F R ANC OI S R E C ANAT I

RI GI DI TY AND DI RECT REFERENCE

(Received i n revised f or m 18 November , 1986)
What is it for a singular term, or for a use of a singular term, to be
referential in the strong sense, i.e. "purely" or "directly" referential?
This is the question I will try to answer in this paper. The intuitive (and
largely metaphorical) notion of referentiality that is current in the
philosophical literature emerges from the following set of statements:
A referent i al t er m is a t er m t hat serves simply t o refer. It is devoi d of descri pt i ve
cont ent , i n t he sense at least t hat what it cont r i but es t o t he pr oposi t i on expressed by t he
sent ence where it occurs is not a concept , but an object. Such a sent ence is used t o
assert of the obj ect referred t o t hat it falls under t he concept expressed by t he pr edi cat e
expressi on i n t he sentence. Pr oper names and demonst r at i ve expressi ons are supposed
t o be referent i al i n this sense; and al t hough definite descri pt i ons are not intrinsically
referential, t hey have a referent i al use.
That such a notion exists in contemporary philosophy is beyond
question. But many philosophers do not like it. I suspect that there are
two reasons why this is so. First, it is thought that the intuitive notion of
referentiality is too vague and metaphorical to be of any use; and
second, assuming that a definite view does emerge from the set of
statements above, it is thought that there are serious objections to this
view. I do not share this pessimism. I think that the notion of referen-
tiality can be satisfactorily defined, and that the objections raised to the
referentiality theory can be met. In this paper, however, I will be mainly
concerned with defining referentiality. Limitations of space will not
allow me to present a thorough defense of the doctrine of referentiality.
My starting point will be the related but less disreputable notion of
rigidity, introduced by Saul Kripke in the philosophical literature. It is
perhaps a bit misleading to speak of "the" notion of rigidity, since I will
show that there are, under that name, three different notions on the
market, all stemming from Kripke's characterization of a rigid designator
as a designator that denotes the same object in all possible worlds, The
PhilosophicalStudies 53 ( 1988) 103- - 117.
9 1988 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
104 F RANCOI S RE CANAT I
t hree di fferent not i ons are: r i gi di t y as a mat t er of scope, rigidity as a
mat t er of t rut h-condi t i ons, and rigidity as (pure or direct) referentiality.
This last not i on, which I shall concent rat e Upon, is t he most interesting,
but it is especially har d to charact eri ze in non-met aphori cal terms. To
provi de such a charact eri zat i on is the task of this paper.
RI GI DI TY AND SCOPE
Let ' s start, then, with the first sense of "rigidity". Many peopl e have said
t hat a rigid desi gnat or is simply a desi gnat or t hat (always) takes wi de
scope in modal contexts. Why have t hey said so? Because Kri pke
characterizes a rigid desi gnat or as a desi gnat or t hat denot es the same
object in all possible worlds, this i dea being somet i mes expressed, in
Kri pke' s writings, by saying t hat a rigid desi gnat or refers to the same
thing whet her we use it to talk about what is actually the case or about
some count erfact ual situation (Kri pke 1971: 145 and 1972: 289). Now
when a desi gnat or - - say, a defi ni t e descri pt i on - - takes wi de scope in a
modal sentence, i.e. in a sent ence used to talk about some possible
world, it does refer to the same object as when it occurs in a sent ence
used to descri be t he actual world. In sent ence (1) below, for example,
t he descri pt i on "t he presi dent of France", when it is given wi de scope,
refers to t he person who is the presi dent of Fr ance in t he actual worl d,
even t hough t he sent ence as a whol e describes a count erfact ual situa-
tion. So it seems t hat a descri pt i on designates rigidly when it takes wi de
scope. The di fference bet ween pr oper names and definite descriptions,
on t hat view, is simply that, cont rary to definite descriptions, pr oper
names always t ake wide scope in modal cont ext s (see e.g. Br ody 1977:
69). Thi s is why, whereas (1) is ambi guous, (2) is not:
(1) The presi dent of Fr ance mi ght have been tall
(2) Mi t t er r and might have been tall
(1) means ei t her t hat Fr ance mi ght have had (instead of Mi t t er r and) a
tall man as presi dent , or t hat Mi t t er r and hi msel f might have been tall.
On this second, "rigid" reading, t he i ndi vi dual who satisfies t he descr i p-
t i on i n the actual worl d is said to be tall in some possible worl d,
whereas in t he first reading, t he pr oper t y of being tall in some possible
RIGIDITY AND DIRECT REFERENCE 105
worl d - - say, W - - is ascribed to the individual who satisfies t he
descri pt i on in W (not in the actual world). Dependi ng on whet her t he
descri pt i on does or does not fall within the scope of the modal
operat or, its referent, i.e. the individual satisfying the descri pt i on, is
pi cked out ei t her in the actual world or in the possible worl d i nt r oduced
by t he modal operat or. There is no such scope ambiguity in the case of
(2), which contains a pr oper name instead of a description.
