Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees Claim Damages should be Stated in the BODY and

PRAYER of pleadings
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against City
Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester.
Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain
transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount
was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same
complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the
allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it
ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the
amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing
in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be
amended. So the any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is
void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited.
The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is
an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of the
complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the
proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court
ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should
specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.











J u l 1 7 , 2 0 1 2
Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest


G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint
for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case
against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs, etc.,
however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the
complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP
210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket
fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay
the correct or sufficient docket fees?

YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the
docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that,
unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.







G.R. No. L-45809 December 12, 1986
SOCORRO SEPULVEDA LAWAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, [as Judge, CFI, Cebu, Branch VIII], and
PACIFICO PELAEZ, respondents.
Jesus Yray for petitioner.
Teodoro Almase for respondents.

FERIA, J .:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari under, Rule 65 of said Rules against
respondent Judge Bernardo L. Salas of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The antecedent facts
are briefly as follows:
Private respondent Pacifico Pelaez filed a Complaint on December 6, 1972 against petitioner's
father, Pedro Sepulveda, for ownership and partition of certain parcels of land. Defendant Pedro
Sepulveda filed his Answer dated December 31, 1972 resisting the claim and raising the special
defenses of laches, prescription and failure to ventilate in a previous special proceeding. During the
presentation of evidence for the plaintiff, the defendant died on March 25, 1975. On May 21, 1975,
counsels for the deceased defendant filed a notice of death wherein were enumerated the thirteen
children and surviving spouse of the deceased.
On May 5, 1975, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration and she was appointed judicial
administratrix of the estate of her late father in July, 1976.
At the hearing of the case on November 27, 1975, Attys. Domingo Antigua and Serafin Branzuela,
former counsels for the deceased defendant, manifested in open court that with the death of their
client, their contract with him was also terminated and none of the thirteen children nor the surviving
spouse had renewed the contract, but instead they had engaged the services of other lawyers in the
intestate proceedings.
Notwithstanding the manifestation of the former counsels of the deceased defendant, the respondent
trial judge set the case for hearing on January 13, 1976 and sent the notice of hearing to said
counsels.
On January 13, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued three orders. The first order substituted the
heirs of the deceased defendant, namely, his thirteen children and surviving spouse, as defendants;
the second order authorized Atty. Teodoro Almase, counsel for the plaintiff, to present his evidence
in the absence of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela and the third order treated the case submitted for
decision, after the plaintiff had presented his evidence and rested his case, and directed that said
counsels and the fourteen heirs of the deceased defendant be furnished copies thereof.
On January 28, 1976, the respondent trial judge rendered a decision against the heirs of the
deceased defendant.
On February 19, 1976, ten of the children of the deceased defendant, who apparently did not know
that a decision had already been rendered, filed an Answer in-substitution of the deceased
defendant through their counsel Atty. Jesus Yray. This was denied admission by the respondent trial
judge for being already moot and academic because of the earlier decision.
On March 9, 1976, the widow and two other children of the deceased defendant, through their
counsel Atty. Delfin Quijano, filed a motion for substitution and for reconsideration of the decision
dated January 28, 1976. On April 7, 1976, the respondent trial judge issued an order setting aside
his decision and setting the case in the calendar for cross-examination of the plaintiff, Pacifico
Pelaez, with a proviso that said order was applicable only to the three heirs who had filed the motion.
On July 14, 1976, the respondent trial judge lifted the order setting aside his decision, despite the
verbal petition for postponement of the hearing made by one of the three heirs on the ground of the
absence of their counsel.
On July 9, 1976, petitioner, who had been appointed judicial administratrix of the estate of the
deceased defendant and who was one of the heirs who had filed an Answer on February 19, 1976,
filed a motion to intervene and/or substitute the deceased defendant. On August 25, 1976, the
respondent trial judge denied the motion for the reason that the decision had already become final.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action of certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the
proceedings in the respondent trial court. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
certiorari. Hence, the present appeal.
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 16 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity, or incompetency of party. Whenever a party to a
pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney
to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name
and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.
