51.

122. p.295 f.n.l3.

123.
124. celow, p.
219.

.!.!l en
- '
.
h
also translated the Udanavarga into Chinese, and whose
of activity as a translator under the Sung
rai !suncr was from 380-1000 See 3uddh1st Text
Infornation no: 6, ;':arch 197E, ::l0.3-4. :t is indicative
of icrnorance of Chinese 3uddhists =oncerninc Santi-
deva that the 55 wrongly to
:Jhar::1ayasas nr (:-:: 7c ).
_
'25
. =y
-

Td'

. ""i

' t
sa

'-.,= )::.. ' w.o
126. 3van=.chuo.serns.oa'i.soyod.oa.la.' juc.oa'i. 'acrel.oa-
vol.
19 of the C011ected Works of =uston ed. by L. Chandra
(New International Acad. of Indian Culture,197l)
18l-E02.
127. compiled notes (zin.bris) on Tsong.kha.pa's lec-
tures on the ??- 3hes.rab.le'u'1.z1n.bris ?Dhoku rr5399 .
Jnfortunately this work was not available to me.
128. i.e the and the (see Eiblio-
;ra?hy). :or a full discussion of works produced by
this controversy see the introduction to the by
9?8-11.
"'raDsl at; on
53.
iE7.26-170.24
these auxilaries were by 3age the
sa:<e of rlisdor:l. :here::orc:::Je who desires an end to suf-
fering should generate ;iisdom.
In this introductory verse the
importance of this cha9ter by asserting the ?rLuacy of
;iisdom over all other .?erfections which are necessary
:or the Sodhisattva's ?ractice as detailed in the previous
?Ortion of the the accumulation of merit
throu=h the of the vir-
. ... ..
tues of etc., is not in itself a requisite for
attaininc the highest it is necessary that they
accom?any as accesso!"y conditions (sahaKari-
in order that 3uddhahood may attained, and
it is axpressly denied that this goal can reached
2
through :<nowledge alone. although these virtues
taught by as a means of aiding ;visdom to
achieve perfect Enlightenment, they are by themselves
?Owerless to achieve iti it is only in ;1armony ";lith
:visdom that they can achieve the suppression of the
emotional and cognitive obscurations
by which suffering is alleviated and
omniscience is obtained. This is just the position of
in which the five moral
?erfections are com9ared to blind men unable to find the
road to Gnlightenment without the guide of Hisdom, and
s<; .
are said not even to name cf unless
3
they are ?erfor.ned in the light of ;-/isdom.
There is some question as to whether the
"'Oarikara!1l," which I have translated here as "auxiliaries"
Out which also could be rendered as "multitude," "retinue"
4
Or even to all five of the moral
?eriections of ::iving, "bral .)iscipline, Patience, :1isor
and I-leditativc Concentration, or to "feditative Concen-
tration (dhiana) or tranquilization (Samatha) alone, as
delineated in the immediately preceding chapter.
I';Cst
commentators, while agreeing that either inter9retation
is feasible, ?refer to as denoting all of
the five moral since from on up, each
of them is the necessary condition for the ?roduction of
5
the succeeding one.
";:'he two aspects of .visdom as causal
and final qoal are indicated here; the former is
the progressively deeper inSight into Emptiness which
enables one to attain the successive 30dhisattva
6
Stages, and the latter the omniscience of the 3Uddha,
who understands all as?ects ot existence
and their
170.29-177.24
"The Superficial and the Oltirnater these are accepted
as the two truths. is the s9here of the
intellect; intellect is what is called "the superficial." L21
fundamental }idhyamika distinction of the two
truths is shown here in a seemingly unambiguous verse,
55.
in with similar formulations by earlier
_ 7
writers. This verse, however, has occasioned
an enormous mas= of comment among Tibetan
scholars on the question as to whether it is to under-
stocti literally or interpreted. this body of
exegetical illuminates crucial differences
among : he Tibetan schools in their understanding of the
system, I have discussed the problems raised
by the differing interpretations of this verse in the
Introduction LCf. 9P' 20-37
177.29-179.2
As to that, two tYPES of Jeople are obsErved -- the
-
yogin and the common person. perceptions OLJ common
persons are sublated by those of the yoqins. And Lthe
perceptions of] the yogins also are sublated, Leach lower
one] by each higher, because of the differences in Ltheir]
intellectual capacity. L3-4b]
ifuile 3uddhists have generally denied the pretensions
to hereditary spiritual superiority of Srahmans and
8
others, social has been oalanced by the
willingness of 3uddhist thinkers to distinguish between
superior and inferior human beings on the basis of their
9
intellectual and moral attainments. The ontological and
epistemological diVision into superficial (or conventional)
and ultimate truths leads naturally to a diVision of
people according to their knowledge of these truths. Santi-
deva distinguishes between yogins, who perceive the non-
56.
errcr.eous nature of as a ot having
attained a meditative state characterized by the non-
perception of any element (sarvadharmanuoalarnbha) from
common people (prakr,tika), who perceive things from a
common-sense realistic point of view who have not
attained the meditative state in which tranquillzation
and insight are inextricably united
lC
yugannadha).
:n the very of common persons, the
commentators include everyone from the masses,
whose minds are unaffected philosophical views,
who nevertheless cling to a substantial and ego-centered
?erception of the world as a result of in:Xll.-n ;.'redilec-
tions, to the heterodox non-Buddhists (tlrthika) who
accept either an abiding mental or physical substratum
such as atman, jiva, isvara, etc., or who
----- .
nihilistically deny moral causality altogether, like
_ _ 11
the Carvakas. :-_ccording to 3Uston all 3uddhist dogma-
ticians arE to considered as yogins, or at lEast
those of thE..':1. who have attained the <'ath of 'lision (darSanS!-
on =.ny of the three -iehicles, froQ the :iinayana
=:earer-:3trEa.!':'Minner u? to the 3uddha
12
:'1imself, ;'Ihich would then !:lake the category of ordinary
coterminous with all those persons
who have not reached the i'ath of i. e. thE

- -
57.
:':ot onl;;r a:-e the wholly er!'oneous vl.ews of common
gersons sublated by those of the ;;rogins,
also among the yogins the views of adherents
of the 'higher' ;uddhist doctrinal will sublate
:rom the
of the adherents of the 'lower' schools.
13
?Oint of view of a like gantideva,
the Ollddhist schools in ascending order are the '/aibha-
s1ka, 3autrantika, "!ogacara. Svatantr1ka-Hadhvarnika and
. -
?rasa
n
siJea-r.,adhyam1ka. '::ven aI!IOng yogins who have rea-
l1zed ::mptiness f!'om the l'rasangika-Hacihyamika of
vie"I, there will ::,e a hierarc.hy of views, since those of
?rasanqika yoqins on a hiqher .=odhlsattva stac;e ylculd
subldte those of one on a lower stage, since repre-
... -
sent a more penetrating intuition of
179.2-130.19
3ecause the example Lof dreams, illusions, etc,]
is accepted by both [the and the the
uninvestigated is for the sake of the Joal.
.:ntities are
and also conceived by the worldly realistic-
ally, not indeed as being like illusion -- hence the
between the yoSin and the worldly. L4C-S]
.;t this the non-l:adhyamika might ask why the
;>osition of an ordinary person is sublated by that of
the yogin, since there is no proof of non-
substantiality. replies with an argument by
analogy, and states that just as all geople are agreed
Sci
creams, illusions co r.ot Exist in the
which tjey ap?ear,15, so ell ?henonena do not
way they seem to, that is, they are nen-sucstan-
tial. .'!lile type of analogical :-easoninq is not
?roeative, itdces serve to indicate the ?ossibility that
our orcina!'y waking judgements can =e as as the y
as they are in creams. analosy eften
in the literature.
1E
:oncedinq nor:su;:,stantiality, the o;>;>onent then tries
to draw consequence that all religious actions and
would lack ;>ur?ose cecause 0: their non-substantial-
ity; any to achieve relisious would
in t:1is case, as vain as "buying an il1uso!y
:'he ::.adhyamika cannot end does not devy tie t:.i.. te non-
substanticlity of the ?ath and its as it is,
all, one of the basic tenets of school,13 =ut his
re91y a one, is that we to utilize
i.e. conventicnal
an the other :noral ?er:ections and aces series
of the 30dhisattva career, as a :or about
hap?iness and ellev1atins suffe:-ing for oneself and
:or others, as long as haven't attained the highest
?erce?tion and continue operate in the worle
of de;>endently-produced actions and their results.
1
9
is just zy means of type of ethical action that we
will attain an understanding of ultimate tLuth. The two
truths can be viewed in a cause anc ef:ect relation:
17
59.
truth is skillful :ileans, ulti::tate trut:'
is the object IOhich arises fror.! that."
20
:he realist opponent, wnor.! here takes
refer to 3autrantika, then
::-aise the as to what the ;-:adhyarnika ccuarrel
with the realists is actually surely Lhe says]
the as Well as he himself conven-
tional and utilizes according to their
functions or natures- he =Urns things with fire, sits on
chairs etc. :'he ;-;adhyar:tika re;:ly 15 that they have no
with the concerning conventional ap-
that fire Ourns etc. is established by a valid
of savs 1n the
-
sa::luccava: all eleillents laCk self, the connec-
tion and its effect is :'lot contradicted ;
appearance of all eler<lents is not contradicted though
they lack all s\!=:stance."
22
:':ie ;:oint at issue is
rather the way in which these entities are perceived to
exist. urdinary ge09le see things as if they genUinely
and ultimately exist, =:ecause :or ordinary ?eople func-
tional capacity :5 equated ultimate existence.
23
Or-
dinary people do see functionally
entities as devoid of substance and like illusions
the yogin does. the debate between
them is about the ontological status of appearances,
rather than their vlaidity qua
L ()_
180.20-181.14
?orms, etc., which are directly perceived are
by convention, not according to a valid
means of knowledge.
It is just as the re9utation of
purity regarding is false. L6J
The fact that form, sound and the other sense objects
are directly perceived does not mean that they are ulti-
mately existent, because direct gerception is a valid
means of knowledge only insofar as it1s a conventional
means of knowledge which is invali-
dated by the analysis. If direct perce?tion
were valid as regards the ultimate, then,
rer:larks. all people mId ?erceive final Reality (tattva)
without any exertion, and the entire 2ath of =uddhism
would be In vain, a patently unacceptable conclusion for
a 3uddhist. dhat appears to sense 9 rcept10naccords
with worldly convention but is false in the final analy-
sis, because its mode of existence is mistaken by wrong
understanding.
This is compared to the way that a woman
!:!ay be called "pure" in a conventional sense. although
upon analYSis her body is seen to be a of impure
24
SUbstances. Similarly we customarily perceive things
to be permanent and endowed with self, although the oppo-
25
site is actually true.
lo1..L5-183. 5
entities were taught by the Protector for the
sake of caUsing worldlings to enter [gradually into a
61.
of Actually Centities] are
instantaneous. If Cit is said thatl this is contra-
dicted even conventionally ewe reply that] there is no
fault Cof not validated]. 'Jom?ared
to worldlings, yogins conventionally perceive
Lwho perceive If that were not so.
deternination of subIated
the worldly [viewl.