This view of rigidity, however, is misguided. Kri pke has recent l y
shown, in his reply to Dummet t (Kripke 1980), t hat rigidity is not
simply, and cannot be reduced to, a mat t er of scope. You can' t say t hat
a desi gnat or is rigid if and onl y if it (always) takes wi de scope in modal
contexts: this woul d make the not i on of rigidity relevant onl y to modal
contexts, whereas the ri gi d/ non rigid distinction applies to designators
in general, even when t hey occur in simple sentences like (3) and (4):
(3) Mi t t er r and is small
(4) The presi dent of Fr ance is small
(3) and (4), no less t han (1) and (2), provi de good evi dence t hat
"Mi t t errand", cont rary to "the presi dent of France", rigidly designates
its referent. To see that, compar e t he t rut h-condi t i ons of these two
sentences. (3) is t rue with respect to a worl d W if and onl y if, in W,
Mitterrand is small. In t hat case, t here is a uni que individual x such
that, for any worl d W, the sent ence is t rue with respect to W if and onl y
if x is small in W. But t here is no single individual such that, for any
worl d W, (4) is t rue with respect to W if and onl y if t hat individual is
small in W; in a worl d where Gi scard is t he presi dent of France,
Giscard' s being small makes (4) true, whereas in a worl d wi t h Chi rac
as presi dent , the t rut h of (4) depends on Chirac' s being small. No
part i cul ar individual is i nvol ved in the t rut h-condi t i on of (4): (4) is t rue
wi t h respect to a worl d if and onl y if, in t hat world, t here is an
i ndi vi dual x such t hat x is bot h t he presi dent of Fr ance and small, but
this individual need not be t he same wi t h respect to all possible worlds.
In the case of (3), on the ot her hand, t h e individual whose being small
woul d make the sent ence t rue is the same in all possible worlds. We
t hus fi nd the r i gi d/ non rigid distinction again, this t i me at the level of
simple sentences, where no scope ambiguity can occur. As Kri pke put s
106 FRANCOI S RECANATI
it, t he ri gi di t y t h e o r y "is a d o c t r i n e a b o u t t he t r ut h- c ondi t i ons , wi t h
r e s p e c t t o c o u n t e r f a c t u a l si t uat i ons, o f ( t he p r o p o s i t i o n s e x p r e s s e d by)
all s e nt e nc e s , i ncl udi ng simple s e nt e nc e s " ( Kr i pke 1 9 8 0 : 1 2 ) .
H e r e Kr i pke ' s r e pl y ends . Bu t it is p o s s i b l e t o go f ur t he r a nd
c o n c l u d e f r o m wha t has j us t b e e n s ai d t hat t he de s c r i pt i on i n ( 1)
de s i gna t e s non- r i gi dl y n o t onl y wh e n it t a ke s n a r r o w s c ope , b u t also
wh e n it falls o u t s i d e t he s c o p e o f t he mo d a l o p e r a t o r . Wh e n it doe s , (1)
s ays t hat t he ma n wh o is p r e s i d e n t of F r a n c e i n t he act ual wo r l d is tall
i n s o me o t h e r p o s s i b l e wor l d. 1 ( F r o m n o w on, I' ll cal l t hi s r e a di ng of (1)
" ( l a ) " . ) Thi s man, h o we v e r , is n o t s peci f i ed, a nd it is not ne c e s s a r i l y
Mi t t e r r a nd. Th e s e nt e nc e , af t er all, d o e s n o t t el l us which wo r l d is
s u p p o s e d t o pl a y t he r ol e o f " t he act ual wor l d" : wi t h r e s p e c t t o a ny
wo r l d W, "t he a c t ua l wo r l d " will b e t hat ve r y wo r l d W. 2 N o w s u p p o s e
a wo r l d W1 wh e r e Gi s c a r d has b e e n e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t i ns t e a d o f
Mi t t e r r a nd. Wi t h r e s p e c t t o W1, ( l a ) is t r ue if a nd onl y i f Gi s c a r d is tall
i n s o me p o s s i b l e wo r l d o t h e r t ha n W1. By t he s a me t oke n, wi t h r e s p e c t
t o a wo r l d W2 wh e r e Chirac has b e e n e l e c t e d, ( l a ) is t r ue i f and onl y i f
Chi r a c is tall i n s o me p o s s i b l e wo r l d o t h e r t han W2. An d , o f c our s e ,
wi t h r e s p e c t t o our a c t ua l wor l d, wh e r e Mi t t e r r a n d is pr e s i de nt , ( l a ) is
t r ue i f a n d onl y i f Mi t t e r r a n d is tall i n s o me o t h e r p o s s i b l e wor l d. So we
s e e t hat t he d e s c r i p t i o n i n (1) des i gnat es non- r i gi dl y e v e n wh e n it t a ke s
wi d e s c ope ; f or t h e r e is n o u n i q u e i ndi vi dual x s uc h t hat , wi t h r e s p e c t
t o a ny wo r l d W, ( l a ) is t r ue i f a nd onl y if x is tall i n s o me p o s s i b l e
wo r l d o t h e r t ha n W. Of c our s e , (1) p r e s e n t s us wi t h t wo di f f e r e nt
wor l ds , o n e of t h e m pl ayi ng t he r ol e o f t he "act ual " wor l d; a nd t he
de s c r i pt i on' s t aki ng wi d e s c o p e me a n s t hat i t s r e f e r e n c e s houl d b e
p i c k e d o u t i n t hi s "act ual " wor l d, not wi t hs t a ndi ng t he f act t hat t he
s e n t e n c e is u s e d t o d e s c r i b e a n o t h e r p o s s i b l e wor l d. Bu t t hi s is n o t
e n o u g h t o ma k e t he de s i gna t i on rigid; f or e v e r y wo r l d is t he a c t ua l
wo r l d wi t h r e s p e c t t o i t sel f, s o t hat it will still b e p o s s i b l e t o c ha nge t he
de s c r i pt i on' s r e f e r e n c e s i mpl y b y changi ng t he wo r l d wi t h r e s p e c t t o
whi c h t h e s e n t e n c e is e va l ua t e d. I t f ol l ows t hat , e v e n i f it was s t i pul a t e d
t hat a c e r t a i n def i ni t e d e s c r i p t i o n al ways t a ke s maxi mal s c o p e i n mo d a l
c ont e xt s , t hi s d e s c r i p t i o n wo u l d still n o t c o u n t as a ri gi d des i gnat or . 3
RIGIDITY AND DIRECT REFERENCE 107
RIGIDITY AND REFERENTI ALI TY
On Kr i pke' s view, rigidity is a mat t er of t rut h-condi t i ons: t o say t hat a
desi gnat or is rigid is t o say t hat t her e is an i ndi vi dual such that, with
r espect to ever y count er f act ual situation, t he t r ut h- condi t i on of any
sent ence cont ai ni ng t he desi gnat or involves t he individual in quest i on.