The former counsels for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda, complied with this rule by filing
a notice of death on May 21, 1975. They also correctly manifested in open court at the hearing of the
case on November 27, 1975, that with the death of their client their contract with him was also
terminated and none of the heirs of the deceased had renewed the contract, and the heirs had
instead engaged the services of other lawyers in the intestate proceedings.
Both the respondent trial judge and the Court of Appeals erred in considering the former counsels of
the deceased defendant as counsels for the heirs of the deceased. The statement in the decision of
the Court of Appeals that "the appearance of the lawyers of their deceased father in court on
January 13, 1976 (Annex K) carries the presumption that they were authorized by the heirs of the
deceased defendant" is erroneous. As this Court held in People vs. Florendo (77 Phil. 16), "the
attorneys for the offended party ceased to be the attorneys for the deceased upon the death of the
latter, the principal. " Moreover, such a presumption was not warranted in view of the manifestation
of said lawyers in open court on November 27, 1975 that they were not representing the heirs of the
deceased defendant.
Consequently, when on the same date, November 27, 1975, the respondent trial judge issued an
order setting the continuation of the trial of the case on January 13, 1976, with notices sent to Atty.
Almase for the plaintiff and Attys. Antigua and Branzuela for the deceased defendant, he acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
It was only at the hearing on January 13, 1976 that the respondent trial judge issued an order
substituting the deceased defendant with his fourteen heirs. This was followed with an order
authorizing counsel for the plaintiff to present his evidence in the absence of Attys. Antigua and
Branzuela, and lastly, an order treating the case as submitted for decision.
In the order of the respondent trial judge dated November 10, 1976, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order denying her motion for intervention (Annex 1 of the Comment), mention
was made of the delayed arrival of Attys. Antigua and Branzuela at the hearing on January 13, 1976
and of their being allowed to cross-examine the plaintiff himself.
The refusal of said former counsels of the deceased defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff was
justified
... in view of the intervening event of appellant's death and the interposition of the equally
established principle that the relationship of attorney and client is terminated by the death of
the client, as acknowledged by respondent court itself as well as respondents. In the
absence of a retainer from the heirs or authorized representatives of his deceased defendant
the attorney would have no further power or authority to appear or take any further action in
the case, save to inform the court of the client's death and take the necessary steps to
safeguard the decedent's rights in the case. (Vda. de Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, May 26,
1981, 104 SCRA 534, 540)
Moreover, as above stated, petitioner had as early as May 5, 1975 filed a petition for letters of
administration, and the same was granted in July, 1975.
Section 17 of Rule 3 provides as follows:
Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shag
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may
be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
de ceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
As this Court has held:
... Under the Rule, it is the court that is called upon, after notice of a party's death and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, to order upon proper notice the legal representative of the
deceased to appear within a period of 30 days or such time as it may grant. Since no
administrator of the estate of the deceased appellant had yet been appointed as the same
was still pending determination in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the motion of
the deceased's counsel for the suspension of the running of the period within which to file
appellant's brief was well-taken. More, under the Rule, it should have set a period for the
substitution of the deceased party with her legal representative or heirs, failing which, the
court is called upon to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased at the cost of the deceased's estate, and such representative
shall then 'immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased.
Respondent court gravely erred in not following the Rule and requiring the appearance of the
legal representative of the deceased and instead dismissing the appeal of the deceased who
yet had to be substituted in the pending appeal Thus, it has been held that when a party dies
in an action that survives, and no order is issued by the court for the appearance of the legal
representative or of the heirs of the deceased in substitution of the deceased, and as a
matter of fact no such substitution has ever been effected, the trial held by the court without
such legal representatives or heirs and the judgment rendered after such trial are null and
void because the court acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives
or of the heirs upon whom the trial and the judgment would be binding. (Ordoveza vs.
Raymundo, 63 Phil 275 [1936]; Obut vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 70 SCRA 546) (Vda. de
Haberer vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 541.
Under the said Rule, priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor
or administrator of his estate. It is only in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an
executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate, that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be
substituted for the deceased.
