PHILIPPINE LAW JOURNAL

AN A.CT BSTUUSBlNG DIVOIlClt

.A.CT N. Uti
BT~.1QQ AN~ B.A., LL.B.
(CantiR'lM4/'tt1m Morek num6er)
COMPARATIVE S'l'UllY OF DIVORCE LA.WOF DlFFERlt~Nl' COUNTlU~
(0) Fruee
0.) ~
(4') J ~
(el) Vllited StateR
(s) Swi~d
(j) Philip
Havins in!DiDdthe ~ of the lNbject and the idea that it would bevery
lwd, if notimpoll8ibl~to~ aUthelaWi onthesubject inminute detail ina work
of this kind, I 8bau ~ m~1f iD,~ng thl! Pftl8eDttopic to the making of
comparative etlldy of the l>ivorce Law of Franco, Germany, J apan, America,
Switaerland and the Philippines.
My endeavor will be to contrast cmelaw with another and make comparisoDS
among them, notwithstlloDdinctheir difterenees of CUStomll,orientations and ge0-
graphical positions. Fromthiseomparativestudy of divorce IllW of these countries,
wecan erect new laws of our ownthat are more eonvenient and adaptable to the
Philippines. mthe study of the divorcelawof America, it will not bediseUSlledthe
provieionsinforcein each State, but the writer will confineto the caUS611 asrecom-
mended by the commissionerson UniformLaws to be adopted by ('A)ngreKIl for the
wholeUnion.
Asfar asthe definiticmof absolutedivorceiscont'ernt'ti, all the above mentioned
nations are in accord in the definition of the 8ame: "Divort.iuma vinculo ml1tri-
monii isthe dis$olutionof the J DaI'ria,gebone!."
Adultery of both spousesisregarded aslegitimatecausefor divorceinGermany,
France, Switzerland, America and the Philippines. But such provision isnot fol-
lowed inJ apan whereinonly the adulteYyof the wifeispunished, basingtheir refuslIl
on the fact that for physical and social considerations the hUllbandshould be ~ven
greater freedomof action onthe ground that the consequencesof a man breaking his
marriae vowsare far lessharmful and far reaching. The husband isnot the chilli
bearer, and hislapaefromvirtue doesnot soseriously'affect.the status of thefamily
while the wife'ssin actually destroys it.
.tRoth . iimiiaritY' whieh we flndtn all these CfOttnttlell, eXcept in'tbll Philippines
for under our law there isbut one cause, are cnlelty, harshness, grave insults and iIl-
\rea.!ments, although each country hAsfiXed a different degree of cruelty infticteet to
justify a decree.
America,,-I&J ?,a,~wn)jllJ ld; Sw,itzel'land, ,admit ,the rea.'jOnableness of wil-
full desertion as a legitimate ~~ :for,d\vor~"alt~ough some of them require the
continuance of the abandonment for a certain period fiXed by Statute wh.ile others
do not so require, but the mere fact' of a wilful and unjustifiable ahandonme~t is a
sufficient cause.
incurable menful and contagious diseases are regarded O s causes f6r' divorce in
America, Germany and Switzerland, while France and J apan are silent on this
matter; but on the other hand .J apan and America, unlike f'xermany, Swit.zerland
and France, recognize bigamy of either spouse as a ground of divorce.
Another similarity in the provisions of the American, French and J apanese
codes, isthat imprisonment for a certain period isaground of divorce, although they
differ in the duration of the imprisonment and the causes giving riseto imprisonment.
Gekany and Switzerland make no provision on the matter for the reason perhaps
that when both parties' contracted the marriage relation, they intended to live to-
gether and never to separate, except, if for certain reasons which might happen during
the marriage the conjugal community become unendurable and no possible restora-
tion of such community is expected. Imprisonment for two years does not neces-
sarily, destroy nor poison the sweetness of the conjugal community, but it deprives
only one of the. spouses of the services and companionsh.ip of the other spouse for
a very litnited period of time. Besides, it is the basis of divorce proceedings to sepa-
rate the spouses w~enever the crime iscommitted against the other, but the imprison-
ment of one of the spouse isnot an offense against the other, but it israther against
the victitn.
Besides these causes enumerated above, J apan recognizes three more grounds'
such as divorce' by mloltal consent, or when for a period of not less than 3 years, it
has been uncertain whether the spouses are alive or dead; or when in case of a "muka-
yosh.i" the adoption is dissolved, or in case of an adopted son married to a daughter
of the house, the adoption is dissolved or annulled; These other causes are not ree-
. '
ognized in the other above mentioned countries, except in Switzerland where
divorce by mutual consent is recognized.
Predicated therefore upon th~provisions of law on the subject of each and .evefY.
one of the above mentioned nations, the question which now presents 'itself, is the
advis8.bility of moulding our laws on the subject according to their J aws.
Every principle of law has to be chosen and adopted with great care and h.igh
regards must be had before accepting any new borrowed principle of law to our own
customs and traditions.
AA to the ad\tiMbi1ity 6l~ti_ O\B' lAw With the flowof the Anglo-
Saxon prillclplel, the Il.llthor would much ~ to lee thfa oountry serving an ap-
preIlttOOllhip, making het own IlI.wamoulded ~ to her proper orientations,
tather than UIBlmilll.ting the IIl.W8,Cl1Storfil!l and ttdittona of foreign countriell.
18 THERE A RELATIVE DIVORCE 11'1'Im PRESEN1' TIMJ !;?
IF SO, s HO UtD 1'1' lUl: UI!:1'AINEt>?
lWatl\te divorce is the partial.lllillpetUlion by law of the Inll.l'ria.tcerela.tion. It.
is Il.iIep&l'Il.tionIImensa ct tlwro (from. bed and hoard), (Bouvier's Dict.ioftllry). Be-
tore the enactment of A(lt. 2710, there were provi8ions of IIl.WHrtlglLl"llingrelative
divorce. Our Civil Code provides that divorce only produces the sll!IPCnsionof the
common life of the ~UlleIl(tbl.. l(4),lI.n I Hiele ~ken from thol1COOnd part of
~. ~ of ,the.Law of 1870. 1')1e!llI.tl\IJd()(~trine is CIItn.bli8hed hy thl) Coundl of
rrent in. the 24th se8l!ion, mnon 8th. This liIJ (:tioll,however, of the Civil COOI\hIlS
.~ ~ded In 1889, December ~, by It. decree of the t{J lIth.Governor of the
Philippines; St. Weyler, hi. (lOmplinnr.e WiUl t.he instrul:t.ion reccivl-'1l Crmu the.Gov-
e~nt of Madrid t.o the eft'cet of .su~}(lIldiDgIiCCtions42 to 107 and aU to aa2 of
the.Civii Code, 01' rather t,it.hll'l.and 12, hl!lI)CCt,ively,of Hook 1of the Civil CIIUI!.
