H Procedure and Jurisdiction

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LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION
Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan
LAST-MINUTE
NOTES ON THE 2012 BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE
SUPREME COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS


H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

[These 8-part Notes discuss all topics/sub-topics in the Supreme Court-prescribed Syllabus for Labor Law]
==================================================================
TOPI CS UNDER THE SYLLABUS

H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

1. Labor Arbiter
a. J urisdiction
b. Effect of self-executing order of reinstatement on backwages
c. Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC

2. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
a. J urisdiction
b. Effect of NLRC reversal of Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement
c. Requirements to perfect appeal to Court of Appeals

3. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) Med Arbiters
a. J urisdiction (Original and Appellate)

4. National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
a. Conciliation vs. Mediation
b. Preventive Mediation

5. DOLE Regional Directors
a. Small money claims

6. DOLE Secretary
a. Visitorial and Enforcement Powers
b. Power to suspend effects of termination

7. Voluntary Arbitrators
a. Submission Agreement
b. Rule 43, Rules of Court

8. Court of Appeals
a. Rule 65, Rules of Court

9. Supreme Court

10. Prescription of Actions
a. Money claims
b. Illegal dismissal
c. Unfair labor practice
d. Offenses penalized by the Labor Code and IRR issued pursuant thereto

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
===========================
TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS:
1. Labor Arbiter
a. Jurisdiction
===========================

Relevant Provisions: Articles 217 and 128 [b], Labor Code
Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022
1.PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS.
a. Employmentrelationship,aprerequisiteforexerciseofjurisdiction.
ChanRobles Internet Bar Review : ChanRobles Professional Review, Inc.
www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph
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The existence of employeremployee relationship between the partieslitigants, or a reasonable causal
connection to such relationship
1
is a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdiction over a labor dispute by the Labor
Arbiters.
b.TheLaborArbitersandtheNLRCarenotexclusivelyvestedwithauthoritytodeterminetheexistenceof
employeremployeerelationship.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Asiapro Cooperative, [G.R. No.172101, November23,2007], involving the
issueofcoverageofownersmembersofrespondentCooperativeundertheSocialSecuritySystem(SSS),itwasheldthat
itisnotonlytheLaborArbiterortheNLRCwho/whichhastheexclusivejurisdictiontodeterminetheexistenceofthe
employeremployeerelationship.TheSocialSecurityCommission(SSC)hasalsothatpower.
Additionally, the MedArbiter may also exercise the power to determine existence of employeremployee
relationship.
c.IncasesofmoneyclaimsofOFWs,LaborArbitersmayexercisejurisdictionevenabsenttheemployment
relationship.
InSantiagov.CFSharpCrewManagement,Inc.,[G.R.No.162419,July10,2007],itwasheldthataseafarer
whohasalreadysignedaPOEAapprovedemploymentcontractbutwasnotdeployedoverseasand,therefore,thereis
no employeremployee relationship, may file his monetary claims case with the Labor Arbiter. This is because the
jurisdictionofLaborArbitersisnotlimitedtoclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelationships.UnderSection10of
R.A.No.8042(MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995),asamendedbySection7ofR.A.No.10022(March
8, 2010), the Labor Arbiter may exercise the claims of OFWs arising out of an employeremployee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral,
exemplaryandotherformsofdamage.
d.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionevenifthecaseisfiledbytheheirsoftheOFW.
ThiswastherulinginMedlineManagement,Inc.v.Roslinda,[G.R.No.168715,September15,2010].Asheirs,
thewifeandsonofJulianoRoslinda,thedeceasedOFW,havethepersonalitytofiletheclaimfordeathcompensation,
reimbursementofmedicalexpenses,damagesandattorney'sfeesbeforetheLaborArbiteroftheNLRC.
e.NatureofjurisdictionofLaborArbitersisoriginalandexclusive.
ThejurisdictionconferredbyArticle217totheLaborArbitersisbothoriginalandexclusive,meaning,noother
officersortribunalscantakecognizanceof,orhearanddecide,anyofthecasesthereinenumerated.
f.ExceptionstotheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbiters.
Thefollowingaretheexceptions:
1. WhentheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentorthePresidentexerciseshispowerunderArticle263[g]of
theLaborCodetoassumejurisdictionovernationalinterestcasesanddecidethemhimself;or
2. WhentheNLRCexercisesitspowerofcompulsoryarbitrationovernationalinterestcasesthatarecertified
to it by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the exercise by the latter of his certification
powerunderthesameArticle263[g];or
3. WhenthepartiesagreetosubmitthecasetovoluntaryarbitrationbeforeaVoluntaryArbitratororPanelof
VoluntaryArbitratorswho,underArticles261and262oftheLaborCode,arealsopossessedoforiginaland
exclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidecasesmutuallysubmittedtothembythepartiesforarbitrationand
adjudication.
TheLaborArbitersdonothavejurisdictionoverthecasesmentionedabovewhicharetakencognizanceofby
saidotherlaborofficialsortribunalsunderspecificprovisionsoftheLaborCode.
g.Reasonablecausalconnectionruletheruleincaseofconflictofjurisdictionbetweenlaborcourtand
regularcourt.
Under this rule, if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer
employeerelations,thenthecaseiswithinthejurisdictionoflaborcourts.
2
Intheabsenceofsuchnexus,itistheregularcourtsthathavejurisdiction.
3
h.Labordisputes,notsubjecttobarangayconciliation.
Labor cases are not subject to the conciliation proceedings prescribed under Presidential Decree No. 1508
requiringthesubmissionofdisputesbeforetheBarangayLupongTagapayapapriortotheirfilingwiththecourtorother
governmentoffices.Requiringconciliationoflabordisputesbeforethebarangaycourtswoulddefeattheverysalutary
purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the
propercourtsorofficestodecideitfinally,theconciliationoftheissuesbeforetheBarangayLupongTagapayapawould
onlyduplicatetheconciliationproceedingsandundulydelaythedispositionoflaborcases.
4
i.LaborArbiterhasnoinjunctionpower;theNLRChas.
While theNLRC is expresslygranted thepowerto issue an injunctionor a restrainingorder in labor disputes
underArticle218[e],thereisnoexpress,orevenimplied,grantofsimilarpowertoLaborArbitersintheLaborCode.

1
KnownasReasonableCausal ConnectionRule.
2
Dai-ichi ElectronicsManufacturingCorporationv. Villarama, Jr. G.R. No. 112940, Nov. 21, 1994, 238SCRA267, 271.
3
SanMiguel Corporationv. Etcuban, G. R. No. 127639, Dec. 3, 1999.
4
Montoyav. Escayo, G.R. Nos. 82211-12, March21, 1989, 171SCRA442.
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j.Powertoconductocularinspection.
TheLaborArbitersortheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives,havethepowertoconductocularinspections,at
any time during working hours, on any establishment, building, ship or vessel, place or premises, including any work,
material,implement,machinery,applianceoranyobjecttherein,andaskanyemployee,laborer,oranyperson,asthe
casemaybe,foranyinformationordataconcerninganymatterorquestionrelativetotheobjectoftheinvestigation.
5
2.JURISDICTIONOFLABORARBITERS.
ThefollowingprovisionsoflawsgrantjurisdictiontotheLaborArbiters:
1. Article217oftheLaborCode;
2. Article128[b]oftheLaborCode;and
3. Section10ofR.A.No.8042(MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995)asamendedin2010by
R.A.No.10022[March8,2010].
2.1.CASESUNDERARTICLE217,

ThefollowingarecasesfallingundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbitersunderArticle217
oftheLaborCode:
1. Unfairlaborpractice(ULP)cases;
2. Terminationdisputes(Illegaldismissalcases);
3. MoneyclaimsinvolvinganamountexceedingP5,000.00;
4.Moneyclaimsraisedinillegaldismissalcases(regardlessofamount);
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee
relations;
5. CasesarisingfromanyviolationofArticle264oftheLaborCode,includingquestionsinvolvingthelegalityof
strikesandlockouts;and
Exceptions:
1. ClaimsforEmployeesCompensation(EC),SocialSecurity(SS),PhilHealth
6
andmaternitybenefits.Reason:
Jurisdiction over EC, SS and maternity benefits is lodged with the Social Security Commission. Jurisdiction
overPhilHealthisvestedwiththePhilippineHealthInsuranceCorporation(PHIC).
2. Cases involving interpretation or implementation of CBA and interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. Reason: Jurisdiction over these cases is vested with the Grievance Machinery and
VoluntaryArbitration. If erroneously filed with the LaborArbiter, they shall bedisposedofby theLabor
Arbiterbyreferringthesametothegrievancemachineryandvoluntaryarbitrationasmaybeprovidedin
saidagreements.
7
2.2.CASESUNDERARTICLE128[b],LABORCODE.
Article 128 [b] involves the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement powers by the DOLE Secretary. The
jurisdictionovercasesarisingfromtheinspectionofestablishmentsisvestedwiththeDOLERegionalDirector,exceptin
cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor inspectors
8
and raises issues supported by documentary
proofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.Thesecontestedcasesfallingunderthisexceptionclause
inparagraph[b]ofArticle128fallunderthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
2.3.CASESOFOFWsUNDERARTICLESECTION10,R.A.NO.8042,ASAMENDEDBYR.A.NO.10022.
TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionovermonetaryclaimsofOFWs,towit:
1. Thosearisingoutofanemployeremployeerelationship;
2. Thosearisingbyvirtueofanylaw;
3. ThosearisingfromacontractinvolvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment;
4. Claimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.
3.UNFAIRLABORPRACTICECASES.
a.AllULPsthatmaybecommittedbyboththeemployersandlabororganizations.
TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverthecivilaspectofallULPsthatmaybecommitted
by either the employers
9
or the labor organizations.
10
The criminal aspect thereof falls under the jurisdiction of the
regularcourt.
b.Unfairlaborpracticeacts.
UndertheLaborCode,thereareonlyfive(5)provisionsrelatedtounfairlaborpractices,towit:
1. Article 247 which describes the concept of unfair labor practices and prescribes the procedure for their
prosecution;
2. Article248whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbyemployers;
3. Article249whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbylabororganizations;

5
Article219of theLaborCode.
6
Formerlyknownasmedicare.
7
Seeparagraph[c] of Article217, Labor Code.
8
laboremployment andenforcement officer.
9
UnderArticle248, LaborCode.
10
Under Article249, Labor Code.
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4. Article 261 which considers violations of the CBA as no longer unfair labor practices unless the same are
grossincharacterwhichmeansflagrantand/ormaliciousrefusaltocomplywiththeeconomicprovisions
thereof.
5. Article263[c]whichreferstounionbustinginvolvingthedismissalfromemploymentofunionofficersduly
elected in accordance with the union constitution and bylaws, where the existence of the union is
threatenedthereby.
4.JURISDICTIONOVERTERMINATIONDISPUTES(ILLEGALDISMISSALCASES).
a.Laborofficialswhomaytakecognizanceofterminationdisputes.
An examination of the Labor Code shows that the following officials have the power to take cognizance of
terminationdisputesintheexerciseoftheiroriginalandexclusivejurisdiction:
1. LaborArbitersunderparagraph[a](2)ofArticle217;
2. VoluntaryArbitratorsorpanelsofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticles261and262;
3. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, in the exercise of his assumption power in national interest
cases. Under paragraph [g] of Article 263, he may take cognizance of termination disputes that are
includedorsubsumedinthecase/soverwhichhehasassumedjurisdiction.
4. TheNLRC,innationalinterestcasescertifiedtoitforcompulsoryarbitrationbytheSecretaryofLaborand
Employment under the same Article 263 [g]. Such certified cases may include or subsume the issue of
terminationofemploymentthelegalityofwhichtheNLRCmayvalidlydecideupon.
b.Terminationcaseisnotagrievableissue.
InNavarroIIIv.Damasco,[G.R.No.101875,July14,1995],theSupremeCourtheldthataterminationcaseis
notagrievableissuethatmustbesubmittedtothegrievancemachinery.
Inanothercase,SanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,[G.R.No.108001,March15,1996,255SCRA133,140],it
wassimilarlyheldthatdismissalsdonotcallfortheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpoliciesandso
theymaynotbeconsideredgrievableorarbitrablebyvirtueofArticle217[c].
InManejav.NLRC,[G.R.No.124013,June5,1998,290SCRA603],itwasdeclaredthatterminationcasesfall
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, not of the Voluntary Arbitrators. The dismissal of
petitioner does not fall within the phrase grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective
bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies, the
jurisdictionofwhichpertainstothegrievancemachineryorthereafter,toavoluntaryarbitratororpanelofvoluntary
arbitrators.
InNegrosMetalCorp.v.Lamayo,[G.R.No.186557,August25,2010].Itwasheldthatterminationdisputes
shouldbebroughtbeforeaLaborArbiter,exceptwhentheparties,underArticle262,unmistakablyexpressthatthey
agreetosubmitthesametovoluntaryarbitration.
5.JURISDICTIONOVERMONEYCLAIMS.
a.Moneyclaimsunderpar.(a),[3]and[6]ofArticle217;classification.
MoneyclaimsfallingwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbitersarethosementionedin
paragraph[a],Nos.3and6ofArticle217.Theymaybeclassifiedasfollows:
1. Anymoneyclaim,regardlessofamount,accompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement;or
2. Any money claim, regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, exceeding the
amountoffivethousandpesos(P5,000.00)perclaimant.
ThemoneyclaiminNo.1abovepresupposesthatitproceedsfromaterminationcase,itbeingaccompanied
with a claim for reinstatement. Hence, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter since it is principally a
terminationdispute.
ThemoneyclaiminNo.2abovedoesnotnecessarilyarisefromorinvolveaterminationcasebutbecausethe
amountexceedsP5,000.00,itfallswithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.IftheamountdoesnotexceedP5,000.00,
itis,underArticle129,theDOLERegionalDirectororhisdulyauthorizedhearingofficerswhohavejurisdictiontotake
cognizancethereof.
b.Moneyclaimsmustariseoutofemployeremployeerelationship.
As a general rule, money claims of workers that are not connected with or do not arise out of employer
employee relationship fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The money claims of workers referred to in
paragraph 3 of Article 217 of the Labor Code embrace those which arise out of or in connection with the employer
employeerelationship,orsomeaspectorincidentofsuchrelationship.
11
Clearly, the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter is not limited to money claims arising out of an illegal dismissal
case,butallmoneyclaimsarisingoutofemployeremployeerelationships.
12
Sonzav.ABSCBNBroadcastingCorporation,[G.R.No.138051,June10,2004]
Since petitioner is not an employee but an independent contractor, his monetary claims for the recovery of
unpaidtalentfees,13
th
monthpay,separationpay,serviceincentiveleave,signingbonus,travelallowance,andamounts

11
SanMiguel Corporationv. NLRC, 161SCRA719.
12
NationBroadcastingCorporationv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 116184, October2, 1997, 280SCRA65, 68-69].
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dueundertheEmployeeStockOptionPlanoftherespondentcompanydonotfallunderthejurisdictionoftheLabor
Arbiterbutcognizablebytheregularcourt.
Consultav.CA,[G.R.No.145443,March18,2005]
TheclaimforunpaidcommissionsfiledbytheManagingAssociateofanentityengagedinhealthcarebusiness,
was declared beyond the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because there was no employeremployee relationship
betweentheparties.Herremedyistofileanordinarycivilactionintheregularcourttolitigateherclaim.
Otherillustrativecaseswheremoneyclaimswereheldnottohavearisenfromtheemploymentrelationship
areasfollows:
1. Apersonalloanfromacompanypresidenttoanemployeeisnotwithintheambitofthejurisdictionofthe
LaborArbiter.
13
2. Claimofemployeeforacashprizeunderaprogramofthecompanywasheldbeyondthejurisdictionofthe
LaborArbiter.
14
Butinanothercase,theclaimbyanemployeeforahouseandlotprizeastopsalesmanwas
heldwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
15
3. Unpaid salaries, allowances and per diem of the President of a company are included in intracorporate
dispute,hence,notcognizablebytheLaborArbiter.
16
Butamoneyclaimofacorporateofficerwhois,at
the same time, a regular employee is not an intracorporate dispute, hence, cognizable by the Labor
Arbiter.
17
4. Money claims of an independent contractor consisting of unpaid commissions and reimbursements fall
beyondthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
18
5. An action to enforce liability arising from a breach of trust, as well as to recover any amount allegedly
misappropriated,mustbebroughtbeforetheregularcourts.
19
5.1.MONEYCLAIMSUNDERARTICLE128OFTHELABORCODE.
a.VisitorialandenforcementpowersofDOLESecretaryunderArticle128.
Article 128 enunciates the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary or any of his duly
authorizedrepresentatives.
b.RequisitesforthevalidexerciseofthevisitorialandenforcementpowersunderArticle128.
For the valid exercise of the visitorial and enforcement powers provided under Article 128 [b], the following
requisitesshouldconcur:
1. Theemployeremployeerelationshipshouldstillexist;
2. The findings in question were made in the course of inspection by the labor employment and
enforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers;and
3.The employees have not yet initiated any claim or complaint with the DOLE Regional Director under
Article129,ortheLaborArbiter,underArticle217.
TheexistenceoftheemploymentrelationshipatthetimeoftheinitiationoftheactionunderArticle128[b]is
essential.Basedonthisrequisite,theSupremeCourt,inthe2006caseofEJRCraftsCorp.v.Hon.CA,[G.R.No.154101,
March10,2006],disagreedwiththecontentionofpetitionerthattheLaborArbiter,andnottheDOLERegionalDirector,
hasjurisdictionoverthiscase.Itheldthatconsideringthattherestillexistsanemployeremployeerelationshipbetween
petitioner and private respondents and that the case involves violations of the labor standard provisions of the Labor
Code,theDOLERegionalDirectorhasjurisdictiontohearanddecidetheinstantcaseinconformitywithArticle128[b]of
theLaborCode.
RizalSecurity&ProtectiveServices,Inc.v.Hon.Maraan,[G.R.No.124915,February18,2008]
TheSupremeCourtruledherethatwhatismaterialtoconsideristhatatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaints
or claims for payment of monetary benefits with the DOLE Regional Office, the complainants were still employees of
petitionercompany.Thus,theSupremeCourtsaidthatconsideringthatitisuncontrovertedthattherestillexistedan
employeremployee relationship betweenpetitioner RizalSecurityandprivate respondents at the time of filingofthe
complainton19May1995,andthatthecaseisoneinvolvingviolationsoflaborstandardprovisionsoftheLaborCode,it
istheDOLERegionalDirectorwhohasjurisdictionoverthecase.
c.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionifemploymentrelationshipnolongerexistsatthetimeoftheinitiationof
theactionunderArticle128.
If at the time of the initiation of the action under Article 128 [b], the employeremployee relationship had
alreadyceasedtoexist,itisnottheDOLERegionalDirectorbuttheLaborArbiterwhohasjurisdictionoverthesame,as
emphasizedinthecaseofBatongBuhayGoldMines,Inc.v.Sec.DelaSerna,[G.R.No.86963,August6,1999,370Phil.
872].

13
FoodTradersHouse, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120677, Dec. 21, 1998, 300SCRA360; SeealsoPondocv. NLRC, G.R. No. 116347, Oct. 3, 1996, 262SCRA632.
14
SanMiguel Corporationv. NLRC, 161SCRA719.
15
Pepsi-ColaBottlingCompanyv. Martinez, 112SCRA578.
16
CagayandeOroColiseum, Inc. v. Ministerof LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 71589, Dec. 17, 1990.
17
GregorioAranetaUniversityFoundationv. Teodoro, G.R. No. 75583, Nov. 8, 1988, 167SCRA79.
18
Sarav. Agarrado, G.R. No. L-73199, Oct. 26, 1988, 166SCRA625.
19
Dacanayv. NLRC, G.R. No. 107277, Aug. 9, 1996, 260SCRA486.
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d.LaborArbitershavenojurisdictioneveniftheamountofthemonetaryclaimexceedsP5,000.00.
AftertheamendmentofArticle128[b]oftheLaborCodebyR.A.No.7730,jurisprudenceaffirmedtherule
that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary under Article 128 are no longer bound by the
restrictiveeffectofArticles129and217insofarastheamountofmonetaryclaimsisconcerned.
Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, [G.R. No. 122006, November 24,
1999,377Phil.80],
ItwasruledherethatwhileitistruethatunderArticles129and217oftheLaborCode,theLaborArbiterhas
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said
provisionsoflawdonotcontemplatenorcoverthevisitorialandenforcementpowersoftheSecretaryofLabororhis
dulyauthorizedrepresentatives.
ExBataanVeteransSecurityAgency,Inc.v.TheSecretaryofLaborLaguesma,[G.R.No.152396,November
20,2007]
ItwasheldinthiscasethattheRegionalDirectorvalidlyassumedjurisdictionoverthemoneyclaimsofprivate
respondentseveniftheclaimsexceededP5,000becausesuchjurisdictionwasexercisedinaccordancewithArticle128
[b]oftheLaborCodeandthecasedoesnotfallundertheexceptionclause.
20
e.LaborArbitersmaystillhavejurisdictionovercontestedcasesundertheexceptionclauseinArticle128
[b].
TheexceptionclauseinArticle128[b],asamendedbyR.A.No.7730,states:
xxx. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings
of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were
not considered in the course of inspection.

3elementstodivestDOLERegionalDirectorofjurisdictionandconferitwithLaborArbiter:
(1) thattheemployerconteststhefindingsofthelaborregulationsofficerandraisesissuesthereon;
(2) thatinordertoresolvesuchissues,thereisaneedtoexamineevidentiarymatters;and
(3) thatsuchmattersarenotverifiableinthenormalcourseofinspection.
21
Resultantly, if the said elements are present and, therefore, the labor standards case is covered by said
exception clause, then the Regional Director will have to endorse the case to the appropriate Labor Arbiters of the
ArbitrationBranchoftheNLRC.
5.2.MONEYCLAIMSCOGNIZABLEBYDOLEREGIONALDIRECTORSUNDERARTICLE129.
Under Article 129 of the Labor Code, DOLE Regional Directors or his duly authorized hearing officers, are
empowered,inasummaryproceeding,tohearanddecideclaimsforrecoveryofwagesandothermonetaryclaimsand
benefits,includinglegalinterest,providedthefollowingrequisitesconcur:
1. Theclaimmustarisefromemployeremployeerelationship;
2. Theclaimantdoesnotseekreinstatement;and
3. TheaggregatemoneyclaimofeachemployeedoesnotexceedP5,000.00.
22
AbsentanyoftherequisitesmentionedabovewilldivesttheRegionalDirectorsoftheirauthoritytohearand
decidesaidmoneyclaims.Consequently,thejurisdictionthereoverisvestedupontheLaborArbiters.
23
6.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSFORDAMAGES.
a.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionoverclaimsfordamages.
Itisnowawellsettledrulethatclaimsfordamagesaswellasattorneysfeesinlaborcasesarecognizableby
the Labor Arbiters, to the exclusion of all other courts. Rulings to the contrary are deemed abandoned or modified
accordingly.
24
No matter how designated, for as long as the action primarily involves an employeremployee
relationship,thelaborcourthasjurisdictionoveranydamageclaims.
b.ClaimsfordamagesofOFWs.
Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages that may be lodged by overseas Filipino
workersarecognizablebytheLaborArbiters.
25
7.JURISDICTIONOVERLEGALITYOFSTRIKESANDLOCKOUTS.
a.Jurisdictionoverstrikesorlockoutsnotaffectingnationalinterest.
Ingeneral,theLaborArbiterhasthepowertodeterminequestionsinvolvingthelegalityorillegalityofastrike
orlockout,uponthefilingofapropercomplaintandafterdueproceedings.
Theemployer,incaseofastrike,ortheunion,incaseofalockout,mayfiletheproperpetitionwiththeLabor
Arbitertoseekadeclarationoftheillegalitythereof.
26

20
SeealsoV.L. Enterprisesv. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 167512, March12, 2007].
21
Ex-BataanVeteransSecurityAgency, Inc. v. TheSecretaryof LaborLaguesma, [G.R. No. 152396, November20, 2007]; SeealsoSeealsoSection1[b], RuleIII of theRulesontheDispositionof LaborStandardsCasesintheRegional Offices[September16, 1987].
22
M. RamirezIndustriesv. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, G.R. No. 89894, Jan. 3, 1997, 266SCRA111, 128; UbayArrastreandStevedoringServices, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 106813, Nov. 25, 1993, 228SCRA189.
23
Paragraph[a] 6, Article217, LaborCode; SouthMotoristsEnterprisesv. Tosoc, G.R. No. 87449, Jan. 23, 1990, 181SCRA386.
24
Primerov. IntermediateAppellateCourt, [G.R. No. L-72644, December14, 1987, 156SCRA435],
25
Section10, RepublicAct No. 8042; Section58, RulesandRegulationsImplementingtheMigrant WorkersandOverseasFilipinosAct of 1995.
26
No. 26, GuidelinesGoverningLaborRelations.
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b.Jurisdictionoverstrikesorlockoutsaffectingnationalinterest.
Jurisdiction over strikes or lockouts in industries affecting the national interest is vested with the DOLE
SecretaryandnotwiththeLaborArbiter,underArticle263[g]oftheLaborCode.Thus,theDOLESecretarymayassume
jurisdictionthereoveranddecideithimselforcertifyittotheNLRCforcompulsoryarbitration.
c.Voluntaryarbitrationofstrikeorlockoutcasesmaybedoneatanystagethereof.
BeforeoratanystageofthecompulsoryarbitrationprocessinastrikeorlockoutcasebeforeaLaborArbiteror
theDOLESecretaryinassumedcasesortheNLRCincertifiedcases,thepartiesmaystillopttosubmittheirdisputeto
voluntaryarbitration.
27
Iftheissueoflegalityorillegalityofastrikeorlockoutissubmittedbythepartiestovoluntary
arbitration, the jurisdiction to resolve said issue belongs exclusively to the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators.
28
d.Jurisdictionoverprohibitedactivitiescommittedduringstrikesorlockouts.
CasesarisingfromanyviolationsofArticle264oftheLaborCoderegardingthecommissionofprohibitedacts
inthecourseofastrikeorlockoutfallwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
29
e.Jurisdictionovercriminalcasesarisingfromstrikesorlockouts.
Jurisdictionovercriminalcaseswhichmayhavearisenasaconsequenceofthestrikeorlockoutfallsunderthe
jurisdictionoftheregularcourts.
8.OTHERISSUESAFFECTINGTHEEXERCISEOFJURISDICTIONBYLABORARBITERS.
Jurisprudence enunciates a number of rulings on issues and controversies not expressly covered by any
provisionsoftheLaborCodebutwhichmayormaynotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.Someofthem
areasfollows:
1.Terminationofcorporateofficersandtheirmonetaryclaims;
2.Issuesinvolvingemployeesingovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporations;
3.Issuesinvolvinganalienparty;
4.Casesinvolvingentitiesimmunefromsuit;
5.Applicationofthedoctrineofforumnonconveniens;
6.Casesinvolvingpriestsandministers;
7.Effectofrehabilitationreceivershiponjurisdictioninlaborcases;
8.CasesinvolvingoverseasFilipinoworkers;
9.Wagedistortioncases;
10.Enforcementoflaborstandardslaws;
11.Claimsofdomesticorhousehelpers;
12.Enforcementofcompromiseagreement;
13.Issuescognizablebygrievancemachineryorvoluntaryarbitration;
14.Issuesinvolvingcooperatives;
15.Issuesinvolvinglocalwaterutilitiesdistricts;
16.Quasidelictortortcases;
17.CriminalandcivilliabilitiesarisingfromviolationsofArticle241;
18.Claimsorcounterclaimsofemployersagainstemployees;
19.ConstitutionalityofCBAprovisions;
20.Taxdeductionsasmoneyclaim;
21.IssuancebyRTCofWritofHabeasDatainrelationtoalaborcase;
8.1.JURISDICTIONOVERTERMINATIONOFCORPORATEOFFICERS(INTRACORPORATEDISPUTES).
a.LaborArbitershavenojurisdictionoverterminationofacorporateofficerwhichisinthenatureofan
intracorporatedispute.
Itisasettledrulethatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbylaw.Thedeterminationoftherights
ofadirectorandcorporateofficerdismissedfromhisemploymentaswellasthecorrespondingliabilityofacorporation,
ifany,isanintracorporatedisputesubjecttothejurisdictionoftheregularcourtsandnotofLaborArbiters.
30
b.NewdoctrineisthatcorporateofficersreferonlytothosementionedintheCorporationCodeandthe
ByLaws;allotherofficersnotsomentionedaredeemedemployees.
MatlingIndustrialandCommercialCorp.v.Coros,[G.R.No.157802,October13,2010].
It is now the prevailing rule, as enunciated in this 2010 case of Matling, that only the following should be
consideredcorporateofficers:
1.ThoseexpresslymentionedinSection25,specificallythethree(3)officerswhichacorporationmusthave,
namely:president,secretary,andtreasurer;and
2.ThoseexpresslymentionedandprovidedforintheByLaws.
Thus, the creation of an office pursuant to or under a ByLaw enabling provision is not enough to make a
positionacorporateoffice.Consequentlytheonlyofficersofacorporationwerethosegiventhatcharactereitherbythe

