Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109232 December 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANG CHUN KIT also known as "ROMY ANG," accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-based drug syndicate operating in
Metro Manila, was collared by NARCOM operatives in a buy-bust operation after he sold to an undercover agent for
P400,000.00 a kilo of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu. His car also yielded more of the regulated
drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box.
On 8 November 1991, at three o'clock in the afternoon, a Confidential Informer (CI) reported to Chief Investigator
Avelino I. Razon that he (CI) had arranged a transaction with a drug dealer interested in selling a kilo of shabu for
P400,000.00 and agreed to consummate the sale at seven o'clock that evening at the lobby of the Cardinal Santos
Medical Center. Chief Investigator Razon immediately organized a buy-bust team composed of Chief Inspector
Rolando Magno as team leader, SPO3 Lolita Bugarin, SPO2 Cesar Jacobo as poseur-buyer, SPO2 Albert San Jose,
and SPO2 Domingo Rubi. Forty (40) bundles of genuine and counterfeit P100-bills were prepared with each bundle
supposed to contain P10,000.00. To camouflage the counterfeit bills genuine P100-bills were placed on the top and
bottom of ten (10) bundles.
At five o'clock in the afternoon the team went to the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. The CI and SPO2 Jacobo who
was carrying the plastic bag of money proceeded to the lobby of the hospital while the others moved around to avoid
detection. At fifteen minutes past seven the accused arrived in a gray Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TBC-958. He was
met at the lobby by the CI who introduced SPO2 Jacobo to him as the person interested to buyshabu. After allowing
the accused a quick look at the bundles of money, SPO2 Jacobo and the CI followed him to the parking lot where the
latter took out from the trunk of his car a blue SM Shoemart plastic bag and handed it to SPO2 Jacobo. After
ascertaining that the bag contained approximately one (1) kilo of shabu, SPO2 Jacobo handed the boodle money to
the accused. Then SPO2 Jacobo casually lit a cigarette to signal to the other NARCOM operatives to move in and
effect the arrest. The other members of the team closed in, placed the accused under arrest and seized the money
from him. They also searched his vehicle and found on the dashboard of his car three (3) packets more of crystalline
substance in a Kleenex box.
SPO3 San Jose brought the regulated drug recovered from the accused to the PC Crime Laboratory where after a
qualitative examination the forensic chemist confirmed the substance found in the SM Shoemart bag and i n the
Kleenex box to be shabu and weighing 983.27 grams and 293.70 grams, respectively:
The accused refuted the charges. He tried to explain his presence at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center thus: In the
early evening of 8 November 1991 as he was preparing to have dinner with some friends in Greenhills, San Juan, he
received a telephone call from his friend Johnny Sy asking if he could ride with him to Greenhills to visit a sick friend
at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. Since he (accused) was able to borrow the car and the driver of his cousin
Roman Ong, he acceded to Johnny. He passed for him and his friend Anthony Co and brought them to the medical
center. Johnny and Anthony alighted in front of the lobby. He proceeded to the parking lot with the driver and
answered the call of nature. Then he lit a stick of cigarette. However some twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes later,
plainclothesmen with guns drawn, Johnny and Anthony in tow, suddenly appeared from nowhere and arrested him
and Uy without informing them the reason for their arrest. He together with Uy, Sy and Co was then brought to Camp
Crame where he was mauled, detained and interrogated without the assistance of counsel. His repeated requests to
make a telephone call to his relatives and counsel were denied.
Loreto Jacobe, the security guard on 12-hour duty at the hospital starting seven o'clock that evening, testified that
from the time he took his post that night until he left there was no untoward incident at the hospital lobby or in its
vicinity as reflected in the logbook. His statements were corroborated by his supervisor Vicente Praga. The accused
concludes that if there was indeed an unusual incident at the lobby, e.g., sale of regulated drugs, then the security
guards on duty would have noted it in their logbook.
On 14 August 1992 the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 155,
1
giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, found appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as "Romy Ang" guilty of selling shabu in
violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, sentenced him to life imprisonment and ordered
him to pay a fine of P30,000.00. Hence this appeal.
The accused maintains his innocence and faults the trial court in not holding that the crime could not have been
committed under the circumstances narrated by the arresting officers and that the alleged buy-bust operation was a
frame-up and the evidence merely planted. He argues that the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since every piece of evidence presented against him is tainted with constitutional infirmities.
We are not impressed. The crux of this appeal hinges on the credibility of witnesses. In People v. Co
2
we said that
"[i]t is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is
received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not." Corollarily, in People
v. Ballagan
3
we ruled that "[i]n a long line of decisions this Court has consistently held that the findings of
facts of a trial judge who has seen the witnesses testify and who has observed their demeanor and
conduct while on the witness stand should not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance
and value have been overlooked which, if considered, may affect the outcome of the case. When the
issue is one of credibility of witnesses the appellate courts will generally not disturb the trial court's
findings." In the case before us we do not see any fact of substance and value which may have been
overlooked by the trial court. Consequently, we defer to its holding that ". . . indeed the prohibited drugs in
question were confiscated from the accused Ang Chun Kit alias "Romy Ang" when he sold the drugs to
poseur-buyer SPO2 Cesar Jacobo."
4

