Facts: Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya,
Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de Leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of Baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land 6 located at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City. On May 19, 1999, Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999, against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Pertinent parts of the notice read: The investigation and ocular inspection conducted by the City Engineer's Office (memorandum dated 18 February 1998) showed that you built your structures sometime in 1999 without any building permit in violation of P.D. 1096 and possibly R.A. 7279, qualifying your structure structures illegal, thus, subject to demolition. The Anti-Squatting Committee in its Resolution No. 52-4 dated 22 April 1999 has recommended for the demolition of your illegal structures. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, you are hereby notified to voluntarily remove/demolish your illegal structures within seven (7) days from receipt of this notice, otherwise the City Demolition Team will undertake the demolition of your illegal structures at your own expense. 7
Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction before Branch 60 of the RTC in Baguio City. In his complaint, Baniqued alleged that the intended demolition of his house was done without due process of law and "was arrived at arbitrarily and in a martial-law like fashion." Specifically, Baniqued alleged that he was (1) never given any copy of the complaint of Generoso Bonifacio; (2) "never summoned nor subpoenaed to answer that complaint"; (3) "never allowed to participate in the investigation and ocular inspection which the City Engineer's Office allegedly conducted, as a consequence of the complaint of Bonifacio, much less to adduce evidence in support of his position"; (4) "never summoned nor subpoenaed to appear before the Anti-Squatting Committee"; and (5) "not given the opportunity to contest the complaint against him, before such complaint was decided and to be carried out by the Defendants." 8 Baniqued buttressed his complaint by arguing that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, i.e., there should be a court action and a court order first before his house can be demolished and before he can be ousted from the lot. 9 More, under Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, an adequate relocation should be provided first before demolition can be had. 10 Too, by virtue of the National Building Code or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, the demolition of buildings or structures should only be resorted to in case they are dangerous or ruinous. Otherwise, the remedy is criminal prosecution under Section 213 of P.D. No. 1096. 11 Lastly, the 1991 Local Government Code does not empower the mayor to order the demolition of anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied. 12 Thus, Baniqued prayed for the following reliefs: A. Immediately upon the filing hereof, a temporary restraining order be issued stopping the Defendants, or any other person acting under their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of Plaintiff's residential unit at Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City under Notice of Demolition No. 55; B. After due notice and hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued for the same purpose as to that of the TRO, and, thereafter, for this preliminary writ to be made permanent; C. A writ of prohibition be issued, commanding the Defendants to stop carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of the aforesaid unit of the Plaintiffs. 13
On June 7, 1999, the RTC enjoined the carrying out of the demolition of the house of Baniqued. The hearing on his application for preliminary injunction was also set. 14
On June 25, 1999, petitioners moved to dismiss 15 the complaint of Baniqued on the ground of lack of cause of action because (1) there is nothing to be enjoined "as there is no Demolition Order issued by the City Mayor" and that the Demolition Team "does not demolish on the basis of a mere Notice of Demolition"; (2) he has "no clear legal right to be protected as his structure is illegal, the same having been built on a land he does not own without the consent of the owner thereof and without securing the requisite building permit"; (3) the Notice of Demolition "was issued in accordance with law and in due performance of the duties and functions of defendants, who being public officers, are mandated by law to enforce all pertinent laws against illegal constructions"; and that (4) "[d]efendants do not exercise judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Neither was the issuance of the assailed Notice of Demolition an exercise of a ministerial function. Nor is there any allegation in the complaint that defendants acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." 16
On October 15, 1999, the RTC granted the motion of petitioners and dismissed the complaint of Baniqued with the following disposition: The RTC reasoned that petitioners "are unquestionably members of the executive branch whose functions are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial." 18 The RTC also sustained the argument of petitioners that "the act complained of can hardly qualify as ministerial in nature as to put it within the ambit of the rule on prohibition." 19 Lastly, the complaint of Baniqued was procedurally infirm because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 20
Baniqued moved for reconsideration 21 which was opposed. Refusing to give up, Baniqued appealed the decision of the RTC. Issue: WON Pohibition is Proper Ruling: Baniqued correctly availed of the remedy of prohibition. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law. 30 As its name indicates, the writ is one that commands the person or tribunal to whom it is directed not to do something which he or she is about to do. The writ is also commonly defined as one to prevent a tribunal possessing judicial or quasi-judicial powers from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. 31 At common law, prohibition was a remedy used when subordinate courts and inferior tribunals assumed jurisdiction which was not properly theirs. Prohibition, at common law, was a remedy against encroachment of jurisdiction. Its office was to restrain subordinate courts and inferior judicial tribunals from extending their jurisdiction and, in adopting the remedy, the courts have almost universally preserved its original common-law nature, object and function. Thus, as a rule, its proper function is to prevent courts, or other tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested by law, and confine them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. However, the function of the writ has been extended by some authorities to cover situations where, even though the lower tribunal has jurisdiction, the superior court deems it necessary and advisable to issue the writ to prevent some palpable and irremediable injustice, and, x x x the office of the remedy in some jurisdictions has been enlarged or restricted by constitutional or statutory provisions. While prohibition has been classified as an equitable remedy, it is generally referred to as a common-law remedy or writ; it is a remedy which is in nature legal, although, x x x its issuance is governed by equitable principles. It is very clear that before resorting to the remedy of prohibition, there should be "no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Thus, jurisprudence teaches that resort to administrative remedies should be had first before judicial intervention can be availed of. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. 37 It admits of several exceptions. Jurisprudence is well-settled that the doctrine does not apply in cases (1) when the question raised is purely legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the claim involved is small; (6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; (8) when strong public interest is involved; (9) when the subject of the proceeding is private land; (10) in quo warranto proceedings; and (11) where the facts show that there was violation of due process. 38