~n the catle of ~ la RamA 113.IlI1la l~lna, :J Phil. Hep., a4, it WWol docidt-'11that titles
4 :and 12 of Book Iof the Civil Code, whil!h tl't',t\t.rtJ 1oIpoot,ivelyof ml\rriog<l and of
Civil Registry, a~ not in fol'l'e for having boon l'!11f1lC1lI11lr! hy 1\11 1Ii'llllrof l,hll Gov.
emor-General for thePhilippinCll It short t.inllJ nfter t.hll Civil Cod(l hll.'41)(~11I!xbmded
inti!>the Islands. It is clear, then, t.hat., Rect.ion Hl7 of the Civil COIle IM:in/( lillS-
pended, we have toOfind out the law on the liubjoot I)revioull to t.heCivil (~Oltl!.that
ill to say, previous to Dec. 8, 1889, uate of its enforcement in Ule lslandli. 'I'hl! lI~w
at that time was that cntitled "Las Biete Partidll.'l" (Thll Heven 1'ltrbl) Wol inl><J rpnlt><J li
by J ustice Malcolm Il.s it is ll.'!l!ertedby our Supreme Court, in the I!ases of thallI)!!
vs. Oft.iz, !) Phil. Rep., 342 (Sp. l!:d.) and De la Rama lIS. De la lUt.ml~,a Phil. Itl!p.,
34.' The Sitite Partidas defined divorce as follows: Divortium means dllpartimiento
and is the means by which the wife isseparated from the husband and t,he hUHbltnd
from the wife on account of sOlileimpediment elCistingbetween them whl!n it is prop-
erly proved in Court. It provided adultery lI.'la ground for divllrC(!. It ise~ident t
therefore, that before the enactment of t,henew divorce law, thenl WI"''; a law hen: in
the Philippines providing forrelativc divorce. Now that Act 2710 hy our I'hilip-
pine Legislature hll.'l been enacted, is the old Siete I'artidas still in for{',con the HUb-'
ject? Accotding to the rules of interpretation, a subsequent law repeat./l I~ prior
law when there is irreconcilable repugnancy between them, or whenl it, ili (widently
intended that the law enacted should supersede the prior nebl on .the liubjcct.. (Black
on Interpretation p. 351.) In Manuel VS. Manuel, Ohio, it' hWolboon ruled down
that the construction of fl, statutll will IJ (!sllch Ill'!t,navoid any l:han~1l in the prior
.laws beyond what is necessary to effect the lIpecifi.cpurpose aftbe act in question.
There are two theories so to lI&yin the way of interpreting the effect of & I&telIta.t~te
on the old statutes. lJ l a late decision by the J udge of Court of First lnlItance for
the City of Manila, Hon. Avance6a., the second theory has been applied and the
reason of his decision was more or less the lack of any provision in the new divorce
law abolishing or contradictiJ lg the provision of the old one.
Besides, we would not be reasonless to say that a relative divorce exists and it
is provided in the new law. Par. 2 of Sec. 9 laysit to be the law that, if the spouses
fail within one year to deliver the legitime of their children, the bonds of matrimony
shall not be considered as dissolved as to th~. The law puts the delivery of the
property as a condition precedent to the dissolution of the bonds of marriage, but
this condition lasts only a year, and after that year the opportunity to comply with
it is lost. "The bonds of matrimony," says the law, "shall not be considered as dis-
solved with regard to the spouses who has not delivered the proPerty with.-
in the said period of one year." It is true that the period stated is not presCripti'~e,
but it is neither a condition precedent simply. It is a -condition precedent with cer-
tain fixed period within which the delivery should be made if the spouse wishes to
have the bonds of matrimony dissolved. In such case, the separation of property
has already been adjudged, the bodily separation effected, but that the bonds of
matrimony still exiRt. This is a relative divorce, or at least it has the effect of a rela-
tive divorce.
Paragraph 1 of the same section 9 seems to allow the existence of a relative
divo!ce between the spouses, such divorce to last for the period of one year. "The
decree of property as soon as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissollJ6Ute bonds
oj matri1ntmy until one year therea,fter: therefore, before the one year period has elapsed,
the spouses are separated bodily or from bed and hoard, which is equivalent to a
relative divorce.
Changing the course o[ the reasoning an argu,ment against this theory wttuld
be based on par. 1of sec. 9. It reads as follows: "The decree '1> divorce shall dis-
solve the community of property as soon as such decree is final, but shaU not dissolve
the bonds of matri1ntmy until one year therea,fter." According to this legal provision,
the divorce isabsolute after a year has elapsed from the rendition of the judgment;
8O.this law holds that the effect of divorce is absolute. The former law holds that
the effect. of divorce is only a legal separation of the spouses. Thus, the contradic-
tion ispatent and the repeal of the former one isthe unavoidable consequence of the
enactment of other.
In view of this argument. and with due respect to the opinion of J udge Avan-
cella, I do not believe that it is dangerous to l!ffirmthat no relative divorce eJ rlstsin
the Philippines !lotthe present time.
TI\elJ OuM forelative diVON't,1IP'Cihd. by the Sietc Parti... waa adulty
only. n.pwtd of au abeoIu.tedi~"" adultery. Thepo-existeneeof tU
two, theD,. iJ Qpossible. Thee~d.~ 01the oneJ epea!1I the exiatenooof the other.
Nothinl Callbe_ct not he at tho llaIlJ 8tUne. If the contention of a claimant isu
absolute divorce, the ground isadultory. Cau a ellUmon divorceon the gro\lad of
adul~ be granted by our jlOurtsby only decreeing a relative divorce? I do not
th~ thoy have, 000a,* the newlawonly recognizesdivorce in its absolute sense.
The ground of adultery is the only ground the law saY'!,t.hull ooverln,; prnctieeJ ly
the pound for relative divQl'C8.
SHOULD THE PROVISION m'THI": OLD LAW m:Rl<;fAINJ o.:m
Asto the q\Ml8tionwhether or not tho provision of tho old law should be (lX-
prelISlyretained, I aminelined to answer in the affirmative, provided the provision
should be modified 80 l\ll not to be inconsistent with the provisiODRofthe new law.