now considers the ?Ossible objections of
a who can cite many scri?tural ?assages in
t:1e 3uddha a9?arently ;,lreaches that the sxandhas,
ayatanas and dhatus, etc., are t=uly existent.
the ; ayayana also acce;>ts these scrii?tures as the tr'.le
:'iord of 3uddha, they resorted to the nerne!lUetic
device of 5cri?tures into whose 3eaninq
is to 0e taken literally (nita:tna) and those whose
::leaning is a judicio'us (neya'-tbCj). :'bus,
according to the ,:adhyamika, the realistic teachings of
t:he 2lnayana were ?reacned the =uddha for the sake of
those who for the were not advanced
enough to the 9rofound teaching of in
order that tney 0e led s-radually that teaching.
7ne doctrine of which is
to the skandhas and other phenonena, is only con-
ventionally valid according to the i!idhyamika. realist
might the.'1 object that in that case there are insufficient
grounds for accepting i.e. impermanence,
:2
even understand
things to endure in e.g. they see a pot 1n
eVt:!r.ing as identical ',Jith t:he ?Ot they noticed in
the morninS-0 ?he i:adhya.-nika answer 15 that
1s validated the yogin's concentration on
?ersonal selflessness
their still ?ertains to the
conventional.
yogins, however, are held to see
reality conventionally; as comp?red to ordinary worldly
?eop1e who ?ermanence to 9henomena.
This type of yogic gerception must disaffirm that of the
vulgar worldling, just as a yogin absorbed in the cor.-
on the repulsiveness of
worldly views of its purity.
133.6-184.10
i;eri t can arise :rom an illusory ::onqueror, just as
it would from a truly e.."d.stent one. ] If sentient
beings are like illusion, can they be reborn after
having died? (Reply] As long as the aggregate of L1ts ]
conditions e.'<:ists, illUsion also will exist. 30w coul d
sentient beings exist truly on account of the
long of their [ 9-10J
opponent now raises an objection from the
religious stand9Qint: if all things are Similar to
dreams illUsions then the Conqueror i.e. the
iuddha, must Similarly lack substantial reality. If tha t
=3.
is the case, how could merit possibly arise
through worship?inq such an illusory 3uddha? It could
not, any more than it could be produced by reverancing
a creation. replies that just as truly
existent merit would De produced as a result of worship-
9
in
g the truly existent 3uddha accepted by the realist,
just so is illusion-like produced from
an illusion-like 3uddha; the difference the
;.;ad:'1yamika and his adversary is solely over the ontolog-
ical status to be assigned to merit and 3Uddha -- the
causal ?rOcess identically in either case
is taken u? at later on CV.3E-40J.
;.:oreover, if sentient lleings are like illusions,
how could they be reborn? According to the opponent re-
birth could not take ?lace in that situation, since an
illusory cannot be regenerated after the illusion is
destroyed. answer is as above, that
causality will continue to 0gerate whether the causes and
results be substantially existent or illusory; an illusion
persist as long as the spells or drugs or whatever
factors are involved in its ?roduction remain
Likewise, as long as the aggregate of conditions
(oratyayasama
cr
rl) for birth in cyclic existence are
?res
ent
, i.e. ignorance, and craving (avidva-
the continuum of a sentient being (sattya-
sam
tana
) will not cease to enter into the varioUS states
. - . j .
of cyclic existence. objection might be put forth
that the continuum of a sentient beinq, since it endures
measureless aeons, could not be a illusion,
cagical creations being of a notoriously short duration.
is that is not necessarily the case; the continua
of sentient beings are of long duration just because their
conditions last a long time. :ength of existence is not
a valid criterion for judging whether something exists
genuinely or not, as illusory objects can have a long
e.g. renembrance from the distant 9ast.
184.11-24
=Objectionl There is no sin in killing an illusory
because Lan illusory person] no mind.
CReply]
3ut when there is ?Dssession of an illusory mind there is
the source of sin and merit. ellJ
Continuing his attack the realist now tries to show
that the consequences of the thesis of :1on-
substantiality would be the nullification of the Dasic
:-\r)r",l of :Uddh5 theft, etc.
5ince sentient teinqs are like illusion Che argues], they
do not have any and so murdering them
would only produce the sin of murderous i.ntention and
not the sin of actual wurder, just as if one were to murder
an illusory person conjured up by a magician. In reply
distinguishes between the ?roducts of magical
illusion and sentient beings, who are "like illusion" in
their mode of existence. The latter do possess minds,
22
c5.
are likewise of an illusory nature,
and through harminS or them and sin
2E
are actually
164.25-185.14
CObjection] is no ?roduction of an illusory
because that is not within the capacity of s?ells,

Illusion, which is ?roduced various
conditions, is of various sorts; nowhere does a
single condition ?Ossess the capacity Lto ?roduceJ all
27
Ceffectsj.
?he opponent then exception to the ?Ossibility
there ceing such illusory minds by again totally
equatipg "real" sentient beings with ::Lagically created
ones.
idea is that just as consciousness cannot exist
in an ele9hant created by a magician, since spells, drugs
and the like do not have the capacity to produce con-
sciousness in the illusions they create. in just the same
Nay illusory sentient could not ?Dssess a
?Oint of the reply is that creations and con-
ventionally real beings can easily distinguished,
although their intrinsic similar. since
are ?roduced by different types of conditions. iagi-
cal creations are generated by s?ells, etc., and living
by ignorance. etc.; the latter conditions have the
ca?acity to give rise to conscious creatures, while the
=ormer do not have such a ca?acity. I have followed
{. -
-'
line of here, as it
to fit easily into the line of argument;
although Tsong.kha9a and inter?ret i.12ab
as statement rather than as an objection,
emphasizing the difference and
ical creations, as the latter cannot te conscious due to
29
the inca?acity of etc. and
shaz here, as alsewher=, are followinq the line of inter-
?retation laid down who
30
nati's ?OSition as well.
125.15-1e7.11
!f a dlready from
the standpoint of and transnigrates
in that case even wouid transrni-
qrate. and what would the point of 30dhisattva activ-
ity: rlhen its causes are extirpated or.
illusion will cease, zut when its causes are extir-
?atec CcycliC will not arise even Con-
ventionally.
13c-15bl
The 0P9
0
nent here is a sUDstantialist
(sv;>.bna-"av?:"din), either a 1aiohasika vadin who
.
:cceots a real, eternal entity o _
(asamSkrta-dharm
a
), 0= a 3autrantika. who holds to the i
'liew thet it is wholly a negation (nirodha) which does
31
not exist as a real entity (dravva). In either case,
these schools acceDt
o
a nirvana which is entirely dls-

