 2000). One way they can be fos-
tered in the moral sphere is by apprising
youngsters of the successes o.f gond people, es-
peci al l y when they band together. Stori es about
people making the worid a bemer piace are es-
pecia[y important nowadays because, in our
"inforrnation age," even young children hear so
.much about cruelty and injustice that ir easy for
cynicism and hopelessness to set in at an early
age (see Schulman & Melcler, 1994, chap, 4),
Schoots can also make e contribucion to the
development of ideals. For example, they can
highlighr and cake pride in their tofry rnission,
which is to pass on to studenrs the best of hu-
rnan civilization in an atmosphere that is a true
rnoral comnruniry, one in which everyone (sru-
dents, teachers, secretaries, bus drivers, etc.) can
expect kind and fair treatment, Schoo.ls can also
include more moral contenc of various kinds in
their curricula. For example, history not only
can be taught as a series of momentous events
carried out by important people or as the play-
ing out of economic dislectics, but it also can
include an analysis of the moralissues inherent
in thoee momentous events and how those im-
portant people dealt with them (see SchulnraR,
1995, for a comprehensive school-based moral
education program).
Hel i gi on and Mor al i t y
AIl religions draw from all three moral dornains
(ernpathy, affiliation, and principlesJ, but differ-
ent religions, or seas within religions, empha-
size one dornain more than another.
Judaism,
for example,
.stresses personal standards or prin-
cipies, and rnuch iabor is devoted ro figuring our
how to appL:y rhem in everyday life. The Torah
furnishes the principles, whereas the Talmud
provides fervent$ reasoned disputations on
how they should be lived.
PAHT VI . I NTERPERSONAL APPROACHES
Chri sti ani ty* emphasi zes the affi l j ati ve do-
mai n: Mora[i ry stems pri nrari l v
(rom
one' s re-
l ari onshi p to Chri st. Chri st i s ahvavs
Preseni ,
and cl ne' s cornmi rmeni to others i s medi ated bv
hi -s presence- One i s good Jor Chri sr.
Hi ndui srn stresses empathi c bonds, as exem-
pl i fi ed by the fol l orvi ng quotati on from the l {i -
rnpadesa, a sacred texr: "As one' s l i fe i s dear to
onesel f, so al so are thsse of al l bei ngs. The good
shorv compassi on torvards al l l i vi ng bei ngs be-
cause of thei r resembl ance to themsel ves."
Rel i gi ons al so modvate good behavi or by
threnreni ng bel i evers wi th God' s rvrcth and
etcrnal damnari on. But doi ng good to avoi d
puni shment i s ebout concern for onesel [ not
others. Therefore, such acti ons rvoul d .not be
consi dered rnoral l y mori vatcd behavi or as l he
rerrn has been defined here.
Religion has been a major source of moral
i nspi rati on i n vi rtual l y every cul ture. It has al so
been a source of cruel ty and stri fe. Gandhi was
inspired by his religious beliefs. But so was the
mon who killed hirn. Religions teech the irn-
portance of kindness and justice, but sometimes
only for fellow believers; sornedmes they teach
that there is virrue in torturing and extermi-
nating non-belicvers. History provides many
exarnplns of atrocities commitrcd in rhe name of
a fervenr and sincere moraliry. Are there les-
sons to be learned from rhese events I
Mor al Pi t f al l s
There is certainly truth in the rna.xim
"The
road
to hell is paved with good intentions." Consid-
erable bad has been done by people who
thought they werc dci ng good. There are ai
lcast three reosons: yielding mortl responsibil-
ity to others, thinkng of others as inherentiy
undesi rabl e, and suppressi ng "bad" thoughts.
Yi el di ng Moral Responsi bi l i ty to Others
We yi cl d our mornl
j udgments to others be-
qause
we believc they have special knowledge
abour ri ght and wrong, sayt because God i s be-
lieved to have spoken to thern or because their
posi ti on gi ves rhem excl usi ve
j uri sdi cti on over
the i nterpretati on of God' s words, They then
become, in effect, the gatekeepers ro heaven,
and we can feel virtuous following their com-
mands, even when they tel l us to sl aughter
rhousands (as happened
j n
the Crusades and
many other hol y wars, before tnd si nceJ.