Thi s view was first explicitly put f or war d by Chr i st opher Peacocke, who
gives t he fol l owi ng defi ni t i on ( Peacocke 1975: 110) :
(R) t is a rigid desi gnat or (in a language L f r ee of bot h
ambi gui t y and indexicals) if and onl y if:
t her e is an obj ect x such t hat f or any sent ence G(t) in whi ch
t occurs, t he t r ut h (falsity) condi t i on f or G(t) is t hat ( x)
satisfy (respect i vel y, fail t o satisfy) G( ).4
Cr i t er i on (R), Peacocke cl ai med, capt ures Russell' s i dea t hat some-
times t he r ef er ence of a singular t er m is a const i t uent of t he pr oposi t i on
expr essed by t he sent ence wher e it occurs. For if a t er m t denot i ng an
obj ect x is a rigid desi gnat or by cri t eri on (R), t hen any sent ence G(t)
will be t r ue if and onl y if x satisfies G( ) . In ot her words, t he obj ect x,
along with t he pr oper t y G( ) , is a const i t uent of t he t r ut h- condi t i on of
t he sent ence. What a rigid desi gnat or cont r i but es to t he t r ut h- condi t i on
of t he sent ence t hus is t he obj ect itself whi ch it refers to, not an
at t ri but e whi ch an obj ect woul d have t o possess in or der t o be r ef er r ed
to.
Russell' s i dea is t he i dea of a pur el y referent i al t erm, a t er m t hat
serves onl y t o refer. Peacocke, in effect, equat es rigidity, in t he sense of
(R), with referent i al i t y, as t he fol l owi ng passage shows:
This criterion of rigid designation can be seen (. . . ) as merely a more explicit formula-
tion of an idea variously expressed as that of a term's "serving... simply to refer to its
object" (Quine), "tagging" an individual (Marcus), or in general of an expression's being
"used to enable . . . individuals to be made subjects of discourse" (Mill); and the view
that proper names are rigid designators in our sense seems a natural elucidation of Miss
Anscombe's remark that the proper name contributes "to the meaning of the sentence
precisely by standing for its bearer". (Peacocke 1975:111)
Thi s equat i on of rigidity with referent i al i t y is consonant with Kri pke' s
i nsi st ance on t he "Millian" char act er of pr ope r names, whi ch he t akes
as par adi gm exampl es of rigid designation. Pr ope r names, Mill says,
108 FRANCOIS RECANATI
"are at t ached to the objects themselves, and are not dependent on ( . . . )
any at t ri but e of the object" (Mill 1947: 20). It is the funct i on of pr oper
names, accordi ng to Kri pke, to refer to an object i ndependent l y of the
propert i es it may have, so as to enabl e one to refer to this object even
with respect to possible worl ds where it no l onger ha s them. The link
bet ween a name and its reference is, for Kripke, "stipulative" rat her
t han "qualitative".
No less t han the wi de scope view of rigidity, however, t he view
which equat es rigidity (in t he sense of (R)) with Millian referentiality is
confused. Referent i al i t y is supposed to distinguish pr oper names f r om
definite descriptions, at least in their non-referent i al uses. Now some
defi ni t e descri pt i ons are rigid and satisfy criterion (R). For example, a
mat hemat i cal descri pt i on like "the cube root of 27" denot es 3 in all
possible worlds, since "3 is the cube root of 27" is a necessary truth.
The rigidity of "t he cube root of 27" can be checked, using cri t eri on
(R), at t he level of t rut h-condi t i ons: for any sent ence S of t he f or m "The
cube root of 27 is F" (where " F" st ands for a predicate), t here is an
object x, namel y t he number 3, such that, with respect to any possi bl e
worl d, S is t rue if and onl y if x satisfies t he predicate. It is no use saying
ei t her that, for S to be true, x must also be t he cube root of 27, or t hat
some ot her number' s being bot h the cube root of 27 and F woul d
verify t he sent ence as well, for t here is no worl d where 3 is not, or
where a number ot her t han 3 is, t he cube root of 27.