Here, there was an urgent need for judicial intervention. The filing of a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have been a useless exercise. The notice of demolition is very clear and speaks for itself. City Mayor Domogan already made up his mind that the house of Baniqued was illegally built and was thus subject to demolition. It could reasonably be assumed that a motion for reinvestigation or reconsideration would have also been denied outright. The irreparable damage to Baniqued in case his house was demolished cannot be gainsaid. The distinction between a notice of demolition and an order of demolition is immaterial. What is material is that Baniqued felt threatened with the impending demolition of his house. It would have been too late and illogical if he waited first for his house to be actually demolished, before seeking protection from the courts. Acting in the earliest opportunity and availing of the best remedy available to protect his right was the prudent course of action. Second, petitioners misconstrued Romero by interpreting it literally. The better interpretation is that the absence of specific allegation that the act complained of was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion would not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint for prohibition, provided that a reading of the allegations in the complaint leads to no other conclusion than that the act complained of was, indeed, done without or in excess of jurisdiction. To subscribe to the reasoning of petitioners may lead to an absurd situation. A patently unmeritorious complaint for prohibition may not be given due course just because of an allegation that the act complained of was committed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. As a parting argument, petitioners contend that the complaint of Baniqued is outside the scope of the rule on prohibition which covers the proceedings of any "tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions." The issuance of the notice of demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rule-making function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and implementation, which is purely an executive function. Neither is the Office of the City Mayor a quasi-judicial body. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi- judicial functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities. SPS. YUSAY vs CA Facts: The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the Citys exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature. On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasi-judicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that the special civil action of prohibition did not also lie under the circumstances considering that the act of passing the resolution was not a judicial, or quasi-judicial, or ministerial act; and that notwithstanding the issuance of Resolution No. 552, the City had yet to commit acts of encroachment, excess, or usurpation, or had yet to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The RTC, acting upon the petitioners motion for reconsideration, set aside its decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property. the City appealed to the CA. CA affirmed RTC. ISSUE: WON Prohibition is proper? RULING: We deny the petition for review, and find that certiorari and prohibition were not available to the petitioners under the circumstances. Thus, we sustain, albeit upon different grounds, the result announced by the CA, and declare that the RTC gravely erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod. Prohibition does not lie against expropriation. The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. 14 The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 15 For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. 16 On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any authority. 17 The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. 18 A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court. 19 1avvphi1 The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion. Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. 20 This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for public use, 21 and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of prohibition become available. Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for thepower of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. 22 Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain. 23 WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618. DELTA DEVT VS HLURB Facts: The BANK is a domestic financial corporation that extends loans to subdivision developers/owners. Petitioner DELTA is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling real estate properties, particularly Delta Homes I in Cavite. DELTA is owned by Ricardo De Leon (De Leon), 6 who is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-637183 7 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, which corresponds to Lot 4 of Delta Homes I. Said Lot 4 is the subject matter of these cases. On July 3, 1995, De Leon and his spouse obtained a P4 million loan from the BANK for the express purpose of developing Delta Homes I. 8 To secure the loan, the spouses De Leon executed in favor of the BANK a real estate mortgage (REM) on several of their properties, 9 including Lot 4. Subsequently, this REM was amended 10 by increasing the amount of the secured loan from P4 million to P8 million. Both the REM and the amendment were annotated on TCT No. T- 637183. 11 DELTA then obtained a Certificate of Registration 12 and a License to Sell 13 from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sometime in 1997, DELTA executed a Contract to Sell with respondent Angeles Catherine Enriquez (Enriquez) 14 over the house and lot in Lot 4 for the purchase price of P614,950.00. Enriquez made a downpayment ofP114,950.00. When DELTA defaulted on its loan obligation, the BANK, instead of foreclosing the REM, agreed to a dation in payment or a dacion en pago. The Deed of Assignment in Payment of Debt was executed on September 30, 1998 and stated that DELTA "assigns, transfers, and conveys and sets over [to] the assignee that real estate with the building and improvements existing thereon x x x in payment of the total obligation owing to [the Bank] x x x." 16 Unknown to Enriquez, among the properties assigned to the BANK was the house and lot of Lot 4, 17 which is the subject of her Contract to Sell with DELTA. The records do not bear out and the parties are silent on whether the BANK was able to transfer title to its name. It appears, however, that the dacion en pago was not annotated on the TCT of Lot 4. 18 On November 18, 1999, Enriquez filed a complaint against DELTA and the BANK before the Region IV Office of the HLURB 19 alleging that DELTA violated the terms of its License to Sell by: (a) selling the house and lots for a price exceeding that prescribed in Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 220; 20 and (b) failing to get a clearance for the mortgage from the HLURB. Enriquez sought a full refund of the P301,063.42 that she had already paid to DELTA, award of damages, and the imposition of administrative fines on DELTA and the BANK. In his June 1, 2000 Decision, 21 HLURB Arbiter Atty. Raymundo A. Foronda upheld the validity of the purchase price, but ordered DELTA to accept payment of the balance of P108,013.36 from Enriquez, and (upon such payment) to deliver to Enriquez the title to the house and lot free from liens and encumbrances. DELTA appealed the arbiters Decision to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. 26 DELTA questioned the imposition of an administrative fine for its alleged violation of Section 18 of PD 957. It argued that clearance was not required for mortgages that were constituted on a subdivision project prior to registration. According to DELTA, it did not violate the terms of its license because it did not obtain a new mortgage over the subdivision project. It likewise assailed the award of moral and exemplary damages to Enriquez on the ground that the latter has no cause of action. 27 The Board held that all developers should obtain a clearance for mortgage from the HLURB, regardless of the date when the mortgage was secured, because the law does not distinguish. Having violated this legal requirement, DELTA was held liable to pay the administrative fine. The Board upheld the validity of the contract to sell between DELTA and Enriquez despite the alleged violation of the price ceilings in BP 220. The Board held that DELTA and Enriquez were presumed to have had a meeting of the minds on the object of the sale and the purchase price. Absent any circumstance vitiating Enriquezconsent, she was presumed to have willingly and voluntarily agreed to the higher purchase price; hence, she was bound by the terms of the contract. The OP adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB Decisions, which it affirmed in toto. e CA ruled against the validity of the dacion en pago executed in favor of the BANK on the ground that DELTA had earlier relinquished its ownership over Lot 4 in favor of Enriquez via the Contract to Sell. RULING: Further, as an entity engaged in the banking business, the BANK is required to observe more care and prudence when dealing with registered properties. The Court cannot accept that the BANK was unaware of the Contract to Sell existing in favor of Enriquez. In Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. v. Adao, 66 we held that a bank dealing with a property that is already subject of a contract to sell and is protected by the provisions of PD 957, is bound by the contract to sell (even if the contract to sell in that case was not registered). In the Courts words: It is true that persons dealing with registered property can rely solely on the certificate of title and need not go beyond it. However, x x x, this rule does not apply to banks. Banks are required to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in dealing even with registered properties for their business is affected with public interest. As master of its business, petitioner should have sent its representatives to check the assigned properties before signing the compromise agreement and it would have discovered that respondent was already occupying one of the condominium units and that a contract to sell existed between [the vendee] and [the developer]. In our view, petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith and we are constrained to rule that petitioner is bound by the contract to sell. 67 Bound by the terms of the Contract to Sell, the BANK is obliged to respect the same and honor the payments already made by Enriquez for the purchase price of Lot 4. Thus, the BANK can only collect the balance of the purchase price from Enriquez and has the obligation, upon full payment, to deliver to Enriquez a clean title over the subject property. 68 Dacion en pago extinguished the loan obligation The BANK then posits that, if title to Lot 4 is ordered delivered to Enriquez, DELTA has the obligation to pay the BANK the corresponding value of Lot 4. According to the BANK, the dation in payment extinguished the loan only to the extent of the value of the thing delivered. Since Lot 4 would have no value to the BANK if it will be delivered to Enriquez, DELTA would remain indebted to that extent. We are not persuaded. Like in all contracts, the intention of the parties to the dation in payment is paramount and controlling. The contractual intention determines whether the property subject of the dation will be considered as the full equivalent of the debt and will therefore serve as full satisfaction for the debt. "The dation in payment extinguishes the obligation to the extent of the value of the thing delivered, either as agreed upon by the parties or as may be proved, unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, or by their silence, consider the thing as equivalent to the obligation, in which case the obligation is totally extinguished." 69