It isalwaysadvisabletwd worthy of praise .heexistenceof a lawwhichgivesto the
spouses an ample opportuDity to reconsider the evil t,hat they hlwe committed.
Repentance must alwayshegivenplace,in IegisJ a.tion.
It isnot alwaysthe purpose of the innooent spouseto deprive the guilty of hill
or her inalienableright orliberty by workiDgfor hisor her imprisonment. Onemay
only bewillingto livehimor bel' for a ClOUple of yearstogivehimor her chanceto re-
form his or her life. There are grounds whichmlloY besufticieattojustify a relative
divorce, but they cannot beaVlUledof for Iaekof legislativeprovision. 1'0my mind,
the time hlUInowcomein which the Philippines must ha.vea complete legislation,
diilereat fromwhat our Chief J ustice has reported to the first Philippine Commill-
sion. (Malcolm, Phil. Gov. par. 35No.9) paralleled to any l':uropelm1.-
lation and unrivalled by auy stat,ute of tho Union.
CONFLICT 01<'LAWS
The marriage relation isa contract which hasa social und Icpl clw.rucwr, con~
lltitUtingthe iJ Ourceof all society, and for this reason the State isactuated and in-
spired with the highest zeal in its prcservllotion. The interest of the State in thill
relation leadsit not only to demand that it,should not beentered into unll.dvillCdly,
but also to prohibit its dissolution at the merewill or ('.u.primof the pl~rtil'J ol, lInlCllll
the consent of the State thereto isobtained.
It isan admitted principle of Private Internat.ional Law tha\' marriagll relatioll
isessentially a status and just as the incidents thereof are deterrninl.odby the law
of the lliacewherethe parties live(lex domicilii),llOalllOitolldiHf#llutionisto beJ 'lJ g-
ulated by thesamelaw. But a question might arillCinC3IICthat theact ()naccount
of whiehdivorceisasked, occurred inanother State by who.'lCluwit wasnot a caUllC
for divorce, though (',onstitutinp;It ground for div()rl'ein t.heState of the Divor(l(~
forum; which law should govern? To this question there are various.theories ad-
vocated; someholding that the lawof the place where the offenseiscommitt.ed should
prevail; others are in favor of the law of the domicil of the parties at the time the
offense was committed; and others in favor of the law o( the parties, domicil at the
time the divorce is sought.
The civil law theory is that the right to dissolve the marriage contract depends
upon the law of the place where the contract was entered into, .because th4ildivor~
alters not only the condition and capacity of the spouSesbut also the status, and for
this reason it is but natural that the law which give rise to the status should have
exclu.'J ivecontrol over it in its dissolut,ioll. (Fiori, Tratado de Darecho Interna-
cional Privado, vol. 3, p 43 et seq.)
But upon principles it would seemclear that the question whether or not a par_
ticular act or omission isa w-ound for divorce, should be determined by the munici.-
pal law. of the divorce forum. Hunt V8. Hunt, 72 N. Y., 217; People V8. Qarw:
ell
,
25 Mich., 247; 12 Am. Rep., p. 260; Shreck V8. Shreck 32 Tex., 578; 5 Am. Rep.,
251; Hood V8. Hood, 11Allen (Mass.) 196; 87 Am. Dec. 709.
This commonly accepted principle isba.'J edupon the lawful exercise of the sov-
ereign power of a state, whose control over inhabitants within its territory isabsolute
~nd a lawful exercise of its police jurisdiction.
But if the object of the suit is not to dissolve the marriage status, but to pro-
nounce the union invalid ab-initio for causes rendering the contract void, the law
Ilopplicableis the lex celebrationis of the marriage contract.
The serious-difficulty which confro~ts usliesasto the effect to begiven inanother
State of a judgment lawfully rendered in another St,ate.
,"It isa fact that not all the countries recognize and admit the absolute divorce.
Andso the difficult,y arises when the quest.ion is between two parties domiciled or
married in a country where no such l!\wis in force, who transferred afterwards in
another country where such law prevails, or vice-versa, and their petition for the
dissolution. In this case, since there will be a conflict of right and interest when
they return to their country where divorce is not allowed, it is the best pOlicy for
the court taking cognizance of the case to adopt an' attitude which would protect
the interest of bothJ parties, either in the place where the party intended to have the
bond dissolved aswell asin their own country. Of course, the courts of the country
where the parties sought to have protection can declare th~mselves incompetent to
take cognizance of the case; but, if they prefer U>exercise jurisdiction over the case
and the parties to t,hesuit are those above described, the best policy for the court
is to grant only the legal separation!according to the law of the parties, regardless
of the lex fori. This policy of the court is salutary, because it does not prejudice
in' any manner the rights and interests of the parties, and on the contrary it protects
-
d1e plII'IJ iesDOt eu1Y widtia 68 ~ of Ute~ courts, bat ahJ o witAiatheir
GWIl.4lOuntry ia eMe t1ley ....,... (MatiMlo de J oy&, Dereeho IrlterDaeioaa.I
~).
But when tM que!ltioD isbetneD we at-.- where abtlol.te divorce prevaiII,
the difficulty disappears and questiOn wDich O O 1Iifroats WI to detiemlilte is the elhct
to be given toa foreign judgment.
The fourteenth amendment to the federal OODstitlltio&provides that "I'l() StAte
shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due PIOOeII8of law", that
is, without notice an4 reasonable oppol'tunity to be beard in his OW1\ beho.lf. If
there has been no such due proooss of law as is demanded under the feden\t C01ll!ltitU
't.ion, the {'.A>urt, is without jurilldict.ion tmd its decree absolutely void within the
limits of its own State as well a.~elsewhere. And if the defendant resides outside of
the jurisdiction of the Court wherein t,lleact,ion iRpendillK, II. serviee of notiCll by a
'general publication of the fact that a sui' has been instituted a~nin8t him, unlesll
the defendant voluntarily,appears, will not~ive the f'..A>Urt jurisdiction over bis pf!l'IlOn,
and alt.hough the judgment is valid where renden..-d, yet in general will be regarded
as void and of no effect outside the jurisdiction where it isrendered. A H it WI\Il held
in the leading ('.ageof Pennoyer 118. Neff, 95 U. S., 714, It personal jud~lnent relldered
against a non-resident defendant, in put"Sua.nceto a l'lel"Viccof DOUet'by a general pub-
lication, was beyond the Court's jurisdiction to bind the defendant; and that, a sta-
tuteauthorizing such a COUl'I!le contravened the fcderalconstitution. Tilt, laws of
DneState have no binding effect and force beyond it.s territorial jUriKtlictioll, IloIld
therefore the procedure followed in this case to subjoct the nun-resident defendan t
to the jurisdiction of the Court, did not bind him in so far that t,he judl{rrlPnj; wall
intended to be binding heyond its territorial Iimitll.
