Alfred Korzybsky.

Science and Sanity

I want to make clear that words are not the things spoken about, and that there is no such thing as an
object in absolute isolation.We must realize that structure, and structure alone is the only link between
languages and the empirical world.

We read unconsciously into the world the structure of language we use.

We shall always be ruled by those who rule symbols.

Genaral semantics is not any philosophy or psychology or logic, in the ordinary sense. It is a new
extensional discipline which explains and trains us how to use our nervous system most efficiently.

In the evolution of the human race and language there was a natural oder of evaluation established;
namely, the life facts came first and labels (words) next in importance. Today, from childhood up, we
inculcate words and language first, and the facts they represent come next in value, another
pathologically reversed order, by which we are unconsciously being trained to identify words with facts.
The averege child is born extensional and then his evaluations ae distorted as the result of intensional
training by parents, teachers etc. who are unaware of the heavy neurological consequences.

Intension vs.extension

For instance we may verbally define man as a featherless biped, rational animal and what not, which
really makes no difference, because no listing of properties could possibly cover all the characteristics of
Smith 1, Smith 2 etc. and their inter-relations.

By extension man is defined by exhibiting a class of individuals made up of Smith 1, Smith 2 etc.
On the surface this difference may appear unimportant; not so in living life applications. The deeper
problems of neurological mechanisms enter here. If we orient ourselves predominantly by intension or
verbal definitions, our orientations depend mostly on the cortical region. If we orient ourselves by
extension or fact (the natural order of evaluation) involves thalamic factors, introducing automatically
cortically delayed reactions. In other words, orientations by intension tend to train our nervous system
in the split between the functions of the cortical and thalamic regions; orientations by extension involve
the integration of cortico-thalamic functions.

Orientations by extension induce an automatic delay of reactions, which automatically stimulates the
cortical region and regulates and protect the reactions of the usually over-stimulated thalamic region.

Nearly all of us, even now, copy animals in our nervous responses, which copying leads to the general
state of un-sanity reflected in our private and public lives, institutions and systems.
The old dictum that we are animals leaves us hopeless, but if we merely copy animals in our nervous
responses, we can stop it provided we can discover a physiological difference in these reactions.

Any affect only gains meaning when it is conscious; or, in other words, when as actual set of relations is
present. In an ideally balanced and efficient human nervous system, the emotions would be translated
into ideas, and ideas into emotions with equal facility. The semantic reactions of a given individual
would be under full control and capable of being educated, influenced, transformed quickly and
efficiently.

Multiordinal terms : terms devoid of meaning outside of a context; they have different meanings,
depending on the order of abstraction.
Semantic reaction : psycho-logical responses to words and other stimuli in connection with their
meanings
Structure: configuration of relations

In Manhood of Humanity I defined man functionally as a time-binder, a definition based on the
observation that the human class of life differs from animals in the fact that, in the rough, each
generation of humans can, at least potentially, start where the former generation left off.

The only possible content of knowledge is structural, a fact which is the semantic factor responsible for
cultures and periods and everything else in human development. The issues we deal with, whenever
human psycho-logical reactions are involved, are circular, as distinguished from animal reactions.
Human structures, in language or in stone, reflect the psycho-logical status, feelings, intuitions,
structural metaphysics and other semantic responses of their makers and periods; and, vice versa, once
these structural strivings and tendencies are formulated as such, they help to quicken and transform
one period into the next one.

The only content of knowledge : the worlds structure.

The human capacity for expanding indefinitely the orders of abstractions bring about the peculiar
stratification of human knowledge.

We must work out a theory of evaluation which is based on the optimum electro-colloidal action and
reaction of the nervous system.

How chemical conditions affect the activities of the organism-as-a-whole can be well illustrated by the
following example. In a jellyfish, we can increase or decrease the locomotor activities by simply changing
the chemical constitution of the water. If we increase the number of Na ions in the sea water, the
rhythmical contractions increase and the animal becomes restless. If we increase the number of Ca ions,
the contractions decrease. In a similar way, we can change the orientation toward light in a number of
marine animals by changing the constitution of the medium. The larvae of Polygordius, which usually go
away from light into dark corners, can be compelled to go toward light by two methods: either by
lowering the temperature of the sea-water, or else by increasing the concentration of the salts in the
sea-water. This behavior can be reversed by raising the temperature or lowering the concentration of
the salts.

Psychogalvanic experiments show clearly that every emotion or thought is always connected with
some electrical currents, and that electricity seems fundamental for colloidal behavior, and, therefore,
for physical symptoms and the behavior of the organism.
In the colloidal process we find the bridge between the physical and the mental, and the mutual link
seems mainly electricity.