27
Article263[h], LaborCode.
28
No. 019, PrimeronStrike, PicketingandLockout.
29
Article217[5], LaborCode).
30
Okol v. SlimmersWorldInternational, G.R. No. 160146, Dec. 11, 2009.
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Corporation Code or by the ByLaws; the rest of the corporate officers could be considered only as employees or
subordinateofficials.
31
Locsinv.NissanLeasePhils.,Inc.,[G.R.No.185567,October20,2010]
PetitionerLocsinwasundeniablyChairmanoftheBoardandExecutiveVicePresidentandTreasurer,andwas
elected to these positions by respondent companys Board of Directors pursuant to its Bylaws. As such, he was a
corporate officer, not an employee, based on the submitted facts in this case and on Presidential Decree 902A, and
Section25ofBatasPambansaBlg.69,ortheCorporationCode.EvenasExecutiveVicePresident/Treasurer,petitioner
Locsin already acted as a corporate officer because such position is provided for in respondent companys By
Laws.Consequently,itwasruledinthiscasethattheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdictionoverhisterminationcasesinceitis
inthenatureofanintracorporatedispute,anissuecognizablebytheRegionalTrialCourtunderSection5ofRepublic
ActNo.8799(SecuritiesRegulationCode).
c.RulingsinTabangandNacpil,nolongercontrolling.
ThefollowingrulingshavebeenabandonedperMatling:
1. PurificacionG.Tabangv.NLRC,[G.R.No.121143,January21,1997,266SCRA462,468],whereitwasruled
that(a)corporateofficersdismissalisalwaysacorporateact,oranintracorporatecontroversy,andthe
natureisnotalteredbythereasonorwisdomwithwhichtheBoardofDirectorsmayhaveintakingsuch
action.Also,anintracorporatecontroversyisonewhicharisesbetweenastockholderandthecorporation.
Thereisnodistinction,qualification,noranyexemptionwhatsoever.Theprovisionisbroadandcoversall
kindsofcontroversiesbetweenstockholdersandcorporations.Inthiscase,thepetitionersdualpositions
at the time of her dismissal, that of Medical Director and Hospital Administrator of private respondent
PamanaGoldenCareMedicalCenterinCalamba,Laguna,areexpresslyprovidedundertheByLaws.
2. Nacpilv.IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorporation,[G.R.No.144767,March21,2002],wherepetitioner
arguedthatheisnotacorporateofficerofrespondentIBCbutanemployeethereofsincehehasnotbeen
electednorappointedasComptrollerandAssistantManagerbytheIBCsBoardofDirectors.Hepointed
out that he has actually been appointed as such on January 11, 1995 by the IBCs General Manager. In
support of his argument, petitioner underscored the fact that the IBCs ByLaws does not include the
positionofcomptrollerinitsrosterofcorporateofficers.He,therefore,contendedthathisdismissalwasa
controversyfallingwithinthejurisdictionofthelaborcourts.TheHighCourt,however,foundthisargument
of petitioner untenable. It declared that even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the General
Manager,suchappointmentwassubsequentlyapprovedbytheBoardofDirectorsofrespondentIBC.That
the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of IBC in its ByLaws is of no
momentbecausetheIBCsBoardofDirectorsisempoweredunderSection25oftheCorporationCodeand
under the corporations bylaws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary. Consequently,
sincepetitionersappointmentascomptrollerrequiredtheapprovalandformalactionofrespondentIBCs
Board of Directors to become valid, it is clear, therefore, that petitioner is a corporate officer whose
dismissalmaybethesubjectofacontroversycognizablebytheSECunderSection5[c]ofP.D.902A(now
bytheRegionalTrialCourtunderR.A.No.8799)whichincludesandcoverscontroversiesinvolvingboththe
electionandappointmentofcorporatedirectors,trustees,officers,andmanagers.Hadpetitionerbeenan
ordinaryemployee,suchboardactionwouldnothavebeenrequired.
BecausethesoundnessofthedictaenunciatedinNacpilandTabangthereinisnotunassailable,asitistoo
sweepinganddoesnotaccordwithreason,justice,andfairplay,theSupremeCourtmadeadefinitiveholdinginthe
2010 case of Matling Industrial and Commercial Corp. v. Coros, [supra] that Nacpil and Tabang should no longer be
controlling.Thus,itruled:
ThepetitionersrelianceonTabang,supra,ismisplaced.ThestatementinTabang,tothe
effect that offices not expressly mentioned in the ByLaws but were created pursuant to a ByLaw
enabling provision were also considered corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum due to the
positionsubjectofthecontroversybeingmentionedintheByLaws.Thus,theCourtheldthereinthat
the position was a corporate office, and that the determination of the rights and liabilities arising
fromtheousterfromthepositionwasanintracorporatecontroversywithintheSECsjurisdiction.
InNacpilv.IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorporation,whichmaybethemoreappropriate
ruling,thepositionsubjectofthecontroversywasnotexpresslymentionedintheByLaws,butwas
created pursuant to a ByLaw enabling provision authorizing the Board of Directors to create other
officesthattheBoardofDirectorsmightseefittocreate.TheCourtheldtherethatthepositionwasa
corporateoffice,relyingontheobiterdictuminTabang.
Consideringthattheobservationsearliermadehereinshowthatthesoundnessoftheir
dicta is not unassailable, Tabang and Nacpil should no longer be controlling. [Underscoring
supplied].
d.Elementstodeterminewhetheradisputeisintracorporateornot.
In view of the declaration in Matling that the Tabang pronouncement is not controlling because it is too
sweeping and does not accord with reason, justice, and fair play, two (2) elements should be considered in order to
determinewhetheradisputeconstitutesanintracorporatecontroversyornot,namely:

31
Gurreav. Lezama, [G.R. No. L-10556, April 30, 1958, 103Phil. 553].
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(a)Thestatusorrelationshipoftheparties;and
(b)Thenatureofthequestionthatisthesubjectoftheircontroversy.
e.Thestatusofanemployee(whorosefromtheranks)asdirectorandstockholderdoesnot
automaticallyconverthisdismissalintoanintracorporatedispute.
AccordingtoMatling,thecriteriafordistinguishingbetweencorporateofficerswhomaybeoustedfromoffice
atwill,ononehand,andordinarycorporateemployeeswhomayonlybeterminatedforjustcause,ontheotherhand,
do not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of creation of the office. In the case of
respondent in Matling, he was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling.The
circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal
constitutedanintracorporatecontroversyoralaborterminationdispute.Anotherconsiderationiswhetherhisstatusas
Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent dismissal as Vice President for
FinanceandAdministration.
Obviously enough, the respondent in Matling was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and
Administration because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started working for Matling on
September8,1966,andhadbeenemployedcontinuouslyfor33yearsuntilhisterminationonApril17,2000,firstasa
bookkeeper,andhisclimbin1987tohislastpositionasVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationhadbeengradual
but steady, as the following sequence indicates: 1966Bookkeeper; 1968Senior Accountant; 1969Chief Accountant;
1972OfficeSupervisor;1973AssistantTreasurer;1978SpecialAssistantforFinance;1980AssistantComptroller;1983
Finance and Administrative Manager; 1985sst. Vice President for Finance and Administration; and 1987 to April 17,
2000Vice President for Finance and Administration. Even though he might have become a stockholder of Matling in
1992,hispromotiontothepositionofVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationin1987wasbyvirtueofthelength
of quality service he had rendered as an employee of Matling. His subsequent acquisition of the status of
Director/stockholderhadnorelationtohispromotion.Besides,hisstatusofDirector/stockholderwasunaffectedbyhis
dismissalfromemploymentasVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministration.
f. Acaseofanemployeewhorosefromtherankstobecomeacorporateofficeratthetimeofhisdismissal
stilltreatedasaregularemployee.
In Prudential Bank and Trust Company v. Reyes, [G.R. No. 141093, February 20, 2001], it was held that
respondentAssistantVicePresidentwhorosefromtherankswasaregularemployeeandisthusentitledtosecurityof
tenure;thatis,herservicesmaybeterminatedonlyforajustorauthorizedcause.Itwasestablishedbyevidencethat
she started her employment with the bank when she was appointed Accounting Clerk on July 14, 1963. From that
position,sherosetobecomesupervisor.Thenin1982,shewasappointedAssistantVicePresidentwhichsheoccupied
untilherillegaldismissalonJuly19,1991.Petitionerbankscontentionthatshemerelyholdsanelectivepositionand
that,ineffect,sheisnotaregularemployeeisbeliedbythenatureofherworkandherlengthofservicetherewith.
g.AcorporateofficermayalsobeanemployeewhosedismissalmayvestjurisdictionontheLaborArbiter.
Acorporateofficermayalsobe,atthesametime,anemployee,asheldinRuralBankofCoron[Palawan],Inc.
v.Cortes,[G.R.No.164888,December6,2006].While,indeed,respondentwastheCorporateSecretaryoftheRural
BankofCoron,shewasalsoitsFinancialAssistantandthePersonnelOfficerofthetwootherpetitionercorporations.
ThecaseofMainlandConstructionCo.,Inc.v.Movilla,[320Phil,353(1995)],instructsthatacorporationcanengageits
corporateofficerstoperformservicesunderacircumstancewhichwouldmakethememployees.TheLaborArbiterhas
thusjurisdictionoverrespondentscomplaint.
h.TransferofjurisdictionfromSECtoregularcourtsunderR.A.No.8799.
UnderSection5[5.2.]ofRepublicActNo.8799[SecuritiesRegulationCode],thejurisdictionoftheSecurities
andExchangeCommission(SEC)overallcasesenumeratedunderSection5ofPresidentialDecreeNo.902Ahasbeen
transferredtothecourtsofgeneraljurisdictionortheappropriateRegionalTrialCourt(RTC).TheSupremeCourt,inthe
exerciseofitsauthority,maydesignatetheRTCbranchesthatshallexercisejurisdictionoverthesecases.
i.Claimsforbenefitsanddamagesinintracorporatecasesarecognizablebytheregularcourts.
Anymonetaryclaimsbeingassertedbyacorporateofficerwhoisnotamereemployeesuchasunpaidsalaries,
commissions, separation pay and backwages, including claims for vacation and sick leaves, 13
th
month pay, Christmas
bonus,medicalexpenses,carexpenses,andotherbenefits,arenotsimplelaborproblemsbutmattersthatcomewithin
the area of corporate affairs and management, and are, in fact, corporate controversies in contemplation of the
Corporation Code and, therefore, the jurisdiction thereover is lodged with the regular courts and not with the Labor
Arbiter.
32
8.2.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGEMPLOYEESOFGOVERNMENTOWNEDAND/ORCONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS.
a.Generalprinciples.
AccordingtoFelicianov.CommissiononAudit,[G.R.No.147402,January14,2004,419SCRA363],thereare
two(2)classesofcorporationsrecognizedunderthe1987Constitution.Thefirstreferstoprivatecorporationscreated
underagenerallaw;thesecondreferstogovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationscreatedbyspecialcharters.

32
Okol v. SlimmersWorldInternational, G.R. No. 160146, Dec. 11, 2009; Lozonv. NLRC, G.R. No. 107660, Jan. 02, 1995, 240SCRA1; Espinov. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 109642-43, Jan. 5, 1995.
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It is now wellentrenched that the hiring and firing of employees of government owned and/or controlled
corporations without original charters are covered by the Labor Code while those with original charters are basically
governedbytheCivilServiceLaw,rulesandregulations.
33
b.Jurisdictionoverdismissalofemployeeforoffensescommittedwhileemployedbyagovernmentowned
corporationbutdiscoveredafteritwasprivatized.
The2010caseofLuzvimindaAngv.PhilippineNationalBank,[G.R.No.178762,June16,2010],presentsthe
uniqueissueofwhichagencyhasjurisdictionoverpetitioneremployeesillegaldismissalcasesinceshewasdismissed
based on offenses which she committed during her employment in respondent PNB while it was still a government
ownedcorporationbutwhichwerediscoveredwhenshewasrehiredafterrespondentPNBwasprivatized.Atthetime
she committed the offenses, the jurisdiction thereover was with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) since respondent
bankwasagovernmentownedcorporation,butatthetimetheoffenseswerediscovered,respondentbankhasalready
beenprivatizedand,therefore,thejurisdictionovertheissueoflegalityorillegalityofherdismissalbelongstotheLabor
ArbiterundertheLaborCode.
c.Specificcases.
CasinoLaborAssociationv.CA.[G.R.No.141020,June12,2008].Inresolvingtheissueofwhetherornotthe
NLRC has jurisdiction over the employeremployee relationship in Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR), Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) and Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC), the
Supreme Court made the definitive ruling that the respondent corporations were created by an original charter.
Consequently, they fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and not the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Postigo v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc.,[G.R. No. 155146, January 24, 2006]. The respondent was
incorporated on March 11, 1960 as a nonprofit, benevolent and nonstock corporation under the Corporation Code.
Having been created under the general corporation law instead of a special charter, it was held that respondent is a
private and not a government corporation. This notwithstanding the fact that its employees are covered by the GSIS.
ExtantontherecordsistherespondentsadmissionthatalthoughitsemployeesarecompulsorymembersoftheGSIS,
saidemployeesarenotgovernedbytheCivilServiceLawbutbytheLaborCode.
DutyFreePhilippinesv.Mojica,[G.R.No.166365,September30,2005]PetitionerDFPwascreatedunder
Executive Order No. 46 on September 4, 1986 primarily to augment the service facilities for tourists and to generate
foreignexchangeandrevenueforthegovernment.Inorderforthegovernmenttoexercisedirectandeffectivecontrol
and regulation over the tax and duty free shops, their establishment and operation were vested in the Ministry (now
Department)ofTourism(DOT),throughitsimplementingarm,thePhilippineTourismAuthority(PTA).Allthenetprofits
from the merchandising operations of the shops accrued to the DOT. Accordingly, since DFP is under the exclusive
authority of the PTA, it follows that its officials and employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.
Camporedondo v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 129049, August 6, 1999]. The Supreme Court ruled that the Philippine
NationalRedCross(PNRC)isagovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwithitsowncharter.
BLISSDevelopmentCorporationEmployeesUnion(BDCEU)FDTUSentrongDemokratikongManggagawa
(SDM)v.Hon.PuraFerrerCalleja,[G.R.No.80887,September30,1994].TheBlissDevelopmentCorporation(BDC)is
a governmentowned or controlled corporation without an original charter. Hence, the unions or labor organizations
therein existing are not covered by Executive Order No. 180 (Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to
Organize of Government Employees, Creating a Public Sector LaborManagement Council, and for Other Purposes)
which became effective on June 01, 2007. They are not required to register under Section 7 of said law as a pre
conditionforfilingapetitionforcertificationelection.
BoyScoutsofthePhilippinesv.NLRC,[G.R.No.80767,April22,1991].Complaintsforillegaldismissaland
unfairlaborpracticelodgedbyemployeesagainsttheiremployer,BoyScoutsofthePhilippines(BSP)whichwascreated
under Commonwealth Act No. 111 for the educational, civic and social development of the youth, fall outside of the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. BSP is both a governmentcontrolled corporation with an original charter and an
instrumentality of the government, despite the fact that its funds are derived principally from membership dues and
propertyrentals.
TradeUnionsofthePhilippinesandAlliedServicesv.NationalHousingCorporation,[G.R.No.49677,May4,
1989, 173 SCRA 33]. Employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) which was organized in 1959 under
ExecutiveOrderNo.399,otherwiseknownastheUniformCharterofGovernmentCorporations(January1,1951),are
coveredbytheLaborCode,NHCbeingagovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter.
Thereis,therefore,noimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificationelectionamongtheworkersofNHC.(SeealsoJucov.
NLRC,G.R.No.98107,Aug.18,1997,277SCRA528).
UniversityofLifeFoundationv.BureauofLaborRelations,[G.R.No.85050,April12,1989].TheUniversityof
LifeFoundationisagovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter,ithavingbeenorganized

33
ZamboangaCityWaterDistrict v. Buat, G.R. No. 104389, May27, 1994.
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under the Corporation Code. Thus, when the Bureau of Labor Relations assumed jurisdiction over the petition for
certification election filed by the union, it acted in accordance with applicable law and latest jurisprudence on the
matter.
Lumantav.NLRC,[G.R.No.82819,February8,1989].FoodTerminal,Inc.(FTI)isagovernmentownedand
controlledcorporationwithoutoriginalcharter,hence,itistheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment,andnottheCivil
Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from the employment of the petitioners and that,
consequently,thetermsandconditionsofsuchemploymentaregovernedbytheLaborCodeandnotbytheCivilService
Law,rulesandregulations.
8.3.JURISDICTIONOVERDISPUTESINVOLVINGANALIENPARTY.
To illustrate ruling case law on this subject, the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Ople,
[G.R.No.61594,September28,1990],isinpoint.Inthiscase,twocontractsofemploymentwereexecutedinManila
between Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and two Filipino flight attendants. Paragraph 10 of the contracts
embodiesthestipulation,amongothers,thatthetermsthereofshallbeconstruedandgovernedbythelawsofPakistan
and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the
agreement.Priortotheexpirationofthecontracts,theservicesofthetwoFilipinoflightattendantswereterminated.
Theyjointlyfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissal.Oneoftheissuesraisediswhichlawshouldapplyandwhichcourthas
jurisdictionoverthedispute.
The Supreme Court, in holding that the Philippine law should apply and that the Philippine court has
jurisdiction,declaredthatpetitionerPIAcannottakerefugeinparagraph10ofitsemploymentagreementwhich,firstly,
specifiesthelawofPakistanastheapplicablelawoftheagreementand,secondly,laysthevenueforsettlementofany
dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement only [in] courts of Karachi, Pakistan. The first clause of
paragraph10cannotbeinvokedtopreventtheapplicationofPhilippinelaborlawsandregulationstothesubjectmatter
ofthiscase,i.e.,theemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenpetitionerPIAandprivaterespondents.Therelationship
is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be
rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship. Neither may petitioner
invokethesecondclauseofparagraph10,specifyingtheKarachicourtsasthesolevenueforthesettlementofdisputes
betweenthecontractingparties.Evenacursoryscrutinyoftherelevantcircumstancesofthiscasewillshowthemultiple
andsubstantivecontactsbetweenlawandPhilippinecourts,ontheonehand,andtherelationshipbetweentheparties,
upon the other. The contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially.
PrivaterespondentsarePhilippinecitizensandresidents,whilepetitioner,althoughaforeigncorporation,islicensedto
dobusiness(andisactuallydoingbusinessinthePhilippines)andhence,isaresidentinthePhilippines.Lastly,private
respondentswerebasedinthePhilippinesinbetweentheirassignedflightstotheMiddleEastandEurope.Alltheabove
contracts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as the proper forum for the resolution of the
contractual disputes between the parties. Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
cannotbegiveneffect so as to oust Philippine agenciesandcourtsof the jurisdiction vesteduponthem by Philippine
law.Finally,andinanyevent,thepetitionerPIAdidnotundertaketopleadandprovethecontentsofPakistanlawon
thematter. Itmust,therefore,bepresumedthattheapplicableprovisionsofthelawofPakistan arethesameasthe
applicableprovisionsofPhilippinelaw.
8.4. JURISDICTIONOVERLABORCASESINVOLVINGENTITIESIMMUNEFROMSUIT.
a.Principleofimmunityfromsuitasappliedtolaborcases.
Immunityisnecessarytoassureunimpededperformanceofthefunctionsofinternational organizations.The
purposeistoshieldtheaffairsofinternationalorganizations,inaccordancewithinternationalpractice,frompolitical
pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the
unhamperedperformanceoftheirfunctions.
34
SoutheastAsianFisheriesDevelopmentCenterv.Acosta,[G.R.Nos.9746870,Sept.2,1993,226SCRA49].
Inthiscase,theSupremeCourt,inupholdingtheprincipleofimmunity,citedwithapprovaltheopinionofthe
then Minister of Justice, thus: One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local
jurisdiction,i.e.,thatitisimmunefromthelegalwritsandprocessesissuedbythetribunalsofthecountrywhereitis
found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
wouldaffordaconvenientmediumthruwhichthehostgovernmentmayinterfereinitsoperationsoreveninfluenceor
control the policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacityofsuchbodytodischargeitsresponsibilitiesimpartiallyonbehalfofitsmemberstates.
DepartmentofForeignAffairsv.NLRC,[G.R.No.113191,September18,1996,262SCRA39,4344].
This case involves an illegal dismissal case filed against the Asian Development Bank (ADB), it was ruled that
saidentityenjoysimmunityfromlegalprocessofeveryformand,therefore,thesuitagainstitcannotprosper.Andthis
immunity extends to its officers who also enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official
capacity.TheCharterandtheHeadquartersAgreementgrantingtheseimmunitiesandprivilegestotheADBaretreaty
covenantsandcommitmentsvoluntarilyassumedbythePhilippinegovernmentwhichmustberespected.

34
SeeLasco, infra; International CatholicMigrationCommissionv. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, Sept. 28, 1990, 190SCRA130.
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Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration [UNRFNRE], [G.R. Nos. 109095
109107,February23,1995].
ThisinvolvesanillegaldismissalcasefiledagainsttherespondentwhichisaspecializedagencyoftheUnited
Nations, the said immunity rule was asserted and reiterated by the Supreme Court. In dismissing the case, the High
CourtsaidthatbeingamemberoftheUnitedNationsandapartytotheConventiononthePrivilegesandImmunitiesof
theSpecializedAgenciesoftheUnitedNations,thePhilippinegovernmentadherestothedoctrineofimmunitygranted
totheUnitedNationsanditsspecializedagencies.Bothtreatieshavetheforceandeffectoflaw.
b.Exceptiontotherule.
InUnitedStatesv.Hon.Rodrigo,[G.R.No.79470,February26,1990,182SCRA644,660],whereitwasheld
thatwhenthefunctionoftheforeignentityotherwiseimmunefromsuitpartakesofthenatureofaproprietaryactivity,
such as the restaurant services offered at John Hay Air Station undertaken by the United States Government as a
commercialactivityforprofitandnotinitsgovernmentalcapacity,thecaseforillegaldismissalfiledbyaFilipinocook
workingthereiniswellwithinthejurisdictionofPhilippinecourts.Thereasonisthatbyenteringintotheemployment
contractwiththecookinthedischargeofitsproprietaryfunctions,itimpliedlydivesteditselfofitssovereignimmunity
fromsuit.
c.Estoppeldoesnotconferjurisdictionoveranimmuneentity.
Anentityimmunefromsuitcannotbeestoppedfromclaimingsuchdiplomaticimmunitysinceestoppeldoes
notoperatetoconferjurisdictiontoatribunalthathasnoneoveracauseofaction.
35
8.5. DOCTRINEOFFORUMNONCONVENIENS.
a.Rationalebehindthedoctrine.
Under the international law principle of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdictionoverthecaseifitchoosestodosoprovidedthefollowingrequisitesconcur:
(1) ThatthePhilippinecourtisonetowhichthepartiesmayconvenientlyresort;
(2) ThatthePhilippinecourtisinapositiontomakeanintelligentdecisionastothelawandthefacts;and
(3) ThatthePhilippinecourthasorislikelytohavepowertoenforceitsdecision.
36
PacificConsultantsInternationalAsia,Inc.v.Schonfeld,[G.R.No.166920,February19,2007].
Petitioners insisted on the application of this principle since the respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a
repatriate.Inrejectingpetitionerscontention,theSupremeCourtcitedthefollowingreasonsthatdonotwarrantthe
applicationofthesaidprinciple:
1. TheLaborCodedoesnotincludeforumnonconveniensasagroundforthedismissalofthecomplaint.
2. Theproprietyofdismissingacasebasedonthisprinciplerequiresafactualdetermination;hence,itisproperly
consideredasadefense.
TheManilaHotelCorp.andManilaHotelInternationalLimitedv.NLRC,[G.R.No.120077,October13,2000].
Thisprinciplewasappliedinthiscase.PrivaterespondentMarceloSantoswasanoverseasworkeremployedas
aprinterinaprintingpressintheSultanateofOmanwhenhewasdirectlyhiredbythePalaceHotel,Beijing,Peoples
Republic of China to work in its print shop. Later, he was terminated due to retrenchment occasioned by business
reversesbroughtaboutbythepoliticalupheavalinChina(referringtotheTiananmenSquareincident)whichseverely
affectedthehotelsoperations.Whenthecasewasfiledin1990,petitionerManilaHotelCorporation(MHC)wasstilla
governmentowned and controlled corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; while
petitionerManilaHotelInternationalCompany,Limited(MHICL)wasacorporationdulyorganizedandexistingunder
thelawsofHongKong.MHCisanincorporatorofMHICL,owning50%ofitscapitalstock.Byvirtueofamanagement
agreementwiththePalaceHotel(WangFuCompanyLimited),MHICLtrainedthepersonnelandstaffofthesaidhotel
inBeijing,China.
InholdingthattheNLRCwasaseriouslyinconvenientforum,theSupremeCourtnotedthatthemainaspects
ofthecasetranspiredintwoforeignjurisdictionsandthecaseinvolvespurelyforeignelements.Theonlylinkthatthe
Philippineshaswiththecaseisthattheprivaterespondentemployee(MarceloSantos)isaFilipinocitizen.ThePalace
Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Consequently, not all cases involving Filipino citizens can be tried here.
RespondentemployeewashireddirectlybytheBeijingPalaceHotel,aforeignemployer,throughcorrespondencesent
to him while he was working at the Sultanate of Oman. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any
authorizedrecruitmentagencyofthegovernment.Hence,theNLRCisaninconvenientforumgiventhatalltheincidents
of the case from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The
inconvenienceiscompoundedbythefactthattheproperdefendants,thePalaceHotelandMHICLarenotnationalsof
thePhilippines.NeitheraretheydoingbusinessinthePhilippines.Likewise,themainwitnesses,Mr.Shmidt(General
ManagerofthePalaceHotel)andMr.Henk(PalaceHotelsManager)arenonresidentsofthePhilippines.
Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the employment contract as such was
perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
wherethecontractwasmade).
ItmustbenotedthattheemploymentcontractwasnotperfectedinthePhilippines.
PrivaterespondentemployeesignifiedhisacceptancethereofbywritingaletterwhilehewasintheSultanateofOman.
This letter was sent to the Palace Hotel in the Peoples Republic of China. Neither can the NLRC determine the facts

35
EbroIII v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110187, Sept. 4, 1996, 261SCRA399.
36
Bankof America, NT&SA, Bankof AmericaInternational, Ltd. v. CA, [448Phil. 181, 196(2003)] andCommunicationMaterialsandDesign, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 102223, Aug. 22, 1996, 260SCRA673, 695],
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surroundingtheallegedillegaldismissalasallactscomplainedoftookplaceinBeijing,PeoplesRepublicofChina.The
NLRCwasnotinapositiontodeterminewhethertheTiananmenSquareincidenttrulyadverselyaffectedoperationsof
thePalaceHotelastojustifyrespondentemployeesretrenchment.
EvenassumingthataproperdecisioncouldbereachedbytheNLRC,suchwouldnothaveanybindingeffect
againsttheemployer,thePalaceHotel,whichisacorporationincorporatedunderthelawsofChinaandwasnoteven
served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine courts and
agencieshavenopowertosolvecontroversiesinvolvingforeignemployers.NeithercoulditbesaidthattheSupreme
Court does not have power over an employment contract executed in a foreign country. If the respondent employee
wereanoverseascontractworker,aPhilippineforum,specificallythePOEA,nottheNLRC,wouldprotecthim.Heis
notanoverseascontractworkerafactwhichheadmitswithconviction.
PhilippineNationalBankv.Cabansag,[G.R.No.157010,June21,2005]
RespondentwashiredbytheSingaporebranchofpetitionerbankwhileshewasatouristinSingaporein1998.
PetitionerisaprivatebankingcorporationorganizedandexistingunderthelawsofthePhilippines,withprincipaloffices
atthePNBFinancialCenter,RoxasBoulevard,Manila.Atthattime,theBranchOfficehastwo(2)typesofemployees:(a)
expatriatesortheregularemployeeshiredinManilaandassignedabroadincludingSingapore;and(b)locally(directly)
hired. She applied for and was hired as Branch Credit Officer. After her 3month probationary period, she was
terminated.Subsequently,shefiledacomplaintbeforetheLaborArbiter.OnappealtotheSupremeCourt,oneofthe
issuespresentedwaswhetherornottheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionovertheinstantcontroversy.TheSupremeCourt,
inansweringthisissueintheaffirmative,ruledthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionbecausetheissuehereinvolvesthe
terminationofanoverseasFilipinoworker(OFW).WhileshemayhavebeendirectlyhiredinSingaporebypetitioner,
however,respondentlikewiseappliedforandsecuredanOverseasEmploymentCertificatefromthePOEAthroughthe
Philippine Embassy in Singapore. The Certificate declared her a bonafide contract worker in Singapore. Thus, even
assumingarguendothatshewasconsideredatthestartofheremploymentasadirecthiregovernedbyandsubjectto
the laws, common practices and customs prevailing in Singapore, she subsequently became a contract worker or an
OFWwhowascoveredbyPhilippinelaborlawsandpoliciesuponcertificationbythePOEA.Atthetimeheremployment
wasillegallyterminated,shealreadypossessedthePOEAEmploymentCertificate.Moreover,petitioneradmitsthatitis
aPhilippinecorporationdoingbusinessthroughabranchofficeinSingapore.Significantly,respondentsemploymentby
itsSingaporebranchofficehadtobeapprovedbythepresidentofthebankwhoseprincipalofficeswereinManila.This
circumstancemilitatesagainstpetitionerscontentionthatrespondentwaslocallyhired;andtotallygovernedbyand
subject to the laws, common practices and customs of Singapore, not of the Philippines. Instead, with more reason
doesthisfactreinforcethepresumptionthatrespondentfallsunderthelegaldefinitionofmigrantworker,inthiscase,
onedeployedinSingapore.Hence,petitionercannotescapetheapplicationofPhilippinelawsorthejurisdictionofthe
NLRCandtheLaborArbiter.
Simv.NLRC,[G.R.No.157376,October2,2007]
Citing the said ruling in PNB v. Cabansag, the High Court noted a palpable error in the Labor Arbiters
disposition of the case, which was affirmed by the NLRC, with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It held that it was
wrongfortheLaborArbitertodismissthecaseforlackofjurisdictionunderitsholdingthatlaborrelationssysteminthe
Philippineshasnoextraterritorialjurisdiction;thatitislimitedtotherelationshipbetweenlaborandcapitalwithinthe
Philippines;andthatsincecomplainantwashiredandassignedinaforeignland,althoughbyaPhilippinecorporation,
itfollowsthatthelawthatgovernstheirrelationshipisthelawoftheplacewheretheemploymentwasexecutedand
herplaceofworkorassignment.
ThepetitionerhereisCorazonSimwhowasinitiallyemployedbyEquitablePCIBank(respondent)in1990as
Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to its Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to the
position of Manager until September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David the Senior Officer,
EuropeanHeadofPCIBank,andManagingDirectorofPCIBEuropeinformingherthatshewasbeingdismisseddueto
lossoftrustandconfidencebasedonallegedmismanagementandmisappropriationoffunds.AccordingtotheSupreme
Court,theLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionnotonlyonthebasisofArticle217oftheLaborCodebutunderSection10of
Republic Act No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as well as Section 62 of the
OmnibusRulesandRegulationsImplementingR.A.No.8042.Undertheseprovisions,itisclearthatLaborArbitershave
originalandexclusivejurisdictionoverclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelations,includingterminationdisputes
involvingallworkers,amongwhomareoverseasFilipinoworkers.(Id.).
8.6. JURISDICTIONOVERLABORCASESINVOLVINGPRIESTSANDMINISTERS.
a.CasesoverwhichLaborArbitersandNLRChavejurisdiction.
Thefactthatacaseinvolvesaspartiestheretothechurchanditsreligiousministerdoesnotipsofactogivethe
caseareligioussignificance.Simplystated,whatisinvolvedinalaborcase,sayforillegaldismissal,istherelationshipof
thechurch,asanemployer, and the minister, as anemployee apurelysecular matternot related tothepractice of
faith,worshipordoctrinesofthechurch.Hence,LaborArbitersmayvalidlyexercisejurisdictionoversaidlaborcase.
Austria v. Hon. NLRC and Cebu City Central Philippines Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventist,[G.R.No.124382,August16,1999]
the minister was not excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the church but was terminated
fromemploymentbasedonthegroundscitedinArticle282oftheLaborCode.Indeed,thematterofterminatingan
employee which is purely secular in nature is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the
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religiouscongregation.Assuch,theState,throughtheLaborArbiterandtheNLRC,hastherighttotakecognizanceof
thecasetodeterminewhetherthechurch,asemployer,rightfullyexerciseditsmanagementprerogativetodismissthe
religiousministerasitsemployee.
b.Ecclesiasticalaffair,meaning.
Anecclesiasticalaffairinvolvestherelationshipbetweenthechurchanditsmembersandrelatestomattersof
faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of these socalled
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle, are proceedings for excommunication, ordination of religious
ministers,administrationofsacramentsandotheractivitieswithattachedreligioussignificance.
8.7.EFFECTOFSUSPENSIONOFPAYMENTOFDEBTS(REHABILITATIONRECEIVERSHIP)ONJURISDICTIONINLABOR
PROCEEDINGS.
a.JurisdictionislodgedwithRTC.
ThejurisdictionoverpetitionforsuspensionofpaymentislodgedwiththeRegionalTrialCourt.
37
AlthoughthejurisdictionoftheSECoverrehabilitationandsuspensionofpaymentscaseswastransferredto
theRegionalTrialCourtspursuantto
b.Receivershiporliquidationofbusiness,effectonjurisdiction.
Astayorderissuedconsequenttotheapprovalofarehabilitationreceivershipsimplysuspendsallactionsfor
claims against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation; it does not work to oust a court of its jurisdiction over a case
properlyfiledbeforeit.ThependencyoftherehabilitationproceedingsdoesnotaffecttheCourtsjurisdictiontoresolve
thecase,butmerelysuspendstheexecutionofitsdecision.
38
c. Thesuspensionembracesallclaimsandallphasesofthesuit,includingexecution.
Thesuspensionofallactionscovers:
1. all claims against the corporation which is undergoing rehabilitation receivership, whether for damages
foundedonabreachofcontractofcarriage,laborcases,collectionsuitsoranyotherclaimsofapecuniary
nature.Noexceptioninfavoroflaborclaimsismentionedinthelaw.
39
2. allphasesofthesuit,beitbeforethetrialcourtoranytribunalorbeforetheSupremeCourt.Noother
action may be taken, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension. It must be
stressedthatwhatareautomaticallystayedorsuspendedaretheproceedings ofasuitandnotjustthe
payment of claims during the execution stage after the case has become final and executory. Once the
processofrehabilitation,however,iscompleted,theCourtshouldproceedtocompletetheproceedings
onthesuspendedactions.
40
3. execution of decisions that are already final and executory may be stayed if the corporation has been
placedunderrehabilitationreceivership.
41
d.Executionoffinaldecisionsduringtheperiodofrehabilitationandsuspension,nullandvoid.
TheproceedingsbeforetheLaborArbiterandtheorderandwritsubsequentlyissuedbytheNLRCduringthe
periodofrehabilitationreceivershipareallnullandvoid.
42
e.Durationofautomaticstayhasnolimit.
Thesuspensionshalllastuptotheterminationoftherehabilitationproceedings.
43
Rubberworld(Phils.)Inc.v.NLRC,[G.R.No.126773,April14,1999,365Phil.273]
Thesuspensionofallactionsforclaimsagainstpetitionerdoesnotexpireafterthree(3)months.Thelawdoes
notprovideforthedurationoftheautomaticstay.Hence,thesuspensiveeffectthereofhasnotimelimitandremainsin
forceaslongasreasonablynecessarytoaccomplishthepurposeoftheorder.
44
f.RemedyistolodgethelaborclaimswiththeRehabilitationReceiver;exception.
Becauseofthesuspensionofproceedings,theremedyshouldbefortheemployeewhoclaimedtohavebeen
illegallydismissed,tolodgeherclaimbeforethedulyappointedreceiver.
45
8.8.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESOFOVERSEASFILIPINOWORKERS(OFWs).
a.ConfermentofjurisdictionovermoneyclaimsofmigrantworkersunderR.A.No.8042,asamendedby
R.A.No.10022.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
FilipinosActof1995(approvedonJune7,1995),conferredoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionuponLaborArbiters,to
hear and decide all claims arising from employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment,includingclaimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.
b. LaborArbitersmayexercisejurisdictionevenabsenttheemploymentrelationshipaswhentheOFWwas
notdeployedabroad.