However, in order that the judgment of a liilitA:,r l'!f.ate may he J (iven lltl'eet in
another State of the Union, it is neOOHSarythlLt the defendant lJ epllrHOnally HCrved
with notice of the action within the territorial limits of tho Court'R jurilldil\tion, or
that he voluntarily appears allowing the Court to acquire jurisdiction over hislllll'llOn.
Asbetween the States of the Union, the comity enjoined by private international
law, touching the effect to be given to fore~n judgment is reinforced and supple-
mented by the clause in the federal constitution providing that "full faith and credit
shall be given each State to the judicial proceedinRli of (.'VeryoUlor State", hilt thil!l
constitutional privilege is subject t.o the limitation that t,he COllrt pronouncinp; the
judgment must have jurisdiction over the ca.~ and [Ierson of the partill!!. And
when an action is brought in one of the States of the Union to enforce a judtlment
rendered in another, in general only such defenses Cllollbe m~e thereto, as I.'ould he
made in the State where it was rendered. The defell!lCllthat a defendant may show
to defeat the validit,y of the judgment are the lack of jurisdiction of the Court. which
proDOUIlOild the judgment over the subject~'ter over ~ person of the ~.
:s.ns... Haidemaa, 14<How., 334; Cheever n. '!filson, 9 Wall., 108; Thompaon 1/1.
Whitman, 18 Wall., 457; Grover Co. V8. Radcliffe, 137 U. S.,287.
It is the weillM of authority that divorce cases are "proceedings quasi in rem"
and not purely proceedings in rem, nor proceedinp illper8OBlIm, because in divorce
cases although the actual subject matter of the litipQon is the marriage status, the
~'U8 being' the res, yet, it can not be said to be altogether proceedings in rem, be-
cause there is a personal elemeat that enters into them not found in suits imItituted
merely to subiect or affect properly. These causes constitute in some measure a
~yiding line between proceedings strictly in rem and proceedings strictly in per8OJ 18Ql,
partaking in fact of the nature of each, but the fQnuer predominating. The nature
of the these proceedings is ~e same whether the suit be for divorce "a ;mensa or a
yinculo".
But the New York Courts are more inclined to hold the view that divorce casea
are proceedings in personam, Williams 1/8. Willi&$lls, 130N. Y., 193; J ones 1/8. J ones,
108 N. Y., 415; O'Dea V8. O'Dea, 101 N. Y., 667.
Hitherto we have only discussed the territorial effect of divorce decrees rendered
by a sister State within the Union, and now iwill consider the exterritorial effect of
divorce decrees rendered by Courts of foreign countries.
It is a well established principle o! a Private International Law that a divorce
obtained in one State other than the domicil of the parties is of no binding effect in
f01'eilPl countries. Domicil of one of the parties at least is essential to give a divorce
decree exterritorial effect, Van J ossen V8. State, 37, Ohio, 317; 41 Am. Rep., 307;
because when the parties are domiciled within the State where the action is brought,
the nature of the proceedings is in rem, and judgments in rem are generally given
conclusive effect everywhere for the sovereignty of a State within its limits issupreme.
Williams 118.Annroyd, 7 Cr. 423; Gelston 118.Hoyt., 3 Wheat, 246; China Mt. I..ife
Ins. CA > . 118.Fore, 142 N. Y., 90.
However, although it is within the sovereign capacity of a State to enact laws
whereby parties may obtain a divorce even when neither husband nor wife is there
domiciled, yet, such a course is (',ondemned by the principles of comity and Private
International Law. The consent of the partieS cannot give jurisdiction over their
foreign status, for that would be to infringe the sovereignty of the State of domicil
which is interested in the continuation of the relation. J ackson 118.J ackson, 1 N.
Y., 424; Harrisonv8. Harrison, 20Ala., 129; Smith V8. Smith, 13 Gray (Mass.) 209.
These general principles of International Law are now so clearly recognized that
municipal laws invariably require that for the granting of a divorce, the parties
should be domiciled within the jurisdiction. Williamson 118.Parison, 1 N. Y., 389;
Hoffman 118.Hoffman, 46 N. Y., 30; Sure 118.I.uidsfelt, 19 I... R. A., ins.
"fb.e question to be 4PermQled ie ..mettler- the Cowtll'aPtiDg the divorce
uwlIt have iJ ueh 00IQP1eteju.risdiotioa of the eotiN rei uto justify the other 8tUee
iaadmit~ it6l1Overeip riaht to OODlPletelyregulate or dillOlve tie marital.D.
Be,oDd doubt, when the Court bas abllOlute and complete jurisdiction of the rei,
that is, if both parties are domiciled within it6 juri8diction, decrees rendered under
these chcumstancee will be Ilven full dect everywhere, becaUlle there ill no poIlIIible
.grou,nd for any o~ State to complain that it6 lIOVereip right6 over it6 own citizellil
have been violated. Clark N. Clark, 8 CUBh. (Mass.,) 380; Barber liB. Root, 10
MU8., 260; Hood w. Hood, 87 Am. 000. 709; HarrillOn N. HarrillOn, 20 Ala., 629.
On the other hand, if neither of the parties are domiciled in the State where
the divorce is obtained, it6 (101111;s are completely without jurisdiction over t,he res,
aad other State might and WQuldjust.ly complain that the State granting the divoroo
had usurped lIOvereignty that it should not have exercised. And coDBequently de-
crees rendered under these circwnstanoo, th"ugb its validity may be admitted within
the divorcing State, yet, no exterritofi!l.1 effect can be given to it in foreign countriell.
J anover N. Turner, 14 Mass., 127; Kerr lIB. Kerr, 41 N. Y., 272; Neff liB. Beohman,
74 J a., 92; Shanon lIB. Shanon, 4 Allen (M~'lIl), 134.
But a different qUCf'ltionpreaents where one of the partillll is domiciled in t,he
State granting the divorce, while the other is domiciled ell!eWhere. In thill cue, the
divorce court has only jurilldiction over part of the rei, and dOCIIthe taking cog-
nizance of the calle mean a ullUrpation of the soverei~ty of another State over its
citizeDII?