Moreover, we do not believe that Police Officers Jacobo, Rubi and San Jose, all public officials who enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, will enmesh themselves in falsehood and implicate the
accused unless they have been impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. But neither the accused nor the record offers
any. As correctly observed by the trial court, "[o]f the thousands, nay, millions of people in Metro Manila, why would
the police officers single out the accused to be the object of a frame-up."
5
While the accused maintains that he is
a victim of a frame-up, which is the usual defense put up by persons accused of being drug pushers,
6
he
failed to substantiate his claim. It is settled that where there is no evidence to indicate that a prosecution
witness was actuated by improper motive the presumption is that he was not so actuated and that he
would not prevaricate and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury; hence his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
7

The accused underscores what he perceived to be a flip-flopping stance of poseur-buyer SPO2 Jacobo. In one
instance Jacobo said that he saw the shabu at the hospital lobby contrary to the version of the prosecution witnesses
that the prohibited substance was taken from the trunk of the car after the accused, the poseur-buyer and the CI
emerged from the hospital lobby. The defense would lay emphasis on the seeming discrepancy between the
statements of SPO2 San Jose that they did not apply ultraviolet powder on the marked money as that was being
done by the PC Crime Laboratory, and that of SPO2 Jacobo that the marked money was not treated with ultraviolet
powder since they ran out of it.
We do not consider the supposed inconsistencies substantial or of such nature as to cast serious doubt on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses. On the contrary they appear to be more of honest lapses which do not impair
the intrinsic credibility of their testimonies. Thus when later asked by the trial court with regard to the marked money
SPO2 Jacobo clarified that after he showed the boodle to the accused the latter immediately left for his car
COURT.
Q: Where did you show the money?
WITNESS.
A: At the lobby of the Cardinal Santos, sir.
Q: After showing the boodle money what did the accused do?
A: He then proceeded to his car, sir.
8

It is elementary in the rule of evidence that inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses with respect to
minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of their
testimony.
9
Such minor inconsistencies even serve to strengthen the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony and thus can be considered a badge of
truth rather than of falsehood. Consequently we consider innocuous whatever discrepancies there were in
the testimonies of the government agents.
For sure the alleged inconsistencies do not detract from the established fact that the accused was caught inflagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation since the arresting agents were able to give an otherwise clear and
convincing account of the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused. And, in every prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs what is material and indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of illicit drug took
place between the seller and the poseur-buyer.
The accused submits that "it is beyond human comprehension how such a big transaction, illegal at that, could be
perfected . . . in front of the watchful eyes of so many people."
10