In the case at bar, the Dacion en Pago executed by DELTA and the BANK indicates a clear intention by the parties that the assigned properties would serve as full payment for DELTAs entire obligation UY LIAO VS NIXON LEE FACTS: Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages against his mother Uy kiao eng before TC manila to compel the petitioner to produce the holographic will of his father so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof maybe instituted. Lee had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the estate and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance but petitioner refused to do so. She denied that she was in custody if the said will or that she knew of its whereabouts. RTC heard the case and after the presentation of evidence, she demurre contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. The RTC denied the demurrer at first but after the motion for recon, it was granted. Respondent file a MR but was denied. CA initially denied the MR but it was later granted. THE CA ordered the production of the will and payment of Attys fees. It ruled that respondent was able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her possession the will. Petitioner filed a MR. The appellate court denied the motion. Left with no other course. Petitioner then contends that petition for Mandamus is not proper in this case. ISSUE: WON Mandamus is proper RULING: The court upheld the order of Mandamus. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction in the mane of the state, directed to some inferior court.. tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified results from the official station of the party to whoom the writ is directed or from operation of law. The definition recognizes the public character of the remedy. And clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The writ is proper recourse for citizen who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty most especially when the public involved is mandated by the constitution. As the provison provides, mandamus will not lie if the tribunal,corp, officer, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act whichthe law enjoins asa duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writof mandamus will not issue to compel an official to compel to do anything to which is not his duty to do so or his duty not to do or to give the applicant anything which he is not entitled by law. Nor will mandamus issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds: [a] that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or [b] that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled. On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.] The writ of mandamus lies to enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ. To preserve its prerogative character, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public. Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the grant of the writ of mandamus lies in the sound discretion of the court.In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay FACTS: The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No . (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents; (2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS: PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities responsible for such pollution.
HELD: (1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution inci dent, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17 & 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other judicial discipline describes a s continuing mandamus , the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in the rules of procedure for environmental cases. 20 days Temporary restraining order
TOPACIO VS ONG Facts: Ferdinand Topacio (petitioner) via the present petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks, in the main, to prevent Justice Gregory Ong (Ong) from further exercising the powers, duties and responsibilities of a Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. It will be recalled that in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 1 the Court, by Decision of July 3, 2007, enjoined Ong "from accepting an appointment to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court or assuming the position and discharging the functions of that office, until he shall have successfully completed all necessary steps, through the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court, to show that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship." 2 IN OCTOBER OF 1998, RESPONDENT WAS NOT DULY-QUALIFIED UNDER THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1, SECTION 7, OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, TO BE APPOINTED AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, MERELY ON THE STRENGTH OF AN IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND A 1ST INDORSEMENT DATED 22 MAY 1997 ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, RESPONDETS BIRTH CERTIFICATE INDICATED THAT RESPONDENT IS A CHINESE CITIZEN AND BECAUSE, AS OF OCTOBER 1998, THE RECORDS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT DECLARED THAT RESPONDENT IS A NATURALIZED FILIPINO CITIZEN. On July 9, 2007, Ong immediately filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Petition for the "amendment/ correction/ supplementation or annotation of an entry in [his] Certificate of Birth," docketed as S.P. Proc No. 11767-SJ, "Gregory Santos Ong v. The Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, et al." 3 Meanwhile, petitioner, by verified Letter-Request/Complaint 4 of September 5, 2007, implored respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to initiate post-haste a quo warranto proceeding against Ong in the latters capacity as an incumbent Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. Invoking paragraph 1, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution 5 in conjunction with the Courts Decision in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, 6 petitioner points out that natural-born citizenship is also a qualification for appointment as member of the Sandiganbayan and that Ong has failed to meet the citizenship requirement from the time of his appointment as such in October 1998. The OSG, by letter of September 25, 2007, informed petitioner that it "cannot favorably act on [his] request for the filing of a quo warranto petition until the [RTC] case shall have been terminated with finality." 7 Petitioner assails this position of the OSG as being tainted with grave abuse of discretion, aside from Ongs continuous discharge of judicial functions. Petitioner thus contends that Ong should immediately desist from holding the position of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan since he is disqualified on the basis of citizenship, whether gauged from his birth certificate which indicates him to be a Chinese citizen or against his bar records bearing out his status as a naturalized Filipino citizen, as declared in Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita. Ong, on the other hand, states that Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita did not annul or declare null his appointment as Justice of the Supreme Court, but merely enjoined him from accepting his appointment, and that there is no definitive pronouncement therein that he is not a natural-born Filipino. He informs that he, nonetheless, voluntarily relinquished the appointment to the Supreme Court out of judicial statesmanship. 9
ISSUE: WON Quo warranto is properly filed by petitioner RULING: On the issue of whether the OSG committed grave abuse of discretion in deferring the filing of a petition for quo warranto, the Court rules in the negative. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 18 The Court appreciates no abuse of discretion, much less, a grave one, on the part of the OSG in deferring action on the filing of a quo warranto case until after the RTC case has been terminated with finality. A decision is not deemed tainted with grave abuse of discretion simply because the affected party disagrees with it. 19 The Solicitor General is the counsel of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and its officials or agents. In the discharge of its task, the Solicitor General must see to it that the best interest of the government is upheld within the limits set by law.
