Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J .:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks
the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues
of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of
the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue,
green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2,
6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater
part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by
the petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the
instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While,
generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the
performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and
enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals,
corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs.
516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the
respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the
Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them
within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction
of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without
or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the
orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive
or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43
Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian,
institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country,
it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the
union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the
church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted
in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of
1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this
country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the
highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to
recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations
and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into
the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When
the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony
of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence
of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art.
VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister
or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal
institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines).
Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art.
XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy
Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results.
The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious
worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY
NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF
POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein
appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question
appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated
September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent
alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted.
He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church.
In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the
petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage
of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people"
(Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the
Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as
actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription
as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is
not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received
by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the
opinion that the Government should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately
be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295;
20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate
the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a
constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and
prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by
the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or
favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act
No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse
postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."
Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between
the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is
yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a
constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

GAMBOA v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
CARPIO, J .:


The Case

This is an original petition for prohibition, injunction, declaratory relief and
declaration of nullity of the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications
Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines
to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company
Limited (First Pacific).

The Antecedents

The facts, according to petitioner Wilson P. Gamboa, a stockholder of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), are as follows:
1


On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which
granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business. In
1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American company
and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding common shares of
PLDT to PTIC. In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several
persons, including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI became the
owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment
executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the
111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC shares, which
represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, were later
declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
2


In 1999, First Pacific, a Bermuda-registered, Hong Kong-based investment firm,
acquired the remaining 54 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC. On 20
November 2006, the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC) of the Philippine
Government announced that it would sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent
of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, through a public bidding to be conducted on
4 December 2006. Subsequently, the public bidding was reset to 8 December 2006,
and only two bidders, Parallax Venture Fund XXVII (Parallax) and Pan-Asia Presidio
Capital, submitted their bids. Parallax won with a bid of P25.6 billion or US$510
million.

Thereafter, First Pacific announced that it would exercise its right of first refusal as a
PTIC stockholder and buy the 111,415 PTIC shares by matching the bid price of
Parallax. However, First Pacific failed to do so by the 1 February 2007 deadline set by
IPC and instead, yielded its right to PTIC itself which was then given by IPC until 2
March 2007 to buy the PTIC shares. On 14 February 2007, First Pacific, through its
subsidiary, MPAH, entered into a Conditional Sale and Purchase Agreement of the
111,415 PTIC shares, or 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC, with
the Philippine Government for the price of P25,217,556,000 or US$510,580,189. The
sale was completed on 28 February 2007.

Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine Government of
46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12 million shares or about
6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT. With the sale, First
Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37
percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to
about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not
more than 40 percent.
3


On the other hand, public respondents Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves,
Undersecretary John P. Sevilla, and PCGG Commissioner Ricardo Abcede allege the
following relevant facts:

On 9 November 1967, PTIC was incorporated and had since engaged in the business
of investment holdings. PTIC held 26,034,263 PLDT common shares, or 13.847
percent of the total PLDT outstanding common shares. PHI, on the other hand, was
incorporated in 1977, and became the owner of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46.125
percent of the outstanding capital stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of
Assignment executed by Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla. In 1986, the
111,415 PTIC shares held by PHI were sequestered by the PCGG, and subsequently
declared by this Court as part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. The sequestered PTIC shares were reconveyed to the Republic of the
Philippines in accordance with this Courts decision
4
which became final
and executory on 8 August 2006.
The Philippine Government decided to sell the 111,415 PTIC shares, which represent
6.4 percent of the outstanding common shares of stock of PLDT, and designated the
Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), composed of the Department of Finance
and the PCGG, as the disposing entity. An invitation to bid was published in seven
different newspapers from 13 to 24 November 2006. On 20 November 2006, a pre-bid
conference was held, and the original deadline for bidding scheduled on 4 December
2006 was reset to 8 December 2006. The extension was published in nine different
newspapers.

During the 8 December 2006 bidding, Parallax Capital Management LP emerged as
the highest bidder with a bid of P25,217,556,000. The government notified First
Pacific, the majority owner of PTIC shares, of the bidding results and gave First
Pacific until 1 February 2007 to exercise its right of first refusal in accordance with
PTICs Articles of Incorporation. First Pacific announced its intention to match
Parallaxs bid.

On 31 January 2007, the House of Representatives (HR) Committee on Good
Government conducted a public hearing on the particulars of the then impending sale
of the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondents Teves and Sevilla were among those who
attended the public hearing. The HR Committee Report No. 2270 concluded that: (a)
the auction of the governments 111,415 PTIC shares bore due diligence, transparency
and conformity with existing legal procedures; and (b) First Pacifics intended
acquisition of the governments 111,415 PTIC shares resulting in First Pacifics
100% ownership of PTIC will not violate the 40 percent constitutional limit on
foreign ownership of a public utility since PTIC holds only 13.847 percent of the
total outstanding common shares of PLDT.
5
On 28 February 2007, First Pacific
completed the acquisition of the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC.

Respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan admits the following facts: (a) the IPC conducted a
public bidding for the sale of 111,415 PTIC shares or 46 percent of the outstanding
capital stock of PTIC (the remaining 54 percent of PTIC shares was already owned by
First Pacific and its affiliates); (b) Parallax offered the highest bid amounting
to P25,217,556,000; (c) pursuant to the right of first refusal in favor of PTIC and its
shareholders granted in PTICs Articles of Incorporation, MPAH, a First Pacific
affiliate, exercised its right of first refusal by matching the highest bid offered for
PTIC shares on 13 February 2007; and (d) on 28 February 2007, the sale was
consummated when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered
the certificates for the 111,415 PTIC shares. Respondent Pangilinan denies the other
allegations of facts of petitioner.

On 28 February 2007, petitioner filed the instant petition for prohibition, injunction,
declaratory relief, and declaration of nullity of sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares.
Petitioner claims, among others, that the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares would result
in an increase in First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7 percent to
37 percent, and this, combined with Japanese NTT DoCoMos common shareholdings
in PLDT, would result to a total foreign common shareholdings in PLDT of 51.56
percent which is over the 40 percent constitutional limit.
6
Petitioner asserts:

If and when the sale is completed, First Pacifics equity in PLDT will go up
from 30.7 percent to 37.0 percent of its common or voting- stockholdings,
x x x. Hence, the consummation of the sale will put the two largest foreign
investors in PLDT First Pacific and Japans NTT DoCoMo, which is the
worlds largest wireless telecommunications firm, owning 51.56 percent of
PLDT common equity. x x x With the completion of the sale, data culled from
the official website of the New York Stock Exchange (www.nyse.com) showed
that those foreign entities, which own at least five percent of common equity,
will collectively own 81.47 percent of PLDTs common equity. x x x
x x x as the annual disclosure reports, also referred to as Form 20-
K reports x x x which PLDT submitted to the New York Stock
Exchange for the period 2003-2005, revealed that First Pacific and
several other foreign entities breached the constitutional limit of
40 percent ownership as early as 2003. x x x
7


Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the consummation of the then
impending sale of 111,415 PTIC shares to First Pacific violates the constitutional limit
on foreign ownership of a public utility; (2) whether public respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares to First
Pacific; and (3) whether the sale of common shares to foreigners in excess of 40
percent of the entire subscribed common capital stock violates the constitutional limit
on foreign ownership of a public utility.
8


On 13 August 2007, Pablito V. Sanidad and Arno V. Sanidad filed a Motion for Leave
to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. In the Resolution of 28
August 2007, the Court granted the motion and noted the Petition-in-Intervention.

Petitioners-in-intervention join petitioner Wilson Gamboa x x x in seeking, among
others, to enjoin and/or nullify the sale by respondents of the 111,415 PTIC shares to
First Pacific or assignee. Petitioners-in-intervention claim that, as PLDT subscribers,
they have a stake in the outcome of the controversy x x x where the Philippine
Government is completing the sale of government owned assets in [PLDT],
unquestionably a public utility, in violation of the nationality restrictions of the
Philippine Constitution.


The Issue


This Court is not a trier of facts. Factual questions such as those raised by
petitioner,
9
which indisputably demand a thorough examination of the evidence of the
parties, are generally beyond this Courts jurisdiction. Adhering to this well-settled
principle, the Court shall confine the resolution of the instant controversy solely on
the threshold and purely legal issue of whether the term capital in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares)
of PLDT, a public utility.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Petition for declaratory relief treated as petition for mandamus

At the outset, petitioner is faced with a procedural barrier. Among the remedies
petitioner seeks, only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of
this court, which however is not exclusive but is concurrent with the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals. The actions for declaratory relief,
10
injunction, and
annulment of sale are not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. On this ground alone, the petition could have been dismissed outright.

While direct resort to this Court may be justified in a petition for prohibition,
11
the
Court shall nevertheless refrain from discussing the grounds in support of the petition
for prohibition since on 28 February 2007, the questioned sale was consummated
when MPAH paid IPC P25,217,556,000 and the government delivered the certificates
for the 111,415 PTIC shares.

However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution has far-reaching implications
to the nationaleconomy, the Court treats the petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus.
12


In Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,
13
the Court treated the petition for
declaratory relief as one for mandamus considering the grave injustice that would
result in the interpretation of a banking law. In that case, which involved the crime of
rape committed by a foreign tourist against a Filipino minor and the execution of the
final judgment in the civil case for damages on the tourists dollar deposit with a local
bank, the Court declared Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, exempting
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process
of any court, inapplicable due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. The Court
held that injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest
like accused x x x that would negate Article 10 of the Civil Code which provides
that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. The Court therefore
required respondents Central Bank of the Philippines, the local bank, and the accused
to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case for damages and to
release the dollar deposit of the accused to satisfy the judgment.

In Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor,
14
the Court similarly
brushed aside the procedural infirmity of the petition for declaratory relief and treated
the same as one for mandamus. In Alliance, the issue was whether the government
unlawfully excluded petitioners, who were government employees, from the
enjoyment of rights to which they were entitled under the law. Specifically, the
question was: Are the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the
Government, including government owned or controlled corporations included among
the four employers under Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay
their employees x x x a thirteenth (13th) month pay x x x ? The Constitutional
principle involved therein affected all government employees, clearly justifying a
relaxation of the technical rules of procedure, and certainly requiring the interpretation
of the assailed presidential decree.

In short, it is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as
one for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications. As this Court
held inSalvacion:

The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been
recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-reaching implications and
raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for
mandamus.
15
(Emphasis supplied)


In the present case, petitioner seeks primarily the interpretation of the term capital
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. He prays that this Court declare that the
term capital refers to common shares only, and that such shares constitute the sole
basis in determining foreign equity in a public utility. Petitioner further asks this
Court to declare any ruling inconsistent with such interpretation unconstitutional.