We can comprehend. From the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, which we find credible, the exchange was
casual and swift: the accused was introduced to the poseur-buyer by the CI; he was shown the money; he passed on
the prohibited drug to the poseur-buyer. There was no verification of the identity of the buyer. Neither was the money
counted nor tests conducted to determine the quality and quantity of the regulated drug. There was no need.
The accused knew the CI who introduced the poseur-buyer to him. There was rapport at once. Thus the transaction
which was consummated in the parking lot of the hospital is no different from an ordinary drug-pushing informal,
casual, daring and swift where the peddlers at times operate in the open and in the presence of other people, e.g.,
in a billiard hall,
11
in front of a store,
12
along a street at 1:45 p.m.,
13
in front of a house,
14
which does not
necessarily discourage them from plying their trade as these may even serve to camouflage their illicit
trade.
15
As we have said, there was nothing absurd in such a scenario. The selling of regulated or
prohibited drugs to complete strangers, openly and in public places, has become a common occurrence,
a sad fact which this Court has taken notice of and attributed to the growing casualness of drug pushers
in the pursuit of their clandestine activity, as if it were a perfectly legitimate operation involving no
particular caution or qualm of conscience.
16
Drug pushers have become increasingly daring in the
operation of their trade and have not hesitated to act openly, almost casually, even in scornful violation of
the law, in selling the illegimate merchandise to any and all buyers.
17

The accused then harps on the testimonies of his witnesses, the security guards on duty, that "there was nothing
untoward that happened at the hospital lobby or premises."
18
If we were to believe these security guards in their
version then all the more should we discredit the accused himself who narrated that while he was at the
parking lot of the hospital several armed men and women with drawn guns suddenly swooped down on
him, pointed their weapons at him, ordered him to raise his hands in the air and then arrested him for no
apparent reason. Certainly, if these security guards were conscientious in the performance of their duties,
as how the accused would like them to appear, then they should have noticed and noted in their logbook
the arrest of the accused in the hospital parking lot which was just a few meters away from the lobby.
Accordingly, we cannot give full faith to the testimonies of defense witnesses Jacobe and Praga.
The defense also asks the Court to reject the story of the prosecution that the shabu was contained in one plastic bag
instead of several small plastic bags as how drug dealers would normally pack the prohibited drug for easy
concealment. We cannot yield. While the swiftness with which the transaction was undertaken is reminiscent of small-
time drug-pushing, what is involved in the case at bench is not a measly sum of money and a small quantity of drugs
that could be packed in tea bags but a wholesale deal involving P400,000.00 and a kilo of shabu.
The defense then faults the prosecution for its failure to present the marked money and urges the Court to
applyPeople v. Distrito
19
where in acquitting the accused we said that "[n]o marked money was seized from
(him) as none passed from the alleged buyers to the alleged sellers." But the reliance on People v.
Distrito is misplaced. We have ruled often enough that the absence of marked money used in buy-bust
operations does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution.
20
Parenthetically, if the defense
only read People v. Distrito carefully it would have realized that in that case there was really no exchange
of money as even the policemen admitted that they arrested the suspect before an actual buy-bust
operation could be effected, unlike in the case at bench where there was an actual exchange of illegal
merchandise for money.
The accused also takes to task the absence of a blotter report before the buy-bust operation and the supposed failure
of the apprehending officers to seal the plastic bag of shabu upon its seizure. These are trivialities which do not abate
the fact that the accused was arrested after he unlawfully sold methamphetamine hydrochloride to NARCOM agents.
Suffice it to say that a prior blotter report and the sealing of the plastic bag of shabu are not indispensable nor
required in buy-bust operations.
The defense argues that the shabu found inside the car is inadmissible in evidence as it was procured through an
illegal search and seizure, the same having been found inside the car and not in the person of the accused who was
outside the car. But the search inside the car was an incident of a lawful arrest. It must be remembered that the
accused was with a driver who was inside the car. Upon the arrest of the accused, the arresting agents also had to
neutralize the driver inside the car who could be presumed at that instance to be acting together and in conspiracy
with the accused. For a weapon could have easily been concealed in the dashboard of the vehicle which was very
well within the reach of the driver at that time. Corollarily, in People v. Figueroa we reiterated that "[t]he warrantless
search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control."
21
Thus whether the accused gave his
consent to the search of the car which the arresting agents say he did, but which he denies, is immaterial.
We however agree with the accused that his signature on the receipt or lists of items confiscated from him is
inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was then assisted by counsel. In People v. Mauyao we said
that "conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged,
since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. They have been obtained in violation of
his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel."
22
With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we
already said in People v. Morico that "when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
at a police station he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating
circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused's being booked and of the date
which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary
detention against the police themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a
judgment of conviction."
23