tinct from cvclic existence (sarnsara). to

- .
32

:: he all are ulti.!llately e!!I!?ty cf
sUbstance. free :rom 9roduction and (utoadani-
rodharahitlI, and a state of qUiescence
(adisantatva), and cney are thus already endowed with
interent from the very
:,eginning.
are in this sense already
erated, it is only conventionally, the force of
creative (ka1oanIvakatva} that a!?pear
and die in cyclic axistence. en an ontolog-
ical level "there is not the slightest differe.:lce :::e-
and cvclic e..xiste.nce" '-"li';:";: 24:l9l. '!'he
. - -
to that if
is an ontologically C041nlCO ba!lis (sananadhikara)
cvclic existence and nirvar;?, then there can be no :-eal
attainment of (which =rom 0= view is
. -
that wpich is entirely distinct from cyclic existencei,
and 50 even 3uddha would continue to If
were the case, itwould De senseless to perform
30dhisattva deeds to attain release transmigration.
:n re!?ly si2?ly reaffirms the working of
causality and its effectiveness on the level.
a magical creation will persist as long as its
caus es are present, and so as long as ignorance and the
other defilements (klesa) are not su!?pressed a sentient
will continue to wander about in cyclic existence.
if Oiie wishes to escape the round of cirth
and dea th one must seek to extirpate its causes, i .e.
ignorance, etc., the ?ractices of the 3uddhist
rath, especially through re!:)eated contem?lation of Realit y.
Cnce these conditions are severed, there will not even be
conventional (let alone cecause
there will be insuf=icient bases for its prodUction.
According to and rtgyalt.shab, there is no
contradiction between inherent liberation and the neces-
sity for religious practice to aChieve freedom from
transmigration; since the causal t=ansmlgratory process
is ooerative on a conVentional level, the nirvana of
- .
realist schools is still required, which is called
"-"--=--- .. y/"t..<_,- ..t...;:) -- ... _ __ ., ..... _ "'''' .. __ i .... _ _ U,L.L VaJ..l.e,
.
.... '-" '-LJ..o:Jo J ............ .;'\,,4 ........... _ .. i ......:il"'_ ---_oW .... ___
:Dents" (cr1o.i::ur.drLbrel.cri.mvaDO'. 'dasj
and which o?ri5es
33
from the practice of the ?ath.
187.12-29
CObjection] If the erroneous Cmindj itself
does not
ny what is illusion perceived? [Reply]
../hen 8Ven
illusion is non-existent in your system, then what is
?erceived?
If you say that an aspect of itself is
? rceivedLwe object that] itwould be truly other e than
, - ]
:tind.. :.,1Sc-16
shifts the focus of his attack in '1.l5b-32
to the of the YogaCarins, and to their objections
to the are first presented with a
:ogacara critiCism of the lildhyamika acce!?tance of uni-
versal non-substantialityI inasmuch as non-substan-
ES.
tiality would pertain to mind itself, the
view would not allow for the ?erception of even illusory
phenomena. 51e '!ogacara claims to .::.void this fault by
accepting a truly existent which; however, errs in
34
perceiving objects as external to it. An a!"!alogous
to this Yogacara position is ad-
vanced: since the Yogacara accepts that even illusions
which are external to consciousness do not exist,
that there is only the appearance of forms such as
elephants, etc., which are in actuality only conscious-
ness, how then does he account for the perception of
phenone..l1a "1hich <!.re restricted as to their spatio-
temporal occcrence On the basis of
Yogacarin assumptions there can ce intelligible
accounting for an ordered sequence of events, or for
publicity of knowledge, and phenomena should therefore
35
able to appear at any place or time.
':'he meaning of 'l.16cd is rather unclear, Out I have
followed the 3C8.? in my translation, which takes it as
forestalling a possible yogacara defense of their ?Osi-
tion, i.e. that there is a perceived aspect (akara)
wpich appears in logical sequence conventionally, but
which is of the nature of mind itself, although it is
objectified as external. The counters that
because itappears there must be something other
than the perceiving consciousness itself, i.e. there
must be an efficient object which is the cause
7U.
of its such a. conclusion would of course
De unacceptable to the Cittamatrin. is, however,
a wide divergence of opinion among
as to the
36
actual meaning of these six Pada-s.
187.31-188.26
;'lhen mind itself is an illusion, then t,lhat is per-
ceived, and by what? '!he .t'rotector of the has
said that mind does not perceive mind; just as the blade
of a sword does not cut itself, so mind Ldoes not
cognize itself]. [17-18bJ
"The Yogacarin takes the POSition that perceived
objects arp- not in fact =ram thp- of
consciousness, out are aspects of mind appearing as
external objects and are therefore like illUsions in
that they do not exist as they appear. There is, then,
the problem of accounting for perception since there
is no actual external object function as the cause
of perception. In this connection the Yogacarin might
bring up the function of self-consciousnEss (svasaQ-
vedana), which is simultaneously aware both of itself
and of ?erceived oejects which are actually identical
to it in nature. The next ten VerEes are devoted to
Santideva's denial of necessity or possibility of
this type of perceptual ?rocess.
:irstly, scriptural authority is cited in order
refute the acceptance of self-consciousness.
37
71
':.'he 3uddha explicitly denies that t:us is ?QssiblE,
in the ..a, "Indeed, :nind does not ?erceive
mnd." It would also be a logical contradic-cion for
the perceiving agent co be essentially identical with the
perceived oDject in sane way that a sword blade cannot
38
cut itself, or the tip of a finger touch itself.
lS3.3C-109.3
thesis] is like a lamp which
itself. ,-?eplyJ --,lam? is !lot illuoined, it is
not covered by darkness.
In order to the ?Ossibility of self-con-
of objects the
the of the Just as the can illumine
other such as pots and itself at sane
so does self-=onsciousness ?erce1ve itself and the
39
object of ?erception at the sa@e time. I:ne ;radhyamika
sees this as an ip-appropr1ate since the function
of light is to reveal that which is obscured DY darkness,
and as there is no darkness in a light, a no
40
need to illumine itself. ?urtherrnore a lanp could not
illUMine itself since that would darkness would
41
cover itself, in Iolhich case there would :::e no darkness.
Just as a non-blue crystal
depends on another for its blueness, therefore
things are ?erceived on another, and so@e non-
7.J.
on anocher.
}e?lyJ ;'hen there is non-blueness,
42
that :::lue not ::e ?roduced by itself. 19c-201
The !ogacarln may ac;ree that the mind does not ?er-
ceive itself in the that it other
objects, out that it has a eual
fUnction.
as the blueness of a clear crystal is the
of sunethir.g else, e.g. = flower-getal
?laced under it, so the reflects other objects in
on certain latencies (vasan2), and it can also
!Jerceive itself in sane way that a ;:'lue o;;,ject like
lapis lazuli a?pears blUe of other attri-
(uoaani). does not accept this
analogy, since even the blue of a blue oOject a?pears in
on causes and conditions. 7ne blUeness of
1a?is lazuli is not 7=oduced by itself, since ?roduction
from self is rejected by all
190.29-191.1.3
"?he lam!) shines" is because itis icnown
cognition, but by what can Cthe '1 "the
in-
tellect illumnes" ::e said to have ceen ;cnO\m?
If
illumination or non-illumination is not ?erceived
anyone,
then even about itis foolish, LlikeJ
about the char@s of a Darren wOQen's
daughter.
:Ven if we acce9t tne nature of a is
illumination, itdoes not follow that conSCiOusness can
139.9-190.24
44
73.
(i.e. ?erceive) itself.
:'hat a lamp s:u.nes is
understood via its an object of cognition but there
is no way that self-consciousness could be ?erceived in
a similar fashion. It can't be known by a ?rior cognition
Decause it would not yet have Deen ?roduced, or a sub-
because it would already have ceased;
could it ?erceived a cognition,
it would not existed prior to and so could
the cause of that cogniticn, which is a sine
43
for being an object of cognition. Consequently it
is foolish even to discuss whether or not se1f-conscious-
ness cognizes as there is no means which such a self-
conscious cognition could ::::e :ulc-.m, either by itself or
by 30me other cognition. discuss it is as senseless
as dp-bating whether a woman's daughtp-r is charming
or not; self-consciousness and the barren
daughter should =e understood as non-existent,
neither can be validated by any perception.
191.21-192.24
J If there is no self-consciousness, how is
consciousness connection
Nith the ex?erience of another Lobjectj memory Lof its
?erception] arises, like a rat's venom.