37
Section5.2, R.A. No. 8799, [August 8, 2000]; PhilippineAirlines, Inc. v. PhilippineAirlinesEmployeesAssociation[PALEA], G.R. No. 142399, June19, 2007, Footnote23.
38
DeCastrov. LibertyBroadcastingNetwork, Inc., G.R. No. 165153, Aug25, 2010; NegrosNavigationCo., Inc.v. CA, G.R. No. 163156, Dec. 10, 2008, 573SCRA434, 455.
39
PhilippineAirlines, Inc. v. Heirsof Zamora, G.R. No. 164267, Nov. 23, 2007.
40
PhilippineAirlines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 123238, July11, 2005[Resolution].
41
AlemarsSibal &Sons, Inc. v. NLRC, [G. R. No. 114761, January19, 2000].
42
LingkodManggagawasaRubberworld, Adidas-Anglov. Rubberworld[Phils.], Inc., [G.R. No. 153882, January29, 2007] .
43
Section11, inrelationtoSection27, Rule4of theInterimRulesof ProcedureonCorporateRehabilitation.
44
SeealsoBFHomes, Inc. v. CA, 190SCRA262, 269, Oct. 3, 1990; Tiangcov. UniwideSalesWarehouseClub, Inc. [G.R. No. 168697, December14, 2009].
45
ClarionPrintingHouse, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 148372, June27, 2005].
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ThecaseofSantiagov.CFSharpCrewManagement,Inc.,[G.R.No.162419,July10,2007],enunciatedthat
despite the absence of an employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the NLRC has
jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The petitioner here was not deployed overseas after signing the contract for
overseas employment. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employeremployee
relationships.BasedonSection10ofR.A.No.8042,LaborArbitershavejurisdictionnotonlyovermoneyclaimsarising
out of an employeremployee relationship but also by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseasdeploymentincludingclaimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamagexxx.
Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the
employmentcontractdidnotcommencetobeeffectiveandnoemployeremployeerelationshipwascreatedbetween
the parties. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employeremployee relationship.The perfectionofthe contract, which in this case coincided
withthedateofexecutionthereof,occurred whenpetitionerand respondentagreed ontheobjectandthecause,as
well as the rest of the terms and conditions set forth therein.The commencement of the employeremployee
relationshipwouldhavetakenplacehadpetitionerbeenactuallydeployedfromthepointofhire.Thus,evenbeforethe
start of any employeremployee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract was
thebirthofcertainrightsandobligations,thebreachofwhichmaygiverisetoacauseofactionagainsttheerringparty.
Thus,ifthereversehadhappened,thatis,theseafarerfailedorrefusedtobedeployedasagreedupon,hewouldhave
beenheldliablefordamages.
c.Monetaryornonmonetaryclaims;jurisdiction.
AllmonetaryclaimscasesthatmaybefiledbyanOFWfallsundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofthe
Labor Arbiter. This includes claims for disability or death benefits. However, causes of action which do not refer to
monetaryclaimsunderSection10ofR.A.No.8042arerequiredtobedismissedorreferredbytheLaborArbiterstothe
appropriateagency.
46
For example, violations of recruitment regulations certainly do not fall under the concept of monetary
claims.ThejurisdictionthereoverbelongstothePOEA.
47
8.9.JURISDICTIONOVERWAGEDISTORTIONCASES.
a.Inorganizedestablishments.
In establishments where there are existing CBAs or recognized collective bargaining unions, jurisdiction is
lodgedwiththeVoluntaryArbitrator.
48
b.Inunorganizedestablishments.
InestablishmentswheretherearenocertifiedcollectivebargainingunionsorexistingCBAs,theLaborArbiters
havejurisdictionisvestedwithLaborArbiters.
49
c.Wagedistortiondisputesmadesubjectofnoticeofstrikeorlockout.
Since wage distortion is not a proper ground to stage a strike or lockout, it should be referred to the Labor
Arbiterforadjudication.
50
8.10.JURISDICTIONOVERENFORCEMENTOFLABORSTANDARDSLAWS.
a.JurisdictionincasesunderArticle128oftheLaborCodeisvestedwithDOLERegionalDirectors.
Irrespectiveoftheamountoftheviolationorclaimunearthedinthecourseofinspection,whethertheamount
thereofisbeloworaboveP5,000.00,theexercisebytheDOLESecretaryofhisvisitorialandenforcementpowerunder
Article 128 [b] is not lost or affected thereby. Hence, the DOLE Regional Directors, being the duly authorized
representativesoftheDOLESecretary,hasjurisdictionoverlaborstandardsviolations.
b.Noforumshoppingifemployees,duringthependencyofthecaseunderArticle128,aredismissedand
subsequentlyfiledanillegaldismissalcasewiththeLaborArbiter.
InConsolidatedBroadcastingSystem,Inc.v.Oberio,[G.R.No.168424,June8,2007],therespondentsatfirst
filed an inspection case before the DOLE Regional Director. While the case was pending, respondents were dismissed
andconsequentlyfiledanillegaldismissalcasewiththeLaborArbiter.Itwasheldthatsuchfilingofthecomplaintfor
illegaldismissaldoesnotconstituteforumshopping.Incaseswherethecomplaintforviolationoflaborstandardlaws
precededtheterminationoftheemployeeandthefilingoftheillegaldismissalcase,itwouldnotbeinconsonancewith
justicetochargethedismissedemployeeswithengaginginforumshoppingwhentheremedyavailabletothematthe
timetheircausesofactionarosewastofileseparatecasesbeforedifferentfora.
8.11.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSOFDOMESTICORHOUSEHELPERS.
TheLaborArbiterretainsjurisdictionoverclaimsthatmaybefiledbydomesticorhousehelpersamountingto
morethanP5,000.00.,despitethedeletionofthephrasecasesinvolvinghouseholdservicesinparagraph4ofArticle
217effectedbyRepublicActNo.6715.
8.12.JURISDICTIONOVERENFORCEMENTOFCOMPROMISEAGREEMENTS.

46
Section1, NLRCenbancResolutionNo. 1-95, Seriesof 1995.
47
PhilsaInternational Placement andServicesCorporationv. Hon. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, [G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001].
48
Article124, Labor Code, asamendedbySection3, RepublicAct No. 6727; Section7, Chapter II, ImplementingRulesof RepublicAct No. 6727; Section1, RuleVII, Rulesof ProcedureonMinimumWageFixingissuedbytheNational WagesandProductivityCommissionon04June
1990.
49
Id.
50
Section6[c], RuleV, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
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Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non
compliancebyanyofthepartiestheretopursuanttoArticle227oftheLaborCode.
51
8.13. JURISDICTIONOVERCASESPROPERLYCOGNIZABLEBYTHEGRIEVANCEMACHINERYORVOLUNTARY
ARBITRATORS.
a. OriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofGrievanceMachineryorVoluntaryArbitrators.
AlthoughtheLaborArbitershaveoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidetheenumeratedcasesin
Article217,oneshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatundertheamendatoryprovisionsofR.A.No.6715,thegrievance
machinery,underArticle260,hasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontoadjustandresolvethefollowinggrievances:
1. thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationoftheCBA;and
2. thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.
If the same are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of their submission, they shall
automaticallybereferredtoaVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitratorswho,underArticle261,havethe
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all such unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementationoftheCBAandthosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.
Thisexplains the lastparagraphofArticle217 whichprovides that (c)ases arisingfromthe interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of
companypersonnelpoliciesshallbedisposedofbytheLaborArbiterbyreferringthesametothegrievancemachinery
and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. By so providing, Article 217 acknowledges in no
uncertain terms the jurisdiction of the grievance machinery under Article 260 and that of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panelofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticle261overtheseissues.
b.Failuretoobservegrievanceprocedure;effect.
InCentralPangasinanElectricCooperative,Inc.v.Macaraeg,[G.R.No.145800,January22,2003],theparties
voluntarilyagreetosubmittheissueofillegaldismissalforvoluntaryarbitrationwithoutpassingthroughthegrievance
machinery.However,beforetheSupremeCourt,thiswasraisedasanissue.TheSupremeCourtruled:Attheoutset,
weholdthatthefirstissueraisedinthepetitionpertainingtotheallegedviolationoftheCBAgrievanceprocedureis
mootandacademic.Thepartiesactiveparticipationinthevoluntaryarbitrationproceedings,andtheirfailuretoinsist
that the case be remanded to the grievance machinery, shows a clear intention on their part to have the issue of
respondentsillegaldismissaldirectlyresolvedbytheVoluntaryArbitrator.We,therefore,finditunnecessarytoruleon
the matter in light of their preference to bring the illegal dismissal dispute to voluntary arbitration without passing
throughthegrievancemachinery.
8.14.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGCOOPERATIVES.
a.Membersofcooperativesarenotemployees.
Membersofacooperativesareitsowners.Issuesontheterminationoftheirmembershipwiththecooperative
donotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.
52
b. LaborArbitershavejurisdictionoverillegaldismissalcasesofemployeesofcooperatives.
Theruleisdifferentwithrespecttotheterminationofemploymentoftheemployeesofthecooperative.The
LaborArbitershavejurisdictionthereover.
PerpetualHelpCreditCooperative,Inc.v.Faburada,[G.R.No.121948,October8,2001]
PetitionerinthiscasecontendsthattheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthecomplaintof
private respondents (who are not members but employees of the cooperative) considering that they failed to submit
their dispute to the grievance machinery. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
Thereisnoevidencethatprivaterespondentsaremembersofpetitionercooperativeandeveniftheyare,thedisputeis
aboutpaymentofwages,overtimepay,restdayandterminationofemployment.UnderArticle217oftheLaborCode,
thesedisputesarewithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.
SanMiguelCorp.v.Semillano,[G.R.No.164257,July5,2010]
Petitionerassertedthatthepresentcaseisoutsidethejurisdictionofthelabortribunalsbecauserespondent
Vicente Semillano is a member of the Alilgilan MultiPurpose Coop (AMPCO), not an employee of petitioner
SMC.Petitionerisofthepositionthattheinstantdisputeisintracooperativeinnaturefallingwithinthejurisdictionof
theArbitrationCommitteeoftheCooperativeDevelopmentAuthority.AMPCOwascontractedbypetitionertosupplyit
with workers to perform the task of segregating bottles, removing dirt therefrom, filing them in designated places,
loading and unloading the bottles to and from the delivery trucks, and to perform other tasks as may be ordered by
SMCs officers. Semillano, together with the other respondents, filed the complaint for regularization with petitioner
SMC,contendingthatAMPCOwasamerelaboronlycontractor.TheHighCourtdeclaredinthiscasethatAMPCOwasa
laboronly contractor and consequently pronounced that all the respondents, including Semillano, were regular
employeesofpetitioner.Onthisissueofjurisdiction,theHighCourtruledthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionbecause
precisely,SemillanohasjoinedtheothersinfilingthiscomplaintbecauseitishispositionthatpetitionerSMCishistrue
employerandliableforallhisclaimsundertheLaborCode.
8.15.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGLOCALWATERDISTRICTS.

51
Section1(i)of RuleVof the2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
52
ApplicabletocooperativesorganizedunderR.A. No. 6938, otherwiseknownasTheCooperativeCodeof thePhilippines.
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InHagonoyWaterDistrictv.NLRC,[G.R.No.81490,August31,1988],itwasdeclaredthatlocalwaterdistricts
are quasipublic corporations and, therefore, the dismissal of their employees are governed by the civil service laws,
rulesandregulations.
However,althoughtheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdiction,theSupremeCourt,inZamboangaCityWaterDistrict
v.Buat,[G.R.No.104389,May27,1994],didnotallowpetitionertobelatedlyraisetheissueofjurisdictionbeforeit,
considering that it never raised said issue before the Executive Labor Arbiter, the NLRC or even before the Supreme
Courtinanotherrelatedcase.Infact,itwaspetitioneritselfwhichfiledthecomplaintbeforetheExecutiveLaborArbiter
andsoughtaffirmativerelieftherefromandparticipatedactivelyintheproceedingstherein.Althoughjurisdictionover
strikes and dismissals of employees in local water districts is lodged not with the NLRC but with the Civil Service
Commission,here,thepetitionerisalreadyestoppedfromassailingthejurisdictionoftheNLRCandis,therefore,bound
torespectalltheproceedingstherein.
8.16.JURISDICTIONOVERCRIMINALANDCIVILACTIONSARISINGFROMVIOLATIONSOFARTICLE241.
ByexpressprovisionofArticle241oftheLaborCode,bothcriminalandcivilliabilitiesarisingfromviolationsof
therightsandconditionsofmembershipinalabororganizationenumeratedinsaidArticleshallcontinuetobeunder
thejurisdictionofordinarycourts.
53
This provision should be distinguished from Article 247 of the Labor Code which vests jurisdiction upon the
Labor Arbiters over the civil aspect of unfair labor practice cases, including damages, attorneys fees and other
affirmativereliefs.
54
8.17.JURISDICTIONOVERQUASIDELICTORTORTCASES.
LaborArbitershavenojurisdictionoverquasidelictortortcases.
Tolosav.NLRC,[G.R.No.149578,April10,2003]
A complaint was lodged with the Labor Arbiter but the Supreme Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdictionoverthecasebecauseitwasestablishedthatthesamewasinthenatureofanactionbasedonaquasidelict
or tort, it being evident that the issue presented therein involved the alleged gross negligence of the coemployees
(shipmates) of Captain Tolosa, the deceased husband of petitioner, with whom Captain Tolosa had no employer
employeerelationship.
8.18.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSORCOUNTERCLAIMSOFEMPLOYERS.
Baezv.Valdevilla,[G.R.No.128024,May9,2000,331SCRA584]
ThejurisdictionofLaborArbitersandtheNLRCunderArticle217iscomprehensiveenoughtoincludeclaimsfor
allformsofdamagesarisingfromtheemployeremployeerelations.Bythisclause,Article217shouldapplywithequal
forcetotheclaimofanemployerforactualdamagesagainstitsdismissedemployee,wherethebasisfortheclaimarises
from or is necessarily connected with the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal
dismissalcase.Thisisinaccordwithparagraph6ofArticle217[a],whichcoversallotherclaims,arisingfromemployer
employeerelations.
Domondonv.NLRC,[G.R.No.154376,September30,2005,471SCRA559]
The private respondentemployer was allowed to assert its counterclaim for damages against petitioner
employee in the same case before the Labor Arbiter because it appears that the same arose out of the parties
employeremployeerelations.ItwasdeclaredthereinthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofsaid
counterclaim.
PhilippineRuralReconstructionMovement[PRRM]v.Pulgar,[G.R.No.169227,July5,2010]
AmonetaryclaimoftheemployerwhichhasnotbeenassertedbeforetheLaborArbiter,cannotbebelatedly
raised.Therecordsinthiscaseindicatesthatrespondentemployee(Pulgar),amanagerofpetitioner(PRRM),hasnotyet
returnedthemoneyhetookfromthePRRMsbranchofficetheTayabasBayFieldOffice(TBFO)inQuezonProvince
whichhedepositedinhisname.UnfortunatelyforPRRM,itneverraisedasanissuethemoneyallegedlystillinPulgars
custodyintheproceedingsbeforetheLaborArbiter,orevenbeforetheNLRC.Theruleiswellsettledthatpointsoflaw,
theories,issuesandargumentsnotadequatelybroughttotheattentionofthetrialcourtneednotbe,andordinarilywill
not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be
offensivetothebasicrulesoffairplay,justiceanddueprocess.
8.19.JURISDICTIONOVERCONSTITUTIONALITYOFCBAPROVISIONS.
Halagueav.PhilippineAirlines,Inc.,[G.R.No.172013,October2,2009]
The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of a CBA provision. It is the Regional Trial
Courtwhichispossessedofthatjurisdiction.
PetitionerswereemployedasfemaleflightattendantsofrespondentPhilippineAirlines(PAL)ondifferentdates
prior to November 22, 1996. They are members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines

53
Last paragraph, Article241, LaborCode.
54
Article247, LaborCode.
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(FASAP),alabororganizationcertifiedasthesoleandexclusivebargainingrepresentativeoftheflightattendants,flight
stewardsandpursersofrespondent.
OnJuly11,2001,respondentandFASAPenteredintoaCollectiveBargainingAgreementincorporatingtheterms
andconditionsoftheiragreementfortheyears2000to2005,hereinafterreferredtoasPALFASAPCBA.
Section144,PartAofthePALFASAPCBA,providesthat:

A. For the Cabin Attendants hired before 22 November 1996:
xxx
3. Compulsory Retirement
Subject to the grooming standards provisions of this Agreement, compulsory retirement shall be fifty-five (55) for
females and sixty (60) for males. xxx.
InaletterdatedJuly22,2003,petitionersandseveralfemalecabincrewsmanifestedthattheaforementioned
CBA provision on compulsory retirement is discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male
counterparts. This demand was reiterated in a letter by petitioners' counsel addressed to respondent demanding the
removalofgenderdiscriminationprovisionsinthecomingrenegotiationsofthePALFASAPCBA.
OnJuly29,2004,petitionersfiledaSpecialCivilActionforDeclaratoryReliefwithPrayerfortheIssuanceof
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch147,docketedasCivilCaseNo.04886,againstrespondentfortheinvalidityofSection144,PartAofthePAL
FASAPCBA.
InrulingthattheRTChasjurisdiction,theSupremeCourtobservedthatfromthepetitioners'allegationsand
reliefprayedfor in itspetition, it isclearthatthe issue raised is whetherSection144, PartAof the PALFASAP CBAis
unlawfulandunconstitutional.Here,thepetitioners'primaryreliefinCivilCaseNo.04886istheannulmentofSection
144,PartAofthePALFASAPCBA,whichallegedlydiscriminates againstthemforbeingfemaleflightattendants.The
subjectoflitigationisincapableofpecuniaryestimation,exclusivelycognizablebytheRTC,pursuanttoSection19(1)of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor
tribunals.
ThesaidissuecannotberesolvedsolelybyapplyingtheLaborCode.Rather,itrequirestheapplicationofthe
Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial
courts,acourtofgeneraljurisdiction.
InGeorgGrotjahnGMBH&Co.v.Isnani,[G.R.No.109272,August10,1994,235SCRA216,221],theCourt
heldthatnoteverydisputebetweenanemployerandemployeeinvolvesmattersthatonlyLaborArbitersandtheNLRC
canresolveintheexerciseoftheiradjudicatoryorquasijudicialpowers.ThejurisdictionofLaborArbitersandtheNLRC
under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employeremployee relationship which can
onlyberesolvedbyreferencetotheLaborCode,otherlaborstatutes,ortheircollectivebargainingagreement.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or viceversa is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the employeremployee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employeremployee relationship between the parties is merely
incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and
CEDAW.
Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor
relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
belongstotheregularcourtsofjusticeandnottothelaborarbiterandtheNLRC.Insuchsituations,resolutionofthe
disputerequiresexpertise,notinlabormanagementrelationsnorinwagestructuresandothertermsandconditionsof
employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction
oversuchclaimstotheseagenciesdisappears.
Iftheregularcourtsaredivestedofjurisdictionoverthecase,thenwhichtribunalorforumshalldeterminethe
constitutionalityorlegalityoftheassailedCBAprovision?
TheCourtholdsthatthegrievancemachineryandvoluntaryarbitratorsdonothavethepowertodetermine
andsettletheissuesathand.Theyhavenojurisdictionandcompetencetodecideconstitutionalissuesrelativetothe
questionedcompulsoryretirementage.Theirexerciseofjurisdictionisfutile,asitislikevestingpowertosomeonewho
cannotwieldit.
Althoughthe CBA provides for a procedure for the adjustment ofgrievances, such referral to thegrievance
machineryandthereaftertovoluntaryarbitrationwouldbeinappropriatetothepetitioners,becausetheunionandthe
managementhaveunanimouslyagreedtothetermsoftheCBAandtheirinterestisunified.
8.20.TAXDEDUCTIONSFROMBENEFITSDUEANEMPLOYEE,COGNIZABLEBYTHELABORARBITERASAMONEY
CLAIM.
Santosv.ServierPhilippines,Inc.,[G.R.No.166377,November28,2008]
RaisedhereasanissueiswhethertheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictiontoruleonthelegalityofthedeductions
madebyrespondentemployerfrompetitionerstotalretirementbenefitsfortaxationpurposes.BoththeLaborArbiter
andtheNLRCruledthatthisissueisbeyondtheirjurisdiction.TheSupremeCourt,however,ruledthatcontrarytothe
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LaborArbiterandNLRCsconclusions,petitionersclaimforillegaldeductionfallswithinthetribunalsjurisdiction.Itis
noteworthy that petitioner demanded the completion of her retirement benefits, including the amount withheld by
respondentfortaxationpurposes.Theissueofdeductionfortaxpurposesisintertwinedwiththemainissueofwhether
or not petitioners benefits have been fully given her. It is, therefore, a money claim arising from the employer
employeerelationship,whichclearlyfallswithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiterandtheNLRC.
55
8.21.ISSUANCEBYRTCOFWRITOFHABEASDATAINRELATIONTOALABORCASE.
ManilaElectricCompanyv.Lim,[G.R.No.184769,October5,2010]
The poser in this case sought to be addressed by the ruling in this case is: May an employee invoke the
remediesavailableundersuchwritwhereanemployerdecidestotransferherworkplaceonthebasisofcopiesofan
anonymous letter posted therein imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which
imputationitinvestigatedbutfailstoinformherofthedetailsthereof?ThiswasansweredintheNEGATIVE.
Respondent Lim is an administrative clerk at petitioner Meralco. On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was
postedatthedooroftheMeteringOfficeoftheAdministrationbuildingofMERALCOPlaridel,BulacanSector,atwhich
respondentisassigned,denouncingrespondent.Theletterreads:
CherryLim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG
MUKHAMO,LUMAYASKARITO,WALANGUTANGNALOOB.
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed about it, respondent
reportedthematteronJune5,2008tothePlaridelStationofthePhilippineNationalPolice.
By reason of this anonymous letter, petitioner directed the transfer of respondent to its Alabang Sector in
Muntinlupa. Respondent objected to the transfer, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a
denial of due process. She cited as reason the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back
entails,aswellastheviolationoftheprovisionsonjobsecurityoftheirCollectiveBargainingAgreement(CBA).Shethus
requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. Not
receiving any response from petitioner, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan where she alleged that petitioners unlawful act and
omissionconsisting of their continued failureand refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged
reportwhichMERALCOpurportedlyreceivedconcerningthreatstohersafetyandsecurityamounttoaviolationofher
righttoprivacyinlife,libertyandsecurity,correctiblebyhabeasdata.Respondentthusprayedfortheissuanceofawrit
commandingpetitionerstofileawrittenreturncontainingthefollowing:
a)a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
purportedlyreceivedbypetitionersontheallegedthreattohersafetyandsecurity;thenature
ofsuchdataandthepurposeforitscollection;
b)themeasurestakenbypetitionerstoensuretheconfidentialityofsuchdataorinformation;and
c)thecurrencyandaccuracyofsuchdataorinformationobtained.
ATROwasissuedbytheRTCbutpetitionersmovedforthedismissalofthepetitionandrecalloftheTROon
thegroundsthat,interalia,resorttoapetitionforwritofhabeasdatawasnotinorder;andtheRTClackedjurisdiction
overthecasewhichproperlybelongstotheNLRC.
Afterdueproceedings,theRTCissuedadecisiongrantingtheprayersofrespondentincludingtheissuanceofa
writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time
thatpetitionerscomplywiththedisclosuresrequired.Itjustifieditsrulingbydeclaringthat,interalia,recoursetoawrit
ofhabeasdatashouldextendnotonlytovictimsofextralegalkillingsandpoliticalactivistsbutalsotoordinarycitizens,
likerespondentwhoserightstolifeandsecurityarejeopardizedbypetitionersrefusaltoprovideherwithinformation
ordataonthereportedthreatstoherperson.
Inrulinginfavorofthepetitioners,theSupremeCourtreasoned:
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs Memorandum
directingherreassignmenttotheAlabangSector,undertheguiseofaquestforinformationordata
allegedlyinpossessionofpetitioners,doesnotfallwithintheprovinceofawritofhabeasdata.
Section1oftheRuleontheWritofHabeasDataprovides:
Section1.HabeasData.Thewritofhabeasdataisaremedyavailable
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatenedbyanunlawfulactoromissionofapublicofficialoremployeeorofa
privateindividualorentityengagedinthegathering,collectingorstoringofdata
or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrievedparty.(emphasisandunderscoringsupplied)
Thehabeasdatarule,ingeneral,isdesignedtoprotectbymeansofjudicialcomplaintthe
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to
provide a forum to enforce ones rightto the truth and toinformationalprivacy,thus safeguarding
theconstitutionalguaranteesofapersonsrighttolife,libertyandsecurityagainstabuseinthisage
ofinformationtechnology.

55
SeealsoIntercontinental BroadcastingCorporation[IBC[ v. Amarilla, [G.R. No. 162775, October27, 2006, 505SCRA687].
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Itbearsreiterationthatlikethewritofamparo,habeasdatawasconceivedasaresponse,
giventhelackofeffectiveandavailableremedies,toaddresstheextraordinaryriseinthenumberof
killingsandenforceddisappearances.Itsintentistoaddressviolationsoforthreatstotherightsto
life,libertyorsecurityasaremedyindependentlyfromthoseprovidedunderprevailingRules.
Castillo v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 628, 635], underscores
theemphasislaiddowninTapuzv.delRosario,[G.R.No.182484,June17,2008,554SCRA768,784],
thatthe writsof amparo and habeasdatawill NOTissuetoprotect purelypropertyorcommercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process clause of
theConstitution.Itisevidentthatrespondentsreservationsontherealreasonsforhertransfera
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are what prompted
hertoadopttheextraordinaryremedyofhabeasdata.Jurisdictionoversuchconcernsisinarguably
lodgedbylawwiththeNLRCandtheLaborArbiters.
Inanothervein,thereisnoshowingfromthefactspresentedthatpetitionerscommitted
anyunjustifiableorunlawfulviolationofrespondentsrighttoprivacyvisavistherighttolife,liberty
orsecurity.Toarguethatpetitionersrefusaltodisclosethecontentsofreportsallegedlyreceivedon
the threats to respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative.Respondentinfacttrivializesthesethreatsandaccusationsfromunknownindividualsin
herearlierquotedportionofherJuly10,2008letterashighlysuspicious,doubtfulorarejustmere
jokes if they existed at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work
betray[s]therealintentofmanagement]andcouldbeapunitivemove.Herpostureunwittingly
concedesthattheissueislaborrelated.
9.SUMMARYOFOTHERISSUESBEYONDJURISDICTIONOFTHELABORARBITERSORNLRC.
In addition tothe foregoing,other issues over which the Labor Arbiters or NLRChavenojurisdiction maybe
summedupasfollows:
1. ClaimsforEmployeesCompensation,SocialSecurity,Medicare(nowPhilHealth)andmaternitybenefits.
56
2.Replevinintertwinedwithalabordispute.
57
3.Violationoftrainingagreement.
58
4. Claim for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation, including the issue of liability in
suretyship.
59
5. Saleofpropertybeingleviedonexecutionhavingbeendoneinbadfaith.
60
6. Contemptinvolvingajudgeoftheregularcourt.
61
7. Injunction filed by a third party with the regular court against the sheriff enforcing a decision in a labor
case.
62
8. Claim of employee for cash prize offered under the Innovation Program of a company which, although
arising from employeremployee relationship, requires the application of the general civil law on
contracts.
63
9. Action initiated by employer against an employee for sum of money and damages for cost of repair jobs
madeonanemployeespersonalcaraswellasforthepurchasepriceofpartsandvehicles.
64
10. Claimsforcommissionsandcertainreimbursementsmadebyanindependentcontractor.
65
11. Violations of labor laws which are penal in nature. Examples are illegal recruitment cases,
66
or criminal
offensesorfeloniescommittedinthecourseofstrikesandlockouts.
67
12. InsolvencyproceedingsintheenforcementoftheworkerspreferenceordainedunderArticle110ofthe
LaborCode.
13. Exerciseofequityjurisdictiontoenjoinactivitiesforpurposesofcompellinganemployertoignoreaclear
mandateofthelaw.
68
14. Administrative action against the licensee or holder of authority cognizable by the POEA which could
proceedindependentlyfromthecriminalaction.
69
15. ReviewofrecruitmentviolationsandotherrelatedcasesdecidedbythePOEA.TheSecretaryofLaborand
Employmenthasexclusiveappellatejurisdictionoverthesecases.
70

56
Article217[6], LaborCode.
57
Basaya, Jr. v. Militante, G.R. No. L-75837, Dec. 11, 1987, 156SCRA299.
58
SingaporeAirlinesv. Hon. Ernani CruzPano, G.R. No. L-47739, June22, 1983; 122SCRA671.
59
SingaporeAirlinesv. Hon. Ernani CruzPano, G.R. No. L-47739, June22, 1983; 122SCRA671.
60
AsianFootwear &RubberCorporationv. Soriano, G.R. Nos. 71695-703, May20, 1986, 142SCRA49.
61
Tolentinov. Inciong, G.R. No. L-36385, July25, 1979, 91SCRA563.
62
PhilippineAssociationof FreeLaborUnions[PAFLU] v. Salas, G.R. No. 39084, Feb. 23, 1988, 158SCRA53.
63
SanMiguel Corporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. 80774, May31, 1988, 161SCRA719.
64
MolaveMotorSales, Inc. v. Laron, G.R. No. 65377, May28, 1984, 129SCRA485.
65
Sarav. Agarrado, G.R. No. L-73199, Oct. 26, 1988, 166SCRA625.
66
Section10, RuleX, BookII, RulesandRegulationsGoverningOverseasEmployment
67
Article264, Labor Code.
68
BulletinPublishingCorporationv. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74425, Oct. 7, 1986, 144SCRA678.
69
Section12, RulesandRegulationsImplementingtheMigrant WorkersandOverseasFilipinosAct of 1995.
70
Section1, RuleIV, BookVI, RulesandRegulationsGoverningOverseasEmployment.
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==============================
1. Labor Arbiter
b. Effect of self-executing order
of reinstatement on backwages
==============================

