Republic of the Philippines vs Felliciano

GR NO 70853 148 SCRA 424

FACTS:

Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then CFI of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land constituting 4 lots situated in the barrio of salvacion, Tinamban Camsur.
Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from victor Gandiola by virtue of a deed of
sale.
By virtue of proclamation no 90 of the then Pres. Magsaysay reserving avast tract of land situated in
Tumbac and saruma, Camsur of settlement purposes in which the property in question was situated.

After several moths, the OSG, on behalf of the govt filed its opposition assailing the non suability of the
state and also on the ground that the existence and authenticity of the purpoted possessory info title of the
respondents predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate the same is not
evidence of of title or if it is, its efficacy has been lost not by prescription and laches.

ISSUE:

WON the state is immune from suit?

RUL INGS:

The court find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non suability of the state has proper
application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the RP as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the state to court just like any private person who is claimed to be
usurping a piece of property is not an action in rem but an action in personam it is an action directed against a
specific party. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein is directed against the republic
represented b y the LRA, a govtal agency created by RA 3844.
By its caption and allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the state which under
settled jurisdiction is not permitted except upon showing that the state has consented to be sued ether
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language, too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no
such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of consent. This is
fatal defect and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed. The failure of the petitioner to
assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a quo, as alleges by private
respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense may be invoked by the court sua sponte at any
stage of the proceedings.



MERITT VS GOVT OF THE PHIL ISLANDS
34 PHILS 311


FACTS:
The case took place in 1910. Merit was a constructor who was excellent in his work. One day while he
was riding his motorcycle along P. Faura he was bumped by a govtal ambulance. The driver of the ambulance
was proven to be negligent. Because of the incident merit was hospitalized and severely injured beyond
rehabilitation that he could not perform his job. In order for merit to recover damages he sought to sue the
govt which latter authorize by the legislative by virtue of ACT 2457 An act authorizing merit to bring to suit
against the govt and authorizing the Atty Gen to appearing said suit-. The lower court then determines the
amt of damages and ordered the govt to pay the same.

ISSUE:

WON the govt is liable for the negligent act of the ambulance driver?
Ruling:
No, by consenting to be sued a state only waives its immunity from suit. It thus not thereby concedes
its liability to plaintiff or creates any cause of action in his favor or extends its liability to the plaintiff or creates
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre existing liability and submit
itself to the jurisdiction of the court subject to its rights to interpose any lawful defense. It follows there from,
that the state by virtue of such provision of the law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private
individual in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the function pertaining to
their offices. Because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the apptments of its agents. The state can only be liable if it
acts through a special agent so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as agent thereof, he
executes the trust confided to him.

The ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a govt o hence, there can be no liability on the
part of the govt. the govt does not take the guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agent whom
it employs, since that would involved it in all its operations in endless embarrassment, difficulties and losses
which would be subversive of the public interest.


FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING
SEPT 30 1954


FACTS:

Defendant , Pan oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the
shipping ad and title, there to, re acquired by the govt following the original purchaser. Fernando froilans
default in payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premium for the said vessel. Pan O chartered said
vessel and operated the same after it had expired and paid the stipulated initial payment thereby exercising its
option to purchase. Pursuant to a bareboat charter contract entered bet. said company and the shipping corp.
The cabinet resolve to restore froilan to his rights under the original contract of sale condition that he shall
repay a sum of money upon delivery 0f the vessel to him that he shall continue paying the remaining
installments due and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and docking the vessel. Pan O
protracted to this restoration of Froilans right under the contract of sale, for the reason that when the vessel
was delivered to it, the shipping admin had authorities do dispose of said authority to the property. Froilan
having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Froilan prepared the required cash of 10,00
and as Pan O refused to surrender possession of the vessel. He filed an action of recovery and have him
declared as the owner of the said property. The RP was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the
possession of in order that the chattel mortagaged constituted thereon maybe foreclosed.

ISSUE

WON the govts motion to dismiss Pan O counter claim may prosper?

RULING

Under the circumstances already had voted to Pan O cannot be considered a possessor in good faith
until after the institution of the instant case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant is entitled to
the refund of its expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimbursed thereof, as it by the
corrected acts of defendant and intervenor RP that the appellant has a lien for his expenses, appellees Froilan,
et al. are declared liable for their imbursement to appelant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed by law with
legal interest from the time of disbursement.