The interpretation of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
has far-reaching implications to the national economy. In fact, a resolution of this
issue will determine whether Filipinos are masters, or second class citizens, in their
own country. What is at stake here is whether Filipinos or foreigners will
have effective control of the national economy. Indeed, if ever there is a legal issue
that has far-reaching implications to the entire nation, and to future generations of
Filipinos, it is the threshhold legal issue presented in this case.

The Court first encountered the issue on the definition of the term capital in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution in the case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, docketed as
G.R. No. 157360.
16
That case involved the same public utility (PLDT) and
substantially the same private respondents. Despite the importance and novelty of the
constitutional issue raised therein and despite the fact that the petition involved a
purely legal question, the Court declined to resolve the case on the merits, and instead
denied the same for disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
17
There, petitioner Fernandez
assailed on a pure question of law the Regional Trial Courts Decision of 21 February
2003 via a petition for review under Rule 45. The Courts Resolution, denying the
petition, became final on 21 December 2004.
The instant petition therefore presents the Court with another opportunity to finally
settle this purely legal issue which is of transcendental importance to the national
economy and a fundamental requirement to a faithful adherence to our Constitution.
The Court must forthwith seize such opportunity, not only for the benefit of the
litigants, but more significantly for the benefit of the entire Filipino people, to ensure,
in the words of the Constitution, a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
18
Besides, in the light of vague and
confusing positions taken by government agencies on this purely legal issue, present
and future foreign investors in this country deserve, as a matter of basic fairness, a
categorical ruling from this Court on the extent of their participation in the capital of
public utilities and other nationalized businesses.

Despite its far-reaching implications to the national economy, this purely legal issue
has remained unresolved for over 75 years since the 1935 Constitution. There is no
reason for this Court to evade this ever recurring fundamental issue and delay again
defining the term capital, which appears not only in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution, but also in Section 2, Article XII on co-production and joint venture
agreements for the development of our natural resources,
19
in Section 7, Article XII
on ownership of private lands,
20
in Section 10, Article XII on the reservation of
certain investments to Filipino citizens,
21
in Section 4(2), Article XIV on the
ownership of educational institutions,
22
and in Section 11(2), Article XVI on the
ownership of advertising companies.
23



Petitioner has locus standi

There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the right
to question the subject sale, which he claims to violate the nationality requirement
prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the
Constitution, then there is a possibility that PLDTs franchise could be revoked, a dire
consequence directly affecting petitioners interest as a stockholder.

More importantly, there is no question that the instant petition raises matters of
transcendental importance to the public. The fundamental and threshold legal issue in
this case, involving the national economy and the economic welfare of the Filipino
people, far outweighs any perceived impediment in the legal personality of the
petitioner to bring this action.

In Chavez v. PCGG,
24
the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters
of transcendental importance to the public, thus:

In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded
as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as
such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to
enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners legal standing, the Court declared that the right they
sought to be enforced is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general public which possesses the right.
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been
involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal, public interest [was] definitely involved
considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic development of
the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved. We concluded that,
as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioners standing. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves matters of
transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Definition of the Term Capital in
Section 11, Article XI I of the 1987 Constitution

Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987 Constitution
mandates the Filipinization of public utilities, to wit:


Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in
character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of
any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its
capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or
association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)


The above provision substantially reiterates Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution, thus:

Section 5. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive
in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such
franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject
to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public
interest so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public
utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the
governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their
proportionate share in the capital thereof. (Emphasis supplied)



The foregoing provision in the 1973 Constitution reproduced Section 8, Article XIV
of the 1935 Constitution, viz:

Section 8. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of
the Philippines sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.
No franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or corporation,
except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress when the public interest so requires. (Emphasis
supplied)


Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, reminds us that the Filipinization provision in the 1987 Constitution is
one of the products of the spirit of nationalism which gripped the 1935 Constitutional
Convention.
25
The 1987 Constitution provides for the Filipinization of public utilities
by requiring that any form of authorization for the operation of public utilities should
be granted only to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. The provision is [an express] recognition of the
sensitive and vital position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security.
26
The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to
prevent aliens from assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the
national interest.
27
This specific provision explicitly reserves to Filipino citizens
control of public utilities, pursuant to an overriding economic goal of the 1987
Constitution: to conserve and develop our patrimony
28
and ensure a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
29


Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must therefore meet
the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public
utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be owned by Filipino citizens.

The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term capital. Does the term
capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to common shares or to
the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting
preferred shares)?

Petitioner submits that the 40 percent foreign equity limitation in domestic public
utilities refers only to common shares because such shares are entitled to vote and it is
through voting that control over a corporation is exercised. Petitioner posits that the
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the ownership
of common capital stock subscribed and outstanding, which class of shares alone,
under the corporate set-up of PLDT, can vote and elect members of the board of
directors. It is undisputed that PLDTs non-voting preferred shares are held mostly
by Filipino citizens.
30
This arose from Presidential Decree No. 217,
31
issued on 16
June 1973 by then President Ferdinand Marcos, requiring every applicant of a PLDT
telephone line to subscribe to non-voting preferred shares to pay for the investment
cost of installing the telephone line.
32


Petitioners-in-intervention basically reiterate petitioners arguments and adopt
petitioners definition of the term capital.
33
Petitioners-in-intervention allege that
the approximate foreign ownership of common capital stock of PLDT x x x already
amounts to at least 63.54% of the total outstanding common stock, which means that
foreigners exercise significant control over PLDT, patently violating the 40 percent
foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed by the Constitution.

Respondents, on the other hand, do not offer any definition of the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. More importantly, private
respondents Nazareno andPangilinan of PLDT do not dispute that more than 40
percent of the common shares of PLDT are held by foreigners.

In particular, respondent Nazarenos Memorandum, consisting of 73 pages, harps
mainly on the procedural infirmities of the petition and the supposed violation of the
due process rights of the affected foreign common shareholders.
Respondent Nazareno does not deny petitioners allegation of foreigners dominating
the common shareholdings of PLDT. Nazarenostressed mainly that the petition seeks
to divest foreign common shareholders purportedly exceeding 40% of the total
common shareholdings in PLDT of their ownership over their shares. Thus, the
foreign natural and juridical PLDT shareholders must be impleaded in this suit so that
they can be heard.
34
Essentially, Nazareno invokes denial of due process on behalf of
the foreign common shareholders.

While Nazareno does not introduce any definition of the term capital, he states that
among the factual assertions that need to be established to counter petitioners
allegations is the uniform interpretation by government agencies (such as the
SEC), institutions and corporations (such as the Philippine National Oil
Company-Energy Development Corporation or PNOC-EDC) of including both
preferred shares and common shares in controlling interest in view of testing
compliance with the 40% constitutional limitation on foreign ownership in public
utilities.
35


Similarly, respondent Manuel V. Pangilinan does not define the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Neither does he refute petitioners claim of
foreigners holding more than 40 percent of PLDTs common shares. Instead,
respondent Pangilinan focuses on the procedural flaws of the petition and the alleged
violation of the due process rights of foreigners. Respondent Pangilinan emphasizes in
his Memorandum (1) the absence of this Courts jurisdiction over the petition; (2)
petitioners lack of standing; (3) mootnessof the petition; (4) non-availability of
declaratory relief; and (5) the denial of due process rights. Moreover,
respondent Pangilinan alleges that the issue should be whether owners of shares in
PLDT as well as owners of shares in companies holding shares in PLDT may be
required to relinquish their shares in PLDT and in those companies without any law
requiring them to surrender their shares and also without notice and trial.

Respondent Pangilinan further asserts that Section 11, [Article XII of the
Constitution] imposes no nationality requirement on the shareholders of the
utility company as a condition for keeping their shares in the utility company.
According to him, Section 11 does not authorize taking one persons property (the
shareholders stock in the utility company) on the basis of another partys alleged
failure to satisfy a requirement that is a condition only for that other partys retention
of another piece of property (the utility company being at least 60% Filipino-owned to
keep its franchise).
36


The OSG, representing public respondents Secretary Margarito Teves, Undersecretary
John P. Sevilla, Commissioner Ricardo Abcede, and Chairman Fe Barin, is likewise
silent on the definition of the term capital. In its Memorandum
37
dated 24
September 2007, the OSG also limits its discussion on the supposed procedural
defects of the petition, i.e. lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction, non-inclusion of
interested parties, and lack of basis for injunction. The OSG does not present any
definition or interpretation of the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. The OSG contends that the petition actually partakes of a collateral
attack on PLDTs franchise as a public utility, which in effect requires a full-blown
trial where all the parties in interest are given their day in court.
38


Respondent Francisco Ed Lim, impleaded as President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE), does not also define the term capital and
seeks the dismissal of the petition on the following grounds: (1) failure to state a cause
of action against Lim; (2) the PSE allegedly implemented its rules and required all
listed companies, including PLDT, to make proper and timely disclosures; and (3) the
reliefs prayed for in the petition would adversely impact the stock market.

In the earlier case of Fernandez v. Cojuangco, petitioner Fernandez who claimed to be
a stockholder of record of PLDT, contended that the term capital in the 1987
Constitution refers to shares entitled to vote or the common shares. Fernandez
explained thus:

The forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public utilities prescribed
by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock entitled to vote, i.e.,
common shares, considering that it is through voting that control is being
exercised. x x x

Obviously, the intent of the framers of the Constitution in imposing limitations
and restrictions on fully nationalized and partially nationalized activities is for
Filipino nationals to be always in control of the corporation undertaking said
activities. Otherwise, if the Trial Courts ruling upholding respondents
arguments were to be given credence, it would be possible for the ownership
structure of a public utility corporation to be divided into one percent (1%)
common stocks and ninety-nine percent (99%) preferred stocks. Following the
Trial Courts ruling adopting respondents arguments, the common shares can
be owned entirely by foreigners thus creating an absurd situation wherein
foreigners, who are supposed to be minority shareholders, control the public
utility corporation.

x x x x

Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to
both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.

x x x x

Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public
utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock
entitled to vote, i.e., common shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of
shares will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal and beneficial
ownership rests in the hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of
petitioner PLDT, since it is already admitted that the voting interests of
foreigners which would gain entry to petitioner PLDT by the acquisition of
SMART shares through the Questioned Transactions is equivalent to 82.99%,
and the nominee arrangements between the foreign principals and the Filipino
owners is likewise admitted, there is, therefore, a violation of Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution.
Parenthetically, the Opinions dated February 15, 1988 and April 14, 1987 cited
by the Trial Court to support the proposition that the meaning of the word
capital as used in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution allegedly refers
to the sum total of the shares subscribed and paid-in by the shareholder and it
allegedly is immaterial how the stock is classified, whether as common or
preferred, cannot stand in the face of a clear legislative policy as stated in the
FIA which took effect in 1991 or way after said opinions were rendered, and as
clarified by the above-quoted Amendments. In this regard, suffice it to state
that as between the law and an opinion rendered by an administrative agency,
the law indubitably prevails. Moreover, said Opinions are merely advisory and
cannot prevail over the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.

