PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES

IN POLITICAL LAW

by Judge ESTELA ALMA A. SINGCO

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:
A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are
closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other natural
resources form an intensive geographical, economic, political
entity or to have historically regarded as an archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by one
or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

- Archipelagic Baselines- basis: UNCLOS: how to treat
Kalayaan Group of Islands (KGI) and Scarborough Shaol:
whether to include or to exclude them from the baselines;
and/or consider as part of the regime of islands.

- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of
Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of
DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of
Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as
scarborough reef, panatag shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found in
the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the
province of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of
reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around with
an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of Subic
Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

- Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the entire
archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is located.
The Philippines essentially claims only the western section of
Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

- RA 9522 (March 10, 2009)- It defines the general configuration
of the archipelago, including the extended continental shelf and
exclusive economic zone to make it more compliant with the
UNCLOS.

- It redrew the countrys baseline to comply with the UNCLOS
requirements for archipelagic state, in the process excluding the
disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough shoal
from the main archipelago and classifying them instead as
regime of islands. They excluded from the baselines. The
national territory constitutes a roughly triangular delineation
which excludes large areas of waters within 600 miles by 1,200
miles rectangular enclosing the Philippine archipelago as
defined in the Treaty of Paris.


- Regime of islands (Art. 121 of UNCLOS) consists of islands
or naturally formed areas of land surrounded by water that
remain above water during high tide. The principle forces
claimant states over a certain territory to maintain peace in the
area because no country can claim exclusive ownership of any
of these islands.

- Magalona, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., GR No. 187167, August 16,
2011- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KGI and the
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS
III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he
drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable
extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of
the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for
three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can
reach up to 125 nautical miles.

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty
over the KGI and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades,
these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance
from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such
that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest
basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago.

- Constitutional issues:

Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters
EEZ; claims over Sabbah and Spratly islands
Delineation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris vs.
RA 9552

- Right of innocent passage- archipelagic sea lane passage and
right of overflight

- 200-Economic Zone (includes Territorial Seas and
Contiguous Zone) READ: UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea.

- Contiguous Zone (12 nm from the end of territorials seas)
- Teritorial seas/maritime domain (12 nm from baseline)
- Internal waters vs. Archipelagic waters

- Reagan vs. CIR, 30 SCRA 968- An exception to the full and
complete power of a nation within its territories is by virtue of the
consent of the nation itself. The embassy premises of a foreign
power are within the territorial domain of the host State. The
ground occupied as embassy premises is not the territory of the
foreign State to which the premises belong.

- Kalayaan Island Group
a) historic right
b) P.D. No. 1596, dated June 11, 1978
c) effective occupation
d) principle of contiguity because of proximity
e) part of the continental shelf
c) RA 3046 & RA 5446
c) RA 9552

- Freedom islands to which Spratly islands belong- basis: terra
nullius

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

- Republicanism

- Separation of Powers
- Principles of Blending of Powers and Checks & Balances
- under the principle of separation of powers, courts cannot
interfere with the exercise by the legislature of its authority to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation (Senate Blue Ribbon
vs Majaducon, GR # 136760, July 29, 2003; Executive
privilege -Neri vs. Senate Committee, GR. No. 180643, Mach
25, 2008)

- Judicial Review: Requisites (Francisco, et al. vs. HR,
et al., November 10, 2003; ABAKADA Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, September 1, 2005;
David et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006).

Local governments: With Rep. Act No. 7160, the union of
legislative and executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the BP Blg. 337 has been disbanded, so that
either department now comprises different and non-
intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a
system of check and balance between the two. The avowed
intent of Rep. Act. No. 7160, therefore, is to vest on the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan independence in the exercise of its
legislative functions vis-a-vis the discharge by the Governor of
the executive functions. (Atienza vs. Villarosa, May 10,
2005).

Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
Epira case-Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17,
2007).

Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of
Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2
of Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate
legislation)

Tests of valid delegation:
1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17,
2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC,
3/19/97; Abakada Guro
Party List vs. Exec. Sec.


- Incorporation Clause -By the doctrine of incorporation, the
country is bound by generally accepted principles of international
law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws.[Tanada vs. Angara, May 2, 1997]

- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimentel vs. Ermita,
462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of customary
Law (Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons; Kuroda
vs. Jalandoni

- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no obligatory
rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The
classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

- Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines, vs. Duque, et al., GR No. 1703034, October 9,
2007- Customary international law is deemed incorporated into
our domestic system. A mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 generally accepted
principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles
of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict
is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are
organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over
national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing with, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the
principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such
as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties
may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the
constitution [Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Civilian Supremacy (IBP vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)-
The calling of the marines constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian enforcement. Notwithstanding the conduct of
joint visibility patrols by the members of PNP and the Philippine
marines, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader and
it is the local police forces who are in charge at all times.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- The vitality of the tenet
that the President is the commander-in-chief of the Armed
Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian
supremacy over the military, and to the general stability of our
representative system of government. The Constitution reposes
final authority, control and supervision of the AFP to the
President, a civilian who is not a member of the armed forces,
and whose duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of
the organic duties imposed upon the office, the other functions
being clearly civil in nature. Civilian supremacy over the military
also countermands the notion that the military may bypass
civilian authorities, such as civil courts, on matters such as
conducting warrantless searches and seizure. The ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the
Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control
the actions and speech of members of the armed forces.
The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
The President could, as a general rule, require military officers to
seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is
based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-
chief.

- Gonzales, et al vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006- Courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive
to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
effectively command, control, and discipline the armed
forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing
Winthrops Military Law and Precedents, 2
nd
edition, p. 49). In
short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that
ensures the Presidents control, and thus civilian
supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this disciplinary
system is the President who exercises review powers over
decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of
War; quoted provisions omitted

- Maintenance of Peace & Order and the protection of the people
against violence are constitutionsl duties of the State and to
bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony
with these constitutional duties (Chavez s. Romulo, G. R.
No. 157036, June 9, 2004).

- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,
June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does
not offend compelling state interest.

- Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like
ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of
its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
freedom of personal and religious activity.

- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the countrys
resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of Rizal
vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The principle of
local autonomy under the 1987 constitution simply means
decentralization. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state of an imperium in imperio
(unlike in a Federal System). The matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it
is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to
local governments.

- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR No.
183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State much
less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare
any part of the Philippine territory for independence.

- Equal access to opportunity for public service Pamatong
vs. COMELEC, April 13, 2004- the provision does not bestow
a right to seek the presidency; it does not contain a judicial
enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline
for legislative action. It is not intended to compel the State to
enact positive measures that would accomodate as many as
possible into public office.


ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

- Valles vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543- Having a Filipino father
at the time of birth makes one a Filipino. Having an Australian
passport and an alien certificate of registration does not
constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and does not
militate against the claim of Filipino citizenship.

- Co vs. HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a persons
citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions in
order that the election of Philippine citizenship is effective:
1. the mother of the person
making the election must be
citizen of the Philippines; and
2. said election must be made
upon reaching the age of
majority.
- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the evolvement
from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election
requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express
classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987
Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941
statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should
not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.
- The Court concluded that, having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is
the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship.
Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The
failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the
election and negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother.
The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the
imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any.
- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: 1)
desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the allied forces
in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other time; 4) marriage of
a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and economic necessity.

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is
an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b)
of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
To claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor
age at the time of the petititon for repatriation was filed by
the parent [Angat vs. RP, September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs.
CA, GR. No. 125793, August 29, 2006- no showing that
Tabasas parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity].

- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the RP and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper
civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite
in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of ones
application for repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before he
lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,
amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)- including citizens
repatriated and unmarried children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate or adopted, below 18 years of age of those
repatriated.


- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA
630- The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for
naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the
person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his foreign
citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of
candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of his foreign
citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19, 2009-
The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born Filipino,
who also possesses American citizenship having been born of
an American father and a Filipino mother, is exempt from the
twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship under the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act (RA 9225) before
running for public office. The Supreme Court En Banc held that
that it has applied the twin requirements to cases which involve
natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the
Philippines. In the present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.]
Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires his
citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To comply
with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is necessary
that the candidate for public office must state in clear and
unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC re dual
allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088, January
19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225
governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and liabilities
under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute
would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter of
residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition
or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of
the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No.
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only
logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow
for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at
the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the Philippines
only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship decides to run for public office. Under Republic Act
No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048, June 19,
2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they
are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an additional
requirement on those who wish to seek elective public
office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time
of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount
to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under R.A. No. 9225.
The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not
applicable because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more
requirements.


- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of
Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual
citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the
Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements,
which will restore their good standing as members of the
Philippine Bar.


- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The
Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international
law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not
applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in
Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of
Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person
having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had
only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in
matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third
State shall, of the nationalities which any such person
possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally
resident or the nationality of the country with which in the
circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala
for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in
Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War
II. Many members of his family and his business interests were
in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on
Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties
on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm
to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely
connected than with Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23, 1989
- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11, 2007- It
is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is
to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is
allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have
lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens
of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance
and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To
begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters
of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including the
Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11
th

day of April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1)
a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native
of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F.
Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby
extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The
1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not
distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of
a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA
292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res
judicata principle) 1.) a persons citizenship be raised as a
material issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.)
the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active
part in the resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is
affirmed by the Supreme Court.

- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) grants
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens
born and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to
apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the
prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.


- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The
alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status
by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend
the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent
Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.
179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence,
it is the - State, through its representatives designated by
statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured
certificate of naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that
maybe raised by private persons in an election case involving
the naturalized citizens descendant.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizens acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation
on ones status as a resident of the Philippines.

ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

- READ: RA 9225 and RA 9189 (Absentee Voting)

- AKBAYAN-Youth vs. COMELEC, March 26, 2001- where it is
both impractical and illegal to conduct a two-day special
registration for new voters, the COMELEC cannot be compelled
to do so.

- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right
is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law.

- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon
certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voters Registration
Act of 1996).

- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of
residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individuals permanent home or a place to which, whenever
absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile:
1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at
any given time.

- Absentee voting under Section 2 of RA 9189 is an
exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision
in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter
under R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It
cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to
enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who,
save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary
voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.


ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13, 2008-
in elections for President, V-President, Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-
proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election
returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As with other
general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he prohibition
namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting
the composition of proceeding of the board of canvassers; and
(3) determination of the authenticity and the due execution of
certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of RA 7166, as
amended by RA No. 9369.

- Non delegation of legislative power

- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The
second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the
law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34
thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards. xxx In the past, accepted as
sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;"
"adequate and efficient instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and
equity;" "public convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy
and efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability,
security and affordability of the supply of electric power and
watershed rehabilitation and management meet the
requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations
on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient
standards.
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere constituent
unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Corrections
could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of
Justice as the rule making authority under RA No. 8177.

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-
Power of Subordinate Legislation with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by filling the details which Congress may not
have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary
regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by DOLE on
the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and
effect of law.

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of legislative power. It
is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the
law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the
12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified
fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation
of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive.

- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the
President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12%
came from Congress and the task of the President is simply to
execute the legislative policy.

- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The requirement
that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal
constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule of
presentment. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the
act of both chambers. It can be exercised neither solely by one
of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers.

- The Presidents Ordinance Power is the Executives rule-
making authority in implementing and executing constitutional or
statutory powers. Indisputably, there are constitutional powers
vested in the Executive that are self-executory.

- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No.
166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR,
the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative of
the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR No.
180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED
under RA 7722.

- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-
Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress.

- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No. 1777271,
May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is involved in the
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in
question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the
nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A.
7941 reading: [T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list is certainly not a justifying card for the
Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition
imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the
same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the Certified
List the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously
misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the provision as an
absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The
interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups.
- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244, October
6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC, March 15, 2006
Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution and RA
7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters: (1) the 20% allocation:
the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the
2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total
votes cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the
House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three
seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4) proportional
representation: the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%
threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in the
second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. (3) Those
garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. (4) Each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no
longer be included because they have already been allocated, at
one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available
seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A.
No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit
our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters.
The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is
arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining
available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55
maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the
product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats
corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats.
Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number
of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections: The
Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed
all political parties to participate in the party-list elections.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political
parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted
down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a
party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party
or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the
major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through
the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing.
The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with,
their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in
the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its
fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can
do the same for the urban poor.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up
of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in
the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article
VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence
of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.
The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.
Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance
with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

- Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646, April 2, 2013-
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:

- 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations,
and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

- 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations
do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.

- 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and
underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

- 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent
those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties
or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

- 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

- The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist
elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (2) all nominees
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along
sectoral lines and do not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented. Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the
sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may
have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not
belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified
because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party
has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the
disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is no
specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000 minimum
population that must compose legislative district. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative with nothing mentioned about a
population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in
order to be similarly situated.

- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25, 2010- In
this case, there is no official record that the population of the City of
Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected prior to the May
2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a
legislation district of its own under Section 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution.

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April 8, 2010
- that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and women who
identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting standards that the
marginalized and underrepresented sector must demonstrate (1) past
subordination or discrimination suffered by the group; (2) an immutable
or distinguishing characteristic, attribute, or experience that define them
as a discrete group; and (3) present political and/or economic
powerlessness.

- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown that the LGBT sector has
been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against because of
negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of violence
perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by reason of their
sexual orientation and gender identity. It added that the magnitude of
opposition against petitioners participation in the party list system is, by
itself, demonstrative of the sectors lack of political power; so, too, is the
fact that proposed legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory
treatment against LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.

- LEGISLATIVE PERKS (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689)
The history of the provision granting Senators and Congressmen
immunity from arrest and detention shows that the privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of
innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights.

- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in
criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecnoming of a member thereof (Osmea vs. Pendatun).

- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard
Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election
to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is a
private organization merely performing public functions, and
that the PNRC Chairman is not a government official or
employee. Not being a government office, the PNRC
Chairmanship may be held by any individual, including a Senator
or Member of the House of Congress. NRC is autonomous,
neutral and independent of the Philippine Government. It is a
voluntary organization that does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government
branches. PNRC Chairmanship is not a government office or an
office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987
Constitution. Senator Gordon can validly serve as the Chairman
of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial position.


Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not mean all the
members. The base in computing majority is normally the total
membership of the body, within the coercive power of the House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority
simply means the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate. (Note:
splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and another
Senator). When the Constitution provides that the Senate
President shall be elected by the majority it does not
delineate who comprises the majority or the minority. The
defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate presidency
are not necessarily the minority.

- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia, 277
SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations that in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules in the absence of showing that there was violation of a
constitutional provision or private rights. Parliamentary rules are
mere procedures which may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.

- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmea vs Pendatun, The House
of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in any case
which will amount to an interference by the judicial department
with the legislature.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as
congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his
offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his case, to
be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend sessions of
congress, for the people elected him with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action and movement.

- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to
shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses, punishable at
most by correctional penalties.

Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by
Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in
Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a preliminary
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is
not being imposed for misbehavior as a member of Congress.

- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The members of
the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of the 3 senators
elect. This does not fall within the powers of the electoral
tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over electoral contests
in which contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but
also have himself inducted into office.

- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles; Paras
vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1, 2009- once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives,
COMELECs jurisdiction over the election contests relating to his
election, returns and qualifications, ends and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. The proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation.

- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates in
the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail
ones eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or disqualification is to
file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a
petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
HRET Rules.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10, 2002-
Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending
the proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc
was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the
said Order of the 2
nd
Division. The said Order was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality, the timely filing of
the motion for reconsideration suspends the execution. It cannot,
thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent (Locsin) as the duly elected representative of the 4
th

District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity
of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2
nd
Division was seasonably
challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his motion for
reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the
HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase election,
returns and qualifications should be interpreted in its totality as
referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestees
title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that election
referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and
counting of the votes; returns to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions
concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and qualifications to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code),
nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in
elections for President, V-President, Senator and Members of
the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns. To be manifest,
the errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass
or election returns sought to be corrected and/or objections
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers
and specifically noted in the minutes of their respective
proceedings.

Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has
jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation of
ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

- This Supreme Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and
resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power
because of passion or personal hostility (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of
congressional election contests are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under
our Constitution.

- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is not
lost upon the instance of the parties bu| continues until the
case is terminated.

- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Courts
jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET operates
only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or
personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law. It is absent in this case.

- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 & 189506,
respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list nominees are
considered as elected members of the House, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

- Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808, June
26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the
COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list
representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each
nominee and that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
to the COMELECs First Division and COMELEC En Banc which
had declared President Villanueva the proper party to submit
CIBACs Certificate of Nomination instead of Perla, who
allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As provided in
Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC also possesses
the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary
tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce
election laws and register political parties. The power to rule
upon questions of party identity and leadership is exercised by
the COMELEC as an incident to its enforcement powers, the
Court declared

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is the
SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of
Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating to the election of
Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of
Representatives is authorized to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do not
include temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A political
party must have at least two senators to be able to have a
representative in the Commission on Appointments, so that any
number less than 2 will not entitle such party a membership in
the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789).