Si mi l ar abdi cari ons of moral responsi bi l i ry
occur in civil insrirurions, partirularly rt' hen
"obedi ence to aurhori ty" i s taughr
' es
a preem-
inent rrirrue. .Soldiers ere cornmcniy caughr
"Yours i s not to rerson rvh\' ," whi ch then al -
lorvs them to justifo unspenkable atrc-rcicies lvith
the rej oi nder "l was
j ust fol l owi ng orders-"
Thi nki ng of Others as Inherentl Y
Undesi ra bl e
When others are consi dered i nherentl y i nteri or
or undesi rabl e, one can feel ri ghreous bv i sol ot-
i ng or ensl avi ng them, or even wi pi ng rhem out
endrel y. The moral rul es of our group do not
apply to the inherently undesirable
Jews,
Gyp-
si es, darl c-ski nned peopl e, and homosexual s
have been among the most frequent victims of
such morel excl usi on, but most peopl es (races,
religions, nationalities, c6stes, ethnic groups,
cl asses, etc.) have, at some ti me i n thei r hi story,
known similar vilificarion and' Persecution.
The sol uti on, of course, i s to bri ng up chi l -
dren to bel i eve that there Bre no rtonpeopl e,
none wha are inherently inferior or undesir-
able, none who ere so unlike rrs thar they fall
beyond the moral boundary,
Suppressi ng
"Bad" Thought s
So-cal l ed bad thoughts, l i ke those accompany-
ing anger and envy, are common ond natural.
But peopl e brought up to bel i eve that
"q
bod
thought is as bad as a bad deed" will often mis-
labei and deny such unwanted thoughts in order
to maintain their positive self-concepts (a psy-
chologically minded observer might then call
thei r anger "unconsci ous"J. Thi s can l ead to re-
rious problems in self-regulation. For erample,
anger, whether acknowledged or not, gencrates
an appeti te for aggressl on. But before we can
insritute sclf-regulation strategies to sever the
anger-aggression link, we must first recognizc
that we are experiencing ffiger. Only then can
we tel l oursel ves, "l ' m angry now and musr
take care not to sui ke out at thi s person," Such
mislabcling is less likety to occur when we learn
to j udge our moral i ty by what ws do, not what
wc rhink.
Mor al Ver sus Ant i soci al Mot i vat i ons
Over the years, theorists have irnplicated an ar-
ray of constructs ro explain anrisocial behavior,
I
/
e;
Tl -
! h,
al -
i r h
i ncl udi ng aggressi ve i nsti ncts and dri ves;
neur onal genet i g and hor monal aber r ar i ons;
disrurbed personeJities and rreak suoeretos;
d1' sfunctional flamilies; abusive childhcod expe-
ri ences; negadue peer pressure; cul tural and me-
di a i nfl uences (such as vi ol ent ftl ms, books, and
garnes); and vari ous forms of soci al i nj usti cc,
such as poverry and racisrn.
As wi th moral moti vati on, no si ngl e con-
srruct wi l l expl ai n al l forms of andsoci al i m-
pul ses. The modve bchi nd the vi ol ence of the
cool , cal cul ari ng mugger i s very di fferent trom
the wrath of the spurned lover, as it is frorn the
premedi tated cruel ty of a sadi st, an assassi na-
ti on by a zeal ous nari onal i st, a dri ve-by shoot-
i ng to i mpress fel l orv gang members, or a re-
sponse to inner voices that sty "kill."
Depending on che motive behind any given act
of vi ol ence, i r rni ght be seen as a product of
rati onal i ry or psychosi s, as consi stent wi th
l ong-standi ng persondi ty
Patterns
ot as 0n
anomaly, ernerging from $cceptional passlons
or drostic circumstances; some might even see
it os rnoral if its goal is to right sorne wrong or
protect the i nnocent.