In the same vein, the SECs construction of Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine
what a law means.
39



On the other hand, respondents therein, Antonio O. Cojuangco, Manuel V. Pangilinan,
Carlos A. Arellano, Helen Y. Dee, Magdangal B. Elma, Mariles Cacho-Romulo,
Fr. BienvenidoF. Nebres, Ray C. Espinosa, Napoleon L. Nazareno, Albert F. Del
Rosario, and Orlando B. Vea, argued that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution includes preferred shares since the Constitution does not
distinguish among classes of stock, thus:

16. The Constitution applies its foreign ownership limitation on the corporations
capital, without distinction as to classes of shares. x x x

In this connection, the Corporation Code which was already in force at the
time the present (1987) Constitution was drafted defined outstanding capital
stock as follows:

Section 137. Outstanding capital stock defined. The term outstanding capital
stock, as used in this Code, means the total shares of stock issued under
binding subscription agreements to subscribers or stockholders, whether or not
fully or partially paid, except treasury shares.

Section 137 of the Corporation Code also does not distinguish between
common and preferred shares, nor exclude either class of shares, in determining
the outstanding capital stock (the capital) of a corporation. Consequently,
petitioners suggestion to reckon PLDTs foreign equity only on the basis of
PLDTs outstanding common shares is without legal basis. The language of the
Constitution should be understood in the sense it has in common use.
x x x x

17. But even assuming that resort to the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission is necessary, there is nothing in the Record of the Constitutional
Commission (Vol. III) which petitioner misleadingly cited in the Petition
x x x which supports petitioners view that only common shares should form
the basis for computing a public utilitys foreign equity.
x x x x

18. In addition, the SEC the government agency primarily responsible for
implementing the Corporation Code, and which also has the responsibility of
ensuring compliance with the Constitutions foreign equity restrictions as
regards nationalized activities x x x has categorically ruled that both common
and preferred shares are properly considered in determining outstanding capital
stock and the nationality composition thereof.
40



We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term capital in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the
election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares,
41
and not to
the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred
shares.
The Corporation Code of the Philippines
42
classifies shares as common or preferred,
thus:

Sec. 6. Classification of shares. - The shares of stock of stock corporations may
be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of which classes or
series of shares may have such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated
in the articles of incorporation: Provided, That no share may be deprived of
voting rights except those classified and issued as preferred or
redeemable shares, unless otherwise provided in this Code: Provided,
further, That there shall always be a class or series of shares which have
complete voting rights. Any or all of the shares or series of shares may have a
par value or have no par value as may be provided for in the articles of
incorporation: Provided, however, That banks, trust companies, insurance
companies, public utilities, and building and loan associations shall not be
permitted to issue no-par value shares of stock.
Preferred shares of stock issued by any corporation may be given preference in
the distribution of the assets of the corporation in case of liquidation and in the
distribution of dividends, or such other preferences as may be stated in the
articles of incorporation which are not violative of the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That preferred shares of stock may be issued only with a stated par
value. The Board of Directors, where authorized in the articles of incorporation,
may fix the terms and conditions of preferred shares of stock or any series
thereof: Provided, That such terms and conditions shall be effective upon the
filing of a certificate thereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Shares of capital stock issued without par value shall be deemed fully paid and
non-assessable and the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the
corporation or to its creditors in respect thereto: Provided; That shares without
par value may not be issued for a consideration less than the value of five
(P5.00) pesos per share: Provided, further, That the entire consideration
received by the corporation for its no-par value shares shall be treated as capital
and shall not be available for distribution as dividends.
A corporation may, furthermore, classify its shares for the purpose of insuring
compliance with constitutional or legal requirements.
Except as otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation and stated in the
certificate of stock, each share shall be equal in all respects to every other
share.
Where the articles of incorporation provide for non-voting shares in the cases
allowed by this Code, the holders of such shares shall nevertheless be entitled
to vote on the following matters:
1. Amendment of the articles of incorporation;
2. Adoption and amendment of by-laws;
3. Sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or
substantially all of the corporate property;
4. Incurring, creating or increasing bonded indebtedness;
5. Increase or decrease of capital stock;
6. Merger or consolidation of the corporation with another corporation or
other corporations;
7. Investment of corporate funds in another corporation or business in
accordance with this Code; and
8. Dissolution of the corporation.
Except as provided in the immediately preceding paragraph, the vote necessary
to approve a particular corporate act as provided in this Code shall be deemed
to refer only to stocks with voting rights.


Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control
or management of the corporation.
43
This is exercised through his vote in the election
of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the
corporation.
44
In the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying
voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as
common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often excluded from
any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of directors and on
other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are merely investors in the
corporation for income in the same manner as bondholders.
45
In fact, under the
Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares can be deprived of the right to
vote.
46
Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any corporate
meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of
common shareholders to vote is invalid.
47


Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if
the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the
term capital shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in
the control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in
the election of directors. In short, the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of
directors.

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public utilities.
As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, capital refers to
the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation, to wit:

MR. NOLLEDO. In Sections 3, 9 and 15, the Committee stated local or
Filipino equity and foreign equity; namely, 60-40 in Section 3, 60-40 in Section
9 and 2/3-1/3 in Section 15.

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

MR. NOLLEDO. In teaching law, we are always faced with this question:
Where do we base the equity requirement, is it on the authorized capital stock,
on the subscribed capital stock, or on the paid-up capital stock of a
corporation? Will the Committee please enlighten me on this?

MR. VILLEGAS. We have just had a long discussion with the members of the
team from the UP Law Center who provided us a draft. The phrase that is
contained here which we adopted from the UP draft is 60 percent of
voting stock.

MR. NOLLEDO. That must be based on the subscribed capital stock, because
unless declared delinquent, unpaid capital stock shall be entitled to vote.

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you.

With respect to an investment by one corporation in another corporation, say, a
corporation with 60-40 percent equity invests in another corporation which is
permitted by the Corporation Code, does the Committee adopt the grandfather
rule?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, that is the understanding of the Committee.

MR. NOLLEDO. Therefore, we need additional Filipino capital?

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.
48


x x x x
MR. AZCUNA. May I be clarified as to that portion that was accepted by
the Committee.

MR. VILLEGAS. The portion accepted by the Committee is the deletion of the
phrase voting stock or controlling interest.

MR. AZCUNA. Hence, without the Davide amendment, the committee report
would read: corporations or associations at least sixty percent of whose
CAPITAL is owned by such citizens.

MR. VILLEGAS. Yes.

MR. AZCUNA. So if the Davide amendment is lost, we are stuck with 60
percent of the capital to be owned by citizens.

MR. VILLEGAS. That is right.

MR. AZCUNA. But the control can be with the foreigners even if they are
the minority. Let us say 40 percent of the capital is owned by them, but it is
the voting capital, whereas, the Filipinos own the nonvoting shares. So we
can have a situation where the corporation is controlled by foreigners
despite being the minority because they have the voting capital. That is the
anomaly that would result here.

MR. BENGZON. No, the reason we eliminated the word stock as stated
in the 1973 and 1935 Constitutions is that according to Commissioner
Rodrigo, there are associations that do not have stocks. That is why we say
CAPITAL.

MR. AZCUNA. We should not eliminate the phrase controlling interest.

MR. BENGZON. In the case of stock corporations, it is
assumed.
49
(Emphasis supplied)


Thus, 60 percent of the capital assumes, or should result in, controlling interest
in the corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term capital, as referring to
controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a Philippine
national in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991,
50
to wit:

SEC. 3. Definitions. - As used in this Act:

a. The term Philippine national shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a
domestic partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines; or a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of
which at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock
outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the
Philippines; or a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business
in the Philippines under the Corporation Code of which one hundred percent
(100%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly owned by
Filipinos or a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or
separation benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least sixty
percent (60%) of the fund will accrue to the benefit of Philippine
nationals: Provided, That where a corporation and its non-Filipino stockholders
own stocks in a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registered
enterprise, at least sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote of each of both corporations must be owned and held by
citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent (60%) of the members of
the Board of Directors of each of both corporations must be citizens of the
Philippines, in order that the corporation, shall be considered a Philippine
national. (Emphasis supplied)

In explaining the definition of a Philippine national, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 provide:

b. Philippine national shall mean a citizen of the Philippines or a domestic
partnership or association wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines; or a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least
sixty percent [60%] of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines; or a trustee of funds for
pension or other employee retirement or separation benefits, where the trustee
is a Philippine national and at least sixty percent [60%] of the fund will accrue
to the benefit of the Philippine nationals; Provided, that where a corporation its
non-Filipino stockholders own stocks in a Securities and Exchange
Commission [SEC] registered enterprise, at least sixty percent [60%] of the
capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote of both corporations must be
owned and held by citizens of the Philippines and at least sixty percent [60%]
of the members of the Board of Directors of each of both corporation must be
citizens of the Philippines, in order that the corporation shall be considered a
Philippine national. The control test shall be applied for this purpose.

Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be
determined on the basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or
not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to vote are
considered.

For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or
Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required
Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with
appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of
which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be considered
held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.

Individuals or juridical entities not meeting the aforementioned
qualifications are considered as non-Philippine nationals. (Emphasis
supplied)






Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned capital
required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required.
The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must
rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional mandate.
Otherwise, the corporation is considered as non-Philippine national[s].

Under Section 10, Article XII of the Constitution, Congress may reserve to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress
may prescribe, certain areas of investments. Thus, in numerous laws Congress has
reserved certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens or to corporations at least
sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens. Some of these
laws are: (1) Regulation of Award of Government Contracts or R.A. No. 5183; (2)
Philippine Inventors Incentives Act or R.A. No. 3850; (3) Magna Carta for Micro,
Small and Medium Enterprises or R.A. No. 6977; (4) Philippine Overseas Shipping
Development Act or R.A. No. 7471; (5) Domestic Shipping Development Act of 2004
or R.A. No. 9295; (6) Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009 or R.A. No. 10055;
and (7) Ship Mortgage Decree or P.D. No. 1521. Hence, the term capital in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution is also used in the same context in numerous
laws reserving certain areas of investments to Filipino citizens.

To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding capital stock, including
both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and
letter of the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to
control of the public utility.

We shall illustrate the glaring anomaly in giving a broad definition to the term
capital. Let us assume that a corporation has 100 common shares owned by
foreigners and 1,000,000 non-voting preferred shares owned by Filipinos, with both
classes of share having a par value of one peso (P1.00) per share. Under the broad
definition of the term capital, such corporation would be considered compliant with
the 40 percent constitutional limit on foreign equity of public utilities since the
overwhelming majority, or more than 99.999 percent, of the total outstanding capital
stock is Filipino owned. This is obviously absurd.