The op?Onent may try to ?rove the existence of
self-consciousness by inferring it through its effect,
the of a subjective experience, e.g. memory
7 ', .
of a ?rior of we do remember
ex?eriencinq such things, there must have been a self-
conscious witness ?resent at the time of the experience.
The ;'';-dhyamilca holds that this cause and effect rela-
tionship does not necessarily and that we can
have the of a subjective experience without
having perceived it at the time of its occurance by
self-consciousness. rai5es the example of a
45
.!:at bite;
at the time one is the bite itself
is experienced, aut not the fact that some disease-
causing organisms carried by the .!:at have entered one's
body. 50wever at a later ddte the disease may tcorne
and at that time one will the rat
bite, and infer that the infection took ?lace at that
time and, in just the same way, do we remember a ?rior
subjective experience.
.lith relation to the remembrance
of an object which is other than the perceiving subject
itself, we that there was a prception of the
object aithough there was no such awareness of the
?erceptual experience at the time that it 9
la
ce.
192.26-193.10
thesis] 5ince Lather are] seen
Hhen one is endowed with other conditions, Cthe
then illumines itself. .... 'l-._
LReplyJ decause of .... 'u:::: a;:;;:.!..!.-
cation of efficacious eye-ointment a ?ot of treasure is
seen, but the Ointment itself will not be seen.
L24J
75.
5ince 2uddhists accept that the of cer-
tain contemplative states brings about the ability to
?erceive the minds of the opponent argues that
one certainly could ?erceive one's own as well,
inasmuch as it is closer and of access than
others', denies that we to
means 0: itself and !1e offers the analogy
of an which has been rendered efficacious
s;ells, etc" in oreer to enable one to see buried
treasure. one can see a pot of treasure
buried far beneath the ground nhen the eye ointment is
applied, one still cannot ?erceive the ointment itself
upon one's own eyes. although one can attair.
knowledge of others' minds, one's own is not
46
directly knowable.
193.15-194.4
The nanl'ler in which things are seen, heard and
;<nown is not rejected here, !:Jut the i"ly?ostatization of
true existence which is the cause of suffering is
disoelled. =25J
confirms here the conventional validity
of ordinary forms, sounds and the like
are known direct or when facts are under-
stood by inference, they are validated by their conformity
to worldly convention and they are not challenged as such.
Phenomena, for the I-ladhyainilca, are accepted as they are
7(.
known in the world without philosophical analysis. !t
is only that component of our understanding which hypo-
phenomena as being truly existent which is re-
jected by the r.idhyamka, because SUC!1 imaginative
construction (kaloana) is the nes=ience which is the
root cause of our suffering and in cyclic
47
;:''':i stenCe
194.6-25
If illUsion is not different from the then
is to be conceived of as identical. itis a
real entity, how can itbe identical? as
though it is not genuine, is what is so is
the perceiver. L26-27b]
It is actually the :oga=ara ?Osition which renders
the ?rocess difficult of accord-
ing to relation between mind and its
(illusory) obj8cts cannot in any way be understood
:rom the Yogacara ?Oint of view -- they deny that thes e
=re of =nature different :ro@ that of ?er-
ceivinq !:Jut we ?reviously seen (v.17ff.) that
:ney cannot identical with it. ifobjects
are to exist =eal, then they exist in way
that they a9?ear, i.e. as independent external
separate from
3ut since ?erceived Objects are not
different they not exist in reality, and
so there would no way by which they could be cognized
77.
48
oy a truly existe:lt mind. This difficulty does not
ar-ise for t::e "!adhyam.ika since he acce?ts that the
object of perception and ?erceiving mind are not ulti-
existent, =ut nevertneless !"las the ca?2.-
Tnus the realistic of an
city for oerception.
different ?erceived object and
can maintained conventionally while kee?ing in
=ind non-inherent existence.
1.94.27-195.20
If say cycliC existence has a real entity
as its support re?ly that] itwould otherwise,
.:lew could a non-existent 1:hi:1c; ;:;e endo\Oled
like s?ace.
activity on of its de?endence on a real
e:ltity?
cyclic existence is objec-
tively or ultiraately existent ;:ecause the ,.12 jor afflic-
tions of ?assion (raoQ), etc., are :nerely
adventitious (acrantuka), as they arise :rom
of a :alse reality a?On mental 00-
jects and the transmigratory ?rocess is itself ?roduced
:!ina
:rom the :"nteractiOn of ':.hes "e forces.
(citta;, the other hand, is non-
(hus,
dual, a:lc. fro!!l those adventitious afflictions.
cyclic existence is essentially mental; it is only
Santideva says that
which is afflicted or ?urifiea.
this de?endence of cycliC existence on a truly existent
"/ '. .
is an untenable ?ro?Qsition because no
relation can cyclic existence and nind
according to the Yogacara,S o.m ten",ts ::yclic exist-
Ence cannot t::e same as :nind since cyclic existence
:s that ,.. hich should :::e yet ::lind is :unda-
free afflictions and of nature of
clear can cyclic
- .
be wholly different than nind since that would
contradict the fundamental of the !osacara
syste.'J.. :tcannot then ::e a real entity and !!lust exist
as a like space (akisa/.
concede the orevious crqument .
aut insist that although c?clic is not a real
entity itcan have causal efficacy because of its ae-
?endence on a entity, i.e. !!lind. It is
deniea, that cyclic could ?assess caus ill
efficacy on the :::asis of such a relation; cyclic existence
degend on anything since there is a cause and effect
relation bet.ieen a (asraya) and a ae?endent
(asravibhav2), and a non-real entity cannot function as
an e:ffect. ;'oreover, causal efficacy is the defining
of a real entity and a non-entity is
49
necessarily in all such capacity.
195.22-196.7
Zt follows that your mind is solitary,
without accompaniment. If mind is thus free from 00-
jectivity then all beings are Iathaqatas. .-IDd if that
79.
is case "Ioat virtue is obtained even if
l.S o!:ltained?
:oavinS shovm then that ::lental objects can have no
to the t:l?e of ?ostulated in the !ogacara
..Ie are led to the conclusion that for wind
is entirely non-dual and free of any accoQpany1ng
thou;h thE iogacarins
of sucject and object.
of the extirpation of afflictive characteristics, how can
thera =e any relation between afflictive
and an 9ure nind? If mind is thus free fran
subjectiVity and ocjectivity, there can be nothing
is falsely or and all sentient
eeinas would be perfectly enliqhtene
c
from
the very since they would be already endowed
If that is the case, then all 9ractice
with such a mind.
of the 3uddhist Path :or the sake of extir?atins defiling
?assicns would useless.
o?ponent oight object that these consequences
do not necessarily :ollow; although there is in reality
no subject-object sentient beings in
clinging to a =elief in objectivity (ohayaphinivesa) and
=.ut if
3ave therefore not extirpated their afflictions.
that is the case, reto:-ts there -,Iould ce no
.rirtue in the realization of ,-lind-only, since even the
actual possession of such a mind is insufficient
SO
eradicate the afflictions.
'0_
196.10-197.8
CObjectionJ if [?nenomena Jare :-mO,1n as havins
a nature which is like illusion, how will ce
suppressed? CIt will not] since 92.ssicn for an illusory
woman is arousec even in her creator. CReply] -!hnt
creator not abandoned his passionate propensities
concerning objects; ehus when he sees Lthe illusory
womanJ, his conception of is of insufficient
51
?Ower ?revene arousal of passion].
now ?Osits a counter-objection to
the j-i"dhyamika 'amch is cOlil?arable to the one just ( v . 29 )
raised against his school, i.e. that a knowledge of
reality as it is described by t.he ::adhya."a1ka would be
inefficacious to end SUffering. 2Ven if all phenonena
are to be empty of true existence and like illusions
as the :-!adhyamika cla!n, one cannot eradicate the passions
by such knowledge, because even a magician vlno has created
a =eautiful woman may become ?assionately at-
to her, des9ite his having full knowledse of her
52
illusory nature.
=etorts that such a magician is not com-
?arable to a ":adhyamika meditator who has (through re-
?eated exercises) internalized the knowl-
edge of the lacl< of true e."d.stence of all 9henomena. :'"ne
magician; while he may have a superficial intellectual
knowledge of the illusory nature of the woman that he has
conjured up, has certainly not suppressed his latent
21.
tendancies to hypostatize (vastuta-samarooa),
which have =een continually reinforced within his mental
continuum =eginningless cyclic
through the agency of false constructive ideation
(mithva-vixaloc). Therefore the weak knowl-
edge of the 1s overcome oy
his predilection to hold to the reality of objects,
his passionate attachment to his own illusion
?Ossible thereoy.

3y reinforcing the Ltowards the
standing of] 3mptiness, the propenSities cling-
ing to will De abandoned.
?hrough constant p=actice Cin thatJ "nothing
at all exists," that too will be abandoned subse-
quently.
In order to extirpate the afflicting passions, a
ingrained awareness of is necessary
which will :,ave the force to O'lercome one's irlnate ?ro-
9ensities tQ hold phenow,ena as being SUbstantial entities.
not only must dogmatic attachment to the view of
existence be destroyed, but equally so must the dogmatic
attachment to the of existence since both these
views are imaginative constructions, and as such, obscur-
ations of ineffable the danger of objectifyinq
_ 53
is a frequent of writers.
after one has obtained insight into
:32
he should :ueciitat-.= that not:"1ing truly exists, neither
real things nor 3Ven though 3mptiness is
the indispensible counteragent to views,
itmust be jettisoned eventually; this is in
with the general view that all teachings are
=ut ex?edients for reaching some goal, and once that goal
is reached, t!1e :neans !:lust De discarded, a ...lclicated by
the \-Iell-known ;:arable of the raft.
198.1-199.7
:'ihen one considers that nothing c.:-:ists and one does
net perceive any how then can non-existence
remain before the mind, Deing unsuPPOrted? rlhen neither
existence nor remains oefore the mind, as
there is no ether condition, itis pacified. C
3
3-34]
opponent Object that contemplating
"nothing at 'ill exists" will not eliminate all Views as
the I'adhyaraika clai..'lIs, since the conception of non-
existence itself (abhavakalpana) would still be present.
that this is so, and states that once
the conception of an imputed existent entity is no longer
perceived, its negation, non-substantiality, will also
from the mind, since itdepends on an imputed
subject to =e produced; and once that subject is negated.
its negation also will automatically disappear.
In
other words non-existence irnolies its o\-In negation, and
not any sort of POsitive position.
::3.
all ideas of either existence or
existence =een the nind, one =ecomes
free the two ocscurations and there is no longer
=ny for intellect's 9roliferatins tendancies
since in oneself of the views of
and non-existence one has all
?Ossi=le conditions. i.s :'!o
i.e.
is attained. :':.-:.e.5e t'iC 'lerses :-e?:resent
-:he of the ..:cdhyc::u':-:a and accorc-
in.:; to while reciting- them, !:ose
into the air and. disappeared, altho'.lgh his audience