But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's conformity to the questioned documents has not
been a factor in his conviction since his guilt has been adequately established by the detailed and unshaken
testimonies of the officers who apprehended him. Hence even disregarding the questioned documents we still find
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Interestingly, we find it difficult to believe the version of the accused. He did not even present Johnny Sy or Anthony
Co to substantiate his story, much less did he reveal the name of the patient they were to visit in the hospital. Besides
it appears that there was no reason for the accused to wait for Johnny Sy and Anthony Co in the parking lot as they
did not have any prior agreement to meet there. On the contrary the accused still had to attend a dinner somewhere
and should not have waited any longer.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Ang Chun Kit also known as "Romy Ang"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling methamphetamine hydrochloride in violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425,
as amended, sentencing him to life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125754 December 22, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN and ROBERTO DELOS REYES, accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September
1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately
proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked
towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. When they reached the house they
"peeped (inside) through a small window and . . . saw one man and a woman repacking suspected
marijuana."
1
They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and
thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned
out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of
the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained
marijuana.
Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425 otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both however denied on the witness stand ownership over the
confiscated tea bags and drug implements.
According to Roberto delos Reyes, he and his wife were merely tenants in the house of Zenaida Bolasa and at the
time he was arrested he had just arrived from work. Upon learning that Zenaida was repacking marijuana inside their
room, he immediately ordered her to leave. Unfortunately however it was at that precise moment that police
authorities entered and announced their presence. He and Zenaida were then brought to the Valenzuela Police
Station for questioning and subsequently detained.
On the part of Zenaida Bolasa, she narrated that at 7:30 in the evening of 11 September 1995 she was on her way to
9th Avenue, Caloocan City, where she was working as a waitress. As she was about to leave the house she met a
certain "Rico" and conversed with him for some time. She denied knowing PO3 Carizon and the fact that the latter
saw her repacking marijuana inside her house.
The trial court upon finding the version of the prosecution to be more plausible convicted both accused Zenaida
Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes of the crime charged and sentenced each of them not only to reclusion perpetuabut
also to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
2

Both accused appealed, although separately, each one represented by a separate counsel.
Maintaining his innocence in this appeal, accused-appellant Roberto delos Reyes insists he had just arrived from
work and had, in fact, just entered his room when he was arrested. Assuming he was indeed repacking marijuana
when the police officers arrived, he claims it would have been inconceivable for them to know what he was doing
inside his room considering the height of his window. Significantly, the police officers had to lean first on the window
in order to observe the activities inside the room.
Accused-appellant Zenaida Bolasa meanwhile asserts that the search in her residence was likewise illegal as her
arrest preceding it was illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized from her could not be properl y used as evidence
against her. She insists that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of PO3 Albert Carizon as
the same was hearsay. According to her and her co-accused delos Reyes, PO3 Carizon was not among the arresting
officers. As such, PO3 Carizon had no personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and search thus
making his testimony hearsay. Since the prosecution did not present the two (2) arresting officers the version of the
prosecution cannot stand on its own.
Bolasa likewise impugns the identity of the items confiscated from her person vis-a-vis those which were submitted
for laboratory examination and charges that the failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily establish the chain of
custody over the specimen is damaging to its case.
We sustain the appeal. This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures
can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug offenders. Thus, after a meticulous
evaluation of the evidence at hand, this Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process
adopted by the prosecution and acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt.
Sec. 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and
effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable
searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other
forms of restraint,
3
and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which
renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable."
4

For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously
operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable."
5
Thus, arrests and seizures in the
following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" and are thus allowed even in the absence of a
warrant
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;.
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
6

An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he
has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
7
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
8

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated
categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of
their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to
believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a
penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid intrusion. As already
discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to
contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window
before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search
cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop
and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any
such showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that
the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was
likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-
appellants;
9
hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
WHEREFORE, the 12 July 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellants Zenaida Bolasa y
Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes guilty of violating Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
insufficiency of evidence and on reasonable doubt; consequently, both are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
immediately from confinement unless held for another lawful cause.
Their Jailers the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan, and the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for Roberto delos Reyes are DIRECTED to implement this Decision
immediately and to report to this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof their compliance herewith WITHOUT
DELAY.
SO ORDERED.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 113474 December 13, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO FERNANDEZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellee.
V. Dennis M. Socrates for accused-appellant.