The marriage status ill a reciprocal one and therefore It doonlC of divorce must
in any Atate 'be valid as to both consort or void as to both. It cannot be valid all to
one and void 88to the other, for that would be to affirm that there might be a husband
without a wife or vice-veraa. So that the Court must do one or the other, it must
exercise jurisdiction' over the whole or over none.
These queatioDII have agitated the Courts and many theoriell have from time to
tame been advanced by the Courts, but all of which have now been difll',s,rded, ex-
cept three leading oneil.
FirBt T1Ieory.-Acoording to the firIIt theory, it is only essential that one of the
partiee should be domiciled in the State granting the divorce, it if!immaterial which
party though It will usually be the plaintiff. The Courts of the party's domicile
having jurisdiction over his or her status will draw to themselves, by re880n of mu-
tuality of the marriage relation, jurisdiction over the other party. And the service
of proOOBsin this C88C can be made by publicat.ion. This theory presents a great in-
convenienee because. it oftentimee permits grave injUlltice to be aone to the defendant
who frequently finds himllelf or hel'llelf divorced without any previous know1edp
whatever that proceedings for that purpose were pending.
Second Theory.-In this !!OOOndt~eory the personal element preponderates and
causes a proceeding wh9se purpose is to dissOlve a status to be regarded in the light
of a proceeding ill penionam rather thana proceeding in rem. . The NewYork Courts
hold that no foreign ,divorce in a State where the plaintiff alone is domiciled will be
valid exterritorially, unless the defendant voluntarily appears oris personally served
with process within the territorial jurisdiction of the divorce Court.
This theory offers a great inconvenience, for it practically f<;>rcesthe plaintiff
who desires a divorce at the very least to seek put the defendant, and one in the
State selected hy the latter, for the very reason perhaps that its laws are more hostile
to the plaintiff than his or her own; and. since the munici~llaws of most States re-
quire that the pl&intiff be domiciled in the States where he seekS a divorce~this theory
would often compel him to abandon his own State altogether and take up his per-
manent residence in the domicil of the defendant, or else forego his right to a divorce
entirely.
Third Theory.-The third theory does not require the plaintiff to go to the
State of the defendant and subject himself.to its laws in order to obtain hi~divorce,
but he. is permitted to get the full benefit of the divorce law of his own State; but a
general publication, asisadvocated by the first theory, isnot sufficieJ lt. The notifica-
tion required here to give the Court jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident
defendant is that he should be given the best notice practicable of the pendency of
the suit, or by mail, message or actual service of notice, a,nd not by advertisement
merely.
This theory adopted by the Courts of New J ersey is the best in point of reason,
principle and juStice to all parties, combining as it does the advantages of both and
the other theories and minimizing the disadvantages of both. According to this
theory, the personal element entering into a divorce suit is neither disregarded t~
the extent of making the divorce a proceeding in rem, nor so magnified as to make
it a proceeding in personam, but isregarded as a proceeding quasi in rem.
SHOULD THE GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE BE INCREASED?
AND IF SO, WHAT NEW GROUNDS SHOULD BE ADOPTED?
The very nature' of marriage, its purposes, its effects upon the persons immedi-
ately concerned, its effe~ts upon the well-being of the soCiety, and lastly the influ-
enQewhich it plays in the very existence of the State. These are some of the forces
which compelled the government of all civilized nations to adopt a policy to regulate
marriage; they encourage marriages; they provide protections and privileges and other
means necessary for its continued existence during the natural lives of the consorts;
they safeguard the welfare of the spouses from impurity and immorality, secures
them the blessings of home and family and creates a noble nursery for the commOn-
wearth. It is the policy of the government to maintain the existence of marriage
nilati0D8 so long 88:it is eon8iet.ent With peace &ad welfare of the cpmmunity. It
protects ~ family from diatUl'banoea coming from bttwde. When the caW18of the
disturbance to the peace and lwmony of the family. ariIea within the family itilelf;
when luch trouble iscaused by the very membenl of the family; when it isbeyond the
power of the government to uppress such disturbance without altering the orglLDisa-
tion of the family, then the government provides for a me&D8whereby the marri&Ke
bond may be dissolved. ThUll, the authOr of the trouble iselimirtatl.
From the above consideration, it may be concluded that the fundamental'ou-
ject of the divorce law, in so far &8it permits the separation of t'he SPOU868is to dis.,
solve the nui.rriage bond when it; is found in such a condition that the "pOU868call
no longer endure living such a union; when life to them has become unsupportable
under the circumstances.
Keeping in view this fundamental object of the divorce law, we flhall proceed
to consider the justification of adultery M I'ground for divorce.
The essential feature in the marriage relation is the affection. The ceremonials
obeerved in thesolemnisation of marriage are nothing but legal fonnalities pref!cribed
for leason8 of public policy, &8safeguards to good order and good morals. But once
the marriageoontract is consUInated, there spring mutual ril(hts and duties, the
faithful observance of which is indispensable to the accomplishment of marriage's
human and divine miSsions. Theile tights and obligationI'! are of social and moral
nature and a violation of the SlLmecrl',af,esa dllltllrbanf',(J in the orlCanization of the.
family and disorder in the community.
I believe that the true ground of justification for adultery WI a CUUMO for divoree
is the non-observance of fidelity on the part of the offender, which both IlflOU8CII,
when they intended to unite for life, ROlemnly swore to keep mutual faithfulness
toward each other. This lack of fidelity on the part nf nne of t,hc spollRe8ereates
trouble in the family and its effeetR go direcUy to the very foundation of marrin.ge.
When distrust will exist between the SpOUSCR, the ceinfidential relatinn is reduced to
its minimum, and there is danger of bring Rt,rangers int.o t.he family. The offender
will not devote as much time and energy to his family a.'!he would boo he remained
faithful, btJ cause his attention is now divided; and lastly, t.here is the oon!lideration
that in the eyes of the public the husband is diRhonored. WhP.ll one of t.ho HpoUseS
commits adultery, the conyugal (,'Ommunit.y which heforo was the sanetuary of lov6
and affections has become the amphitheater of temptable immorality, the stute of the
most abominable crime against IOnrriage and the forever Rilcnt witnCSRof the dis-
grace of the offended party. Under these circumstances, it issaid that marriage ~
lation is unbearable and that it beL'Omesa burden in life instead of being the liOurce
of happiness. In this case divorce then is the proper means to' remedy the condition
in order to bring the spouses to normal happineRR hy ~ivinJ /;them an opport,unity fA )
find a condit.ion where happinCllS may he found.
lf1fbat hu just been said of adultery is true, shall the family remain UDdisturb-
ell in U.1lal'm000Yand pea.ee,' if none of thelpOUSell commit adultery? Oul' ob8erva-
tM. iillti lmutecl sphere shows 1Uithat sUch a Condition CllmlOtalWayS be attained.