Efforts to reduce violence can focus either on
dec.reasing the strength of people' s antisocial
rnorives or on strengthening the rnoral mo-
givss-s1
on both. Strategies that fofls only on
rcducing antisocial motives contain the implicit
nssumption that aggression and avarice are
Pre-
dominantly products of social or psychological
pothology, such as povert], racism, alienation,
repressed i mpul ses, or srrested superego devel '
npmenl . Presumabl y one does not have to pro-
mote moraliry; one merely has to clear up the
puthology that is supposedly keeping people
frorn being nice to each other (Schulman,
1ee0).
Thc position espoused here is quite different,
contending that base behavior is frequentiy as
much a product oE noral motiaation deficits
(such as too little empathy, inadequate attach-
ments to moral exemplars and a moral corn-
tnuni ty, and a dearth of moral pri nci pl es) as i t
is of unchecked antisocial impulses (see Has-
tings, Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, Usher, &
Bridges, 2000). An impiication of this moral
txotivation deficits position is that parenE,
teachers, and others who work with children
necd to rake active steps to boost their charges'
rnoral moti vati on. Chi l dren need to hear from
adults that th.y are expected to treat others
kindly and fairly, even when they would rather
not. Unforrunately, many children norvadays
CHAPTER 36. HOW WE B ECOME MOHAL 5Og
grorv up wi thoui ever havi ng heard thi s rnes-
sage cl ear l v and f or cef ul l v.
Samedmes Di renr-s are a.frai d that thei r chi l d
rvili become loo lcind and sensitive ro others and
thereforc ron ea-.i l v taken advantage ot, Re-
search does nor support thi s rvorrv. Chi l dren
and adul t s l vho ar e ki nd our of empar hv or pr i n-
ciple (in contrest to insecure individuals lvho ry
to pl ease others to gai n attendon ond fri end-
shi p) t end t o bc per cept j ue and r esi l i ent , and ar e
generally respected by peers (Carlson, L"ahey, 8r
Neeper, 198{; Kurdek tc Kri l e, 1982).
On an opti rni sti c norc, rnost chi l dren do rurn
out to have consci ences, and most of us pl oba-
bl y encount er a l ot mor e ki ndness t han un-
ki ndness i n our dai l y l i ves. [t i s curi ous nnd
hearreni ng that ki ndness moves us and does
not seem unnatural , that when we l earn about
extrerne octs o[ kindness or self-sacrifice (say, o
sol di er ri ski ng hi s l i l e for o buddy or someone
jumping lnto a river to rescue a strdnger), lve
are not ordi nari l y shocked, as i f the behqvi or
were bi zarre and al i en. Such a*s fal l i n a range
considered normal, and we cirn cornprehend
and identify with the motives behind the acts
(there ts no DSM-IV category for exfferne
kindness).
In contrast, extreme cruelty ofren baffles us;
we wonde' r how anyonc could be so heartless.
We may find evil fascinating, but most also iind
it repellent andl confusing. And children usually
cannot understand it at all. They cannot futhom
why the wicked witch wants to kill the children,
or why people murder total strangers or their
own babies, or why Hitler murdered so many
millions.
And lve sdults cannol give thern good expla-
nations; we do not undersmnd it eirher. When
we learn about extreme acts of riolence, like
someone randomly shooting classmstes in a
schooi , none of the many proposed expl anati ons
feels satisfnns. It is as if some peopie have an
apperite for violence that is so far beyond nor-
mal that their motivations remain incompre-
hensi bl e.
Thar extreme goodness feels more normol to
us than extreme badness is worth remembering
as we, scientists and laypersons, try to piece to-
gether an understanding of human nature.
Sornehow, we have been ushered down a unique
evol uti onary path where, unl i ke any other bi -
ol ogi cal system, we have come to care about
goodness. Thi s i nterest i n, and responsi veness
to, morality has played a major role in the de-
velopment of human civilization and has con-
i or
at -
t p-
als
ot
. A
PS,
r l t
r i l -
l l e,
i i r -
foll
ly-
r al .
l ad
t i s-
Cer
sy-
:al l
( : f r -
rle,
rt5
:an
the
.ize
can
ust
rch
l rn
har
l l | - -
ot t
510 PART VI . TNTEBPEFSONAL APPROACHES
tri bured enorrnousl v to rhe sun' i sal and fl our-
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