USA VS RUIZ
136 SCRA 487

FACTS


The USA had a naval base in Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases
agreement between Phil and the US. Respondents alleges that whether or not in the bidding conducted by the
US for the construction of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another grp. For this reason a suit
for specific performance was filed against the US.


ISSUE

WON or not the US Naval base in bidding said contracts exercise govtal functions to be able to invoke
the doctrine of state immunity?


RULINGS

The traditional role of state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another
without its consent. The rule is necessary consequence the principle of independence and equality of states.
However, the rule of international law are not petrified, they are continually and evolving. And because the
activity of states have multiplied it has been necessary to distinguished them bet sovereign and govt act sand
private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that, the state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and govtal acts.
THE restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings out of commercial
transaction of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities and economic affairs, a state maybe descended
to a level of an individual and can this been to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters
into business contracts.
In this case the project is integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US
AND PHIL, indisputably, the function of govt of highest order. They are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purpose.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS
VILLASOR


FACTS

On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in a special proceedings in favor of pj Klenner Co. Ltd. Gavino uncharan
and then ICCagainst the petitioner confirming the arbitration award in the amt of P1,712,396.40. the award is for the
satisfactional judgement against the Phil govt on june 24, 1969. Respondent Villasor issued an order declaring the
decision final and executor. Villasor directed the sheriff of Rizal province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute said
decision. The provincial sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially Phil Veteran and PNB.
The funds of the AFP are deposited with PVB and PNB are public funds appropriated and allocated for the payment of
pensions of retirees, allowances of military and civilian personnel and for the maintenance and operation of the AFP.
Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Villasor in granting the issuance of writ of
execution against the property of the AFP hence the garnishment and notices are null and void.

ISSUES

IS the writ of execution by respondent Villasor valid?


RULINGS

What was done by the respondent is not inconformity with the dictates of the consti that is a fundamental
postulate flowing from the justice concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its govt is immune from suit without
its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The state may not be sued without its consent to be sued. The state liability adjudged. A corollary, both dictated by
logic and good sense from basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if
the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule is that whether
the state gives it consent to be sued by private parties either general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and the power of the courts ends when the
judgement is rendered. Since the govt funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
to satisfy such judgement is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursement of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriationas required by law. The function and public services renderd by the state
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law.

MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, Petitioner
Vs
CA
GR NO 89898 OCT 1, 1990


FACTS

In lieu of an expropriation proceedings filed in court by petitioner, municipality of Makati opened a bank
account with the PNB Buendia under petitioners name containing the sum of P417,510.00. pursuant to the provisions of
PD no 42. After due hearing, the court fixed the amt of the property and orderd petitioner to pay such amt minus the
advance payment it has made. After this decision became final and executor, a writ of execution was issued anda notice
of garnishment was served by respondent sheriff was informed that ahold code was place on the account of
petitioner. Private respondent then filed a motion praying for the court order the bank to deliver the sheriff unpaid
balanced while petitioner also filed a motion to lift the garnishment.
While these motions are pendings, a manifestation was filed informing the court that the private respondent
was no longer the owner of the subject property and that ownership to this has been transferred to PSB inc. A
compromise agreement was made between private respondent and PSB w/c was then approved by the court. The court
further ordered PNB Buendia to immediately release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 w/c corresponds to the balance of
the appraised value of the subject property from garnished account of petitioner, but the bank failed to comply as it was
still waiting for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling it to make a disbursement form the amt so
ordered.


ISSUE
WON the balanced of the appraised value of the subject property may be levied upon the second account of the
petitioner?

RULING

In this jurisdiction, well settled rule is that public funds are not subject to levy unless otherwise provided for by
statute. More particularly, the properties of municipalities whether real or personal which are necessary for public use
cannot be attached and sold at execution sale to satisfy money judgement against the municipality. Municipal revenues
derived from taxes, licsense and market fees and which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the govt activities and functiond of the municipality are exempt from execution. The foregoing rule finds its
application in the case at bar, absent a showing that the municipalcouncil of Makati passed an ordinance appropriating
from its public funds an amt corresponding to the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987. No levy
maybe validly affected on the public funds.
Wherefore the court resolve to oder petitioner, mun of Makati to immediately pay BSBI and private respondent
the amt of P4,953,506.45. petitionerishereby required to submit to this court a report of its compliance with the
forgoing order within a non extendible period of 60days from the date of receipt of this resolution.