In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the policy of the government on the matter at hand. 24 It appears that after studying the case, the Solicitor General saw the folly of re-litigating the same issue of Ongs citizenship in the quo warranto case simultaneously with the RTC case, not to mention the consequent risk of forum-shopping. In any event, the OSG did not totally write finis to the issue as it merely advised petitioner to await the outcome of the RTC case. By petitioners admission, what is at issue is Ongs title to the office of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. 25 He claims to have been constrained to file the present petition after the OSG refused to heed his request to institute a suit for quo warranto. Averring that Ong is disqualified to be a member of any lower collegiate court, petitioner specifically prays that, after appropriate proceedings. While denominated as a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the petition partakes of the nature of a quo warrantoproceeding with respect to Ong, for it effectively seeks to declare null and void his appointment as an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan for being unconstitutional. While the petition professes to be one for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner even adverts to a "quo warranto" aspect of the petition. 27 Being a collateral attack on a public officers title, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition must be dismissed. The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, 28 even through mandamus 29 or a motion to annul or set aside order. Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. 33 It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, 34 and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. 35 Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, 36 reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, 37 that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the privateperson suing must show a clear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action. 38 In the present case, petitioner presented no sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. He in fact concedes that he was never entitled to assume the office of an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to the office. In Garcia v. Perez, this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Suffice it to mention that a de facto officer is one who is in possession of the office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. 44 If a person appointed to an office is subsequently declared ineligible therefor, his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that will confer on him the status of a de facto officer. If only to protect the sanctity of dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State, and without ruling on the conditions for the interplay of the de facto doctrine, the Court declares that Ong may turn out to be either a de jure officer who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired, or a de facto officer who enjoys certain rights, among which is that his title to said office may not be contested except directly by writ of quo warranto, 47 which contingencies all depend on the final outcome of the RTC case. PABLO BURGUETE vs. JOVENCIO Q. MAYOR The petitioner, Pablo Burguete, is the municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon, and was elected for that position in November, 1951; the respondent, Jovencio Q. Mayor, is the provincial governor of Romblon; and Esteban B. Montesa, the acting municipal mayor of Badajoz, Province of Romblon. On August 21, 1952, a criminal complaint for serious slander was filed against Burguete in the justice of the peace court of Badajoz. On October 7, 1952, the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Romblon. On November 13, 1952, Jovencio Q. Mayor suspended the petitioner as mayor on the ground that a criminal case against him was pending, and that it was the "standing policy of the Administration to the place under suspension any elective official against whom a criminal action involving moral turpitude is pending adjudication before the competent court." The Governor directed Esteban B. Montesa, the vice-mayor, to act as mayor. Burguete now files in this Court a petition for mandamus and quo warranto against Mayor and Montesa. The case for serious slander against Burguete is still, pending in the Court of First Instance. Burguete has filed a motion to quash, but it was denied. The case could not be tried on the merits on account of the non- appearance of the witnesses for the prosecution. No administrative investigation by the provincial board has been conducted under section 2188 of the Administrative Code. The questions raised in this case are not new, as they have already been decided in the case of Lacson vs. Roque, * (49 Off. Gaz., 93). There it was held that the mere filing of an information for libel against a municipal officer is not a sufficient ground for dispensing him. The same may be said with regard to serious slander, which is another form of libel. Libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. Furthermore, it would be an easy expedient to file a criminal complaint or information against a municipal mayor for the purpose of suspending him, and the suspension would last almost indefinitely, according to the time that would elapse before the criminal case is finally terminated by conviction or acquittal. It is unnecessary to elaborate here on the reasons given for the principle, as they are set forth extensively in said decision. Our conclusion is that the suspension of the petitioner is illegal and unjustified. In view of the foregoing, the respondent Jovencio Q. Mayor is ordered to reinstate Pablo Burguete in his office as municipal mayor of Badajoz, Romblon, and to oust the respondent Esteban B. Montesa, as such officer, with costs against the respondents. It is so ordered.