continued to hear recital of the rest of the
199.1.2-200.4
;'.lst as desires are fulfilled '::Jy
je
o
,1els and trees, the i:.lage of tne .:onqueror is
seen the disci?les. of of
1

disci?les and the vow. 351
Zf it is the case that a is con?letely free
of constr'..!ctive ideation as clai:ns, an
o09Qnent oeject that then would De unable
:ulfill the ai3s of sentient he would Oe
without any thoughts concerning them or the to
aid concedes that the 3uddha is in fact
all intellect'.lal or other worldly activity, and
that the a!?pearance of the .3uddha's !Jody endowed with
--' ".
thirty-two characteristics 0: a being and
activity in which he are all auto-
and fulfill the of
without any nore ideational activity than is
oy wish-grantinq jewel or tree
in qranting the worldly desires 0= and
::len.
:'he of this ii9gearance of the .;;uddh? is
two-fold:
the of the wholesome actions
(kusala of those who ;,ecoI:le the .::uddha's disci-
plEs, and the ?rojective of the intense vow
(oranidhana) to achieve the welfare of sentient Deings

which was the at of his
a :Odhisattva.
:'his docetistic view is in acco:-..:ance
'./i th the ;;ahayana conce9tion of
55
nature of the 3uddha.
2CO.IO-30
';ust <is
a wand, ;,y a dealer
in antidotes
who ClaterJ dies, is able to ?urify
sons, although :1e has ?<issed away ii long ti;ne Since,
so the of the :Qnqueror, too, has ern?Qwered
=y Chis] confOrmity to 30ddhisattva activity, and it
performs all deeds, although the 3cdhisattva
?assed away into C
36
-37]
?!he opponent may object at this that it is
incorrect to view the 3uddha's actions as effects of
his 30dhisattva vow, since the 30dhisattva who made
- - - - - - -
57
35.
the vow is no longer 9resent, naving 9assed away into
replies these Gffects will occur

of the 20sence 0= the just as a
stick consecrated the use of s?ells, etc., by a dealer
56
in antidotes as a remedy to snake Dite and other
poisons will continue to De effective, even though the
consecrator will have been long dead. 3imilarly, al-
though the 50dhisattva has ?assed into the highest non-
aoidlna nirvana (aoratiithlta nirvanai, the effects of
J. i
;-u.s practice of -=::::"';1s:.'.:t'1a activity are still :1ani-
f ested in the many a9parent deeds of the ;uddha for the
'oenefit of sentient =eings.
201.1-202.16
J can t:here De a result of worshipping
.a ':uddha"j who is without thouaht? ;'ieol vi .'!'here can
it is taught that Cthe merit of worshipping
Lin the world] and one who is extin-
';uished is equal. 5cripture says that there will ;,e a
r esult either conventionally or ultimately -- otherwise
:"10W can itbe that "worshipping a real is
efficc. ::ious. C38-3S]
.iere dismisses as invalid a ?Ossible
:iinavana objection to the Hahayanist worship of a 3uddha
who is free from all ?ow can De 9ro-
duced for the devotee, they ask, since the j'iahayana
3uddha, lacking all thought, could not enjoy their
worship? reply 1s that 1t is taught in scripture
;;L .
that there is no difference at all in the obtained
from a =uddha or one who has ?assed
awav into remainderless nirvana
- . .
the scri?tural passages cited in the 3cnP are
- - 58
all from j'ahayana works, t:his would seem to be a con-
clUsion that the :nayana, too, -;.,'ould have to accept, to
justify their own veneration of the
who has :Jassed into the extinction of oarinirvana. '':-:,e
' '.
effects of reliqious ?ractice are depen-
dent on there a =eneficiary apart trom the ?racti-
tioner; the merit of worship is ?roduced of
ef=ect of that on the of the devotee.
nnether the of worship are conventionally exis-
tent as n",ld the ,!idhyamika, or substantially
as the 2lnayanist is depicted as believing, the fact
that Doth agree that there 1s a meritorious
effect "roduced.
!'he :ilnayanist must agree that the
.anayanist worship is as efficacious as his own, since
the "real .3uddha" (satya-bUddhaj whom he worships is
as insensate as the more illusory of the raha-
yana, as he has =een totall y extinguished in pari-
59
nirvana
.

2C2.17-204.lS
:':<\leryJ Since Lis attained] through the
:ealization of the ':cur :....oble Truths, what is the purpose
- - - - - -
204.16-30
87.
of 3mptinesst CReply] says:
"':'here is no =:nlightenment <Jithout this Path." C40J
op?Onent now questions the usefulness
of the view of itself, since to
and other :::inavana schools, -'.nlightenment is
. -
obtained only of an intellectual and
60
?lative: "..:.."lderstanding of the ?our Truths. ':'hus
there would not any 9urpose in ap9lying oneself to
the contEmplation vf the ..:adhya:nika view of the non-
substantiality of all since itis just thEse
dharmas which are acce?ted as real the :unayana.
jantideva's reply is based upon various scri?tural
which advance the contention that there can
no liberation or complete of the defile-
without an understanding of selflessness of
61
the Azhidharmic (dharnangirat."ilvaj.

3ut ',jhat if the ;:.ahiyana is nct valid
=scriptureJ? :low is your own scriptUre vali-
dated? COpponent's reply] it is proven by its
acce:Jt?nce ,-us and the I. ;"xe::Jlyl It
was establIshed [as authentic] =or you from
;:'eginning.
L'U]
::'he Aadhyar.tika argument in the previous verse is
eu scriptural citations the ?raina.....ara,nita
5ut ras , Nhich the iinayanist would disallow as an ac-
." I
ceptable reason since he does not accept their validity
as the ;,-ord of :=uddha.
jantideva rejoins that it is
equally impossible to that the :iinayana
scriptures are the authentic iiord of 2Uddha -_ a conclu-
62
sion with which :nany :;estern scholars concur':'he
3inayanist may then advance the fact that his
are accepted equally by his own school and the i'ahaya-naI
;:,ut tile ;iahayana scriptures are rejected !Jy his school,
as proof of thE authenticity of the canon.
this is a jUdgement on his part, and
not satisfactory 9roof says as there was a
?Oint in the life of the ;{lnayanist ile 3ade the
to accept even his own scrioture as valid.
2C5.1-20E.2
reasons for confidencE in
that
scripture]
should also c?plied

....
its truth 9rovenl its acceptance by people other
than of us. then even the /edas. etc., are true.
421
ilnayanist inSists that he has his canon
7alid of conpellinq =easons: it has been nandea
in an unbroken trans@ission from teacher to stUdent
i since the earliest direct disci:Jl es
of the 5uddha, AnandaI atc.. collected
at the council; the teachings
of -.'inaya and .Ulhidhama are logically conSi s t er, t
and in accordancE with the truth.
doesn't
87.
of 3rnptiness? CReply] 3cripture says:
"':'here is no :::nlightenment <-Ii thout this Path." C40J
2inayinist opponent now questions the usefulness
of the view of :m9tiness itself, since according to the
t
'faibt2sik.as and other =:inavana schools, ,;,nlighten..."en is
. -
obtained only by of an intellectual and conte.""-
60
':'hus
?lati'TE: "..:..."lderstanding 0:: the =our !ruths.
there would not any 9urpose in applying oneself to
the conte.plation of the ,.:adhya;n:!.1<a view of the non-
sucstantiality of all dharmas, since itis just these
dharmaS which are as real by the :ilnayana.
reply is based upon various scri?tural
which advance contention that there can
no liberation or complete abandonment of defile-
without an understanding of selflessness of
61
the
204.16-30
J 3Ut ',.jhat if the i:ahayana is net "alid
=scri?turej? 30w is your own vali-
dated? reply] 3ecause itis 9roven by its
J It
acceot?nce ':Jy !:oth I us and the :'iahayanaI.
. - -
was established Las authentic] for you from the
":lesinninq.
<...41J
:'he ,.lidbyar.t1
ka
in the previoUS verse is
0,. s.::ri?tural citations the ?raina2arapita
jutras, which the would disallow as an ac-
='3 .
ceptable since he does not accept their validity
as the :';ord of 3uddha. rejoins that it is
equally impossible to de.r:lonstrate that the :-iInayana
scriptures are the authentic of ;uddha -- a conclu-
62
sion with which :nany ::estern scnolars concur. :'he
j1nayanist may then advance the fact that his scriptures
are accepted ec::u=.L!.y by his own school and the ;:ahayana,
:rut the ;iahayana =.:-e rejected his school,
as ?roof of the authenticity of the iinayana canon.
this is a judgement on his part, and
not satisfactory says as there was a
?Oint in the life of the =efore he the
to even his own scri?ture as valid.
2C5.1-20E.2
reasons for confidence that
scri?turel should also ::e a?plied to -che
-r
its truth ?rovenl 0y its by other
than of us, even the ledas, etc., are true. 421
insists that has acce9ted his canon
as valid of compelling it has ;:,een handed
dovm in an unoroken transQission from teacher to student
(gurus i:I'-r; c:a;:-:;i'V':';:,"'c; since the earliest direct discioles
of the Ouddha, ;manda, j':ahakasya,)a, atc" collected
them at the council; the teachings
of .;;utra, and ,ilihidharr.1a are logically consister,::
in accordance with the truth. doesn't
39.
deny that such is case, aut he =ejects ehe
:iina-
yanists to on
grounds that these criteria are
c.?plicai:Jle to the
che i-ahayana also claLrr.s an
tradition, t:le ::act that they assert that the ,:anayana
scri!?tures were crans:r.i tted :,y i'aitreya, ,:en jusriand
63
OC;1er ahistorical .=odhisaetva figure:; rather weakens
their claims to historical authenticity, a situation
which the could not fail to notice.
accordinqly on laying
out material than or historical criteria
for the of a scri?ture as the
of =Uddha. L'1 is mark of
:uddha's s?eech. :he ::our characte.istics found in the
64
are (li connection with the