SPOUSES FONTANILLA
VS
HON MALIAMAN

FACTS
National irrigation admin, agovt agency was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of
petitioner caused by negligence of the driver of the said agency. NIA maintains that he is not liable because the driver
does not perform primarily proprietorship functions not goVernmental.

ISSUE
WON NIA may be held liable for damages caused by the driver?

RULINGS

YES, NIA is a govt agency with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the govt, because its
community services are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands, thus, making it an
agency with proprietorship functions governed by corpo law and is liable for actions of their employees.



VILLAVICENCIO
VS
LUKBAN
L-14639, 39PHILS778


FACTS

Justo lukban, in his capacity as mayor together with the police officer took custody of 170 women at the night 0f
oct 25 beyond the latters consent and acknowledge thereafter were sipped to Davao City here they were signed as
laborers.
A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the writ but
the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.

ISSUE

WON the act of the mayor has a legal basis?


RULING

The SC said that the mayors act was not legal. His intent of exterminating was commendable but there was no
law saying that he could force Filipino women to change their domicile. The women, said the court, although in a sense
lepers of society were still Filipino citizens and they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by others citizen the
right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could consider tantamount to slavery.



SENATE VS ERMITA, GR NO 169777

FACTS

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition profer that the president has abused power by issuing EO 464
ensuing observance of the separation of powers, the rule on executive privilege and respect for the right appearing in
a legislative inquiry in aid of legislation under the consti and for other purposes. Petitioner pray for its declaration as
null and void for being unconsti.
The committee issued invitation to various officials of the executive department them to appear as resource
speaker in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issue of massive election fraud, wire tapping and the
role of military in the so called gloriagate scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from
the president as provided by EO 464 which requires public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of
the president prior to appearing before either house.

ISSUE
Is section 3 of EO 464 which requires all public officials enumerated in section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
president prior to appearing before either house of congress valid and constitutional?


RULING

NO. the enumeration in sec 2(b) of EO 464 is broad and covered by the executive privileged. The doctrine of
executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain info as a matter of necessity be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being by definition, an exemption from the obligation to develop info, in this case to
congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has the right to info from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.
If the executive branch withhold such info on the ground that is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefore and why it must be respected.
The infirm provision of EO 464, however, allow the executive to evade the congressional request for info
without clearly asserting a right to do so and or proffering its reason therefore. By the mere expedient of invoking such
provisions, the power of congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.


MINISTERIO VS CFI OF CEBU
GR NO 31635, AUG 31 1971
40 SCRA 464

Facts

Petitioners, as plaintiff in a complaint filed in the court of first instance of cebu dated april 13, 1966 sought the
payment of just compensation for a registered lot containing an area of 1045m2, alleging that in 1927 the natl govt
through its authorized representative took physical and material possession of it and use it for the widening of the
Gorordo avenue, as national road in cebu city, praying just compensation and without any agreement either written or
verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of its price or return of its possession. It was
further alleged that on aug 25 1965, the appraisal committee of cebu city approved a resolution no 90 appraising a
reasonable and just price of the said lot. Thereafter, the complaint was amended on june 30, 1966, in the sense that
remedy prayed for was in the alternative either the restoration of possession or the payments of just compensation.
IN THE answer filed by defendant, now respondent, through the OSG, defense relied upon was that the suit in
reality was one against the govt and therefore shld be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on july 1 1969,
the parties submitted stipulation of fats to this effect. That the plaintiff was the registered owner of the said lot
described on the survey plan and used the same for the widening of Gorordo avenue. That the appraisal committee of
cebu city approved a reso #90 series of 1965 fixing the lots price and that lot is in possession of the nat govt the same
being utilized has not yet been paid the value of the land.
The lower court dismissed the complaint stating that the case is undoubtedly against the nat govt and that there
is no showing that the govt has consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed for certiorari to review the
decision under Art III sec 1(2) of the consti.

Issue

WON the decision of the CFI,CEBU to dismissed the complaint by reason govt immunity of suit is correct?

Ruling

NO, the doctrine of govt immunity cannot be invoked for perpetration of injustice. If there were observance of
regularity, petitioners would not be in said complaint they are now. It is thinkable then, that precisely there was a failure
on what the law requires and the petitionershas the right to demand from the govt what is due to them. The SC decided
that the lower court decision of dismissing the cse is reversed and the case is remanded to the lower court for
proceedings in accordance with the law.