CITY OF ILOILO vs. CONTRERAS-BESANA CASE: This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order seeks to overturn the three Orders issued by Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 32. FACTS: On September 18, 1981, petitioner filed a Complaint for eminent domain against private respondent Elpidio T. Javellana (Javellana) and Southern Negros Development Bank, the latter as mortgagee. The complaint sought to expropriate two parcels of land registered in Javellanas name to be used as a school site for Lapaz High School. Petitioner alleged that the Subject Property was declared for tax purposes to have a value of P60.00 per square meter, or a total value of P43,560.00. On December 9, 1981, Javellana filed his Answer where he admitted ownership of the Subject Property but denied the petitioners avowed public purpose of the sought-for expropriation, since the City of Iloilo already had an existing school site for Lapaz High School. Javellana also claimed that the true fair market value of his property was no less than P220.00 per square meter. On May 11, 1982, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, alleging that it had deposited the amount of P40,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank-Iloilo Branch. Petitioner claimed that it was entitled to the immediate possession of the Subject Property, citing Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1533 after it had deposited an amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation. Javellana filed an Opposition to the Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession citing the same grounds he raised in his Answer that the city already had a vast tract of land where its existing school site was located, and the deposit of a mere 10% of the Subject Propertys tax valuation was grossly inadequate. On May 17, 1983, the trial court issued an Order which granted petitioners Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession and authorized the petitioner to take immediate possession of the Subject Property. Thereafter, a Writ of Possession was issued in petitioners favor, and petitioner was able to take physical possession of the properties sometime in the middle of 1985. At no time has Javellana ever denied that the Subject Property was actually used as the site of Lapaz National High School. Aside from the filing by the private respondent of his Amended Answer on April 21, 1984, the expropriation proceedings remained dormant. Sixteen years later, on April 17, 2000, Javellana filed an Ex Parte Motion/Manifestation, where he alleged that when he finally sought to withdraw the P40,000.00 allegedly deposited by the petitioner, he discovered that no such deposit was ever made. In support of this contention, private respondent presented a Certification from the Philippine National Bank stating that no deposit was ever made for the expropriation of the Subject Property. Private respondent thus demanded his just compensation as well as interest. Attempts at an amicable resolution and a negotiated sale were unsuccessful. It bears emphasis that petitioner could not present any evidence whether documentary or testimonial to prove that any payment was actually made to private respondent. April 2, 2003, private respondent filed a Complaint against petitioner for Recovery of Possession, Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. Private respondent alleged that since he had not been compensated for the Subject Property, petitioners possession was illegal, and he was entitled to recovery of possession of his lots. He prayed that petitioner be ordered to vacate the Subject Property and pay rentals amounting to P15,000.00 per month together with moral, exemplary, and actual damages, as well as attorneys fees. On May 15, 2003, petitioner filed its Answer, arguing that Javellana could no longer bring an action for recovery since the Subject Property was already taken for public use. Rather, private respondent could only demand for the payment of just compensation. Petitioner also maintained that the legality or illegality of petitioners possession of the property should be determined in the eminent domain case and not in a separate action for recovery of possession. Both parties jointly moved to consolidate the expropriation case and the case for recovery of possession which motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated August 26, 2003. On November 14, 2003, a commission was created to determine the just compensation due to Javellana. On November 20, 2003, private respondent filed a Motion/Manifestation dated November 19, 2003 claiming that before a commission is created, the trial court should first order the condemnation of the property, in accordance with the Rules of Court. Javellana likewise insisted that the fair market value of the Subject Property should be reckoned from the date when the court orders the condemnation of the property, and not the date of actual taking, since petitioners possession of the property was questionable. Before petitioner could file its Comment, the RTC issued an Order dated November 21, 2003 denying the Motion. Javellana filed on November 25, 2003, an Omnibus Motion to Declare Null and Void the Order of May 17, 1983 and to Require Plaintiff to Deposit 10% or P254,000.00. Javellana claimed that the amount is equivalent to the 10% of the fair market value of the Subject Property, as determined by the Iloilo City Appraisal Committee in 2001, at the time when the parties were trying to negotiate a settlement. On December 12, 2003, the RTC issued the First Assailed Order, which nullified the Order dated May 17, 1983 (concerning the issuance of a writ of possession over the Subject Property). Neither party sought reconsideration of this Order. Nonetheless, about six months later, the RTC issued the Second Assailed Order, which it denominated as an "Amended Order". The Second Assailed Order was identical to the first, except that the reckoning point for just compensation was now the "time this order was issued," which is June 15, 2004. After the parties were able to fully ventilate their respective positions, the public respondent issued the Third Assailed Order, denying the Motion for Reconsideration , and ruling as follows: The Order dated June 15, 2004 among other things stated that parties and counsels must be bound by the Commissioners Report regarding the value of the property not at the time it was condemned but at the time this order was issued. ISSUE: WON the correct reckoning point for the determination of just compensation is at the time the expropriation complaint was filed in court.
RULING: YES. Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. When the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Even under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure, under which the complaint for expropriation was filed, just compensation is to be determined "as of the date of the filing of the complaint." Here, there is no reason to depart from the general rule that the point of reference for assessing the value of the Subject Property is the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation. Concededly, Javellana also slept on his rights for over 18 years and did not bother to check with the PNB if a deposit was actually made by the petitioner. Evidently, from his inaction in failing to withdraw or even verify the amounts purportedly deposited, private respondent not only accepted the valuation made by the petitioner, but also was not interested enough to pursue the expropriation case until the end. As such, private respondent may not recover possession of the Subject Property, but is entitled to just compensation. The City of Iloilo should be held liable for damages for taking private respondents property without payment of just compensation.
MIGUEL BELUSO VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY (CAPIZ), Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings. A petition for expropriation was thereafter filed on April 14, 1997 by the respondent Municipality of Panay before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Roxas City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the land sought to be expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing the same. The trial court denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and declared that the expropriation in this case is for "public use" and the respondent has the lawful right to take the property upon payment of just compensation. Petitioners then filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming that they were denied due process when the trial court declared that the taking was for public purpose without receiving evidence on petitioners claim that the Mayor of Panay was motivated by politics in expropriating their property and in denying their Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Hearing of the Court Appointed Commissioners; and that the trial court also committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the affidavits of persons denying that they signed a petition addressed to the municipal government of Panay. Then CA rendered its Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the petitioners were not denied due process as they were able to file an answer to the complaint and were able to adduce their defenses therein; and that the purpose of the taking in this case constitutes "public use". Issue: Whether the Municipal Government of Panay exercise the power of Eminent Domain is being exercised in accordance with the delegating law under the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments. Decision: The petition is granted. Rationale: The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice. A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; and the reason for this is settled: A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.] 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. As respondents expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGUs exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.