Li ke any descri pt i on, the descri pt i on "t he cube r oot of 27" denot es
the object whi ch has the pr oper t y it "connot es", viz. the pr oper t y of
being a number x such t hat x 3 = 27. The link bet ween t he descri pt i on
and i t s reference is typically "qualitative" in Kri pke' s sense. It woul d be
definitely odd to say t hat t he descri pt i on "is at t ached to the object itself,
and does not depend on any at t ri but e of t he object". The reference of
t he descri pt i on is a funct i on of t he concept it expresses, and this con-
cept is what t he descri pt i on cont ri but es to the proposi t i on expressed by
the sent ence where it occurs. To dramat i ze this point, consi der an
attributive use Of the description: "The cube r oot of 27, what ever it is, is
F". The proposi t i on expressed by this sent ence is clearly not a "singular
proposi t i on" consisting of an object and t he pr oper t y F. Nobody woul d
be willing to say t hat t he descri pt i on here is referential, even t hough it
is rigid.
R I GI DI T Y AND DI R E C T R E F E R E NC E 109
The difference bet ween rigidity and referentiality was poi nt ed out by
Kri pke hi msel f in ' Nami ng and necessity' . Ther e is, he says, a difference
bet ween a rigid definite descri pt i on and a pr oper name, even when the
descri pt i on in quest i on is used to "fix the reference" of t he name:
~r is s u p p o s e d t o be t he r at i o of t he c i r c umf e r e nc e o f a ci r cl e t o i t s di a me t e r . Now, i t ' s
s o me t h i n g t ha t I ha ve n o t h i n g but a va gue i nt ui t i ve f eel i ng t o a r gue for: It s e e ms t o me
t ha t h e r e t hi s ( 9r eek l et t er is n o t be i ng u s e d as short f o r t he p h r a s e ' t he r at i o o f t he
c i r c u mf e r e n c e of a ci r cl e t o i t s d i a me t e r ' . . . I t is u s e d as a name f or a real n u mb e r . . .
No t e t ha t h e r e b o t h ' :~' a nd ' t he r at i o of t he c i r c u mf e r e n c e o f a ci r cl e t o i t s di a me t e r '
a r e ri gi d d e s i g n a t o r s . . . ( Kr i pke 1972: 278)
The intuitive di fference Kri pke has in mi nd is t hat ' z~' , as a name,
is purel y referential, while t he rigid descri pt i on ' the ratio of the
ci rcumference of a circle to its di amet er' is not.
Ther e is, of course, a connect i on bet ween referentiality and rigidity:
referentiality implies rigktity. A referential t erm is rigid "de jure"; it is,
in Mill' s t ermi nol ogy, "attactied to the object itself", i ndependent l y of
its propert i es, and so cannot fail to denot e the same object in all
possible worlds, since what changes f r om worl d to worl d is not the
object itself, its identity, but onl y its (contingent) properties. By contrast,
a mat hemat i cal descri pt i on - - or, for t hat matter, any essential
descri pt i on - - is rigid onl y "de facto": like any description, it denot es
the obj ect t hat falls under a certain concept, but in this case the concept
happens to fit the same object in all possible worlds. 5
The pr obl em is that, whereas rigidity in the sense of (R) is a well-
defi ned not i on, referentiality is not . What does it mean to say t hat a
referential t erm refers t o the object "itself"? One way of underst andi ng
this is to say t hat a referential t erm is a t erm wholly devoi d of
descriptive cont ent , a t erm whose link to its reference is purel y
stipulative, as Kri pke says. But this is far t oo strong, for not all
referential t erms are like pr oper names in this respect: demonst rat i ve
expressions like "this table" or pr onouns like ' T' or "you" clearly have
some sort of descriptive cont ent . Rat her t han whol l y devoi d of descrip-
tive cont ent , a referential t erm is such t hat what it cont ri but es to the
proposi t i on expressed is t he object it refers to rat her t han a concept
under which this object falls (even if, at some level, t he t er m does
express such a concept). But this cannot be explained, as Peacocke
thought, in t erms of criterion (R): it is t rue that, when a t er m is
110 FRANCOIS RECANATI
referent i al , t her e is an obj ect such t hat t he t r ut h- condi t i on of any
sent ence cont ai ni ng t he t er m i nvol ves this obj ect . But this cr i t er i on is
t oo weak, since it char act er i zes all rigid expressi ons, i ncl udi ng rigid
descri pt i ons, whi ch nobody woul d want t o classify as referent i al (at
least in t hei r at t ri but i ve uses).
LOCKWOOD' S CRI TERI ON
An obvi ous sol ut i on t o t he pr obl em at hand is t he following. Let ' s
distinguish t he st at e of affairs r epr es ent ed by an ut t er ance, i.e. its
t r ut h- condi t i on, and t he pr oposi t i on expr essed by t he ut t er ance. A rigid
expr essi on is an expr essi on such t hat t he t r ut h- condi t i on of any
sent ence cont ai ni ng it i nvol ves a cer t ai n obj ect , in conf or mi t y to
cr i t er i on (R). When an expr essi on i s referent i al , t her e is an obj ect such
t hat not onl y t he t r ut h- condi t i on but also the proposition expressed
involves t hat obj ect .
Var i ous phi l osopher s have insisted that, t o under st and t he pr oposi -
t i on expr essed by an ut t er ance wher e a referent i al t er m occurs, it is
necessar y t o know whi ch obj ect has been r ef er r ed to; it is necessar y t o
i dent i fy t he r ef er ence, (See e.g. Evans 1982. ) Thi s gives a sense in
whi ch t he pr opos i t i on expr essed i ncl udes t he ver y obj ect t hat is
r ef er r ed to, r at her t han si mpl y a concept under whi ch t hat obj ect falls.