MINERS VS FACTORAN
GR NO 98332 JAN 16 1995


FACTS
Former pres Corazon Aquino issued EO 211 and 279, in the exercise for her legislative power. Eo 211 prescribes
the interim procedure in the processing and approval of application for the exploration, devt and utilization of minerals
pursuant to Art XII sec 2 of the consti. EO 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude njoint venture
and co production or sharing agreements for the xploration and utilization of vast ,mineral resources.
The issuance and the impending implementation by the DENR administrative order 57 w/c declares that all
existing mining leases or agreement/c were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 consti shall be convertedinto
production, sharing agreements within one year from the effectivity of these guidelines and admin order #82 w/c
provides that a failure to submit letter of intent and mineral production-sharing agreement w/in 2 yrs from the
effectivity of the dept AO#57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining quarries and sand and gravel claims after their
respective effectivity date compelled the miners asso, an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim
owners, claim holders to file the petition assailing the validity and constitutionality before the court.

ISSUE

WON the two admin orders are valid and constitutional

RULINGS

YES, petitioners insistence on the application of PD 463 as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance
and approval of declaration of location and all other kinds of application for the exploration, utilization of mineral
resources pursuant to EO 211iserroneous. PD 463 as amended pertains to the old system of exploration devt and
utilization of natural resources through license concession and leasewhich however has been dis allowed by art 12 sec
2 of the 1987 consti. By virtue of the said provision, mandate and its implementing law EO 279 which superseded EO 211
the provisions dealing with license, concession and lease of mineral resources under PD 463 as amended, and other
existing laws are repealed and therefore cease to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands the provisions of PD 463 as amended, and other existing mining lands
still govern. Sec 7 of EO 279 thus provides:
Sec 7: all provisions of PD 463 as amended by other existing mining laws and their implementing rules and
regulation, a parts thereof which are not inconsistent with the provision of their EO, shall continue in force and effect

Well settled is the rule, however that regardless of the reservation clause. Mining lease or agreements granted
by the state, such as those granted pursuant EO 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through
reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.
Accordingly, the state in the exercise of its police powers in this regard way not be produced by the
constitutional restriction of non-inpairment of contract from altering modifying and amending the mining lease or
agreements granted under PD 463 as amended pursuant o EO 211. Police power being co extensive with the necessities
of the case and the demands of the public interest, extends to all public needs. The passage of EO 211 provided legal
basis for DENR secretary to carry into effect the mandate of art XII, sec 2 of the 1987 consti:
Wherefore the petition in DISMISSED for lack of merit.



Ynot V IAC
148 SCRA 294

FACTS
The petitioner challenges the constitutionality of EO 626-A w/c provides that no carabao regardless of sex, or
physical condition and purpose and no carabeef shall be transported one province to another. The carabao or carabeef
transported in violation of this EO as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the govt to be
distributed to charitable institution and other similar insti as the chairman of the NMIC may see fit in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the director of animal industry may see first, as the case of
carabaos.
The petitioner had transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated
the police station commander of barotac nuevo, Iloilo for violation of the above mention EO. The petitioner sued for
recovery and the RIC Iloilo a writ of replacement upon his filing of a supersede as bond of php 12,000. After considering
the merit of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and since they could be longer be produced,
ordered the confiscation of the bond. The rule also declined on the constitutionality of the EO, as raised by the
petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The petitioner appeared to the IAC w/c upheld the trial court decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the EO is unconstitutional as its penalty impasses w/out the according of the owner the right to
be heared before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process.




RULINGS

The minimum requirements of due process is notice and hearing w/c may not be dispense with because they
are intended as safeguard against official arbitrariness. This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every
case for there are number of admitted exceptions.
The protection of the general welfare is the function of the police power w/c both restrained by due process.
The individual as member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him from thw womb and beyond
the tomb in particularly he does or owns.
It is this power that is now being invoked by the govt to justify EO amending the basic rule EO 626, prohibiting
the slaughter of carabao except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as it is
expressed in one of his whereases that present condition demands that carabao and bufaloes be conserved for the
benefit of small farmers who rely on them for energy needs.
The court affirm the need of such measure. But the court cannot say w/ certainty that it complies with the 2
nd

requirement, that there be lawful method to strengthen the original measure. EO 626-A imposes an absolute bannot
only on the slaughter but likewise on their movement. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achievedby the questioned measure is missing.
Even if reasonable, measure, between the means and the end were to be assumed the court will still have to
reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabao and carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually by the police only.
Under the challenged measure, significantly no such trial is prescribed and the property being transported is
automatically impounded by the police and declared by the measure itself as forfeited to the got.
The carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander were returned only petitioner after
he had filed a complaint for reconsideration..


VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES INC
VS
CA
GR NO 91359, SEPT 25, 1992
214 SCRA 286


FACTS

This is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision rendered on aug 11 1989. On may 12, 1986a MOA was
executed by PADPAO and the PC chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract per guard for eight hours of service
per day. On june 29 1987 Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cutthroat
competition. PADPAO and PC SUSIA found VMPSI guilty and recommend edits expulsion from PADPAO. The cancellation
for its license to operate as a security agency, as a result , PADPAO refuse to issue clearance/cerficate o f membership to
VPMSI when it requested one. VMPSI filed a civil case no. 88-471 against the PC-chief and PC-SUSTA in the RTC-Makati
branch 135 on march 28, 1988. On the same date, the court insured a restraining order enjoining the PC chief and PC
SUSTA commiting acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI license PC chief and PC SUSTA field
a motion to dismiss, opposing injunction and motion to quash and TRO.
The state had not given any a consent thereto and VMPSI license already expired. The TRO and injunction would
not any purpose because there was no more license to be cancelled. Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion on april 18,
1988 the lower court denied VMPSI application on write of VMPSI restracted its application for the issuance of section
injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment by the penalty for its farline to submits application for renewal of its
application for its license. On june 19, 1988, issued a writ of muslim-injunction upon a bond of 100,000, restraining the
defendant from cancelling.
PC chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion for a recon of the above sought relief by petition for certiorari in the court
of appeals. On august 11, 1989, the CA granted the petition.

ISSUE



RULINGS
Wherefore the petition for review is denied and the judgement appleaded is affirmed.
The state may not be sued without its consent. Invoking this rule, the PC chief and PC-SUSIA, being
instrumentalities of the govt exercising a primarily govtal function of regulating the orglal and operation of private
detective agency watchman or security guard agencies said official and agency may not be sued w/out because
VMPSI did not only to compell the public responded certain way, but coorse, because VMPSI seeks actual and for
compensatory damage in the amount P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in the same case. Oven if the action propers,
the payment of its monetary claim may not be enforced because the state did not consent appreciate the necessary
funds for that purpose.



Dela Llana
V
Alfa
112 SCRA 294
March 12, 1982

FACTS
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of batas pambansa blg. 129 entitled an act heorganizing the judiciary,
justices and judges of interior courts from the court of appeals to municipal circuit courts except the occupants in the
sandiganbayan court of TAX APPEALS, unless appted to the interior courts established by such act. They likewise impute
lack of good faith in its enactment and characterized as undue delegation of legislative power to the president his
authority to fix the compensation and allowance of the justices and judges thereafter appointed and determination of
the date when the reorganizativon when shall be deemed completed. The solicitor general maintains that there is no
valid justification for the attack of the constitutionality of the statule, it being legitimate exercise of the power vested in
the batasang pambansa to recognize the judiciary. The allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the
independence of the judiciary being unvarranted and devoid of any support in law.

ISSUE
WON batas pambansa blg. 129 should be declared unconsti fir colliding w/ the security of tenure enjoyed by
justices and judges.

RULING
The SC dismissed the petition, the unconsti of batas pambansa 129 having been shown. It held that the
enactment thereof was an answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary.
It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create courts ordinarily includes the power to
organize and reorganize them, and that are the power to abolish courts is generally co-extensive w/ the power to create
them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualified by the permanence of tenure. The ought of judges to hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 yrs., or become incapatuated to discharge the duties of their
office, does not deprive congress of its power to abolish, reorganize interior courts.


CHIONGBIAN
VS
ORBOS
245 SCRA 25
June 22, 1995

FACTS
The congress passed the organic act for the autonomous region in muslim Mindanao (RA 6743) rusuant to
art 10518,1987 consti. A plebessible was called in some provinces w/ resulted to 4 provinces (lanao del sur,
maguindanao, sulu and tawi tawi) in favor of creating an autonomous and region and therefore became the
ARMM. The RA states that those province and cities who did not vote in favor of it shall remain in their
existing admin regions provided however, that the president may merge the existing regions through
administrative determination. Pres Aquino then issued EO containing the provinces/cities that will be
merged transferring (representing legislative districts protested the EO, saying that there is no law w/c)
provinces from their existing regions to another. The petitions who are members of the congress,,
representing legislative districts protected the EO, saying that there is no law w/c authorizes the president
and pick certain provinces/cities w/in existing region and restructure than to a new admin regions. The
transfer of 1 province where is current region to another is a form of reorg. An alternation of existing
structure of the govt. the RA 6743 only hold authority of the pres to merge existing reg. and cant be
construed as reorganizing them.