In the case at bar, in view of the pendency of Special Proceeding No. 37-SF Intestate Estate of
Pedro Sepulveda, and the pending application of petitioner to be appointed judicial administratrix of
the estate, the respondent trial judge should have awaited the appointment of petitioner and granted
her motion to substitute the deceased defendant.
While the lower courts correctly held that the death of Pedro Sepulveda did not obliterate his verified
Answer to the Complaint filed by private respondent and that the Answer filed by the ten heirs and
the Answer filed by the Administratrix were both unnecessary, the said heirs or the administratrix
could, with leave of court, file an Amended Answer.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the proceedings conducted by the respondent trial
judge after the death of the deceased defendant are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed; the petition for certiorari is granted;
petitioner is ordered substituted for the deceased defendant, Pedro Sepulveda; and the proceedings
conducted by the respondent trial judge after the death of the deceased defendant, including the
decision rendered by him on January 28, 1976, are set aside; with costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.








G.R. No. L-11567 July 17, 1958
ARSENIO FERRERIA, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MANUELA IBARRA VDA. DE GONZALES, ET AL., respondents-appellants.
F. M. Ejercito for respondents.
Pedro R. Manago for petitioner.
MONTEMAYOR, J .:
This is quite an old case, about a landlord and some of her tenants, which had its origin in a
complaint filed by some of said tenants was back on February 3, 1947. The thing involved is about
twenty cavans of palay. But under the present law, the appeal from a resolution of the Court of
Agrarian Relations had to come directly to this Tribunal.
Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales presumably owned a parcel of land in Umingan, Pangasinan,
cultivated by tenants. After the sharing of the crop for the agricultural year 1946-47 by her overseer,
Luis Tecson, a number of the tenants, dissatisfied with their share on the basis of 60-40, claiming
that they were entitled to 70% of said crop, filed complaints with the Tenancy Division of the
Department of Justice. It would appear, however, that only tenant Arsenio Ferreria continued with his
complaint, his co-complainants having withdrawn theirs. Ferreria's complaint was filed not only
against Manuela Ibarra, but also against the overseer, Luis Tecson. During the pendency of the
case, Manuela died on November 27, 1948. Counsel for Ferreria filed a petition for substitution
which was granted by order of the Department of Justice, dated December 9, 1948, which also set
the case for hearing on January 6, 1949.
The said order of December 9, 1948, at the bottom thereof, made mention of Manolita Gonzales as
residing at 272 Buendia St., Rizal City. The return of service of said order supposedly by the Sheriff
(Annex C), shows that a copy of the same was left with one Aurora Gonzales, niece of Manolita
Gonzales, apparently living in said address. It may be stated in passing that Manolita Gonzales
claims that she did not own the land in question; that her only right and interest in it was as an heir,
being one of the five surviving children of Manuel.
The scheduled hearing was held in the absence of Manolita Gonzales. Decision was finally rendered
in the case on May 18, 1951. On May 23, 1952, the Court of Industrial Relations, then in charge of
tenancy cases, issued a writ of execution of the judgment, the dispositive part of said decision in part
reading as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the respondent landlord and/or her duly authorized
representative is/are hereby ordered to deliver to the petitioner-tenant Arsenio C. Ferreria the
balance of 20.6 cavanes of palay equivalent to 10% of his share to complete his 70%
participation in the crop harvested for the agricultural year 1946-1947, or its money value at
the Naric price of palay in the locality, within 15 days from receipt of this decision.
Another portion of the dispositive part reproduced, states that the complaints of the other
complainants were dismissed.