Relevant Provision: Article 223, Labor Code
1. REINSTATEMENTASPECTOFLABORARBITERSDECISION,SELFEXECUTORYORIMMEDIATELYEXECUTORYEVEN
PENDINGAPPEAL.
a.OnlythereinstatementorderedbytheLaborArbiterisselfexecutory.
ItmustbestressedattheoutsetthatitisonlythereinstatementorderedbytheLaborArbiterwhichisself
executory(orimmediatelyexecutory)incharacter.IfthereinstatementisorderedbytheNLRConappeal,ortheCourt
ofAppealsortheSupremeCourt,itisnotselfexecutoryandawritofexecutionisnecessarytoimplementandexecute
it.
Article223oftheLaborCodeisclearthatthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterreinstatingadismissedorseparated
employee,insofarasthereinstatementaspectisconcerned,shallimmediatelybeexecutory,evenpendingappeal.
b.2optionsoftheemployer.
Theemployerhas2optionsbothofwhichspeaksofreinstatement:
1. Actual reinstatement(reinstatementto formerpositionunder the sameterms andconditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or if position is no longer available, to a substantially equivalent
position);or
2. Payrollreinstatement.
It must be noted that the employer has no way of preventing reinstatement.. The posting of a bond by the
employershallnotstaytheexecutionforreinstatement.
c.Effectifemployerdoesnotreinstate.
Incasetheemployerfailedtoreinstate(actuallyorinthepayroll)theemployeeorderedreinstatedbythe
LaborArbiter,theprevailingruleisenunciatedintheenbancdecisioninGarciav.PhilippineAirlines,Inc.,[G.R.No.
164856,January20,2009].
TestundertheGarciadoctrine.
Under the said case of Garcia, the test to determine the liability of the employer (who did not reinstate the
employee pending appeal) to pay the wages of the dismissed employee covering the period from the time he was
orderedreinstatedbytheLaborArbitertothereversaloftheLaborArbitersdecisioneitherbytheNLRC,theCourtof
AppealsortheHighCourt,istwofold,towit:
(1) Theremustbeactualdelayorthefactthattheorderofreinstatementpendingappealwasnotexecuted
priortoitsreversal;and
(2) The delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is due to the
employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding
thereversaloftheLaborArbitersdecision.
Inotherwords,aftertheLaborArbitersdecisionisreversedbyahighertribunal,theemployeemaybebarred
from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was
withoutfaultonthepartoftheemployer.
In this Garcia case, while respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) was undergoing rehabilitation receivership, an
illegal dismissal case was filed by petitioners against respondent PAL which was decided by the Labor Arbiter in their
favor.Onappeal,theNLRCreversedtherulingoftheLaborArbiterandheldthattheirdismissalwasvalid.Resolvingthe
issue of whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the Labor Arbiters order of
reinstatementpendingappeal and the NLRCdecision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, now that respondent PAL
hasterminatedandexitedfromrehabilitationproceedings,theSupremeCourtheldthatPALisnotobligatedtopaysuch
wagesinthelightofthependencyoftherehabilitationproceedingswhicheffectivelypreventeditfromcomplyingwith
thereinstatementorderedbytheLaborArbiter.
d.TherulingsinRoqueroandGenuinohavebeenmodified.
As a result of the Garcia doctrine, the rulings in Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, [G.R. No. 152329, April 22,
2003]andGenuinov.NLRC,[G.R.Nos.14273233,December4,2007]havebeenexpresslymodified.
In Roquero, the dismissal of the employee was held valid by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal to the NLRC, the
LaborArbitersdecisionwasreversedandconsequently,thedismissedemployeewasorderedreinstated.Theemployee
didnotappealfromthatdecisionoftheNLRCbutfiledamotionfortheissuanceofawritofexecutionoftheorderof
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22
reinstatement.TheLaborArbitergrantedthemotionbuttheemployerrefusedtocomplywiththesaidorderonthe
groundthatithasfiledaPetitionforReviewbeforetheSupremeCourt.Subsequently,thedismissaloftheemployee
washeldvalidbytheSupremeCourt.Butitheldthattheunjustifiedrefusaloftheemployertoreinstatethedismissed
employeeentitlesthelattertothepaymentofhissalarieseffectivefromthetimetheemployerfailedtoreinstatehim
despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor
Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was
mandatoryontheemployertoactuallyreinstatethedismissedemployeeorreinstatehiminthepayroll.Havingfailedto
doso,theformermustpaythelatterthesalariesheisentitledto,asifhewasreinstated,fromthetimeofthedecision
oftheNLRCuntilthefinalityofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourt.
TherulinginRoquero[supra]wasqualifiedbytheSupremeCourtinitsrulinginthe2007caseofGenuinov.
NLRC,[G.R.Nos.14273233,December4,2007],ontheissueofwhetherthedismissedemployeewhoisreinstatedin
thepayrollandnotactuallytohisformerpositionhastheobligationtorefundwhathehasreceivedasandbywayof
salaries during his payroll reinstatement if and when his dismissal is held valid and legal on appeal. In this case, the
SupremeCourthadtakentheviewthat(i)fthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterislaterreversedonappealuponthefinding
that the ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require the dismissed employee on payroll
reinstatementtorefundthesalarieshe/shereceivedwhilethecasewaspendingappeal,oritcanbedeductedfromthe
accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to receive from his/her employer under existing laws,
collectivebargainingagreementprovisions,andcompanypractices.However,iftheemployeewasreinstatedtowork
duringthependencyoftheappeal,thentheemployeeisentitledtothecompensationreceivedforactualservices
rendered without need of refund. Considering that Genuino was not reinstated to work or placed on payroll
reinstatement,andherdismissalisbasedonajustcause,thensheisnotentitledtobepaidthesalariesstatedinitem
no.3ofthefallooftheSeptember3,1994NLRCDecision.
Consequent to the Garcia doctrine, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the prevailing principle that even if the
orderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversedonappeal,itisobligatoryonthepartoftheemployertoreinstate
andpaythewagesofthedismissedemployeeduringtheperiodofappealuntilreversalbythehighercourt.Itsettles
the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is immediately executory and the employer has to either re
admitthemtoworkunderthesametermsandconditionsprevailingpriortotheirdismissal,ortoreinstatetheminthe
payroll,andthatfailingtoexercisetheoptionsinthealternative,employermustpaytheemployeessalaries.
ThespiritoftheruleonreinstatementpendingappealanimatestheproceedingsoncetheLaborArbiterissues
the decision containing an order of reinstatement. The immediacy of its execution needs no further
elaboration.Reinstatementpendingappealnecessitatesitsimmediateexecutionduringthependencyoftheappeal,if
thelawistoserveitsnoblepurpose.Atthesametime,anyattemptonthepartoftheemployertoevadeordelayits
execution,asobservedinPanuncillo
71
andaswhatactuallytranspiredinKimberlyClark,
72
CompositeEnterprises,Inc.,
73
AirPhilippines
74
andRoquero[supra],shouldnotbecountenanced.
Abocv.MetropolitanBankandTrustCompany,[G.R.Nos.17054243,December13,2010]
This case answers the lingering question on the entitlement of an employee to reinstatement wages and
benefitsduringthetimewhenhewasunderpayrollreinstatementasorderedbytheLaborArbiteruntilthereversalof
theLaborArbitersrulingbytheNLRConappeal.Inthiscase,theemployeewasreinstatedinthepayrolluponorderof
theLaborArbiterwhofoundhisdismissalillegal.Onappeal,theNLRCsetasideandreversedthedecisionoftheLabor
ArbiterbutorderedrespondentMetrobanktopayAbocreinstatementwagesfromJuly12,1999(dateofdecisionofthe
Labor Arbiter) to September 16, 1999; salary increase from January 2000 to June 2001; Christmas bonus for the year
2000;13
th
monthpaydifferentialfortheyear2000;andsalarydifferentialforJulyandAugust2001.TheNLRCexplained
that petitioner Aboc was entitled to receive these monetary awards because he was included in the payroll by
respondent Metrobank as he was ordered reinstated by the Labor Arbiter. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Inaffirmingthesaidrulingonthemonetaryawards,theSupremeCourtruledthattheyarewarrantedunder
Article 223 of the Labor Code and jurisprudence. It cannot be denied that respondent Metrobank opted to reinstate
petitioner Aboc in its payroll. Since Metrobank chose payroll reinstatement for Aboc, he then became a reinstated
regular employee. This means that he was restored to his previous position as a regular employee without loss of
seniority rightsandotherprivilegesappurtenant thereto. Hispayrollreinstatement puthim on equal footing with the
otherregularMetrobankemployeesinsofarasentitlementtothebenefitsgivenundertheCBAisconcerned.
ThefactthatthedecisionoftheLaborArbiterwasreversedonappealhasnocontrollingsignificance.Therule
isthateveniftheorderofreinstatementoftheLaborArbiterisreversedonappeal,itisobligatoryonthepartofthe
employertoreinstateandpaythewagesofthedismissedemployeeduringtheperiodofappealuntilfinalreversalby
thehighercourt.
75
e.TheprincipleofreinstatementpendingappealaswellastheRoquerodoctrine(nowGarcialdoctrine)
applyonlyincasethereisafindingofillegalityofdismissalbytheLaborArbiter.
Inthe2009caseofLansanganv.AmkorTechnologyPhilippines,Inc.,[G.R.No.177026,January30,2009],it
washeldthattheprincipleofreinstatementpendingappealaswellastheRoquerodoctrinalrulingfindapplicationonly

71
Panuncillov. CAPPhilippines, Inc., [G.R. No. 161305, February9, 2007].
72
KimberlyClark(Phils), Inc. v. Facundo, [G.R. No. 144885, July26, 2006(UnsignedResolution)].
73
CompositeEnterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso, [G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007, 529SCRA470].
74
AirPhilippinesCorp. v. Zamora, [G.R. No. 148247, August 7, 2006].
7575
CitingCollegeof theImmaculateConceptionv. NLRC&Atty. MariusF. Carlos, Ph.D., G.R. No. 167563, March22, 2010.
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in case there is a finding of illegality of dismissal by the Labor Arbiter.The petitioners in this case were found by the
Labor Arbiter to have committed a dishonest act and, therefore, ruled that their dismissal was valid and legal but he
orderedtheirreinstatementtotheirformerpositionswithoutbackwagesasameasureofequitableandcompassionate
reliefowingmainlytopetitionerspriorunblemishedemploymentrecords,showofremorse,harshnessofthepenalty
anddefectiveattendancemonitoringsystemofrespondent.
Basedontheforegoingfacts,theSupremeCourtnotedthatRoquero,aswellasArticle223oftheLaborCode
on which the appellate court also relied, finds no application in the present case. Article 223 concerns itself with an
interim relief, granted to a dismissed or separated employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending appeal, as
what happened in Roquero. It does not apply where there is no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the present case.
Petitionersarenotentitledtofullbackwagesastheirdismissalwasnotfoundtobeillegal.Agabonv.NLRC,[G.R.No.
158693, Nov. 17, 2004], so states payment of backwages and other benefits is justified only if the employee was
unjustlydismissed.
f.TheconceptofreinstatementpendingappealunderArticle223contemplatesallkindsofillegaldismissal
cases.
Inthe2010caseofC.Alcantara&Sons,Inc.v.CA,[G.R.No.155109,September29,2010],theCAdeniedthe
reinstatementof the ordinary union members who participated in the illegal strike but whose dismissal was found to
have been illegally effected since they did not commit any illegal acts in the course of the strike. The CA justified its
denial by ruling that the reinstatement pending appeal provided under Article 223 contemplates illegal dismissal or
terminationcasesandnotcasesunderArticle264(ProhibitedActivities[inStrikesandLockouts]).TheSupremeCourt,
however, pronounced that this perceived distinction does not find support in the provisions of the Labor Code. The
groundsforterminationunderArticle264arebasedonprohibitedactsthatemployeescouldcommitduringastrike.On
the other hand, the grounds for termination under Articles 282 to 284 are based on the employees conduct in
connection with his assigned work.Still, Article 217, which defines the powers of Labor Arbiters, vests in the latter
jurisdiction over all termination cases, whatever be the grounds given for the termination of
employment.Consequently,Article223, whichprovidesthatthedecision of the LaborArbiter reinstating adismissed
employee shall immediately be executory pending appeal, cannot but apply to all terminations irrespective of the
groundsonwhichtheyarebased.
==============================
1. Labor Arbiter
c. Requirements to perfect appeal
to NLRC
==============================
1.PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS.
a.Appeal,defined.
Thetermappealreferstotheelevationbyanaggrievedpartytoanagencyvestedwithappellateauthorityof
any decision, resolution or order disposing the principal issues of a case rendered by an agency vested with original
jurisdiction,undertakenbyfilingamemorandumofappeal.
76
.
Appealisnotaconstitutionalrightbutamerestatutoryprivilege.Hence,partieswhoseektoavailofitmust
complywiththestatutesorrulesallowingit.
77
However,whiletherighttoappealisastatutoryandnotanaturalright,itisnonethelessanessentialpartof
ourjudicialsystem.Courtsare,therefore,advisedtoproceedwithcautionsoasnottodepriveapartyoftherightto
appeal.Litigantsshouldhavetheamplestopportunityforaproperandjustdispositionoftheircausefree,asmuchas
possible,fromtheconstraintsofproceduraltechnicalities.
78
b.MotionforreconsiderationofaLaborArbitersdecision,notallowed.
A motion for reconsideration is unavailing as a remedy against a decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Labor
ArbitershouldtreatthesaidmotionasanappealtotheNLRC.
79
MillenniumErectorsCorporationv.Magallanes,[G.R.No.184362,November15,2010]
Petitioner here contends that the Labor Arbiters decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal had
become final and executory following respondents failure to perfect his appeal to the NLRC, maintaining that the
requirementsforperfectionofanappealandforproofofservicearenotmererulesoftechnicalitywhichmayeasilybe
set aside. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the NLRC did not err in treating respondents motion for
reconsideration as an appeal, the presence of some procedural flaws including the lack of verification and proof of
servicenotwithstanding.

76
Section1[b], RuleI, Book V, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
77
Philux, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 151854, Sept. 3, 2008.
78
NoveltyPhilippines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 146125, Sept. 17, 2003; Labadv. Universityof SoutheasternPhilippines, G.R. No. 139665, Aug. 9, 2001, 362SCRA510.
79
Reyesv. MaximsTeaHouse, G.R. No. 140853, Feb. 27, 2003; Cayenav. NLRC, G.R. No. 76137, Feb. 18, 1991.
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c.PetitionforRelieftreatedasappeal.
Petitioner company in New Pacific Timber & Supply Co., Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 124224, March 17, 2000],
contendsthattheappealinitiatedbyprivaterespondentsdenominatedasPetitionforReliefisnotthepropermodeof
seekingareviewofthedecisionrenderedbytheLaborArbiter.Accordingtothepetitioner,nowhereintheLaborCode
orintheNLRCRulesofProcedureistheresuchapleading.Rather,theremedyofapartyaggrievedbyanunfavorable
rulingoftheLaborArbiteristoappealsaidjudgmenttotheNLRC.TheSupremeCourtdisagreedwiththiscontention
and allowed the said pleading to be treated as a valid appeal in the interest of substantial justice. And this,
notwithstanding the fact that the said Petition for Relief was filed way beyond the 10calendar day reglementary
period.
2.GROUNDSFORAPPEALTOTHECOMMISSION(NLRC).
a.GroundsforappealunderArticle223.
TheappealtotheNLRCmaybeentertainedonlyonanyofthefollowinggrounds:
a.IfthereisaprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheLaborArbiter;
b.Ifthedecision,orderorawardwassecuredthroughfraudorcoercion,includinggraftandcorruption;
c. Ifmadepurelyonquestionsoflaw;and/or
d.If serious errors in the findings of fact are raised which, ifnot corrected, would causegrave or irreparable
damageorinjurytotheappellant.
80
b.NLRChascertioraripower.
ThefirstgroundaboveregardingprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheLaborArbiteris
actuallyanexerciseofcertioraripowerbytheNLRC.ThecaseofTriadSecurity&AlliedServices,Inc.v.Ortega,[G.R.
No.160871,February6,2006],expresslyrecognizesthiscertioraripoweroftheNLRC.
81
3.PERFECTIONOFAPPEAL.
a.Requisitesforperfectionofappeal.
ThefollowingaretherequisitesforperfectionofanappealtotheNLRCfromthedecision,orderorawardof
theLaborArbiter:
82
a.Theappealshouldbefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod;
b.TheappealshouldbeverifiedbyappellanthimselfinaccordancewithSection4,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt;
c. Thereshouldbeproofofpaymentoftherequiredappealfee;
d.Acashorsuretybondshouldbepostedifjudgmentinvolvesmonetaryaward;
e.The appeal should be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal in three (3) legibly typewritten copies
which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof, the relief prayed for, a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, resolution or order and a
certificateofnonforumshopping;and
f.Thereshouldbeproofofserviceoftheappealmemorandumontheotherparty.
83
b.Effectofperfectionofappeal.
Onceanappealisfiled,theLaborArbiterlosesjurisdictionoverthecase.Allpleadingsandmotionspertaining
totheappealedcaseshouldthereafterbeaddressedtoandfiledwiththeCommission.
84
TheonlyexceptionisonthereinstatementaspectoftheLaborArbitersdecision.Theperfectionoftheappeal
shall not affect his continued exercise of jurisdiction over this particular aspect of his decision. Resultantly, he shall
continuetohavejurisdictionovertheenforcementandexecutionofhisreinstatementorderevenatthetimewhenthe
appealfromhisdecisionwastimelyfiledanddulyperfected.ThependencyoftheappealbeforetheCommission(NLRC)
doesnotaffecthisjurisdictiontosoimplementhisreinstatementorder.
c.Perfectionofappeal,mandatoryandjurisdictional.
Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the reglementary period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. It is not only a mere technicality. Noncompliance with such legal requirements is fatal.
FailuretoperfectanappealasrequiredbytheRuleshastheeffectofrenderingthejudgmentfinalandexecutory,hence,
unappealable.
85
Consequently,theNLRChasnoauthoritytoentertainanappealwhichwasnotperfected,muchlesstoreverse
thedecisionoftheLaborArbiter.
86
3.1.REGLEMENTARYPERIODTOPERFECTTHEAPPEAL.
a.Reglementaryperiodisten(10)calendardays.
Theshortenedperiodoften(10)daysfixedbyArticle223contemplatescalendardaysandnotworkingdays.
87

80
Articles129and223, LaborCode; Section2[d], RuleVI, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
81
SeealsoMetroDrugDistribution, Inc. v. MetroDrugCorporationEmployeesAssociation-FFW, [G.R. No. 142666, September26, 2005].
82
AsprovidedunderSection4[a], RuleVI of the2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
83
Bristol MyersSquibb[Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.
84
Section9, RuleVI Ibid..
85
Delgadov. CA, G.R. No. 137881, Dec. 21, 2004; CorporateInnHotel v. Lizo, G.R. No. 148279, May27, 2004; Sapitanv. JBLineBicol Express, Inc., G.R. No. 163775, Oct. 19, 2007.
86
Gaudiav. NLRC, G.R. No. 109371, Nov. 18, 1999.
87
RJLMartinezFishingCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-63550-51, Jan. 31, 1984.
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25
b.Whentoreckonstartofrunningofthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod.
The ten (10) calendar day reglementary period to appeal should be counted from the date of receipt of the
decision, award or order by the counsel or representative of record and not from the date of receipt thereof by the
party.
88
c.Effectoffailuretoappealwithinthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod.
Failuretobringanappealwithintheperiodprescribedbytherulesrendersthejudgmentappealedfromfinal
andexecutorybyoperationoflaw.
89
Consequently, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right, to a writ of execution and the issuance
thereofbecomesaministerialdutywhichmaybecompelledthroughtheremedyofmandamus.
90
d.Someprinciplesonreglementaryperiod.
Somenoteworthyprinciplesaffectingthe10calendardayreglementaryperiodareasfollows:
1. Saturdays,Sundaysandlegalholidaysincludedinreckoningthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod.
91
2.Dateofmailingofappealmemorandumisthedateofitsfiling.
92
3.Exceptionstothe10calendardayperiodrule.
i.10
th
dayfallingonaSaturday.
93
ii.10
th
dayfallingonaSundayorholiday.
94
iii.NLRCspowertowaivedefectinsubstanceorformunderArticle218[c].
95
iv.Relianceonerroneousnoticeofdecision.
96
v.AppealfromdecisionsofLaborArbitersonthirdpartyclaimsten(10)workingdays.
97
vi.AppealfromdecisionsofLaborArbitersindirectcontemptcasesfive(5)calendardays.
98
vii.Allowingtheappealforsomecompellingreasonsandtosubservejustice.
99
4.Motionforextensionoftimetoperfectanappeal,notallowed.
100
5.Motionforextensionoftimetofilememorandumofappeal,notallowed.
101
6.Motionforextensionoftimetofileappealbond,notallowed.
102
e.Rationalebehindtheruleonnonextensionofperiodtoappeal.
Toextendtheperiodofappealistoprolongtheresolutionofthecase,acircumstancewhichwouldgivethe
employertheopportunitytowearouttheenergyandmeagerresourcesoftheworkertothepointthathewouldbe
constrainedtogiveupforlessthanwhathedeservesinlaw.
103
f.ReglementaryperiodofappealfromdecisionsofDOLERegionalDirectorsunderArticle129oftheLabor
Code.
ThereglementaryperiodwithinwhichappealtotheNLRCmaybeinstitutedbyanyorbothpartiesfromthe
decisions,awards orordersof the DOLERegional Directorsor hisduly authorizedHearingOfficers isfive (5)calendar
daysfromreceiptthereof.
104
If the 5
th
day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a holiday, the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the next
workingday.
105
3.2.APPEALFEE.
a.Appealfee,amountthereof.
TheappellantisrequiredtopayanappealfeeofP150.00totheRegionalArbitrationBranchorRegionalOffice,
andtheofficialreceiptofsuchpaymentshouldbeattachedtotherecordsofthecase.
106
b.Latestrule:paymentofappealdocketfeeisbothmandatoryandjurisdictional.
1. The2010caseofSaintLouisUniversity,Inc.v.Cobarrubias,[G.R.No.187104,August3,2010],re
asserted the rule that the payment of appeal docket fee is both mandatory and jurisdictional. This case involves an
appealfromthedecisionofaVoluntaryArbitratortotheCourtofAppeals(CA)underRule43oftheRulesofCourt.In
the2000caseofWorkersofAntiqueElectricCooperative,Inc.v.NLRC,[G.R.No.120062,June8,2000],itwasruled
thatanappealisperfectedonlywhenthereisproofofpaymentoftheappealfee.Thishasbeentheconsistentrulingin
aplethoraofcase.

88
Section6, RuleIII, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC; FlexoMfg. Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-55971, Feb. 28, 1985, 135SCRA145; LynxIndustriesContractor, Inc. v. Tala, G.R. No. 164333, Aug. 24, 2007.
89
ChronicleSecuritiesCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. 157907, Nov. 25, 2004.
90
HenryClydeAbbott v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-65173, Oct. 27, 1986, 145SCRA206.
91
JudyPhilippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998; SMAgri andGeneral Machineriesv. NLRC, G.R. No. 74806, Jan. 9, 1989.
92
GSISv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 180045, November17, 2010].
93
JudyPhilippines, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 111934, April 29, 1998]
94
Serranov. CA, G.R. No. 139420, Aug. 15, 2001; SeealsoRemingtonIndustrial SalesCorp. v. Castaneda, G.R. Nos. 169295-96, Nov. 20, 2006.
95
NewPacificTimber&SupplyCo., Inc. v. NLRC, G. R. No. 124224, March17, 2000.
96
FirestoneTireandRubber Companyof thePhilippinesv. Lariosa, [G.R. No. L-70479, February27, 1987].
97
Section2, RuleVI, NLRCManual onExecutionof Judgment.
98
Article218[d], asamendedbyRepublicAct No. 6715, March21, 1989; Section1, RuleIX, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
99
ChronicleSecuritiesCorporationv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 157907, November 25, 2004]; Manabanv. Sarphil Corporation, [G.R. No. 150915, April 11, 2005].
100
; Bristol MyersSquibb[Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.
101
Bunaganv. Sentinel Watchman&ProtectiveAgency, Inc., [G.R. No. 144376, September13, 2006]; Section3, RuleVI, OldRulesof Procedureof theNLRC; Section1, RuleVI, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC
102
Lamzonv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 113600, May28, 1999, 307SCRA665; 367Phil. 169, 177].
103
GlobeGeneral ServicesandSecurityAgencyv. NLRC, G.R. No. 106477, Oct. 23, 1995.
104
Article129, LaborCode; Section1, RuleVI, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
105
Section1, RuleVI, Ibid.; Bristol MyersSquibb[Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.
106
Section5, RuleVI, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
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c.Exceptionstotheruleonpaymentofappellatecourtdocketfees.
Thefollowingarerecognizedexceptionstothestrictobservanceoftheruleondocketfees:(1)mostpersuasive
and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribedprocedure;(3)goodfaithofthedefaultingpartybyimmediatelypayingwithinareasonabletime fromthe
timeofthedefault;(4)theexistenceofspecialorcompellingcircumstances;(5)themeritsofthecase;(6)acausenot
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10) peculiar, legal and
equitablecircumstancesattendanttoeachcase;(11)inthenameofsubstantialjusticeandfairplay;(12)importanceof
theissuesinvolved;and(13)exerciseofsounddiscretionbythejudge,guidedbyalltheattendantcircumstances.
107
3.3.APPEALBOND;REQUIREDONLYINCASEOFMONETARYAWARD.
a.Perfectionofappealincaseofmonetaryjudgment.
An appeal from a decision involvinga monetaryaward maybeperfectedonlyupon the posting ofacash or
suretybond.
108
The logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure during the period of appeal against any occurrence that
would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if it is subsequently affirmed. It also validates and justifies, at
least on a prima facie basis, an interpretation that would limit the amount of the bond to the aggregate of the sums
awardedotherthanintheconceptofmoralandexemplarydamages.ThisisconsistentwiththeStatesconstitutional
mandatetoaffordfullprotectiontolaborinordertoforcefullyandmeaningfullyunderscorelaborasaprimarysocial
andeconomicforce.
109
b.Someprinciplesonbondrequirement.
1. Bondshouldbepostedwithinthe10calendardayreglementaryperiod.
110
2. If a party failed toperfecthisappealby thenonpaymentof theappeal bond withinthe10calendarday

periodprovidedbylaw,thedecisionoftheLaborArbiterbecomesfinalandexecutoryupontheexpiration
ofthesaidreglementaryperiod.
111
3. Thepostingofbondisbothmandatoryandjurisdictional;nonpostingthereofisfatal.
112
4. Remedyofemployeeincaseemployerfailedtopostbondistofileamotiontodismissappeal.
113
5. Awardofdamagesandattorneysfeesexcludedfromthecomputationofbond.
114
6. Nomonetaryaward,noappealbondrequired.
115
7. LaborArbitersdecisionsorordersshouldstatetheamountawarded.
116
8. Iftheamountofthemonetaryawardisnotincludedinthejudgment,theappealbondisnotrequiredtobe
posted.
117
9. Incaseofconflictbetweenthebodyandthefalloofthedecision,thelattershouldprevail.
118
10. Bondisnotrequiredtoentertainamotionforreconsideration.
119
11. Suretybondmustbeissuedbyanaccreditedbondingcompany.
120
12. Thebondpostedshouldbeineffectuntilfinaldispositionofthecase.
121
13. Realpropertybondinlieuofcashorsuretybondallowed.
122
14. Postingofabankcertificationorabankguarantee,notsufficientcompliancewiththebond
requirement.
123
15.LongChristmasholiday,notanexcuseforlatefilingofbond.
124
c.Motiontoreducebond,requisites.
The general rule is that the bond that should be posted should be equivalent to the monetary award of the
LaborArbiter.
125
Amotiontoreducebond,however,isallowedprovidedthatthefollowingconditionsarecompliedwith,towit:
(1) Themotiontoreducebondshouldbebasedonmeritoriousgrounds;and
(2) Areasonableamountinrelationtothemonetaryawardshouldbepostedbytheappellant.
126
d.SomeprinciplesonMotiontoReduceBond.
1.Themotiontoreducebondmustbefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod.
127
2. Thefilingofamotiontoreducebondevenduringthereglementaryperioddoesnotstaythefinalityofthe
decision.
128