ISSUE
WON the power to merge admin regions is legislative in character or executive as the respondents contend
Petitioners contention is that such is unlikely delegate of power to the president to merge region
through admin determination or act any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power
delegated.
Respondents- no undue delegation but only as grant of power to filled up or provide the details of
legislation bec. The congress did not have the faculty to provide them/


RULING
Petition is dismissed
The petition and subsequent reorg of admin region have been by the president pursuant to authority granted to
him by law. On conferring the president the power to merge the existing regions ff. the estab of autonomous region of
muslim Mindanao congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislative dating back to the initial org of
administrative region in 1972 (RA 5453) this was also the basic for the sufficient standard by w/c the president is to be
sueded in the exercise of power. Standard can be gathered or impled. Standard can be found in the policy underlying
grant of power to the president in RA 5435 of the power to reorganize the exec. Dept to promote simplicity economy,
efficiency in the govt to enable it to pursue its program consistent with the national goals for accelerated social and
economic development.


ICHONG
V
HERNANDEZ
GR NO L-7995
101 PHIL 115

FACTS

Republic Act 1180 entitled An act to regulated the retail business. In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the RA, contending that it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the lawsand deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.

ISSUE

WON RA 1180 deprives equal protection of law and due process?

Rulings

We hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy, a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business, free citizens and country from dominance and control and
that the enactment falls within the scope of the police power of the state thru which and by which it protects its own
personality and ensures its security and future.



CALALANG
V
WILLIAMS
70PHIL726

FACTS

To alleviate traffic congestion during rush hour in certain roads of manila, the national traffic commission, upon
approval of the director of public works and communication and pursuant to commonwealth ACT 548, resolved that all
animal drawn vehicles be not allowed to pass and pickup passenger in those certain places at rush hour. Thinking that
this is undue delegation of police power of the state, that is dtriment not only to animal drawn owners but of the riding
public and thus such actionshould be lect at the hand of legislature and not mere administrative agencies. Maximo
calalang filed a petition for prohibition before the SC to forbid the aforementioned agencies from enforcing of the
reroutingof animal drawn animal drawn vehicles during rush hour.

ISSUE

WON the rules and regulation promulgated by the Director of public works with the approval of the Public works
and communication secretary is unconstitutional because it is an undue delegation of power?

RULINGS

NO,COMMONWEALTH ACT 548 do not confer legislative power upon the director of PW and the sec of the
PWC. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulation now complained
of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out legislative policy laid down by the national
assembly. To promulgate rules and regulation on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long
national road should be closed to traffic. In view of the condition of the road on the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest is an admin function which cannot be directlydischarge by the national
assembly.
CA 548, by virtue by which the rules and reg complained of were promulgated aims to promote safe transit upon
and avoid obstruction on national roads In the interest and convenience of the public. It was inspired by a desire to
relieve of traffic congestion, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then lies at the bottom of the enactment of said
law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, property and with
business occupation. Persons and property mabe subjected toall kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health and propriety of the state. To thi, is the fundamental aim of our govt, the rights of individual is
subordinated.

ASSO OF SMALL LAND OWNERS
VS
SEC OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175SCRA343

FACTS

A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are 9 and
5 hectare of rice landworked by four tenants. Tenants declared full ownership by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD
27. The petitioners now contend that pres Aquino usurped the legislative power.
The petitioners are landowners and sugar planters in Victoria mills in negross occ against proclamation 131 and
EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of agrarian reform law with initial fund of P50B,
The petitioners invoked their rightof retention under PD27, that owners of rice andcorn lands not exceeding 7
hectares.

ISSUE

WON the aforementioned EO PD and RA were constitutional

RULINGS

The promulgation of PD 27 by marcos was valid in excersise of police power and eminent domain of the state.
Likewise, the power of Aquino to promulgate proclamation 131 and EO 228 and 229 are authorized police power
and eminent domain of the state.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. Thecarrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just compensation. The taking contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of
land. What is required is the surrender of the title and the physical possesionof excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to the owner in favor of the farmer.
A state maybe sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and method.
Subject and purpose of the agrarian reform lawis valid. However, what is to be determined ids the method
employed to it.