On receipt of a copy of this writ of execution, Luis Tecson and Manolita Gonzales each filed a
petition to set aside said writ. Luis claimed that it was true that he was an overseer of Manuela
Ibarra, but that upon her death on November 27, 1948, the possession that he held of the land as
overseer passed on to the administrator of the estate; that thereafter, he no longer had anything to
do with said property, and that in the distribution of the crop for 1946-1947, the share of Manuela
was duly delivered by him to her, and that any claim by Ferreria should be filed with and against her
estate. On her part, Manolita claimed that she was surprised to receive a copy of the writ of
execution because she was never made a party to the case and had never been served any process
or notice of hearing therein, and that an examination of the record of the case would show that from
the inception of the case up to the rendering of the decision, her name was never mentioned by any
of the parties, and that it was a surprise to find her name included in the title of the decision as one
of the defendants, although the body of said decision never mentioned her name; that although she
was one of the five heirs of Manuel Ibarra, she, Manolita, was not the actual owner of the estate
which was then under probate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal; and that if Ferreria
had any claim against the estate, he should file the same to be passed upon by the probate court.
Both Luis and Manolita asked that the writ of execution be set aside.
It would seem that nothing was done about the petitions, and after the creation of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Judge Tomas P. Panganiban finally took action on the same, and by order of
August 23, 1956, overruled the same, holding that under the law creating the Court of Agrarian
Relations, said court had exclusive and original jurisdiction to try, investigate, and settle all cases,
matters and disputes arising between landlord and tenant, and that the case at bar was purely a
dispute between landlord and tenant. Both petitioners Luis and Manolita asked for reconsideration of
the order, Manolita emphasizing her contention that she was deprived of her day in court due to the
failure of plaintiff Ferreria to make the proper substitution, citing Rule 3, Section 17, above-
reproduced. In a resolution dated October 29, 1956, the Agrarian Court held that Manuela Ibarra had
been duly substituted by Manolita Gonzales, and that service of the order of substitution was duly
served upon her. We reproduce the pertinent portion of the resolution:
Anent the first ground, it appears that respondent Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales was duly
substituted upon her death by Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong in a petition filed by
counsel for the petitioners on December 9, 1948, and granted by the representative of the
former Tenancy Division, now Court of Agrarian Relations, on the same date. A copy of the
order granting the petition for substitution was sent to Manolita Gonzales Vda. de
Carungcong, through the Chief of Police of Rizal City, by registered mail on December 9,
1948. Therefore, respondent Manolita was duly notified of the hearing set on January 6,
January 26, March 26, April 21, May 7, June 7, and July 1, all in the year 1949, but these
hearings had to be cancelled due to the absence of the respondents on January 6, 1949 and
their several motions for postponement on the subsequent dates. On July 2, 1949, the
hearing proceeded in the absence of the respondents during which petitioners presented
their evidence. Notwithstanding several chances given to the respondents to present their
evidence on August 5, 1949 and September 20, 1949, respondents persistently failed to
appear. However, on February 3, 1950, counsel for the respondents cross examined one
witness of the petitioners and finally, on March 4, 1950 respondents presented their
evidence, with the exception of Manolita Gonzales de Carungcong (who) never appeared.
The Agrarian Court further said that if Manolita did not care to appear before the former Tenancy
Division, she cannot now complain that she was deprived of her day in court; and that as to Luis
Tecson, since the decision orders "the respondent landlord and/or her duly authorized
representative" to deliver to the petitioner Ferreria the balance of 20.6 cavans of palay, Luis Tecson,
as overseer and duly authorized representative of the landlord, must comply with the decision of the
court, and that his counsel's contention that the property involved was within the jurisdiction of the
probate court was incorrect, for the reason that the palay ordered to be delivered, properly belonged
to Ferreria as his share in the crop and, therefore, it was not part of the estate under administration,
neither was it a claim against the estate.
Both Manolita and Luis have filed the present petition to review the order of August 23, 1956,
denying the petitions to lift the writ of execution and the order of October 29, 1956, denying the
petition for reconsideration. The petition was given due course and appellee Ferreria was required to
answer, which he did. Thereafter, both parties filed memoranda in support of their contentions.
The first question to be determined is whether or not there was a valid notification or service of the
order granting the petition for substitution on Manolita Gonzales. It will be remembered that a copy of
the order was never served on Manolita personally, but upon her niece, Aurora Gonzales. In other
words it was substituted service. Section 8, Rule 7, regarding the service of summons, provides as
follows:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be promptly served as required in the
preceding, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing there or by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof or upon the defendant by registered mail.