aooroQriate rather
- ... ... - . ,
than with the inappropriate, (2) connection with the
rather than (3) a cause
of renunciation of rather than of their in-
crease and (4) the good qualitlEs (aur;a) of nir-
rather chan those of cyclic existence. .:jince the
scri?tures meet these criteria, should be
as the speech of the =uddha by the
the scri?tures are accepted also sone
non-;uddhists as oeinq authentic is quickly disposed of
?O.
as a 9roper reasor. -- if acceptance by non-=uddhists
.;ere an acceptable validation of scripture, 'Chen toe :iecias
and other heretical and texts would be
true.
is a conclusion tOa'C could
not accept, a 2uddhist.
206.3-22
!:: sayi "'::'he scriptures J have contro-
versial ?Dints should therefore be rejected] then
you should reject your :;ince with these
scri?tures there are ?oints contested by the
and Cthe adherents ofl your Lsectarian divisionl
and other sects].
431
5ince the 2tnayanist finds inconsistencies in the
,'lahiyina canon, some of which he accepts as agreeing with
his own teachings, and SO!!le of which, such as the .;adhya-
:!like. ViE.l of :::CUptiness, he rejects as erroneous, he
believes this casts doubt on the authenticity of the
canon as a whole, This cannot hold water, Since
?Ositions in the canon are areas
of de!::ate,
Itgoes without saying that the adherents of
the reject Views, cut
within the itself thare is no consensus. Tra-
ditionally the ?JLnayana is divided into four divi-
sions and eighteen sub-sects, each with differing
Versions of the whole or of the canon, and there
are numerous sharp disagreements on doctrine and disci-
91.
E5
?line and wi thin these 'Tarious oivisions.
206.22-207.29
?rUe is the root of the ;uddha's ?eaching;
trUe aor nirvana can for
.
C44J
whcse minds objectS.
dt this ?Oi!1t a direct on
contention that can obtained
via the cOr.lprer.ension of the ::our l'rut!1s alone l';40J.
state of a true is the founda-
tion for all the abilities meditative states that
lead to ;:nlighten.,"-entr and thUs is of ?rl.mary L-a90rtance
to 3uddhism. ::;y a ::lonk weans not merely a
,
nominal, self-professed or beggerly ::lonk
ty?es W!10 have
and 2
hik
,u-S),
::>ratijna...
=een always in evidence in India, or even a ?rop-
erly monk (inaoticaturthalsarpano:)a-
although such a one is of course riahtlv
. . - -
entitled to be called a monk in Only a
o
who destroyed the (ohinnakleS -
fully deserves the c.ppelation "monk." ::or that
these who have only ?erceived the sixteen aspects
of the .?our -rruths according to the :iinayana tenets
cannot =e said to have achieved true monkhood because
under the r.idhyamika groundrUles the of the
can only come abOut through an understanding
0f Emptiness and the acquisition of a state of conscious-
92-
ness free trom all conceEltual activity Lsee '/.33-34, 49l.
3ince the of the 'rruths
is dependent on (although that specific under-
standing is free from it leads co attach-
EE
ment to real entities conceptual i-
zation, passion. karma and rebirth. Therefore onewho
has not understood is of
the and of attaining remainderless
In this and the following verses, Santideva is
.
further confirmed to a ?rasangika, rather than a
.3vatantrika j:adhyamjJ<.a, since che latter accept that
2rnayana achieve a of and dest=oy
the defilement-obscuration without understanding
S7
ness
207.30-208.16
If Liberation were the of the
defilements, then should occur immediately
after that destruction. LIt does nati Decause a ?Oten-
tiality for action is seen even in those who arp exempt
-45;
from the
'- .1
Tnis is a further attack on the that
their have attained cowplete freedom ::r08 suffer-
ing, i.e. through understanding the ?our
though a temporary sUppres3ion of the
defilements occurs through the intuition of the ?our
Truths, it is seen in the n1nay,ana scriptures
33.
t.hat the of ?revious karma for a
futl'.re effect i st.ill ;Jresent. in these ;,rhats. ':'"nis
::'.Cy be illustrated =y the ::,eatin-q ;.;c.udgalyayana suffered
at. the 0: some of a tirthika teacher whom
he met on his return jo__ from after he had told
to the ?ractices which were causing t.heir
teacher to suffer there. would be
:'"nqulimila IS chast.isement by an angry alOD, '..Ihlch re-
sulted from t.he he committed 9r1or to his con-
63
version by the 3uddha ?Otentialities for results
such as those were of course formed long ::,efore either
..:..ngulinala had !Jecome sair.t.s
63
when they were st.ill defiled common ?e09le.
they destroyed the innate (kleSasahakarij,
they t'iere not CO::l9letely freed fron further re::irth since
they had not destroyed ignorance which is the root cause
of cra'.Ting (tH7a). It is craving and the ?Ossession of
views which are the main causes of
200.17-,,09.2
If U'ot.: sayJ it is certain that L_=Uhats J do not take
rebirth, ::,ecause they are without craVing, re91y that
they do have craving; J i!lthough this craving is non-defiled,
why cannot it like ignorance? 2raving
arises fr08 feeling, and that feeling exist.s in those
.c..rhats.
o?ponent might attem9t to argue that the
could not take rebirth since they were free from its
3<;
cause, i.e. craving, this is
e.s :::-08 the !:acihyc.!niki! ?Oir..t of vie.i, t.he .-1":1a _
:tana cOr.l?l.et.ely destroy ignorar..ce, cause
of ::ecause he fails to completely sever his
substantialistic Vietis. , ;,1 though the Arhat :nay be free
of he is not from a type of non-de-
::iled craving generated by igr.orance of the same type as
non-defiled ignorance to which
-
70
and 5aints are'
Ci!use of in the
causal is feeling
who
a direct. int.uition of '-he 70u= 2ruths
=annot oe said to f=on cravinq they
;lave tile feelin.;s 'N!U.C!1 act. as its cause. :':'1e :!l!layanist
that since feelings ?assessed =y
':he ;'..rhat HOuld ::,e unobjectionable (niravadvasva-','<>danE:'j
::hey ..oule not rest.:lt in crc;,ving.
the
?
erS
gective, ;:he fEeli"qs ;;,f these ...rhats will
=e uno::,jectionable, since they include to
real er..tities, and thus oe ?rociuctive of craving
and re.i::irt l1.
209.2-210.4
., :7lind ..Iith an aDject ::lUSt re..-nain :ixed sonewhere.
:;i thout Lan :.mderstandinc: of 1 ':''';\9tin.::ss, a fettered
:nind tiill !:e ;:>roduced again, as in the case of non-
?
erce
9tual meditative eqUipoise.

- -
':5.
je
7ne cownenced at -;.44 is here SU:,,-
:ne who has not understood
:2ri.::ed and concluded.
non-substantiality of all things attached to
truly eXistent of
;:he :our ';:ruths, eitner to the enjects
':.he!-:lselves, or the nirvana , which is the-roa1 0::: that . cen-
.-.s a result of that attac!'-;:tent, cravin; :'3