107
Saint LouisUniversity, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, Aug. 3, 2010, citingLimv. DelosSantos, G.R. No. 172574, July31, 2009, 594SCRA607, 616-617.
108
BorjaEstatev. SpousesR. Ballad, G.R. No. 152550, June8, 2005, 498Phil. 694.
109
ForeverSecurity&General Servicesv. Flores, G.R. No. 147961, Sept. 7, 2007.
110
Gaudiav. NLRC, G.R. No. 109371, Nov. 18, 1999; Lamzonv. NLRC, G.R. No. 113600, May28, 1999, 307SCRA665; 367Phil. 169, 177.
111
Santosv. Velarde, G.R. No. 140753, April 30, 2003; BorjaEstatev. SpousesBalladG.R. No. 152550, June8, 2005, 459SCRA657, 667.
112
Quiambaov. NLRC, G.R. No. 91935, March4, 1996, 324Phil. 455; Aquinov. NLRC, G.R. No. 98108, Sept. 3, 1993, 226SCRA76.
113
Diazv. Nora, G.R. No. 89324, Oct. 11, 1990.
114
Navarrov. NLRC, [G.R. No. 116464, March1, 2000].
115
Abav. NLRC, G.R. No. 122627, July28, 1999.
116
Section14, RuleV, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
117
Vergarav. NLRC, G.R. No. 117196, Dec. 5, 1997, 282SCRA486.
118
Mendoza, Jr. v. SanMiguel Foods, Inc., [G.R. No. 158684, May16, 2005].
119
Cadalinv. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 168923, November28, 2008].
120
Section6, RuleVI, 2005Rulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
121
Section6, RuleVI of the2005Rulesof Procedureof theNLRC; AFPGeneral InsuranceCorp. v. Molina, [G.R. No. 151133, June30, 2008].
122
UERM-Memorial Medical Center v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 110419, March3, 1997, 269SCRA70].
123
Cordovav. KeysasBoutique, [G.R. No. 156379, September16, 2005].
124
MaryAbigailsFoodServices, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 140294, May9, 2005].
125
Ramirezv. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009.
126
Section6, RuleVI of the2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
127
Coral Point Development Corporationv. NLRC, G. R. No. 129761, Feb. 28, 2000; TimesTransportationCompany, Inc. v. Sotelo, G.R. No. 163786, Feb. 16, 2005; Stolt-NielsenMarineServices, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147623, Dec. 13, 2005.
128
Coral Point Development Corporationv. NLRC, supra; Stolt-NielsenMarineServices, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147623, Dec. 13, 2005.
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3.Thefullamountofthemonetaryawardshouldstillbepostedeveniftheappellanthasfiledamotionto
reducebond.
129
4. Ifneitherbondnormotiontoreducebondisfiledwithinthereglementaryperiod,thedecisionbecomes
finalandexecutory.
130
5. Reductionofbond,notamatterofright.
131
6. Liberalconstructionandrelaxationofruleonpostingofappealbond.
132
(a) therewassubstantialcompliancewiththeRules;
(b) surroundingfactsandcircumstancesconstitutemeritoriousgroundstoreducethebond;
(c) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of
resolvingcontroversiesonthemerits;or
(d) theappellants,attheveryleast,exhibitedtheirwillingnessand/orgoodfaithbypostingapartialbond
duringthereglementaryperiod.
133
6. Thefailuretopostthebondmustbecausedbyathirdparty,notbytheappellanthimself.
134
7. AlternativeremedyistopaypartialappealbondwhilemotiontoreducebondispendingwiththeNLRC.
135
8. Partialbondpostedmustnotbeinadequate.
136
9. Thepartialbondmustbepostedduringthereglementaryperiod.
137
10. PostingofbondtogetherwiththemotionforreconsiderationofNLRCdecisionheldvalid.
138
11. NLRCmaygrantadditionaltimetopostbondafterdenialofmotiontoreducebond.
139
12. Motionforextensionoftimetofilebondmustbefiledwithinthereglementaryperiod.
140
13. Inaccuracyinthecomputationofmonetaryawardsmustbeproved.
141
14. Financialdifficultiesorfinancialincapacity,notsufficientgroundstoreducethebond.
142
15. Cooperativesarenotexemptedfrompostingbond.
143
16. Monetary award in foreign currency necessarily requires that the peso equivalent be computed at the
officialconversionrateonthedateoftherenditionofthedecision.Hence,anythinglesswouldinevitably
resultinaninadequateordeficientbondandwouldnecessarilyresultinthenonperfectionofanappeal
beforetheNLRC.
144
3.4.MEMORANDUMOFAPPEAL.
a.Memorandumofappeal,requisites.
Theappealshouldbeaccompaniedbyamemorandumofappealinthree(3)legiblytypewrittencopieswhich
shallstatethegroundsrelieduponandtheargumentsinsupportthereof,thereliefprayedfor,astatementofthedate
whentheappellantreceivedtheappealeddecision,resolutionororderandacertificateofnonforumshoppingwith
proofofserviceontheotherpartyofsuchmemorandumofappeal.
145
b.SomeprinciplesonMemorandumofAppeal.
1.Lackofverificationinanappeal,notfatalnorjurisdictional.
146
2.Merenoticeofappeal,insufficient.
147
3.OnlycomplainantswhosignedthememorandumofappealaredeemedtohaveappealedtheLaborArbiters
decision.
148
4.Failuretoallegematerialdateintheappealmemorandum,notfatal.
149
5.Failuretoattachacertificateofnonforumshoppingintheappealmemorandum,fatal.
150
6.Belatedfilingofthecertificateofnonforumshopping,fatal.
151
3.5.PROOFOFSERVICETOADVERSEPARTY.
a.Effectoffailuretoserveacopytoadverseparty.
WhileSection4[a],RuleVIofthe2005RevisedRulesofProcedureoftheNLRCrequiresproofofserviceonthe
otherpartyoftheappeal,noncompliancetherewith,however,willpresentnoobstacletotheperfectionoftheappeal;
nordoesitamounttoajurisdictionaldefecttotheNLRCstakingcognizancethereof.
152
Ithaslongbeensettledthatmerefailuretoserveacopyofamemorandumofappealupontheopposingparty
doesnotbartheNLRCfromentertaininganappeal.
153

129
Ramirezv. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 182626, Dec. 4, 2009.
130
GlobeGeneral ServicesandSecurityAgencyv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 106477, October23, 1995, 249SCRA408, 414-415].
131
Nicol v. FootjoyIndustrial Corp., G.R. No. 159372, July27, 2007.
132
IntertranzContainerLines, Inc. v. Bautista, [G.R. No. 187693, July13, 2010].
133
Forever Security&General Servicesv. Flores, G.R. No. 147961, Sept. 7, 2007; CiudadFernandinav. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 166594, July20, 2006, 495SCRA807.
134
MaryAbigailsFoodServices, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 140294, May9, 2005.
135
RosewoodProcessing, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. Nos. 116476-84, May21, 1998, 290SCRA408; 352Phil. 1013]; PasigCylinderMfg., Corp. v. Rollo, [G.R. No. 173631, September8, 2010].
136
Sapitanv. JBLineBicol Express, Inc., [G.R. No. 163775, October19, 2007],
137
ColbyConstructionandManagement Corp. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 170099, November28, 2007].
138
Postigov. PhilippineTuberculosisSociety, Inc. (PTSI), [G.R. No. 155146, January24, 2006, 479SCRA628, 635].
139
Buenaobrav. LimKingGuan, [G. R. No. 150147, January20, 2004].
140
Lamzonv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 113600, May28, 1999, 307SCRA665; 367Phil. 169, 177].
141
TimesTransportationCompany, Inc. v. Sotelo, [G.R. No. 163786, February16, 2005].
142
TimesTransportationCompany, Inc. v. Sotelo, supracitingBiogenericsMarketingandResearchCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. 122725, Sept. 8, 1999, 372Phil. 653, 661.
143
BalagtasMulti-PurposeCooperative, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 159268, October 27, 2006].
144
DelaCruzv. GolarMaritimeServices, Inc., [G.R. No. 141277, December16, 2005].
145
Section4[a], RuleVI, Ibid.; Bristol MyersSquibb[Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, G.R. No. 148156, Sept. 27, 2004.
146
MillenniumErectorsCorporationv. Magallanes, [G.R. No. 184362, November15, 2010]; Gaerlanv. NLRC, G.R. No. L-66526, Sept. 28, 1984, 132SCRA402.
147
Section4[b], RuleVI, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC; Bristol MyersSquibb[Phils.], Inc. v. Viloria, supra.
148
SolgusCorp. v. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 157488, February6, 2007].
149
Del MarDomesticEnterprisesv. NLRC, G.R. No. 108731, Dec. 10, 1997.
150
Section4(a), RuleVI of TheNewRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
151
MandaueGalleonTrade, Inc. v. Isidto, [G.R. No. 181051, July5, 2010].
152
PNCCv. NLRC, G.R. No. 103670, July10, 1998, 292SCRA266; C. W. TanMfg. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 79596, Feb. 10, 1989.
153
SunriseManningAgency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 146703, Nov. 18, 2004; Pagdonsalanv. NLRC, G.R. No. L-63701, Jan. 31, 1980, 127SCRA463; MillenniumErectorsCorporationv. Magallanes, [G.R. No. 184362, November15, 2010].
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========================================
a. Jurisdiction
========================================

Relevant Provision: Articles 217 [b], 218 [e], 223 and 263 [g], Labor Code
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
1.JURISDICTIONOFTHECOMMISSION(NLRC).
a.Kindsofjurisdiction.
TheNLRCexercisestwo(2)kindsofjurisdiction:
1. Originaljurisdiction;and
2. Exclusiveappellatejurisdiction.
154
2.ORIGINALJURISDICTION.
TheNLRCexercisesoriginaljurisdictionoverthefollowingcases:
a. Injunctioninordinarylabordisputestoenjoinorrestrainanyactualorthreatenedcommissionofany
orallprohibitedorunlawfulactsortorequiretheperformanceofaparticularactinanylabordispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any
party.
155
b. InjunctioninstrikesorlockoutsunderArticle264oftheLaborCode.
156
c. Labordisputescausingorlikelytocauseastrikeorlockoutinanindustryindispensabletothenational
interest,certifiedtoitbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentforcompulsoryarbitration.
157
3.EXCLUSIVEAPPELLATEJURISDICTION.
TheNLRCexercisesexclusiveappellatejurisdictionoverthefollowing:
a. AllcasesdecidedbytheLaborArbiters.
158
b. ContemptcasesdecidedbytheLaborArbiters.
159
c. Cases decided by the DOLE Regional Directors or the duly authorized hearing officers of the
Department of Labor and Employment involving recovery of wages, simple money claims and other
benefitsunderArticle129oftheLaborCode.
4.SIGNIFICANTDISTINCTIONBETWEENJURISDICTIONOFLABORARBITERSANDNLRC.
The NLRC does not have original jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Article 217 over which Labor
Arbitershaveoriginalandexclusivejurisdiction.Thus,ifaclaimdoesnotfallwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdiction
oftheLaborArbiter,theNLRCcannothaveappellatejurisdictionthereover.
160
========================================
b. Effect of NLRC reversal of Labor Arbiters
order of reinstatement
========================================

1.EFFECTSOFTHEREVERSALBYTHENLRCOFTHELABORARBITERSORDEROFREINSTATEMENT.
a.Meaningofreversal.
ReversalbytheNLRCoftheLaborArbitersorderofreinstatementmeansthattheNLRCfoundthefinding
ofillegalityofthedismissaloftheemployeebytheLaborArbiterasnotvalid.Hence,theemployerspositionthat
thedismissalisvalidandlegalisaffirmed.
b.Effectsofreversal.
Thefollowingaretheeffects:

154
Section1, RuleVII, 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
155
Article218[e], LaborCode; Section1, RuleXI, Ibid..
156
Section2, RuleXI, Ibid..
157
Article263[g], LaborCode; RuleIX, Ibid..
158
Article217[b], LaborCode.
159
Section1, RuleXXIII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, Feb. 17, 2003; Section1, RuleX, Ibid..
160
Pondocv. NLRC, G. R. No. 116347, Oct. 3, 1996, 262SCRA632.
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1. On backwages The employer, as a general rule, hastopay the socalled reinstatement wagesof
theemployeefromthetimehewasorderedreinstatedbytheLaborArbiteruntilthereversalbythe
NLRC of such reinstatement order. The exception is when there exists justifiable reason for not
effectingactualorpayrollreinstatementpendingappeal,asenunciatedundertheGarciadoctrine.
161
(See discussion under SubTopic [b] (Effect of selfexecuting order of reinstatement on backwages),
LaborArbiterabove).
2. On reinstatement If the employee was, pending appeal, reinstated either to his former
position/substantiallyequivalentpositionorinthepayroll,thereversalofthereinstatementordered
bytheLaborArbiterwillnotaffectsuchreinstatementiftheemployeeelevateshiscasetotheCourt
ofAppealsorsubsequently,totheSupremeCourt.However,iftheemployeenolongerelevatesthe
case to the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court, the reversal shall mean the end of the
litigation, hence, the reinstatement of the employee should cease as a matter of course upon the
finalityofthereversaldecisionoftheNLRC.
========================================
c. Requirements to perfect appeal
to Court of Appeals
========================================

Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court
1.NOAPPEALFROMNLRCDECISIONS.
a.NostatutorygrantofrighttoappealfromNLRCdecisions.
ThesyllabusforlaborlawprescribesasatopicRequirementstoPerfectAppealtoCourtofAppeals.However,
itbearsnotingthatunderthepresentstateofthelaw,thereisnoprovisionforappealsfromthedecisionsoftheNLRC.
While Article 223 bears the epigraph of appeal, it actually refers only to decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
ArbiterwhichshallbefinalandexecutoryunlessappealedtotheNLRCbyanyorbothpartieswithinten(10)calendar
daysfromreceiptthereof.
Instead, the present Article 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R. A. No. 6715, merely provides that the
NLRCshalldecideallcaseswithintwenty(20)daysfromreceiptoftheansweroftheappellee,andthatsuchdecision
shallbefinalandexecutoryafterten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptthereofbytheparties.
WhentheissuewasraisedinSt.MartinFuneralHomev.NLRC,[G.R.No.130866,September16,1998],on
the argument that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLR since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Supreme Court nevertheless rejected this thesis. It held that there is an
underlyingpowerofthecourtstoscrutinizetheactsoftheNLRConquestionsoflawandjurisdictioneventhoughno
right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which
restrictstheseparationofpowersandforestallsarbitraryandunjustadjudications.
2.MOTIONFORRECONSIDERATION,ANINDISPENSABLEREQUISITE.
a.ThefilingofaMotionforReconsiderationoftheNLRCdecisionisanindispensableprerequisite.
Pursuant to said St. Martin ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, the
remedyoftheaggrievedpartyistotimelyfileamotionforreconsiderationoftheNLRCsdecisionasapreconditionfor
any further or subsequent remedy and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for
whichsaidRulehasnowfixedthereglementaryperiodofsixty(60)daysfromnoticeofthedecision.
162
Technically,therefore,thedecisionsoftheNLRCarenotappealabletoanyhigherorsuperiorcourtortribunal.
However,judicialreviewofthedecisionsofanadministrativequasijudicialbodyliketheNLRCmaystillbehadonthe
groundsoflackofjurisdiction,graveabuseofdiscretion,seriouserroroflaw,fraudorcollusionbywayofaspecialcivil
actionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
163
Thisprinciplewasfurtherunderscoredinthe2008caseofSolasv.Power&TelephoneSupplyPhils.,Inc.,[G.R.
No.162332,August28,2008].Statingthatrespondentsmustbedisabusedoftheirbeliefthatsincenoappealmaybe
taken from the NLRC decision, then the same can no longer be altered, the High Court cited Panuncillo v. CAP
Philippines,Inc.,[G.R.No.161305,February9,2007,515SCRA323],whereitwasheldthatwhileunderthesixth(6
th
)
paragraphofArticle223oftheLaborCode,thedecisionoftheNLRCbecomesfinalandexecutoryafterthelapseoften
calendardaysfromreceiptthereofbytheparties,theadversepartyisnotprecludedfromassailingitviaapetitionfor
certiorariunderRule65beforetheCourtofAppealsandthentotheSupremeCourtviaapetitionforreviewunderRule
45.

161
Garciav. PhilippineAirlines, Inc., [G.R. No. 164856, January20, 2009(EnBanc)].
162
Section4, Rule65, 1997Rulesof Civil Procedure.
163
Confederationof CitizensLaborUnionsv. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-38955-56, Oct. 31, 1974; SanMiguel Corporationv. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. L-39195, May16, 1975; Scott v. Inciong, G.R. No. L-38868, Dec. 29, 1975.
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b.SomeprinciplesonMotionforReconsiderationoftheNLRCdecision.
1. MotionforReconsideration(MR)oftheNLRCdecision,notfoundinthelawbutintheNLRCRules.
164
2. TheMRshouldbefiledwithinten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptofthedecision,resolutionororder.
165
3.TheMRshouldbeunderoath.
166
4.OnlyoneMRfromthesamepartyshallbeentertained.
167
5.TheMRismandatoryandjurisdictional.
168
6.TheMRistheplainandadequateremedyreferredtoinSection1,Rule65oftheRulesofCourt.
169
7.PartiescannotarrogatetothemselvesthedeterminationofwhethertofileanMRornot.
170
8. Latefilingofmotionforreconsiderationmaybeexcused.
171
9.With the first MR which the NLRC granted, there is no need for the parties to file another MR before
bringingupthemattertotheCA.
172
10. Decisionmayhavebecomefinalandexecutoryforonepartybutnotfortheotherwhoseasonablyfiledan
MR.
173
11. Changingoftheoryonmotionforreconsideration,notallowed.
174
12. Prematurity,propergroundforfailuretofileamotionforreconsideration.
175
Prematurity is the proper nomenclature to describe the ground to be invoked for failure to exhaust
administrativeremedies.Aprematureactionconstitutesafatalinfirmity.
c.Exceptionstotheruleonexhaustionofadministrativeremedies.
It bears to stress that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies under which the Motion for
Reconsiderationfalls,isnotanironcladrule.thisprinciplemaybedisregardedunderthefollowingcircumstances:
176
(1) Whenthereisaviolationofdueprocess;
(2) Whentheissueinvolvedispurelyalegalquestion;
(3) Whentheadministrativeactionispatentlyillegalamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction;
(4) Whenthereisestoppelonthepartoftheadministrativeagencyconcerned;
(5) Whenthereisirreparableinjury;
(6) When the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
impliedandassumedapprovalofthelatter;
(7) Whentorequireexhaustionofadministrativeremedieswouldbeunreasonable;
(8) Whenitwouldamounttoanullificationofaclaim;
(9) Whenthesubjectmatterisaprivatelandinlandcaseproceedings;
(10) Whentheruledoesnotprovideaplain,speedyandadequateremedy;
(11) Whentherearecircumstancesindicatingtheurgencyofjudicialintervention;
(12) Whennoadministrativereviewisprovidedbylaw;
(13) Wheretheruleofqualifiedpoliticalagencyapplies;
(14) Whentheissueofnonexhaustionofadministrativeremedieshasbeenrenderedmoot;
(15) Wheretheorderisapatentnullity,aswherethecourtaquohasnojurisdiction;
177
(16)Wherethequestionsraisedinthecertiorariproceedingshavebeendulyraisedandpasseduponbythe
lowercourt,orarethesameasthoseraisedandpasseduponinthelowercourt;
178
(17) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable.
(18) Where,underthecircumstances,amotionforreconsiderationwouldbeuseless;
179
(19) Wherepetitionerwasdeprivedofdueprocessandthereisextremeurgencyforrelief.
(20) Where,inacriminalcase,relieffromanorderofarrestisurgentandthegrantingofsuchreliefbythe
trialcourtisimprobable.
(21) Wheretheproceedingsinthelowercourtareanullityforlackofdueprocess.
(22) Wheretheproceedingswasexparteorinwhichthepetitionerhadnoopportunitytoobject.
(23) Wheretheissueraisedisonepurelyoflaworwherepublicinterestisinvolved.
180
3.RULE65CERTIORARIPETITIONTOCAFROMNLRCDECISIONS.
a.Certiorari,nature.
IncaseswherethedecisionoftheNLRCisrenderedwithoutorinexcessofjurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseof
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction,theaggrievedpartymayelevatethecasetotheCourtofAppeals

164
Section15, RuleVII , 2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC.
165
Section15, RuleVII thereof.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
PilipinoTelephoneCorporationv. National TelecommunicationsCommission, G.R. No. 138295, Aug. 28, 2003,410SCRA82, 88; LopezdelaRosaDevelopment Corporationv. CA, [G.R. No. 148470, April 29, 2005].
169
(Seagull Shipmanagement andTransport, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123619, June8, 2000; SeealsoMandaueDinghowDimsumHouseCo., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 161134, March3, 2008; PLDTv. Buna, G.R. No. 143688, Aug. 17, 2007.
170
MetroTransit Organization, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 142133, November19, 2002].
171
RemingtonIndustrial SalesCorp. v. Castaneda, [G.R. Nos. 169295-96, November20, 2006].
172
Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, [G.R. No. 154798, October20, 2005].
173
Arandilla, Jr. v. MindanaoElectricCooperative, Inc. (MAGELCO), [G.R. No. 157329, July28, 2005].
174
CocomangasHotel BeachResort v. Visca, [G.R. No. 167045, August 29, 2008].
175
PeftokIntegratedServices, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124841, July31, 1998; Jamerv. NLRC, G.R. No. 112630, Sept. 5, 1997.
176
SeeLagunaCATVNetwork, Inc. v. Maraan, [G.R. No. 139492, November 19, 2002], ascitedinSocial SecurityCommissionv. Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 152058, September27, 2004].
177
MandaueDinghowDimsumHouseCo., Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 161134, March3, 2008].
178
Miguel v. JCTGroup, Inc., supra; Kiamcov. NLRC, G.R. No. 129449, June29, 1999.
179
PLDTv. Imperial, G.R. No. 149379, June15, 2006; MidasTouchFoodCorp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111639, July29, 1996, 259SCRA652.
180
Id.
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notbywayofordinaryappealbutbyandthroughthespecialcivilactionforcertiorariprovidedunderRule65thereof,as
amendedbythe1997RulesofCivilProcedure[effectiveJuly1,1997].
b.SomeprinciplesonRule65certioraripetition.
1.CertiorarimaybefiledeveniftheNLRCdecisionhasbecomefinalandexecutory.
181
2.CertioraripetitionunderRule65iscognizablebytheCAandnotbytheSC
182
.
3.Periodwithinwhichtofilecertioraripetitions60days.
183
4.The60dayperiodisinextendible.
184
5.The60dayperiodisreckonedfromreceiptofthedecisionbycounsel,notbyparty.
185
=========================================
3. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) Med Arbiters
a. Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate)
=========================================

1. JURISDICTIONOFTHEBUREAUOFLABORRELATIONS(BLR)ANDLABORRELATIONSDIVISIONS(LRD)INTHEDOLE
REGIONALOFFICES.
a.ConcurrentjurisdictionoftheBLRandLRD.
The Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and the Labor Relations Divisions (LRD) in the Regional Offices have
concurrentjurisdiction.
Atty.Montaov.Atty.Verceles,[G.R.No.168583,July26,2010]
TheHighCourtpointedoutthatArticle226oftheLaborCodeclearlyprovidesthattheBLRandtheRegional
Directors of DOLE have concurrent jurisdiction over interunion and intraunion disputes. Such disputes include the
conductornullificationofelectionofunionandworkersassociationofficers.Thereis,thus,nodoubtastotheBLRs
jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving memberunions of a federation arising from disagreement over the
provisionsofthefederationsconstitutionandbylaws.
b.Originalandexclusivejurisdiction.
TheBLRandtheLaborRelationsDivisionsintheDOLEregionalofficeshaveconcurrentoriginalandexclusive
authority to act, at their own initiative (motu proprio) or upon request of either or both parties, on the following
controversies:
a.Allinterunionconflicts;
b.Allintraunionconflicts;and
c.Alldisputes,grievancesorproblemsarisingfromoraffectinglabormanagementrelationsinallworkplaces,
whetheragriculturalornonagricultural,exceptthosearisingfromtheimplementationorinterpretationof
collective bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary
arbitration.
186
Suchconcurrentjurisdictionappliesinthefollowingspecificactions:
1.Applicationforregistrationoflaborunions;and
2.Petitionforcancellationofunionregistration.
187
Asfarascomplaintsforexaminationofunionsbooksofaccountsisconcerned,theRulesofProcedure
onMediationArbitrationpurposelyandexpresslyseparatedordistinguishedexaminationsofunionaccountsfrom
the genus of intraunion conflicts and provided a different procedure for the resolution of the same. Original
jurisdiction over complaints for examinations of union accounts is vested on the Regional Director and appellate
jurisdictionoverdecisionsoftheformerislodgedwiththeBLR.
188
c.Administrativefunctions.
In addition to the aforementioned controversies over which they have concurrent original and exclusive
jurisdiction,theBLRandtheLaborRelationsDivisionsintheDOLEregionalofficeslikewisehaveconcurrentjurisdiction
overthefollowingadministrativefunctions:
1. Registrationoflaborunions;
2. Keepingofregistryoflaborunions;

181
TomasClaudioMemorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152568, Feb. 16, 2004.
182
St. MartinFuneral Homev. NLRC, [G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295SCRA494(EnBanc)].
183
SeeSection4, Rule65, asamendedbyCircularNo. 39-98[effectiveSept.1, 1998] andfurtheramendedbyA. M. No. 00-2-03-SC[effectiveSept. 1, 2000].
184
SeeSection4, Rule65, asamendedbyCircularNo. 39-98[effectiveSept.1, 1998] andfurtheramendedbyA. M. No. 00-2-03-SC[effectiveSept. 1, 2000].
185
Section6[a], RuleIII of the2005RevisedRulesof Procedureof theNLRC; Ginetev. SunriseManningAgency, [G.R. No. 142023, June21, 2001].
186
Article226, LaborCode; PolicyInstructionsNo. 6; Villaorv. Trajano, G.R. No. 69188, Sept. 23, 1986.
187
Section1, RuleII, Rulesof ProcedureonMediation-Arbitration.
188
Section1, RuleII, Rulesof ProcedureonMediation-Arbitration; LaTondeaWorkersUnionv. TheHon. Secretaryof Labor andEmployment, G.R. No. 96821, Dec. 09, 1994.
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3. Maintenance and custody of the files of Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) and other related
agreements.
4. Recordsofsettlementoflabordisputes;and
5. CopiesofordersanddecisionsofVoluntaryArbitrators.
189
2.APPELLATEJURISDICTION.
a.Rulesonappeals.
ThefollowingaretherulesonappealswithrespecttotheBLR:
1. IntrauniondisputesDecisionsofMedArbitersinintrauniondisputesareappealabletotheBLR.
190
2. InteruniondisputesDecisionsoftheMedArbiterininteruniondisputes(certificationelections)arenot
appealabletotheBLRbuttotheDOLESecretary.
191
3. The BLR exercises appellate jurisdiction over all cases originating from the DOLE Regional Director
involvingthefollowingissues:
a.Unionregistration;
b.Cancellationofcertificatesofunionregistration;and
c.Complaintsforexaminationofunionsbooksofaccounts.
192
Asfarascancellationofunionregistrationisconcerned,incasethedecisionisrenderedbytheBLRDirectorin
the exercise of his original jurisdiction, the same may be appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary by any party
withinthesameperiodoften(10)days,copyfurnishedtheopposingparty.
193
b.Reglementaryperiodforappeal.
ThedecisionoftheMedArbiterandDOLERegionalDirectormaybeappealedtotheBLRbyanyoftheparties
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, copy furnished the opposing party. The decision of the BLR Director in the
exerciseofhisoriginaljurisdictionmaybeappealedtotheOfficeoftheDOLESecretarybyanypartywithinthesame
period,copyfurnishedtheopposingparty.Theappealshallbeverifiedunderoathandshallconsistofamemorandumof
appealspecificallystatingthegroundsrelieduponbytheappellant,withsupportingargumentsandevidence.
194
c.FinalityofthedecisionoftheBLRorOfficeoftheDOLESecretary.
The decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations or the Office of the DOLE Secretary shall become final and
executoryafterten(10)daysfromreceiptthereofbytheparties,unlessamotionforitsreconsiderationisfiledbyany
partythereinwithinthesameperiod.Onlyone(1)motionforreconsiderationofthedecisionoftheBureauofLabor
RelationsortheOfficeoftheDOLESecretaryintheexerciseoftheirappellatejurisdictionshallbeallowed.
195
3.INTERUNIONORINTRAUNIONDISPUTES.
a.Interunionorrepresentationdisputes.
An interunion dispute or representation dispute refers to a case involving a petition for certification
election filed by a duly registered labor organization which is seeking to be recognized as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of the rankandfile employees or supervisory employees, as the case may be, in the appropriate
bargainingunitofacompany,firmorestablishment.
196
b.Intraunionorinternaluniondisputes.
Anintrauniondisputeorinternaluniondisputereferstoanyconflictbetweenandamongunionmembers,
includinggrievancesarisingfromanyviolationoftherightsandconditionsofmembership,violationofordisagreement
overanyprovisionoftheunionsconstitutionandbylawsordisputesarisingfromcharteringoraffiliationofaunion.
197

c.Coverageofintrauniondisputes.
Intrauniondisputesshallinclude:
(1) Cancellationofregistrationofalabororganizationfiledbyitsmembersorbyanotherlabororganization;
(2) Conduct of election of union and workers association officers or nullification of election of union and
workersassociationofficers;
(3) Audit/accountsexaminationofunionorworkersassociationfunds;
(4) Deregistrationofcollectivebargainingagreements;
(5) Validity/invalidityofunionaffiliationordisaffiliation;
(6) Validity/invalidityofacceptance/nonacceptanceforunionmembership;
(7) Validity/invalidityofimpeachment/expulsionofofficersormembersoftheunionorworkersassociation;
(8) Validity/invalidityofvoluntaryrecognition;
(9) OppositiontoapplicationforunionandCBAregistration;
(10)Violationsofordisagreementsoveranyprovisionintheconstitutionandbylawsofaunionorworkers
association;
(11)Disagreementsovercharteringorregistrationoflabororganizationsandcollectivebargainingagreements;

189
Article231, LaborCode.
190
Section1[1], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
191
SeeArticle259of theLaborCode.
192
Section2, RuleII, Rulesof ProcedureonMediation-Arbitration.
193
Section16, RuleXI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
194
Section16, RuleXI, BookV, Ibid..
195
196
Section1[9], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; Dioknov. Hon. Cacdac, G.R. No. 168475, July4, 2007; Bautistav. CA, G.R. 123375, Feb. 28, 2005, 452SCRA406, 420.
197
Section1[bb], RuleI, BookV, Ibid.; Dioknov. Hon. Cacdac, supra; Bautistav. CA, supra.
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(12)Violationsoftherightsandconditionsofmembershipinaunionorworkersassociation;
(13)Violations of the rights of legitimate labor organizations, except interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements;
(14)Suchotherdisputesorconflictsinvolvingtherightstoselforganization,unionmembershipandcollective
bargaining
(a) betweenandamonglegitimatelabororganizations;
(b) betweenandamongmembersofaunionorworkersassociation.
198
4.OTHERRELATEDLABORRELATIONSDISPUTES.
a.Relatedlaborrelationsdispute,meaning.
Related labor relations dispute refers to any conflict between a labor union and the employer or any
individual,entityorgroupthatisnotalaborunionorworkersassociation.
199
b.Coverageofotherrelatedlaborrelationsdisputes.
Otherrelatedlaborrelationsdisputesinclude:
(1)cancellationofregistrationofunionsandworkersassociations;and
(2)apetitionforinterpleader.
200
c.Interpleader,meaning.
Interpleader refers to a proceeding brought by a party against two or more parties with conflicting claims,
compelling the claimants to litigate between and among themselves their respective rights to the claim, thereby
relievingthepartysofilingfromsuitstheymayotherwisebringagainstit.
201
5.MEDARBITER.
a.MedArbiter;jurisdiction.
The MedArbiter refers to an officer in the DOLE Regional Office or in the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
authorizedtohearanddecidethefollowingcases:
1. representationcases;
2. interuniondisputes;
3. intrauniondisputes;and
4. otherrelatedlaborrelationsdisputes.
202
5.
b.MedArbiterhasnojurisdictionovercancellationofunionregistrationcases.
Specifically excepted from the jurisdiction of MedArbiters are cases involving the cancellation of union
registration.
203
ThesamedevolvesupontheDOLERegionalDirectorortheBLRDirector,intheexerciseoftheiroriginal
jurisdiction.
c.SomeprinciplesonthejurisdictionofMedArbiters.
1. The MedArbiter has authority to decide on the issue of whether an employeremployee relationship
exists.
204
2. Heisalsoempoweredtodecideotherissuesrelatedtotheeligibilityofemployeestovote.
205
3. He cannot order the renegotiation of a CBA, his authority being confined to the determination of the
exclusivebargainingagentinthebargainingunit.
206
4. Heispossessedofthepowertoissuetemporaryrestrainingorderandthewritofinjunctioninappropriate
cases.
207
5. FactualfindingsofMedArbitersareaccordedgreatrespect.
208
6. He may, upon his own initiative or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a
judgmentwithinfive(5)yearsfromthedateitbecomesfinalandexecutory,requiringtheSherifforaduly
deputizedofficertoexecuteorenforcethesame.
209
6. RULEON30%SUPPORTREQUIREMENTTOFILEACOMPLAINTORPETITION.
a.Requirementof30%unionsupportincaseofcomplaintaffectingentiremembership.
Wheretheissueinvolvestheentiremembershipofthelabororganization,thecomplaintorpetitionisrequired
tobesupportedbyatleastthirtypercent(30%)ofitsmembers.
210
However, this 30% support requirement needed to report violations of rights and conditions of union
membership,asfoundinthelastparagraphofArticle241oftheLaborCode,neednotbestrictlyobserved.
211
Itisthusnotmandatory.
212

198
Section1, RuleXI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03,Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
199
Section1[rr], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
200
201
Section1[z], RuleI, BookV, Ibid..
202
Section1[ii], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
203
Id.
204
M. Y. SanBiscuits, Inc. v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 95011, April 22, 1991.
205
Central NegrosElectricCooperative, Inc. v. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 94045, Sept. 13, 1991.
206
FFWv. Noriel, G.R. Nos. L-47182-83, Oct. 30, 1978, 86SCRA132.
207
Diniov. Laguesma, [G.R. No. 108475, June9, 1997, 273SCRA109].
208
FurusawaRubberPhilippines, Inc. v. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, G. R. No. 121241, Dec. 10, 1997, 282SCRA635.
209
Section1, RuleXXIV, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
210
Section4, RuleXI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode.
211
Vercelesv. Bureauof Labor Relations-Department of Labor andEmployment, [G.R. No. 152322, February15, 2005].
212
Rodriguezv. Director, Bureauof Labor Relations, [G.R. Nos. L-76579-82andL-80504, August 31, 1988, 165SCRA239].
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b.30%notrequiredifentireunionmembershipisnotinvolved.
The30%requirementisnotnecessaryiftheissuedoesnotinvolvetheentiremembershipoftheunion.
213
============================================
4. National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
a. Conciliation vs. Mediation
b. Preventive Mediation
============================================
Relevant Provisions: 1. Executive Order No. 126, [Reorganizing the Ministry of Labor and Employment and for
Other Purposes] (January 30, 1987)
2. Executive Order No. 251[Creating the NCMB] (July 25, 1987)
Both issued by President Corazon C. Aquino
1.NATIONALCONCILIATIONANDMEDIATIONBOARD(NCMB).
a.TheBoardundertheLaborCode.
The word Board as used in the Labor Code refers to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB).
214
ItisanagencyattachedtotheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentprincipallyinchargeofthesettlement
of labor disputes through conciliation, mediation and of the promotion of voluntary approaches to labor dispute
preventionandsettlement.
215
b.ConciliatorMediator.
AConciliatorMediatorreferstoanofficeroftheNCMBwhoseprincipalfunctionistoassistinthesettlement
anddispositionoflabormanagementdisputesthroughconciliationandpreventivemediation,includingthepromotion
andencouragementofvoluntaryapproachestolabordisputespreventionandsettlement.
216
c.NCMBisnotaquasijudicialagency.
Accordingtothe2009caseofTabiguev.InternationalCopraExportCorporation,[G.R.No.183335,December
23, 2009], based on the functions of the NCMB, as enumerated in Section 22 of Executive Order No. 126 (the
ReorganizationActoftheMinistryofLaborandEmployment),itcannotbeconsideredaquasijudicialagency.
d.Notbeingaquasijudicialagency,NCMBsrulingsarenotcognizablebytheCourtofAppeals.
ThiswastheholdinginthesamecaseofTabigue[supra].Hence,NCMBsdecisionscannotbeelevatedtothe
CourtofAppealsunderRule43oftheRulesofCourt.
2.CONCILIATIONANDMEDIATION.
a.Conciliationormediation,meaning.
Both the terms conciliation and mediation refer to a process whereby a third person usually called
Conciliator (in case of conciliation) or Mediator (in case of mediation), intervenes in a dispute involving two or more
conflicting parties for the purpose of reconciling their differences or persuading them into adjusting or settling their
dispute. The Conciliator or Mediator normally does not make or render any decision, his role being confined to the
functionsaforedescribed.
b.Jurisdictionoverconciliation,mediationandvoluntaryarbitrationcases.
Originally, conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration functions are vested with the Bureau of Labor
Relations.Thesefunctions,however,wereallabsorbedbytheNCMBunderthelawwhichcreatedit.
217
c.Distinctionbetweenconciliationandmediation.
Generally,thereisnomarkeddistinctionsbetweenconciliationandmediation.ThereasonisthatInboth
cases, a neutral third party (called Conciliator or Mediator) is tasked to assist two or more opposing parties in
findingappropriateresolutiontoadispute.
Philippine law and jurisprudence do not embody any specific distinctions between these two as in fact,
thereappearstobenouniversaldefinitionofthesewidelyacceptedalternativemodeofdisputeresolution.
In other jurisdictions, however, the principal distinction between conciliation and mediation lies on the
extentofthepowerandauthoritygrantedtotheneutralthirdparty.
In mediation, the Mediator normally facilitates a deliberation or discussion of the issues between the
parties. He may or may not offer any opinions on the strength and weaknesses of each party's position and
arguments.Thus,mediationmaybeclassifiedintotwo,namely:
1. FacilitativeMediationwheretheMediatordoesnotmakeorofferanyopinion;or
2. EvaluativeMediationwheretheMediatoroffersanopinionwhichisnotbindingontheparties.
It bears stressing, however, that regardless of which of the 2 methods above is chosen, the Mediator is
notempoweredtoimposehiswillontheparties.