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even
assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court. Under
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list
representatives must first show to the House that they possess
the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the
HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the
directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list
representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of
judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior
recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring
the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners direct
recourse to this Court is premature. The discretion of the House
to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute,
being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.


- APPROPRIATION- Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733, -
The Presidents creation of the Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform through an executive Order involves no
exercise by Congress of its taxing power or spending power.

- The appropriation for the PCCR was authorized by the
President, not by Congress. In a strict sense, appropriation has
been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that the money
may be paid out of the treasury, while appropriation made
by law refers to the act of the legislature setting apart or
assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the
payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.

- IMPORTANT: LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate
Blue Ribbon (203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the
determination whether a law has been violated is not in aid of
legislation but in aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of
separation of powers. To allow the Committee to investigate the
matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and
that the inquiry into the same justiceable controversy would be
an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction
that had set in much earlier (investigation was not in aid of
legislation).

- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs.
Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks,
GR No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a
criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint.

- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the
power to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-
preservation as the branch of government vested with the
legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can
assert its authority and punish contumacious acts against it.
Except only when the Congress and/or its Committee exercise
the power of contempt, it cannot penalize violators even if there
is overwhelming evidence of criminal culpability. It can only
recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although
it may include in its Report a recommendation for the criminal
indictment of persons who may appear liable.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power of
the President to withhold information requested by other
branches of the government. The Constitution does not
expressly grant this power to the President but courts have long
recognized implied Presidential powers if necessary and
proper in carrying out powers and functions expressly
granted to the Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this
jurisdiction, several decisions have recognized executive
privilege starting with the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez,
and the most recent being the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority and the 2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.
As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief
Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military
and national security matters affecting the nation. In the
discharge of this responsibility, the President may find it
necessary to withhold sensitive military and national security
secrets from the Legislature or the public.
As the official in control of the nations foreign service by
virtue of the Presidents control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the President is the chief implementer of the
foreign policy relations of the State. The Presidents role as chief
implementer of the States foreign policy is reinforced by the
Presidents constitutional power to negotiate and enter into
treaties and international agreements. In the discharge of this
responsibility, the President may find it necessary to refuse
disclosure of sensitive diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or
the public. Traditionally, states have conducted diplomacy with
considerable secrecy. There is every expectation that a state
will not imprudently reveal secrets that its allies have shared with
it.
There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the
internal deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and
advisers. To encourage candid discussions and thorough
exchange of views, the Presidents communications with his
Cabinet and advisers need to be shielded from the glare of
publicity. Otherwise, the Cabinet and other presidential advisers
may be reluctant to discuss freely with the President policy
issues and executive matters knowing that their discussions will
be publicly disclosed, thus depriving the President of candid
advice.
Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The
interest of protecting military, national security and
diplomatic secrets, as well as Presidential communications,
must be weighed against other constitutionally recognized
interests. There is the declared state policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of
legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure
testimonial and documentary evidence in deciding
cases.
The balancing of interests between executive privilege
on one hand and the other competing constitutionally
recognized interests on the other hand - is a function of the
courts. The courts will have to decide the issue based on the
factual circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on
executive privilege between the Executive and the Legislature,
and between the Executive and the Judiciary, have been
decided by the courts.
Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear
that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential since there should be ample opportunity for
discussion before [a treaty] is approved the offers exchanged
by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged
even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude
that the Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that historic confidentiality would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations. xxx Diplomatic
negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no
exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is
only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a
type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration
of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if
there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the
desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally
privileged status.

- Operational Proximity Test (Neri vs. Senate Committee,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited
by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed
up the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the
ZTE? c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve
the project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered
by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by
a close advisor of the President. Under the operational
proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor,
being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there
is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with
publish rules.

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas
corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006-
The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends
to government agencies created by Congress and officers
whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class. xxx
So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman
Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent
Senate Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in
their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative
action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond
to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the
realm of proper investigation

- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a
mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad
power of Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege
1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would
subvert crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informers privilege- not to disclose the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged
with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process
by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the
executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the
executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it and state
the reason therefore and why it must be respected.


- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by
a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive
official may be exempted from this power the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of
Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch,
and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in its appearance of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of
Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress (a)
to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b)
to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its
oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely:
scrutiny; investigation and supervision.


- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE Abakada Guro Party List, et
al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 the signing of a bill by
the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
certification of the Secretaries of both houses of Congress that it
was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole, a distinct bill may be produced. The power of the
Senate to propose amendments, it can propose its own version
even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution
to originate in the House.

- BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- The Supreme
Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of giving
said conference ample latitude for compromising differences
between the Senate and the House. It can propose
amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long as the
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the
approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act
of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in
order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened
to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and (b) its real properties are actually, directly, and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is defined
as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred
from participation or enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a
manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The
words dominant use or principal use cannot be substituted for
the words used exclusively without doing violence to the
Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with exclusively

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July
14, 2008- Any government expenditure without the
corresponding appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional.
There can be no dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans,
whether concluded or not, cannot be obligated in a procurement
contract without a prior appropriation from Congress. When the
executive branch secures a loan to fund a procurement of goods
or services, the loan proceeds enter the National Treasury as
part of the general funds of the government. Congress must
appropriate by law the loan proceeds to fund the procurement of
goods or services, otherwise the loan proceeds cannot be spent
by the executive branch. When the loan falls due, Congress
must make another appropriation law authorizing the repayment
of the loan out of the general funds in the National Treasury. This
appropriation for the repayment of the loan is what is covered by
the automatic appropriation

-
ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a sitting
president evolved through case law.

Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President by
virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative.

Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that
the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term to
which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is clear
that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent
only with his tenure (representing the period during which the
incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (the time during
which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right).

Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive
immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 It is not proper
to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the
doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and
there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the law
grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates
for President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest
number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not
inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as
national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial
and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of
the election returns duly certified by provincial and city
boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the Presidential
Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to determine
whether or not said duly certified election returns have been
irregularly made or tampered with or reflect the true results
of the elections in the areas covered by each and, if not, to
recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon
the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same
shall be counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor,
which Congress has no power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has
effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253 SCRA
559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that
Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when
she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of the
Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No. 003,
Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008.


- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain
reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a
grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the
same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant
of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme Court's
exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to
"promulgate its rules for the purpose."


- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,
resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara
pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not
contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article
VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

- The fundamental rule applicable in a presidential
election protest is Rule 14 of the PET Rules. It
provides,

Rule 14. Election Protest.Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner.

- Pursuant to this rule, only two persons, the 2
nd
and 3
rd
placers,
may contest the election. By this express enumeration, the rule
makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest
concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario
where, if the declared winner had not been truly voted upon by
the electorate, the candidate who received that 2
nd
or the 3
rd

highest number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a
successful election contest.
- The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have any rule on
substitution nor intervention but it does allow for the analogous
and suppletory application of the Rules of Court, decisions of the
Supreme Court, and the decisions of the electoral tribunals. Rule
3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court.
This rule allows substitution by a legal representative. It can be
gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor
seeks to appear before the Presidential Tribunal as the legal
representative/substitute of the late protestant prescribed by said
Section 16. However, in the Supreme Courts application of this
rule to an election contest, it has every time ruled that a public
office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, the Supreme Court
consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in
election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency
of the protest.
- This is not to say that death of the protestant necessarily abates
the pending action. In Vda. de De Mesa (1966) the Supreme
Court held that while the right to a public office is personal and
exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely
personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such
that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to
continue the protest proceedings. Hence, the Supreme Court
has allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party
in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein movant/intervenor,
Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of
President. Thus, given the circumstances of this case, we can
conclude that protestants widow is not a real party in interest to
this election protest (Ronald Allan Poe vs. GMA, PET case No.
002, March 29, 2005).
- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions
contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are post
election remedies, namely, regular election contests and quo
warranto. The word contest means that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and
proclamation of the President or Vice-President there can be
no contest before a winner is proclaimed.
- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No. 191988,
August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President the
second time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on the
second election as President, there is no case or controversy to
be resolved in this case.