PUNO, J .:
The fiesta of Barangay Tanabag, Puerto Princesa City, on June 24, 1988, was marred by the death of Marianito
Merced. He died of internal hemorrhage caused by multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by accused-appellant Alfredo
Fernandez. Accused-appellant Fernandez was found guilty of the crimes of Homicide
1
and for violation of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm).
2
For the homicide charge, he was
sentenced by the trial court to an indeterminate penalty of EIGHT (8) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, and TWO
(2) MONTHS of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, with the accessory penalty of civil
interdiction and absolute disqualification for the duration of the penalty. For the violation of P.D. 1866, he
was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN
(11) DAYS of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS and
NINE (9) MONTHS of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as maximum. He was also ordered to pay
the heirs of deceased Marianito Merced, Jr., as civil indemnity the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) and the costs.
3

The prosecution evidence shows that on June 24, 1988, Isagani Merced, his younger brother Marianito Merced,
Nonoy Stag, Barangay Tanod Melchor Nollan, Santiago Abrina, Carlito Radam, and Moises Radam were among the
house guests of Barrio Captain Ruben Asebuque of Barangay Tanabag, Puerto Princesa City. They had a drinking
spree. Arlando Fernandez, son of accused-appellant Alfredo Fernandez, came and earnestly invited them to their
house. He bragged that his father had butchered a dog for "pulutan."
At 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the group left and proceeded to the house of accused-
appellant.
4
There they found the group of Antonio Alcantara, Julio Josol, Sonny Gallego, Norto Dalabajan,
and Arlando Fernandez. The two (2) groups then joined each other and continued drinking.
The guests were imbibing hard drinks at the lawn. It was Isagani Merced
5
who saw accused-appellant descend
from his room. He went behind his brother, Marianito Merced with a gun concealed in his jacket.
6
He
swiftly aimed his gun at Marianito Merced's shoulder and pulled its trigger. Marianito slumped on the
ground. The loud shot caused the guests to scamper away. Isagani froze as he was only two (2) meters
away from accused-appellant.
7
He then heard a clicking sound and accused-appellant faced him. Gripped
by fear, he ran away, hid in the bushes of the highway, and reported the shooting incident to Barangay
Captain Ruben Asebuque.
8

Barangay Tanod Nollan
9
arrived just in time to witness the shooting. He vividly saw accused-appellant pull
the trigger and then removed the cartridge. "Ano ba yan," he shouted.
10
Startled, accused-appellant
chased him but later gave up.
Marianito Merced had no chance to survive the assault. In his autopsy, report, Dr. Rudolph V. Baladad, Sr., certified
that the deceased sustained twenty-one (21) gunshot wounds over the right arm and over the anterior right chest wall
below the right nipple.
11

Immediately after the incident, accused-appellant fled and hid in the forest of Barangay Concepcion. After three (3)
days in the mountains, he paddled his way to Barangay Tagburos then proceeded to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City.
There he stayed at his sister-in-law's house.
Four (4) days thereafter, or at around 8:00 o' clock in the evening of June 28, 1988, Patrolman Roberto Pamintuan of
the Investigation and Follow-up Section of the Integrated National Police, Puerto Princesa Station, received a
confidential report on the hiding place of accused-appellant.
12
Acting on that information, Pat. Roberto
Pamintuan, Pat. Servando Alonzo, and Pat. Golifardo rushed to the house indicated, cordoned the area,
and identified themselves as police authorities. Accused-appellant gave himself up. The owner of the
house then turned over accused-appellant's suitcase to the police officers. They inspected the suitcase
without any objection from accused-appellant. The suitcase yielded a homemade twelve (12) gauge
shotgun, one (1) empty shell, and one (1) live ammunition. Accused-appellant had no license to carry the
said shotgun.
13
He was arrested and taken to the police headquarters.
Accused-appellant Fernandez
14
denied shooting the victim. He declared that on June 24, 1988, he was
gravely ill with malaria. Allegedly, his wife, Magdalena Fernandez, was massaging him in their bedroom to
arrest his chill.
15