not destroyed, and tne is to continue in
;:he cycle of rebirth and not attain
:hus, without the of a
fettered =y attac!1.<;Jent to c::erce;?tual .. cnjects is destined
to be continually ?roduced. .:.lthough such a mind might
je extinguished ny the ?ower of contern91ation,
it will be ?roduced again, as in the case of one
absorbed in non-gerce9tual equi?oise
samaoatti), a state of insensibility reached the
?ourth Dhyana, where it is :alsely taken to oe
71
despite the fact that it leads only to
tion
insentient gods and the eventual oroduction of
72
new conscious activity. 7herefore those who are
to achieve
.
should direct their
.
to the of since it is only by
of it, and not by the Four :ruths alone, that the
com9lete removal of craving and hence, can
attained.
96 -
210.5-10
that 5?eech which was suitable to be recorded in
the sutras is accepted-::'y you ;J"naya"nists! as having
:,een s?<,ken by the 3uddha, why not acce9t the .,:aha"yana
since they are generally in with
your sutras? If Cyou say that J the whole canon J
is faulty of one Lsutra'sJ incomprehensibility
you, then by the same taken] because 0= the conformity
of one sutra lto chose of your schoel] why shouldn't they
all be as] having been spoken by the
.3ecause that statement Cof the ;:ana:r-anaJ was unfathomaj:,le
by the l\ahakasyapa, .lho could think that it 1 s
to acce9ted =eeause you fail to understand it? [49-511
?hese three stanzas are found in all 3anskrit manu-
73
scripts and the Tibetan translation, there seems co
a strong as to their authenticity. 2rajnakarar.tati
?Oints out that they do not a?pear to De in the correct
?lace in the text; their argument to questions of
scri9tural authenticity already dealt with in 7erses ';2-44
?erhaps the,:' originally formed ;>a.rt of the ?revious sec-
and somehow car..e to ce wrongly inserted here. JUt
thei= otvious unsuitability in their present ?lace, as well
as the fact that they are only or less a
of previous arguments are strong evidence that they were
not by but are an inter9Qlation cy
74
another hand.
97.
210.15-211.12
3avin; liberated from the extremes of attachment
and fear [the =odhisattvaJ in cyclic existence
for the sake of those that suffer, because of Lvoluntary]
ignorance. rhis then is the result of Emptiness. L52J
and fear are adherence to the
two of and nihilism (saSyata-
uccheda-anta)j through oelier in the nature of
;:hinqs one becomes attached to thern, and thinking
that nothing exists at all great fear and terror can arise.
:'he !;adhyamika claims to offer a middle ;Jath netween these
two extremes: unde!:standing t?1e ultimate truth of non-
substantiality is the for in
and acce?tance of conventional existence is the
agent to nihilisr:l. :'he 30dhisattva hO'lrJever, al
he attained wisdom, still elects to in cyclic
existence under<;oing nirth and death out of his qreat
compassion for living beings, in order to extricate them
its misery, althoush he undefiled by its
evils. Jltiwately the 30dhisattva views sentient oeings
the of view of their non-substantiality,
by a deliberate assumption of ignorance, i.e. an accept-
ance of the conventional as a working casis for ethical
he chooses to see as actually existing
and suffering. L3ee 1.76.1 Comprehension of
- 75
results in non-aoiding
ss .
which the who is attracted either
the ?1easures of cyclic EAistence or of extinc-
tion ('vhich to the eA"i:remes of >,err.1al1ence and
res;Jecti',Tely), elects -':0 !:enain in cyclic
e:d.stence.
:'his 'Terse can, :10.,ever, ;,e \.!ncerstood in an entirel,!
different :ne first of this verse is
=ead as "not :1aving :::een lii:::eratec. from c.DC
fear" a reading
rous:;i:1 and :2.idya, ins-cead of "havinc: :::een licerated
fran the <=..'Ct!:enes of attacrunent and fear" ("sakti t.,-a-
santanirmuktva-";, which ;icS a:;cepted by
translators.
'I'his was an early :?Cint o! dis1?Ute reqard-
in<: tne and ?!"a jna.l.:aramcti \-li th his usual s>rudence
:?resents Xlth alternatives althouc:;h he ?er-
=avors che ccnmentiuq cn it fi!:st.
: have aoo:;:ted the la-.:te!: \-;hich ut least as
valid a:1 tradition, as it see.-:1S to to

76
:aore i" consonance \-ii th conte:>:t;.
::Owever, read in
other way, this verse .lOuld :::e an On jection of ':he
o;?ponent:
"':.'hose ::tiserable ones \-Jho !:C!:Iain i!! cyclic
existence, not frec =ros attachment and fear of
':?1eir ignorance is -.:he result of 3ffi9tiness.
In other words, is just as muc?1 a cause of
Oondage as the ?erce9tion of real 0tjects; the latter
?roduces but the causes
relic:;ious as?irant, heard of and not
-0
.
understood it 9r0gerly will De c? this
conception of universal non-s'.lbstantiality which encoI!t-
- even thG _. ' and ic.th and the of :,irvana,
fear will cause co on che cranquil
bli55 of and continue to endure the
of cyclic

objections tr.e of 23ptiness do
7herefore Jm?tiness should
not ::cllo.l
'..Jit!'!out hesitation. 3ince .:mptiness is t::e counteragent
to the of the emotional and obscura-
ho.1 could one desirous of or.miscience not quidd.y
':ions,
it?
oDjection that of
would lead to which is to
as well as the other objections to the efficacy of the
_.:adhyamika .Ihich had advanced in this section '1.40
et are inapplicable see also 'i.S5-56], and there-
one should ?ractice on
any doucts. obstacles to attaining
(sarvainatai of 3uddhahood are the c.nd cog-
5ince an understancing of

of these oDscurations it is indis?ensible
the aspirant to
2121-22
It is pro?er that fear be ?roduced regarding that
l aO.
which generates sufferins, cut why should 3Dptiness which
allays suffering If there were some Sel f ,
then fear could occur regarding any object whatsoever.
since there is not any Self at all, whose fear
it ;-55-56"1
Itmiqht be objected that contemplation of
is not suitaole for most ?eople, on the that
such a radical of all our notions of
5ubsuntial realityof the tmiverse .lill ;:rodcce only ab-
ject terror at first. does not deny the
?sychological truth of this, =ut to dispell
such fear through rationc.l analysis. ;"ctually, it is
ordinary phenomena that should frighten us, cs they
directly or indirectly causes of suffering. under-
standing of on the other hand is ?roductive of
advancement and Li=eration. end as such should
::e welcomed vIi th joy. ":"s for fear itself, Iole cannot
find any basis for its production upon ?roper
7ear arises onl/ in those afflicted the ignorance of
clinging to a truly existent 3el if there
were really ego existing apart :ron the various ;?sycho-
sornc.tic eler:1ents, it would ap?ropriate that a person
"lould fear unpleasant or terrifying thir.ss. 3uch
a personal 3elf, however, is just hypostatized =y the
and upon analysis is
found to have no SUbstantial reality whatever a?art from
le1.
its utility as a verbal and convention. If this
the case, fear of at all an absurdity,
as there is seen to De no real sucject which could be the
?Ossessor of that fear.
213.5-215.23
::':1e c>el:: is neither teet:h, hair or nails, :1or is it
snot or ?i1legn, pus or 3elf is neitr.er
sweat, fat or entrails, nor is it the colon,
or urine. Self is flesh or sinew, it is
not bodily heat or wind. :tis not the cavities,
six ccnsciousnesses in any way whatever. =53-591
::ere ,;a.'1tideva :'eqins a se:::tion 57-E9J devoted to
the actual of the ?ro?Qsition that a ?er-
sonal 3elf does not axist (oudc31anairatmya). :'he :irs1:
?Osition deals with is that which identifies
3elf or ?E:rsonal identity (literally the "r ahamJ) with
77
the Taterial elements of the body. atteopt at arqu-
___ ..... _.&-ol ..... _
__1 ....... ,( ...;.... _ ....
ulC1,1.\-Q..... V11 ..uo..U.Ct CiS !.t tc --..,;. ..;.11;;:_.... c .... ...... c;J.J....
....
that u?Qn analysis any identification of the 3elf
the body parts here is found to absurd, a
false and applies equally to
entire physical body which is the aggregate of then.
;antideva employs here a variant of the listof body
?2rts which is used in the contemplations on the repul-
78
siveness of the body. As elsewhere in this section,
;:>osition in verses does not differ
102.
from those of the
Prajnakaramati cakes these
verses as a refutation of Jaina, ;."Irnamsaka and ?udgala-
.
vada views en the :>elf, t::u.s is not e:q?licitly indi-
cated by the verses. :'he last quarter of 'i. 59, which
refers to the six-consciousnesses smell,
taste, tactile and consciousnesses) begins t:he
refutation of the which identifies
, - . 79
the with consciousness.
215.26-216.20
;mo\-Jledge of sound is '- the 3elfl then sound \-Jill
always oe ?erceived.
there is no of knowledge,
what is known of which Cthe 3elf1 is deSignated
as If that which doesn't know is
then it'Would follov) that a 9iece of ',lOod is knowledge;
is certain that there is no knowledge without ?roxin-
ity to an object of knowledge. C60-
6
1]
begins the refutation of the 2erson
_l... "-'k_
. .,.. ..... " ,-,.e
";a,.7J(n':ic.. cCCeut::S as
:;..einq
-- _..... _---,
c;.u c .... C,L.Ua..r..
cogn.:Lzinq
.' .
;:>rinci;:>al.
;antideva begins :'y statinq the consequence
(orasancr?,) that if :<nowledge of sound (saooa- inana), for
is identified with the 3elf or Person, then sound
ought to be always since equated
Lr;m'\utability.
7ne might reply that sound is
always nanifested, but that the and witneSSing
Person abides forever. 'The V.adhya.':'...ika cannot accept this
answer, since it is ?recisely the awareness of an object
103.
of knowledge that. knowledge or knowing.
!f the .:ia':l.I<hya can 90Sit knowledge existing yJithout an
object then the absurd consequence would follow
thet a ,looden stick or ot.her insentient object could
said to a knower, because itis without
1'"nerefore yle nrust reject
of an object.
contention that can De a knowing
30
(the ?erson) unconnected with some object.
216.22-217.27
I= knows fOr@, doesn't italso
If itdoesn't hear! of the
hear?
of sound, then there is also no knowledge of that.
is that LSelfJ which has the character of auditory cog-
nition also that cognizes form? One ?erson is
l..':lputed to ::e i::ot.h =ather and son, but it is not so in
there is sattva, rajas and t2maSi t:,ese
reality.
That ,- nat.ure of for:a-cognitiOI']
are not father or son.
is not seen when there is the nature of
cognition.
62-64:
:f we the 3elf to De the eA?eriencing ?erson in
then why dcesn't it
its as;Ject as a :< ...lovler of fOr::l (rUn;! j,
hear sound since its nature is
edcre of 30und (as in "i. 60-61)? If the 5a:nJ<:h'ra .resoonds
- . - -
that when the ?erson is cognizing it is not
in the ?resence of sound, 2nd accordingly does not cog-
nize soune, takes that as an that
10<: "
at t!...'ne the rerson is not :mowlcdc:e of soune, wrc..'..-::!1
vitiate its status as
cf the five
sound, forn, snell, taste, touch). ,"i:::lreover, itis not
possible that the Person coulc cogni::e sound ann
=O!:7.1 , it is c cannot
?Ossess a du.:!l character. :'he .:ia'11i<hya ::u.. .::;ht r2ise t.:1
eX2...'7101e of one ::: erson, can ::,e cons i dereci as xt:l a
s on sane
i!!-:: t.wo cnaracters; -:he underl yins
nature 0: eithGr or is the i.e.
31
:'.!nde.::te::.tal .5ubst.ance ; anc constit-
32
:..lent ela'rlents (aur;a ). "::.us it";Jcu1.c actu2lly :;e only
a c!1a.racter -,.,hicn '..;as cognized :''1 t:.e '::erson. '::1i s
'!:1alogy coe:: :"lot hold, says ,:aOlti.deva, since the dual
of father anc son are a
?erson, viewing fran two -,oines of