213
SeeSection1of RuleXIVof theImplementingRulesof BookV; SeealsoDioknov. Hon. Cacdac, [G.R. No. 168475, July4, 2007].
214
Section1[e], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
215
Section1[15], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases.
216
Section1[k], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
217
SeeSection22of ExecutiveOrderNo. 126, [ReorganizingtheMinistryof LaborandEmployment andforOtherPurposes] promulgatedonJanuary30, 1987byPresident CorazonC. Aquino, asamendedbySection4of ExecutiveOrderNo. 251promulgatedonJuly25, 1987, creating
theNCMB.
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Inconciliation,theConciliatorisgivenmorepowerandauthorityinthathemaynotonlyofferanopinion
ontheissuesat handbutmayactuallymakeabindingopinionthereonprovidedthepartiesstipulateinadvance
thereon.Hisopinionisbasedonthefactsandthelawinvolvedinthecontroversybeforehim.
It may thus be observed that conciliation is more formal than mediation in the sense that the formers
opinion,unlikethelatters,maybebindingontheparties,althoughitmaybemerelytemporaryincharacter.
c.Privilegednatureoftheinformationinconciliationandmediationproceedings.
Any information and statements made at conciliation proceedings should be treated as a privileged
communication and thus may not be used as an evidence in any proceedings. They are inadmissible in evidence.
Conciliators and similar officials are not allowed to testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken up at
conciliationproceedingsconductedbythem.
218
Theprivilegednatureofthecommunicationappliesnotonlyincasesofconciliationandmediationproceedings
beforetheBLR,itsMedArbitersoranyofitshearingofficersbutalsoinsimilarproceedingsconductedbyotherlabor
officials, such as the ConciliatorsMediators of the NCMB as well as the Labor Arbiters and the Commissioners of the
NLRC.
For instance, in modifying the award of annual salary increases given by the Secretary of Labor and
EmploymenttotheemployeesundertheCBA,inthecaseofNissanMotorsPhilippines,Inc.v.SecretaryofLaborand
Employment,[G.R.Nos.15819091,June21,2006],theSupremeCourtpointedoutthatitcannotsanctiontheaward
madebythepublicrespondentDOLESecretarybasedostensiblyontherevelationoftheNCMBAdministratorthatwas
sourcedfromtheconfidentialpositiongiventohimbypetitionercompany.Thereasonforthisissimple.Article233of
theLaborCodeprohibitstheuseinevidenceofanyconfidentialinformationgivenduringconciliationproceedings.The
NCMBAdministratorclearlybreachedthisprovisionoflaw.
3.PREVENTIVEMEDIATION.
a.NCMBsauthoritytoeffectconversionofanoticeofstrike/lockoutintoapreventivemediationcase.
Preventive mediation, as a remedy, is not found in the Labor Code. But under the law which created the
NCMB,oneofitsfunctionsistoprovidepreventivemediationtodisputingparties.
219
Thisremedycoverspotentiallabordisputesthatarethesubjectofaformalorinformalrequestforconciliation
andmediationassistancesoughtbyeitherorbothpartiesorupontheinitiativeoftheNCMBtoavoidtheoccurrenceof
actuallabordisputes.
220
b.Someprinciplesonpreventivemediation.
1. Filingofnoticeofpreventivemediation,firststeptosubmitcaseforpreventivemediation.Itisonlyafter
thisstepthatasubmissionagreementmaybeenteredintobythepartiesconcerned.
221
2. Only certified or duly recognized bargaining representatives may file a notice or request for preventive
mediationincasesofbargainingdeadlocksandunfairlaborpractices.
222
3. Noticeofpreventivemediationisdifferentfromthenoticetostrikeorlockout.
c.Authoritytoconvertanoticeofstrike/lockoutintoapreventivemediationcase.
TheNCMBhastheauthoritytoconvertanoticeofstrike/lockoutfiledbytheunionintoapreventivemediation
caseunderanyofthefollowingcircumstances:
1. Whentheissuesraisedinthenoticeofstrike/lockoutarenotstrikeableincharacter.
2. Whenthepartywhichfiledthenoticeofstrike/lockoutasksfortheconversion.
3. When both parties to a labor dispute mutually agree to have it subjected to preventive mediation
proceeding.
4.
d.Conversionofanoticeofstrike/lockoutintoapreventivemediationcaseresultsinitsdismissal.
Once a notice of strike/lockout is converted into a preventive mediation case, it will be dropped from the
docketofnoticesofstrike/lockout.Oncedroppedtherefrom,astrike/lockoutcannolongerbelegallystagedbasedon
thesamenotice.Theconversionhastheeffectofdismissingthenotice.
e.Strikeisillegalifstagedafterconversionofthenoticeofstrikeintoapreventivemediationcase.
AcaseinpointisPhilippineAirlines,Inc.v.SecretaryofLaborandEmployment,[G.R.No.88210,January23,
1991, 193 SCRA 223], where the strike was declared illegal for lack of a valid notice of strike in view of the NCMBs
conversionofsaidnoticeintoapreventivemediationcase.
Itisclear,accordingtoSanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,[G.R.No.119293,June10,2003],thatthemoment
theNCMBordersthepreventivemediationinastrikecase,theunionthereuponlosesthenoticeofstrikeithadfiled.
Consequently,ifitstilldefiantlyproceedswiththestrikewhilemediationisongoing,thestrikeisillegal.
223

218
Article233, LaborCode; Section2, RuleXXII, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [February17, 2003].
219
Section22, ExecutiveOrder No. 126.
220
Section1[20], RuleIII, NCMBManual of ProceduresforConciliationandPreventiveMediationCases; SeealsoSection1[mm], RuleI, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [February17, 2003].
221
InsularHotel EmployeesUnion-NFLv. Waterfront InsularHotel Davao, [G.R. Nos. 174040-41, September22, 2010].
222
Id.; Section3, RuleIVof theNCMBManual of Procedure.
223
NUWHRAINv. NLRC,[G.R. No. 125561, March6, 1998, 287SCRA192]; PhilcomEmployeesUnionv. PhilippineGlobal Communications, [G.R. No. 144315, July17, 2006].
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===========================
5. DOLE Regional Directors
a. Small money claims
===========================
1.SMALLMONEYCLAIMS(ORSIMPLEMONEYCLAIMS).
a.Claimsthatmayberecovered.
Article 129 contemplates the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal
interest,owingtoanemployeeorpersonemployedindomesticorhouseholdserviceorhousehelperundertheLabor
Code,arisingfromemployeremployeerelations.
b.RequisitesforthevalidexerciseofjurisdictionbyDOLERegionalDirectorsorHearingOfficersunderArticle
129.
Thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur:
(1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or
househelperunderthecode;
(2) Theclaimantwhoseemploymenthasbeensevereddoesnotseekreinstatement;and
(3) TheaggregatemoneyclaimoftheemployeeorhousehelperdoesnotexceedP5,000.00.
224
In the absence of any of the aforesaid three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive
jurisdictionoverallclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelations,otherthanclaimsforemployeescompensation,
socialsecurity,PhilHealthandmaternitybenefits.
225
c.JurisdictionwhentotalmonetaryclaimexceedsP5,000.00.
Article 217 [a] (6) grants jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiters over all monetary claims arising from employer
employeerelations,includingthoseofpersonsindomesticorhouseholdservice,ifthetotalamountthereofexceedsfive
thousandpesos(P5,000.00),regardlessofwhetheraccompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement.
226
Incaseofnumerousclaimants,theindividualclaimshouldnotexceedP5,009.00.
227
d.WhenclaimdoesnotexceedP5,000.00butemployeepraysforreinstatement.
Even if the individual claims of the employees do not exceed P5,000.00, if they include claims for
reinstatement,thematterfallswithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
228
Inotherwords,ifthe
monetaryclaimisassertedaspartofanillegaldismissalcase,theamountofmonetaryclaimbecomesimmaterialsince
theprincipalactionistheillegaldismissalwhichappropriatelyfallsunderthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.
e.Effectofclaimingseparationpayinlieuofreinstatementasanalternativeremedy.
IntheeventthatwhatthecomplainantunderArticle129assertsasanaccompanyingremedytohismonetary
claimisnottheremedyofreinstatementbutthepaymentofseparationpayinlieuofreinstatement,theDOLERegional
Director or DOLE Hearing Officer has no jurisdiction thereover since the principal action remains the illegality of the
dismissal.
f.Employmentrelationshipshouldnolongerexistatthetimeoftheinitiationofthecomplaintformonetary
claimunderArticle129.
If the employment relationship still exists at the time of the filing of the complaint, the case necessarily falls
underthecoverageofArticle128whereitisaprerequisitethatsuchrelationshipshouldstillexistatthetimeofthe
initiationofthecomplaint.
If the employment relationship no longer exists, the complaint falls under Article 129 for as long as the
terminated employee does not raise the issue of legality of his dismissal or asserts any claim for reinstatement and
merelyconfineshiscomplaintonlyonhismonetaryclaimswhichshouldnotexceedP5,000.00.
Once the employeremployee relationship has already ceased and the legality of the dismissal is raised and
reinstatement is sought, jurisdiction thereover necessarily falls under the Labor Arbiter by virtue of Article 217 of the
LaborCode.Andsuchjurisdictioncoverstherecoveryofmonetaryandotherbenefitsconsequenttosuchdismissal.
229
g.AppealsfromdecisionsoftheDOLERegionalDirectorunderArticle129.
1. AppealistotheNLRCandnottotheDOLESecretary.
2. BasisoftheappealisArticle129andnotArticle223oftheLaborCode.
3. Reglementaryperiodofappealis5calendardays.
4. Motionforextensionofthereglementaryperiod,notallowed.
5. GroundsforappealandrequisitesforperfectionofappealtotheNLRCaresimilartothoseofappealsfrom
decisionsoftheLaborArbitersunderArticle223oftheLaborCode.

224
AlbayI ElectricCooperative, Inc. v. Martinez, Sr., [G.R. No. 95559, November 9, 1993, 227SCRA606].
225
SeealsoSection1[a], RuleXI, BookIII, RulestoImplement theLaborCode; RajahHumabonHotel, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 100455, Sept. 17, 1993, 226SCRA394.
226
CinderellaMarketingCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. 112535, June22, 1998.
227
AlbayI ElectricCooperative, Inc. v. Martinez, Sr., [supra].
228
M. RamirezIndustriesv. Secretaryof Labor, G.R. No. 89894, Jan. 3, 1997, 266SCRA111.
229
Oreshoot MiningCorporationv. Hon. Arellano, G.R. Nos. 75746-48, Dec. 14, 1987.
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=================================
6. DOLE Secretary
a. Visitorial and Enforcement Powers
=================================
1.VISITORIALANDENFORCEMENTPOWERS.
a.3separatepowerstreatedinArticle128.
Thethree(3)kindsofpowertreatedinArticle128areasfollows:
1.Visitorialpowerwhichisembodiedinparagraph[a]thereof;
2.Enforcementpowerwhichistreatedinparagraphs[b]and[c]thereof;and
3.Appellatepowerorpowerofreviewwhichisfoundinthesubparagraphofparagraph[b]thereof.
b.Natureofthevisitorialandenforcementpowers.
The visitorial and enforcement powers granted to the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representatives
areinthenatureofaquasijudicialpower.
230
c.Subjectofthevisitorialandenforcementpowers.
The subject of the visitorial and enforcement powers granted to the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized
representativesunderArticle128istheestablishmentwhichisunderinspectionandnottheemployeesthereof.
MaternityChildrensHospitalv.SecretaryofLabor,[G.R.No.78909,June30,1989].
Accordingtothiscase,anyawardsgrantedarenotconfinedtoemployeeswhosignedthecomplaintinspection
butareequallyapplicabletoallthosewhowereemployedbytheestablishmentconcernedatthetimethecomplaint
was filed, even if they were not signatories thereto. The reason is that the visitorial and enforcement powers are
relevantto,andmaybeexercisedover,establishments,notoverindividualemployeesthereof,todeterminecompliance
bysuchestablishmentswithlaborstandardslaws.
d.DulyauthorizedrepresentativesbeingreferredtoinArticle128.
The DOLE Regional Directors are the duly authorized representatives of the DOLE Secretary referred to in
Article128oftheLaborCode.
231
1.1.VISITORIALPOWERUNDERARTICLE128.
Thevisitorialpowercoversandincludes:
a.access to employers records and premises at any time of the day or night, whenever work is being
undertakentherein;and
b.theright:
1. tocopyfromsaidrecords;
2. to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary to
determineviolationsorwhichmayaidintheenforcementoftheLaborCodeandofanylaborlaw,wage
order,orrulesandregulationsissuedpursuantthereto.
232
1.2.ENFORCEMENTPOWERUNDERARTICLE128.
Theenforcementpowerincludes:
a.to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code and other
laborlegislationsbasedonthefindingsoflaboremploymentandenforcementofficersorindustrialsafety
engineersmadeinthecourseofinspection.
b.toissuewritsofexecutiontotheappropriateauthorityfortheenforcementoftheir orders,exceptin
cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and
raisesissuessupportedbydocumentaryproofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.
233
c. to order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of any unit or department of an establishment

when noncompliance with the law or implementing rules and regulations poses grave and imminent
dangertothehealthandsafetyofworkersintheworkplace.Withintwentyfour(24)hours,ahearingshall
beconductedtodeterminewhetheranorderforthestoppageofworkorsuspensionofoperationsshallbe
liftedornot.Incasetheviolationisattributabletothefaultoftheemployer,heshallpaytheemployees
concernedtheirsalariesorwagesduringtheperiodofsuchstoppageofworkorsuspensionofoperation.
234
d. torequireemployers,byappropriateregulations,tokeepandmaintainsuchemploymentrecordsasmay
benecessaryinaidofhisvisitorialandenforcementpowersundertheLaborCode.
235
1.3.APPEALTOTHEDOLESECRETARY.
a.GrantofappellatepowertotheDOLESecretary,anewprovisioninArticle128[b].

230
DolePhilippines, Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, Nov. 30, 2006.
231
SanMiguel Corporationv. TheHon. CA, G.R. No. 146775, Jan. 30, 2002
232
Article128[a], LaborCode; Section1, RuleX, BookIII, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 7-A, Seriesof 1995.
233
Article128[b], LaborCode.
234
Article128[c], Ibid.; Section3[a] and[b], RuleX, BookIII, RulestoImplement theLaborCode.
235
Article128[f], LaborCode.
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TheappealfromtheorderoftheDOLERegionalDirectorissuedunderArticle128shouldbemadetotheDOLE
Secretary.
236
b.Reglementaryperiod.
Ten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptofacopyoftheorderoftheDOLERegionalDirector.
237
c.Groundsforappeal.
TheaggrievedpartymayappealtotheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymenttheorderoftheRegionalDirector
onanyofthefollowinggrounds:
1.thereisaprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheRegionalDirector;
2. theorderwassecuredthroughfraud,coercionorgraftandcorruption;
3.theappealismadepurelyonquestionsoflaw;or
4.serious errors in the findings of facts were committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave and
irreparabledamageorinjurytotheappellant.
238
2.REQUISITESFORTHEVALIDEXERCISEOFTHEVISITORIALANDENFORCEMENTPOWERSUNDERARTICLE128,AS
AMENDED.
Three(3)requisitesshouldconcur:
a. Theemployeremployeerelationshipshouldstillexist;
b. Thefindingsinquestionweremadeinthecourseofinspectionbythelaboremploymentandenforcement
officersorindustrialsafetyengineers;and
c. TheemployeeshavenotyetinitiatedanyclaimorcomplaintwiththeDOLERegionalDirectorunderArticle
129,ortheLaborArbiter,underArticle217.
2.1.FIRSTREQUISITE:EMPLOYMENTRELATIONSHIPSHOULDSTILLEXISTATTHETIMEOFTHEINITIATIONOFTHE
ACTIONUNDERARTICLE128[B].
a.Existenceofemployeremployerrelationship,essential.
EJRCraftsCorp.v.Hon.CA,[G.R.No.154101,March10,2006]
Itwasheldthatconsideringthattherestillexistsanemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenpetitionerand
privaterespondentsandthatthecaseinvolvesviolationsofthelaborstandardprovisionsoftheLaborCode,theDOLE
Regional Director has jurisdiction to hear and decide the instant case in conformity with Article 128 [b] of the Labor
Code.
239
RizalSecurity&ProtectiveServices,Inc.v.Hon.Maraan,[G.R.No.124915,February18,2008].
TheSupremeCourtruledthatwhatismaterialtoconsideristhatatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaintsor
claims for payment of monetary benefits with the DOLE Regional Office, the complainants were still employees of
petitionercompany.
b.LaborArbiterhasjurisdictionintheabsenceofemploymentrelationship.
BatongBuhayGoldMines,Inc.v.Sec.DelaSerna,[G.R.No.86963,August6,1999,370Phil.872].
If at the time of the initiation of the action under Article 128 [b], the employeremployee relationship had
alreadyceasedtoexist,itisnottheDOLERegionalDirectorbuttheLaborArbiterwhohasjurisdictionoverthesame.
2.2.SECONDREQUISITE:THEFINDINGSSHOULDBEMADEINTHECOURSEOFINSPECTION.
Under the second of the three (3) requisites for the valid exercise of the visitorial and enforcement power
under Article 128 [b], it is essential that the findings in question were made in the course of inspection by the labor
employmentandenforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers.
2.3.THIRDREQUISITE:NOACTIONONTHESAMEVIOLATIONOFLABORSTANDARDLAWSHASYETBEENFILED
UNDEREITHERARTICLES129OR217OFTHELABORCODE.
Corollarytothesecondrequisiteaboveisthethird(3
rd
)requisitethattheaffectedemployeesshouldnothave
initiatedyetanyclaimorcomplaintontheviolationofthelaborstandardsprovisionsofthelawwitheithertheDOLE
Regional Director under Article 129, or the Labor Arbiter, under Article 217 of the Labor Code. This is as it should be
becauseoncethecomplainthasalreadybeentakencognizanceofbytheDOLERegionalDirectorunderArticle129.orby
theLaborArbiterunderArticle217,jurisdictionattachestheretoandwillnotbelostasaresultofthefindingsmadein
thecourseofinspectionbythelaboremploymentandenforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers.

236
SeeArticle128[b], Labor Code.
237
Section1, RuleIVof theRulesontheDispositionof LaborStandardsCasesintheRegional Offices; SeealsoUniversityof ImmaculateConcepcion, v. Secretaryof LaborandEmployment, [G.R. No. 143557, June25, 2004].
238
Section2, RuleIV, RulesontheDispositionof LaborStandardsCasesintheRegional Offices.
239
SeealsoBayHaven, Inc. v. Abuan, [G.R. No. 160859, July30, 2008].
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3.JURISDICTIONALDISTINCTIONSAMONGARTICLES128[B],129AND217.
1.Onthenatureoftheproceedingsandtheconcomitantpowersgranted.
Article 128 [b] involves the exercise of visitorial and enforcement powers by the DOLE Secretary or his duly
authorizedrepresentatives(referringtoDOLERegionalDirectors).
Article129involvestheexerciseofadjudicatorypowerovermonetaryclaimsnotexceedingP5,000.00andnot
accompanied by any claim for reinstatement by the DOLE Regional Directors or any of the duly authorized hearing
officersofDOLE.
Article 217 involves the exercise by the Labor Arbiters of their quasijudicial power to hear and decide
monetaryclaimsexceedingP5,000.00regardlessofwhetheraccompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement.

2.Onthepersonorofficergrantedthepowers.
Article 128 [b] grants the power specifically to the DOLE Secretary or his duly authorized representatives
(referringtoDOLERegionalDirectors).
Article129grantsthepowerspecificallytotheDOLERegionalDirectorsoranyofthedulyauthorizedhearing
officersofDOLE.
Article217grantsthepowerspecificallytotheLaborArbitersoftheNLRC.

3.Onthesubjectmatter.
Article128[b]appliestoinspectioncasesinvolvinganyviolationsofthelaborstandardsprovisionsoftheLabor
Code and other labor legislations regardless of the amount of monetary claims involved. Moreover, it is not only
confinedtomonetaryclaimsbutalsoincludesviolationsofoccupationalsafetyandhealthstandards.
Article129appliestomonetaryclaimswhosetotalamountdoesnotexceedP5,000.00.
Article217appliestomonetaryclaimsexceedingP5,000.00.
4.Ontheaccompanyingclaimforreinstatement.
Article128[b]appliesonlytoinspectioncaseswithoutanyaccompanyingclaimforreinstatement.
Article129appliesonlywhenthemonetaryclaimisnotaccompaniedbyanyissueinvolvingreinstatement.
Article217appliestomonetaryclaimsexceedingP5,000.00,irrespectiveofwhetherornotaccompaniedbya
claimforreinstatement.
5.Onthepartyinitiatingtheaction.
Article 128 [b] contemplates situations where the case for violation of labor standards laws and other labor
legislationsarosefromtheroutineinspectionconductedbythelaboremploymentandenforcementofficerorindustrial
safetyengineers of theDOLE,with or without acomplaint initiatedbyan interested party. Here, it is the DOLE which
generallyinitiatestheactionmotuproprio.
Article129contemplatessituationswherethereisacomplaintinitiatedbyaninterestedpartyforrecoveryof
wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Here, it is the complainant (aggrieved employee) who initiates the
action.
Article 217 contemplates situations where a complaint is initiated by a worker or employee. Here, it is the
complainantwhoinitiatestheaction.

6.Ontheexistenceofemployeremployeerelationship.
Article128[b]isapplicableonlywhentheemployeremployeerelationshipstillexists.Incasetherelationship
nolongerexists,monetaryclaimsmayfalleitherundertheexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoftheLaborArbiterswhen
thetotalamountexceedsP5,000.00orundertheexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoftheDOLERegionalDirectorifthe
totalamountthereofdoesnotexceedP5,000.00.Accordingly,ifonthefaceofthecomplaint,itcanbeascertainedthat
theemployeremployeerelationshipnolongerexists,thecase,whetherornotaccompaniedbyanallegationofillegal
dismissal, should immediately be endorsed by the DOLE Regional Director to any of the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC.
(Section3,RuleII,RulesontheDispositionofLaborStandardsCasesintheRegionalOffices,Sept.16,1987).
Article129isapplicablewhentheemployeremployeerelationshipnolongerexistsandthemoneyclaimarose
fromsaidrelationshipandthetotalamountthereofdoesnotexceedP5,000.00.
Article 217 is applicable irrespective of whether or not the employeremployee relationship still exists for as
longastheclaimarosefromthesaidrelationshipandthetotalamountofthemonetaryclaimsexceedsP5,000.00.
7.Ontheremedyofappeal,howtaken.
Article128[b]grantsappealfromtheorderissuedbythedulyauthorizedrepresentativeoftheDOLESecretary
tothelatter.
Article 129 grants appeal from the decision of the Regional Director or any of the duly authorized hearing
officersofDOLEtotheNLRC.
Article217grantsappealfromthedecisionoftheLaborArbitertotheNLRC.

8.Onthereglementaryperiodofappeal.
Article128[b]prescribesnospecificreglementaryperiodforappeal.Thelawissilentonthismatter.However,
undertheRulesontheDispositionofLaborStandardsCasesintheRegionalOfficesissuedonSeptember16,1987bythe
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DOLESecretary,thereglementaryperiodisfixedatten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptoftheorder.(SeeSection1,Rule
IVthereof).
Article129prescribesthereglementaryperiodoffive(5)calendardaysfromreceiptofacopyofthedecisionor
resolutionbyapartywithinwhichtoperfecttheappeal.
Article217doesnotcontainanyprovisiononthereglementaryperiodforappeal.However,Article223ofthe
LaborCodeprescribesthereglementaryperiodoften(10)calendardaysfromreceiptofthedecision,awardororderof
theLaborArbiter,withinwhichtoperfecttheappeal.
9.Onrequirementofpostingofbondtoperfecttheappeal.
Article128[b]requiresthatincasetheordersubjectoftheappealinvolvesmonetaryaward,anappealbythe
employermaybeperfectedonlyuponthepostingofacashorsuretybondissuedbyareputablebondingcompanyduly
accreditedbytheDOLESecretaryintheamountequivalenttothemonetaryawardintheorderappealedfrom.
Article129issilentontherequirementofbond;hence,thisisnotrequiredtoperfecttheappeal.
Article217doesnotembodytheprovisionrequiringpostingofbondtoperfecttheappeal.Itisprovidedforin
10.Onthegroundsforappeal.
Article128[b]doesnotspecifythegroundsforappeal.ButSection2,RuleIVoftheRulesontheDispositionof
Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices [September 16, 1987], which implements Article 128 [b] (prior to its
amendmentbyR.A.No.7730onJune2,1994),enumeratesthefollowinggrounds:
a.thereisaprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheRegionalDirector;
b. theOrderwassecuredthroughfraud,coercionorgraftandcorruption;
c. theappealismadepurelyonquestionsoflaw;or
d.serious errors in the findings of fact were committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave or
irreparabledamageorinjurytotheappellant.
TheabovecitedgroundsstillapplyevenaftertheamendmentofArticle128[b]byR.A.No.7730.
Article 129 expressly makes reference to the grounds provided in Article 223 [infra] of the Labor Code as
applicabletoappealsbroughtthereunder.
Article 217 does not contain the grounds but those mentioned in Article 223 are applicable to appeals from
decisions,awardsorordersoftheLaborArbiter.
UnderArticle223,thefollowingarethegroundsforappeal:
a.IfthereisaprimafacieevidenceofabuseofdiscretiononthepartoftheLaborArbiter;
b.Ifthedecision,orderorawardwassecuredthroughfraudorcoercion,includinggraftandcorruption;
c. Ifmadepurelyonquestionsoflaw;and/or
d.If serious errors in the findings of fact are raised which, ifnot corrected, would causegrave or irreparable
damageorinjurytotheappellant.(Articles129and223,LaborCode;Section2[d],RuleVI,2005RevisedRules
ofProcedureoftheNLRC).
11.Ontheperiodtodecideappealandfinalityofdecision.
Article 128 [b]does notprescribetheperiod within which to decide theappeal andwhen suchdecision will
becomefinalandexecutory.However,itsimplementingrules,whilenotprovidingtheperiodwithinwhichthedecision
should be rendered, mention that the decisions, orders or resolutions of the DOLE Secretary shall become final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof. (See Section 5, Rule V, Rules on the Disposition of Labor
StandardsCasesintheRegionalOffices).
Article129mentionsexpresslythattheNLRCshouldresolvetheappealwithinten(10)calendardaysfromthe
submissionofthelastpleadingrequiredorallowedunderitsrules,whichperiodisdifferentfromthatprovidedunder
Article223whichiswithintwenty(20)calendardays.Withrespecttothefinalityofthedecisionontheappealedcase,
Article223providesthatthesameshallbefinalandexecutoryafterten(10)calendardaysfromreceiptthereofbythe
parties.
Article217doesnotembodytheprovisionontheperiodwithinwhichtodecideappealedcasesortheperiod
withinwhichsuchdecisionshallbecomefinalandexecutory.ThesemattersareprovidedunderArticle223oftheLabor
Code.
=====================================
6. DOLE Secretary
b. Power to suspend effects of termination
=====================================
Relevant Provision: Article 277 [b], Labor Code
1.SUSPENSIONOFTHEEFFECTSOFTERMINATION.
a.Powertosuspendeffectsoftermination.
OneoftheextraordinarypowersgrantedtotheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentishispowerunderArticle
277[b]oftheLaborCodetosuspendtheeffectsofterminationeffectedbyanemployerwhichhemayexerciseeven
pendingresolutionofthelegalityorvaliditythereofinanappropriateproceeding.