As to the service of court orders, we have Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 27, which read as follows:
SEC. 3. Modes of service. Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and
other papers, shall be made either personally or by mail.
SEC. 4. Personal service. Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a
copy to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person
having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, then by
leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the
party's or attorney's residence, if known, with a person of sufficient discretion to receive the
same.
We find that under none of these above-quoted provisions of the Rules of Court had Manolita been
duly served with the order of substitution. According to her, at the time, she was not living at 272
Buendia St., where copy of the order was left with Aurora who lived in that place. The rules require
that the copy should be left at the residence or office of the one served, or with someone living
therein. Furthermore, Manolita claims that she never received the copy left with her niece and that
they were not living together.
The other question is whether or not there had been a valid substitution. Rule 3, Section 17, of the
Rule of Court provides as follows:
SEC. 17. Death of party. After a party die and the claim in not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the decease
within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for
and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian litem for the
minor heirs.
In the present case, there is no question that there had been no court order for the legal
representative of Manuela Ibarra to appear, nor had any such legal representative ever appeared in
court to be substituted for the deceased; neither had complainant Ferreria ever procured the
appointment of such legal representative of the deceased, nor had the heirs of the deceased,
including Manolita ever asked to be allowed to be substituted for the deceased Manuela. As a result,
the hearings were held without the presence of Manolita Gonzales. True, Atty. Emilio Fernandez, it
seems, originally represented Manuela and apparently, Luis Tecson, and continued within their
representation, but Manolita now argues that with the death of Manuela Ibarra, his relationship as
counsel for Manuela ceased, and what is more, he was never authorized to appear for Manolita
Gonzales. Inasmuch as Manolita Gonzales was never validly served a copy of the order granting the
substitution and that, furthermore, a valid substitution was never effected, consequently, the court
never acquired jurisdiction over Manolita Gonzales for the purpose of making her a party to the case
and making the decision binding upon her, either personally or as legal representative of the estate
of her mother Manuela.
However, we agree with the Agrarian Court in so far as it holds that it has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving tenancy. The fact that the landlord dies not mean that the relation of landlord and
tenant ends, because the estate continues to be the landlord and if, as in this case, it is found that
during the lifetime of Manuela Ibarra, the sharing of crop for the agricultural year 1946-1947 should
have been on the basis of 70-30, instead of 60-40, and therefore, the owed Ferreria 10% of said
crop, then said obligation remained a charge on her estate after she died and there was no
necessity for the tenant to file a claim for this 10% with the probate court in charge of the estate.
As to Luis Tecson, we agree with him in his contention that in the sharing of the crop for the
agricultural year 1946-1947, he acted merely as an overseer and that he gave the share
corresponding to the owner to Manuela, and that since then, specially after her death, he had
nothing more to do with the land. It is clear that the obligation to deliver to tenant Ferreria 10% of
that crop of the agricultural year, should it be later found that the basis should have been 70-30,
instead of 60-40, rests with the estate of Manuela through the administrator and not with Luis
Tecson, whose relation as overseer had long ceased.
In connection with the basis of sharing of the crop for the agricultural year 1946-1947, Manolita in
her pleadings claims that her mother furnished the work animals, seeds, and other facilities used in
the cultivation and that consequently, the share should have been on the 50-50 basis. Ferreria
claims the contrary. These conflicting claims should be finally determined by the Agrarian Court.
In view of the foregoing, we hereby set aside not only the writ of execution, the resolution of the
Agrarian Court and its order denying the motion for reconsideration of the same, now sought to be
reviewed, but also the original decision of the Tenancy Division for lack of jurisdiction. The case is
hereby ordered remanded to the Court of Agrarian Relations for further proceedings, in which
proceedings, the Agrarian Court may bear in mind and consider the rulings and holdings contained
in this decision, specially with regards to substitution of parties and the liability of Luis Tecson in
relation to any palay which Ferreria may be found to be entitled to. No costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.



G.R. No. L-18707 February 28, 1967
AGUSTIN O. CASEAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CONCEPCION SANCHEZ VDA. DE ROSALES (Substituted by her heirs), ROMEO S.