PLANTERS BANK VS JAMES NG FACTS: On various occasions in 1997, James Ng and his brother Anthony (respondents) obtained loans from petitioner amounting to Twenty Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) to secure which they mortgaged two parcels of land situated in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 79865 and 79866 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Respondents failed to settle their loan obligation, hence, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage before Notary Public Stephen Z. Taala. 2 The Notice of Auction Sale scheduled the sale of the properties covered by the mortgage on April 7, 1999 at the Main Entrance of the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City. 3 The Notice was published in Metro Profile, a newspaper of general circulation, in its March 9, 16 and 23, 1999 issues. 4
The highest bidder at the auction sale was petitioner to which was issued a Certificate of Sale that was registered with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on May 19, 1999. 5 As respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within one year, petitioner filed on June 26, 2001, an ex-partepetition for the issuance of a writ of possession, docketed as LRC Case No. Q-14305 (01) and lodged before RTC-QC, Branch 77.1avvphi1 In the meantime, respondents instituted an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage, raffled to RTC-QC, Branch 221 which, by Order of June 14, 2000, 6 issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from consolidating its title to the properties and committing any act of dispossession that would defeat respondents right of ownership. After numerous incidents arising from petitioners petition for issuance of a writ of possession and respondents complaint for annulment which incidents reached this Court, petitioner was finally allowed by Branch 77 of the RTC-QC, by Order of August 22, 2008, to present evidence ex parte on its petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. By Decision of January 19, 2009, RTC-QC, Branch 77 denied the issuance of a writ of possession. Petitioner, in the main, asseverates that Branch 77 of the RTC-QC cannot cite as ground for denial of the issuance of a writ of possession questions relating the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure. Respondents counter that there are no facts or the facts are insufficient to entitle petitioner to a writ of possession.The petition is meritorious. ISSUE: WON Foreclosure is proper RULING: It is settled that questions regarding the validity of a mortgage or its foreclosure as well as the sale of the property covered by the mortgage cannot be raised as ground to deny the issuance of a writ of possession. Any such questions must be determined in a subsequent proceeding 9 as in fact, herein respondents commenced an action for Annulment of Certificate of Sale, Promissory Note and Deed of Mortgage. Parenthetically, the court a quo denied the issuance of the writ as it credited respondents opposition to petitioners petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, which opposition it synthesized as follows: On the other hand, the mortgagors[-respondents herein] contend that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings conducted by the Notary Public over the mortgaged properties of the mortgagors suffered jurisdictional infirmities; that the jurisdictional infirmities consisted of the fact that the requirement of posting the notices of the sale for not less that twenty (20) days in at least three (3) public places in the city where the property is situated was not complied with; that the notice of auction sale did not mention with preciseness and particularity the kind of improvement on the mortgaged property, which consist of a three-storey building; that the bank (petitioner herein) and the Notary Public colluded to deprive the prospective bidders interested in the properties from participating in the public auction sale since they were deprived of knowing the real status of the subject properties; that the mortgaged properties were auctioned for a price grossly disproportionate and morally shocking as compared to the real value of the same properties; that the petitioner also violated the provisions of Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3, governing the procedure of extrajudicial foreclosure, x x x. 10 (underscoring supplied) By crediting respondents opposition, Branch 77 of the court a quo pre- empted its co-equal branch, Branch 221, to which jurisdiction over respondents annulment petition was laid, from determining the merits of respondents claim- basis of said petition. Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; x x x Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. (underscoring supplied) Since respondents failed to redeem the mortgage within the reglementary period, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and the issuance thereof is merely a ministerial function. 11 The judge to whom an application for a writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. Until the foreclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial. 12 In fact, even during the period of redemption, the purchaser is entitled as of right to a writ of possession provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure sale is shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law. More so when, as in the present case, the redemption period has expired and ownership is vested in the purchaser. 13 The defaulting mortgagor is not without any expedient remedy, however. For under Section 8 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, 14 it can file with the court which issues the writ of possession a petition for cancellation of the writ within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was given possession. So Section 8 of Rule 39 provides: SECTION 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty daysafter the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the pendency of the appeal. (underscoring supplied) IN FINE, it was grievous error for QC-RTC, Branch 77 to deny petitioners motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. PNB vs. Sanao Marketing Facts: Sanao Marketing Corporation and the Sanao spouses obtained a loan in the amount of P150,000,000.00 from PNB secured by a real estate mortgage of several parcels of land situated in the 3 municipalities. The contract provided that if the mortgagors fail or refuse to pay the obligations at any time, then all the obligations covered by the real estate mortgage and all amortizationthereof shall immediately become due and payable and that the mortgagee may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially or extrajudicially. The respondents failed to pay their obligations and so PNB foreclosed the mortgage through Atty. Clavecilla. The mortgage was foreclosed. Thereafter, Atty. Clavecilla executed a Provisional Certificate of Sale certifying that on the 22nd day of March 1999, at exactly ten oclock in the morning, he sold at a public auction at the lobby/main entrance of the Regional Trial Court, Hall of Justice, Naga City the mortgaged properties to PNB for P213,162,787.50, which amount the latter considered as payment pro tanto of petitioners loan.
Respondents Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC against PNB, the Register of Deeds of the City of Naga and the Province of Camarines Sur, and Atty. Clavecilla, for the court to declare the Provisional Certificate of Sale and the auction and foreclosure proceedings null and void. PNB, on the other hand, filed with the RTC of Pili a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the properties located in Pili. RTC of Pili granted the writ of possession prayed for by PNB. The CA nullified the orders of the RTC. Aggrieved by the Decision, PNB filed the instant petition, arguing in the main that in nullifying the orders of the RTC of Pili, the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as the issuance of writs of possession is purely ministerial on the part of the trial court. Issue: Is PNB entitled to the writ of possession? Held: YES. A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment. It has been consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial. Such writ issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. The court neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment. The judge issuing the order following these express provisions of law cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, PNB has sufficiently established its right to the writ of possession. It presented as documentary exhibits the contract of real estate mortgage and the Provisional Certificate of Sale on the face of which appears proof of its registration with the Registry of Deeds in Camarines Sur. There is also no dispute that the lands were not redeemed within one year from the registration of the Provisional Certificate of Sale. It should follow, therefore, that PNB has acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession. The RTC of Pili had the ministerial duty to issue that writ, as it did actually, upon mere motion, conformably to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. The CA also erred in its decision on another ground. The judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look into the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. In the issuance of a writ of possession, no discretion is left to the trial court. Any question regarding the cancellation of the writ or in respect of the validity and regularity of the public sale should be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135. In fact, the question of the validity of the foreclosure proceedings can be threshed out in the Civil Case pending before the RTC of Naga which was filed by respondents before PNB had filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The Court of Appeals should not have ruled on factual issues on which the RTC of Naga had yet to make any finding. Besides, a review of such factual matters is not proper in a petition for certiorari.
MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN VS GARCIA Facts: The expropriation suit was commenced by complaint of the Municipality of Bian, Laguna filed in the RTC. The complaint named as defendants the owners of eleven (11) adjacent parcels of land in Bian The land sought to be expropriated was intended foruse as the new site of a modern public market and the acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. One of the defendants, Francisco filed a MTD. Her motion was filed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67. Her "motion to dismiss" was thus actually a pleading, taking the place of an answer in an ordinary civil action; it was not an ordinary motion governed by Rule 15, or a "motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule 16. Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in favor of the plaintiffMunicipality.
Francisco filed a "Motion for Separate Trial. She alleged she had the special defense of "a constitutional defense of vested right via a pre-existing approved Locational Clearance from the H.S.R.C. The Court granted the motion. It directed that a separate trial be held for Francisco regarding her special defenses.
Judge issued order dismissing the complaint "as against defendant FRANCISCO," and amending the Writ of Possessions as to "exclude therefrom and from its force and effects said defendant .. and her property ..."
The Municipality filed a MR. Francisco filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Execution and/or Finality of Order," contending that the Order had become "final and executory for failure of the Municipality to file a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal within the reglementary period," i.e "fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order .. appealed from.
The Municipality contended that "multiple appeals are allowed by law" in actions of eminent domain, and hence the period of appeal is thirty (30), not fifteen (15) days;the special civil action of partition and accounting under Rule 69.
Issue: whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed, as regards which 'the period of appeal shall be thirty [30] days, instead of fifteen (15) days
Held: In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Section 39 of BP129 to the effect that in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.
The municipality's MR was therefore timely presented, well within the thirty-day period laid down by law therefor; and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sought to be considered had become final and executory.
It is claimed by the Municipality that the issuance of such aseparate, final order or judgment had given rise "ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became available." The Municipality is right. In an action against several defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others. " In lieu of the original record, a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court. More than one appeal being permitted in this case, therefore, "the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required as provided by the Implementing Rules in relation to Section 39 of B.P. Blg. 129.
Sps. Dioniso vs Linsangan Facts: Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural lands in San Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant, Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo) cultivated. Upon Romualdos death, his widow, Emiliana, got Cruzs permission to stay on the property provided she would vacate it upon demand. In September 1989 spouses Vicente and Anita Dionisio (the Dionisios) bought the property from Cruz.[1] In April 2002, the Dionisios found out that Emiliana had left the property and that it was already Wilfredo Linsangan (Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength of a Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan*2+ dated April 7, 1977. The Dionisios wrote Wilfredo on April 22, 2002, demanding that he vacate the land but the latter declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an eviction suit[3] against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael, Bulacan. Wilfredo filed an answer with counterclaims in which he declared that he had been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to amend their complaint. Despite initial misgivings over the amended complaint, Wilfredo asked for time to respond to it. The Dionisios filed their amended complaint on August 5, 2003; Wilfredo maintained his original answer. The MTC issued a pre-trial order[4] specifying the issues. For the plaintiffs: (1) whether or not the defendant can be ejected from the property and (2) whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable rent for the use of the property, damages, and attorneys fees. For the defendant: (1) whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction to try this case; (2) whether or not the defendant can be ejected from the questioned property; and (3) whether or not the defendant is entitled to damages and attorneys fees. On May 3, 2004 the MTC rendered judgment, ordering Wilfredo to vacate the land and remove his house from it. Further, the MTC ordered Wilfredo to pay the Dionisios P3,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for the use of the land and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of suit. On appeal,*5+ the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC decision, holding that the case was one for forcible entry. On review,[6] however, the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered judgment on July 6, 2006, reversing the decisions of the courts below, and ordering the dismissal of the Dionisios action. The CA held that, by amending their complaint, the Dionisios effectively changed their cause of action from unlawful detainer to recovery of possession which fell outside the jurisdiction of the MTC. Further, since the amendment introduced a new cause of action, its filing on August 5, 2003 marked the passage of the one year limit from demand required in ejectment suits. More, since jurisdiction over actions for possession depended on the assessed value of the property and since such assessed value was not alleged, the CA cannot determine what court has jurisdiction over the action. ISSUE: Whether or not the Dionisios amendment of their complaint effectively changed their cause of action from one of ejectment to one of recovery of possession; and Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action before it. RULING: One. An amended complaint that changes the plaintiffs cause of action is technically a new complaint. Consequently, the action is deemed filed on the date of the filing of such amended pleading, not on the date of the filing of its original version. Thus, the statute of limitation resumes its run until it is arrested by the filing of the amended pleading. The Court acknowledges, however, that an amendment which does not alter the cause of action but merely supplements or amplifies the facts previously alleged, does not affect the reckoning date of filing based on the original complaint. The cause of action, unchanged, is not barred by the statute of limitations that expired after the filing of the original complaint. Here, the original complaint alleges that the Dionisios bought the land from Cruz on September 30, 1989; that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant; that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave the land upon demand; that in April 2002 the Dionisios discovered on visit to the land that Emiliana had left it and that Wilfredo now occupied it under a claim that he bought the right to stay from Emiliana under a Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan; that the Dionisios did not know of and gave no consent to this sale which had not been annotated on their title; that the Dionisios verbally told Wilfredo to leave the property by April 31, 2002; that their lawyer reiterated such demand in writing on April 22, 2002; that Wilfredo did not heed the demand; that the Dionisios wanted to get possession so they could till the land and demolish Wilfredos house on it; that Wilfredo did not give the Dionisios just share in the harvest; and that the Dionisios were compelled to get the services of counsel for P100,000.00. The amended complaint has essentially identical allegations. The only new ones are that the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, Romualdos widow to stay out of their kindness, tolerance, and generosity; that they went to the land in April 2002, after deciding to occupy it, to tell Emiliana of their plan; that Wilfredo cannot deny that Cruz was the previous registered owner and that he sold the land to the Dionisios; and that a person occupying anothers land by the latters tolerance or permission, without contract, is bound by an implied promise to leave upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy. To determine if an amendment introduces a different cause of action, the test is whether such amendment now requires the defendant to answer for a liability or obligation which is completely different from that stated in the original complaint.