Article 128 Visitorial and Enforcement Power
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b.Grounds.
TheDOLESecretarymaysuspendtheeffectsofterminationpendingresolutionofthedisputeintheeventofa
primafaciefindingbytheappropriateofficialoftheDOLEbeforewhomthedisputeispendingthat:
1.theterminationmaycauseaseriouslabordispute;or
2.theterminationisinimplementationofamasslayoff.
240
c.Rationaleforsuspendingtheeffectsoftermination.
Theobviouspurposebehindthisruleistobringthepartiesbacktothestatusquoantelitem,thatis,theirstate
ofrelationshippriortothetermination.Inthisway,theworkerswillbelitigatingtheissueofthevalidityorlegalityof
theirterminationonmoreorlessequalfootingwiththeemployersincetheywillnotbedeprivedoftheirwageswhile
thelitigationisongoing.
d.Reinstatementpendingresolutionoftheterminationdispute.
Suspension of the effects of termination will necessarily result in the immediate reinstatement of the
terminatedemployees.AnorderofreinstatementpendingresolutionofthecasemaythusbeissuedbytheSecretaryof
LaborandEmploymentpursuanttothispower.(No.12,BriefingPaperonR.A.6715).
e.WhoaretheappropriateofficialsreferredtoinArticle277[b]?
The particular portion of Article 277 [b] on suspension of the effects of termination empowers the
appropriateofficialoftheDepartmentofLaborandEmploymentbeforewhomthedisputeispending,tomakethe
primafaciefindingthattheterminationmaycauseaseriouslabordisputeorisinimplementationofamasslayoff
whichfindingisaprerequisitetotheissuancebytheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentoftheordersuspendingthe
effectsofthetermination.
Thesaidprovisiondoesnotspecifywhothisappropriateofficialis.AdissectionoftheLaborCodeindicates
thatthefollowingofficialshavethepowertotakecognizanceofterminationdisputesintheexerciseoftheiroriginaland
exclusivejurisdiction:
1. LaborArbitersunderparagraph[a](2)ofArticle217;
2. VoluntaryArbitratorsorpanelsofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticles261and262;
3. TheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment,intheexerciseofhisassumptionpowerinnationalinterestcases.
Underparagraph[g]ofArticle263,hemaytakecognizanceofterminationdisputesthatareincludedinthe
case/soverwhichheassumesjurisdictionthereunder.
4. TheNLRC,innationalinterestcasescertifiedtoitforcompulsoryarbitrationbytheSecretaryofLaborand
EmploymentunderthesameArticle263[g].
f.CasewhereDOLESecretaryorderedboththesuspensionoftheeffectsofterminationandthereturnto
workofemployeespursuanttoacertificationorderissuedunderArticle263[g].
UniversityofSto.Tomasv.NLRCandUSTFacultyUnion,[G.R.No.89920,October18,1990]
Inthiscase,allthesixteen(16)officersanddirectorsofthefacultyunionwereterminatedonthegroundsof
grave misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming a faculty member. As a result of said
dismissal, some faculty members stagedmass leaves of absence forseveraldays,disruptingclasses in all levels atthe
university.ThefacultyunionfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalandunfairlaborpracticewiththeLaborArbiterwho,
onaprimafacieshowingthattheterminationwascausingaseriouslabordispute,certifiedthemattertotheSecretary
ofLaborandEmploymentforapossiblesuspensionoftheeffectsoftermination.Onthebasisofthis,DOLESecretary
FranklinDrilonissuedanordersuspendingtheeffectsoftheterminationoftheunionofficersanddirectorsandordering
theuniversitytoacceptthembacktoworkunderthesametermsandconditionsprevailingpriortotheirdismissal.
Later, on the basis of a petition for assumption or certification filed by the university, Secretary Drilon modified said
order by certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 [g] of the Labor
Code. He accordingly ordered the university to readmit all its faculty members, including the 16 union officers and
directors,underthesametermsandconditionsprevailingpriortothedispute.
Based on the foregoing, it may be said that suspension of the effects of termination has the same effect as
assumptionorcertificationasfarasthereinstatementoftheaffectedemployeesisconcerned.
===========================
Jurisdiction
===========================
Relevant Provisions: Articles 217 [c], 260, 261 and 262, Labor Code
NOTE:ALTHOUGHNOTPRESCRIBEDINTHESYLLABUS,ADISCUSSIONONTHEJURISDICTIONOFTHEVOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR, VISVIS THE GRIEVANCE MACHINERY/PROCEDURE AND LABOR ARBITER IS NECESSARY,
TOFULLYAPPRECIATETHISTOPICONVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
1.JURISDICTIONOFGRIEVANCEMACHINERY.

240
Article277[b], LaborCode, asamendedbySection33, R. A. No. 6715.
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Submissionofanissuetothegrievancemachinery,asageneralrule,isthefirststepbeforevoluntary
arbitrationmayberesortedtobytheparties.
Thegrievancemachineryhasjurisdictionoverthefollowinggrievances:
1. InterpretationandimplementationoftheCBA;and
2. Interpretationandenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.
241
Ifthesetwocasesareunresolvedwithin7daysfromtheirsubmissionforresolutionbytheGrievance
Committee,theyshallbeforwardedtoaVoluntaryArbitratorforvoluntaryarbitration.

2.JURISDICTIONOFVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
a.Originalandexclusivejurisdiction.
TheVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitratorsshallhaveexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionoverthe
followingcases:
1. Unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement(CBA).
2. Unresolvedgrievancesarisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.
3. ViolationsoftheCBAwhicharenotgrossincharacter.
4. Wagedistortionissuesarisingfromtheapplicationofanywageordersinorganizedestablishments.
5. Other labor disputes, including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks, upon agreement of the
parties.
242
6. Unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation and implementation of the Productivity Incentive
ProgramsunderR.A.No.6971.
b.SomeprinciplesonjurisdictionofVoluntaryArbitrators.
1. CasescognizablebyVoluntaryArbitratorsbutfiledwiththeLaborArbiters,DOLERegionalOfficesorNCMB
should be referred to the Voluntary Arbitrators mutually chosen by the parties.
243
They are required to
immediately dispose and refer the same to the appropriate grievance machinery or voluntary arbitration
providedintheCBA.
244
2. CasescognizablebyVoluntaryArbitratorsbutfiledwiththeregularcourtsshouldbedismissed.
245
3. WHENACASEDOESNOTINVOLVETHEPARTIESTOACBATHEEMPLOYERANDTHEBARGAININGUNION
ITISNOTSUBJECTTOVOLUNTARYARBITRATION.Onlydisputesinvolvingtheunionandthecompanyshall
bereferredtothegrievancemachineryorvoluntaryarbitrators.
246
TERMINATIONDISPUTES.
4. Aterminationdisputeisnotagrievableissue;hence,grievancemachineryandVoluntaryArbitratorshave
no jurisdiction over this issue. Termination cases do not call for the interpretation or enforcement of
companypersonnelpoliciesandsotheymaynotbeconsideredgrievableorarbitrable.
247
5. Interminationcases,ifthebargainingunionisnotnamedapartytotheillegaldismissalsuiteitherbecause
itfailedtoobjecttothedismissaloftheemployeeorthesuitwasinitiatedbytheemployeealone,without
theassistanceofhisunion,VoluntaryArbitratorhasnojurisdictionthereover.
248
6. EvenifitisthepolicyoftheStatetopromotevoluntaryarbitrationasamodeofsettlingdisputes,thisdoes
notforeclosethefilingofaterminationcasewiththeLaborArbiter.
249
7. To confer jurisdiction with the Voluntary Arbitrator over termination disputes, there must be express
agreement between employer and the bargaining agent to submit the termination case to voluntary
arbitration.
250
8. EveniftheCBAprovides thatterminationdisputesaregrievable,thesameismerelydiscretionaryonthe
partofthepartiesthereto.
251
9. TheVoluntaryArbitratorhasnojurisdictionovercases involving the terminationofemployment effected

pursuanttotheprovisionofaunionsecurityclause.
252
10. Even on the issue of termination of employment due to retirement under the retirement plan provided
under the CBA, it has been held that the Labor Arbiter and not the Voluntary Arbitrator who has
jurisdictionthereover.
253
MONEYCLAIMSCASES.
11. The Voluntary Arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims arising from the
interpretationorimplementationoftheCBAand,thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementof

241
Article260, Labor Code.
242
SeeArticles261and262, LaborCode.
243
, Seeparagraph2, Article261, asamendedbyR.A. No. 6715andimplementedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03; See
244
Par. 2, Article261, LaborCode; Section4, RuleXIX, BookV, RulestoImplement theLaborCode, asamendedbyDepartment OrderNo. 40-03, Seriesof 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
245
Unionof NestleWorkersCagayandeOroFactoryv. NestlePhilippines, Inc., [G.R. No. 148303, October17, 2002].
246
Tabiguev. International CopraExport Corporation, [G.R. No. 183335, December23, 2009].
247
SeeArticle217[c]; SanMiguel Corporationv. NLRC, [G.R. No. 108001, March15, 1996, 255SCRA133, 140].
248
Manejav. NLRC, [G.R. No. 124013, June5, 1998, 290SCRA603], PantrancoNorthExpress, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 95940, July24, 1996] andAtlasFarms, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 142244, November18, 2002].
249
Viverov. CA, [G.R. No. 138938, October 24, 2000, 344SCRA268, 281].
250
LandtexIndustriesv. CA, [G.R. No. 150278, August 9, 2007].
251
Viverov. CA, [supra].
252
SanyoPhilippinesWorkersUnion-PSSLUv. Canizares, [G.R. No. 101619, July8, 1992].
253
PantrancoNorthExpress, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 95940, July24, 1996].
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companypersonnelpolicies,underArticle261.TheLaborArbitersjurisdictionovermoneyclaimscasesis
limitedonlytothosearisingfromstatutesorcontractsotherthanaCBA.
254
STRIKESANDLOCKOUTS.
12. The Voluntary Arbitrators may hear and decide issue of legality of strikes or lockouts for as long as the
partiesmutuallyagreetosubmitittovoluntaryarbitration.
255
VIOLATIONSOFACBA.
13. Ordinary violation of a CBA which involves noneconomic provisions thereof is not ULP and should be
resolved as a grievance or grievable issue properly cognizable under the grievance machinery and
voluntaryarbitrationprovisionsofaCBA.IftheviolationoftheCBAisgrossincharacter,i.e.,therefusalto
complywiththeeconomicprovisionsthereofisflagrantand/ormalicious,itshouldbetreatedasanunfair
labor practice and thus may be taken cognizance of by the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 or by the
VoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators,uponagreementoftheparties,underArticle262of
theLaborCode.
WAGEDISTORTIONCASES.
14. Jurisdictional over wage distortion cases depends on whether the establishment is organized or
unorganized.Iforganized,theVoluntaryArbitratorhasjurisdiction.Ifunorganized,theLaborArbiterhas
jurisdiction.
256

ENFORCEMENTOFDECISIONSOFVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
15.Bothpartiestoavoluntaryarbitrationproceedingarerequiredtocomplyvoluntarilyandfaithfullywiththe
decisionrenderedtherein.
257
16. The Voluntary Arbitrator may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the NLRC or the
regularcourtsoranypublicofficialwhomthepartiesmayhavedesignatedintheirSubmissionAgreement,
toexecutethefinaldecision.
17. IntheabsenceoftheVoluntaryArbitratoror,incaseofhisincapacity,themotionfortheissuanceofawrit
of execution should be filed with the Labor Arbiter in the region having jurisdiction over the workplace.
Thefilingofamotionfortheissuanceofawritofexecutioniswithoutprejudicetoanyotheractionwhich
the aggrieved party may take against the noncomplying party such as a motion for contempt or
impositionoffinesandpenalties.
258
c.PowersanddutiesofVoluntaryArbitrators.
TheVoluntaryArbitratorshallhavethefollowingpowers:
1. Torequireanypersontoattendhearing/s;
2. To subpoena witnesses and receive documents when the relevancy of the testimony and the materiality
thereofhavebeendemonstratedtothearbitrator;
3. Totakewhateveractionisnecessarytoresolvetheissue/ssubjectofthedispute;
4. Toissueawritofexecutiontoenforcefinaldecisionsandinconnectiontherewith,itshallbehisdutyto:
4.1. seetoitthathisdecisionisfullysatisfied;
4.2.inquireintothecorrectnessoftheexecutionofhisfinaldecision;
4.3.considerwhateversuperveningeventthatmaytranspireduringsuchexecution;
4.4.determineeveryquestionoffactandlawwhichmaybeinvolvedintheexecution.
259
3.LATESTRULE:DOLESECRETARYMAYACTASVOLUNTARYARBITRATOR.
a.AdministrativeInterventionforDisputeAvoidance(AIDA).
AnewformofdisputesettlementbytheDOLESecretarywasenunciatedinDOLECircularNo.1,Seriesof2006
issued on August 11, 2006. This recourse is separate from the established dispute resolution modes of mediation,
conciliationandarbitrationundertheLaborCode,andisanalternativetoothervoluntarymodesofdisputeresolution
such as the voluntary submission of a dispute to the Regional Director for mediation, to the NCMB for preventive
mediation,ortotheinterventionofaregionalorlocaltripartitepeacecouncilforthesamepurpose.
260
b.PartieswhomayrequestfortheDOLESecretarysintervention.
Either or both the employer and the certified collective bargaining agent (or the representative of the
employees where there is no certified bargaining agent) may voluntarily bring to the Office of the DOLE Secretary,
throughaRequestforIntervention,anypotentialorongoingdisputedefinedbelow.
261

254
SeeArticle217[c]; Del MontePhilippines, Inc. v. Saldivar, [G.R. No. 158620, October11, 2006].
255
Pursuant toandonthestrengthof Article262.
256
Article124, Labor Code, asamendedbySection3, R.A. No. 6727; Section7, Chapter II, ImplementingRulesof R.A. No. 6727; Section7, ChapterII, ImplementingRulesof R.A. No. 6727; Section1, RuleVII, Rulesof ProcedureonMinimumWageFixingissuedbytheNational Wages
andProductivityCommissionon04June1990.
257
Section8, RuleVII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004]; LuzonDevelopment Bankv. Associationof LuzonDevelopment BankEmployees, G.R. No. 120319, Oct. 9, 1995.
258
Section1, RuleVIII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004]; SeealsoArticle262-A, Labor Code; Section8, RuleXIX, BookV, RulestoImplement theLabor Code, asamendedbyDepartment Order No. 40-03, Series
of 2003, [Feb. 17, 2003].
259
Section3, RuleV, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004].
260
No. 1, DOLECircularNo. 1, Seriesof 2006.
261
Id..
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c.Potentialorongoingdispute.
Apotentialorongoingdisputerefersto:
1.aliveandactivedispute;
2.thatmayleadtoastrikeorlockoutortomassivelaborunrest;and
3.is not the subject of any complaint ornotice of strike or lockoutatthe time aRequest for Intervention is
made.
262
d.PrerequisitetointerventionbytheDOLESecretary.
The Office of the Secretary or the Regional Director, in the proper case, shall proceed to intervene after the
partiesshallhavemanifestedthat:
1. they voluntarily submit their potential or ongoing dispute to intervention by the Office of the DOLE
Secretary;
2. there is no pending notice of strike or lockout or any related complaint in relation to their potential or
ongoingdispute;
3. they shall refrain from any strike or lockout or any form of work stoppage or from filing any related
complaintwhiletheSecretary'sinterventionisineffect;and
4. they shall abide by the agreement reached,whose termsmay be enforced through the appropriate writs
issuedbytheDOLESecretary.
All agreements settling the dispute should be in writing and signed by the parties as well as the official who
mediatedthedispute.
263
4. NEW RULE: DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTORS MAY ACT AS EXOFFICIO
VOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
DepartmentOrderNo.8307,Seriesof2007[June8,2007]designatedallDOLERegionalDirectorsandAssistant
RegionalDirectorsasExOfficioVoluntaryArbitrators(EVAs)tohavejurisdictionoverthefollowingissues:
1. GrievancesarisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationoftheCBAs;
2. Grievancesfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies;
3. VoluntaryarbitrationcasesreferredbytheDOLESecretaryundertheDOLEsAdministrativeInterventionfor
DisputeAvoidance(AIDA)initiative(providedunderDOLECircularNo.1,Seriesof2006,[supra]);
4. Uponagreementoftheparties,anyotherlabordisputeasmaybesubmittedbytheparties.
5.PHILIPPINEARBITRATIONLAW,NOTAPPLICABLETOLABORCASES.
RepublicActNo.876,[TheArbitrationLaw]doesnotapplytovoluntaryarbitrationoflaborcases.
6.ALTERNATIVEDISPUTERESOLUTIONACTOF2004,NOTAPPLICABLETOLABORCASES.
RepublicActNo.9285[AlternativeDisputeResolutionActof2004]approvedonApril2,2004,doesnotapply
tolaborcases.
===========================
a. Submission Agreement
===========================
1.SUBMISSIONAGREEMENT.
a.Initiationofarbitration.
Anarbitrationmaybeinitiatedeitherbywayof:
1. ASubmissionAgreement;or
2. ADemandorNoticetoArbitrateinvokingthearbitrationclauseintheCBA;or
3. AnAppointmentfromtheNCMB.
Sometimes,boththeSubmissionAgreementandtheNoticetoArbitrateareusedinterchangeably.
264
b.SubmissionAgreement,defined.
ASubmissionAgreementreferstoawrittenagreementbythepartiessubmittingtheircaseforarbitration,
containingastatementoftheissues,thenameoftheirchosenVoluntaryArbitratorandastipulationandanundertaking
toabidebyandcomplywiththeresolutionthatmayberenderedtherein,includingthecostofarbitration.
265
c.ContentsofaSubmissionAgreement.
TheSubmissionAgreementshouldcontain,amongothers,thefollowingstipulations:
1. Anagreementtosubmitthecasetoarbitration;

262
Id..
263
No. 4, Ibid..
264
No. 54, NCMBPrimeronGrievanceSettlement andVoluntaryArbitration.
265
Section1[i], RuleII, NCMBRevisedProcedural GuidelinesintheConduct of VoluntaryArbitrationProceedings[Oct. 15, 2004].
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2. Thespecificissue/stobearbitrated;
3. Thename/softheVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators;
4. Thenames,addressesandcontactnumbersoftheparties;
5. The agreement to perform or abide by the decision that may be rendered therein by the Voluntary
ArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitrators.
266
2.NOTICETOARBITRATE.
a.NoticetoArbitrate,defined.
A Notice to Arbitrate refers to a formal demand made by one party to the other for the arbitration of a
particulardisputeintheeventofrefusalbyonepartyinaCBAtosubmitthesametoarbitration.
267
b.SubmissiontoarbitrationthroughNoticetoArbitrate.
Ifafterexhaustingthegrievanceprocedure,thegrievanceremainsunresolvedandonepartyrefusestosubmit
thesametovoluntaryarbitration,thefollowingprocedureshouldbeobserved:
1. ANoticetoArbitrateshouldbeservedupontherefusingorunwillingparty,copyfurnishedthepermanent
VoluntaryArbitrator,ifoneisnamedintheCBA,andtheNCMBRegionalBranchhavingjurisdictionoverthe
workplace;
2. AfterthelapseofthesevendayperiodwithinwhichtorespondtotheNoticetoArbitrate,thepermanent
VoluntaryArbitratorshallimmediatelycommencethearbitrationproceedings;
3. IntheabsenceofapermanentVoluntaryArbitratornamedintheCBA,theNCMBshallappointaVoluntary
Arbitrator who shall immediately commence the arbitration proceedings upon receipt of such
appointment.
268
c.ContentsofaNoticetoArbitrate.
TheNoticetoArbitrateshouldcontain,amongothers,thefollowing:
1. Thenames,addressesandcontactnumbersofthepartyuponwhomthenoticeismade;
2. ThearbitrationclauseoftheCBA;
3. Thespecificissue/sordispute/stobearbitrated;
4. Thereliefsought;and
5. Thename,addressandcontactnumbersofthepartyinitiatingorrequestingthearbitration.
269
d.Submissionagreementandnoticetoarbitrate,distinguished.
SubmissionAgreementissometimescalledastipulationoranagreementtoarbitrate.Itisusedwhere
thereisnopreviousagreementtoarbitrate.Thesubmissionagreementwhichmustbesignedbybothparties,describes
an existing dispute. It often names the arbitrator, prescribes the procedure in the hearing and sometimes contains
considerable details of the arbitrators authority and other matters which the parties wish to control. A submission
agreementismoreappropriateininterestdisputessincecollectivebargainingagreementsgenerallydonotprovidefor
the arbitration of such disputes that may arise in the future. Submission agreement is often entered into after the
disputehasmaterializedandtheissuescanalreadybedefined.
However,aDemandoraNoticeofIntenttoArbitrateorsimplyaNoticetoArbitrate,ismoreapplicable
torightsdisputesbecausecollectivebargainingagreementsarerequiredunderRepublicActNo.6715,toprovidefora
grievance procedure and a voluntary arbitration clause with respect to disputes arising from the application or
interpretationoftheCBAortheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.Thus,itisperfectlyvalid
tostipulateintheCBAonanagreementtoarbitratefuturedisputesthatmayariseunderandduringthetermthereof.
Ifadisputeiscoveredbysuchanarbitrationclause,arbitrationmaybeinitiatedunilaterallybyonepartybyservingupon
theotherawrittendemandornoticeofintenttoarbitrate.
270
e.SomeprinciplesinconnectionwithSubmissionAgreement.
1. Partiestoacasemaystillchoosetoexecuteasubmissionagreementevenifthereisalreadyanarbitration
clauseintheCBA.
2. PartiesnotimpleadedinthecasearenotboundbythedecisionrenderedbytheVoluntaryArbitrator.
271
===========================
===========================
1.JUDICIALREVIEWOFDECISIONSOFVOLUNTARYARBITRATORS.
a.Decisionsarefinalandexecutory.
Asageneralrule,decisionsorawardsofVoluntaryArbitratorsarefinal,inappealableandexecutoryafterten
(10)calendardaysfromreceiptofacopythereofbytheparties.
272

266
Section5, RuleIV, Ibid..
267
Section1[j], RuleII, Ibid..
268
269
270
No. 55, NCMBPrimer onGrievanceSettlement andVoluntaryArbitration.
271
TemicAutomotivePhilippines, Inc. v. TemicAutomotivePhilippines, Inc. EmployeesUnionFFW, [G.R. No. 186965, December 23, 2009].
272
Article262-A, LaborCode; No. 107, NCMBPrimeronGrievanceSettlement andVoluntaryArbitration.
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b.Judicialreview.
It is wellsettled a rule, however, that the findings of fact and law made by the Voluntary Arbitrator may be
reviewedbythecourt.
273
Judicialreviewisjustifiedincertaincases,
274
towit:
TheVoluntaryArbitratorsdecisionsorawardsmaybecontestedonthefollowinggrounds:
1.Lackorwantofjurisdiction;
2.Graveabuseofdiscretion;
3.Violationofdueprocess;
4.Denialofsubstantivejustice;
5.Erroneousinterpretationofthelaw.
275
c.SomeprinciplesinthejudicialreviewofdecisionsoftheVoluntaryArbitrators.
1.FactualfindingsofVoluntaryArbitratorsaccordednotonlyrespectbutfinality.
276
2. Voluntary Arbitrator acts in a quasijudicial capacity, although he is not a part of a government unit or a
personneloftheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.
277
3. ThemodeisordinaryappealunderRule43ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
278
4.Periodofappealis15days.
279
5.Paymentofappealdocketfeewithinprescribedperiod,bothmandatoryandjurisdictional.
280
6.AppealwillbedismissediferroneouslyfiledunderRule65insteadofRule43.ItmustbenotedthatRule65
petitionforcertiorariisnotasubstituteforalapsedappeal.
281
===========================
8. Court of Appeals
===========================
1.RULE65CERTIORARIPETITIONTOCAFROMNLRCDECISIONS.
a.Certiorari,nature.
A decision of the NLRC may be elevated to the Court of Appeals by way of Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari in
caseswheresuchdecisionisrendered:
1. withoutjurisdiction;or
2. inexcessofjurisdiction;or
3. withgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.
b.SomeprinciplesonRule65certioraripetition.
1. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the
commissionofgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.
282
2. Therighttofileaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariisneitheranaturalrightnorapartofdueprocess.Awritof
certiorariisaprerogativewrit,neverdemandableasamatterofright,neverissuedexceptintheexerciseof
judicialdiscretion.
283
3. ThejurisdictionoftheCAtoreviewadecisionoftheNLRCinapetitionforcertioraridoesnotincludethe
correctnessofitsevaluationoftheevidenceorofitsfactualfindingswhicharegenerallyaccordednotonly
respect but also finality, but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The judicial
reviewdoesnotgoasfarastoexamineandassesstheevidenceofthepartiesandtoweightheprobative
valuethereof.
284
4. CertiorarimaybefiledeveniftheNLRCdecisionhasbecomefinalandexecutory.
285
5. CertioraripetitionunderRule65iscognizablebytheCAandnotbytheSC.
286
7. Periodwithinwhichtofilecertioraripetitions60dayswhichisinextindible.
287
8. 60day period computed from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsiderationornewtrialistimelyfiled,whethersuchmotionisrequiredornot,the60dayperiodshall
becountedfromnoticeofthedenialofsaidmotion.
288
9.The60dayperiodisreckonedfromreceiptofthedecisionbycounsel,notbyparty.
289

273
Continental MarbleCorporationv. NLRC, G.R. No. L-43825, May9, 1988.
274
Unicraft IndustriesInternational Corporationv. CA, G.R. No. 134903, March26, 2001.
275
SimeDarbyPilipinas, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 90426, Dec. 15, 1989; No. 107, NCMBPrimer onGrievanceSettlement andVoluntaryArbitration.
276
HondaPhils., Inc. v. SamahanngMalayangManggagawasaHonda, G.R. No. 145561, June15, 2005; National Steel Corporationv. CA, G.R. No. 134468, Aug. 29, 2002; ColegiodeSanJuandeLetran-Calambav. Villas, [G.R. No. 137795, March26, 2003].
277
LuzonDevelopment Bank v. Associationof LuzonDevelopment Bank Employees, [G.R. No. 120319, October 6, 1995]; OceanicBicDivision(FFW) v. Romero, No. L-43890, July16, 1984, 130SCRA392, 400; SeealsoLudo&LuymCorporationv. Saornido, G.R. No.
140960, Jan. 20, 2003, 395SCRA451, 458.
278
LuzonDevelopment Bank, [supra]; Alcantara, Jr. v. CA, [G.R. No. 143397, August 6, 2002]; SeeLeyteIVElectricCooperative, Inc. v. LEYECOIVEmployeesUnion-ALU, G.R. No. 157775, October 19, 2007; CentroEscolar UniversityFacultyandAlliedWorkers-Independent Unionv.
Court of Appeals, [G.R. No. 165486, May31, 2006, 490SCRA61, 69-70].
279
Section1, inrelationtoSection4, of Rule43, Rulesof Court.
280
Saint LouisUniversity, Inc. v. Cobarrubias, [G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010]; RubyShelterBuildersandRealtyDevelopment Corporationv. FormaranIII, G.R. No. 175914, Feb. 10, 2009, 578SCRA283, 297; Ruizv. DelosSantos, G.R. No. 166386, Jan. 27, 2009, 577SCRA29, 43.
281
ManilaMidtownHotel v. VABorromeo, [G.R. No. 138305, September22, 2004],
282
Odangov. NLRC, G.R. No. 147420, June10, 2004.
283
GermanMachineriesCorporationv. Endaya, G.R. No. 156810, Nov. 25, 2004; Nunal v. CommissiononAudit, G.R. No. 78648, Jan. 24, 1989, 169SCRA356, 363.
284
SeaPowerShippingEnterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 138270, June28, 2001, 412Phil. 603; Permex, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125031, Jan. 24, 2000; Aquinov. CA, G.R. No. 149404, Sept. 15, 2006.
285
TomasClaudioMemorial College, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 152568, Feb. 16, 2004.
286
St. MartinFuneral Homev. NLRC, [G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295SCRA494(EnBanc)].
287
SeeSection4, Rule65, asamendedbyCircular No. 39-98[effectiveSept. 1, 1998] andfurther amendedbyA. M. No. 00-2-03-SC[effectiveSept. 1, 2000]; Labaov. Flores, G.R. No. 187984, Nov. 15, 2010; LagunaMettsCorporationv. CA, G.R. No. 185220, July27, 2009, 594SCRA
139, 143, citingDeLosSantosv. CA, G.R. No. 147912, April 26, 2006, 488SCRA351; Yutingcov. CA, 435Phil. 83, 91[2002].
288
Tirazonav. CA, G.R. No. 169712, March13, 2008.
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===========================
9. Supreme Court
===========================
1. APPEALFROMTHECOURTOFAPPEALSTOTHESUPREMECOURTBYPETITIONFORREVIEWONCERTIORARI
UNDERRULE45.
a.Rule45petitions,themodeofelevatingacasefromtheCourtofAppealstotheSupremeCourt.
Since the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that may be filed
beforeitfromthedecisionsoftheNLRC,anyallegederrorscommittedbyitintheexerciseofitsjurisdictionwouldbe
errorsofjudgmentwhicharereviewablebymeansofatimelyappealtotheSupremeCourtandnotbyaspecialcivil
action of certiorari. Such appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari
underRule45andnotaspecialcivilactionofcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.
b.SomeprinciplesonRule45,RulesofCourt.
1. Reglementary period to appeal is 15 days from notice of judgment or denial of the motion for
reconsideration.
290
2. ApetitionforcertiorariunderRule65cannotbeasubstituteforalostappealunderRule45;hence,itshould
bedismissed.
291
3.ApartycannotfileapetitionbothunderRules45and65.
292
============================
10. Prescription of Actions
a. Money claims
b. Illegal dismissal
c. Unfair labor practice
d. Offenses penalized by the
Labor Code and IRR issued
pursuant thereto
============================
1.PRESCRIPTIVEPERIODOFMONEYCLAIMSCASES.
a.Prescriptiveperiodisthree(3)yearsunderArticle291oftheLaborCode.
Theprescriptiveperiodofallmoneyclaimsandbenefitsarisingfromemployeremployeerelationsis3years
fromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued;otherwise,theyshallbeforeverbarred.
293
b.Allmoneyclaimsofworkersprescribein3years.
Article291contemplatesallmoneyclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelationship,including:
1.MoneyclaimsarisingfromtheCBA.
294
2.MoneyclaimsofOverseasFilipinoWorkers(OFWs).
295
3.Incrementalproceedsfromtuitionincreases.
296
2.PRESCRIPTIVEPERIODOFILLEGALDISMISSALCASES.
a.LegalbasisisnotArticle291oftheLaborCodebutArticle1146oftheCivilCode.
The 3year prescriptive period in Article 291 solely applies to money claims but not to illegal dismissal cases
which are not in thenature of moneyclaims. The prescriptive period of illegaldismissalcases is 4yearsunderArticle
1146oftheCivilCode.
297
3.PRESCRIPTIVEPERIODOFUNFAIRLABORPRACTICE(ULP)CASES.
a.PrescriptiveperiodofULPcasesis1year(Article290,LaborCode).
Theprescriptiveperiodforallcomplaintsinvolvingunfairlaborpracticesisone(1)yearfromthetimetheacts
complainedofwerecommitted;otherwise,theyshallbeforeverbarred.
298
b.Prerequisiteforprosecutionofcriminalcases.
BeforeacriminalactionforULPmaybefiled,itisaconditionsinequanonthatafinaljudgmentfindingthatan
unfair labor practice act was committed by the respondent should first be secured or obtained in the labor or
administrativecaseinitiatedbeforetheLaborArbiterortheVoluntaryArbitrator,asthecasemaybe.
299
Finaljudgment
isonethatfinallydisposesoftheactionorproceeding.Forinstance,iftheremedyofappealisavailablebutnoappealis