It was then raining and six (6) men took shelter in their house. Minutes later, a group of eight (8) men led by Isagani
Merced and Marianito Merced arrived and started drinking gin.
16
The night was pierced by a loud blast of
gunshot. His wife looked downstairs and saw a dead body in their yard. Terrified, she fled with their
youngest son leaving him and their three (3) other sons.
17

Fear that he would be implicated in the crime gripped accused-appellant. He also left home and hid in the highlands
of Barangay Concepcion.
18
After three (3) days in hiding, he trekked down to Sitio Abanico where he was
apprehended.
His wife returned home three (3) days after the incident. He was nowhere to be found. It was only then that she
reported the killing and her missing husband to the Police Station of Puerto Princesa City.
After trial, the court in a Joint Decision found accused-appellant guilty of Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm
and imposed the penalties adverted to earlier.
Accused-appellant thus appealed to the Court of Appeals. In his Brief, he assigned the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF
HOMICIDE AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, IN DENIAL OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE THAT WERE
CONSTITUTIONALLY INADMISSIBLE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN DENYING APPELLANT HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT UNLESS PROVEN GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
On January 31, 1994, the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered judgment modifying the assailed
Decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 7517, the Court finds accused Alfredo Fernandez GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder, described and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder under said provision is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. In view, however, of the provision of the 1987
Constitution, banning death sentences, and there being no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attending the offense, said accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA (People vs. Deslate, 192 SCRA 644, 648). Accused is further sentenced to pay the
heirs of the deceased the amount of P 50,000.00 as indemnity for death. Pursuant to Section 13,
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court hereby ELEVATES the case and
record to the Hon. Supreme Court.
As to Criminal Case No. 7518, for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition, the Court finds
accused Alfredo Fernandez GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of said crime, described
and penalized under P.D. 1866, as amended, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
toreclusion perpetua. There being no modifying circumstances attending the offense, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of TEN (10)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) years, EIGHT (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the lower
court in said case is hereby MODIFIED.
The shotgun, the empty shell and the live ammunition (Exhibits A, B, B-1) are FORFEITED in favor
of the Government.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
19

Considering the modification of the penalty to reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 7517 and conformably with
Article VIII, section 5, paragraph 2(d) of the Constitution, the Court of Appeals certified and elevated the entire
records of the case to us for review.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
Accused-appellant Fernandez invokes the rule of double jeopardy and procedural due process. He urges that the
right against double jeopardy proscribes simultaneous prosecution for several offenses made out of the same act.
We reject the submission of accused-appellant. The two (2) Informations against accused-appellant charged him with
two (2) distinct offenses, i.e., murder and illegal possession of firearm. The first crime is punished by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code while the second crime is punished by a special law, P.D. 1866. The charge for Illegal
Possession of Firearm is not necessarily included in the charge of Murder. Accused-appellant cannot therefore
complain that he has been charged with two (2) offenses on the basis of the same act.
The second assignment of error hardly deserves any consideration. The rule that searches and seizures must be
supported by a valid warrant is not absolute. Jurisprudence recognizes five (5) generally accepted exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
20
They are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest,
21
(2) search of moving
vehicles,
22
(3) seizure in plain view,
23
(4) customs
searches,
24
and (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
25

The evidence reveals that on June 28, 1988, Pat. Pamintuan, Pat. Alonzo, and Pat. Golifardo cordoned the house
where accused-appellant sought refuge at Sitio Abanico. They were not armed with a warrant of arrest. Without any
protest, however, accused-appellant came out of the house and gave himself up to the police officers. The owner of
the house then turned over his luggage to said police authorities. With the acquiescence of accused-appellant, his
suitcase was searched and it yielded the subject firearm and ammunition. He then signed and acknowledged a
Receipt certifying that one homemade shotgun with one (1) live ammunition and one (1) empty shell was confiscated
from him.
26
In his cross-examination, he stated:
Q You said that on June 28, 1988, several persons requested you to go down the
house of the sister of your wife in Sitio Abanico, Puerto Princesa City?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And they identified themselves as Policemen, is that correct?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And you knew for a fact that they were Policemen before you went down, is
that correct?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And that you likewise stated a while ago your purpose in going to Puerto
Princesa coming from Barangay Concepcion was to report the dead person near
your house on June 24, 1988, is that correct?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And considering Mr. Witness, that before you went down you knew for a fact
that they were Policemen near the house of your
sister-in-law, did you not take advantage of the opportunity and reported the
matter?
A No, ma'am.
27

xxx xxx xxx
Q After you were apprehended by the Police on June 28, 1988, a certain
document has been signed by you, is that correct?
A Yes, ma'am.
28