Whe n a t er m is non- r ef er ent i al , t he pr oposi t i on expr essed involves onl y
a cer t ai n concept ; if t he t er m is rigid de fact o, this concept happens t o
fit t he same obj ect in all possi bl e worl ds, but it is not necessar y f or
under st andi ng t he pr oposi t i on t o i dent i fy t he obj ect in quest i on. As
Loc kwood ( 1975: 488) put s it:
A hearer may be said fully to grasp what statement is being expressed (by "the cube of
408 has more factors thar~ there are planets") quite irrespective of whether he knows
what the cube of 408 is, or even if he falsely believes it to be, say, 48,914,012. Yet, in
the case of a term that is functioning referentially, being able correctly to identify its
reference would seem to be a prerequisite of knowing what is being asserted by its aid.
"The cube of 408" bei ng a rigid descri pt i on, t her e is an obj ect , viz.
number 67, 917, 302, such t hat t he t r ut h- condi t i on of any sent ence
cont ai ni ng it involves t hat object: "t he cube of 408 is F " is t rue, with
r espect t o any possi bl e worl d, iff 67, 917, 302 is F. But t he numbe r in
RI GI DI TY AND DI RECT REFERENCE 111
quest i on is no part of the proposi t i on expressed by the sentence, in the
sense t hat one can under st and what is said by an ut t erance of this
sent ence wi t hout identifying the number t hat is referred to - - and
t herefore wi t hout knowi ng t hat the sent ence is t rue iff t hat number is F.
What is part of the proposi t i on expressed is the concept "cube of 408",
not the number t hat falls under t hat concept.
The pr obl em is t hat we don' t know exactly, at this stage, what is
meant by "the proposi t i on expressed", as opposed to the t rut h-condi t i on
of the ut t erance. This, however, is not very i mport ant . The not i on of
proposi t i on expressed is essentially tied to t hat of underst andi ng, and
what count s is precisely the connect i on bet ween referentiality and
underst andi ng. "The cube root of 27" rigidly designates t he number 3,
but we can under st and the descri pt i on even if we don' t now what
number it designates; a referential term, on the ot her hand, is such t hat
to under st and an ut t erance where it occurs one has to know which
object it designates.
Michael Lockwood has put forward a defi ni t i on of referentiality in
t erms of underst andi ng which is i nt ended to capt ure the connect i on as
well as t he di fference bet ween referentiality and rigidity. Accor di ng to
(a simplified versi on of) Lockwood' s criterion, 6
(RR) A t erm t is referential if and onl y if t here is an object x such
t hat
(i) an ut t erance S(t) is t rue iff x satisfies S( ) , and
(ii) to under st and the ut t erance, one must know t hat it is t rue iff
x satisfies S( ) .
In this framework, a referential t erm is a rigid desi gnat or (this is what
clause (i) amount s to), but a rigid desi gnat or of a very special sort: it is
a rigid desi gnat or such that, to under st and an ut t erance where it occurs,
one has to know t hat it designates an object rigidly and which object it
so designates (this is what clause (ii) amount s to). Mor e precisely,
underst andi ng the ut t erance involves, accordi ng to (RR), de re knowl-
edge of the reference: it involves knowi ng of a certain object t hat the
ut t erance is t rue if and onl y if this object satisfies the predicate. (This
means that, to under st and t he ut t erance, one must f or m an "i nforma-
t i on-based t hought ", in Evans' s terminology. )
112 FRANCOIS RECANATI
I wish t o ret ai n Lockwood' s insight about t he basic nat ur e of
referent i al i t y. (RR), however , is not sat i sfact ory as it stands. Accor di ng
t o (RR), under st andi ng an ut t er ance with a referent i al t er m involves
i dent i fyi ng t he r ef er ence of t he t erm, and this implies t hat t he r ef er ence
actually exists. I ndeed, many phi l osopher s t hi nk t hat when t he r ef er ence
of a referent i al t er m does not exist, t her e is not hi ng to "under st and",
since no pr oposi t i on is expressed. Thi s I do not wish to dispute. What I
think, however , is t hat i dent i fi cat i on of t he r ef er ence is not a necessar y
condi t i on of referentiality: a t er m may well be referent i al , and under -
st ood by t he hear er as referent i al , wi t hout its r ef er ence bei ng identified.
