City of Ozamiz v.

Lumapas
G.R. No. 30727; July 15, 1975; Antonio, J.
Digest prepared by Paolo Tamase

A. Facts
1. Serapio LUMAPAS was an operator of Romar Line, a business of transportation buses for passengers and cargoes in Ozamiz
City and Pagadian (Zamboanga del Sur).
2. On Sept. 15, 1964, the Municipal BOARD of Ozamiz CITY enacted Ordinance No. 466, which imposed parking fees for every
motor vehicle parked on any portion of the existing parking space in the City of Ozamiz.
a. This ordinance covered LUMAPAS buses, which parked along Zulueta Street (in the market area) whenever they
would wait for passengers.
b. The buses had to pay the parking fee at a toll station, around 100 ft. after the parking area along Zulueta
Street.
c. Under the Ordinance, LUMAPAS paid P1.00 for each of his busses from Oct. 1964 to Jan. 1967, paying a total sum
of P1,259.00 under protest.
3. In 1968, LUMAPAS filed a complaint against the CITY, alleging that Ordinance No. 466 was ultra vires and asking that it be
nullified and his parking fees reimbursed.
a. The CFI found that (a) the parking area was a municipal street, and (b) the parking fees were in the nature of
toll fees for the use of public worksand violated R.A. 4136 (Land Transportation & Traffic Code) since the toll
fees were imposed without prior recommendation of the Sec. of Public Works and approval by the President.
b. The CFI then declared the Ordinance null and void, and ordered reimbursement.
4. [In the course of the petition, the Court noted that the President had approved the ordinance in question, after the
Secretary recommended it to him.]

B. Issue: WON the CITY (through its Municipal BOARD) had the power to enact Ordinance No. 466.

C. Held: YES, the fees were in the nature of parking fees and not toll fees. Petition granted.

D. Ratio
1. The powers of municipal corporations, as mere creatures of law, are limited to powers (a) expressly granted to them by
statute and those (b) necessarily implied or incidental. The power to tax, meanwhile, is inherent in Congress.
2. Because of the nature of the limited power of LGUs, said powers are construed strictissimijurisand any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the municipality.
a. Under the Ozamiz City Charter (R.A. No. 321), the BOARD has the power to regulate the use of streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries, and other public places and enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for the *+ promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the City. Hence, the Charter granted the CITY police power to be exercised as a governmental
function for municipal purposes.
b. The CITYs police power included the full power to control and regulate its streets to promote public health,
safety, and welfareand therefore the time, place, and manner of parking in streets and public places.
3. As to LUMAPAS contention that the ordinance charged a toll fee:
a. Parking ordinarily implies more than a temporary and momentary stoppage at the curb *+ it involves the idea
of using a portion of the street as a storage for an automobile.
b. Toll, when used in connection with highways, is a duty imposed on goods and passengers travelling public
roads. The toll for use of a toll road is for its use in travelling thereon, not for its use as a parking place[.]
c. In this case, the PUVs are only charged the P1.00 fee when they stop on any portion of the existing parking areas
for the purpose of loading and unloading passengers or cargoes, not when they merely pass through without
stopping. The fees are therefore parking fees.
4. The Court noted that the purpose of the Ordinance was actually for regulation, not revenue, since the amounts charged are
minimal (and decrease according to the size of the vehicle.) The intended result is increased safety and convenience
arising from decongestion of traffic.