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This interesting essay argues that there is only one Wittgenstein, not two: one Wittgenstein who used two alternative modes of expression, two alternative languages for one framework; moreover, these two options are not sequential, but co-exist and are complementary. The very possibility of two such complementary modes of expression is itself a significant metaphilosophical matter.
Originaltitel
Soulez, A. 1989, Wittgenstein & Phenomenology or: Two Languages for One Wittgenstein
This interesting essay argues that there is only one Wittgenstein, not two: one Wittgenstein who used two alternative modes of expression, two alternative languages for one framework; moreover, these two options are not sequential, but co-exist and are complementary. The very possibility of two such complementary modes of expression is itself a significant metaphilosophical matter.
This interesting essay argues that there is only one Wittgenstein, not two: one Wittgenstein who used two alternative modes of expression, two alternative languages for one framework; moreover, these two options are not sequential, but co-exist and are complementary. The very possibility of two such complementary modes of expression is itself a significant metaphilosophical matter.