To under st and t he ut t erance "Ral ph Banilla is a mi dget " i nvol ves
knowi ng who Ral ph Banilla is, but to under st and t he sent ence onl y
i nvol ves knowi ng t hat t he t er m is referent i al , t hat t her e is an i ndi vi dual
t hat must be i dent i fi ed f or an ut t er ance of this sent ence t o be under -
st ood. To be sure, (RR) does not i mpl y t hat t he i dent i fi cat i on of t he
r ef er ence is a necessar y condi t i on of referent i al i t y; but it does i mpl y
t hat t he exi st ence of t he r ef er ence, whi ch is a necessar y condi t i on f or
under st andi ng an ut t er ance with a referent i al t erm, is also a necessar y
condi t i on f or a t er m t o be referent i al . A t er m is referent i al , accor di ng
t o (RR), onl y i f there is an obj ect such t hat to under st and t he ut t er ance
involves i dent i fyi ng this obj ect . But this is wrong: a t er m can be
referent i al even t hough t her e actually is no such obj ect . The t e r m
"Ral ph Banilla" is referent i al , and under s t ood as such, even if f or some
r eason it fails t o r ef er - - even if Ral ph Banilla does not exist. The
cat egor y "referent i al t er m" is not di fferent f r om t he cat egor y " pr oper
name" in t hat respect : "Rai ph Banilla" is linguistically a pr ope r name
even if, f or some r eason, it has no bear er . ( The ver y i dea t hat no
pr oposi t i on is expr essed when t he r ef er ence of a referent i al t er m does
not exist implies t hat a t er m can be referent i al even if its r ef er ence does
not exist; ot herwi se, t he not i on of a referent i al t er m wi t hout r ef er ence
woul d be sel f-cont radi ct ory. )
Somet hi ng like (RR) was i nt ended by Loc kwood as a defi ni t i on not
of referent i al i t y f or a t er m but of referent i al i t y f or a use of a t erm. It
may i ndeed be useful t o have a not i on of referent i al use such t hat a
t er m is "referent i al l y u s e d " onl y if t her e is an obj ect it refers to. But if
what we ar e i nt er est ed in is t he semant i c di st i nct i on bet ween pr ope r
names and demons t r at i ve expr essi ons on t he one hand, and defi ni t e
RI GI DI TY AND DI RECT REFERENCE 113
descriptions on t he other, the f or mer being referent i al and the latter
non-referent i al , we need a not i on of referentiality (call it "t ype-referen-
tiality") t hat is i ndependent of extra-linguistic mat t ers such as t he
existence or non-exi st ence of the reference of t he term. We must,
t herefore, modi f y the defi ni t i on accordingly. 7
TYPE- REFERENTI ALI TY
When t he t erm t in a sent ence S ( t ) is a rigid designator, t here is an
object such t hat an ut t erance of this sent ence is t rue if and onl y if this
object satisfies the predi cat e S( ) . In such a case, I will say t hat the
t rut h-condi t i on of the ut t erance is a singular truth-condition. I will also
speak of a non-si ngul ar t rut h-condi t i on in the case of an ut t erance S ( t )
where t is non-rigid. A t rut h-condi t i on is singular in the same sense t hat
a proposi t i on is said to be singular (see Kapl an 1977), but of course
one must distinguish a singular t rut h-condi t i on f r om a singular pro-
position. This distinction is equi val ent to the distinction bet ween
rigidity and referentiality.
Al t hough this will perhaps sound paradoxical, I want to define
(type-)referentiality in terms of singular t rut h-condi t i ons. First, however,
I must say a few words about sent ence-meani ng. Type-referent i al i t y is a
feat ure of the linguistic meani ng of some expressions - - t he referential
t erms - - and since the linguistic meani ng of an expressi on is its
cont ri but i on to the linguistic meani ng of the sent ences where it occurs,
it may hel p to say a few things about sent ence-meani ng in general.
Fr om a pragmat i c poi nt of view, the meani ng of a sent ence is
essentially its "i l l ocut i onary act potential"; it consists in indications
concerni ng t he speech act t he sent ence can be used to perform. A
speech act is commonl y said to have two component s: a t ype of
satisfaction and a set of condi t i ons of satisfaction. The meani ng of a
sentence, t herefore, consists in indications concerni ng bot h the t ype and
the condi t i ons of satisfaction of the speech act. (Of course, sent ence-
meani ng is rel at ed onl y to the speech act t he speaker is supposed t o
per f or m "directly", not to t he speech acts t hat the speaker may per f or m
indirectly.) Needl ess to say, t hose sentential indications are insufficient
and t he "context" supplies furt her clues about the speech act being
114 FRAN~O IS RE CANATI
per f or med. Thi s account is, I admi t , oversi mpl i fi ed, but it will do f or
our pr esent pur poses.
Some part s of t he sent ence - - t he so-cal l ed i ndi cat ors of i l l ocut i onary
f or ce, f or exampl e t he i mper at i ve mood - - i ndi cat e t he t ype of satis-
fact i on of t he speech act: t hey i ndi cat e t hat t he ut t er ance is supposed t o
be t rue or o b e y e d or what ever. Some ot her el ement s cont r i but e t o
i ndi cat i ng t he sat i sfact i on-condi t i ons of t he ut t erance; t hey partially
descr i be a st at e of affairs such t hat t he ut t er ance is satisfied if and onl y
if this st at e of affairs obtains. Now my suggest i on is t hat some t erms - -
t hose t hat are t ype- r ef er ent i al - - specifically i ndi cat e t hat t he t rut h-
condi t i on or, mor e general l y, t he sat i sfact i on-condi t i on of t he ut t er ance
is singular, s
He r e is my defi ni t i on of t ype-referent i al i t y:
( TR) A t er m is (t ype-)referent i al if and onl y if its linguistic
meani ng i ncl udes a feat ure, call it "REF", by vi rt ue of whi ch
it i ndi cat es t hat t he sat i sfact i on-condi t i on of t he ut t er ance
wher e it occur s is singularl
The t r ut h- condi t i on of an ut t er ance S ( t ) is singular if and onl y if t her e
is an obj ect x such t hat t he ut t er ance is t r ue if and onl y if x satisfies
S( ) . If, t her ef or e, t he t er m t is referent i al , its meani ng i ncl udes a
f eat ur e by vi rt ue of whi ch it i ndi cat es t hat t her e is an obj ect x such t hat
an ut t er ance of S ( t ) is t r ue or mor e general l y satisfied if and onl y if x
satisfies S( ) .