Under this special circumstance, it cannot be held that accused-appellant was subjected to a search which may be
stigmatized as a violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
29
He waived his
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure by his acquiescence. In the recent case
of People vs. Felimon Ramos,
30
we ruled, viz:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I,
page 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and
such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
And, the product of such a lawful search is admissible in evidence.
31

Since accused-appellant was found in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, his
arrest without warrant was proper. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that a
peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person who is actually committing an offense in his presence.
Lastly, accused-appellant insists that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He anchored his defense on
alibi. We have ruled, time and again, that alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and
their clear identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. In the case at bench, prosecution witness
Isagani Merced unequivocally identified accused-appellant as his brother's assailant. In his direct examination, he
testified:
Q For what purpose did you run away?
A Because I already saw my brother already dead, my purpose is to save my life.
Q Who killed your brother?
A Alfredo Fernandez.
Q How did he kill your brother?
A He shot him.
32

xxx xxx xxx
Q In that occasion when you were just two meters away from the accused did
you do anything to your brother?
A Because I was shock of the incident, I just stared at him.
33

Barangay Tanod Nollan corroborated Isagani Merced in the identification of accused-appellant. He testified:
Q And while you were near the house of Alfredo Fernandez, what else transpired
if any?
A I saw Alfredo Fernandez went down his house bringing a gun . . . .
Q Do you know where Alfredo Fernandez was proceeding to when he went out
the house wearing a jacket and having a gun?
A He is going to Marianito Merced.
Q Will you kindly demonstrate before the Court how Alfredo Fernandez was
carrying that gun which you said he was according to you hiding in his jacket?
A Yes, sir.
Q Demonstrate before this Court.
(Witness demonstrating holding the gun with his right hand and on a 45 degrees
position and the left hand holding the barrel pointing the tip of the barrel to
Merced on his right shoulder)
Q How far were you when you saw Alfredo Fernandez doing what you have just
demonstrated?
A About 2 meters more or less.
34

In checkered contrast, the testimonies of accused-appellant and his wife do not inspire credence. They are contrary
to human nature and general experience of man. It defies imagination how Magdalena Fernandez could have left
their house with her youngest son unmindful of her gravely sick husband and other children. Also, despite accused-
appellant's ailment, he allegedly intentionally exposed himself to a higher risk of aggravation by spending three (3)
days in the forest. This flight from locus criminis is a strong indication of a guilty mind.
35
If accused-appellant was
innocent of the crimes charged, he could have helped the fallen Marianito Merced who was shot in his
own yard. He could have taken him to the nearest hospital. Or, he could have reported the incident to
Barangay Captain Ruben Asebuque whose house is only two hundred (200) meters away. But he did
neither of these Good Samaritan acts. Instead, he unabashedly confronted Isagani Merced and Barangay
Tanod Nollan.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the killing is qualified by treachery. The victim was accused-appellant's
guest. He was unarmed and unsuspecting. He was merrily drinking with friends when accused-appellant
surreptitiously came from his back and shot him at pointblank. There is no doubt, the victim was not in any position to
defend himself from the unreasonable and unexpected attack of accused-appellant.
36
The wounds sustained by
Marianito Merced bespeak of his unpreparedness to defend himself. Clearly, accused-appellant
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to
insure its success without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.
37

We also agree with the Court of Appeals in modifying the penalty in Criminal Case No. 7518. As aptly noted by the
Court of Appeals, viz:
The Acting Solicitor General is of the opinion that in respect to Criminal Case No. 7518, the penalty
under P.D. 1866 should be reclusion perpetua, citing Section 1 thereof, which provides for a graver
penalty if and when "homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm."
It should be observed that the information for illegal possession of firearm did not allege that the
firearm was used in the commission of murder. The information for illegal possession of firearm
was separate from the information for murder. Under Section 1 of Rule 115, an accused, as one of
his rights, is entitled "To be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him." In one
case, it was held that an accused charged with simple theft cannot be validly convicted under P.D.
133 which imposes a higher penalty and refers to theft of items the accused is "working on, using
or producing (Matilde vs. Jabson, L-38392, Dec. 29, 1975, cited p. 293, Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. II, 6th Edition). In the same manner, we hold that accused in the present case
cannot be validly convicted for possession of an unlicensed firearm used in the commission of
murder, when such circumstance is not specifically alleged in the information, otherwise accused's
right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged will be violated. "All that this constitutional
right signifies is that an accused should be given the necessary data as to why he is being
prosecuted against" (People vs. Mencias, 147 Phil. 78, 89.
38