'me fabric of which hWnan society is made up is so intricate and perfIexing tba.t
mairiItp rel&tioJ l .cannot be secured from the infinite number of misfortunes. '.To
eite lID instance; if a husband, without committing adultery, wilfully and without
cause, abandoDS his family and children' without leaving any life provision whatso-
ever for his wife and children, will the family remain ill peace? Shall the law close
ite eyes and its ea.:s completely ~ the bitter cries and ini'serable situation of the
'-i1y? There is no one to support; no one to p~tect the membe1'8 of the family.
_ what is WOl'8e,the natural object of ma.rriage can no longer be accomplished.
Desertion is no less an offense than adultery with respect to the marriage relation,
While in desertion the suffering inflicted is moral &8 well as material injury. H such
gaIuy of unhappy circumstances will loom out in the sacred sanctuary of marital
aftection,it is beyond peradventure of doubt that that poor helpless wife will seek
refuge in the heaven of carna.t profession in order to maintain the union of her body
and soul together and also those of her children. In view of these reasons, we shall
naturally include desertion as one of those causes with thoIle wise limitations which
aie necessary to prevent abuses and miscarriage of justice. Desertion is rooog-
ilized asground for divorce in England, United States, Germany (Art. 1567), Vene-
mala (Art. 152 pro 2), Porto Rico (Art. 164 pro 5), Italy (Art. 148), Guatemala (Art.
170pro 8) and J apan (Art. 813 pro 6).
Cruelty inflicted bY'one spouse to another should also be one of the grounds for
divorce with certain carefully defined limitations. Some of these limitations are that
such cruelty must be such as being intolerable, barbarous, savage or inhUIDB;nacts.
Or, according to Connecticutt statute, such cruelty must be such as to cause "da.Qger
to life, limb or health", or such as to make the conyugal community undurable.
The apprehended harm must be bodily, including detriment to health, but not mere
mental suffering, because the court has 'no scale of sensibilities by which it can' gauge
the quantum injury done and felt. This rule rests not strictly on j\!.8tice, but on the
difficulty of making proof. But mere rudeness of language, petulance of mannel'8,
austerity of temper, or an occasional sally of temper which does not injure or threaten
to injure the hcalth or body of the complaining party, does not constitute cruelty
within this law. The justification of cruelty as ground for divorce rests on the vin-
dication of the weaker (Usually the wife). The wrong done to the wife in this partic-
ular case may be actually greater than when the husband commits adultery.
On the other hand since love and affection is deemed the foundation, corner-
stone and unit of the social order, once that such natural love has disappeared, does
it ootfollow "thatit isimproper, WljuataDdimmoral to force man 8oI1d woman to
continueto livetopther ashuabaad and wifewhileIon hasbeendestroyed by cruel
ty aDd betrayal?
Cruelty 8!J groundof divorceisrecopised inall States of theUnion, except intwo
or three. .It isalsoMOOgniJ .ed inJ apan (art. 813pro5), Guatemala (Art. 170"pro3).
U1'11p&y(Art. 148,)Porto Rico(Art.1Mpr. 4), Italy (Art. 148), VenelUela (Art. 152

pro2), Spain (Art. 1~pro2), Germany (Art. 1568)and Fiance (Art. 231).
The third ground which I believeought to be included as a ground of divorce
iswhereoneof thespousesissutlering ablolute, perpetual and incurable impotency,
occurring after marriage. Impotency used in this caaemeans the total lossor des--
truction of the sexual organ, 80that copulation isabsolutely impossible. .It isneed
lessto state that the principal and immediate object of marriage is reproduction.
I seenoreason, novalid reasonwhy themarriagerelation bestill maintained against
the will of oneof the spouseswhenthere isabsolute certainty of the impossibility of
realizingthe very object of marriage.
The fourth ground which I recommend is where one spouse has attempted
against the lifeof the other spouse.
The justification of this ground is even more apparent than in adultery, d~
sertion and cruelty. In cruelty, thebody of the offendedparty isinjured; intheone
under consideration the very lifeof the offended is exposed to destruction. This
ground of divorce is recognized in Germany (Art. 1566, Uruguay (Art. 148), and
Guatema1a (Art. 170).
EFFECT OF DIVORCE LA\VB IN DIFFERENT COUNTRU;B
(a) A dvantages:
It isprecisely under the systemof matrimonial indissolubility that crime is re
warded and innocencepunished; for them the unpreposscssed and recklesshusband
can livein adultery outsideof hishouseand demands however that thiswife, faith-
ful and submissive,should continuelivingwithhimunder the s&IDeroof and tolerat-
ing his incontinence protected by'law. The only thing to be attained from this
systemintheprostitution of thesanctity of the home, protection of viceand punish-
ment of innocence, without avoiding the unfaithful spouse from committing the
crime.
It isan undeniable fact that wherever the matrimonial institution exist, there
are disagreeablemarriageswhichonly recognizehatredness and the homellOnvcrted
into a birth placeof immorality and unfaithfulness.
In thesecaseswhenby the fault of oneof the spousesthe tiCllof marriage have
been lossened and the conditions imposed by the illlltitution cannot be fulfillClI,it
isanimmorality, a tyranny tocompel oneof thespouses to remainperpetually and
indissolubly subjected under theyokeof the guilty spouse.
Totheeeuaforiunate marriageswhiehcannoloqer fiodJ iappiness inth~union
eo.tract.eelbut ~rtune and shlime, thebalilamisapPliCable,and not to thehavPY
Dia!riBge8thatb~the inan environment saturated with happiness.
QUi ,,~perclianee kJ okuponwithgoodeyeswhen6tii' dall~telil haviIigootltract-
eel ~:in searett of l$ppinell8, do not find; however, butlltueltiell, ihsult8 &b.d
vtIiAtiOnlJ .fihm the. man of whofii.theypfllclse1y a~ait hapVbiell8,protection. and
esteem? Thai worillin isforever iJ 1i8etableand dead for kindrtese, beMuseshe' has
DO miledy to free her OPPlilsBOt. .It is vet;' unJ ust thBt love bA'VingdisapPeared
~ween twi:> beings who onooloved each otbet and haviDg OOenCOrivertedinto an
illto1erableliUtferingthe cOnyugafbed thai wasIItime a ileStof fragrant ftawet8, of
pdetieal buSses''and ofti~kable felicities, they should he condemned t6 remain
during thelrlifeiime dtownedin ti1illforiU1le; when each of them could look for 8:
new.love and new happiness. To delly this terilooy to UIifottuitat.ebeingswho are
grievingIltlder the'p~ of anettlmal unbAppineiJ S,isUtijti8t, iti1J ilotalt.hat criee
against.thejusticeof menand of God.