The f eat ur e " REF" does not exhaust t he meani ng of a referent i al
t erm. As I said above, some referent i al t er ms ar e not whol l y devoi d of
descr i pt i ve cont ent ; t hey have what Evans calls a "referent i al qualifier"
and what Kapl an calls a "charact er". A referent i al expr essi on such as
"this t abl e" or t he pr onoun "you" s omehow char act er i zes t he r ef er ence
in such a way t hat it can be i dent i fi ed in cont ext (as a t abl e pr omi nent
in t he vicinity, or as t he hearer). Recal l that, when a t er m is referent i al ,
under st andi ng t he ut t er ance i nvol ves i dent i fyi ng t he r ef er ence of t he
t erm. In his i dent i fi cat i on of t he r ef er ence, t he hear er is hel ped by t he
meani ng of t he referent i al t erm. In some cases at least, a referent i al
t er m i ndi cat es not onl y (via t he f eat ur e "REF") t hat t here is an obj ect
such t hat t he ut t er ance is t r ue i f and onl y if this obj ect has a cer t ai n
pr oper t y; it also i ndi cat es h o w this obj ect can be identified. In ot her
wor ds, a referent i al t er m i ncl udes as par t of its meani ng, besi des t he
R I GI DI T Y AND DI R E C T R E F E R E NC E 115
feat ure "REF", a mo d e o f pr e s e nt at i on of the reference. Owing bot h to
the feat ure " REF" and to the mode of present at i on, a sent ence S ( t ) - -
where t is a referential t er m - - indicates that:
t here is an object x which is F ( = mode of present at i on),
such t hat the ut t erance is satisfied if and onl y if x satisfies
s ( ) .
For example, "this table is G" indicates t hat t here is a table pr omi nent
in the vicinity, such t hat the ut t erance is true if and onl y if it is G; "you
are G" indicates t hat t here is a person to whom the ut t erance is
addressed, such t hat the ut t erance is t rue if and onl y if this person is G;
and so on. In all t hose cases, the "mode of present at i on" associated with
the referential t erm makes a certain object contextually identifiable, and
t he ut t erance is present ed as satisfied if and onl y if this object has the
pr oper t y expressed by the predi cat e in the sentence. 9
Al t hough it is part of the meani ng of the t erm, and t herefore also of
the meani ng of the sent ence where it occurs, the mode of present at i on
of the reference is no part of the proposi t i on expressed by the ut t er-
ance. The proposi t i on expressed by t he ut t erance, in my framework, is
t he satisfaction condi t i on the ut t erance present s itself as having, a~ Now
consi der a sent ence "t is G", where t is a referential t erm whose
meani ng i ncl udes a certain mode of present at i on of its reference; an
ut t erance of this sent ence means t hat t here is an object x, possessing a
certain pr oper t y F (---- mode of present at i on), such t hat the ut t erance is
satisfied iff x is G. The ut t erance t herefore expresses the proposi t i on
t hat x is G, a "singular" proposi t i on with t he object x (and not t he
concept F) as a constituent. The mode df present at i on helps the hearer
to under st and which object is such t hat the ut t erance is satisfied if .and
onl y if it has a certain propert y, but this object' s satisfying the mode of
present at i on is no part of the condi t i ons of satisfaction the ut t erance
present s itself as having, no part of the proposi t i on expressed - - which
proposi t i on cannot be grasped unless x is actually identified. In this
way, we capt ure t he intuitive not i on of (pure or direct) referentiality.
Let me now summarize. Fol l owi ng Peacocke and Kripke, I have
defi ned rigidity (distinguished f r om the pseudo-ri gi di t y connect ed with
scope) in t erms of t rut h-condi t i ons: a rigid desi gnat or is such t hat t he
t rut h-condi t i on of t he ut t erance where it occurs is singular. I have tried
to go furt her and defi ne referentiality as a sort of meta-rigidity - - as
116 F RAN( ~ OI S RECANATI
rigidity ref l ect ed i n meani ng. A referenti al t erm indicates that t he
t rut h- condi t i on o f t he ut t erance i s singular; it i ndi cat es that t here is an
obj ect x such that t he ut t erance S(t) whe r e it occurs i s true i f f x
sati sfi es t he predi cat e S ( ) . A referenti al t erm, t heref ore, i s a desi gnat or
that si gni fi es its o wn rigidity.11
NOT E S
I say: "in some other possi bl e world", because I am assuming t hat ut t er ances of t he
t ype "It mi ght have been t he case t hat P" are count erfact ual and entail t hat it is not t he
case t hat P. Thi s assumpt i on is, of course, cont roversi al , but it is not at issue here, and
my argument does not rest upon it.
2 Thi s may seem remi ni scent of Lewis' Indexical Theor y of Act ual i t y and t her ef or e not
very Kri pkean. But i n fact t he claim I am maki ng amount s t o not hi ng mor e t han what
Pet er van Inwagen, i n his paper on t he Indexical Theor y of Actuality, calls t he "Weak
Theory", whi ch he says is trivially t r ue (Inwagen 1980: 410- - 412) . On t he ot her hand, I
t hi nk one cannot reject t he cl ai m accordi ng to whi ch even wide scope descri pt i ons are
non-ri gi d, wi t hout accept i ng t h e thesis t hat a worl d is a ci rcumst ance of ut t erance, and
t her ef or e wi t hout accept i ng somet hi ng like Lewis' Count er par t Theor y (see Inwagen
1980: 416- - 417) . I cannot elabOrate this poi nt here.