289
Ginetev. SunriseManningAgency, [G.R. No. 142023, June21, 2001].
290
AsianTransmissionCorporationv. CA, G.R. No. 144664, March15, 2004; SeealsoTirazonav. CA, G.R. No. 169712, March13, 2008; SanMiguel Corporationv. CA, G.R. No. 146775, Jan. 30, 2002, 375SCRA311, 315.
291
MalayangKapisananngManggagawasaAssociatedAngloAmericanTobaccoCorp. [MAKAMANGGAGAWA] v. AssociatedAngloAmericanTobaccoCorp., G.R. No. 156613, Feb. 18, 2008; NewEverMarketing, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 140555, July14, 2005, 463SCRA284, 293-294.
292
NagkahiusangMamumuosaPicopResources, Inc.-SouthernPhilippinesFederationof Labor[NAMAPRI-SPFL] v. TheHon. CA, G.R. Nos. 148839-40, Nov. 2, 2006; SeealsoPanganibanv. TaraTradingShipmanagement, Inc., [G.R. No. 187032, October18, 2010].
293
Section1, RuleII, BookVII, RulestoImplement theLaborCode; E. Ganzon, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 123769, Dec. 22, 1999; Surimav. NLRC, G.R. No. 121147, June26, 1998.
294
Cadalinv. POEA, [G.R. Nos. 104776, 104911-14and105029-32, December05, 1994].
295
Degamov. AvantgardeShippingCorp., [G.R. No. 154460, November22, 2005]; SoutheasternShippingv. Navarra, Jr., [G.R. No. 167678, June22, 2010]; MedlineManagement, Inc. v. Roslinda, [G.R. No. 168715, September15, 2010].
296
Universityof Pangasinanv. Confesor, G. R. No. 109977, Sept. 5, 1997; CebuInstituteof Technologyv. Ople, G.R. No. L-58870, April 15, 1988, 160SCRA503.
297
Callantav. CarnationPhilippines, [G.R. No. 70615, February29, 1986]; SeealsoPLDTv. Pingol, [G.R. No. 182622, September 8, 2010]; Azcor Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117963, Feb. 11, 1999; PremiereDevelopment Bankv. NLRC, G.R. No. 114695, July23, 1998;
HagonoyRural Bank, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122075, Jan. 28, 1998, 285SCRA297.
298
Paragraph2, Article290, LaborCode; Section2, RuleII, BookVII, RulestoImplement theLaborCode.
299
AsprovidedunderArticle247of theLaborCode.
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made,then,thejudgmentisdeemedfinalandexecutory.Ifanappealismade,thenthefinaljudgmentrenderedbythe
lasttribunal,saytheSupremeCourt,towhichthecasewaselevatedshouldbethereckoningfactor.
c.Interruptionofprescriptiveperiodofoffenses.
AsfarasULPcasesareconcerned,therunningoftheone(1)yearprescriptiveperiodisinterruptedduringthe
pendencyoftheadministrativeproceeding.
300
d.Evidentiaryvalueofthefinaljudgmentinthelaborcase.
InULPcases,thefinaljudgmentintheadministrativecasecannotbepresentedasevidenceofthefactsproven
therein or as evidence of the guilt of the respondent therein. Its evidentiary or probative value is confined merely in
provingthefactofcompliancewiththeconditionsinequanonprescribedbylaw,i.e.,thatafinaljudgmenthasbeen
secured in the administrative proceeding finding that an unfair labor practice act was in fact committed by the
respondent.
301
4. PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF OFFENSES PENALIZED UNDER THE LABOR CODE AND ITS IMPREMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS(IRR).
a.Prescriptiveperiodis3years(Article290,LaborCode).
TheprescriptiveperiodofallcriminaloffensespenalizedundertheLaborCodeandtheRulestoImplementthe
LaborCodeisthree(3)yearsfromthetimeofcommissionthereof.
b.ConsequenceofnoncompliancewithprescriptiveperiodunderArticle290.
Failuretoinitiateorfilethecriminalactionorcomplaintwithintheprescriptiveperiodshallforeverbarsuch
action.
c.IllegaldismissalisnotanoffenseunderArticle290.
Theactoftheemployerindismissinganemployeewithoutcause,althoughaviolationoftheLaborCodeand
its implementing rules, does not amount to an offense as this term is understood and contemplated under Article
290.
302
5.ACCRUALOFCAUSEOFACTION.
a.Causeofaction,elements.
The prescriptive period provided under the law commences to run only upon the accrual of the cause of
action.Thethree(3)elementsofacauseofactionareasfollows:
1. Arightinfavoroftheplaintiffbywhatevermeansandunderwhateverlawitarisesoriscreated;
2. Anobligationonthepartofthenameddefendanttorespectornottoviolatesuchright;and
3. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breachoftheobligationofthedefendanttotheplaintiff.
303
b.Whenacauseofactionaccrues.
Anactiondoesnotaccrueuntilthepartyobligatedtodoorperformanact,refuses,expresslyorimpliedly,to
complywiththeduty.Generally,withoutademandforcomplianceandtheconsequentrefusalbythepartyobligatedto
complytherewith,thecauseofactioncannotbedeemedtohaveaccrued.
5.1.ACCRUALOFCAUSEOFACTIONINMONEYCLAIMSCASES.
a.MeaningofaccruedcauseofactioninmoneyclaimscasesunderArticle291;generalrule.
Thegeneralruleisthatallmoneyclaimsarisingfromanemployeremployeerelationshipshallbefiledwithin
three(3)yearsfromthetimethecauseofactionaccrued;otherwise,theyshallbeforeverbarred.Thismeansthatifitis
establishedthatthebenefitsbeingclaimedhavebeenwithheldfromtheemployeeforaperiodlongerthanthree(3)
years, the amount pertaining to the period beyond the threeyear prescriptive period is barred by prescription. The
amountthatcanonlybedemandedbytheaggrievedemployeeshallbelimitedtotheamountofthebenefitswithheld
withinthree(3)yearsbeforethefilingofthecomplaint.
304
b.Exception.
Acauseofactionformoneyclaimsaccruesuponthecategoricaldenialofaclaim.Inotherwords,toproperly
construe Article 291, it is essential to ascertain the time when the third (3
rd
) element of a cause of action
transpired.Stateddifferently,inthecomputationofthe3yearprescriptiveperiod,adeterminationmustbemadeasto
theperiodwhentheactconstitutingaviolationoftheworkersrighttothebenefitsbeingclaimedwascommitted.Forif
thecauseofactionaccrued more than three(3)yearsbeforethe filingof the moneyclaim, suchcause ofaction has
alreadyprescribedinaccordancewithArticle291.
305
Serranov.CA,[G.R.No.139420,August15,2001,363SCRA223].
Itwasdeclaredherethatthecauseofactionofpetitionerhasnotyetprescribed.Theantecedentfactsindicate
thatfrom1974to1991,respondentMaerskFilipinasCrewing,Inc.,thelocalagentofrespondentforeigncorporation,
A.P.Moller,deployedpetitionerSerranoasaseamantoLiberian,BritishandDanishships.Aspetitionerwasonboarda

300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Callantav. CarnationPhilippines, Inc., G.R. No. 70615, Feb. 29, 1986.
303
JMarketingCorporationv. Taran, G.R. No. 163924, June18, 2009, 589SCRA428, 440, citingAutoBusTransport System, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 156367, May16, 2005; Mendozav. NLRC, G.R. No. 122481, March5, 1998, 287SCRA51.
304
FarEast Agricultural Supply, Inc. v. Lebatique, G.R. No. 162813, Feb. 12, 2007.
305
Article291, Labor Code; Degamov. AvantgardeShippingCorp., [G.R. No. 154460, November22, 2005].
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shipmostofthetime,respondentMaerskofferedtosendportionsofpetitionerssalarytohisfamilyinthePhilippines.
The amounts would be sent by money order. Petitioner agreed to such arrangement and from 1977 to 1978, he
instructedrespondentMaersktosendmoneyorderstohisfamily.RespondentMaerskdeductedtheamountsofthese
money orders totaling HK$4,600.00 and 1,050.00 Sterling Pounds from petitioners salary. Respondent Maersk also
deductedvariousamountsfromhissalaryforDanishSocialSecuritySystem(SSS),welfarecontributions,shipclub,and
SSSMedicare.
It appears that petitioners family failed to receive the money orders petitioner sent through respondent
Maersk. Upon learning this in 1978, petitioner demanded that respondent Maersk pay him the amounts the latter
deducted from his salary. Respondent Maersk assured him that they would look into the matter, then assigned him
again to board one of its vessels. Whenever he returned to the Philippines, petitioner would go to the office of
respondent Maersk to follow up his money claims but he would be told to return after several weeks as respondent
Maerskneededtimetoverifyitsrecordsandtobringupthematterwithitsprincipalemployer,respondentA.P.Moller.
Meantime, respondent Maersk would hire him again to board another one of its vessels for about a year. Finally, in
October1993,petitionerwrotetorespondentMaerskdemandingimmediatepaymenttohimofthetotalamountofthe
moneyordersdeductedfromhissalaryfrom1977to1978.OnNovember11,1993,respondentA.P.Mollerrepliedto
petitionerthatitkeepsaccountingdocumentsonlyforacertainnumberofyears,thusdataonhismoneyclaimsfrom
1977 to 1978 were no longer available. Likewise, it claimed that it had no outstanding money orders. A.P. Moller
declinedpetitionersdemandforpayment.Inrulingthatthecauseofactionhasnotyetprescribed,theSupremeCourt
declared:
ThefactsinthecaseatbararesimilartotheBaliwagcase(BaliwagTransit,Inc.v.Ople,[G.
R.No.57642,March16,1989]).PetitionerrepeatedlydemandedpaymentfromrespondentMaersk
butsimilartotheactuationsofBaliwagTransitintheabovecitedcase,respondentMaerskwardedoff
thesedemandsbysayingthatitwouldlookintothematteruntilyearspassedby.InOctober1993,
Serranofinallydemandedinwritingpaymentoftheunsentmoneyorders.Thenandonlythenwas
the claim categorically denied by respondent A.P. Moller in its letter dated November 22, 1993.
FollowingtheBaliwagTransitruling,petitioners causeofactionaccruedonlyuponrespondentA.P.
Mollers definite denial of his claim in November 1993. Having filed his action five (5) months
thereafterorinApril1994,itwasheldthatitwas filedwithinthethreeyear(3)prescriptiveperiod
providedinArticle291oftheLaborCode.
PhilippineNationalConstructionCorporation[PNCC]v.NLRC,[G.R.No.100353,October22,1999].
ThecomplainantwasnotdismissedbutmerelyaskedtogoonvacationinMay,1985.ItwasonlyonAugust16,
1989thathewasinformedoftheterminationofhisservices.Hence,itwasheldthatwhenhebroughthiscomplaintin
1989, his cause of action was not yet barred by prescription. It was within the threeyear prescriptive period under
Degamov.AvantgardeShippingCorp.,[G.R.No.154460,November22,2005].
PetitionerOFWwasrepatriatedtothePhilippinesonMarch4,1995duetoanaccidentrequiringsurgeryand
hospitalization.Immediatelyuponhisarrival,petitionerreportedtorespondentAvantgardesoffice,butsinceitwasa
Saturday and there was no one to assist him, he went to his relatives in Cebu and was operated at Metro Cebu
Community Hospital. Later, on December 24, 1997, petitioner asked Avantgarde to pay his sickness benefits. On
January6,1998,Avantgarderepliedthatitcouldnolongeractonpetitionersclaimashehaddeviatedfromthelegal
procedure and, should he wish, he could personally followup with its foreign principal, Johnson Management, Pte.,
Ltd.OnMarch4,1998andMay5,1998,petitionerwrotealettertoSembawangregardinghisclaim.Sembawangdid
notreply.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner lodged a complaint for payment of disability benefits and other money claims
againsttherespondentswiththeLaborArbiterwhodismissedthecaseonthegroundofprescription.Onappeal,the
NLRC likewise ruled that petitioners cause of action had prescribed as a mere letter of demand would not toll the
prescriptiveperiodforfilingthecomplaint.Petitionersmotionforreconsiderationwasdenied.
Inaffirmingthesaidruling,theSupremeCourtruledthatacauseofactionaccruesuponthecategoricaldenial
oftheclaim.Consequently,petitionerscauseofactionaccruedonlyonJanuary6,1998,whenAvantgardedeniedhis
claimandsobreacheditsobligationtopetitioner.Petitionercouldnothaveacauseofactionpriortothisdatebecause
hisearlierrequestswerewardedoffbyindefinitepromises.Unfortunately,thecomplaintfiledinthiscaseonMarch2,
2001wasalreadybeyondthethreeyearprescriptiveperiodmandatedbytheLaborCode.
c.Differentprescriptiveruleforserviceincentiveleave.
TheSupremeCourtclarifiedinAutoBusTransportSystem,Inc.v.Bautista,[G.R.No.156367,May16,2005],
thecorrectreckoningoftheprescriptiveperiodforserviceincentiveleave,consideringthattheserviceincentiveleave
isacuriousanimalinrelationtootherbenefitsgrantedbythelawtoeveryemployeebecauseinthecaseofservice
incentiveleave,theemployeemaychoosetoeitherusehisleavecreditsorcommutethemtotheirmonetaryequivalent
ifnotexhaustedattheendoftheyear.Furthermore,iftheemployeeentitledtoserviceincentiveleavedoesnotuseor
commute the same, he is entitled upon his resignation or separation from work to the commutation of his accrued
serviceincentiveleave.
Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code as well as the three (3) elements of a cause of action [supra], the
SupremeCourtruled:
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Correspondingly,itcanbeconscientiouslydeducedthatthecauseofactionofanentitled
employeetoclaimhisserviceincentiveleavepayaccruesfromthemomenttheemployerrefusesto
remunerate its monetary equivalent if the employee did not make use of said leave credits but
instead chose to avail of its commutation. Accordingly, if the employee wishes to accumulate his
leavecreditsandoptsforitscommutationuponhisresignationorseparationfromemployment,his
causeofactiontoclaimthewholeamountofhisaccumulatedserviceincentiveleaveshallarisewhen
theemployerfailstopaysuchamountatthetimeofhisresignationorseparationfromemployment.
Applying Article 291 of the Labor Code in light of this peculiarity of the service incentive
leave,wecanconcludethatthethree(3)yearprescriptiveperiodcommences,notattheendofthe
year when the employee becomes entitled to the commutation of his service incentive leave, but
from the time when the employer refuses to pay its monetary equivalent after demand of
commutationoruponterminationoftheemployeesservices,asthecasemaybe.
XXX
In the case at bar, respondent had not made use of his service incentive leave nor
demanded for its commutation until his employment was terminated by petitioner. Neither did
petitionercompensatehisaccumulatedserviceincentiveleavepayatthetimeofhisdismissal.Itwas
onlyuponhisfilingofacomplaintforillegaldismissal,onemonthfromthetimeofhisdismissal,that
respondentdemandedfromhisformeremployercommutationofhisaccumulatedleavecredits.His
causeofactiontoclaimthepaymentofhisaccumulatedserviceincentiveleavethusaccruedfromthe
timewhenhisemployerdismissedhimandfailedtopayhisaccumulatedleavecredits.
Therefore,theprescriptiveperiodwithrespecttohisclaimforserviceincentiveleavepay
onlycommencedfromthetimetheemployerfailedtocompensatehisaccumulatedserviceincentive
leave pay at the time of his dismissal. Since respondent had filed his money claim after only one
month from the time of his dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive
periodprovidedforbyArticle291oftheLaborCode. [Underscoring supplied]
FollowingtherulinginAutoBus[supra],itwasheldinFarEastAgriculturalSupply,Inc.v.Lebatique,[G.R.No.
162813,February12,2007],thatLebatiquetimelyfiledhisclaimforserviceincentiveleavepay,consideringthatinthis
situation, the prescriptive period commences at the time he was terminated. On the other hand, his claim regarding
nonpaymentofovertimepaysincehewashiredinMarch1996isadifferentmatter.Inthecaseofovertimepay,he
canonlydemandfortheovertimepaywithheldfortheperiodwithinthree(3)yearsprecedingthefilingofthecomplaint
onMarch20,2000.
d. Filingofacasewithgrievancemachinerytollstherunningoftheprescriptiveperiod.
Amonetaryclaimcannotbeconsideredtohaveprescribedifwithinthe3yearperiod,itwassubmittedtothe
grievancecommitteeasprovidedundertheCBA.
306
5.2.ACCRUALOFCAUSEOFACTIONINILLEGALDISMISSALCASES.
It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from the time the employment of the
workerwasunjustlyterminated.Thus,asageneralrule,the4yearprescriptiveperiodshallbecountedandcomputed
from the date of the employees dismissal up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of
employment.
307
BaliwagTransit,Inc.v.Ople,[G.R.No.57642,March16,1989].
AbusofpetitionerBaliwag Transit drivenbythe respondent driver figured inan accident with atrain of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) on August 10, 1974. This resulted to the death of eighteen (18) passengers and
caused serious injuries to fiftysix (56) other passengers. The bus itself also sustained extensive damage. The bus
companyinstitutedacomplaintagainstthePNR.Thelatterwasheldliableforitsnegligenceinthedecisionrenderedon
April 6, 1977. The respondent driver was absolved of any contributory negligence. However, the driver was also
prosecuted for multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries, but the case was provisionally dismissed in
March1980forfailureoftheprosecutionwitnesstoappearatthescheduledhearing.SoonafterthePNRdecisionwas
rendered,thedriverrenewedhislicenseandsoughtreinstatementwithBaliwagTransit.Hewasadvisedtowaituntilhis
criminal case was terminated. He repeatedly requested for reinstatement thereafter, but to no avail, even after
terminationofthecriminalcaseagainsthim.Finally,onMay2,1980,hedemandedreinstatementinalettersignedby
hiscounsel.OnMay10,1980,petitionerBaliwagTransitrepliedthathecouldnotbereinstatedashisdriverslicense
hadalreadybeenrevokedandhisdrivingwasextremelydangeroustotheridingpublic.Thispromptedrespondent
drivertofileonJuly29,1980,aformalcomplaintwiththeMinistryofLaborandEmploymentforillegaldismissalagainst
BaliwagTransitprayingforreinstatementwithbackwagesandemergencycostoflivingallowance.Thecomplaintwas
dismissed by the Regional Director
308
on the ground of prescription under Article 291 of the Labor Code. This was
reversedbythenLaborandEmploymentMinisterBlasF.Ople.OnappealtotheSupremeCourt,itwasruledthatthe
actionhasnotyetprescribedatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaint,viz.:
We hold that the private respondents right of action could not have accrued from the
mere fact of the occurrence of the mishap on August 10, 1974, as he was not considered

306
Central NegrosElectricCooperative, Inc. [CENECO] v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 106246, September 1, 1994].
307
Ramosv. OurLadyof PeaceSchool, G.R. No. L-55950Dec. 26, 1984, 218Phil. 708, 712; BaliwagTransit, Inc. v. Ople, infra.
308
It wastheRegional Director whohasjurisdictionover illegal dismissal casesat that time.
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automaticallydismissed onthatdate. At best,he wasdeemed suspended fromhis work,andnot
evenbypositiveactofthepetitionerbutasaresultofthesuspensionofhisdriverslicensebecause
oftheaccident.Therewasnoapparentdisagreementthenbetween(respondentdriver)Hughesand
his employer. Asthe privaterespondent was thepetitionersprincipal witnessin itscomplaint for
damagesagainstthePhilippineNationalRailways,wemayassumethatBaliwagTransitandHughes
wereonthebestoftermswhenthecasewasbeingtried.Hence,thereexistednojustificationat
that time for the private respondent to demand reinstatement and no opportunity warrant (sic)
eitherforthepetitionertorejectthatdemand.
WeagreewithprivaterespondentthatMay10,1980isthedatewhenhiscauseofaction
accrued,foritwasthenthatthepetitionerdeniedhisdemandforreinstatementandsocommitted
that act or omission constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. The
earlierrequestsbyhimhavingbeenwardedoffwithindefinitepromises,andtheprivaterespondent
notyethavingdecidedtoasserthisright,hiscauseofactioncouldnotbesaidtohavethenalready
accrued. The issues had not yet been joined, so to speak. This happened only when the private
respondent finally demanded reinstatement on May 2, 1980, and his demand was categorically
rejectedbythepetitioneronMay10,1980.
VictoryLiner,Inc.v.Race,[G.R.No.164820,March28,2007].
Therulewasreiteratedherethatthe4yearprescriptiveperiodshallcommencetorunonlyupontheaccrualof
thecauseofactionoftheworker.Inthiscase,therespondentemployeewasabusdriverwhofiguredinanaccidenton
thenightofAugust24,1994.Asaconsequencethereof,respondentsufferedafracturedleftlegandwasrushedtoa
hospitalwherehewasoperatedonandconfinedfromAugust24,1994uptoOctober10,1994.One(1)monthafterhis
release from the said hospital, the respondent was confined again for further treatment of his fractured left leg at
anotherhospital.Hisconfinementthereinlastedamonth.InJanuary1998,therespondent,stilllimpingheavily,wentto
thepetitionersofficetoreportforwork.Hewas,however,informedbythepetitionerthathewasconsideredresigned
fromhisjob.Inholdingthatthecauseofactionofrespondenthasnotyetprescribed,theSupremeCourtstatedthatThe
respondentmustbeconsideredasunjustlyterminatedfromworkinJanuary1998sincethiswasthefirsttimehewas
informed by the petitioner that he was deemed resigned from his work. Thus, it was only at this time that the
respondents cause of action accrued. Consequently, the respondents filing of complaint for illegal dismissal on 1
September1999waswellwithinthefouryearprescriptiveperiod.
6.INTERRUPTIONOFRUNNINGOFPRESCRIPTIVEPERIOD.
Like other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to interruption, and in the
absenceofanequivalentLaborCodeprovisionfordeterminingwhetherthesaidperiodmaybeinterrupted,Article1155
oftheCivilCodemaybeapplied.
309
Thesaidprovisionstates:
Article1155.TheprescriptionofactionsisinterruptedwhentheyarefiledbeforetheCourt,
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written
acknowledgmentofthedebtbythedebtor.
Thus,theprescriptionofanactionisinterruptedby:
(a) thefilingofanaction;
(b) awrittenextrajudicialdemandbythecreditor;and
(c) awrittenacknowledgmentofthedebtbythedebtor.
IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorp.v.Panganiban,[G.R.No.151407,February6,2007].
In this case, while the filing earlier by respondent of a civil case for nonpayment of his unpaid commissions
couldhaveinterruptedtherunningofthe3yearprescriptiveperiod,itsconsequentdismissalbytheCourtofAppeals
duetolackofjurisdictioneffectivelycanceledthetollingoftheprescriptiveperiodwithinwhichtofilehismoneyclaim,
leavingrespondentinexactlythesamepositionasthoughnocivilcasehadbeenfiledatall.Therunningofthe3year
prescriptiveperiodnothavingbeeninterruptedbythefilingofthecivilcase,respondentscauseofactionhadalready
prescribed on September 2, 1991, three (3) years after his cessation of employment on September 2,
1988.Consequently,whenrespondentfiledhiscomplaintforillegaldismissal,separationpay,retirementbenefitsand
damagesinJuly24,1996,hisclaimclearlyhadalreadybeenbarredbyprescription.
PLDTv.Pingol,[G.R.No.182622,September8,2010].
Respondent was dismissed by petitioner on January 1, 2000. Respondent Pingol cited the same date of
dismissal in his complaint before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint on the ground of
prescriptionbecauseatthetimehefileditonMarch29,2004,four(4)yearsandthree(3)monthshadalreadyelapsed.
Respondent,however,claimedthatbetween2001and2003,hemadefollowupswithPLDTmanagementregardinghis
benefits.This,tohismind,tolledtherunningoftheprescriptiveperiod.CitingthesameArticle1155andfollowingthe
rulinginIntercontinentalBroadcasting[supra],theSupremeCourtheldthatrespondentscauseofactionhadalready
prescribed because he never made any written extrajudicial demand. Neither did petitioner make any written
acknowledgment of its alleged obligation. Thus, respondents claimed followups could not have validly tolled the

309
Intercontinental BroadcastingCorp. v. Panganiban, [G.R. No. 151407, February6, 2007]; SeealsoDeGuzmanv. CA, G.R. No. 132257, Oct. 12, 1998, 297SCRA743; 358Phil. 397, 407-408.
Article 291 Money Claims
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runningoftheprescriptiveperiod.Moresowhenrespondentneverpresentedanyprooftosubstantiatehisallegation
offollowups.
7.PRINCIPLEOFPROMISSORYESTOPPELASAPPLIEDTOLABORCASES.
a.Principleofpromissoryestoppel,anexceptiontoArticle291.
Theprincipleofpromissoryestoppelisarecognizedexceptiontothethreeyearprescriptiveperiodenunciated
inArticle291oftheLaborCode.
310
Promissory estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was
intendedthatthepromiseshouldbereliedupon,asinfactitwasreliedupon,andifarefusaltoenforceitwouldvirtually
sanctiontheperpetrationoffraudorwouldresultinotherinjustice.
311
b.Elementsofpromissoryestoppel.
In order to make out a claim of promissory estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following
elements:
(1)apromisewasreasonablyexpectedtoinduceactionorforbearance;
(2)suchpromisedid,infact,inducesuchactionorforbearance;and
(3)thepartysuffereddetrimentasaresult.
312
AccessoriesSpecialist,Inc.v.Alabanza,[G.R.No.168985,July23,2008].
All the foregoing requisites of promissory estoppel are present in this case. Respondent is the wife of Jones
Alabanza,formerVicePresident,ManagerandDirectorofpetitioner(ASI),whodiedwithoutreceivinghismoneyclaims
consistinginunpaidsalaries,separationpayand13
th
monthpay.Jonesrenderedoutstandingservicesforthepetitioners
from1975toOctober1997.OnOctober17,1997,JoneswascompelledbytheownerofASI,hereinpetitionerTadahiko
Hashimoto,tofilehisinvoluntaryresignationonthegroundthatASIallegedlysufferedlossesduetolackofmarketand
incurred several debts caused by a slam in the market. At the time of his resignation, Jones had unpaid salaries for
eighteen(18)monthsfromMay1995toOctober1997equivalenttoP396,000.00andUS$38,880.00.Hewaslikewise
notpaidhisseparationpaycommensuratetohis21yearsofserviceintheamountofP462,000.00andUS$45,360.00
and13
th
monthpayamountingtoP33,000.00.JonesdemandedpaymentofhismoneyclaimsuponresignationbutASI
informedhimthatitwouldjustsettlefirstthemoneyclaimsoftherankandfileemployees,andhisclaimswillbepaid
thereafter.Knowingthepredicamentofthecompany,Jonespatientlywaitedforhisturntobepaid.Severaldemands
weremadebyJonesbutASIjustkeptonassuringhimthathewillbepaidhismonetaryclaims.JonesdiedonAugust5,
2002andfailedtoreceivethesame.
Inholdingthattheprincipleofpromissoryestoppelappliestothiscase,theSupremeCourtnotedthatJones
reliedonthepromise ofASI thathe wouldbepaid assoonastheclaimsof all the rankandfileemployeeshadbeen
paid.Ifnotforthispromisethathehadheldontountilthetimeofhisdeath,thereisnoreasonwhyhewoulddelay
filing the complaint before the Labor Arbiter. Thus, there is ample justification not to follow the prescriptive period
imposed under Article 291 of the Labor Code. Great injustice will be committed if the employees claims would be
brushed asideona mere technicality, especially when it was petitionersown action thatprevented respondent from
interposingtheclaimswithintherequiredperiod.
8.DOCTRINEOFLACHESASAPPLIEDTOLABORCASES.
a.Concept.
Laches is the failure for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, in exercising due
diligence,couldorshouldhavebeendoneearlier.Itisnegligenceoromissiontoassertarightwithinareasonabletime,
warrantingthepresumptionthatthepartyentitledtoassertiteitherhasabandonedorhasdeclinedtoassertit.The
doctrineoflachesorstaledemandsisbaseduponthegroundofpublicpolicywhichrequires,forthepeaceofsociety,
discouragementofstaleclaims.Andunlikethestatuteoflimitations,itisnotamerequestionoftimebutisprincipallya
questionofinequityorunfairnessofpermittingarightorclaimtobeenforcedorasserted.
313
Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what
shouldhavebeendonebutfailedtodoso.Conversely,ifthesaidpartydidnothavetheoccasiontoasserttheright,
thenhecannotbeadjudgedguiltyoflaches.Lachesisnotconcernedwiththemerelapseoftime;ratherthepartymust
havebeenaffordedanopportunitytopursuehisclaiminorderthatthedelaymaysufficientlyconstitutelaches.
314
In laborcases,laches maybeappliedonly uponthe mostconvincingevidenceofdeliberate inaction,forthe

rightsoflaborersareprotectedunderthesocialjusticeprovisionsoftheConstitutionandundertheCivilCode.
315
b.Lachesandprescription,distinguished.
Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law, not
courtsofequity.Thus,lachescannotbeinvokedtoresisttheenforcementofanexistinglegalright.Itisalongstanding
principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no
arbitrarydiscretiontodisregardthem.
Laches cannot be invoked to bar a cause of action which was filed within the prescriptive period allowed by
law.Thus,wheretheclaimwasfiledwithinthe3yearstatutoryperiod,recoverythereforcannotbebarredbylaches.

310
AccessoriesSpecialist, Inc. v. Alabanza, G.R. No. 168985, July23, 2008.
311
Ramosv. Central Bankof thePhilippines, G.R. No. L-29352, Oct. 4, 1971, 41SCRA565.
312
Mendozav. CA, G.R. No. 116710, June25, 2001, 412Phil. 14, 29.
313
GandaraMill Supplyv. NLRC, G.R. No. 126703, Dec. 29, 1998; PremiereDevelopment Bankv. NLRC, G.R. No. 114695, July23, 1998.
314
Placewell International ServicesCorp. v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, June26, 2006; Jucov. Heirsof TomasSiyChungFu, G.R. No. 150233, Feb. 16, 2005, 451SCRA464, 471-472; PremiereDevelopment Bankv. NLRC, supra.
315
HagonoyRural Bank, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122075, Jan. 28, 1998, 285SCRA297.
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53
Courtsshouldneverapplythedoctrineoflachesearlierthantheexpirationoftimelimitedforthecommencementof
actionsatlaw.
316
Chuav.CA,[G.R.No.125837,October6,2004].
Itwasheldherethatthereisnolacheswherethereisnoproofthatprivaterespondentemployeeshadfailed
orneglectedtoasserttheirright,consideringthattheyfiledtheirclaimwithintheperiodprescribedbylaw.
PlacewellInternationalServicesCorp.v.Camote,[G.R.No.169973,June26,2006].
Thedoctrineoflacheswasnotappliedsincerespondentfiledhisclaimwithinthe3yearprescriptiveperiodfor
thefilingofmoneyclaimssetforthinArticle291oftheLaborCode.
END OF DISCUSSION ON
TOPIC H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

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316
Mendozav. NLRC, G. R. No. 122481, March5, 1998.

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Relevant Provision: Article 223, Labor Code

2. If a party failed toperfecthisappealby thenonpaymentof theappeal bond withinthe10calendarday

Relevant Provision: Article 223, Labor Code

Relevant Provision: Article 129, Labor Code

Relevant Provision: Article 128, Labor Code

c. to order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of any unit or department of an establishment

Relevant Provision: Article 277 [b], Labor Code

9. TheVoluntaryArbitratorhasnojurisdictionovercases involving the terminationofemployment effected

In laborcases,laches maybeappliedonly uponthe mostconvincingevidenceofdeliberate inaction,forthe

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