If Oil the CoiitraryW'j; only gi'ant thelli personal separation, this indi880lubility
of marriage will placethose spouseswho have not made ariy vow.of chastity iil an
\018Upportabfucondition, ooinPe!lingthemto becriminalsinorder tofind inthearms
Ofit manor womansomemitigation for their sUfJ eriJ 1g soulswhicharethirsty of love.
Dbt with a legislationondivorce, the anoinaloussituation of unhappy marriage and
t~econdition of the .cWldrerilIondof society ate thereby remedied; besides,.concu-
binage, polygamy lIondpolian<J ryare avoided.
We see every day throughout the events that without a Divorce J ..aw, illicit
unions of marritld men and married womenwith women or men who are not their
respective spousesand whieh aretheexternal manifestation of a scandalous Polyg-
amy, are enhanced.
It is very Immoral to seechildrenlivingunder the conyupl roof wherenothing
arefound but infiunies; where,irulteadof preservingthefaith promised before.the al-
tar, it is converted into a place of the ugliest immoralities. It is not an edifying
eXamplethat the children should growupcolitemplating the impunity of the per-
pet.ual commissionof such a crimewhichdevelopsin the family.
But with the present I~w,the moral conditionSof the country and the morality
of the family in particUlar,.will be bettered, for under the rule of divorcethere will
not haveabandoned wivescompelledto lookfor bread inclandestinerelations; there
will not have deserted childrenlost in the rivulet on account of the separation of
the parents, without education, without home, without the environsof love or of
charity.
Supposing that the contending parties in a divorce caseshould have children;
it isasked. what will becomeof them? They will bebenefitted, their-surroundings
will be bettered, for the homewherethey werereared up i tained with infamy OJ !
~, for their p&reIltllor any of themcannot'pve them but ~~of deceit aiMl,
treuObjtheir IeIltimentl 'Willbebettered, for an iQllDOl'llI. hoD'cannot prod1lJ '8noble
IeIltimentaj and 1a8tly, their lifewill bebettered, for divorcewill reduceth9 number
of abortioDS,infanticides, abandonment 'of many children, IODS' of inlatortunell;
LookiDaupon thedivoree question fromthe stand point of events; weare con-
vincedthat it hasnotobetructed theproareisiveand moral developmentpf procreation
Aecordingto the StatistiCl fumished by the Bureau of the Censu8of the United
Stat., the number of dM>l'CleI illinClleUingin the divorceoountri8ll,88 for ~DlDple,
J ~, which ill the oountry mOlJ tradical in dil'Otoeand, yet, itIl population ill ever
inereaaiDg.
Cotnpa~with the PhiJ ippinell,J ava whereabeolutAldivorceill in foree, in 1880
it bil1~hIidtwomilliOllland a haif pciop1efor ita popiJ lationand nowthat nUmberhu
iiil!teaaedto twtiliy-iUnemUliOnII.On tte ether band, the PhilippiDel whereno aboo
lIOhrie di't'b1"ce wU in:foree, 01 onemilUonand a balf of peoplefor thell&lDeyear, call
only boat now of lICBrcelyten million inhabitanta. (Census of the Philippiriea).
(b) ~:
The divorcelaw which opensthe way to the un100tIeningof p88IIionand pvea
facility to the oe1ebfationof newaDdretleated marria&esill the causeOf the corrup..
tibii of domeeticusaaeeaDd cUstom8. Could a ll&dderseeneand ai the iiametime a
mote horrible spect8c1epreeent itle1f before the ctllidren than the Ilipit' of .theit
lathen UJ iitedin lawful 1VedJ ookto other women, and their mothers to oilier men,
in such a way that they find themselveswith two or morefather and two or ~
mothen?
ACcordingto Mr. Stearney,-Divorce ill the portal which ill opened to pa88lon,
in order to search for, or create pretextS, whenever the weight of matrimony, the
ccmyup1 tedium ill felt. Who can 88IlU1'e that in such casee,'whereloveno lonier
reignsand thehoUlethat wasformerlya paradiseof delighta, but nowoonverted into
a sceneof ignominy, oollilionwill not be'sought 80 that commonlifecould be made
UDBUpportable?There cannot be a moreharmful thing to the moral well-bel of
the Off-eprlngsof a maniap than the divorceof their parents whichdeatroysODeor
the other of the two best influencesthat work on childhood, and may poisoneven
the inflUencethat is left. And according to Mr. Pablo Mankegpza,-UDivotee
isnowoneof the fathomlessfounta~ of mishaps, a slowvenon which underminea
domeatic felieity, which deatroys the healthful youth' of the children, the morals
of a na~ion, and the development of the economicresourcesof a country."
Glaasen in his work "Le Marriage at Ie DivorCE''',affirms that, according to
statistics, the num~ of divorces increases continously in raPid ptogrellllionjthat
divorcereaultsinita ownabuseand that theabuseof divorceendangerstheexistence
of the family.
In Engl&nd,whenthe bill on abSolutedivorcewasintroduoed.forthe fQst time
iJ i theabgU8tbody of the English Parliamen~, Gladstone, the celebrated'oratorsaid
thefo!iowinginthecourseof his~oD. regardingthebin: "I donot knowwhere
di~ leadsus; but what I knoW'isth&t it dragsUs to th~placewhereChristianity
Ii!sd'takenusany . H England declaresthe dissolubiUtyof marriage, it iswiseto
record Ilt1Ch an event in the annals of history with black letters rather than with
golden ones."
Thesepositiveassertionsof eminent men lam~nting j;hecondition of their ooun-
tiY "beeiaUle of divorce, would lack weight and authority to convinceusof the ~
c6nse4-uenOO8 whichgOhand inhand with divorceif wedo not strengthen with fa~ts
sUffiCient to provetheir existence.
In America,for example, whereabsolutedivorceisknown, we,hear criesof alarm
whichspringrromthe hearts{)fthe poor and the richalike,i~ the htlt aswell asin
th~' ~lace,due ~, the rapid increaSe~(div~ that are daily recorded by the tri-
b~ls .. As'a resul~of th~abnormality which elu;iangers~tio~l morality and..