In the example given, only the foreigners holding the common shares have voting
rights in the election of directors, even if they hold only 100 shares. The foreigners,
with a minuscule equity of less than 0.001 percent, exercise control over the public
utility. On the other hand, the Filipinos, holding more than 99.999 percent of the
equity, cannot vote in the election of directors and hence, have no control over the
public utility. This starkly circumvents the intent of the framers of the Constitution, as
well as the clear language of the Constitution, to place the control of public utilities in
the hands of Filipinos. It also renders illusory the State policy of an independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

The example given is not theoretical but can be found in the real world, and in fact
exists in the present case.

Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the
election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation expressly state that the
holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of
the stockholders for the election of directors or for any other purpose or
otherwise participate in any action taken by the corporation or its stockholders, or to
receive notice of any meeting of stockholders.
51


On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in
the election of directors. PLDTs Articles of Incorporation
52
state that each holder of
Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held
by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common
Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for the election of directors
and for all other purposes.
53


In short, only holders of common shares can vote in the election of directors, meaning
only common shareholders exercise control over PLDT. Conversely, holders of
preferred shares, who have no voting rights in the election of directors, do not have
any control over PLDT. In fact, under PLDTs Articles of Incorporation, holders of
common shares have voting rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred shares
have no voting right for any purpose whatsoever.

It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority
of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on PLDTs 2010 General Information
Sheet (GIS),
54
which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities
and Exchange Commission,
55
foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT
whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares.
56
In other words, foreigners
hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDTs common shares, while Filipinos hold only
35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear
that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably
exceeds the allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities
expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Moreover, the Dividend Declarations of PLDT for 2009,
57
as submitted to the SEC,
shows that per share the SIP
58
preferred shares earn a pittance in dividends compared
to the common shares. PLDT declared dividends for the common shares at P70.00 per
share, while the declared dividends for the preferred shares amounted to a
measly P1.00 per share.
59
So the preferred shares not only cannot vote in the election
of directors, they also have very little and obviously negligible dividend earning
capacity compared to common shares.

As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS,
60
as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT
common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is P10.00
per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares
but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares.
Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while foreigners
own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares.
61
Worse, preferred shares
constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while common shares
constitute only 22.15%.
62
This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is
not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the common shares, blatantly
violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino
beneficial ownership in a public utility.

The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must
rest in the hands of Filipinos in accordance with the constitutional mandate. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is constitutionally required for the States grant of
authority to operate a public utility. The undisputed fact that the PLDT preferred
shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, are non-voting and earn only 1/70 of the
dividends that PLDT common shares earn, grossly violates the constitutional
requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership of a
public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less
than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly contravenes the express
command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that [n]o franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall
be granted except to x x xcorporations x x x organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens
x x x.

To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of
shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election of directors, and thus exercise
control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDTs common shares,
constituting a minority of the voting stock, and thus do not exercise control over
PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4)
preferred shares earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn;
63
(5)
preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred shares
constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only
22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public utility is a mockery of the
Constitution.

Incidentally, the fact that PLDT common shares with a par value of P5.00 have a
current stock market value of P2,328.00 per share,
64
while PLDT preferred shares
with a par value ofP10.00 per share have a current stock market value ranging from
only P10.92 to P11.06 per share,
65
is a glaring confirmation by the market that control
and beneficial ownership of PLDT rest with the common shares, not with the
preferred shares.

Indisputably, construing the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution to include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject
surrender of our telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear
abdication of the States constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to
Filipino citizens. Such an interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional
provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the
exploitation of natural resources as well as the ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising businesses. The Court should never open to foreign
control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to Filipinos for that would be a
betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must perform its
solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the Constitution to ensure, in
the words of the Constitution, a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution
expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development
of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising
business, is self-executing. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional
provisions are self-executing was explained in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
66
thus:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always
been, that

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphasis
supplied)





In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are
presumed to be self-executing. Justice Puno stated:

Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing,
rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is
not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people can be
easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages
is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.


Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on
arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-
incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to
effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life,
liberty and the protection of property. The same treatment is accorded to
constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for
public use without just compensation. (Emphasis supplied)


Thus, in numerous cases,
67
this Court, even in the absence of implementing
legislation, applied directly the provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions
limiting land ownership to Filipinos. In Soriano v. Ong Hoo,
68
this Court ruled:

x x x As the Constitution is silent as to the effects or consequences of a sale by
a citizen of his land to an alien, and as both the citizen and the alien have
violated the law, none of them should have a recourse against the other, and it
should only be the State that should be allowed to intervene and determine
what is to be done with the property subject of the violation. We have said that
what the State should do or could do in such matters is a matter of public
policy, entirely beyond the scope of judicial authority. (Dinglasan, et al. vs. Lee
Bun Ting, et al., 6 G. R. No. L-5996, June 27, 1956.) While the legislature has
not definitely decided what policy should be followed in cases of violations
against the constitutional prohibition, courts of justice cannot go beyond
by declaring the disposition to be null and void as violative of the
Constitution. x x x (Emphasis supplied)


To treat Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution as not self-executing would mean
that since the 1935 Constitution, or over the last 75 years, not one of the constitutional
provisions expressly reserving specific areas of investments to corporations, at least
60 percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos, was enforceable. In short,
the framers of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions miserably failed to effectively
reserve to Filipinos specific areas of investment, like the operation by corporations of
public utilities, the exploitation by corporations of mineral resources, the ownership
by corporations of real estate, and the ownership of educational institutions. All the
legislatures that convened since 1935 also miserably failed to enact legislations to
implement these vital constitutional provisions that determine who will effectively
control the national economy, Filipinos or foreigners. This Court cannot allow such an
absurd interpretation of the Constitution.

This Court has held that the SEC has both regulatory and adjudicative
functions.
69
Under its regulatory functions, the SEC can be compelled by mandamus
to perform its statutory duty when it unlawfully neglects to perform the same. Under
its adjudicative or quasi-judicial functions, the SEC can be also be compelled by
mandamus to hear and decide a possible violation of any law it administers or
enforces when it is mandated by law to investigate such violation.

Under Section 17(4)
70
of the Corporation Code, the SEC has the regulatory function to
reject or disapprove the Articles of Incorporation of any corporation where the
required percentage of ownership of the capital stock to be owned by citizens of
the Philippines has not been complied with as required by existing laws or the
Constitution. Thus, the SEC is the government agency tasked with the statutory
duty to enforce the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution on the ownership of public utilities. This Court, in a petition for
declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus as in the present case, can
direct the SEC to perform its statutory duty under the law, a duty that the SEC has
apparently unlawfully neglected to do based on the 2010 GIS that respondent PLDT
submitted to the SEC.
Under Section 5(m) of the Securities Regulation Code,
71
the SEC is vested with the
power and function to suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the
franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or
associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law. The SEC is mandated
under Section 5(d) of the same Code with the power and function to investigate
x x x the activities of persons to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations
that SEC administers or enforces. The GIS that all corporations are required to submit
to SEC annually should put the SEC on guard against violations of the nationality
requirement prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws. This Court can compel
the SEC, in a petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a petition for mandamus
as in the present case, to hear and decide a possible violation of Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution in view of the ownership structure of PLDTs voting shares, as
admitted by respondents and as stated in PLDTs 2010 GIS that PLDT submitted to
SEC.

WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term capital
in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to
common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and non-
voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term capital in
determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3046
(as amended by RA 5446)
AN ACT DEFINE THE BASELINES OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines describes the national territory as comprising all the
territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Paris concluded between the United States and
Spain on December 10, 1898, the limits of which are set forth in Article III of said treaty, together
with all the islands embraced in the treaty concluded at Washington, between the United States and
Spain on November 7, 1900, and in the treaty concluded between the United States and Great
Britain on January 2, 1930, and all the territory over which the Government of the Philippine Islands
exercised jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
WHEREAS, all the waters within the limits set forth in the above-mentioned treaties have always
been regarded as part of the territory of the Philippine Islands;
WHEREAS, all the waters around, between and connecting the various islands of the Philippines
archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary
appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal waters of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, all the waters beyond the outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of
the boundaries set forth in the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of
straight lines joining appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago; and
WHEREAS, the said baselines should be clarified and specifically defined and described for the
information of all concerned; Now, therefor,
Section 1. The baselines for the territorial sea of the Philippines are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:

N. Latitude E. Longitude Asimuth Distance in
Meters
Y'ami Island (E)
Line 1 (Yami I. (E.) Tumaruk Rk.)
2107'03" 12157'24" 35327' 71,656
Tumaruk Rk.
Line 2 (Tumaruk Rk. Balintang
Is.)
2028'28" 12202'06" 34713' 58,105
Balintang Island
Line 3 (Balingtang Is. Didicas
Rk.)
1957'45" 12209'28" 37505' 97,755
Didicas Rk.
Line 4 (Didicas Rk. - Iligan Pt.)
1904'50" 12212'18" 35039' 86,155
Iligan Pt.
Line 5 (Iligan Pt. - Ditolong Pt.)
1818'45" 12220'15" 35123' 136,030
Ditolong Pt.
Line 6 (Ditolong Pt. - Diviuisa Pt.)
1705'50" 12231'44" 1656' 34,378
Diviuisa Pt.
Line 7 (Diviuisa Pt. - Dijohan Pt.)
1648'00" 12226'06" 2101' 57,781
Dijohan Pt.
Line 7a (Dijohan Pt. - Bulubalik Pt.)
1618'45" 12214'28" 1052' 142,360
Bulubalik Pt.
Line 8 (Bulubalik Pt. - Tinaga I.)
1502'56" 12159'30" 30015' 120,986
Tinaga I.
Line 9 (Tinaga I. - Horadaba Rks.)
1429'45" 12257'40" 28627' 148,690
Horadaba Rks.
Line 10 (Horadaba Rks. Matulin
Rk.)
1406'41" 12416'54" 30634' 1,083
Matulin Rk.
Line 11 (Matulin Rk. - Atalaya Pt.)
1406'20" 12417'23" 33146' 178,480
Atalaya Pt.
Line 11a (Atalaya Pt. - Finch Rk.)
1240'59" 12504'02" 31330' 22,268
Finch Rk.
Line 12 (Finch Rk. - SE of Manjud
Pt.)
1232'40" 12512'57" 31356' 12,665
SE Manjud pt.
Line 12a (SE of Manjud Pt. - Sora
Cay)
1227'54" 12517'59" 32227' 14,225
Sora Cay
Line 13 (Sora Cay - Bunga Pt.)
1221'47" 12522'46" 32103' 22,793
Bunga Pt.
Line 13a (Bunga Pt. - Tubabao I.)
1212'10" 12530'40" 33150' 12,686
Tubabao I.
Line 14 (Tubabao I. - Tugnug Pt.)
2306'06" 12533'58" 35522' 83,235
Tugnug Pt.
Line 15 (Tugnug Pt. - Suluan I.)
1121'06" 12537'40" 33103' 75,326
Suluan Island
Line 16 (Suluan I. - Tuason Pt.)
1045'20" 12557'40" 34751' 107,070
Tuason Pt.
Line 17 (Tuason Pt. - Cauit Pt.)
948'33" 12610'00" 35525' 55,415
Cauit Pt.
Line 18 (Cauit Pt. Arangasa Is.)
918'35" 12612'25" 34244' 49,703
Arangasa Is.
Line 19 Arangasa Is. -
Quinablangan I.)
852'50" 12620'28" 34840' 131,330
Quinablangan I.
Line 19a (Quinablangan I. - Above
Languyan R.)
742'58" 12634'30" 35308' 25,619
Above Languyan R.
Line 20 (Above Languyan R.
Pusan Pt.)
729'10" 12636'10" 35652' 22,489
Pusan Pt.
Line 21 (Pusan Pt. - Tuguban Pt.)
716'59" 12636'50" 2639' 36,259
Tuguban Pt.
Line 22 (Tuguban Pt. - Cape S.
Agustin N.)
659'24" 12628'00" 2033' 83,350
Cape San Agustin (N)
Line 22a (Cape S. Agustin (N)
Cape San Agustin (S)
617'03" 12612'08" 3016' 1,707
Cape San Agustin (S)
Line 23 (Cape S. Agustin (S)
Panguil Bato Pt.)
616'15" 12611'40" 3923' 125,100
Panguil Bato Pt.
Line 23a (Panguil Bato Pt. -
Tapundo Pt.)
523'45" 12528'42" 6632' 7,484
Tapudo Pt.
Line 24 (Tapundo Pt. - Manamil I.)
522'08" 12524'59" 8919' 7,667
Manamil I.
Line 24a (Manamil I. - Balut I. (W)
522'05" 12520'50" 13901' 3,051
Balut I. (W)
Line 25 (Balut I. (W) - Middle of 3
Rk. Awash)
523'20" 12519'45" 12447' 149,840
Middle of 3 Rk. Awash
Line 26 (Middle of 3 Rk. Awash
Tongquil I.)
609'39" 12413'02" 8618' 259,400
Tongquil I.
Line 27 (Tongquil I. - Sumbasumba
I.)
600'15" 12152'45" 6129' 115,950
Sumbasumba I.
Line 28 (Sumbasumba I. -
Kinapusan Is.)
530'10" 12057'35" 4319' 44,445
Kinapusan Is.
Line 29 (Kinapusan Is. - Manuk
Manka I.)
512'37" 12041'05" 6314' 101,290
Manuk Manka I.
Line 30 (Manuk Manka I. - Frances
Reef)
447'50" 11952'10" 5830' 80,847
Frances Reef
Line 31 (Frances Reef - Bajapa
Reef)
424'54" 11914'54" 13434' 29,330
Bajapa Reef
Line 32 (Bajapa Reef) - Panguan I.)
436'04" 11903'36" 16405' 13,480
Panguan I.
Line 33 (Panguan I. - Omapoy I.)
443'06" 11901'36" 23848' 42,470
Omapoy I.
Line 34 (Omapoy I. - Sanga-Sanga
I.)
455'02" 11921'15" 24611' 51,005
Sanga-Sanga I.
Line 35 (Sanga-Sanga I. - Pearl
Bank)
506'12" 11946'30" 17005' 80,200
Pearl Bank
Line 36 (Pearl Bank - Baguan I.)
549'04" 11939'01" 10313' 137,050
Baguan I
Line 36a (Banguan I. - Taganak I.)
606'00" 11826'42" 7652' 15,535
Taganak I.
Line 37 (Taganak I. - Gt.
Bakkungaan O
604'05" 11818'30" 11839' 24,805
Gt. Bakkungaan
Line 37a (Gt. Bakkungaan -
Sibaung I.)
610'32" 11806'42" 13604' 18,470
Sibaung I.
Line 38 (Sibaung - I. Muligi I.
617'45" 11759'45" 21536' 79,915
Mulugi I. 653'00" 11825'00" 11914' 140,541
Line 39 (Mulugi I. - Mangsee Is.)
Mangsee Is.
Line 39a (Mangsee Is. - Cape
Melville)
730'10" 11718'20" 13450 48,815
Cape Melville
Line 40 (Cape Melville - Ligas Pt.)
748'50" 11659'30" 15354' 15,665
Ligas Pt.
Line 41 (Ligas Pt. - Cay)
756'28" 11655'45" 17040' 5,666
Cay
Line 41a (Cay-Secam I.)
759'30" 11655'15" 20452' 22,925
Secam I.
Line 42 (Secam I. - N. of Canipan
Bay)
810'47" 11700'30" 20909' 54,900
N. of Canipan Bay
Line 43 (N. of Canipan Bay
Tatub Pt.)
836'50" 11715'06" 21857' 18,570
Tatub Pt.
Line 44 (Tatub Pt. - Punta Baja)
844'40" 11721'28" 22204' 45,125
Punta Baja
Line 45 (Punta Baja - Malapackun
I.)
902'50" 11737'58" 22330' 32,194
Malapackun I.
Line 46 (Malapackun I. - Piedras
Pt.)
915'30" 11750'04" 22550' 148,260
Piedras Pt.
Line 47 (Piedras Pt. - Tapuitan I.)
1011'28" 11848'18" 20319' 124,900
Tapuitan I.
Line 48 (Tapuitan I. - Pinnacle Rk.)
1113'40" 11915'28" 20847' 136,590
Pincle Rk.
Line 49 (Pinnacle Rk. - Cape
Calavite
1218'34" 11951'45" 20040' 134,230
Cape Calavite
Line 50 (Cape Calavite - Cabra I.)
1326'40" 12018'00" 14812' 58,235
Cabra I.
Line 51 (Cabra I. - Capones Is.)
1353'30" 12000'58" 17926' 113,400
Capones Is.
Line 52 (Capones Is. - Pa-Lauig Pt.)
1455'00" 12000'20" 16809' 58,100
Palauig Pt.
Line 53 (Palauig. - Hermana Mayor
I.)
1525'50" 11953'40" 16417' 40,870
Hermana Mayor I.
Line 53a (Hermana Mayor
Tambobo Pt.)
1547'10" 11947'28" 16710' 20,490
Tambobo Pt.
Line 54 (Tambobo Pt. - Rena Pt.)
1558'00" 11944'55" 18143' 22,910
Rena Pt.
Line 54a (Rena Pt. - Cape Bolinao
1610'25" 11945'18" 19139' 18,675
Cape Bolinao
Line 55 (Cape Bolinao - Darigayos
Pt.)
1620'20" 11947'25" 22620' 80,016
Darigayos Pt.
Line 56 (Darigayos Pt. - Dile Pt.)
1650'15" 12020'00" 17958' 81,616
Dile Pt.
Line 56a (Disle Pt. - Pinget I.)
1734'30" 12019'58" 18827' 12,060
Pinget I.
Line 56b (Pinget I. - Badoc I.)
1740'58" 12020'58" 19246' 27,170
Badoc I.
Line 57 (Badoc I. - Cape Bojeador)
1755'20" 12024'22" 19503' 65,270
Cape Bojeador
Line 58 (Cape Bojeador - Dalupiri
I.)
1829'30" 12034'00" 22216' 101,740
Dalupiri I.
Line 59 (Dalupiri I. - Catanapan Pt.)
1910'15" 12113'02" 21329' 25,075
Catanapan Pt.
Line 60 (Catanapan Pt. - Dequey I.)
1921'35" 12120'56" 20227' 116,870
Dequey I.
Line 61 (Dequey I. - Raile)
2920'06" 12146'35" 18047' 42,255
Raile
Line 62 (Raile - Y'ami I. (W)
2043'00" 12146'55" 20030' 48,140
Y'ami I.(W)
Line 63 (Y'ami I. (W) - Y'ami I. (M)
2107'26" 12156'39" 23840' 237
Y'ami I. (M)
Line 64 (Y'ami I.(M) - Y'ami I. (E)
2107'30" 12156'46" 30708' 1,376
Y'ami I. (E) 2107'03" 12157'24"

Section 2. All waters within the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland
or internal waters of the Philippines.
Section 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 17, 1961.
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session


Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand eight.
Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009
AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED
BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the
Territorial Sea of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:
Basepoint
Number
Station
Name
Location World Geodetic System of 1984
(WGS 84) Coordinates
Distance
to next
basepoint
(M)
Latitude (N) Longitude (E)
1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21657.73" 1215727.71" 70.08
2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 195738.19" 122946.32" 99.17
3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt. 181835.30" 1222019.07" 71.83
4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 17716.30" 1223128.34" 1.05
5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt. 17614.79" 1223143.84" 0.39
6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17551.31" 1223142.66" 3.29
7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17236.91" 122313.28" 9.74
8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. 165918.03" 1222756.61" 3.51
9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 164956.11" 1222650.78" 2.40
10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 164738.86" 122264.40" 30.94
11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt. 161844.33" 1221406.69" 116.26
12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 142954.43" 1225751.15" 80.29
13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk. 146.29.91" 1241659.21" 0.54
14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 146.10.40" 1241726.28" 96.04
15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12416.37" 125353.71" 6.79
16 PAB-13A Bacan Is. 123618.41" 125850.19" 5.52
17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 1232.33.62" 1251259.70" 0.80
18 PAB-14A Cube Rk. 1231.57.45" 1251332.37" 4.90
19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt. 122836.42" 1251712.32" 1.30
20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt. 122737.51" 125185.23" 7.09
21 PAB-16A S Sorz Cay 122141.64" 125237.41" 5.68
22 PAB-16B Panablihon 121727.17" 125270.12" 5.21
23 PAB-16C Alugon 121321.95" 1253019.47" 1.94
24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 121148.16" 1253130.88" 0.54
25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt. 121120.67" 1253148.29" 5.71
26 PAB-18A SE Tobabao Is. 1267.00" 1253411.94" 83.94
27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 104516.70" 125588.78" 56.28
28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 94959.58" 126106.39" 57.44
29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 85316.62" 1262048.81" 40.69
30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt. 81311.53" 1262853.25" 30.80
31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 74245.02" 1263429.08" 12.95
32 PAB-22C Languyan 72949.47" 1263559.24" 0.54
33 PAB-23 Languyan 72916.93" 1263559.50" 0.76
34 PAB-23B Languyan 72830.97" 1263557.30" 1.2
35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt. 72729.42" 1263551.31" 10.12
36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 71719.80" 1263618.26" 1.14
37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt. 71614.43" 1263557.20" 63.28
38 PAB-25B Cape San Agustin 61714.73" 1261214.40" 1.28
39 PAB-25 Cape San Agustin 6168.35" 1261135.06" 67.65
40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani Is. 52334.20" 1252842.11" 0.43
41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato Pt. 52321.80" 1252819.59" 3.44
42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 62155.66" 1262511.21" 3.31
43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 52158.48" 1252152.03" 0.87
44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5222.91" 1252059.73" 1.79
45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt. 52320.18" 1251944.29" 78.42
46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 698.44" 1241542.81" 122.88
47 PAB-33A Kantuan Is 62647.22" 12213.34.50" 29.44
48 PAB-34A Tongguil Is. 6233.77" 1215636.20" 2.38
49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 618.51" 1215441.45" 1.72
50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6017.88" 1216311.17" 85.94
51 PAB-38A Kirapusan Is 512.8.70" 1204138.14" 55.24
52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka Is. 44739.24" 1195158.08" 43.44
53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 42453.84" 1191450.71 0.61
54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4253.83" 1191415.15" 15.48
55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 436"9.01" 119322.75" 6.88
56 PAB-42A Paguan Is. 44252.07" 119144.04" 8.40
57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 44555.25" 119315.19" 2.28
58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4475.36" 119512.94" 18.60
59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 45510.45" 119221.30 23.37
60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis Pt. 5223.73" 1194418.14" 44.20
61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 54635.15" 1193951.77" 75.17
62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is. 6558.41" 1182657.30" 8.54
63 PAB-48A Taganak Is 6414.08" 1181833.33" 13.46
64 PAB-49 Great Bakkungaan Is. 6114.65" 118654.15" 3.97
65 PAB-50 Libiman Is. 61339.90" 118352.09" 5.53
66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 61743.99" 11805.44" 41.60
67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 65214.53" 1182340.49" 75.06
68 PAB-53 South Mangsee Is. 73026.05" 1171833.75" 26.00
69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 74830.69" 1165939.18" 6.08
70 PAB-54A Balabac Great Reef 75127.17" 1165417.19" 1.18
71 PAB-54B Balabac Great Reef 75219.86" 1165328.73" 2.27
72 PAB-55 Balabac Great Reef 75436.35" 1165316.64" 5.42
73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 820.26" 1165410.04" 10.85
74 PAB.61 Secam Is. 81118.36" 1165951.87" 30.88
75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 88756.37" 1171551.23" 7.91
76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 84417.40" 1172039.37" 11.89
77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt. 85332.20" 1172815.78" 13.20
78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt. 92.57.47" 1173738.88" 81.12
79 PAB.64B Dry Is. 95922.54" 1183653.61" 82.76
80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan Pt. 111319.82" 1191517.74" 74.65
81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 121935.22" 1195056.00 93.88
82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 135324.45" 12015.86" 115.69
83 PAB-71 Hermana Mayor Is. 154843.61" 1194656.09" 9.30
84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 155761.67" 1194455.32" 12.06
85 PAB-72B Rena Pt. 16957.90" 11945.15.76" 0.25
86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 161012.42" 1194511.95" 6.43
87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 161634.46" 1194619.50" 0.65
88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 163712.70" 1194628.62" 1.30
89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 161829.49" 1194644.94" 1.04
90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 161928.20" 119477.69" 0.63
91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16204.38" 1194720.48" 80.60
92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 173424.94" 1202033.36" 6.86
93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 174117.56" 120212.20" 14.15
94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17554.13" 1202440.56" 35.40
95 PAB-79 Cape Bojeador 182932.42" 1203342.41" 1.77
96 PAB-79B Bobon 183052.88" 1203455.35" 58.23
97 PAB-80 Calagangan Pt. 191014.78" 1211252.64" 98.07
98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 204315.74" 1214657.80" 25.63
99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21717.47" 1215643.85" 0.08
100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21718.41" 1215648.79" 0.25
101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21712.04" 121573.65" 0.44
Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.
Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and
jurisdiction over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions
of applicable laws including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, as amended.
Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the
aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United
Nations.
Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith
produce and publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of
basepoints and baselines as set forth in this Act.
Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a
supplemental budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into
law.
Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other
portions or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all
other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby
amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in any two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
Approved
(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216 was finally passed
by the Senate and the House of Representative on February 17, 2009.
(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary General
House of Represenatives
(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES
Secretary of Senate
Approved: MAR 10, 2009
(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183591 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET
AL.
G.R. No. 183752 - CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET
AL.
G.R. No. 183893 - THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAURENCE LLUCH
CRUZ v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
G.R. No. 183951 - THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as
represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N.
DEANO, petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P.
SANTOS-AKBAR,petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, represented by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDDATU,
in his capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan
Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CARLO B. GOMEZ, ET AL., petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
The piece of writing being assailed in these consolidated Petitions is a peace negotiation document,
namely theMemorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA). The Solicitor General explained that this document,
prepared by the joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace
Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of
consensus points reached between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a
Bangsamoro homeland.
1
Subsequently, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the
consolidated cases at bar based on changed circumstances as well as developments which have
rendered them moot, particularly the Executive Department's statement that it would no longer sign
the questioned peace negotiation document.
2
Nonetheless, several parties to the case, as well as
other sectors, continue to push for what they call a "complete determination" of the constitutional
issues raised in the present Petitions.
I believe that in light of the pronouncement of the Executive Department to already abandon the
MOA, the issue of its constitutionality has obviously become moot.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental
act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an
actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and,
that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of
the case itself. But the most important are the first two requisites.
3

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale.
4
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the
issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. Simply stated, there is nothing for the court to
resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
5

Such is the case here.
The MOA has not even been signed, and will never be. Its provisions will not at all come into effect.
The MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a
piece of paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of
violating, any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no
more leg to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for
resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of
opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that
the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.
6

For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of the MOA will merely be an
academic exercise. It would, in effect, only be delivering an opinion or advice on what are now
hypothetical or abstract violations of constitutional rights.
In Abbas v. Commission on Elections,
7
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and Republic Act No. 6734 (the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) were challenged for purported
violations of the provisions of the Constitution on freedom of religion. The Court held therein that it
should not inquire into the constitutionality of a peace agreement which was already consummated
(the 1976 Tripoli Agreement) and an Organic Act which was already passed into law (R.A. No. 6734)
just because of potential conflicts with the Constitution. Then, with more reason should this Court
desist from ruling on the constitutionality of the MOA which is unsigned, and now entirely
abandoned, and as such, cannot even have any potential conflict with the Constitution.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public
interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The
power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears
or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the
Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of
constitutional law.
The Executive Department has already manifested to this Court, through the Solicitor General, that it
will not sign the MOA in its present form or in any other form. It has declared the same intent to
the public. For this Court to insist that the issues raised in the instant Petitions cannot be moot for
they are still capable of repetition is to totally ignore the assurance given by the Executive
Department that it will not enter into any other form of the MOA in the future. The Court cannot doubt
the sincerity of the Executive Department on this matter. The Court must accord a co-equal branch
of the government nothing less than trust and the presumption of good faith.
Moreover, I deem it beyond the power of this Court to enjoin the Executive Department from entering
into agreements similar to the MOA in the future, as what petitioners and other opponents of the
MOA pray for. Such prayer once again requires this Court to make a definitive ruling on what are
mere hypothetical facts. A decree granting the same, without the Court having seen or considered
the actual agreement and its terms, would not only be premature, but also too general to make at
this point. It will perilously tie the hands of the Executive Department and limit its options in
negotiating peace for Mindanao.
Upon the Executive Department falls the indisputably difficult responsibility of diffusing the highly
volatile situation in Mindanao resulting from the continued clashes between the Philippine military
and Muslim rebel groups. In negotiating for peace, the Executive Department should be given
enough leeway and should not be prevented from offering solutions which may be beyond what the
present Constitution allows, as long as such solutions are agreed upon subject to the amendment of
the Constitution by completely legal means.
Peace negotiations are never simple. If neither party in such negotiations thinks outside the box, all
they would arrive at is a constant impasse. Thus, a counsel for one of the intervenors who assert the
unconstitutionality of the MOA
8
had no choice but to agree as follows:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Well, we realize the constitutional constraints of
sovereignty, integrity and the like, but isn't there a time that surely will come and the life of
our people when they have to transcend even these limitations?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, we have seen it happen in several instances, Your Honor.
x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And in pursuit of that purpose, the Supreme Court
cannot look beyond the horizon and look for more satisfying result?
DEAN AGABIN: Well, if you mean by looking beyond the horizon, it would mean a violation
of the provisions of the Constitution, then it should not be, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: In some part, we have gone to Malaysia. We have
gone to the OIC, and we have even gone to Libya.
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor. But in all these, we have always insisted on preserving
the territorial integrity of the country.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And this dicta or [dogma] is unassailable forever.
There cannot be an exception.
DEAN AGABIN: It is unassailable under the present Constitution, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: But, at least, you can also agree that the Constitution
ought to be changed in order for a country to fulfill its internal obligation as a matter of
necessity.
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, if the people so will it, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: You remember how the emperor of Japan lost his
divinity? They just changed their Constitution, isn't it?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, it was enforced upon him by Mr. McArthur, and they have no choice.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Isn't that a very good example of thinking outside the
box? That one day even those who are underground may have to think. But frankly now
Dean, before I end, may I ask, is it possible to meld or modify our Constitutional Order in
order to have some room for the newly developing international notions on Associative
Governance Regulation Movement and Human Rights?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes. It is possible, Your Honor, with the consent of the people.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And, therefore, we vote it to a referendum or any
consultation beforehand?
DEAN AGABIN: If there is such a proposal for or amendment or revision of the Constitution,
yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: So, either initiative or CHA-CHA or CON-AS?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor.
9