If different macrospopic, microscopic and submicroscopic lesions of the nervous system result in quite
definite psycho-logical symptoms, which on the semantic levels appear as a lack of evaluation of
relations, then, vice versa, the use of linguistic systems, which systematically train the immature nervous
system of the child and of the grown-ups in delusional evaluation, must result in at least colloidal
disturbances of the nervous system.

If we speak in neurological terms, we may say that the present nervous structure is such that the
entering nerve currents have a natural direction, established by survival; namely, they traverse the brain
stem and the thalamus first, the subcortical layers next, then the cerebral cortex, and return,
transformed, by various paths.
Experience and experiments show that the natural order was sensation first, idea next; the sensation
being an abstraction of some order, and the idea already an abstraction from an abstraction or an
abstraction of a higher order.
Experience shows again that among humans, this order in manifestations is sometimes reversed; namely
that some individuals have idea first; some vestiges of memories and sensations next, without any
external reason for the sensations. Such individuals are considered mentally ill. They see where
there is nothing to see; they hear where there is nothing to hear; they have pains when there is no
reason to have pains and so on. This reversal of order, but in a mild degree, is extremely common at
present among all of us and underlies mainly all human misfortunes and un-sanity.
This reversal of order in its mild form is involved in identification or the confusion of orders of
abstractions; namely, when we act as if an idea were an experience of our senses. This implies
nervous disturbances, since we violate the natural order of the activities of the nervous system. The
mechanism of projection is also connected with this reversal of order. This reversal transforms the
external world into a quite different and fictitious entity.
That the reversal of order in the manifestations of the functioning of the nervous system must be
extremely harmful, becomes evident when we consider that in such a case the upper layers of our
nervous system (the cortex) not only do not protect us from over-stimulation originating in the external
world and inside us, but actually contribute to the over-stimulation by producing fanciful, yet very real,
irritants. Experiments on some patients have shown how they benefit physically when their internal
energy is liberated from fighting phantoms and so can be redirected to fight colloidal disturbances.

When a quality is treated physiologically as a reaction of an organism to a stimulus, it also becomes a
relation.

The non-identity principle : to properly distinguish the orders of abstractions.

The cortex receives its material as elaborated by the thalamus. The abstractions of the cortex are
abstractions from abstractions and so ought to be called abstractions of higher order. In neurology,
similarly, the neurons first excited are called of first order; and the succeeding members of the series
are called neurons of the second order. Such terminology is structurally similar to the inherent
structure and function of the nervous system. The receptors are in direct contact with the outside world
and convey their excitation and nerve currents to the lower nerve centers, where these impulses are
further elaborated and then abstracted by the higher centers.
Those individuals who overwork their thalamus and use their cortex too little are emotional and stupid.
This statement is not exaggerated, because there are experimental data to show how through a psycho-
neural training the semantic reactions, in some cases, can be re-educated, and that with the elimination
of the semantic disturbances there is a marked development of poise, balance and a proportional
increase of critical judgement, and so intelligence.
When these shifting, dynamic, affective, thalamic-region, lower order abstractions are abstracted again
by the higher centers, these new abstractions are further removed from the outside world and cease to
be shifting; they become relatively static and thus more reliable. Such higher order abstractions
represent a perfected kind of memory, which can be recalled exactly in the form as it was originally
produced. For instance, the circle, defined as the locus of points in a plane at equal distance from a
given point called the center, remains permanent as long as we wish to use this definition. We can,
therefore, recall it perfectly, analyse it etc., without losing the definiteness and the stability of this
memory. Thus, critical analysis, and therefore, progress, becomes possible. Compare this perfected
memory, which may last indefinitely unchanged, with memories of emotions which, whether dim or
clear, are always distorted. We see that the first are reliable, that the others are not.

It seems that the so-called ethics, in general, sanity, which underlie desirable human characteristics
have a definite physiological mechanism, automatically involving on psycho-logical levels these desirable
semantic attitudes. It appears that some of the psycho-logical problems enormously complex and
difficult to reach are solved, not by preaching, but by most simple and elementary physiological training,
a fact which has been verifid empirically.
Pavlov shows, in an unusually impressive variety and numbers of experiments, how order and delay
are intimately related with most fundamental processes in the higher nervous centers, and how, by the
changes or interplays of them, we can produce or eliminate pathological states of the nervous system.

Usually, one extremely fundamental semantic fact is disregarded; namely, that what on the psycho-
logical level is objective and in language descriptive to one person (e.g. my toothache), is inferential to
the other person, and vice versa. The lack of consciousness of abstracting introduces an identification of
orders of abstractions; namely, the confusion of descriptions with inferences and vice versa.