CA 327; PD 1445; ART 2180; ACT 3038

STATE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

General rule:
The state and its political subdivision cannot be sued without its consent. Neither can a department,
bureau, agency or office or instrumentality of the govt where the suit may result adverse consequences to public
treasury whether in the dirbusement of funds or loss of property. This is also called the royal prerogative of
dishonestybecause it grants the stte the prerogative to defeat any legislative claims against it by simply invoking its non
suability.
How to apply the said doctrine to specific case involving the Philippine state

1. Determine if the suit qualifies as a suit against the state
- When the republic is sued by name
- When the suit is against an incorporated govt agency
- When the suit is on its face against a govt officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will belong not to
the officer but to the govt
- When the suit is filed against officials act allegedly performed by them in the discharged of their duties, the
suit is regarded as one against the state and it will require the state to perform a positive act.

Cases when the state immunity does not apply

a. Relief does not require the state to act upon it.
b. When the act of the public officer is ultra vires or in bad faith or with malice or gross negligence.


2. Determine if there is express consent to be sued.
2.a. Unincorporated agency

FIRST VIEW

The state consent to be sued on money claims involving liability arising from contract under act 3083.
But the claim must be file with the commission on audit under CA 327 and PD1445. Express consent made
through a general law or special law waiving. In this jurisdiction the general law waiving the immunity of the
state from suit is found in Act 3083, when the Phil Goct consent and Submits to be sued upon money claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied which could srve as a basis of civil action as basis
between private parties.


SECOND VIEW

The SC did not cite any express consent to be sued on money claims arising from conyracts. Instead, the
SC used as a basis in dismissing the case for lack of implied consent consent. When unincorporated agency
entered into contract in the exercise of their sovereign functions. Howver the SC ruled that the money claims
should be first filed with the CoA, pursuant to act 327

2.b. incorporated govt agency

Express consent base on their charter. An unincorporated agency may be use it s charter expressly
provides that it can be sued and sue. If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter
for the simple rule is that it is suableif its charter says so, in this is true regardless of the functions it is
performing. A GOCC with original charter may be even sued for torts.

2.c. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Express consent under the local gov code and or charter.
Section 22 of the local govt code states that one of the corporate power of local govt units is to sue
and be sued. They are subject of suits even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides
that they can sue and be sued.

3. DETERMINE IF THERE IS IMPLIED CONSENT
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the state himself
Commences litigatioin, thus opening itself to a counterclaim
When it enters into a contract, but not all contracts entered to by the LGU operates as a waiver
of its non suability. Distinguished
a) Sovereign and govt acts- jure imperii
b) Private, commercial andpropietary acts juregestionis- the state immunity rhus extends only
to acts jure imperii
4. DETERMINE IF THE CASE FALLS UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE OF STATE IMMUNITY

EXCEPTIONS

A public officer may besued to compel him to do an act required by law
To restrain him frm enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional
To compel an officer to pay for damages from an already appropriate fund or a revenue officer to refund tax
overpayments from a fuund already available for such purpose
To secure a judgement the the officer impleaded maybe satisfied himdelf without the govt itself having to do an
act to assist him
Where the govt. itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party impleaded the govt. even without first filing
with the COA as the doctrine of immunity cannot be used for perfectrating injustice

5. DETERMINE IFTHE STATE IS LIABLE
When the state waives its immunity, all it does, in effect is to sue the other party an opportunity to prove if it
can, that the state has liability.

6. Determine If the STATE FUNDS OR PROPERTY CAN BE SUBJECT TO EXECUTION

RULES ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE STATE

Execution against unincorporated govt agencies
Rule:
Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment, they are exempt from execution
Against incorporated agencies
Funds and properties of incorporated govt agencies maybe subject to execution.
EXCEPTION
Local govt funds are not subject to execution
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION
PUBLIC funds of local govt untis maybe subject to execution if there is already
corresponding appropriation as required by law.

7. IF EXECUTION IS NOT ALLOWED, DETERMINE HOW RECOVERY CAN BEMADE AGAINST THE STATE
MONEY CLAims against unincorporated govt agencies must be filed with the CoA.