acca:;;t3 ":at!-u=rn55 " == ":;v:::;.e55 c.:- c
the esser-ticl or of tn2t person. :OOwever
to attri:i::ute a -iual ::: ;,aracter to a :?er!rlanent unitazy en-
ti:'y li;{e ,3uosta.nce ::anOlct ::'e ,,-llmled, ,=>ec2use
that case it =e a dual entity. ...3ee
:'he t:u-ee .::onsc:ituent ale.'1lents ;.}hich constitute the
of i.a. sattva, =aj e5
end tamas, abide in their own nature
105.
and are ahlays isolated. 7nus it is to 90sit
any of to which be
upon their having the ca?acity change, to
Ce either ?roduced as are and son.
the does ascribe an evolutionary ability
':0 the ;:adhyar.ti.ka sees this as a
=latant contradiction of its ?artless and gernanent na-
tu=e. if the were a!'!
it all at all but
knOvl er.t;:>i.rically that this is not so.
217.23-219.17
thesis:i that takes
on I like a dancer. ?e91yJ :n that case
it is non-eternal. If that consciousness ?ro-
duc=s] the latte= that singularity has never
existed 9reviously. If characteristics are not
real, ;:ell us is the innate nature of that ..>elf].
:f it is consciousness, it would follow that all
are identical. 7he oental and non-mental would also be
identical, because their mode of neing is eouivalent. .\nd
if particulars are false, what is the foundation for their

?he argues that while consciousness may
its form, first soune and then shape
and color (form), its underlying basis is identical, just
as the same dancer or actor can change costume and a99car
leE,.
in many roles.
If the accepts this,
then he is adoitting the
(asasvata) of the 3elf, since ! t has cast off
one character and taxen on another.
It cannot be viewed
as a single in its former and latter
tWQ cognitions with different attributes
regarded as se?arate ?henomena (at least Eroo the
Viewpoi!'!t) although the theory of sat!<:?rvavada
(see "I. 1 34c-137 ) would hold that t:he effect (the latter
of formj is ?resent in the cause (the former
cosnition of sound).
If the 3affikhya answers that the vari-
.
ous facets of cQqnition are unreal, are merely reflected
in the innately existent intellect as a clear crystal re-
flects the of otner forws, itself
33
that if the
9henooena reflected in consciousness are adventi-
tious a?pearances, what can nature of the cognizing
Person 90ssibly oe? It must De consciousness itself.
3ut
if a partless and all is the innate
character of all cognition, then all sentient ceings would
identical and
unitary, because this consciousness
34
is CO:nmon to all
of only that, Out the basic
and i.e. the Person and funda-
substance, the saoe since their innate
nature is the same -- partless and permanent.
=inal1y,
if ?articulars are only false a9pearances, it is
219.18-220.15
107.
JOintless to oostulate an substance of
. 35 -
the ?hysical realm
there could be no raal u9Qn
could =e established.
also is not the 3elf, of its
7hen Lif the 09?Onent
insentience, like a cloth, etc.
saysj it through conjunction with 3ind, it
would follow that 3elf2 is destroyed it is
?hen ifthere is a 3elf, how could
coc;nizant.
it =e affected by the ;ou would have to acce?t
S?2 as 3elf since it toO is! insentient and
ce
. c3-r-:J
1
non-functional. - --..1
stanzas deal with the refutation of the
conce?tion of a ;;elf (at-Nn) which is
3E
an eterp.al substance distinct from and
the non-mental (acetanaj could the 3elt is
denied Santideva, asserts that such a 3elf would
entirely insentient, like a ?iece of or a
:'he
of and hence could not =e a knowing subject.
.::;aiyayikas' view is that the 3elf is t.he agent
that :<nows .,. the :!lind on the other hand is only the
S,7
the Self use of the wind
instrQl1ent (karar:a)";
t.hrough a relation with the intellect (=ucidhi-
If this is so, says
samavava) in order to cognize.
then ?er.nanent nature of the Self is
lC2 .
disaffirmed when there is cos-nition, as in the
of intoxication of swoon, since itwould have changed its
character by com?letely its nature of
conjunction with mind
If the 0990nent says that the defect does
a9ply since the a unitary uncnansing nature
or not it is conjoined "lith consciousness, the
author re?lies that the opponent should, for the sake of
consistency, accept that such an 3elf could not
affected at all contact with mental functions; the
=eins that itwould an otiose
!1tity, like s9ace (akasa). 6s such itwould OE devoid
of all activity and ?Ower either to =enefit
or haro since it lose all of
inq as an aqent or an oejEct of reward or
:'his is a charge -,oInich the ::aiyayikas in turn ofter.
the =uddhist view of selflessness
as is shown in the following verses.
220.16-227.13
_Cpponent: :'here is lo;ical connection between
action and its result without a 3elt. .;ince La ?erson:
is annihilated once he ?erforned an action, to
will the result celonq? are cer-
tain that action and effect have distinct su?ports, and
that the self is devoid of activity, isn't this debat.e
possessor of the cause is t.he
109.
-?e;>ly1 :':'1is is
?Ossess
or
of the effect.
.-,sent and enjoyer -"ere t:aught
no'c ;:erceived.

recourse to thE of a ?erso
nal

of the i@portant onjections to 'che
coctrine of selflessness is that: if tne
?Ers is indeed 2.S cla:!.n only 2.n
cn
aggregate of :::sychoso;;Jatic thEre ,louIe. ::'e :-:0
for the o?eratior.. of caus2.tion, inasQUch as
there -,Jould be :}o relation :Jet',]een the ?erson ;.Iho ?er-
fo!:'-!ed a v1r:ucus or: -""i1 cction and the one \-iho wculd
35

receive the reward or for it.
coes not attack the directly here, states
that thE who in ielf is wror.s
criticise on scers ?Oth
is ?erfc:c.lea
:"r! 1i::e

-cnat
and the ",ffect is ex?eriencea in the ne::t, the ?erson
,mo is the SU??Drt for the :?erfo!T.lance cf the
action is different tnut for the of its
If the o??Dnent that in his
::-esult.
is an unchanqing ;el= underlyinq these ?ersons.
can =ring u? the consequence that such a
ielf ':Jculd ::e cOr:J::;letely tee. from the act:!.vi ties of
?erforming actions and their results =ecause of
39
there is no SUD-
its non-co';:nitive !1ature
stantial difference the ?rogonent of
,adin) and the :udchist.
11
It is ti"'.rouqh tile ,-,ental activity of a ?ersonal
continu,"--,-,-:\ (sa,?tanaJ that: the consequences of ?ctior..s an'
al\r;ays ceen for the :uddhists
?G
with the of :nora.l causality. .. ;1e:l
a virtuous or non-virtuous ceases to exist, it
:;ehlnd a late::t ?r0gensity (vasan;) ,.!rich is 2. s?ecial
of ::lental force (saI<1skarai :'n the ne."tt :aOI:1E:nt "l!llch is
I
the chief effect of the ?revious 7.us
effects the qives to results in t.:'e
next life which are ?leasant ?ainful in
with or non-virtuous of
the is of course a
of single =ut ordinary ?eoole im-
?cte a unity tc it. this unity is con-
venticnally valid, we can s?eak of
the same gerson. :n are not: 1:he
::ut neither are they entirely Cifferent, since there
is a continuity ::,e1:,,;een ;:ham.
::27.13-2284
<,ast ana future ::li:1as arc not the 5elf, ;:,ecause
do not If _you say that the ?resentlyJ ?roducec
::tind 1.:;::: the ...ielf, then when that is destroyed there would
again ::e no 5elf. as when the ?laintain is
divided into there is nothing at all, 50 the
also non-existent sought through
investigation.