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- Estrada vs.
Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read: TEMPORARY
DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The question whether the
claimed temporary inability of Estrada is a political question
beyond the Supreme Courts power of review. The decision that
President Arroyo is the dejure President made by a co-equal
branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO DOCTRINE)
Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005-
Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President by the
Constitution which may not be delegated to or exercised by an
agent or alter ego of the President. Justice Laurel, in his
ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at first blush, the
argument of ratification may seem plausible under the
circumstances, it should be observed that there are certain acts
which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of
the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no
amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any
of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial
law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII) and the exercise by him of the
benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These
distinctions hold true to this day. There are certain presidential
powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive
prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of
government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning
power notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a
showing that the executive power in question is of similar
gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude that the
power of the President to contract or guarantee foreign debts
falls within the same exceptional class. Indubitably, the decision
to contract or guarantee foreign debts is of vital public interest,
but only akin to any contractual obligation undertaken by the
sovereign, which arises not from any extraordinary incident, but
from the established functions of governance.

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT- Sarmiento vs.
Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs. Torres; Calderon vs.
Carale- Congress cannot expand the constitution by
increasing those officers who need prior confirmation by
the CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002, De
Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR No.
191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In Re
Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No.
191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17,
2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII, Section
15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of the term of the outgoing President does not apply to
vacancies in the High Tribunal. Although Valenzuela came to
hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it
cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest
on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby,
the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate
Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of
the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002-
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once an appointee has qualified into
office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the CA does
not alter its permanent character. It is effective until
disapproved by the CA or until the next adjournment of
Congress. It is extended only during a recess of Congress.
If disapproved by CA, appointee can no longer be extended
a new appointment. If by-passed, the President is free to
renew the ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462 SCRA
622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to make such
acting appointment. The President may even appoint in acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as
the President deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-gap
measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office. It may be extended any time there is
vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006- Under Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive
departments," ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group
of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by
law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. xxx The President appoints the first group of officers with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints
the second and third groups of officers without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the third
group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency,
commission, or board to appoint is declared unconstitutional.
- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position of
department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is not a third
level position and does not require presidential appointment.
- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES AND THEIR
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited from holding
multiple positions and receiving compensation therefrom-
BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12, 2004.

- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general rule
has always been that the power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is that as
far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him
to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures. The chief executive, under our laws, has the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the Office of the President.

- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No. 192935,
December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine Truth
Commission finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that
the laws are faithfully executed. The President's power to
conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws - in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency - is inherent in the President's
powers as the Chief Executive. Suffice it to say that there will be
no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing
funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation
on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093, July
31, 2007 The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his
power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987
Constitution. The Presidents power to reorganize the executive
branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section
20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President
broad organization powers to implement reorganization
measures. Be that as it may, the President must exercise good
faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency
of the executive department. Reorganization is effected in good
faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential
Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries
and materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed
or revoked.

- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 The
Presidents power (EO 292) to reorganize offices outside of
the Office of the President Proper is limited merely
transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President to Departments or Agencies and vice-versa. The
DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch.
Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the President,
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President
to transfer any function or agency of the DECS to the Office of
the President. Under its charter, the Philippine Sports
Commission (PSC), is attached to the Office of the President.
Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the
functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential
issuance.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The presidential
power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all
executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and
does not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail
the Presidents power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In
mandating that the President shall have control of all executive x x
x offices, Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
exempt any executive office one performing executive functions
outside of the independent constitutional bodies from the Presidents
power of control. xxx The Presidents power of control applies to the
acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of control
means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a
subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.

- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP (Lacson vs. Perez,
May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of state of
rebellion during or in the aftermath of the May 1, 2001 seige of
Malacanang is not violative of the separation of powers doctrine.
The President, as Commander in chief of Armed Forces of the
Philippines, may call upon such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656, February
3, 2004- The Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers pursuant to her calling out power.

- Gudani vs. Senga, Augsut 15, 2006- It is on the President that
the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the
prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again,
the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect.
Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President
and obeying the Senate, the Supreme Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President.
After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and
not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces. if the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a
member of the AFP to appear before Congress, the legislative
body seeking such testimony may seek judicial relief to compel
the attendance.

- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora The President
has full discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to
call out the armed forces.

- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006- PP
1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017s extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws
even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the president; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires
and unconstitutional. In the absence of legislation, the President
cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private
business affected with public interest.

- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of
national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.

- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT- Requisites: 1)
there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the delegation must
be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation must be subject to
such restrictions as Congress may prescribe and 4) the
emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national
policy declared by Congress.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the second
paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also
to other national emergency. If the intention of the Framers of
our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority
to declare a state of national emergency pursuant to Section 18,
Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the
declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers
could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that
Congress should first authorize the President before he can
declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion
then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence
of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
or business affected with public interest, is different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

- Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief and that a
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon
the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that only the
President is authorized to exercise emergency powers as
provided under Section 23, Article VI and the calling out powers
under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. While the
President exercises full supervision and control over the police, a
local chief executive, such as a provincial governor, only
exercises operational supervision over the police, and may
exercise control only in day-to-day operations. As discussed in
the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, only the
President has full discretion to call the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the Court stressed.

- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370- The
pardoning power of the President is final and unappealable.

- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March 13,
2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it
extends to all persons who committed the particular acts
described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.

- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA
449-It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105 Phil.
1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot intrude, and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it.
Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus
that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President, being
the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was echoed
in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of
his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ
and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many
ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's
foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign
relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and
influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is executive altogether.

As regards the power to enter into treaties or
international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in
the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least
two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light,
the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the
agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the
President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the
fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the
Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to
invade it. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:
In our system of government, the President, being the
head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy,
the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into
treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has
the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole
authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring
the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for
the validity of the treaty entered into by him. x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into
treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light,
the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements
with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464 may be
interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already
inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis to hold the
President or its representatives accountable to Congress for
the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the Presidents power to
enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of Senate
concurrence, since the President must still ensure that all
treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of
the Constitution. It follows from the above discussion that
Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may
not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article
VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such
pertains only to the validity of the treaty under
consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant
to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a whole
that has been given the authority to concur as a means of
checking the treaty-making power of the President, but only the
Senate.

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under our
Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the
Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to
ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which
has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should
not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence
of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this
Court via a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the
performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot
issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is
beyond its jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.

- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL THE
SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable belongs to the
President. Only lands, which have been classified as alienable,
may be sold. There must be a law authorizing its sale or
alienation by the President or by another officer before
conveyance can be executed on behalf of the government
(Section 48, Book I of the 1987 Administrative Code). Laurel
vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797- The President may not convey
valuable real property of the government on her sole will.
Conveyance must be authorized by a law enacted by Congress.

- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS-
to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. xxx
Insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local
officials administratively.


ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs. Guingona;
Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children); Kilosbayan vs. Morato;
IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa
(private citizen not proper party).

- Garcia v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 157584, April 2, 2009-
The immediate implementation of full deregulation of the local
downstream oil industry is a policy determination by Congress
which this Court cannot overturn without offending the
Constitution and the principle of separation of powers. That the
law failed in its objectives because its adoption spawned the
evils petitioner Garcia alludes to does not warrant its nullification.
In the words of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing in the 1999
Garcia case, [a] calculus of fear and pessimism xxx does not
justify the remedy petitioner seeks: that we overturn a law
enacted by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive.

- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199, April
24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government and are not empowered to execute absolutely their
own judgment from that of Congress or of the President, the
Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or not such
judgment has been made with grave abuse of discretion, when
the act of the legislative or executive department is contrary to
the constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or when executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,
under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate
disputes between the legislative and executive branches of
government on the proper constitutional parameters of power.

- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court adopts
the DIRECT INJURY test. In People vs. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.

- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even when the
petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been
allowed to sue under the principle of transcendental
importance. DAVID, ET AL VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA,
384 SCRA 152; BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS.
ZAMORA, 342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
380 SCRA 739.

- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may
be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing
that the issues are of transcendental importance
which must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.

- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For a
citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by
a favorable action.

- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party
1. registered voter must show that the action concerns his
right of suffrage
2. taxpayer he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to
the third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional
right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third partys
constitutional claim.

- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme Court
is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real parties in
interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA BUGAL-
BLAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421 SCRA 148.

- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC, the
Court still entertains to adjudicate the substantive matter if there
is a grave violation of the constitution; to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public and capable of
repetition, yet evading review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula
that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public
interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
bar and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;
SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS. COMELEC, 435
SCRA 98.


- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUANCES will
not preclude the SUPREME COURT from exercising its power of
judicial review to determine whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of issuing authority under its EXPANDED
JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS. COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269,
June 15 2004.

- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 -
Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as peoples
organizations and taxpayers since the matter involves an issue
of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional importance, namely,
the qualification nay, the citizenship of a person to be
appointed a member of this Court. xxxx This case is a matter of
primordial importance involving compliance with a Constitutional
mandate. As the body tasked with the determination of the
merits of conflicting claims under the Constitution, the Supreme
Court is the proper forum for resolving the issue, even as
the JBC has the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear,
therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong
is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of
the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother
were naturalized along with his father.

- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBCs
principal function is to recommend appointees to the Judiciary.
For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the President a list of at
least three nominees and the President may not appoint
anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy in the SC is required
by the Constitution to be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be compromised only
because the constitutionally named Chair could not sit in the
JBC. Although it would be preferable if the membership of the
JBC is complete, the JBC can still operate to perform its
mandated task of submitting the list of nominees to the President
even if the constitutionally named ex-officio Chair does not sit in
the JBC, the Court stressed.

The Court held that considering that the complete membership in
the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its supervisory power over
the JBC, it should not be deprived of representation. It ruled that
the most Senior Justice of the High Court, who is not an
applicant for the position of Chief Justice, should participate in
the deliberations for the selection of nominees for the said
vacant post and preside over the proceedings in the absence of
the constitutionally named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section
12 of RA 296, or the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: In case
of vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his
office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first
in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply
to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of the
Chief Justice.

- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court held
that the use of the singular letter a preceding representative of
Congress in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. The
word Congress is used in its generic sense. Considering the
language of the subject constitutional provision is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids such as
the records of the Constitutional Commission.

- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended to
create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the public
clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of
members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial independence, they
adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in creating a JBC,
the private sector and the three branches of government would
have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the
members of the Judiciary. To allow the Legislature to have more
quantitive influence in the JBC by having more than one voice
speak, whether with one full vote or one-half a vote each, would,
as one former congressman and member of the JBC put it,
negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution, declared the
Court.

- The Court also held that the JBCs seven-member composition
serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution should
there be a stalemate in voting. It further held that under the
doctrine of operative facts where action prior to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized as a matter of equity
and fair play, all JBCs prior official acts are valid.

- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to who
should remain as sole representative of Congress in the JBC
and that such is best left to the determination of Congress.

- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon- The Chief Justice
must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations
where augmentation is needed.

- PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section 4(1) of
the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc or, in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members.

- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines is justiciable- the
problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.

- FARIAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy matters are
not the concern of the Supreme Court- government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government.

- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581, A
motion to change the venue of (and authority to conduct)
preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the
courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive department and not of
the judiciary.

- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it should
be resolved in favor of change of venue.

- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31, 2006- In
view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June 24, 2006,
the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is
hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight
Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177),
otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal
Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven
Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise
known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the
death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:


(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law
violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of
the Revised Penal Code.


- PROMULGATE RULES concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all court, the admission to the practice of law,
the IBP, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
NOTE: Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure;
uniform; not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

WRIT OF AMPARO The right to enforce and protect a
persons rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of rights. It
is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty,
and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of
a private individual or entity. The writ covers extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the
aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family be
protected in a government agency or by an accredited person or
private institution capable of keeping and securing their safety. If
the petitioner is an organization, association or institution
referred to in Section 3(c) of the Rule, the protection may be
extended to the officers involved. The Supreme Court shall
accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend
temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and
any member of the immediate family, in accordance with
guidelines which it shall issue. The accredited persons and
private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that
may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession or control of a designated land or other property, to
permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying,
or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon. The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be
inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party. If the
motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information, the court, justice or judge
may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the
opposition. The movant must show that the inspection order is
necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to
be threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may
prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all
parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its
issuance, unless extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. The court, justice or judge, upon verified
motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or
photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The motion may be
opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged
nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or
judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit
of the opposition. The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.
(d) Witness Protection Order. The court, justice or judge,
upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981. The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to
other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008-
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to address these
extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary
and independent remedy beyond those available under the
prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we
shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Where, as
in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with
the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and directly
intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or
security the personal concern that the writ is intended to
protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however,
to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by
analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.

- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires
the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
- (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
- (c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information;

- (d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;


- (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database
or information or files kept by the respondent.
Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The COMELEC
cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in
the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court.

Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19, 2005-
Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence of the
Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as meaning
there is no intention to diminish that plenary power. RA 8974
which requires full payment before the State may exercise
proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires only a
deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.

PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 While the fundamental
law requires mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or
death, nowhere however, has it proscribed an intermediate
review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and compelling to
provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before
the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more
squarely within the rule making prerogative of the Supreme
Court than the law making power of Congress. The rule
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a
subordinate appellate court, before the case is elevated to the
Supreme Court for automatic review, is such a procedural
matter.

- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA 604-
does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not decisions within
the constitutional requirement; they merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained and the petition to review
decision of the CA is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence, there is no need to fully explain the Courts
denial since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the CA decision.

- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA
329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the
constitution is applicable only in cases submitted for decision,
i.e, given due course and after the filing of the briefs or
memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a resolution is
issued denying due course to a petition and stating the legal
basis thereof.

- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The
constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is bases, does not preclude the
validity of memorandum decisions, which adopt by reference
the finding of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decisions of inferior tribunals.

- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No. 181107-
The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion to decide
whether a minute resolution should be used in lieu of a full-
blown decision in any particular case. Further, the Supreme
Court explained that the grant of due course to a petition for
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.
When it fails to find any reversible error committed by the CA,
there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial as it means
that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and
conclusions of the CA. There is no point in reproducing or
restating in the resolution of denial the conclusions of the
appellate court affirmed.The constitutional requirement of
sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear presentation of facts and laws
applies to decisions, where the petition is given due course,
but not where the petition is denied due course, with the
resolution stating the legal basis for the dismissal.


- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section 14
does not preclude the validity of Memorandum Decision
which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of
law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. It is intended
to avoid cumbersome reproduction of the decision (or portions
thereof) of the lower court.


ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION


- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil Service
Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and
adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to enforce or
order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or orders. The
authority to decide cases would be inutile unless accompanied
by the authority to see that what has been decided is carried out.

- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The CSC
is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since the
responsibility of the establishment, administration and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the concerned
department or agency, the role of the CSC is limited to assisting
the department agency with respect to these qualification
standards and approving them.

- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The Constitution
grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including
every government-owned or controlled corporation. It is further
classified into career and non-career service positions. Career
service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit
and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
there is security of tenure. A state university president with a
fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of
trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service
officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of
the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law,
respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.

- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though the
CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided by
government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a complaint
may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the authority to
hear and decide the case, although it may in its discretion opt to
deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation, as
provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The Supreme Court also
ruled that since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC and the
CSC had opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSCs
exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no report,
no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices
vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic connotes
something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. It means
that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs, as a
general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But a
distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be made.
If the GOCC was established through an original charter (or
special law), then it falls under the civil service, e.g., GSIS and
SSS. However, corporations which are subsidiaries of these
chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is excluded from the
coverage of the civil service.


- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of government
refers to any of the various units of the government, including a
department, bureau, office, instrumentality or government-owned
or controlled corporation or a local government or a distinct unit
therein. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national
government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and
government-owned or controlled corporations,

- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is employed in
a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil service law applies. It
is not true either that with respect to money claims, the Labor
Code applies. Regardless of the nature of employment or claim,
an employee in a GOCC with original charter is covered by the
Civil Service Law.

- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) the
appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service
may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys
security of tenure.

- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent
appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed,
including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. The mere fact
that a position belongs to the Career Service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he
does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have
to depend on the nature of appointment, which in turn depends
on his eligibility or lack of it.

- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented transfer
of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary is a violation
of the security of tenure clause in the Constitution.

- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that aims
by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation
constitutes removal.

- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its
violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also
protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such state
interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of
the government involving termination of services may appeal to
the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on certiorari to
the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still
feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June 28,
2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the Administrative
Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil Service primarily
confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73 SCRA 285, on two
instances when a position may be considered primarily
confidential: (1) President declares the position to be primarily
confidential upon recommendation of of the CSC; (2) when by
the nature of the functions, there exists close intimacy between
the appointee and appointing authority which ensures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is
primarily confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position of
Casino Operations Manager is not primarily confidential

- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There
must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public
office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the
term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238
of the Revised Penal Code. (Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres,
Catanduanes vs. CA, 284 SCRA 276, 1997).

- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) rule on double
compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive such
pension or gratuity if he accepts another government position to
which another compensation is attached.

- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 PCCG Chair
Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution from
simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel. The
position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are incompatible offices since
the CPLC reviews actions of the PCGG Chair. It pointed out that
the general rule to hold more than one office is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his position/

- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21, 1997-
When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement
is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents and purposes he
is considered as not having left his office, and notwithstanding
the silence of the decision, he is entitled to payment of back
salaries.

- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 The Supreme
Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect Cruz's termination
with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages can be awarded in his
favor.

- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil
service officer or employee, who has been found illegally
dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of
his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement,
and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated, he
is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to back
wages but also to full retirement benefits.

- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 The CSC as an aggrieved
party, may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a decision exonerating a
civil service employee of administrative charges.

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes
of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the provisions of
Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it
directly. This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power
to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as
provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing
from its list of eligibles those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary
proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the
system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the law
or the rules of the service.

- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular No.
6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O. 180.


COMELEC

- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag vs.
Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase without reappointment
applies only to one who has been appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, whether or
not such person completes his term of office which could be
seven, five or three years. There must be a confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment
before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.


- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243
SCRA 690.

- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009- The
COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an
adjunct to its constitutional duty to enforce and administer all
election laws, by virtue of the explicit provisions of paragraph 6,
Section 2, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx
- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it
by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may
be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-
judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the
power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to
the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly
be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers
to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the
exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A)
and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code.
7


- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc.
v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:

- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other
hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the
rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to
it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific
persons are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise
of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the
conduct of the proceedings.

- Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe
into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in
said province; and consequently, to determine whether the
certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an
election offense had possibly been committed could by no
means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative
function.

- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was
exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind
the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force
conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.

- The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a
government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings
or proceedings.

- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to
punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend,
would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power,
which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to
secure the conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case,
the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when
petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and
to answer questions regarding the various election documents
which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession
and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish
petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force
hearings.

- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a
board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear
before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of
the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board
exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty
to determine whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine
election returns signed by the proper officers.
10
When the results
of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being
canvassed, counsels for various candidates posited numerous
questions on the certificates of canvass brought before the
COMELEC. The COMELEC asked petitioner to appear before it
in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election
documents coming from Maguindanao were spurious or not.
When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC
undeniably acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it
issued the assailed resolutions.

MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,
INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix
the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and
exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:
Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]
Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the
President and Vice-President, states:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the
second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for . . . the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and functions
and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours

- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC does not
have the requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of
the plenary legislative power.


- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 - The
COMELEC correctly stated that the ascertainment of the identity
of [a] political party and its legitimate officers is a matter that is
well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other
than the fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC
the power and function to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise
of such power and in the discharge of such function, the
Commission is endowed with ample wherewithal and
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it
was created to promote free, orderly and honest elections.

- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007
COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of leadership
within a party and to ascertain its legitimate officers and leaders.
xxx The COMELEC is endowed with ample wherewithal and
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will
ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it
was created to promote free and orderly honest elections.

- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16, 2010-
While the question of party leadership has implications on the
COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2 of Art.
IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Ateinza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such
expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and
discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot interfere, given the
limited scope of its power over political parties.

- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793, February
22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act or omission of a
municipal or regional trial court, petition for certiorari shall be
filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.

- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28, 2005-
Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to
the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending
appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority
to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules
of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any
applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section 3,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC
en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or
resolutions decided by a division. Since the petitioner
seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested
of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of
the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division
was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely
filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It
cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4
th

legislative district of Leyte.
- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The COMELEC en
banc does not have the authority to hear and decide cases at the
first instance. Under the COMELEC Rules, pre-proclamation
cases are classified as Special Cases and in compliance with the
provision of the Constitution, the two divisions of the COMELEC
are vested with the authority to hear and decide these special
cases.

- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.
6735. Reliance on the COMELECs power under Section 2(1)
of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and
regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and
which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard
tests.

- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative
only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are
(1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its
Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to
assist, through its election registrars, in the establishment of
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters affidavits, and voters identification cards used in
the immediately preceding election.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct of
plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a
case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively
charged with the power of enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws. Its acts, therefore, enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997
Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.


- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC may
validly order a manual count notwithstanding the required
automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law authorizing
the commission to use an automated election system, if that is
the only way to count votes. It ought to be self-evident that the
Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the
result of an election.

- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a valid
exercise of the COMELECs constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of
the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had in mind
the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in
the interest of justice and fair play. Accordingly, those
candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the
time of the elections, should they obtain the highest number of
votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987
constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving barangay officials decided by the trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011- Final
orders of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative defenses
of petitioner cannot be questioned before the Supreme Court
even via a petition for certiorari.


COMMISSION ON AUDIT

- COAS AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.
Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COAs auditing powers
are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private corporation or entity
handles public funds, it falls under COA jurisdiction. Under Sec.
2(1), item, (d), non-governmental entities receiving subsidies or
equity directly or indirectly from or through the government are
required to submit to post audit.

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even
with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will still
bind government agencies and their officials. A concurrent
private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or
assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. Manifestly,
the express language of the Constitution, and the clear intent of
its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion - the COA
does not have the exclusive power to examine and audit
government agencies. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the need to allow independent private audit of
certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as
when there is a private investment in a government-controlled
corporation, or when a government corporation is privatized or
publicly listed, or as in the case at bar when the government
borrows money from abroad.

- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits accruing
to a public officer may not, without his consent, be withheld and
applied to his indebtedness to the government.

- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA, acting
by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a decision
for the commission. The power to decide on issues relating to
audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting as a collegial
body which has the jurisdiction to decide any case brought
before it.

- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil 868,
COAs power over the settlement of accounts is different
from power over unliquidated claims, the latter of which is
within the ambit of judicial power.

- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurers salary and other
emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage but no to
apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage for which her
liability is still being litigated.

- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.
- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February 7, 2012]-
There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a
pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government
agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in
Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post audit is mandated for
certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and
only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.
In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court
may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with
the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination. When the
language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision
be unduly enlarged by this Court.
- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The appointment
of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven years; an appointment for a
lesser period is void and unconstitutional; the appointing authority
cannot validly shorten the full term of seven years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational
system prescribed by the Constitution;
- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired
portion of the term of the predecessors, but such appointments cannot
be less than the unexpired portion as this will disrupt the staggering of
terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D);
- Members of the Commission who were appointment for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission;
- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less
than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chair
for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chair. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that
the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioners and the
unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven
years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Char
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment;
and that
- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)
- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al- [G.R. No. 196271.
October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of local officials, their term
has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room for any
implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no
vagueness that would allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the
term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by
Congress.
- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term
mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new
term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the
extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because
Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a
way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed, if
acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all
laws would be illusory. 55 Congress cannot also create a new term and
effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional
intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. 56
Hence, holdover whichever way it is viewed is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where the
question of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of
approval by, this Court. The present case though differs significantly
from past cases with contrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v.
COMELEC, 57 Adap v. Comelec, 58 and Montesclaros v. Comelec, 59
where the Court ruled that the elective officials could hold on to their
positions in a hold over capacity.
- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of
elective officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay
officials, 67 is specifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may
be denied such power, as shown when the Constitution shortened the
terms of twelve Senators obtaining the least votes, 68 and extended the
terms of the President and the Vice-President 69 in order to synchronize
elections; Congress was not granted this same power. The settled rule
is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere
statute. 70 More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this
Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the
ARMM for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three
years 71 as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmea.
- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.: 79
- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and
the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is
empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public
offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both
laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive
positions. However, in the absence of any contrary
provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why
the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be
similarly applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing
power. This argument has no merit. As between the President
who has supervision over local governments as provided by
law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President,
until the law provides otherwise.
- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no
approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local
government.
- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through
their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent,
etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent,
may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent
delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of
Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing. 80
(Emphasis ours.)
- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,
and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21
months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays
in the delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper
management of the affairs of the regional government, and in
responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this
context, allowing the President in the exercise of his constitutionally-
recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a
reasonable measure to take.

- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS-
Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth
term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution,
however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth
term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end of
the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the
term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third
term.

- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23,
2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under
the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive
suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be
a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.

- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss
of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the
suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of
office is a consequence that only results upon an eventual
finding of guilt or liability.

- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009-
Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he
ran for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning,
assumed the position of SB member, thus, voluntarily
relinquishing his office as punong barangay which the court
deems as voluntary renunciation of said office.

- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the
recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an
elective officials terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a
candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term
but later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be
stitched with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of
time prior to the recall term, when another elective official holds
office, constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.

- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit
rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must
be one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position
by virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have
fully served the term.

- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis Ong, service for the full term, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service
for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule,
notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation.
There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity
of Francis Ongs service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared
VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID.

- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR
No. 176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted
after the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income
requirement for cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec.
450 of the , explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from
the said increased income requirement. The respondent LGUS
had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and
that the year before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs
had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under
the LGC of 1991.

- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORTY- Its
function is limited to the delivery of basic services. RA 7924
does not grant the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. The MMDA is a development authority. It is not a
political unit of government. There is no grant of authority to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local government
units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. (MMDA vs. BelAir
Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).

- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the
MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is
an unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was
intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that
transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge
expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with
regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of
the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly
traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable
intentions are limited by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can
but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in
this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
regulation arising from a legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo
Garin, April 15, 2005).

- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-
MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms
of advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail
Transit 3 (MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDAs
powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it
had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of
police and legislative power.

- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657,
August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its
powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to
implement the Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as
envisioned by E.O 179; hence, it could not have been validly
designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows
that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of
respondents terminals. Even the MMDAs claimed authority
under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with
the above-quoted ruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with
police power.


INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of
income because they form part of the gross accretion of the
funds of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252
SCRA 695).

- LGUS SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY
RELEASED WITHOUT ANY CONDITION OF APPROVAL
FROM ANY GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily
see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a
just share in the national taxes; and (2) just share shall be
determined by law; (3) that just share shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.
(ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)

- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation,
the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment
to local government units shall be withheld is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of
Art X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles of
local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code.
The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local
governments, and local governments are empowered to levy
taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject
to congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local
autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally
enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate
enforcement by this Court. The GSISs tax-exempt status, in
sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but
restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The
subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code
provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of
Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).

- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of
Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial
Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax,
the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has
withdraw such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous
ruling in National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.

- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is
primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it
may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by
virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An
agency of the Government refers to any of the various units
of the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation,
or a local government or a distinct unit therein;

while an
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned and controlled
corporations. It had already become, even if it be conceded to
be an agency or instrumentality of the Government, a taxable
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last
paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of
real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to
MCIAA.

- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the
port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the
general public does not exempt it from the payment of real
property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities
and appurtenances are the petitioners corporate patrimonial
properties, not for public use, and that the operation of the port
and its facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the
nature of ordinary business.

- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAAs Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from local taxation. Second, the real properties
of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of
MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport
Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are
used by the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport
Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real
Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.

- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national
government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing
the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is
taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with
greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities.

- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against
the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when
Congress grants an exemption to a national government
instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is
construed liberally in favor of the national government
instrumentality.

- PRESIDENTS SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,
September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga
ng mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief
Executive or his alter ego.

- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a
local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any
of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters
of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the
President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the
wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the
principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the
executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations. (Dadole vs. COA, December 3, 2002).

- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of
LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their
discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant,
depending on the availability of local funds, the genuine and
meaningful local autonomy is ensured.

- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no
power to grant franchises.
ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)


- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section 3(7)
of Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an
impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject
of impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for
criminal offenses committed.

- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,
November 10, 2003- definition of TO INITIATE
IMPEACHMENT- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice.

- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on
Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred
to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.

- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles
of Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary
resolution, De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan
Pambansa, September 3, 1995.

- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him
beyond the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be
impeached.

- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010-
The doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed
coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement
of the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual
doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as
respondents posit, provide civil servants, particularly local
government, with blanket immunity from administrative liability
that would spawn and breed abuse of bureaucracy.

- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the
opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that the
Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of
the Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy
Ombudsman Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).

- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending
case before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of
bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.

- OMBS POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,
March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make
a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and those cognizable by regular courts.

- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has
consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control and upon authority of
the Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the
power to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770
makes no mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious
import of this exclusion is to withhold from the Special
Prosecutor the power to preventively suspend.

- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,
April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and
state prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting
any investigation of cases against public officers involving
violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman
may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any
stage.

- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of a public
official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head
of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty
imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural
aspect of the Ombudsmans functions and not its jurisdiction.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675, June
16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the
Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power
is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears
out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary
authority, including the power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at
fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman
to be an activist watchman, not merely a passive one.

- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011-
Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases do not stay the execution of the penalty imposed.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26,
2011- The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which explicitly
states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. Also, the power of the Ombudsman to implement
the penalty is not merely recommendatory but mandatory.

- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
165584, January 22, 2008 Supreme Court reiterated this
ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty
is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with
due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to
contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary
authority on the DECS over public school teachers and
prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on
June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was
ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770
was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987
Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of
earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770
were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to
act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with
the exception of officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.


- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a GOCC is
originally created by charter or not. What is decisive is that
it has been acquired by the government to perform
functions related to government programs and policies.

- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan,
376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution and
Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the Ombudsman the power to
direct any officer or employee of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters to perform any
act or duty required by law or to stop any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.

- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding
Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272-
Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for recovery
of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.


ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)

- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No. 161881,
July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No. 542 is a mere
license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner for the use or
exploitation of natural resources and public lands over which the State has
sovereign ownership under the Regalian Doctrine. Like timber or mining
licenses, a forest land grazing lease agreement is a mere permit which, by
executive action, can be revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or
modified, whenever public welfare or public interest so requires. The
determination of what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the
State as owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or
license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under the
due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In cases in
which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's welfare, the
license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the latter, as well as to
the police power of the State. Such a privilege or license is not even a
property or property right, nor does it create a vested right; as such,
no irrevocable rights are created in its issuance. xxx

- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to
recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen by
many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a long
and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of social justice,
abhors a further delay in the resolution of this controversy and brings it to
its fitting conclusion by denying the petition.

- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and
lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed
to have never been public lands and are private. The right of
ownership granted to indigenous peoples over their ancestral
domains does not cover the natural resources. The right granted
to IP to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural
resources covers only their exploration to ensure ecological and
environmental protection.

- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 recognized the
existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial as
an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- Foreshore
and submerged areas form part of the public domain and are
inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas are also form part of the public domain and are also
inalienable, unless converted into alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain.

- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the
public domain may only be leased and not sold to private
parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain which
the government could not sell to private parties except if the
legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed
lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or
public service. xxx The ownership of lands reclaimed from
foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian Doctrine, which
declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to
the State

- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to
alienable lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to
private corporations which can only lease the same. The State
may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not bar
private corporations from participating in reclamation projects
and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands. What the
Decision prohibits, following the explicit constitutional mandate,
is for private corporations to acquire reclaimed lands of the
public domain. There is no prohibition on the directors,
officers and stockholders of private corporations, if they are
Filipino citizens, from acquiring at public auction reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain. They can acquire not
more than 12 hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired
becomes private land.

- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.
Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial property,
can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or
qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands
acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are patrimonial
property which even private corporations can acquire by
purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain if sold or transferred to a public or municipal corporation
for a monetary consideration become patrimonial property in the
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once converted to
patrimonial property, the land may be sold by the public or
municipal corporation to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations.

- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes, GR
No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands become
patrimonial property or private property of the government only
upon a declaration that these are alienable or disposable lands,
together with an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public
service or the development of national wealth. Only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for
the acquisition of property of the public domain begin to run.

- in connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that
those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title,
to such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land Act merely
requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does not require
that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during
the entire period of possession. The possessor is thus entitled to
secure judicial confirmation of title as soon as the land it covers
is declared alienable and disposable. This is, however, subject to
the December 31, 2020 deadline imposed by the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 9176.

- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No.
17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the State
except for the lot areas with existing titles. The continued
possession and considerable investment of private claimants do
not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do
these give them a right to apply a title to the land they are
presently occupying. The present land law traces its roots to the
Regalian Doctrine.

- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the Supreme
Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the public
domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay as 400
hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of agricultural
land). Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under
PD No. 705. Forest lands do not necessarily refer to large tracts
of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees
and underbrushes.

- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No. 16678,
April 24, 2009 The classification of lands of the public domain
is of two types, i.e., primary classification and secondary
classification. The primary classification comprises agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. The
agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified
by law according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This
further classification of agricultural lands is referred to as
secondary classification. Congress, under existing laws, granted
authority to a number of government agencies to effect the
secondary classification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial or industrial or other urban uses.


- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009-
While the acquisition and the purchase of real properties in the
country by a foreigner is void ab initio for being contrary to the
Constitution, the subsequent acquisition of the said properties
from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen has cured the flaw in the
original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands reclaimed
by PEA or through a contract with a private person or entity,
such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of public
domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not
to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084
and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands of
public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino
citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand,
the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of
public lands under its charterThe Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. The NHA is an end-user agency authorized
by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The
moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds,
they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties
of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and
private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not
converted to patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it
would be useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally
transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More importantly, it
cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals since it can only
transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and
prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the
foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed
land has been declared alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been
reclassified as patrimonial property.

- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that the
classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the Regalian
doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated
to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
public domain.

- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the
prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of land.
It does not extend to immovable or real property as defined
under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we would have
a strange situation where the ownership of immovable property
such as trees, plants and growing fruit attached to the land would
be limited to Filipinos and Filipino corporations only.

- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands of the
public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A
homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is one
of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes.

- La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1,
2004 Foreign corporations are confined to technical and
financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or
utilize the countrys natural resources by entering into the
necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the pursuit
of visible operations. Service contracts with foreign corporations
as contractors who invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the
State. Control by the state must be on the macro level,
through the establishment of policies, guidelines,
regulations, industry standards and similar measures that
would enable the government to control the conduct of the
affairs in various enterprises and restrain activities deemed
not desirable or beneficial.

- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose
Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et al.,
March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows service
contracts in the large-scale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance as provided by law. The Court
said that these agreements with foreign corporations are not
limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The 1987
Constitution allows the continued use of service contracts
with foreign corporations as contractors who would invest
in and operate and manage extractive enterprises, subject
to the full control and supervision of the State.

- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No.
152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR
No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its
Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et
al., J une 23, 2006- Mining operations in the Diwalwal Mineral
Reservation Area lies within the full control of the executive
branch of the state. xxx Mining operations in the Diwalwal
Mineral Reservation are now, therefore, within the full control of
the State through the executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA
7942, the State can either directly undertake the exploration,
development, and utilization of the area or it can enter into
agreement with qualified entities.

- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426
SCRA 517 Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution does
not apply retroactively to a license, concession or lease
granted by the government under the 1973 constitution or
before the effectivity of the 1987 constitution.

- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule of
law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership.

- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373 SCRA 316
The operation of public utility shall not be exclusive.

- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc.,
556 SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has the
imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of
its apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.

- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum,
it does not appear that, in approving 23 of R.A. No. 7925,
Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that
doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as
having amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to
exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The
National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not
authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience
(CPCs) and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly
issued legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had
violated the terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises are
extended through statutes, they should receive recognition as
the ultimate expression of State policy.

- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353-
Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when
the public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to
alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted
away.

- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 The
constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall
not be exclusive.

- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7,
2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It
mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so
requires.


ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)


- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have
revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo
v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).

- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs.
Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of
civil and political rights only either by government official or
private individual.

- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial
powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to
Section 5- perform such other functions and duties as may be
provided by law.

- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although
admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.

- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that
the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and
conducted in a just and humane manner does not mean validity
or legality of the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence
of resettlement area designated or earmarked by the
government.

ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)

- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR
No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A review center is not an institution
of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722[i]t does not
offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED. Moreover, [a] review course is only
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees, and it does not require
enrollment, attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis in
order to complete the review center course requirements or take
the licensure examination.

- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational
institution and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court
sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service
rules on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private
petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence, the
University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach
or who may continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April
3, 2001).

- Letter of the UP LAW: AM 10-10-4 SC; March 8, 2011- The
Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondnets
academic freedom as it does not dictat upon the law professors
the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. They are free to determine what they will teach their
students and how they will teach. Moreover, it is not inconsistent
with the principle of academic freedom for the Supreme Court to
subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for
contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their
capacity as teachers. The right to freedom expression of
members of the BAR may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold
the publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system.


- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As
enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos
v. Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to
formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation forms part of academic freedom. And
such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by the
courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its
exercise. Therefore, absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion, the courts may not disturb the Universitys decision
not to confer honors to petitioner.

- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with
academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of
higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and determine whether these standards have been
met. At the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire
an employee on probation, belongs to the university as the
employer alone.

- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study. Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant
therewith, who should be retained in its rolls of professors and
other academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de
Manila University v. Capulong: As corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed
with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.

- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section
5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for
itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for
itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it
shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

- It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching
the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in
any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach. Indeed,
while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of
1982 that students have a right to freely choose their field
of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, such right is subject to
the established academic and disciplinary standards laid
down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore,
can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its
free choice of students for admission to its school.


ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)


- IMMUNITY OF THE STATE FROM SUIT (Read general
principles; Phil Agila Satellite, Inc. vs. Lichauco, May 3,
2006)- The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the
performance of official functions against an officer of the
government by a private citizen which would result in a charge
against or financial liability to the government must be regarded
as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded. However, government immunity from suit
will not shield the public official being sued if the government no
longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the
liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious
act in the performance of his/her duties.

- COA vs. Link Worth Intl. Inc., GR No. 182559, March 13,
2009- The COA is an unincorporated government agency which
does not enjoy a separate juridical personality of its own, Hence,
even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its
primarily governmental functions, COA cannot be sued without
its consent.

- Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA, GR No. 155504, June
26, 2009- Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary
contract with PROVI and thereby gave its implied consent to be
sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot
be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or attachment.

- GTZ v. CA, GR No. 152318, April 16, 2009- German Agency
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), which implements a joint
health insurance project of the German and Philippine
governments, is not entitled to immunity from suit in the
Philippines as GTZ, being the equivalent of a government-
owned-and-controlled corporation, has the power and capacity to
sue and be sued under the Corporation Code. GTZ is akin to a
governmental owned or controlled corporation without original
charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly
consented to be sued,

- PCCG vs. Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2006- When the
government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034.
Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the
main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.
For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly
authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a
private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private
individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or
defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act
of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver
of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case,
petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private
respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.

- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs.
Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion,
January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of the
former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly
abolished.

- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or
indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They
cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to
a civilian position to speak of.

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY 70%

- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools
established by religious groups and mission boards.


ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)


- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos.
183591, 183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The
Court noted that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD
establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the
Central Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of
Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed
to the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place.
Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is
authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act
would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process
of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an
undue influence or interference with that process.

- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when acting
as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers to
propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, all
powers necessary to the effective exercise of principal power
granted, such as the power to fix qualifications, apportionment,
etc..

- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is
insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives for
constitutional amendments. While the Constitution recognizes
the right of citizens to propose amendments, the people cannot
exercise such until Congress provides for its implementation.

- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready
and shown to the people before they sign such
proposal. The framers plainly stated that before they sign
there is already a draft shown to them. The framers also
envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself
because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature. The essence of amendments
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire
proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their
behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal
must be embodied in a petition.

- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS.
COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution
or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of
the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but
as component elements of a Constituent Assembly.

- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes
proposals for amendments, it does not have the final say on
whether or not its acts are within constitutional limits- an issue
which is clearly subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times
necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be
validly held together with general elections.

- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no
piece meal ratification.

- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of
amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed
amendments/revisions so provide.


ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)


- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April11, 2002- Section 25 of the Transitory
Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only
be way of direct exception.

- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The
Supreme Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations
that the Arroyo administration is engaged in double speak in
trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort
by foreign troops on native soil.

- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342 SCRA
449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has
been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and
certified by the duly authorized representative of the United States
government. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and
consent of the United States Senate does not detract from its status as
a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.
For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can be taken of
the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to
its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in
nature, whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under the
provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from
ratification. The second reason has to do with the relation between the
VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951. This
earlier agreement was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of
both the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate.

- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN), et al.,
Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al., No. 170516, July
16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence,
such pertains only to the validity of the treaty under consideration, not to
the conduct of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is
not even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to
concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.

- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs. Smith, et
al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo, et al., G.R. No.
176222- February 11, 2009
-
The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States, entered
into on February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006 are
DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to forthwith negotiate with
the United States representatives for the appropriate agreement on
detention facilities under Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V,
Sec. 10 of the VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained
until further orders by this Court.