THE DOCTRINE OF GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY FROM SUIT CANNOT CERSVE
AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PERPETRATING AN INJUSTICE TO CITIZENS

PIERCE VS SOCIETY OF SISTERS

FACTS:

Appellee , the Society of Sisters a corpo with the power to established and maintain schools and Hill Military
academy, a private org conducting an elem., college, prep, and military training school, filed actions against appellant
public officials including the Sev. of Oregon Pierce, challenging the constitutionality of the Oregon Compulsory Education
Act of 1992 under the 14
th
Amendment of the US Consti and obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting
appellants from enforcing such act. The Act required that all parents and guardians to send children ages bet 8-16 yrs
old to a public school.
Appellee asserted that their enrollment were declining as a result of the Act. The district court entered an order
enjoining appellants from enforcing the acts and appellants sought review in consolidated appeals.


ISSUE:

Does the Act unreasonably interfere of the liberty of Parents and Guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of their children.

RULLINGS:
The Act violates the 14
th
amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interest and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose with in the competency of the state.
The court also ruled that the inevitable practical results of enforcing the act was the destruction of appellees
primary school and perhaps all other private primary schools for normal children with in the state. The Act unreasonably
interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of their children. Although
appellees were corpo, they could claim constitutional protection for their business and property . They sought
protection from a real threat of injury from the arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful with their patrons and enjunctive
relief was proper.
The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to choose the
appropriate preparation for their children.



CABANAS vs. PILAPIL 58SCRA94


FACTS:

Florentin Pilapil, deceased, left an insurance having his child, Milian Pilapil as the beneficiary and authorized his
brother Francisco Pilapil, to act his trustee during his daughters minority. The lower court decided to save the mother of
the child Melchora Cabanas the right to act his trustee acting the appropriate aprovision in the Civil Code and the
consideration of the children welfare. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the refention of the amount in
question by involving the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the insurance policy.

ISSUE:

Won the mother shed be entitled to act as trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an insurance policy
from the deceased.

RULLINGS:

With the condition that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal
case. The decision arrived at stand the test of the strictest examination. The appealed decision in supported by another
rational consideration. It is reinforced by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary , as an agency of the state,
acting as parents partial, is called upon whenever pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord priority
to his best interest. This prerogative of parents partial is inherent in the supreme power of the state. Whether the
power is lodged in a royal person or in legislative and has no affinity ti those arbitrary powers which are sometimes
expected by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.
There is a constitutional provision vitalizing this concept. The state shall strengthen the family as a basic social
institution. If the constitution wisely dictates it is the family as the unit that has to be strengthen. It does not admit of
doubt that even if a stinger case were presented for the uncle, still deference to a court mandate would have led the
lower court to decided as it did.
The administration should be given to the mother in pursuant to the afore stated constitution provision and in
consonance with doctrine of parents partial.


TANADA vs. ARGARA GATT CASE ER no.118295, 5-2-1997

FACTS:

Petitioners, questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Phil. Senate of the Presidents ratification
of the International Agreement establishing the WTO. They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of
the 1987 Constitution to to develop a self reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos..
to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote preferential use of Filipino Labor, domestic materials and locally
produce goods. Further they contended that the rational treatment and party provision of the WTOA place rational and
products of member countries on the same footing as Filipino and Local products in contravention of the Filipino first
policy of our constitution and render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by Filipinos.

ISSUE:

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in World trade liberalization and economic
globalization into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

RULLING:

No, the 1987 Constitution does not prohibit our country from participating in world trade liberalization and
economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized and deregulated and privatized.





LIMBONA vs. MANGELIN 170 SCRA 786


FACTS:

Sultar Alimbusar limbona was appointed as member of the sanguniang pampook Reg .Autonomous government
Reg. XII representing Lanao del Sur, He was elected speaker of the regional legislative assembly of central Mindanao,
Chairman Commission on Muslim affairs invited limbona together with Razul Reg. XI Pampook speaker in a conference.
Petitioner, ordered Acting Sec. Alimbiyao to inform the Assemblyman that there will be no session on said date as
petitioner and Razul are attending a committee hearing.
The assembly held a session in defiance of petitioners advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum. The
speaker Pro-Tempo race was authorized to preside in the session. On motion to declare the seat of the speaker vacant in
attendance, the assemblyman voted in the affirmative, hence, the chain declared said seat of the speaker vacant.
The petitioner them want to court prying that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
respondents during the session rall and void and holding the election of petitioner as speaker of the legislative assembly
or Batasang Pampook Reg.XII held on March 12,1987 and subsisting and making the injunction permanent.


ISSUE:

Won the expulsion of the petitioner has made the case most and academic
What is the extent of self government given to the two Autonomous government of Region IX and XII