',"1 : . , . ' _, . , . ,' .
tranquility, various, societieswereformed to combat and dethrone fromthe heart
of ~anthe liking'for divo~.
In Boston, a Congressof protestant bishops'was heid,.in whicha justice of the
Sq~e Court of Rhode Islandssaid,-"The institution of marriage isundergoing
a.y.ertiginous ev:olutionfroma contract for lifein~ a contract fW: conventionalities;
'Y~arefacinga danger which~es pletrerp.ble grea.tly,'and the chruch aswell8.11
the State should co-operateand take a stand to preservesocietyfromthis imminent
~.'"
Divorcehasincreasedand extended itself likeanepidemicwhichcorruptsmoral-
ity and diminishespopulation.' Thus, inFrance, the lawof divo~ceha~ingbeen re-
~blished in 1884, thebirtll rate decreased in 1901 by 19% andin 11)07by 32%.
In. theearly half of theyear 1909, the number of divorcesamounted to 398,7~0, and
t)lat od deaths to 426,913, that is, an.excessof 28,203 d,eathsover births:
; YonMoltke, the great strategic of themodemage, said: "that from1870France
beenlosing a battle each day and its cause is the law of divorce, and within
fifteenyearsFrancewill have37 or 38regimentsless. And accordingto Mr. Bureau,
& famousprofessor of the University of Paris, in hisbook entitled "La. CrisisMoral
d~.loslTiemPosModemos", publishesthefollo~ingstatistics that provestheincrease
of divorcewhichhas beenthe principal causeof the decreaseof the French popula-
.,:-
tion.
In 1886 the numbe~of divQrceswas 2,900
In 1890the nlDllberof divorceswas 5,497
In 1905 the number of divorceswas.10,109
In 1907 the number of divorceswas12,304
Now, makiog & brief ClOU;lpa.rison of the number of divofOOlll with th&t of mar-
ria&eet welIban be convinced that thoformer number isdouble than the lat. 0Qe.
In FraDcethe suitsfor divorcerank from1773in the year 1884to 7M3in the year
1891;whereaamarriapsnumbered from892in theyear 1884to 3247inthe year 1891.
In Cennany. ~ were534ZdivorcesgrantAldin 1882and 6178in 1891-
InliJ ngtand,divo~ UlMt from127in 1860to 300in 1887,an incl"l'.8llC muchmore
~id than that of the population or that of marriages.
In the .Special Census Report on Marrillge and Divorce, statistics reveal WI
the fact that in the United States one million divorces weregranted, that is, from
1887to 1901; or within a period of thirteen YCllrs;and from1887W1907, or within
aperiod of 2Qyears, 1,340,000iNitsfor divol'OOl:l werefiled,and out of whichmoretba~
% obtained a favorable result.
Consideringnowthe elfe~of divorce on Ulevu!>ulation, wefind fl"Om8Cv~1
statistics that divorcedecreasesinstead of increasing it. Acoo,rding to the Amer-
ican Ce~us Report, w~have the followingdata.: from 187o-1~, the increasep C
population was30per.centum; from1880-1890 it WIlS 25per centwu; from 1890--
1900it was21per centumand frqm1900-1906 it was10.50per centum.
From the foregoingdata. showing the increase of divorce llJ l tIle dL'creascl?f
population, wecan ll9Dolude. that though the increll8Cof divorce in America ~ wCtlI
asinother natioDS,doesnot J )ecessari1yshowa declinein thostandard of sociui an~
domesticmomlity, nevertheless, it .ml,llltbe admitted that if the inCl'ClUlC continues
unchecked, divorcewill tend to inducesuch ItdL-cline,it b(~in~the lo~ical and n~-
sary consequenceof the abuse.
The natuml vinculumof loveisthe cssential clL'lOentof the lUarriagll rL'latioll,
and not the nominal bond of legal sanction; if this isso, does it not followa.'!th(~
night the day that the maintenance of the legnl hond isimproper if the natural hond
ceases? It wouldnot beright toforcea man and womanto liveashusband and wife
whohad noloveforoneanother but only contempt.and hat-redj whyshould wethink
it right to forcethem to liveashusband and wifeaft(~rloveha'l 1lC(l!l dL'litroycdhy
cruelty or betrayal?
Now, if notwithstanding the countless restrictions iUlllOlledin thL' application
of the present law, safeguarding the interests of the Stnte, of the family and of the
individual; if despite the assurances of our Legislative, Executive and J udicial dc-
pa.rtulents, to do their best to check, to guard and to suppressany attempt of abuse
and corruption, there are stillllOmewho believe'prejudicoo in their rights asIlCIlCe-
fut citizensby the pa888geof thislaw, forgetting perhaps that there arein thiscoun-
try thousandsl of unhappy families, that are forever condcmnoo to suffer tilecruel-
ties, insults, and vexatioDSof the man of whomthey preciselyawait happiness, pro-
tection, and ~teem; and if in spiteof their knowledgethat they asprogressiveciti.
zeDS should uphold the pal!8ageof this law will remain obstinate by continuously
refusingto yield, to them, therefore, I take theliberty of addressingthesefewwords.
. There are many things permitted by law, whichthe conscienceof many, taken
individuallv, cannot toleratej nevertheless, the J .egislature isfoteed to pass such
measuresin order to protect the interests of the wholecommunity.
Wemust not fear that this lawmight destroy and poisonthe sweetnessof our
family lifeand degenerate the morality of our country, because this law doesnot
compel themto resort to it; and if notwithstanding the rare unfaithfulnessof some
wives, weprefer to forgivethemand extend to themthe temptation, the enoourage-
ment, the licenseof running through the whole calendar of matrimonial offenses,
without redressingthe offense,then no body will-interfereto us, and asa result we
will not fail witnessingeveryday thegradual but firmdownfall of that scared honor
whichevery body will stakehislifefor thevindicationof theMme.
Nor need wehaveany fear tba.t the granting of divorcesunder theseconditions
will menacethe stability of the family or threaten the integrity of the State. The
essenceof all tnle marriage,8S wehave said, islove, and loveisthe greatest thing
in all the world. Let full freedomof choicebe exercised in mating; let all worldly
and material considerationsas incentives to marriage be eliminated; let the union
be protected and guaranteed by such regulationsaswehave laid down; let lovebe
cherished and encouraged in every youthful heart, and then let it do its perfect
work, and I believethat theinstinctswhichhaveprompted theformationof theunion
may be safely trusted to safeguard its continuance.