It must be noted that the Constitution has been in force for three decades now, yet, peace in
Mindanao still remained to be elusive under its present terms. There is the possibility that the
solution to the peace problem in the Southern Philippines lies beyond the present Constitution.
Exploring this possibility and considering the necessary amendment of the Constitution are not per
se unconstitutional. The Constitution itself implicitly allows for its own amendment by describing,
under Article XVII, the means and requirements therefor. In Tan v. Macapagal,
10
where petitioners
claim that the Constitutional Convention was without power to consider, discuss, or adopt proposals
which seek to revise the Constitution through the adoption of a form of government other than the
form outlined in the then governing Constitution, the Court ruled that:
[A]s long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by [the Convention], there is no
room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends
to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the Courts are
devoid of jurisdiction. x x x.
At this point, there is far from a concrete proposed amendment to the Constitution which the Court
can take cognizance of, much less render a pronouncement upon.
At most, the Court can only exhort the Executive Department to keep in mind that it must negotiate
and secure peace in Mindanao under terms which are most beneficial for the country as a whole,
and not just one group of Muslim insurgents. Transparency and consultation with all major players,
which necessarily include affected local government units and their constituents, are essential to
arrive at a more viable and acceptable peace plan. The nature and extent of any future written
agreements should be clearly established from the very beginning, and the terms thereof carefully
drafted and clearly worded, to avoid misunderstandings or misconstructions by the parties and the
public. If a document is meant to be a list of consensus points still subject to further negotiations,
then it should just simply state so.
As a final note, I find it necessary to stress that the Court must not allow itself to be mired in
controversies affecting each step of the peace process in Mindanao. It is not within the province or
even the competence of the Judiciary to tell the Executive Department exactly what and what not,
how and how not, to negotiate for peace with insurgents. Given this kind of situation where war and
peace hang in the balance, where people's lives are at stake, and the Executive Department, under
its residual powers, is tasked to make political decisions in order to find solutions to the insurgency
problem, the Court should respect the political nature of the issues at bar and exercise judicial
restraint until an actual controversy is brought before it.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the GRANT of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Solicitor General
and, accordingly, for the DISMISSAL of the Petitions at bar for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000]
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D.
SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG
MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-
LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI
TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY,
VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG,
TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE
CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO,
SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES
MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO,
CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G.
ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H.
ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N.
TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O.
SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE
ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO,
ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S.
LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S.
SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR
TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID,
NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL,
FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO
M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented
by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID,
represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA,
EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO
BLAAN TRIBAL FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLES
EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR
THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to
comment.
[1]
In compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the
IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the
Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition
be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The
Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground
that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the
petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier,
one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in
defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a
Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is
an expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility
to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People
and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon,
et al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree
with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray
that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were
granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and
intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII
of the Constitution:
(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and
Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains
including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources
found within ancestral domains are private but community property of the
indigenous peoples;
(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural
resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the development and
utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for not more than 25 years; and
(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries,
wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.
[2]

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
ancestral domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found
within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.
[3]

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
[4]

These provisions are:
(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely,
the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and
Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the National
Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve
disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.
[5]

Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that the administrative
relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. They
contend that said Rule infringes upon the Presidents power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.
[6]

Petitioners pray for the following:
(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other
related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners
of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
8371 and its Implementing Rules;
(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and
Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the
implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the States
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.
[7]

After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the
Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate
opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1,
Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends
should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources
and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice
Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7
(a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he
believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view
that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices
Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of
Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE
AMO, SERGIO L. MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES,
JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO FABREGAS,
FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T.
TUTANA, JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD,
ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA M. LANCION,
NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE,
AIDA T. GADON, ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO
ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA,
MORADO PREFIDIGNO, TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA
MOISES,respondents/intervernors.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition
[1]
seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals,
[2]
dated June 22, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null
and void the Decision
[3]
dated January 30, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179,
confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land
registration court an application for registration of a parcel of land with an
approximate area of 1,200,766 square meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for
brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro (formerly known as Boso-
boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to
the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620
signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division,
Bureau of Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina
Watershed. On March 24, 1986, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an
Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
[4]
Subsequently, more
applicants joined (collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity).
[5]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners application. In due course, the
land registration court issued an order of general default against the whole
world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva,
one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902. Petitioners
declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the corresponding real
estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in pro-
indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners
submitted evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the
Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of the
property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his name on 22
March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on 16 December 1987
and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the
property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28,
1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II. He owned
and possessed the property until1958. He declared the property for tax purposes,
the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3 February
1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue of
a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the ownership of the
property by Angelina Reynoso,Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando Leyva,
the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name underTax
Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3
August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and
under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October
1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of
Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO,
VICENTE TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of
the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO
FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA,
JOSE TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA
ASTORIAS, MYRNA LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS,
PEDRO BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO
TORRES, AIDA GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the
property in a Deed of Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and
AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R.
SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9).
[6]

During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial
prosecutor appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the
oppositors to present their evidence, the land registration court issued an
order considering the case submitted for decision based on the evidence of
the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and reset the hearing to
January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the oppositors. On
this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due
notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for
decision based on the evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land
registration court held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to
establish their registrable rights over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered
a decision confirming the imperfect title of petitioners. We quote the pertinent
portions of the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the
witnesses presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open,
public and notorious possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest
since time immemorial and said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy
Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all
cross-examined by Counsel for Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes
in the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the
Applicants and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing
trees; portions to palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish
registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court
can only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983
private rights is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of
public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights
means that applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in
question was acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from
the Spanish government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands xxx (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have
acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the
Marikina Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per
Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the
area applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the
Marikina Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per
Proclamation No. 1283 promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-
boso Town Site Reservation, amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18,
1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).
[7]

In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April
6, 1991, petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991
confirming their title had become final after the Solicitor General received a
copy of the decision on February 18, 1991. Petitioners prayed that the land
registration court order the Land Registration Authority to issue the necessary
decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal whether the land registration court had already rendered a
decision and if so, whether the Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an
appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of
the land registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on
February 18, 1991 as alleged by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an
order directing the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on
the ground that there had been no clear showing that the Lot had been
previously classified as alienable and disposable making it subject to private
appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an
association of holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) under its
Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity), filed with the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-
Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot,
which is situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable.
They claimed that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the
certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF for tree planting
purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the
preliminary conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary
conference, all the parties as represented by their respective counsels agreed
that the only issue for resolution was whether the Lot in question is part of the
public domain.
[8]

The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition and declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the
land registration court. The Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973
(Art. XIV, Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public
domain belong to the State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for
registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that
the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs.
Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs.
Bacas, 176 SCRA 376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever
that the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the
bulk of the public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and
disposable. Worse, the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge, Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was
attached to the application of private respondents, categorically stated that "This
survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed
by the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March
2, 1988, submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These
documents readily and effectively negate the allegation in private respondent
Collados application that said parcel of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by
any form of title, nor any public land application and are not within any government
reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis supplied). The respondent court could not
have missed the import of these vital documents which are binding upon the courts
inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department to classify
public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent judge from assuming
jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public
domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same
(subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and
not the courts. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties
surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the Busol Forest
Reservation, the fact remains that it was so converted into a forest reservation, thus it
is with more reason that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the same into private
property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest
zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563;
Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, fraud or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387,
391) and a decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).
[9]

Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION
OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC LONG AFTER THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION
FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF TIME OR LONG AFTER
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated
July 26, 1904
[10]
established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for
brevity) situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even
concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, is inside the technical,
literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of petitioners claim
over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They
point out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are
subject to existing private rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that
their claim of ownership goes all the way back to 1902, when their known
predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and ownership over the
Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land
possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and
therefore alienable and disposable. They conclude that private rights were
vested on Sesinando Leyva before the issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the
Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
[11]
The
Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the
Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias
[12]
which laid the foundation that
all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain.
[13]
Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.
[14]

The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or
the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly amended the Mortgage Law
as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last Spanish land
law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration
of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state.
[15]

Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all
rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands
through the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine Commission, passed Act
No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing
of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It
also provided for the issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,
for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government;
and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of
Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term public land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained
in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and
excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
[16]

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of
lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919.
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA
141 for brevity) amended Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains
to this day as the existing general law governing the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands.
[17]

In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the
legislature passed Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act 496 placed all registered lands in
the Philippines under the Torrens system.
[18]
The Torrens system requires the
government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named in the
title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title
is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
quieted upon issuance of the certificate.
[19]
PD 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree enacted on June 11, 1978,
[20]
amended and updated Act
496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine
substituting, however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands
and waters of the public domain.
[21]
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate
opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources,
[22]
explained thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention
was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the
principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian
doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a necessary starting point
to secure recognition of the states power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well
knew that the concept of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced
by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was continued and
applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the
provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII
[23]
of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation
and Utilization of Natural Resources barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural
resources the State could alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the
Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV
[24]
on the National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII
[25]
on National Economy and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all
natural resources except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987
Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as
well as all natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong
to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal,
minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features which supply a
human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a community,
and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes.
[26]

In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.,
[27]
the Court had occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court
resolved the issue of whether the parcel of land which the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to be a watershed area is
exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL for brevity).
[28]
The Court defined watershed as an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide
which separates it from adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also
recognized that:
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most
important product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational
responsibility that needs to be answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or
overlying any ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources
as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department
to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the
protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management
or administration of such waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect
watershed areas and took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and
Development Bureau (ERDB), a research arm of the DENR, regarding the
environmental assessment of the Casile and Kabanga-an river watersheds
involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of
both watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig
waterworks, the activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and
water conservation practices jeopardize and endanger the vital
waterworks. Degradation of the land would have double edge detrimental effects. On
the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the Mangumit river which drains to
the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an side, this would mean
destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the Matangtubig
springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the protection of
the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would be destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support
system to thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these
watersheds come the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road
building and erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural
activities of the Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before
these watersheds would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation
threatens the livelihood of thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we
hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed development policy and program be
immediately formulated and implemented before the irreversible damage finally
happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and
Adjudication Board or DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the
parcels of land involved in order to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse
of natural resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest
zones. Population growth and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the
environment. Environmental degradation from unchecked human activities
could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future generations. Hence, by
constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable properties
of the State.
Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as
they vigorously argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the
issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed reservation?
The answer is in the negative.
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of
proving that he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as
amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for
is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to
warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect title. An imperfect
title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo real or
royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el
estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase.
[29]
Or,
that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
for at least thirty years preceding the filing of his application as provided by
Section 48 (b) CA 141.
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was
superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect
title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time
petitioners application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985.
[30]
As
amended, Section 48 (b) now reads:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public
Land Act requires that the applicant must prove the following:
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions
set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued.
[31]