ROSALES, ET AL.,defendants-appellees.
Juan L. Pastrana for plaintiff-appellant.
Francisco Ro. Cupin and Wenceslao B. Resales for defendants-appellees.
REGALA, J .:
This is an appeal from the order of dismissal entered by the Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil
Case No. 780, entitled Agustin Caseas vs. Concepcion Sanchez Vda. de Rosales, et al.
On August 21, 1952, Rodolfo Araas and Agustin O. Caseas filed with the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, under Civil Case No. 261, a complaint for specific performance and enforcement of their
alleged right under a certain deed of sale, and damages against the spouses Jose A. Rosales and
Concepcion Sanchez. They alleged that sometime in 1939, Agustin O. Caseas acquired from
Rodolfo Araas under a deed of assignment, the latter's rights and interest over a parcel of land
covering an area of more or less than 2,273 square meters and designated as Lot No. 445-A of the
Butuan Cadastre No. 84 (Psd. 4943); that Rodolfo Araas in turn, acquired the said property from
the spouses Jose A. Rosales and Concepcion Sanchez under a deed of sale executed on March 18,
1939 under the terms of which, however, the actual transfer of the aforesaid land unto the vendee
would be made only on or before February 18, 1941; and that despite the above documented
transactions, and despite the arrival of the stipulated period for the execution of the final deed of
transfer, the vendors spouses refused to fulfill their obligation to effect such transfer of the said lot to
the vendee, Rodolfo Araas or his assignee, the herein appellant, Agustin O. Caseas. Thus, the
principal relief prayed for in the above complaint was for an order directing the defendants-spouses
to "execute a deed of absolute sale of the property described in the complaint in favor of the
assignee, plaintiff Agustin O. Caseas.
After the defendants-spouses had filed their answer to the above complaint, but before trial, the
counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice to the trial court that plaintiff Rodolfo Araas and defendant
Jose A. Rosales had both died. In view of the said manifestation, the lower court, in an order dated
April 27, 1956, directed, the surviving plaintiff, Agustin O. Caseas, to amend the complaint to effect
the necessary substitution of parties thereon. The said surviving plaintiff, however, failed altogether
to comply with the aforementioned order of April 27, 1956 to the end that on July 18, 1957, the lower
court issued the following order:
Until this date no amended complaint was filed by the attorney for the plaintiffs. This shows
abandonment and lack of interest on the part of the plaintiffs. This being an old case, for
failure on the part of the counsel for the plaintiffs to comply with the order of this Court the
same is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.
As no appeal was taken from the above order of dismissal, the same, in due time, became final.
On April 18, 1960, Agustin O. Caseas, the same plaintiff Caseas in civil Case No. 261, filed with
the same Court of First Instance of Agusan, under Civil Case No. 780, another complaint against the
widow and heirs of the late Jose A. Rosales "to quiet, and for reconveyance of, title to real property,
with damages." This suit referred itself to the very same property litigated under Civil Case No. 261
and asserted exactly the same allegations as those made in the former complaint, to wit: "that the
plaintiff (Agustin O. Caseas) has acquired the above-described property by purchase from its
previous owner, Rodolfo Araas now deceased, ...; and said Rodolfo Aranas had in turn acquired
the same property by virtue of another deed of sale executed by Jose A. Rosales, now also
deceased;" (Par. 3, Complaint) "that under the terms and stipulations of paragraph 2 of the deed of
sale (between Rosales and Araas) ... Jose A. Rosales was to hold title to the land in question in
favor of Rodolfo Araas or the latter's signs and successors in interest for a period of (5) years from
February 19, 1936, at the expiration of which said Jose A. Rosales was to execute a document
conveying absolutely the title to the land in question in favor of the aforementioned Rodolfo Araas
or his assigns and successors in interest" (Par. 9, Complaint) ; "despite which obligation the
defendants refused, even after the expiration of the stipulated period to "convey title to the land in
question and to execute the corresponding document covering the same." (Par. 12, Complaint) In
the premises, the plaintiff prayed for judgment "quieting the title of the plaintiff to the land in question
and ordering the defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the same in favor of the said
plaintiff" plus costs and damages.