Thus, if a dog was trained to respond to a bell, which was a signal for food, he could be trained further
to link the signal to another neutral stimulus, let us say, the sound of a buzzer with the bell and the bell
with food. Such a secondary acquired reaction may be called of the second order. Naturally, it is very
instructive to find out if these responses could be extended to more orders. Experiments disclosed the
important fact that, as far as dogs and alimentary reactions are concerned, it was impossible to go
beyond the second order. However, when defense reactions were tested, it was found that it was
possible to establish acquired reactions of the third order. But it was impossible to go beyond the third
order, even in these cases.
In our field, where we have to formulate sharp differences between the nervous responses of man and
animal, we say that animals stop abstracting or linking of signals on some level, while humans do not.

The structure and function of the central nervous system is such that some stimulations can be
concealed and become macroscopically seemingly inactive, giving no obvious manifestation or response,
yet preservating their active exciting characteristics which, by proper treatment, can be released at will.
In physics we have a similar phenomenon in the case of frozen light, galvanic and storage batteries and
many others, although probably the sub-microscopic mechanisms are different.

Our nervous systems registers objects with its lower centers first, and each of these lower specific
abstractions we call an object. Verbal labeling of an object = second order abstraction

We define the consciousness of abstracting as awareness that in our process of abstracting we have left
out characteristics.

The consciousness of abstracting eliminates automatically identification and confusion of the orders of
abstractions, both applying to the semantic confusion on all levels. If we are not conscious of
abstracting, we are bound to identify or confuse the object with its finite number of characteristics, with
the event. Confusion on these levels may misguide us into semantic situations ending in unpleasant
shocks. If we acquire the consciousness of abstracting and remember that the object is not the event
and that we have abstracted characteristics fewer than, and different from, those the event has, we
should expect many unforeseen happenings to occur; consequently, when the unexpected happens, we
are saved from painful and harmful semantic shocks.
If, through lack of consciousness of abstracting, we identify or confuse words with objects and feelings,
or memories and ideas with experiences which belong to the un-speakable objective level, we identify
higher order abstractions with lower. I call this objectification, because it is generally the confusion of
words or verbal issues (memories, ideas etc) with objective, un-speakable levels, such as objects, or
experiences or feelings. If we objectify, we forget, or do not remember that words are not the objects or
the feelings themselves, that the verbal levels are always different from the objective levels. When we
identify them, we disregard the inherent differences, and so proper evaluation and full adjustment
become impossible.
Similar semantic difficulties arise from the confusion of higher order abstractions; for instance, the
identification of inferences with descriptions.

An organism may only be called adapted to life when it not only receives stimuli but also has protective
means against stimuli.
It is obvious that in the human organism the field for stimulations is vastly greater than in animals. We
are subjected not only to all external stimuli but also to a large number of permanently operating
internal semantic stimuli, against which we have had, as yet, very little protective psychphysiological
means. Such structurally powerful stimuli are found in our doctrines, metaphysics, language, attitudes
etc. These do not belong to the external objective world, and so the animals do not have them in a like
degree.

One adjusts oneself by increasing the field of consciousness.

As our enquiry has shown, in practically all mental ills, a confusion of orders of abstractions appears as
a factor. When we confuse the orders of abstractions and ascribe objective reality to terms and symbols,
or confuse conclusions and inferences with descriptions, a great deal of semantic suffering is produced.
Obviously, in a such a delusional world, different from the actualities, we are not prepared for
actualities, and then always something unexpected or frightful, may happen.
As we have seen, the general preventive psychophysiological discipline in all such cases of confusion of
orders of abstractions is found in consciousness of abstracting.

In infancy the confusion of orders of abstractions must be considered as an entirely natural semantic
period. Objects and sense perceptions are the only reality the child knows and cares about; so he does
not and cannot discriminate between events and objects. By necessity, he identifies unknowingly two
entirely different levels. As his symbol usually means a satisfaction of his wants, naturally he identifies
the symbols with the objects and events.
The more the child comes in touch with reality, the more he learns, and in a normal child the
pleasure principle, which was established as a method of adjustment on the infantile level, is slowly
displaced by the reality principle, which thus becomes the semantic method of adjustment of the
complete adult.

A general underlying structure of languages: they have inherent interconnection, underlying
assumptions and implications, the analysis of which is seldom, if ever, carried far enough. Now these
structural assumptions and implications are inside our skin when we accept a language-any language. If
unraveled, they become conscious; if not, they remain unconscious.
It should be noticed (as this is very important) that the undefined terms, being undefined, are
overloaded with emotional values. As the higher nervous centers cannot handle them, the lower nerve
centers work upon them overtime. If we do not analyse our languages into their undefined terms and
structural postulates, our strongest emotional and semantic components, which made these
languages, remain hidden and unconscious. We call this the structural unconscious.