Aristotle724 Student Essay Contest

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The Self-Elimination of Eliminativism

The central problem in the philosophy of mind is to establish a relationship between
mental states and physical states. Given our knowledge of physical reactions that obey strict
rules of cause-and-effect, it is hard to conceive of the mind as effective in causing physical
processes (like raising one's arm). Because physical behavior often correlates with external
stimuli antecedent to that behavior, physicalists have postulated that mental states will eventually
be describable as a series of predictable biochemical reactions. Eliminative materialism, or
eliminativism, is a specific physicalist theory that claims mental states do not exist at all. This
is supported by a rejection of the "folk psychological" explanations of other humans' behavior. In
this essay I will argue that eliminativism is a self-refuting theory, because positing this
explanation of the mind-body relationship itself presupposes the existence of mental content.
In Paul Churchland's article "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," a
case is made for eliminativism primarily by analyzing the successes and failures of folk
psychology. Folk psychology is the term for the common-sense explanations that we ascribe to
other people on the basis of how they behave. Churchland maintains that folk psychology has not
evolved as a theory since the Ancient Greeks and has failed to match the rapid progress of
sciences like biology, physiology, and neuroscience. Folk psychology also fails to explain a
number of behavioral phenomena, such as mental illness, memory retrieval, and the
psychological function of sleep. On this basis of failures, eliminativists reject folk psychology as
a viable theory. It follows that eliminativism rejects that mental states exist at all, since it is folk
psychology that requires the existence of mental state to explain human behavior. Without folk
psychology, mental states are no longer a necessary explanatory tool; instead it is hypothesized
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that physics will eventually describe all behavior by appealing to predictable neurophysiological
states.
In addition to its relation to the mind-body problem, eliminativism would have far-
reaching implications throughout philosophy. If eliminativism were to be true, then this would
severely weaken the field of epistemology. Without the existence of mental states, there would
be no propositional attitudes, which would mean that propositional content would be
meaningless. In addition, eliminativism implies that we do not hold inner beliefs, which would
then invalidate the concept of truth. We could no longer claim objectivity of our statements,
because we would have no mental ability to consider arbitrary propositions against well-
supported propositions. Furthermore, there could be no moral responsibility placed on
individuals, for their behavior would simply be a result of deterministic physical mechanisms
attributed to natural laws.
These consequences of eliminativism are quite shocking, though they do not constitute a
basis for the rejection of eliminativism; yet we can refute the theory by showing that it is
internally inconsistent. As mentioned above, eliminativism is incompatible with holding a
propositional attitude because this requires the exercise of a mental state. If this is true
according to eliminativism, then the proposition "eliminativism is a plausible theory of the mind-
body relation" is self-contradictory. The concept eliminativism entails that mental states do not
exist, yet mental states are necessarily required for the formation of propositions. Even if such a
proposition is not actively being expressed by a talking human being, no proposition can be
formed without human input. The concepts that are used in the proposition, such as
"eliminativism" and "theory", need to be formed by a human using the mental faculty of thought.
Another consequence of eliminativism is the nonexistence of free will, but free will is needed in
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order to evaluate ideas as true or false. Without the ability to consider other theories of the mind-
body relationship, the person who advocates for eliminativism is implying they had no choice
but to passively utter that eliminativism is true. That makes the statements of the eliminativists
no better than the utterances of a parrot who repeats the words he is trained to say.
Aside from the contradictions that are inherent in the theory of eliminativism, the claim
that physics will eventually explain all human behavior rests on a mistaken view of science.
Science can never override philosophy, because all special sciences depend hierarchically on
philosophy (at least, on epistemology). In order for physicists or neuroscientists to establish any
"objective facts" regarding the nature of human behavior they must have the ability to freely
weigh evidence. Physics depends on induction from observed cases, and this method of
reasoning requires not just mental states but the free will to be objective. By asserting the
existence of free will, this does not mean that physicists cannot discover how the mind works.
This just means that the physicist must first accept the role that mental events and free will play
in their ability to form concepts and scientific theory. Once those epistemological understandings
are formed, then the scientist can use his free will to discover the inner workings of the human
brain and even to discover the biological mechanism of free will. But to use free will in order to
discover the non-existence of free will is a clear self-contradiction.
Churchland and other eliminative materialists make an interesting claim about the non-
existence of mental states, but this claim is self-refuting. The idea that science will eventually
explain all human behavior as a predictable chain of physical reactions is an impossibility, for
free will entails the ability of humans to choose their behavior. That said, physics can certainly
make great strides in explaining the mental ability of humans, but that will never amount to
eliminating the casual role of mental states in human actions or the ability of humans to freely
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direct their thoughts. Eliminativism thus fails on these counts to be a plausible theory of the
mind-body relationship, and it is important to recognize that the existence of mental events and
free will are necessary preconditions of a self-consistent theory of the mind.


References
1. Chalmers, David John. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.
New York: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.