3 St ephen Schiffer (1977: 31) makes a similar point. He i nt roduces an oper at or "*"
t hat t ransforms a definite descri pt i on i nt o one t hat has maximal scope i n every sent ence
in whi ch it occurs, and not es t hat t he pr oposi t i on expressed by "It mi ght have been t he
case t hat the* Pr esi dent of t he US in 1976 was a l apsed Quaker " is t rue i n a possi bl e
worl d if and onl y if whoever in that world is President of the US in 1976 is such t hat he
or she mi ght have been a l apsed Quaker.
4 Belief-contexts const i t ut e an obvi ous obj ect i on t o cri t eri a such as (R) or (RR) below.
Si nce I cannot discuss t he special pr obl ems rai sed by belief-contexts i n this paper, I
shall set this obj ect i on aside and consi der onl y non- i nt ensi onal contexts.
s The di st i nct i on bet ween t he two sorts - - or t he two sources - - of rigidity can be
found i n vari ous places i n t he literature, t he locus classicus bei ng Kapl an 1977; t he
t ermi nol ogy "de facto vs de lure" is Kripke' s: see Kri pke 1980, foot not e 21.
6 On Lockwood' s cri t eri on, see Lockwood 1975: 485. A similar view is put forward i n
Recanat i 1981: 627- - 628.
7 The definition, of course, must also be modi fi ed so as t o t ake indexicality i nt o
account. (TR) below, cont r ar y t o (R) and (RR), works for indexical as well as for
non-i ndexi cal expressions.
s Whe n a non-referent i al express!on (e.g. a defi ni t e descri pt i on) is used referentially,
t he context, not t he sent ence, i ndi cht es t hat t he (i nt ended) sat i sfact i on-condi t i on of t he
ut t er ance is singular. We may speak, i n this case, of "token-referentiality".
9 The quest i on arises whet her all referent i al t erms have an associ at ed mode of pr esen-
tation, or whet her some of t hem, namel y pr oper names, don' t . I t hi nk t hat pr oper
names, like or di nar y indexicals, have an associ at ed mode of present at i on, by vi rt ue of
whi ch a sent ence S(NN), where "NN" is a pr oper name, i ndi cat es t hat
t her e is an obj ect x, called "NN", such t hat t he ut t er ance is t r ue iff x
satisfies S( ) .
Thi s t heory of t he meani ng of pr oper names has been at t acked by Saul Kri pke, whose
argument s I don' t find convincing; but I cannot devel op my views here.
Not i ce t hat t he not i on of "mode of pr esent at i on" t hat is used her e is linguistic and
not epistemic. The linguistic meani ng of a referent i al t er m conveys a cert ai n mode of
R I GI DI T Y AND DI R E C T R E F E R E NC E 117
presentation of the reference, but this mode of presentation is not necessarily identical
with the mode of presentation of the object referred to in the thought expressed by the
utterance. (By "thought", I do not mean the "proposition" expressed - - soon to be
defined - - but the object of the so-called "propositional attitudes". In any theory of
Direct Reference, the proposition expressed must be carefully distinguished from the
object of the attitudes - - here called the thought.) There are, for example, two modes of
presentation associated with the pronoun "I' : from a linguistic point of view, the
reference is presented as "the speaker" (or something like that), but the concept that is
relevant to the thought being expressed is the concept of "self" (or something like that).
Kaplan and Perry are both guilty of confusing the two sorts of mode of presentation.
~0 In this v~ay, we can distinguish between the propositions expressed by "The cube
root of 27 is F" and by "3 is F' : both sentences have the same truth-condition - - both
are true iff 3 is F - - but only the second presents itself as true iff 3 is F. Only the
second sentence conveys the indication that there is an x such that the sentence is true
iff x is F. This is the basis for the distinction between "the cube root of 27", which is
rigid, and "3", which is referential.
~ An ancestor of this paper was read at the first meeting of the Paris Friday Group
(fall 1982), the conference ' Recent trends in semantics' (Urbino, July 1983), and
elsewhere. I would like to thank Benoit de Cornulier, Pierre Jacob, Dan Sperber,
Charles Travis, and especially Mike Harnish, Paul Horwich and Paul Kay, for their
comments on the penultimate version of the paper.
R E F E R E NC E S
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69.
Evans, G.: 1982, The Varieties of Reference (J. McDowell ed.), Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
van Inwagen, P.: 1980, ' Indexicality and actuality', The Philosophical Review 89: 403- -
426.
Kaplan, D.: 1977, Demonstratives, draft 2, Mimeo, UCLA.
Kripke, S. A.: 1971, ' Identity and necessity', in M. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individua-
tion, New York: NYUP, 135 - - 164.
Kripke, S. A.: 1972, ' Naming and necessity', in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.),
Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 253--355.
Kripke, S. A.: 1980, Preface to Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1--21.
Lockwood, M.: 1975, ' On predicating proper names' , The Philosophical Review 84:
471-498.
Mill, J. S.: 1947, A System of Logic, London: Longmans.
Peacocke, C. A. B.: 1975, ' Proper names, reference, and rigid designation' , in S.
Blackburn (ed.), Meaning, Reference and Necessity, Cambridge: CUP, 109--132.
Recanati, F.: 1981, ' On Kripke on Donnellan' , in H. Parret, M. Sbisa and J. Verschueren
(eds.), Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics, Amsterdam: John Benjamins,
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