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to
register the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or
title because of the failure to complete the required period of possession,
whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of
EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.
There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners
had acquired ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode
of acquisition from the State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of
1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been in possession for two years. Verily,
petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the manner and for the
number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to
the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a
watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-disposable and inalienable public
land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot
has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the filing
of petitioners application.
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no
longer be counted because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer
susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable
public agricultural land. Forest lands, including watershed reservations, are
excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or other
inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality
of Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,
[32]
the Court declared that
inalienable public lands -
x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive
and extinctive, does not run against the State.
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never
confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard
to public land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals
[33]
is in point. In Gordula, petitioners
did not contest the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the
heart of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No.
573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners in Gordula contended, however,
that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of landowners prior
to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to the
subject land. The Court ruled:
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any
grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a
showing of a title from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not
acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No.
573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3)
years after the issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land,
as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private
ownership as it has been classified as public forest reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573,
should not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the
claimant had occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years,
declared the land for taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes
[which are] accepted by the government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is]
continuous, open and unmolested and recognized by the government. Prescinding
from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-year possession by petitioner Gordula
from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the 30-year possession required under
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is enough to vest upon petitioner
Gordula the private rights recognized and respected in Proclamation No. 573.
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we
held that a settler claiming the protection of private rights to exclude his land from a
military or forest reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence that
the property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of
public lands.
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No.
141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the
substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public
lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application
for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the
land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or possessors claim
an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and
notorious possession.
Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the
Lot prior to EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently
segregated the Lot from the public domain and made the Lot alienable and
disposable when he issued Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly excluded an
area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-
boso Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small
part of this excluded town site area. Petitioners further contend that town
sites are considered alienable and disposable under CA 141.
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED
JULY 26, 1904, AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16,
BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED
RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE
LAND EMBRACED THEREIN AND RESERVING THE SAME, TOGETHER
WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR
TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI OF THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive
Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16,
both series of 1915, which established the Watershed Reservation situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, certain portions of land
embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the adjacent parcel of land of
the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of Chapter XI of the
Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future subdivision
survey in accordance with the development plan to be prepared and approved by the
Department of Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are
more particularly described as follows:
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the
Marikina Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon, beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-
30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less, from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28
W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W 1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30
50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m. to point 5; thence N 14 18
W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; thence N 71 38 W
458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 12; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East
1000.00 m. to point 16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East
1075.00 m. to point 18; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South 1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West
1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 27; thence Due West
636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of three thousand seven
hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less.
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable
and disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan
being N 74 30 E., 8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1. Antipolo, Rizal; thence
Due West 363.44 m. to point 2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due
West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West
1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 9; thence Due North
1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 11; thence Due North
509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13; thence S 71 38 E
458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14 18 E
1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E
503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e
1575.00 m to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred
twenty five (1,225) Hectares, more or less.
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21
st
day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No.
1637 issued on April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised the area and
location of the proposed townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor
O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed
by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and reverted it to MWR
coverage.
[34]
Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH
ESTABLISHED THE TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES
OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON
BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING
PROCLAMATION NO. 765 DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED
PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the
authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which
established the townsite reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical
descriptions of the land embraced therein, subject to private rights, if any there be,
which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
(Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending
the area under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation)
situated in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of
Rizal, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-
13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12);
on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-
26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along
lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-43-44 by the Angat Watershed
Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on the Topographic Maps with the
Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12, Marikina Watershed
Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey.
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within
the herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-seven.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department
is needed to declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed
reservation and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural
or other purposes.
[35]
Unless and until the land classified as such is released in
an official proclamation so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
[36]

The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private
character of the Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development
dated March 18, 1986 that the Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed
(Exh. R). The Certification reads:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
REGION IV
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
MAR 18 1986
VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal,
containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse
side hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C.
Reynoso, is verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina
Watershed Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904
per Proclamation No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the
Boso-Boso Townsite Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18,
1977 known as Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation.
Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396
dated June 2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements,
to the exclusion of any other government agencies.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained
in his internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
Verified by:
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
Cartographer II
Checked by:
(Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
ATTESTED:
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
Chief, Forest Engineering &
Infrastructure Section
The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had
occurred, and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by
several documents submitted by the Solicitor General before the land
registration court.
The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a
Report
[37]
dated March 2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio
of the then National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration,
confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms part of the MWR. He
thus recommended the dismissal of the application for registration. The
Report states:
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San Isidro,
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of title in the
case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a portion
of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the subject of
registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948 and was
issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia Garcia, et al.,
pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree dated February 8,
1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining portion of plan Psu-
162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court for
its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application in the
instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining supplied).
Likewise, in a letter
[38]
dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land
Inspector, DENR, Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly confirmed that the Lot is within the
MWR. The letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo,
Rizal, with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN
SIXTY SIX (126.0766) hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is
within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July
2, 1904 which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
x x x
That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration
Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by
Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-
A is recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied). Copy of the letter is
attached herewith as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T.
Collados [as original applicant] application is the technical description
[39]
of the
Lot signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division
of the Bureau of Lands. This technical description categorically stated that the
Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to
show clearly and positively that the Lot had been officially released from the
Marikina Watershed Reservation to form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. We hold that once a parcel of land is included
within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as
in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part of
such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent
declassification is shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had been excluded
from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April 25,
1985 would have been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the
proclamation in 1974. The result will not change even if we tack in the two
years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot from 1902 until the
issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then
DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the
townsite reservation, where petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the
MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may
be applied to this case by analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[40]

Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the
Republics petition for annulment of judgment which was filed long after the
decision of the land registration court had allegedly become final and
executory. The land registration court rendered its decision on January 30,
1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991.
[41]
Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of
Appeals the petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP
Blg. 129
[42]
only on August 6, 1991, after the decision had supposedly become
final and executory. Moreover, petitioners further point out that the Solicitor
General filed the petition for annulment after the land registration court issued
its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground
that the land registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically,
over the Lot which was not alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General
maintained that the decision was null and void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer
available because it is barred by the principle of res judicata. They insist that
the land registration court had jurisdiction over the case which involves private
land. They also argue that the Republic is estopped from questioning the land
registration courts jurisdiction considering that the Republic participated in
the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not
alienable and disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not
clearly and convincingly show that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620,
ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a watershed reservation of the
public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of this, the alleged
procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired
jurisdiction over the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court
involving the Lot are therefore null and void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,
[43]
as follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such
as public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly
adjudge the registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title
No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or
collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for
by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns
over technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,
[44]
which involved the registration of public
lands, specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res
judicata and estoppel to silence the Republics claim over public lands. The
Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when
the Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel
or laches validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is
to be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to
technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State
of the public properties registered and which are not capable of private
appropriation or private acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders
of certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social
Forestry Program, filed with the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which
petitioners sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their
forefathers had occupied, developed and tilled belong to the
Government, they filed a petition with then President Corazon C. Aquino and
then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of land to
them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to
take steps for the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for
development under the DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585 dated June 5, 1990 excluding
1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the same under the
DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904
WHICH ESTABLISHED THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-
12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF LANDS
EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY
OF ANTIPOLO, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and
pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President
of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33,
which established the Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the
public domain embraced therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and
Barangay San Joseph and Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and
place the same under the Integrated Social Forestry Program of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with existing laws, rules and
regulations, which parcel of land is more particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being
identical to corner 1 of Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not
otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5
th
day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through
the Regional Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime
between the years 1989 to 1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona
fide residents of the barangays mentioned in the proclamation as qualified
recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were intervenors. The
certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the
DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a
period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25)
years.
[45]
The DENR awarded contracts of stewardship to ISF participants in
Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other barangays based on the
Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted.
[46]

According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the
pendency of LRC Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Opposition in Intervention before the land registration court to assert
their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that
the land registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30,
1991 confirming petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a
copy of the decision on August 9, 1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for
new trial before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land
registration court could not act on its motions due to the restraining order
issued by the Court of Appeals on August 8, 1991, enjoining the land
registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by the Solicitor
General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which
allowed the same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
[47]
provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall
be attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial
court, as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has
recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago
vs. Court of Appeals
[48]
reiterated the ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court
of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for intervention even when
the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court held that:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at
this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on
appeal x x x the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for
certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme
Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x
Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply
a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of
the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not
to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of
intervenors in relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the
validity of the certificates of stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly
possessed inquired into considering this too was not in issue. In fact,
intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a declaration that the
Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We cannot fault
the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival
groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already
claimed at least five lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of
the petitioners on one side and those of the DENR awardees on the other. It
also spawned a number of criminal cases between the two rival groups
including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict application of the
rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated June 22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated
January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC
No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30389 December 27, 1972
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO
LEE HONG HOK,petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.

FERNANDO, J .:p
Petitioners
1
in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the Torrens Title
2
of respondent
Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task for petitioners quite difficult is that their factual
support for their pretension to ownership of such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by
respondent Court of Appeals. Without such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory,
which, to put it mildly, is distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the
government through the appropriate public officials
3
exercising the competence duly vested in them by
law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied, that land not otherwise passing
into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state. Such an assumption is at war with settled
principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there
is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising
from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he
"acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with
which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of Lands on
June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot
2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous
Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of
Naga City to defendant-appellee Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of
Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in
connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based
on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one
year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a private property as the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have always sustained the public
character thereof for having been formed by reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to
the appellants is an action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any
fraud committed by defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land
involved through his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of
the Bureau of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was done in the
open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award
thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer of the
Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application, and the said
deceased occupied the land since 1938."
4

On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to be
attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken place,
notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard what was
accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely by reclamation. It
does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of the other two errors imputed to
respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines preclude a party other than the
government to dispute the validity of a grant and the recognition of the indefeasible character of a
public land patent after one year, is possessed of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset,
there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal proposition
set forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court of Appeals, now a
member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to this action. Only the
Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent
(Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485,
July 31, 1959). This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot
claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the registered
owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as
they refer to private registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but
notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants."
5
Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable to attack. It is a
restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion,
6
a 1908 decision. As was there
categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is
raised by the government and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of the grant is a
question between the grantee and the government."
7
The above citation was repeated ipsissimis
verbis in Salazar v. Court of Appeals.
8
Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance
with the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v. Rodriguez,
9
"question
the [title] legally issued."
10
The second assignment of error is thus disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-known
distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state which is
appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or acquire property, it
is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes under the heading
of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to lands
held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and
use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of the confusion that existed during the medieval era between
such two concepts, but did note the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium."
11
As far as
the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cario v. Insular
Government,
12
a case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown...."
13
That was a manifestation of the concept of jura
regalia,
14
which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership however being vested in the state
as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by Holmes served to confirm a much more
extensive discussion of the matter in the leading case of Valenton v. Murciano,
15
decided in 1904. One of
the royal decrees cited was incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias
16
in these words:
"We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal
crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be
restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before all what to us or to our
viceroys audiences, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition,
but also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be
necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we may
wish."
17

It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government"
18
that "as to the unappropriated
public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is vested in Congress, ..."
19
They
continue to possess that character until severed therefrom by state grant.
20
Where, as in this case, it was
found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly
categorized as public land is undeniable.
21
What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of
Lands
22
finds application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was
ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of public lands,
the property must be held to be public domain."
23
For it is well-settled "that no public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government."
24
It is
indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.
25
The most recent restatement of the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, follows:
26
"The applicant, having failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot
No. 463 involved in the present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been
acquired by any private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and
remains part of the public domain."
27
To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice Esguerra:
"According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and
during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the actual issuance of the sales
patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them
because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based
on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under Section 38 of Act 496 any
question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within one
year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon
becomes indefeasible ..."
28
Petitioners cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's
title is impressed with the quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to
accord deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands,
29
Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land Registration
Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that both are against
the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
issued is conclusive and final."
30
Such a view has been followed since then.
31
The latest case in point
is Cabacug v. Lao.
32
There is this revealing excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with
reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period
of five years."
33
It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its resolution
of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.