To the above complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, namely: res
judicata, prescription, lack of cause of action, failure to include indispensable parties, and that the
contract subject of the complaint was void ab initio. After the plaintiff had filed his opposition to the
above motion, the lower court issued the order under appeal dismissing the complaint. Of the above
grounds, though, the lower court relied alone on the defendants' plea of res judicata, lack of cause of
action and prescription. The material portion of this order of dismissal reads:
The Court, however, believes that this action is barred by prior judgment. The order of
dismissal in Civil Case No. 261 was already final and has the effect of an adjudication upon
the merits. The parties in Civil Case No. 261 and in this case are substantially the same; the
subject matter is the same and there is identity of cause of action. All the elements of res
judicata are therefore present.1wph1.t
Moreover, the complaint states no cause of action if its purpose is to quiet title, because the
plaintiff has as yet no title to the land in question. Precisely, this action is brought in order to
acquire or secure title by compelling the defendants to execute a deed of sale in favor of the
plaintiff. However, this action for specific performance cannot also prosper because being
based upon an agreement in writing it is already barred by prescription as the period of ten
years has long expired when the present complaint was filed.
The appeal at bar assails the above determination that Civil Case No. 780 is barred by a prior
judgment and by prescription and that the same states no cause of action. It is on these issues,
therefore, that this Court shall dispose of this appeal.
We find for the appellant.
When certain of the parties to Civil Case No. 261 died and due notice thereof was given to the trial
court, it devolved on the said court to order, not the amendment of the complaint, but the
appearance of the legal representatives of the deceased in accordance with the procedure and
manner outlined in Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 17. Death of Party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may
order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
In the case of Barrameda vs. Barbara, 90 Phil. 718, this court held that an order to amend the
complaint, before the proper substitution of parties as directed by the aforequoted rule has been
effected, is void and imposes upon the plaintiff no duty to comply therewith to the end that an order
dismissing the said complaint, for such non-compliance, would similarly be void. In a subsequent
case, Ferriera et al. vs. Gonzalez, et al., G.R. No. L-11567, July 17, 1958, this court affirmed a
similar conclusion on the determination that the continuance of a proceedings during the pendency
of which a party thereto dies, without such party having been validly substituted in accordance with
the rules, amounts to a "lack of jurisdiction."
The facts of this case fit four squares into the Barrameda case abovecited, save for the minor
variance that in the former two of the litigants died while only one predeceased the case in
Barrameda. Here, as in Barrameda, during the pendency of civil case, notice was given to the trial
court of the deaths of one of the plaintiffs and one of the defendants in it. Instead of ordering the
substitution of the deceased's legal representatives in accordance with Rule 3, section 17 of the
Rules of Court, the trial court directed the surviving plaintiff to amend the complaint and when the
latter failed to comply therewith, the said court dismissed the complaint for such non-compliance. We
must hold, therefore, as We did in Barrameda that inasmuch as there was no obligation on the part
of the plaintiff-appellant herein to amend his complaint in Civil Case No. 261, any such imposition
being void, his failure to comply with such an order did not justify the dismissal of his complaint.
Grounded as it was upon a void order, the dismissal was itself void.
Consequently, as the dismissal of Civil Case No. 261 was void, it clearly may not be asserted to bar
the subsequent prosecution of the same or identical claim.
Finally, We find ourselves unable to share the appellees' view that the appellant's complaint under
Civil Case No. 780 failed to state a sufficient cause of action. A cause of action is an act or omission
of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other (Ma-ao Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79
Phil. 666) and both these elements were clearly alleged in the aforesaid complaint.
Insofar as the issue of prescription is concerned, this Court is of the view that it should defer
resolution on it until after Civil Case No. 780 shall have been tried on the merits, considering that
one of the defenses set up by the appellant against the said issue is the existence of a trust
relationship over the property in dispute.
In view of all the foregoing, the order dated January 20, 1961 dismissing Civil Case No. 780 is
hereby set aside and the said case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for trial on the merits.
Costs against the appellees.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.

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