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1994 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accused-appellant.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 123872 January 30, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J .:
Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for violating Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver
twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the
provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public interest.
1

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant who was
assisted therein by his counsel de parte.
2
Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a
verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty
of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.
3

It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of June 20,
1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1
Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant,
according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton
box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant. That informer,
according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a
drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias
from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the
arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and
place.
4

Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial that while he
indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and
without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective
job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so
as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.
He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never informed of his
constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin,
corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a
supervisor,
5
although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged
employment.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in
flagrantetransporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on
record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the
lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection
of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.
1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient evidence as
no proof was proffered showing that he willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered
28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana
from Baguio City to Cavite."
Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of the People's
cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that
informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting
testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is as follows:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. The penalty
ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor,
or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of
a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various modes of
commission
6
being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as
set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its
punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions," Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of
any of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering,
giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.
As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged therein and
attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The governing rule with
respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment
would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so
as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description
of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.
7
In appellant's
case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio
City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that
particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.
The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been produced in
court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to give effect to or
recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him These
assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation,
the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.
For one the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations of SPO1
Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in
which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the
prosecution,
8
more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on
whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are
generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable
services to the police.
9
Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses,
and not for the defense to dictate that course.
10
Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the
coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,
11
but which
remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless search and
seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994,
the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from
Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance
should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the
following dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
12
Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription.
Thus, (1) customs searches;
13
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
14
(3) seizure of evidence
in plain view;
15
(4) consented searches;
16
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
17
and (6) "stop and
frisk" measures
18
have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was
that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early
morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the
point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the
courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant applied for, there
is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which
particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the
suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and
whether the same were arriving together with, or were begin brought by someone separately from, the courier.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they
could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for
applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for
obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances
should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a
dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the
"early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as
backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show
up, and how he would do so.
On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1
Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that
although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as
neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes
successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding
assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and
tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial
chambers.
3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained
from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof
was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under the
provision, a peace officers or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority
to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.
19
On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of
permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a).
20
These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on
persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative
term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as
having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent
man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
21

Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal
charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our
statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or quantum,
22
and
was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from
which we derived the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable
ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,
23
or an apparent
state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and
prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.
24

Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under
discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of
evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.
25
It has the same meaning as
the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, the investigating fiscal "finds cause
to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."
26
It should, therefore, be in that
sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to
the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Cl arin recounted that the
informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was
carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly
innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves
as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant
voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without
bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarter for questioning.
Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the
slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of
things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the
officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and
had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not
downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of
eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were
already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a
well grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance
both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally
transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the officers
approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage,
and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant
readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal
activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly or
impliedly.
27
Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should
not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law,
28
the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously
performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do
so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear waiver of his right.
29

4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately establish that
the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic
chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized
from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court
below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the carton
box in which the same were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated evidence and proper
safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which
subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly
admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who categorically
related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana,
they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the
veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had
transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the
subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp, the guilt of
appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed to
communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could
possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438
30
which defines certain rights of persons arrested,
detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and
investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily be
struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no
incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him
which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was
clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers
together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court
below.
5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in
Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750
grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes
a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation
of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never
intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section
20, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision from which
such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court has already concluded that Republic Act
No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
31
the rules wherein were observed although the
cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation thereof is in its
aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if
the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the
death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
32
While the minority or the death of the victim
will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating
circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death if the
offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the
graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor
victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of the Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal Case No.
3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.