[8] Here, both the original and the amended complaint required Wilfredo to defend his possession based on the allegation that he had stayed on the land after Emiliana left out of the owners mere tolerance and that the latter had demanded that he leave. Indeed, Wilfredo did not find the need to file a new answer. Two. Wilfredo points out that the MTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case since it involved tenancy relation which comes under the jurisdiction of the DARAB.[9] But the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint.[10] Besides, the records show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his claim that he was a tenant of the land. The MTC records show that aside from the assertion that he is a tenant, he did not present any evidence to prove the same. To consider evidence presented only during appeal is offensive to the idea of fair play. The remaining question is the nature of the action based on the allegations of the complaint. The RTC characterized it as an action for forcible entry, Wilfredo having entered the property and taken over from widow Emiliana on the sly. The problem with this characterization is that the complaint contained no allegation that the Dionisios were in possession of the property before Wilfredo occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of eviction suit.[11] Nowhere in the recitation of the amended complaint did the Dionisios assert that they were in prior possession of the land and were ousted from such possession by Wilfredos unlawful occupation of the property. Is the action one for unlawful detainer? An action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint sufficiently alleges the following: (1) initially, the defendant has possession of property by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however, such possession became illegal upon plaintiffs notice to defendant, terminating the latters right of possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year from plaintiffs last demand that defendant vacate the property, the plaintiff files a complaint for defendants ejectment.*12+ If the defendant had possession of the land upon mere tolerance of the owner, such tolerance must be present at the beginning of defendants possession. Here, based on the allegations of the amended complaint, the Dionisios allowed Emiliana, tenant Romualdos widow, to stay on the land for the meantime and leave when asked to do so. But, without the knowledge or consent of the Dionisios, she sold her right of tenancy to Wilfredo. When the Dionisios visited the land in April 2002 and found Wilfredo there, they demanded that he leave the land. They did so in writing on April 22, 2002 but he refused to leave. The Dionisios filed their eviction suit within the year. It is pointed out that the original complaint did not allege that the Dionisios tolerated Emilianas possession of the land after her husband died, much less did it allege that they tolerated Wilfredos possession after he took over from Emiliana. But the rules do not require the plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact language of such rules. The Dionisios alleged that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant and that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that she would leave upon demand. These allegations clearly imply the Dionisios tolerance of her stay meantime that they did not yet need the land. As for Wilfredo, it is clear from the allegations of the complaint that Emiliana assigned to him her right to occupy the property. In fact that assignment was in writing. Consequently, his claim to the land was based on the Dionisios tolerance of the possession of Emiliana and, impliedly, of all persons claiming right under her. True, the Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan under which Emiliana transferred her tenancy right to Wilfredo appears to have been executed in 1977, years before Cruz sold the land to the Dionisios, implying that Wilfredo had already been in possession of the property before the sale. But what is controlling in ascertaining the jurisdiction of the court are the allegations of the complaint. The Dionisios alleged in their complaint that they were the ones who allowed Emiliana (and all persons claiming right under her) to stay on the land meantime that they did not need it. The MTC and the RTC gave credence to the Dionisios version. The Court will respect their judgment on a question of fact. WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition. LORENZO SHIPPING VS DISTRIBUTION MGMT Facts: the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter- Resolution, 1 advising respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153). For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO 213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994. 2
On July 2, 2001, in order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals (CA) a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. SP No. 65463). On November 29, 2001, 3 however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4, 2001. 4 Later, on April 10, 2002, the CA denied DMAPs motion for reconsideration. 5
DMAP appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 152914), but on June 5, 2002, 6 the Court denied DMAPs petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners failure to: (a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, in view of the foregoing denial of petitioners' motion for extension of time to file the petition; and (b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of P202.00 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section [c], Rule 56 and paragraph 1 of Revised Circular No. 1-88 of this Court." On August 12, 2002, 7 the Court denied with finality DMAPs motion for reconsideration. In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the occasion of which DMAP, acting through its co-respondents Lorenzo Cinco, its President, and Cora Curay, a consultant/adviser to Cinco, publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and, worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" 9 to the effect that the Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." 10 They averred that the respondents purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!" 11
In their comment dated January 20, 2003, 12 the respondents denied any intention to malign, discredit, or criticize the Court. The respondents further stated that the term time frame was laymans parlance to explain to DMAP members that the petition had been dismissed due to a technicality, considering that the appeals process in the case before the Court had taken only a month instead of the expected three to six months; Lastly, the respondents submitted that a serious study and analysis of the decision of the CA, which the Court affirmed, revealed that the decision of the CA centered only on the constitutionality of the assailed executive issuances. ISSUE: Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to indirect contempt of court? RULING: Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. 21 The phrase contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts. 22
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, 23 and need not be specifically granted by statute. 24 It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. 25 Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. 26 The power to punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of justice. 27 The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 28
Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court. 29
The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. 30 The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. 31 There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself. 32 Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt, 33 although it is advisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of other persons. 34
In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed. 35
The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra. The petitioners mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months," 54 was insufficient, without more, to sustain the charge of indirect contempt. Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea Transport Update stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP presented", 55 or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months." Contrary to the petitioners urging that such phrases be considered as "scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" 56 and as indicative that "the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners" 57 or that "the point that respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: defy the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!", 58 we find the phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No. 152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAPs members to defy the resolutions. The unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAPs members of the developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.1avvphi1 We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. We have no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen: 59
xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption. The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of court.